Joint Professional Military Education: Time for a New Goal

A Monograph
by

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14. ABSTRACT

The character of war is changing. A strong professional military education system in the interwar period successfully navigated the U.S. military through major changes in early 20th century warfare. In 2003 that same dedication is necessary to prevail in equally dynamic times.Only this time, a service centric education system is falling short of the mark. The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA) was a call to jointness, an attempt to correct the overwhelming service centric nature of the U.S. military. In 1988, the Panel on Military Education of the One Hundredth Congress of the Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives was commissioned with Congressman Ike Skelton as chairman. Together the GNA and Skelton Commission succeeded in creating a force substantially more joint than the one of 1986. However, they may have unintentionally institutionalized a legacy that will inhibit future progress. The goal of this monograph is first to assess the intent of the GNA and Joint Vision (JV) 2020 and determine if the current JPME system can meet that intent. Next, this paper will attempt to determine what JPME's primary task and purpose should be and what form or structure is necessary to achieve it. It does not address curriculum, fiscal issues or service PME, except for its relationship to JPME. Although not profound, the key conclusion and central issue of this project is jointness as a culture. Therefore, any education system designed to support the creation of a truly joint force as described by JV2020, must support a joint culture. JPME's primary or essential task is the education of professional officers in the application of military power. JPME's foundation and primary purpose should be to develop, foster and enhance the joint culture. This requires a framework which provides as much interaction 'as possible' between officers of all services and ranks, early and continuously throughout their career. This is best accomplished by creating a single in-residence university for military and national security studies. A true university, that offers undergraduate, graduate and doctorate programs and degrees. The university campus should hold all the joint and service primary, intermediate and senior level core colleges, as well as, select precommissioning programs. The self-defeating concept of jointness from a service perspective should be eliminated and genuine joint education instituted for all officers from precommissioning to retirement. A joint force requires a joint culture if it is to survive and be effective. This requires people to interact and share attitudes, values and ideas. Genuine joint education can be a powerful catalyst to achieving the joint vision, but it requires time and effort in order to be successful.

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Abstract

JOINT PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION: TIME FOR A NEW GOAL by LCDR Robert W. Lyonnais, United States Navy, 65 pages.

The character of war is changing. A strong professional military education system in the interwar period successfully navigated the U.S. military through major changes in early 20th century warfare. In 2003 that same dedication is necessary to prevail in equally dynamic times. Only this time, a service centric education system is falling short of the mark.

The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA) was a call to jointness, an attempt to correct the overwhelming service centric nature of the U.S. military. In 1988, the Panel on Military Education of the One Hundredth Congress of the Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives was commissioned with Congressman Ike Skelton as chairman. Together the GNA and Skelton Commission succeeded in creating a force substantially more joint than the one of 1986. However, they may have unintentionally institutionalized a legacy that will inhibit future progress. The establishment of the Joint Specialty Officer (JSO) and the concept of joint education from a service perspective initiated a movement that has resulted in Joint Professional Military Education's (JPME) subjugation to Service PME and the near universal institutionalization of the perception that jointness is a qualification. Joint education from a service perspective is an invalid concept. The result of a compromise designed to reconcile the constraints of the time. The argument is not whether the JSO was appropriate or necessary in 1986 to force the services to accept jointness, but rather it is a concept which has achieved its purpose and outlived its usefulness.

The goal of this monograph is first to assess the intent of the GNA and Joint Vision (JV) 2020 and determine if the current JPME system can meet that intent. Next, this paper will attempt to determine what JPME's primary task and purpose should be and what form or structure is necessary to achieve it. It does not address curriculum, fiscal issues or service PME, except for its relationship to JPME

Although not profound, the key conclusion and central issue of this project is jointness as a culture. Therefore, any education system designed to support the creation of a truly joint force as described by JV2020, must support a joint culture. JPME's primary or essential task is the education of professional officers in the application of military power. JPME's foundation and primary purpose should be to develop, foster and enhance the joint culture. This requires a framework which provides as much interaction 'as possible' between officers of all services and ranks, early and continuously throughout their career. This is best accomplished by creating a single in-residence university for military and national security studies. A true university, that offers undergraduate, graduate and doctorate programs and degrees. The university campus should hold all the joint and service primary, intermediate and senior level core colleges, as well as, select precommissioning programs. The self-defeating concept of jointness from a service perspective should be eliminated and genuine joint education instituted for all officers from pre-commissioning to retirement.

A joint force requires a joint culture if it is to survive and be effective. This requires people to interact and share attitudes, values and ideas. Genuine joint education can be a powerful catalyst to achieving the joint vision, but it requires time and effort in order to be successful.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 1
BACKGROUND 6
GNA 6
The Skelton Report 10
What Exactly is the 'J' in JPME? 19
ANALYSIS 32
To Meet an Intent 32
Chicken or the Egg— Primacy 36
CONCLUSIONS 39
RECOMMENDATIONS 43
APPENDIX A 49
APPENDIX B 57
APPENDIX C 59
BIBLIOGRAPHY 61

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The advent of formal military education in historical terms is a relatively recent event. Although many great military leaders of the past understood the importance of studying war, there were no formal programs in which to pursue this education. For many, war was merely a part time profession. The creation of standing professional armies eventually brought forth the creation of professional military institutions. Originally focused on the technical arms, artillery, fortification and seamanship, it expanded during the enlightenment to include theory and history.[1] Its more or less current form came about with the creation of the general staff. The most celebrated was the German Krieg's Academy.[2] The subjects, concepts and methodologies have changed and evolved over time to match the changing character and national views of contemporary warfare but the general service centric nature remains.

Despite its title, the establishment of the Army Industrial College[3] in 1924 was the advent of joint education in the United States.[4] The perceived success of this school during World War II, as well as, the early recognition that war was a joint endeavor and required the appropriate officer education resulted in the founding of the Army - Navy Staff College (ANSCOL) in 1943[5], the Joint Chiefs of Staff's "General Plan for Postwar Joint Education of the Armed Forces", and

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[1] Martin L. Van Crevald, *The Training of Officers* (New York: The Free Press, 1990), 7-18. Van Crevald places the origins of professional military education no earlier than the 18th century. He provides a broad overview of the origins and focus of military training and education from antiquity to the modern era.
[2] Ibid., 21.
[3] Francis W. Hearn, *The Industrial College of the Armed Forces: Contextual Analysis of an Evolving Mission 1924-1994* (Blacksburg: Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1997), ii. The Army Industrial College became the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) in 1946.
[4] VanCrevald, 64. VanCrevald indicates that the "smashing success" of this school as a joint institution was accidental, but had much to do with its (a) association with business, at the time considered a prestigious occupation, (b) its establishment of useful contacts within the departments of state and treasury, (c) as a new school, officers approached it with an open mind and (d) primarily non-military subjects allowed the Air Corps, Army and Navy to relax mutual antagonisms and develop mutual understanding and ideas.
[5] Anonymous, "Golden Aniversary" (*Joint Force Quarterly*, Summer 1996), 108. The National War College (NWC) and the Joint Forces Staff College (est 1946) trace their roots to ANSCOL.

the founding of the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC) in 1946.[6] Unfortunately jointness in the absence of an immediate credible threat can quickly degenerate into interservice rivalries and competition for resources. Jointness, its adherents, and ultimately any real manifestation of interservice cooperation declined. Despite this early recognition, a truly joint education system has not been established.

Operations Urgent Fury and Eagle Claw vividly displayed the service centralism of the U.S. military and prompted Congress to intervene with the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA). The GNA was a call to jointness, an attempt to correct this shortcoming, but in the process might have unintentionally established the greatest obstacle to Joint Profession Military Education (JPME) and a joint force—the Joint Specialty Officer (JSO)[7]. By doing so, it initiated a movement that has resulted in the establishment and the almost universal acceptance of a system founded on the perception of jointness as a qualification and the subservience of JPME[8] to Service Professional Military Education (PME).[9] It will not be argued whether the JSO was an

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[6] David P. Mullen, *Joint Training at the Junior Officer Level: Are We Doing the Right Thing for our Future Leaders* (Maxwell AFB: Air University, 1999), 11-20. and Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives One Hundred First Congress, First Session, Congressman Ike Skelton (Chairman), *Report of the Panel on Military Education of the One Hundredth Congress of the Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives* [Skelton Report] (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), 43-52. provide excellent discussions on the evolution of JPME. AFSC was renamed Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC) in 2000.

[7] JSOs are officers designated by the Secretary of Defense, with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), who are educated and trained in joint matters and have completed the requirements for JSO designation. To qualify as a JSO nominee the officer must complete JPME Phase I and Phase II, served or serving a full tour in a joint duty assignment and nominated by a Service Secretary. See CJCS, *Instruction 1800.1A Officer Professional Military Education Policy* (Washington D.C.: Officer of the CJCS, 01 Decemeber 2000), A-C-1. for full explanation.

[8] "JPME is that portion of PME that supports fulfillment of the educational requirement for joint officer management." CJCS, *OPMEP*, A-B-1-2. There are two types of JPME; JPME from a joint perspective and JPME from a service perspective. The later is taught at the service precommissioning, primary, intermediate and senior level courses, schools, academies and colleges. JPME Phase I is joint education from a service perspective. Credit for completing Phase I is awarded upon success completion of any of the CJCS accredited Service Intermediate or Senior Level Colleges. JPME Phase II is joint education from a joint perspective and credit for completing this phase is awarded upon successful completion of any of the CJCS accredited Joint Intermediate or Senior Level Colleges. Some of the Joint Colleges award both phase I and II credits.

[9] "PME entails the systematic instruction of professionals in subjects enhancing their knowledge of the science and art of war. The PME system should produce: (1) Officers educated in the profession of arms. (2) Critical thinkers who view military affairs in the broadest context and are capable of identifying and evaluating likely changes and associated responses affecting the employment of US military forces. (3)

appropriate concept in 1986 to force the services to accept jointness, but rather it is a concept that has achieved its purpose and outlived its usefulness.

Although there is disagreement on what JPME should look like and how it should be implemented there is also much agreement. The importance of PME in America has never been seriously challenged. The Skelton report states PME is vital to national security[10] and history lends support to this strong assertion. During the fiscal austerity of the interwar period of the 1920s and 30s, the United States Navy (USN) and the United States Army (USA) made a conscious decision to maintain its officer education systems at the expense of many other programs even readiness.[11] This emphasis on education has been lauded as a key factor in the American WWII victories.[12]

There is also general agreement that JPME must be rigorous, obtained as early as possible in an officer's career, studied by all officers not only the ones selected for joint assignments, officers are most effective when they are competent in their service and finally that the current system is not as effective as it could or should be.

The conflicts arise during execution. Concepts must be turned into action and things like 'as early as possible' require an actual time. These conflicts appear to have been reconciled by compromise. Compromise is not always good. Occasionally it can lead to the institutionalization of well intentioned but harmful concepts such as "jointness from a service perspective"[13] or the

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Senior officers who can develop and execute national military strategies that effectively employ the Armed Forces in concert with other instruments of national power to achieve the goals of national security strategy and policy." CJCS, *OPMEP*, A-B-1

[10] Skelton Report, 17.

[11] The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Group on Professional Military Education, Dick Cheney (Chair), *Professional Military Education: An Asset for Peace and Progress* (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 1997), 13-14.

[12] References of this position are numerous of which the following are well articulated: Williamson Murray, "Remarks at the Conference on Military Education for the 21st Century Warrior" (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 1998); Skelton Report, 12.; Leonard D. Holder and Williamson Murray, "Prospects for Military Education" (*Joint Force Quarterly*, Spring 1998), 81-90.; and Richard A. Chilcoat, "The Revolution in Military Education" (*Joint Force Quarterly*, Summer 1999), 59.

[13] Skelton Report, 51. "The first type is joint education in *service* PME schools. Title IV requires a strengthened focus on joint matters and on preparation for joint duty assignments. This education is for *all*

acceptance of procedure over substance. Many of the JPME problems can be attributed to a misunderstanding, which has construed jointness as a qualification with the JSO as its quantifiable, enforceable measure.

Some claim that the rapid growth of information technologies, the end of the cold war and globalization have ushered in a new strategic environment[14] and "Since our strategic environment is constantly changing, our strategic education plans must change as well."[15] This sentiment is indicative of the core problem: the current JPME system is designed primarily to train JSOs, not educate officers in the application of the military component of national power. "You can train for a known enemy, as we did during that period [Cold War], but you can only educate for an unknown enemy."[16] The application of military power should be contingent on the situation, hence an education system that espouses this concept should not need to change simply because the strategic environment changes, in fact, it is arguable that any attempt to keep up with the strategic environment will result in failure.

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officers in service schools whether or not they will be subsequently assigned within their own service or to a joint position. This constitutes joint education from a *service perspective*." Emphasis Original.

[14] Recognition of a changing global environment and national threats are reflected in the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States, the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review and the 1997 National Military Strategy. The National Command Authority has made it quite clear in its addresses and speeches, including the 2003 State of the Union address, that the United States has abandoned the Cold War strategy of containment in favor of a strategy of engagement utilizing pre-emptive strike options when necessary. Several authors have described the effects of the end of the Cold War, globalization, the information age and the possibility of a pending or current Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Some prominent literary works are: John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, *In Athena's Camp*. *Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age* (Washington, D.C.: Rand, 1997); Arthur K. Cebrowski, "Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future" (*Naval Institute Proceedings*, 1998); Robert J. Bunker, "Generation, Waves, and Epochs: Modes of Warfare and the RPMA" (*Air Power Journal*, Spring 1996); and Williamson Murray, "Thinking About Revolution in Military Affairs" (*Joint Force Quarterly*, March 2002).

[15] Mullen, 33. This sentiment is echo by others including Richard A. Chilcoat in "The Revolution in Military Education" (*Joint Force Quarterly*, Summer 1999); Kenneth A. Romaine Jr., *Junior Leader Development: Is the United States Army Preparing its Lieutenants for Success?* (Leavenworth: School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2001) and Jeffrey D. McCausland and Gregg F. Martin, "Transforming Strategic Leader Education for the 21st Century Army" (*Parameters*, Autumn 2001).

[16] Fred Pang and Harry Summers, Remarks at the Naval Post Graduate School and Office of Naval Research Conference on Military Education for the 21st Century Warrior (Internet, http://web.nps.navy.mil/Future Warrior/Remarks/Pang-Sum.html accessed on 24 November 2002), 5. This is not the only source presenting this concept, it is most often seen in its general form of "train for certainty, educate for uncertainty."

This paper challenges the very concept of the JSO, the system predicated toward their production, and the concept of joint education from a service perspective. The goal is to determine why the current system is structured the way it is and if it is meeting the intent of the GNA and Joint Vision (JV) 2020. Finally, it attempts to determine what JPME's primary task and purpose should be and determine what form or structure is necessary to achieve it. It will not attempt to address curriculum, fiscal issues or service PME, except for the latter's relationship to JPME.

CHAPTER TWO

BACKGROUND

Attempting to analyze how the post World War II military education system evolved to its present form is not relevant to the topic of what JPME is or should be.[17] However in order to understand the current system, it is absolutely imperative to examine JPME's most defining events, the Goldwater-Nichols Military Reorganization Act of 1986 (GNA) and the *Report of the Panel on Military Education of the One Hundredth Congress of the Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives* (the Skelton Report). The GNA provided the specified broad requirements for JPME and the Skelton Report provided the framework. The law and the Skelton Commission's recommendations were implemented in a series of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instructions (CJCSI); the current governing instruction is CJCSI 1800.01a, *Officer Professional Military Education Policy* (OPMEP).

GNA

The GNA was a defining moment not only in regards to JPME but in the history of the United States. Section 3 of the GNA clearly delineates the tasks congress was ordering;

> "(1) to reorganize the Department of Defense and strengthen civilian authority in the Department;
> (2) to improve the military advice provided to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense;
> (3) to place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands for the accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands;
> (4) to ensure that the authority of the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands is fully commensurate with the responsibility of those commanders for the accomplishment of missions assigned to their commands;
> (5) to increase attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning;
> (6) to provide for more efficient use of defense resources;
> (7) to improve joint officer management (JOM) policies; and

[17] For discussions on the evolution of JPME see the Skelton Report, 43-52. and Mullen, 11-19.

(8) otherwise to enhance the effectiveness of military operations and improve the management and administration of the Department of Defense."[18]

More generally stated the GNA shifted control of the nation's military power away from the Service Chiefs and to the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Regional Combatant Commanders.[19]

If these are the specified tasks, what was the purpose? The GNA's purpose can and has been deduced as a conscious effort by Congress to force the Department of Defense (DOD) to create a more joint force or at least a significantly less service centric one.[20] Congress targeted

Table 1 Title IV: Joint Officer Personnel Policy Specified Tasks

1. Establishes joint officer management policies.
2. Establishes an occupational category, the "joint specialty," for the management of officers who are trained in and oriented to joint matters.
3. Provides that joint specialty officers (JSO) shall be selected by the Secretary from nominees submitted by the Secretaries of the military departments.
4. Requires such officers to have completed a joint education program and a full joint duty tour.
5. Requires that one-half of joint duty positions above captain/Navy lieutenant be filled by officers who have been nominated or selected for the joint specialty.
6. Directs the Secretary to designate at least 1,000 critical joint duty assignments that must always be filled by JSOs.
7. Requires the Secretary to establish career guidelines for JSOs.
8. Requires all officers promoted to general or flag rank to attend a CAPSTONE education course on working with the other armed forces.
9. Requires immediate assignment to joint duty for graduates of a joint school.
10. Sets forth a promotion review process for officers who are serving, or who have served, in joint duty assignments.
11. Requires the Secretary to ensure that the qualifications of officers assigned to joint duty assignments are such that certain promotion rates will be achieved.
12. Prohibits (subject to a waiver by the Secretary) promotion to general or flag rank unless the officer has served in a joint duty assignment.
13. Requires the Chairman of the JCS to evaluate the joint duty performance of officers recommended for three- and four-star rank.
14. Directs the Secretary to advise the President on the qualifications needed by officers to serve in three- and four-star positions.

Note: Adapted from Bill Summary & Status for the 99th Congress, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?do99:hr03622:@@@d/tom:bss/d099query.htm

[18] United States Congress, *Public Law 99-433 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1986.), Section 3 POLICY.
[19] See Appendix A for a summary of the GNA.
[20] Skelton Report, 24. "A major objective of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, as discussed in Chapter I, is to encourage a larger perspective on the part of the military officer corps." and Peter W. Chiarelli, "Beyond Goldwater-Nichols" (*Joint Force Quarterly*, Autumn 1993), 77. "Title IV instituted the Joint Specialty Officer (JSO) designation among provisions intended to improve the Joint Staff and foster joint culture."

the military education system as a supporting effort to achieve its goal. The GNA Title IV Joint Officer Personnel Policy assigned the DOD a number of specified tasks for this supporting effort (Table 1), which in essence, called on the Secretary to make his officer corps more joint. The key or essential task was the creation of a program (task 1, table 1) that would create and manage Joint Specialty Officers (JSO). The officers would be educated and experienced in 'joint matters', hence qualified in the concurrently established 'joint specialty' (tasks 2-4, table 1). The GNA does not prescribe what this system should look like, only that it should educate officers in 'joint matters', the details of how to educate the JSO would have to wait until the Skelton Report. Additionally, the framers realized these JSOs must be protected from the established service cultures and therefore established quotas, requirements, and reports, to ensure the JSO was an attractive career choice and that the JSOs would remain at least equally competitive for promotion within their service.

The GNA defined 'joint matters' as those "matters relating to the integrated employment of land, sea, and air forces, including matters relating to- (1) national military strategy; (2) strategic planning and contingency planning; and (3) command and control of combat operations under unified command."[21] This definition is broad enough to be almost inclusive of all applications of military power. It is then arguable that the study of 'joint matters' is simply the study of warfare or the application of military power. Additionally, the consistent use of the Joint Task Force (JTF) has made condition (3) the norm vice the exception. This normalization has eliminated the utility of using condition (3) as a qualifier. The magnitude of JTF requirements certainly weakens the argument for a small select group of joint integration specialist (JSOs) and increases the requirement for every officer to be competent in unified command.

[21] U.S. Congress, *Goldwater-Nichols Act*, Title IV, section 668 paragraph (a).

The ambiguity of the JSO and 'joint matters' definition was not lost on the Skelton Commission. The Skelton Commission concluded: "defining the JSO is the crux of the problem."[22] and provided amplification to the GNA joint matters definition adding,

> "Several other subjects subsumed in the elements contained in the Goldwater-Nichols Act definition, Joint and combined operations, Joint doctrine, Joint logistics, Joint communications, Joint intelligence, Theater/campaign planning, Joint force development, including certain military aspects of mobilization.[23]

This definition although slightly more precise, still suffers from the same problem of breadth associated with the GNA definition and its broad inclusiveness of all applications of military power.

Unquestionably, the GNA made enormous improvements within the DOD. The purpose of this report is not to question whether the JSO was appropriate in 1986 as a quantifiable measure of effective compliance of a military establishment in open opposition to the GNA, but rather is it inhibiting further joint development and is it still an appropriate JPME goal? The intent of the GNA was to create a more effective fighting force, that is, a force that functioned 'jointly'. The JSO was an expedient tool. The primary purpose (stated or not) of the contemporary joint education system is to create JSOs. This is precisely the issue and the problem; not defining the JSO, but determining what the JPME system should be attempting to accomplish. Jointness is not a qualification, but the current system is designed and functions as if it were. The Skelton report is the perennial JPME document, but despite the vast improvements it has wrought, it has further complicated this issue by virtually equating JSOs with strategists and creating the concept of "jointness from a service perspective".

[22] Skelton Report, 52.
[23] Ibid., 60.

The Skelton Report

In 1989, the commission[24] led by Congressman Ike Skelton (D-MO)[25] published a report on military education that would become known respectively as the Skelton Commission and the Skelton Report. The panel was charged "to assess the ability of the Department of Defense (DOD) professional military education (PME) system to develop officers competent in both strategy and joint (multi-service) matters."[26] The report is the most thorough examination of the military education system in concept, practice and honesty. Although not a law and absent any directive power, its importance in JPME is second only to the GNA, but with regards to JPME influence it is preeminent. The GNA elevated the importance of JPME in an officer's career and as a law it is directive. However, the Skelton report detailed what the JPME program should be and was accepted based on the merit of its arguments with approximately ninety percent of the panel's recommendations being adopted voluntarily by the services and joint chiefs.[27]

Combined, the GNA and the Skelton Commission have succeeded in creating a force substantially more joint than the one of 1986 or 1989, but they may have institutionalized a legacy that will inhibit future progress. It is neither possible to articulate nor fully understand the immense political-military and cultural constraints at the time of the GNA's enactment and the publication of the Skelton Report, it is enough to acknowledge they existed. In fact, it is testimony to their success that many of these constraints have weakened or disappeared. In light

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[24] The commission was established by the House Armed Services Committee on 13 November 1987. Ike Skelton (D-MO) was appointed chairman with Jack Davis (R-IL) as the ranking minority member. The other panel members were Solomon P. Ortiz (D-TX), George Darden (D-GA), John G. Rowland (R-CT), Joseph E. Brennan (D-ME), Jon Kyl (R-AZ) and Owen B. Pickett (D-VA). The panel was given one year to assess the military education system and issue a report of its findings. In general the panel concluded the education system was basically sound and comparable with the most prestigious foreign PME school systems visited (United Kingdom, Germany, and France), however it could and should be improved.

[25] Congressman Ike Skelton is a native of Lexington, MO and a graduate of Wentworth Military Academy and the University of Missouri at Columbia where he received A.B and L.L.B. degrees. He was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives in 1977 and has represented the fourth congressional district ever since. Prior to 1977, he served as a Lafayette County Prosecuting Attorney and as a Missouri State Senator. He is an Eagle Scout, a member of the Sigma Chi social fraternity, a Lions Club member, and vice chairman of the board of trustees of the Harry S. Truman Scholarship Foundation. He is also an elder of the First Christian Church in Lexington. http://www.house.gov/skelton/about.html, accessed on 26 April 2003.

[26] Ibid., 1.

[27] CSIS, 9.

of this progress it is time to re-evaluate some of the commission's concepts and conclusions. Of the selected nine 'key' conclusions in table 2, only two will be challenged; the second and the eighth. The remaining seven will be drawn on through out the paper in support of positions, conclusions or recommendations. The JSO is a problem, but it isn't simply a problem of definition. It is a problem in concept and scope. Although the intermediate level may be the most important level of education, it is certainly too late to begin joint education in earnest and this will be addressed in the next section.

Table 2 Key Skelton Commission Conclusions

1. PME is becoming increasingly important.
2. Defining the JSO is the crux of the problem.
3. The effective joint officer is one who is expert (or competent) in his or her own service.
4. True joint education can only take place in an environment in which the military departments are equally represented and service biases minimized, and in which the joint curriculum is taught from a joint perspective.
5. Joint education is a major way to change the professional military culture so that officers accept and support the strengthened joint elements and is important both for learning facts and for affecting attitudes and values.
6. The major subject of professional military education should be the employment of combat forces.
7. As an officer ascends in rank and assumes broader responsibilities, his focus on both joint matters and strategy should increase.
8. The intermediate education level is the appropriate point to begin intensive study of joint matters and strategy.
9. The curriculum as defined by the syllabus and the curriculum taught in the classroom varied significantly.

Note: Adapted from the *Report of the Panel on Military Education of the One Hundredth Congress of the Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives*, 1989. See Appendix C for expanded list and bullet page references.

As for concepts, three in particular will be challenged;

1) Joint Education from a Service Perspective
2) Joint synonymous with Strategy
3) The Joint Specialty Officer

Of the three concepts above, only the third, the Joint Specialty Officer, is a GNA legal requirement. The other two originated in the Skelton report. The first is an interpretation of the GNA Title IV Section 663 requirements. Section 663 requires the Secretary of Defense (with the advice of the CJCS) to

> periodically review and revise the curriculum of each school of the National Defense University (and of any other joint professional military education school) to enhance the education and training of officers in joint matters. The

> Secretary shall require such schools to maintain rigorous standards for the military education of officers with the joint specialty.[28]

It also mandates that the Secretary require each service intermediate and senior PME school to "periodically review and revise its curriculum for senior and intermediate grade officers in order to strengthen the focus on (1) joint matters; and (2) preparing officers for joint duty assignments."[29] The language does not indicate that either jointness from a service perspective or jointness from a joint perspective was a required approach. It may have been the intent of the framers and clearly the Skelton Committee was in a better position to judge.

Joint education from a joint perspective makes intuitive sense despite its lack of clarity and meaning. However, joint education from a service perspective has limited intuitive value. It is not defined or sufficiently explained in the Skelton Report[30]. If jointness is supposed to achieve a common language and understanding of the American way of war throughout the officer corps, how can this be achieved by teaching four different variations (Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine) to four different service homogeneous student bodies? It might make sense if every officer was to attend each of these service institutions, but that is impractical and redundant. It might even make sense if every officer attended JPME phase II and it was actually long enough to make a sustained impact, but that is not required and without significant restructuring would be impossible based on current resourcing. Moving Phase II to the service schools would only exasperate the problem and essentially extinguish genuine JPME at the intermediate level, since it is not the curriculum that makes joint education joint, it is the balance of services within the faculty and student body.[31] The service perspective model is the most

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[28] U.S. Congress, *Goldwater-Nichols Act*, Title IV, section 663 paragraph 3(b).
[29] Ibid., paragraph 3(c).
[30] "The first type is joint education in *service* PME schools. Title IV requires a strengthened focus on joint matters and on preparation for joint duty assignments. This education is for *all* officers in service schools whether or not they will be subsequently assigned within their own service or to a joint position. This constitutes joint education from a *service perspective*." Skelton Report, 51. Emphasis original.
[31] This idea is prevalent throughout the Skelton Report and is the crux of the definition for genuine JPME. Only two of the many examples are provided here for illustration, "genuinely 'joint;' that is, in an environment in which the military departments are equally represented and service biases minimized, and in which the joint curriculum is taught from a joint perspective--that of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

glaring of contradictions between concept and recommendation in the Skelton report. With the exception of the first attribute in table 3, the remaining three are not consistent with the service perspective approach.

Table 3 Joint Officer Attributes

1. An in-depth, expert knowledge of their own service.
2. Experience operating with the other services.
3. Mutual trust and confidence in the other services.
4. Sufficient knowledge of the other services and the perspective to allow them to "see joint"—that is, not to view the other services from the perspective of their own, but to view all of the services from a higher vantage point, the joint perspective personified by a unified commander or the JCS Chairman.

Note: Adapted from the *Report of the Panel on Military Education of the One Hundredth Congress of the Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives*, 1989, page 55.

It is interesting that much of the Skelton Report appears to conceptually challenge the idea of joint education from a service perspective. The report is quite clear that the single most important piece of genuine JPME is equal service representation in the student body and faculty with curriculum almost irrelevant if the student body service representation is not balanced (refer to table 2 conclusions 4 and 9). In fact, only schools with this mix of services qualify as joint from a joint perspective or genuine joint education and it is this experience that sets the JSO apart from the rest of the officer corps. A few of the many examples throughout the report illustrate these points. "The term joint education is often used, incorrectly, to refer to instruction in joint matters without regard to such important factors as the composition of the student body and faculty or who controls the school."[32], "It [GNA] required that *all* officers attending service PME schools study joint matters and that Joint Specialty Officers receive "genuine" joint education in joint schools."[33], "…the service-oriented approach means that the College of Naval warfare is *not* a joint school. It does not have the faculty mix, student mix, and *perspective* of a genuine joint institution."[34], and

> Joint specialist education should be conducted in schools that are genuinely "joint;" that is, in an environment in which the military departments are equally

Staff, a commander of a unified command, or a contingency joint task force commander at the 3-star level." and "If service schools *could* provide genuine joint education, there would be no need for separate joint schools.", Skelton Report, 83 and 98. Also conclusion 9 in table 2 is pertinent to this issue.

[32] Ibid., 64.

[33] Ibid., 57. Emphasis original.

[34] Ibid., 70. Emphasis on not is original, emphasis added on perspective.

> represented and service biases minimized, and in which the joint curriculum is taught from a joint perspective…[35]

Even more intriguing is the report argues the GNA used specific language in certain instances to leave room to restructure or increase the JPME system if necessary.[36] After examining the concepts and conclusions of the Skelton Commission it is puzzling why they did not take advantage of this acknowledged provision of the GNA and recommend a greater restructuring of the PME system to reconcile some of the apparent conflicts, unless constrained in some fashion. It is assumed that because of the Services' opposition to the GNA, the Skelton Commission could not recommend rescinding or altering any part of the controversial law for fear of the potential movement it could create, even if it conflicted with their ideas of joint education and perhaps found it necessary to offer a framework acceptable to most that could garner immediate execution.

Whatever the reason(s), the commission recommended the dual perspective approach to JPME. The larger point is this educational concept is not mandated by law and can be changed by the CJCS. Indeed, the current CJCSI 1800.01a OPMEP has institutionalized an improved version of this dual concept. Jointness from a joint perspective is still used[37] but it is clarified later as "examines joint operations from the standpoint of the Chariman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a combatant commander, and a joint task force (JTF) commander."[38] Jointness from the service perspective has become "teach joint operations from the standpoint of Service forces in a joint force supported by Service component commands."[39] Although this is an improvement, under close examination it still falls short. The joint

[35] Ibid., 83. Emphasis original.
[36] "The framers of the Goldwater-Nichols Act clearly intended a more comprehensive restructuring if that proved necessary." Skelton Report, 91.
[37] CJCS, OPMEP, A-B-1.
[38] Ibid., A-B-6.
[39] Ibid., A-B-6.

perspective portion at the Intermediate Level College (ILC) [40] level is only a 3 month education program while the service program is a minimum of 10 months on top of over a decade spent in the precommissioning and primary phases. Additionally, only the joint perspective piece is tasked to "further develop joint attitudes and perspectives, expose officers to and increase their understanding of Service cultures while concentrating on joint staff operations."[41] As will be discussed later, such a lofty cultural goal requires much more than 3 months time.

The commission focused on the intermediate and senior level PME schools while reassessing and broadening its charter from merely determining the system's ability to produce officers "competent in both strategy and joint matters"[42] to assessing "the ability of the Department of Defense military education system to develop professional military strategists, joint warfighters and tacticians."[43] Additionally they were checking for GNA compliance and the quality of the education. How the commission viewed its charter is insightful to their view of jointness. The report's strong emphasis and in-depth explanation of the relationship between jointness and the strategic level of war, while at the same time ignoring (intentionally or not) its importance at the operational and tactical levels, gives the perception that jointness and strategy are virtually synonymous or if not synonymous then solely a strategic matter. This perception is best illustrated by some examples from the text itself: "In this context, the strengthening of joint institutions and joint military advice … is closely related to the panel's focus on how well the PME system is encouraging military officers to think strategically."[44]; "…the study of national security strategy, an inherently joint pursuit, for selected officers."[45] and "Because military strategy in the modern age is inherently joint… ."[46] No argument was found nor will be given

[40] A formal, intermediate-level Service college; includes institutions commonly referred to as intermediate Service colleges, intermediate-level schools, intermediate Service schools, or military education level-4 producers. Ibid., GL-4.
[41] Ibid., A-B-6.
[42] Skelton Report, 22.
[43] Ibid., 13.
[44] Ibid., 24.
[45] Ibid., 59.
[46] Ibid., 104.

against the position that a strategist must understand the capabilities of all services and their integration, however the position that jointness is solely or even mostly a strategic issue bodes poorly for the education system and perhaps why the commission concluded that the ILC was the appropriate level to begin in earnest the study of joint matters.[47] It appears this conclusion was reached because it was believed that jointness is a strategic matter, occasionally an operational issue and not a tactical one. If this was once true, it is certainly not in the 21st century. All warfare is joint and interagency. This includes the tactical and operational levels as well.

Additionally, the commission believed the intermediate level was appropriate because, "From this point forward in their careers, many officers will serve in joint assignments."[48] It also appears it was assumed that this type of education was not needed in any capacity other than a joint assignment. There are two critical problems with this position. First, most organizations and functions in the military operate off a 'pull' system. That is, you don't get anything unless you ask for it. This, combined with the old military adage, "you don't know, what you don't know", leaves many officers in a Joint Duty Assignment (JDA)[49] without the benefit of a genuine joint education in the precarious situation of not being able to ask for the appropriate additional resources even though they may be available simply because they are unaware they exist or are ignorant of their capabilities. In this situation, they are left doing what they know, which may not necessarily be most efficient, effective, or proper. In a way, it can be argued that in many instances, jointness is restricted to the strategic level by default, not because it is the best method. Second, it is no longer true that most officers only serve in a joint capacity after they attend an ILC. Michael Carrell concluded in "Inculcating Jointness: Officer Joint Education and Training from Cradle to Grave", that many officers "work in a joint arena from day one … [this] is

[47] Ibid., 14.
[48] Ibid., 105.
[49] An assignment to a designated position in a multi-Service or multinational command or activity that is involved in the integrated employment or support of the land, sea, and air forces of at least two of the three Military Departments. CJCS, OPMEP, GL-4.

becoming the rule rather than the exception" and "[they] cannot wait for intermediate service school to learn how to operate in that environment."[50]

The root of many of these conflicts appears to be the JSO, both as a concept and as a distracter. As a concept the JSO is flawed for several reasons. First, the idea of a JSO creates the illusion that jointness is a qualification. A skill set that can be mastered through proper training and the creation of the correct processes and standard operating procedures. Second, it also creates the potential for non-JSO qualified officers to ignore joint issues, since there is a group of so-called 'experts' specifically assigned the task of integrating the service components into a joint force. Thirdly, David Mullen presented the argument that history has shown that any officer can find himself in a position planning or executing joint operations, some within 2-years of commissioning.[51] Finally, service programs such as the joint planner sub-specialty further complicate the purpose and uniqueness of the JSO as well as reinforcing the perception that jointness is indeed a qualification by offering their own. By creating their own service unique joint qualifications, the services have portrayed an implicit recognition that a small select group of officers specialized in joint integration is not enough.

There are other minor effects of the qualification approach as well, such as concern over the cost of the Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL)[52] and the possibility of potential budget reductions. A smaller JDAL requires fewer JSOs. A lower JSO requirement, translates into a smaller JPME education system, which is less costly than a big one.

As a distracter, the JSO appears to have coerced the DOD to focus its JPME education system on the creation of JSOs in sufficient quantities to fill the JDAL. This goal has caused the education system to focus on training efficient staff officers vice educating officers in the

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[50] Michael Carrell, *Inculcating Jointness: Officer Education and Training from Cradle to Grave* (Newport: Naval War College, 2000), 7.
[51] Mullen,15-19.
[52] Positions designated as joint duty assignments are reflected in a list approved by the Secretary of Defense and maintained by the Joint Staff. CJCS, *OPMEP*, GL-4.

application of military power. This leads to the common reductionist approach, reflected in the manner in which the school system is often graded. Many authors intent on improving the JPME system have expended large amounts of time and energy attempting to determine the skills required for a good JSO.[53] The JSO is reduced to a set of necessary skills. This skill set is used to measure the school system's level of success and identify areas for improvement. While training officers for JDAs is important and requires this type of effort, it is equally important to educate officers to be better thinkers and acquire a joint understanding, which cannot be gleaned from the mastery of staff processes and procedures. Training and education should always maintain a close relationship, but it appears genuine JPME is getting the short-thrift.

[53] Gerald C. Kobylski, *Relevant Joint Education at the Intermediate Level Colleges* (Newport: Naval War College, 2002) is an excellent example of this type of approach.

What Exactly is the 'J' in JPME?

> In fact, until you're clear about the purpose in institutions of that kind[education], you run the risk of diffusion of effort and lack of clear sense on the part of all the participants as to just what is it they're trying to do.[54]

Jointness is many things to many people. At the ILC[55] level and below it is treated as a qualification embodied in the Joint Specialty. JV 2020 illustrates a spectrum of jointness from simple deconfliction through its apex of integrated service, interagency and multinational capabilities depicted in table 4.

Table 4 Jointness American Style



Note: Adapted from CJCS, *Joint Vision 2020 Presentation*, Officer of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Electronic Library, February 2001, slide 1.

This picture presents a hopeful image of service integration and synergy resulting in increased capabilities greater than the sum of their parts. "Our objective in implementing the joint vision is the optimal integration of all joint forces and effects."[56] There appears to be a key distinction between joint and jointness beyond the grammatical differences between a noun and an adverb.

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[54] Andrew Goodpaster, USA(Ret.) quoted in the Skelton Report, 19.
[55] see Appendix C for current PME structure.
[56] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), *Joint Vision 2020* (Washington, D.C. Officer of the CJCS Joint Electronic Library, February 2001), 34.

Finding definitions for joint is not difficult. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* provides a broad but conceptually limiting definition; "**joint--**Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate."[57] The definition for a joint force is better – "A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments, operating under a single joint force commander."[58] From these definitions we can deduce that joint is an organizational structure. JV2020 expands our understanding by explaining what the joint force is expected to accomplish and the foundation of joint operations. "The joint force, because of its flexibility and responsiveness, will remain the key to operational success in the future.",[59] and that "Interoperability is the foundation of effective joint, multinational, and interagency operations."[60]

Determining what jointness is, is more difficult. There are no occurrences of the word in JP 1-02. JV2020 provides some insight, indicating there is something more required than structure and interoperability to achieve the vision's goals; "To build the most effective force for 2020, we must be fully joint; intellectually, operationally, organizationally, doctrinally and technically."[61], "The synergy gained through the interdependence of the Services makes clear that jointness is more than interoperability."[62] and "The foundation of jointness is the strength of individual Service competencies pulled together."[63]

JV2020, the GNA, the Skelton Commission, as well as many authors, tacitly imply that jointness is an organization. Organizations are people, not wiring diagrams, and as such must have their own culture if they are to function and survive. Whether this surreptitious approach to

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[57] CJCS. *Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. (Washington, D.C.: Office of the CJCS, 23 March 1994 (As Amended Through 1 September 2000)), 242. Emphasis original.
[58] Ibid, 245.
[59] CJCS *JV2020*, 2.
[60] Ibid., 15.
[61] Ibid., 2.
[62] Ibid., 34
[63] Ibid.

defining jointness is by design or accident is irrelevant. The point is each of these key documents implicitly and occasionally teeter on explicit recognition that jointness is a culture. The most explicit examples are in JV2020,[64]

> The linchpin of progress from vision to experimentation to reality is joint training and education – because they are the keys to intellectual change. Without intellectual change, there is no real change in doctrine, organizations, or leaders.[65]

and

> Although technical interoperability is essential, it is not sufficient to ensure effective operations. There must be a suitable focus on procedural and organizational elements, and decision makers at all levels must understand each other's capabilities and constraints. Training and education, experience and exercises, cooperative planning, and skilled liaison at all levels of the joint force will not only overcome the barriers of organizational [service] culture and differing priorities, but will teach members of the joint team to appreciate the full range of Service capabilities available to them.[66]

General John J. Sheehan, USMC (Ret.) was explicitly clear concerning what education institutions accomplish, "Each service, in its institutional process of education, teaches a culture. Whether you accept it or not, it happens."[67]

Many claim the GNA created a joint culture and the overwhelming success of Operation Desert Storm is proof positive.[68] The second claim's validity can and has been argued both ways. The best arguments still only place Desert Storm at the very beginning of the JV2020 joint continuum in table 4. The first claim concerning the GNA is debatable and perhaps impossible,

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[64] The following are a few examples from the Skelton Report portraying a similar thought. "Schools transmit, interpret and share culture.", Skelton Report, 57. The commission advocates early and continuous education to promote understanding and reduce rigidity – "Joint education confronts one aspect of that rigidity [service centrism]. Having spent most of their career to date in their service, officers are likely to be predisposed to solutions to military problems involving only forces and doctrine of their service. A major purpose of joint education is to overcome that predisposition.", Skelton Report, 58-59. Also Table 2 (page 11) Key Skelton Commission Conclusion 5; Joint education is a major way to change the professional military culture so that officers accept and support the strengthened joint elements and is important both for learning facts and for affecting attitudes and values.

[65] CJCS, *JV2020*, 35.

[66] Ibid., 15.

[67] John J. Sheeham, Remarks at the Naval Post Graduate School and Office of Naval Research Conference on Military Education for the 21st Century Warrior. Internet, http://web.nps.navy.mil/Future Warrior/Remarks/Skelton.html accessed on 24 November 2002.

[68] Richard A. Chilcoat, "The Revolution in Military Education" (*Joint Force Quarterly*, Summer 1999), 59-63.; Seth Cropsey, "The Limits of Jointness" (*Joint Force Quarterly*, Summer 1993), 72-78.; and

as cultures are not created by edict.[69] Since the prerequisite for a culture is an organization, by restructuring the defense department the GNA created the conditions in which a culture could grow and possibly develop. As can be seen in the following quote from the Skelton Report, the framers of the GNA were conscious of their direct assault on the service cultures and the difficulties associated with creating a new supra-culture in the presence of established service cultures diametrically opposed to its creation.

> Congress' objective is nothing short of a change in the culture of the officer corps. In the words of Admiral Harry D. Train, II, former commander in Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command, it is to arrive at a point where "jointness is a state of mind." A former war college president added that "[jointness is] an acculturation process that takes both time and emphasis.[70]

It would be premature to conclude that jointness is a culture by simply determining it isn't a qualification, that it must be more than an organizational structure or because some documents have provided implicit recognition or have indicated that the military culture was the intended target of their programs. No arguments were found challenging the notion that military cultures exist and many articles present military culture as an established fact, but it is still necessary to look at what a culture is. This is no simple task as Edgar H. Schein, of the Sloan School of Management at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, pointed out in his study of organizational climates and cultures summarized in his article, "Organizational Cultures", there are wide and varied opinions on this topic and only recently has it begun to be studied.[71] He has found consensus on a number of areas and backed by his own studies he has proposed a definition for organizational culture;

> Culture is what a group learns over a period of time as that group solves its problems of survival in an external environment and its problems of internal integration. Such learning is simultaneously a behavioral, cognitive and an emotional process. Extrapolating further from a functionalist anthropological

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William M. Steele and Robert B. Kupiszewski, "Joint Education. Where Do We Go From Here" (*Joint Force Quarterly*, Winter 1993-94), 63-70.

[69] Lawrence B. Wilkerson, "What Exactly is Jointness" (*Joint Force Quarterly*, Summer 1997), 67. COL Wilkerson applied this concept specifically to jointness; "True jointness is not imparted by fiat."

[70] Skelton Report, 57.

[71] Edgar H. Schein, "Organizational Culture" (*American Psychologist*, February 1990), 109.

> view, the deepest level of culture will be the cognitive in that the perceptions, language and thought processes that a group comes to share will be the ultimate causal determinant of feelings, attitudes, espoused values, and overt behavior. …*Culture* can now be defined as (a) a pattern of basic assumptions, (b) invented, discovered, or developed by a given group, (c) as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, (d) that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore (e) is to be taught to new members as the (f) correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems. [72]

Don Snider, a professor of political science at West Point, applied Schein's and others' work directly to the military, establishing four basic elements of military culture; (1) discipline, (2) professional ethos (3) ceremonial displays and etiquette and (4) cohesion and espirit de corps. Additionally, he created a more specific definition.

> …military culture may be said to refer to the deep structure of organizations, rooted in the prevailing assumptions, norms, values, customs and traditions which collectively, over time, have created shared individual expectation among the members. Meaning is established through socialization to a variety of identity groups that converge in operations of the organization. Culture includes both attitudes and behavior about what is right, what is good, and what is important, often manifested in shared heroes, stories, and rituals that promote bonding among the members. [73]

Each of these definitions when they discuss such issues as time, shared expectations, assumptions, norms, values and perceptions of what is right and important imply there is some type of organizational memory.

By superficially applying portions of Schein's and Snider's definitions and the concept of organizational memory it appears obvious that each of the services overwhelmingly meet each of the criteria. This same confidence is not present when viewing the joint community. Intuitively this makes sense. A key piece of every discussion thus far has been time. Officers (with the exception of Special Operations Command) generally do not serve in the joint world for extensive periods. There is very little time for socialization or bonding to occur and develop the other shared attributes. This makes it difficult, if not impossible, to develop a sense of community.

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[72] Ibid.,111.
[73] Don M. Snider, "An Uninformed Debate on Military Culture" (Orbis, Winter 1999), 14.

Greater research of the type advocated by Schein[74] is required for conclusive evidence, but the table below should illustrate the point.

Table 5		Cultural Element Comparison					
		Army Officer	Naval Officer	Marine Officer	Air Force Officer	Special Operations Officer	Joint Officer
Selected Cultural Elements	Time	200+ Years	200+ Years	200+ Years	50+ Years, 90+ Years as a community	25 Years for the Organization, 60-100 Years+ for the components	Varies to include possible JDA time, 3 months at JFSC, 1 year at a Senior Joint College
	Socialization	Vast Amounts	Vast Amounts	Vast Amounts	Vast Amounts	Vast Amounts	Varies to include possible JDA time, 3 months at JFSC, 1 year at a Senior Joint College
	Collective Memory	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Only what is written down. (After Action Reports, Procedures, Instructions, Doctrine)
	Shared Perceptions	Boots on the Ground	The place for a true sailor is haze gray underway	Once a Marine always a Marine	Modern Armored Knight	To those who dare, win	Ad Hocism
	Shared Values	Duty, Honor, Country	Duty First	Semper Fi	Integrity	Never Quit	None
	Heroes	Audie Murphy	John Paul Jones	Chesty Puller	Billie Mitchell	Aaron Banks	None
	Rituals	Many	Many	Many	Growing	Many	None
	Traditions	Many	Many	Many	Change, Developing	Many	None
Note: not the result of scientific study.							

There is opposition to JV2020 and any movement towards a greater supra-culture of jointness. Some fear that a strong joint culture will weaken the service cultures and thus degrade their capabilities. Others feel that a strong joint culture will reduce the competitive spirit between the services necessary to produce innovation, growth and prevent stagnation.[75] Schein's, and to an extent Snider's, arguments show this fear is unfounded; subcultures are natural and often

[74] Schein, 110-111,118. In the article Schein describes the contemporary methods of studying culture on pages 110-111, but provides a brief summary on page 118.

[75] Seth Cropsey, "The Limits of Jointness" (*Joint Force Quarterly*, Summer 1993) and Harvey M. Sapolsky, "Interservice Competition: The Solution, Not the Problem" (*Joint Force Quarterly*, Summer 1993). These authors believe the benefits from service competition and debate are more important than Jointness, which will diminish the power of individual services and the extinction of multiple perspectives.

necessary developments of large cultures.[76] Snider argues that currently there is no strong supra-culture, but only "an identifiable set of subcultures."[77] However, Snider along with Howard Grave in "Emergence of the Joint Officer" does acknowledge that "..now more than a decade later, during which America's armed forces have fought several conflicts under unified command, a new joint culture is emerging at the field-grade and senior officer levels…"[78] A more pragmatic position can be found by viewing any of the services. Each possesses a unified service culture supported by many diverse sub-cultures, many of which are intertwined. Assuming it were possible, it is unlikely that after several hundred years anyone is going to recommend an active program to undo the service cultures based on a perception that it is weakening the branch or community subcultures.

The evidence and theories appear to be fairly compelling that jointness is indeed a culture. The real challenge with jointness is that instead of developing its own subcultures, it must be the product of many subcultures. For additional insight into how this may come about it is necessary to look at how people within these organizations develop the shared assumptions, perceptions and values.

Morris Massey, author of the seminal work on value systems, *The People Puzzle, understanding yourself and others*, would interpret these things to be part of an individual's gut value system, the critical factor "that guides the behavior of all humans. … Literally everything is sifted through the gut-level value systems operating in each of us."[79] There are many areas in which Schein's and Massey's theories agree and overlap despite the one is primarily looking at the collective group of individuals, while the other is focused on the individual within the group. Time and emphasis are two key elements in which Massey, Schein and Snider are in complete

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[76] Schein, 117.
[77] Snider, 19.
[78] Howard D. Graves and Don M. Snider, "Emergence of the Joint Officer" (*Joint Force Quarterly*, Autumn 1996), 53.
[79] Morris Massey, *The People Puzzle, understanding yourself and others* (Reston, Va: Reston Publishing Company, Inc., 1979), 3-4.

agreement. It takes a tremendous amount of continued effort over a significant period of time to alter a culture or an individual's value system. Time and effort are generally intuitively understood in regards to values or cultures and are a key piece of Admiral Train's statement quoted earlier. Altering a culture is the more difficult of the two, since when you attempt to alter a culture you are indeed trying to alter the collective individuals' value system as well. Schein provides examples and cites other studies highlighting how people "who changed significantly during training would revert to their former attitudes once they were back at work in a different [original] setting."[80] The parallel to these types of examples and the means in which the CJCS attempts to instill jointness in its officers is uncanny and perhaps similarly effective. In general, an officer attends his first genuine joint education program between his 12th-15th year of commissioned service. He should then be assigned to a minimum 22 month Joint Duty Assignment (JDA). After that, he may return to his service never to serve in another JDA. In effect, 2 years or 5% of a 20 year career is devoted to genuine joint acculturation. To be fair, the framework in the OPMEP attempts to address this issue by including the joint introduction and joint awareness phases during the precommissioning and primary education levels, respectively. However, the standards set by the Skelton Commission for genuine joint education discount even considering these phases as joint acculturation.

Massey focused on the development of an individual's value system, perhaps best know for coining the term Significant Emotional Event (SEE).[81] Massey believed the old adage was true, "Every person is a product of his or her environment."[82] That in general the culture you are surrounded by will play a critical if not decisive role in shaping an individual's value system. An individual's gut level value system determines how they relate to the world around them,

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[80] Schein, 109.
[81] "Dramatic changes in values probably occur only when an individual experiences what might be called a *Significant Emotional Event*." A SEE is an event so arresting, it causes an individual to question their value system and re-evaluate their priorities. Massey, 18. Combat is an example of a military SEE.
[82] Ibid., 52.

influencing every decision they make.[83] Massey's theory is especially intriguing when you compare an individual entering pre-commissioning. He knows very little about the environment he has just entered, in a sense he is born into the military. The obvious exceptions are military brats and enlisted to officer commissioning programs, but even in these cases the individual is only familiar with the world he is entering and will experience a steep learning curve. Massey claims there are four identifiable phases of value development; imprint, modeling/hero worship, socialization, and lock-in. Another unscientific study or comparison will again prove insightful, this time a comparison will be made between Massey's development phases and an Officer's career (see table 6).

Table 6	Massey's Phase Comparison to Officer Education Phases		
	Average Age	**Carreer Point**	**Officer's Education Phases**
IMPRINTING	0-7	0 - upto 4 years	Precommissioning
MODELING/HERO WORSHIP	8-13	4 - 14 years	Primary
SOCIALIZATION	14-19	14 - 19	Intermediate
LOCK-IN	Begins around 10, finalized around 20.	19 - 25	Senior
		25+	Flag/General

Note: (a) Comparison is not the result of scientific study.
(b) Morris Massey's phases from The People Puzzle (Reston: Reston Publishing Co., Inc.)

Of the four phases imprinting is the most critical. "During the imprinting period, the mind accepts and imprints a number of "patterns" for future "filtering" of the world. A child's orientation to the world is created: up/down, inside/outside, external/internal."[84] Massey develops this concept further to include what is normal, acceptable, right/wrong—every decision made. To illuminate its importance he gives an example and an analogy. The example is a description of the philosophy of priests and teachers of the middle ages, "Give me a child until six, and you can have him thereafter (because he is already molded for life)."[85] The analogy is, "As the twig is bent, so the tree shall grow."[86]

[83] Ibid., 4.
[84] Ibid., 9.
[85] Ibid.
[86] Ibid.

Imprinting occurs during an officer's pre-commissioning and primary education phases. Massey's theory indicates that these phases are the most important in developing a joint culture, since they lay the foundation of how an officer will view warfare, as well as, his service's roles and responsibilities.[87] Massey believes the most effective way to influence an individual's gut value system is at the imprinting phase. Consequently, the most effective means of fostering a joint culture is by imprinting officer candidates with a genuine joint war perspective from the very beginning of their careers. The current service pre-commissioning programs can not do this.[88] The only military education an officer receives during this critical imprinting phase is from a service perspective (reference Appendix C).[89] The initial service indoctrination at the service academies, Reserve Officer Training Course (ROTC) and Officer Candidate School (OSC) is not conducive to the development and enhancement of a joint culture, as it bends the twig almost irretrievably toward service-centralism.

Also, occurring during the officer's pre-commissioning and primary education phases is Modeling and Hero Worship. During this developmental phase "Identification, or modeling, is one of the important factors establishing our personality, standards, and goals."[90] During this phase the individual "will absorb values from a diverse selection of models."[91] It is common for

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[87] The Skelton Report often appears to implicitly acknowledge and encourage this idea. The following two passages are the best examples; "Joint education should begin early in an officer's career, probably during precommissioning training. This early exposure is not meant to provide in-depth knowledge of joint matters or to prepare prospective officers for joint duty. Rather, it should introduce them to a broader perspective from which to view the narrow, focused branch or warfare-specialty training, primarily skill-related, that he will receive in the first years of his commissioned service. … Finally, it should encourage them to reach beyond the knowledge and skills required of their warfare specialty and begin a career-long commitment to reading and studying about warfare, including its broader concepts." and "Having spent most of their career to date [intermediate level college] in their service, officers are likely to be predisposed to solutions to military problems involving only forces and doctrine of their service• A major purpose of joint education is to overcome that predisposition." Skelton Report, 58-59. Emphasis original.

[88] As discussed in the previous section the service schools do not provide genuine joint education as defined by the Skelton Commission. The following Skelton Report quotation re-emphasizes this point: "If service schools *could* provide genuine joint education, there would be no need for separate joint schools." Skelton Report, 98. Emphasis original.

[89] A few officers and officer candidates do attend their sister service primary education schools or a semester at a sister service academy, but these numbers are too small to affect the culture of the organization.

[90] Massey, 12.

[91] Ibid., 15.

young officers to be instructed to pick a role model to emulate and assist in developing his leadership style. Although, an officer may continue to pick role models through out his entire career, the further he is into a career, the less likely the role models are to influence his values and it is more likely that he is picking models perceived to possess a similar or compatible value system as his own.

The socialization phase is more of an experiment and validation phase than a developmental phase. It is here "our value system programmed during childhood and adolescence locks in, and we then "test" it against the reality of the world."[92] Though individuals may deviate radically from their programmed value system during this phase, "they generally seem to revert back to the original programmed values."[93] It is important to note that it is during this phase, that under the current JPME framework, an officer is templated to experience genuine jointness for the first time. The evidence from Schein and Massey appear to indicate, that in general during this phase an officer's actions may change during this joint period to conform to the new (joint) environment, but it is not a permanent change in his value system and he will revert to his programming (service centrism) at the earliest opportunity.

Lock-in is the most ambiguous and confusing phase. Massey uses many approximations, which is understandable since this is not a hard science. Generally, most people will arrive at lock-in no later than 22 years of age. However, as noted earlier in the socialization phase discussion, they are locking in a value system (perhaps slightly refined by the socialization phase) that was more or less complete by the 10th year of age.[94]

It is intriguing, especially when Massey's concept of lock-in is kept in mind, that the Skelton Commission concluded that "if joint education is delayed until senior PME many officers

[92] Ibid., 17.
[93] Ibid., 18.
[94] Ibid., 51-52. On these pages Massey explains how the age of lock-in was selected. Two of the most expressive quotes are taken from pages 51 and 52 respectively "…ten years old—when they locked in on their basic gut-level values." and "Also, a number of studies indicate lock- of values around this age [10]."

may be too rigid and set, in their ways."[95] This assertion assumes that these same officers are not set in their ways by the time they attend ILC. Those officers that do attend an ILC, will in most cases, do so after their eleventh year of commissioned service (not including precommissioning time) and at the college of their own service, which will in most cases reinforce the service imprinted values vice seriously challenge them. Based on these facts, Massey's model would indicate that the officer's gut level value system is already established prior to the officer attending an ILC. Although the panel correctly concluded joint education must begin as early in an officer's career as possible, they misidentified this point as the ILC, which is during the socialization phase. If joint education is to have the desired affect it must begin during the imprinting phase, ideally during precommissioning. This is an example of a reoccurring problem; execution. While the commission advocates joint education at the earliest levels, it is joint education from a service perspective not genuine joint education. Very little genuine joint education takes place in the military and of these opportunities few officers actually attend. If Massey's theories are even remotely accurate this small amount of joint acculturation of a small select element cannot compete with the decade or two of service indoctrination of the masses.

It is noteworthy that Schein's definition is supportive of JV2020's endstate and that his definition is implicitly acknowledged and interwoven throughout the Skelton Report. JV2020 requires full interoperability at all levels including intellectual, cognitive, organizational and doctrinal. The very basic foundation required to achieve this high goal is set out in Schein's definition of a culture; "a pattern of basic assumptions, …adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore is to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel…".[96] Despite these similarities, the Department of Defense's education system is predicated on training a select few officers on the application of systems and procedures designed to deconflict and assuage four distinct cultures in the most

[95] Skelton Report, 105.
[96] Ibid., 111.

complex of human endeavors- war. In effect, substituting process for true understanding—culture.

CHAPTER THREE

ANALYSIS

> Fundamental to the development of the U.S. officer corps is quality professional military education (PME). The education that officers receive should be broad enough to provide new academic horizons for those who have been narrowly focused, but deep enough to ensure scholarship and challenge and whet the intellectual curiosity of all officers capable of developing strategic vision. PME should broaden officers' perspective and, thus, help break down, the myths of branch or warfare specialties, as well as service parochialisms. Because education is an investment in our country's future, the services must be willing to sacrifice some near-term readiness for the long-term intellectual development of their officers. Only by accepting these sacrifices will our officers have the intellectual talents to respond to the demands of their profession, especially major crises and wars.[97]

To Meet an Intent

This chapter's epigraph from the Skelton Report in one paragraph broadly states the task, purpose and intent of JPME. It is too broadly stated to construct a framework but a good conceptual start. JPME's primary task should be to educate and not train, "provide new academic horizons". Its purpose should be to build and develop a common understanding, "help break down, the myths of branch or warfare specialties, as well as service parochialisms." Its intent is to build a force for long term success, "sacrifice some near-term readiness for the long-term intellectual development of their officers." It is impossible to argue with these points, but the breadth makes them subject to interpretation and disagreement in execution.

JV2020's intent is to create a "fully joint force: intellectually, operationally, organizationally, doctrinally, and technically."[98] Since, this goal is to be achieved sometime in the future around 2020, it shares the same goal as the Skelton Commission, long term success.

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[97] Skelton Report, 133.

[98] CJCS, *JV2020, 2*. This is a partially deduced intent from the document. The word intent is not used in the body of the document nor is task. The deduced task is to create a joint force capable of full spectrum dominance. The full quote used for the purpose is: "To build the most effective force for 2020, we must be fully joint: intellectually, operationally, organizationally, doctrinally, and technically."

This requires professional officers educated in the application of military power, this is JPME's primary or essential task.

Organizations if they are to survive and be successful must have an organizational culture. In this case that organization is a joint force, so it requires a joint culture. Consequently the primary purpose of the JPME system should be to develop, foster, and enhance joint culture and achieve true understanding, defined by Schein as "language and thought processes that a group comes to share will be the ultimate causal determinant of feelings, attitudes, espoused values, and overt behavior."[99] This is fully within the guidance of the Skelton Commission, which "believes that the objective of joint education should be to change officers' attitudes about developing and deploying multi-service forces."[100]

With the task, purpose and intent stated, how should the JPME system be structured?

The Skelton Report with the notable exception of joint education from a service perspective laid out a sound framework, guidance and noble concepts for JPME. What should be studied is not contested, but re-emphasized. The Skelton Report clearly states what should be studied; "The panel believes that the major subject of professional military education should be the employment of combat forces, the conduct of war. Other subjects such as leadership, management, and executive fitness are useful but should be secondary."[101] It is in keeping with the direction of the GNA to study joint matters, which as discussed earlier is in essence the application of military power. Warriors study warfare in its entirety. The current OPMEP reflects the Skelton Commission's guidance and details a solid framework, less the concept of joint education from a service perspective and the goal of producing JSOs.[102] But these are problems in execution more than concept. It appears real world constraints, past and present,

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[99] Schein, 111.
[100] Skelton Report, 57.
[101] Ibid., 7. Also reference Table 2 (page 11) Key Skelton Commission Conclusion 6. The major subject of professional military education should be the employment of combat forces.
[102] "JPME is that portion of PME that supports fulfillment of the educational requirements for joint officer management." CJCS, *OPMEP*, A-B-1.

forced or coerced the system away from the conceptual models of education and understanding and towards the more pragmatic expedients of training and Service PME as a substitute for genuine JPME.

The foundation and primary purpose of the JPME system should be to develop, foster and enhance a joint culture this requires a framework which provides as much interaction 'as possible' between officers of all services and ranks. This mix of services is a frequently occurring matter in professional literature and is crucial to the development of joint culture. The only way to achieve this interaction is through in-residence education in seminars or groups composed of a diverse mix of services in the student body and faculty. This is genuine JPME as described in the Skelton report:

> "…genuinely "joint;" that is, in an environment in which the military departments are equally represented and service biases minimized, and in which the joint curriculum is taught from a joint perspective--that of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a commander of a unified command, or a contingency joint task force commander at the 3-star level." [103]

Virtual classrooms and distance learning can supplement but can never replace in-residence learning. For only face-to-face discussions can facilitate genuine JPME.

Some have claimed the services always come together in a time of crisis or combat, that jointness has never been a problem in past conflicts. This is sometimes true but often not. In the cases in which it is true, Massey's theory indicates that combat is a significant emotional event that challenges the individuals gut value system of service culture. The intense desire to survive drives service members to reevaluate their service-centric values, resulting in a new value system that embraces survival by mutual cooperation, trust and understanding between the services—jointness. Often this does not occur quickly enough and its absence is a contributor to lost first battles. At other times, the conflict is not long enough for a new value system to develop such as Operations Eagle Claw and Just Cause. Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson as the deputy director of

[103] Skelton Report, 83.

the Marine War College noticed that this same type of learning or SEE can occur in small mixed service seminars and claims that in the absence of combat the seminar can substitute for the cauldron of combat.[104]

As stated earlier, the primary purpose of JPME should be to develop, foster, and enhance jointness. Since jointness is a culture composed of many individuals entering from diverse backgrounds and experiences, this can only be done by directly targeting individual value systems in order to develop a joint culture. Targeting value systems and indoctrinating members into a culture is nothing new to the military, many businesses or society. The key piece for this to occur is face-to-face contact continued throughout the officer's career. Since precommissioning corresponds with the most important of Massey's phases of development, imprinting, this is the foundation of the officer's perception of warfare and should be heavily if not solely joint. This is increasingly important since many individuals at this career point are young, impressionable and usually do not know which service they would like to belong, much less what they actually want to do in the military. Once begun, JPME must be continued periodically throughout the officer's career. As cultures grow, change and adapt to their environments, continuous genuine JPME will ensure the culture remains viable.

Recognizing that for joint organizations to be effective the officers must still develop and retain a competency in their service; primary education and training must be heavily weighed in favor of the service. After the primary level, officer responsibilities become increasingly broad requiring a corresponding breadth of knowledge and an increasing emphasis on joint education.[105] The emphasis should continue to shift toward jointness until retirement. A general pictorial of emphasis is shown in table 7.

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[104] Wilkerson, 67. The Skelton Commission echoed this concept during their discussion on the value of mixed student bodies and faculties. The following quote is indicative of the discussion: "In mixed seminars, a student who attempts to impose his service bias on the discussion will immediately be challenged.", Skelton Report, 64.

[105] Table 2 (page 11) Key Skelton Commission Conclusion 7. "As an officer ascends in rank and assumes broader responsibilities, his focus on both joint matters and strategy should increase."



It must be noted that this general concept of officer education is very similar to the current framework. The primary differences are the strong genuine JPME emphasis at the beginning of a career and the requirement for genuine JPME throughout a career in lieu of joint education from a service perspective in the precommissioning, primary and early intermediate phases in the current framework. (See Appendix C for a concise summary of the current basic PME framework.)

Chicken or the Egg— Primacy

Many scholars and soldiers have put forth the argument that in order for a joint force to be effective each officer must first be an expert in his own service. The first argument against this position is a matter of semantics, but a critical one. It is better to state an effective officer must be competent or proficient in his service for several reasons relating to what expertise implies. When does an officer become an expert in his service? Under close scrutiny, the answer

is probably never. He may eventually become an expert in his particular branch or warfare specialty, but it is unlikely he will ever be a true expert on everything his service does. Secondly, if indeed this were possible and jointness was delayed until after service expertise was achieved, very few officers would ever concern themselves with joint matters, and this would only occur very late in their career. The other obvious reason for adopting service competence is to avoid delaying joint education or assignment. Perhaps a more detailed variation of the position is better. An effective officer should obtain service competence appropriate for his rank or position. This is a subtle distinction, but one that appears in the Skelton report as both service competence and expertise.[106] The third and most important reason is the issue of primacy.

Currently PME has primacy over JPME. The OPMEP and Skelton Report state JPME is that portion of PME, which is focused on joint matters.[107] While every officer attends the service required PME schools, only a few will attend genuine JPME. Services schedule JPME attendance when it is most convenient and least disruptive to the officer's service career requirements. Part of the reason for this is provided by the acceptance of the first position; service expertise comes before working joint. The other is the flat out resistance to joint education and training, either for cultural reasons or a pragmatic prioritization of time. If all warfare is joint (and interagency) as JV2020 and numerous others have espoused, then JPME should be the study of warfare; its theory, history and doctrine. This is something all officers regardless of service should know and understand. If JPME is the study of warfare in its entirety, then service PME or that portion of warfare focused on a particular medium (sea, air, land, space, information, etc.) is a sub-set of JPME. Even if this argument is rejected out of hand, primacy to JPME must be accepted for pragmatic scheduling reasons. In almost any organization common education and training required by all personnel is scheduled and resourced first. The specialty

[106] "…the best joint officer is one who is expert in his or her own service.", Skelton Report, 69. and "Joint Specialty Officers must as a prerequisite to further professional growth, be competent in their own service.", Skelton Report, 55.
[107] CJCS, *OPMEP*, A-B-1.

items are developed second in order to avoid redundancy, increase efficiency and (hopefully) effectiveness. All officers need JPME from pre-commissioning until retirement. Therefore the JCS should develop this system first. The services should review what their officers will learn in the joint program and develop their own to fill any gaps.

CHAPTER FOUR

CONCLUSIONS

The GNA was a call to jointness that was only partially heeded and reluctantly implemented. A significant piece of the GNA was the requirement to create the Joint Officer Management Program; a means to quantify and enforce Congress's intent to create a joint force. The unfortunate result of this progressive act is jointness became viewed, and in many instances institutionalized, as a skill or qualification. Nowhere is this idea more evident than in the JSO.

The JSO, both as a concept itself and as a distracter, is the root of many of the conflicts between joint education concepts and their execution. As a concept the JSO is flawed because it attempts to replace understanding with procedures and process. It creates the illusion that jointness is a qualification and justifies restricting the number of officers who receive genuine joint education to a select few. This has created an organizational structure, which gives license to non-JSO officers to ignore joint issues and requirements. Additionally, it delays genuine joint education to a career point past when many officers have already served in a capacity requiring the planning and/or execution of joint operations.

As a distracter, the JSO has coerced the DOD to focus its JPME system on the production of JSOs in sufficient quantities to fill the JDAL. This goal has caused the education system to focus on training efficient staff officers instead of educating officers in their profession. Unfortunately, the JSO remains mandated by law. Consequently new legislation is required to correct the JSO problem.

The Skelton Commission concluded the PME system in 1989 did not have a recognizable framework. Either in support of the JSO concept or due to unspecified constraints the Skelton Report recommended a framework, which included two perspectives to joint education; a joint perspective and a service perspective. The Skelton Commission interpreted section 663 of Title IV to be a legal requirement for this dual perspective approach, however analysis of the law's text

indicates it is just an interpretation and not a requirement. The Skelton Report, while advocating the jointness from a service perspective concept of joint education, concurrently invalidated the same as an acceptable system for educating officers in joint matters, requiring all joint officers to attend genuine joint education, which is joint from a joint perspective. This and the compelling evidence of the Schein, Maslow and Snider studies invalidate the concept of joint education from a service perspective as well as, show jointness is indeed an organizational culture.

The current joint education system is a compromise. Despite the heralding of its arrival at the end of WWII, very little progress was made in joint reform until the GNA and the Skelton Report. The GNA was an unwelcome mandate for the DOD to become more joint and actively opposed by the Service Chiefs. After examining the concepts present in the GNA, the Skelton Report and the Skelton Commssion's conclusions it is puzzling why they did not recommend or mandate greater restructuring of the PME system, unless they were constrained or felt constrained. It is assumed that because of these constraints the GNA and Skelton Commission found it necessary to offer a framework that did not fully meet their joint education expectations. These constrains required a framework that was most importantly quantifiable (thus enforceable) and acceptable to most, therefore able to garner enough support for immediate execution.

The framework of the current OPMEP is sound in regards to the learning objectives nested within the learning areas of each education level. However, curriculum is only one third of the education structure and the least important of the three. Without a balanced representation of the services in the faculty and student body (the prime requirement of genuine joint education) none of the learning objectives can be fully understood collectively as a DOD organization despite the false appearance of understanding through the rote memorization of templated procedures and processes provided at the service schools.

The unstated intent of GNA was to create a joint force. JV2020 calls for full spectrum dominance by a fully integrated joint force. A joint force requires jointness; a collective understanding, bonding, and shared values – culture. The vast majority of JPME is conducted by

the invalid concept of jointness from a service perspective at service PME institutions with their skewed service representations. This system is incapable of developing much less fostering a joint understanding. As Lawrence Wilkerson pointed out in his essay "What Exactly Is Jointness", "jointness is not created by doctrine, joint or otherwise. It is brought about by people, good and bad."[108] In order to achieve jointness these people, good and bad, must be brought together continuously either on the training field or in the classroom (preferably both), but they must be brought together. The current system cannot achieve the collective understanding required to achieve genuine jointness and is therefore incapable of achieving the intent of the GNA or JV2020.

The intent of JV2020 is to create a fully joint force. This requires professional officers educated in the application of military power and a joint culture. Consequently the primary purpose of the JPME system should be to develop, foster, and enhance joint culture and achieve true understanding, defined by Schein as "language and thought processes that a group comes to share will be the ultimate causal determinant of feelings, attitudes, espoused values, and overt behavior."[109] The call to jointness is not a call to abandon service PME or culture. Even in a fully integrated joint force subcultures are natural, desirable and necessary. Effective and useful joint officers will still need to be competent in their service, which is and should remain the goal of service PME.

There is little opposition and strong support for joint education beginning as early as possible in an officer's career. The dissention surfaces on the type and the point when it should begin in earnest. Currently, joint education begins in earnest at the ILC level and it is at this level that the first genuine joint education is available to a select few officers. The glaring problem is the current system's acceptance of service PME in lieu of joint PME and the substitution of training in process and procedures for genuine joint education or culture and understanding.

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[108] Wilkerson, 66-67.
[109] Schein, 111.

Today's system is quite simply, too little too late. Schein's, Snider's and Massey's studies indicate that in order to achieve the intent of the GNA and JV2020 all officers must begin genuine JPME beginning at the precommissioning level and consistently maintained throughout their career.

The character of war is changing. Just as a strong PME system in the interwar period successfully navigated the U.S. military through major changes in early 20th century warfare, today that same dedication is necessary to prevail in these dynamic times. Only this time, a service centric education system is falling short of the mark.

CHAPTER FIVE

RECOMMENDATIONS

Although not profound, the key conclusion and central issue of this project is that jointness is a culture. Therefore, any education system designed to support the creation of a truly joint force as described in JV2020, must enhance or promote a joint culture as defined by Schein and Snider. The following recommendations are made with this as the primary goal. Fiscal issues were not considered. However, Richard Kohn and Arie De Guess illuminated valid and provoking points on this issue, "We spare no effort or expense to provide our soldiers with the finest weapons in history; we ought similarly to spare no expense in furnishing the best officers to lead them"[110] and "The ability to learn faster than your competitors may be the only sustainable competitive advantage."[111] It is understood that many of the following recommendations require a significant financial commitment, but as so many authors have shown, officer education throughout history has proven essential and has been substantially rewarded.

First and foremost, we must eliminate the self-defeating concept of jointness from a service perspective and institute genuine joint education for all officers from pre-commissioning to retirement. The key component of genuine joint education is a mixed service representation in the student body and faculty. This fits with the Snider, Schein and Maslow theories and studies. In order to develop an organizational culture the individuals of the organization must interact continuously over time. The requirement for interaction is clear and equally clear is this can only occur in-residence. Virtual classrooms or distance learning can augment and support the in-residence programs but it will not be a substitute for in-residence education.

Whatever course is selected, JPME should have primacy. All officers regardless of service share the same oath to support and defend the constitution and similar duties and

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[110] Richard H. Kohn, "An Officer Corps for the Next Century" (*Joint Force Quarterly*, Spring 1998), 77.
[111] Arie De Guess for Royal Dutch Shell was quoted in Richard A. Chilcoat, "The Revolution in Military Education" (*Joint Force Quarterly*, Summer 1999), 60.

responsibilities, which ultimately coalesce as the application of military power. Consequently the JPME requirements and framework should be laid out first. The services can fill in any gaps or close any seams required by the services with service PME or training, not the other way round as is the current situation.

The foundation and primary purpose of the JPME system should be to provide as much interaction 'as possible' between officers of all services and ranks in order to develop, foster and enhance jointness—joint culture. It appears the best way to provide the most interaction between officers of all services and ranks is to place them on a single piece of geography, therefore there should be a single university for military and national security studies; a national joint university. This university must become nationally recognized as the premier institution of its kind in order to attract the best and the brightest faculty and students drawn from both the military and the civilian population. The location is critical for attracting guest speakers, adjunct faculty and permanent faculty. Since, it is unlikely the DOD will ever be able to compete with civilian universities for faculty in regards to monetary compensation it is imperative the university's location is not equally unappealing. Also, it must be close enough to Washington D.C. to attract quality adjunct faculty, guest speakers and maintain political currency, but not too close as to become unduly hindered.[112] It must be a true university, "An institution for higher learning with teaching and research facilities comprising a graduate school and professional schools that award master's degrees and doctorates and an undergraduate division that awards bachelor's degrees."[113] As demonstrated earlier, joint education should focus on the history, theory and doctrine of war, consequently the degrees offered should be in the field of military art and science.

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[112] Van Crevald, *The Training of Officers*, 107-8. Van Crevald states "Just as there is only one conduct of war at the highest level, so there should only be a single national defense university (NDU) dedicated to studying and teaching it. … It should not be in Washington, D.C., which, as the center of power and news, in many ways offers too vulnerable an environment for serious thought and study. Nor, on the other hand, should it be located in some provincial backwater where a first-rate faculty will be impossible to assemble and retain."

[113] Margery Berube (Editor), *The American Heritage Dictionary, Second College Edition*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1985), 1323.

Ideally the campus would be home to the services' primary, intermediate, and senior level core colleges as well as the joint schools and possibly select precommissioning programs as well. There are many advantages to such an institution. First, placing all levels of service and joint education at a single geographic location will ensure the largest amount of interaction. This interaction between all ranks and services should be designed to occur in formal and informal settings beyond the classroom through a host of activities including; dinning halls, intramural sports and community activities. Of course, unplanned interactions would occur naturally, as well. This will create the conditions for a genuine joint culture to form and continually develop. Additionally, it will provide the necessary and often absent conduits for information flow from the lowest officer rank to the highest and back down; genuine and unfiltered. This should help keep senior officers in-touch with reality on the ground as well as allow the junior officers to fully understand the senior officers' vision and positions. It is reasonable to assume increased mentorship would also occur.

Secondly, any command post exercise (CPX), simulation or staff experiment could be conducted and coordinated among all the resident institutions. In addition to enhancing each school's education and training potential it would also provide useful information for the services and joint combatant commands. An example of such usefulness can be found with C3 systems' integration and interoperability. It can be assumed that the services would use their actual systems for the exercises and interoperability problems should surface quickly, providing many data points for correction or perhaps even provide the impetus for a single joint system accepted by all the services. The learning and education value of the exercises should be better than those currently run at isolated institutions, which have no choice, but to place officers in positions well above their experience and maturity level. With all the service and joint schools co-located, officers could fill positions appropriate to their grade and experience level vastly improving the education and training benefits. This would also provide a more realistic picture of how the staffs will actually function and what senior officers will expect of them. Real mentoring would occur

throughout the exercise. During these exercises the role of the Combined Joint Force Commander (CJFC), an O8 or O9 position, could be filled by an officer who has been or will very soon fill this position instead of what often occurs in the current framework were the CJFC is filled by a major (O4) or lieutenant colonel (O5). While the student CJFC climbs an incredibly steep learning curve all officers in the exercise suffer. The students are never sure if the exercise experience resembles reality. Consequently, they find it difficult to determine what lessons are to be learned and if those they think they learned are correct. This problem is exasperated by the scarcity of available mentoring. Officers find it difficult to receive any type of mentoring for their position since their exercise superiors are their peers.

Third, a component of a university is research. By co-locating such an enormous amount of experience, interviews and surveys could become routine with a large survey base improving the level of research.

Fourth, by offering a full degree program from bachelor to doctorate, it institutionalizes the life long learner concept and provides the medium to its accomplishment. It balances education with experience. Officers would attend the university periodically throughout their career. Offering the opportunity to reflect on their experiences and the shared experiences of others allowing for true learning to occur.

Precommissioning is more challenging than the other levels due to its historical and cultural connections. However, based on Massey's theories it is the most important, since it lays the foundation of how an officer will view warfare, as well as, his service's roles and responsibilities. Consequently, if the goal of JPME is to foster and develop a common understanding of the application of military power, genuine joint education must begin at the precommissioning level. Since education from a service perspective is not joint education, the current system is insufficient. Officer candidates must be inculcated with a joint perspective from the very beginning. The preponderance of precommissioning education must be genuine JPME in order to lay a solid joint war foundation. It is recommended that further study be conducted to

determine the most effective means to bring genuine JPME to the precommissioning level and explore the potential benefits of a joint commissioning program.

Awarding military degrees should be continued and expanded. Every officer should be required to earn at least a minor degree in military art and science as the foundation of their officer development. Cadets, Midshipman and Officer Candidates would be encouraged to complete a Bachelor of Arts (BA) program at the precommissioning level either by double majoring or selecting it as their major. All officers should be required to complete the requirements for a BA in military art and science as a graduation requirement at the primary education level at the national joint university. Master's of Military Art and Science (MMAS) would be awarded upon the successful completion of the joint intermediate level college.

The importance of education should be reflected in the promotion system. Obtaining a BA and MMAS should be prerequisites for promotion to O4 and O6 respectively. To ensure joint schools have the necessary prestige and attraction, authority to award the BA and MMAS degrees should be retained at the joint schools and not divested to the service PME institutions. Exceptions to the military art and science requirement should be made for officers in certain, but not all, technical specialties such as medicine, lawyers, chaplains and certain engineering fields.

The GNA was critical to the success of today's fighting force, but parts of Title IV are impeding the development of a joint culture. In order to eliminate the perception that jointness is a qualification the Title IV JSO requirements must be rescinded and the JOM modified (refer to table 1, page 7). It is time to enact new legislation reflecting the following modifications to the GNA:

1. Modify the joint officer management policies and eliminate the "joint specialty" occupational category (JSO), but retain the JDAL in order to quantify joint experience. The JDAL should be expanded to reflect junior (company and department head officer level) officer positions.
2. JDA should be a requirement for senior officer promotions to O6 and above.

3. Eliminate the requirement for the Secretary to ensure that the qualifications of officers assigned to joint duty assignments are such that certain promotion rates will be achieved. If the suggested recommendations are enacted this will become unnecessary and with the elimination of the JSO and JOM will be difficult to track and enforce.

Retain or conduct a separate study to evaluate the following GNA requirements:

1. Require the Chairman of the JCS to evaluate the joint duty performance of officers recommended for three- and four-star rank.
2. Direct the Secretary to advise the President on the qualifications needed by officers to serve in three- and four-star positions.
3. Set forth a promotion review process for officers who are serving, or who have served, in joint duty assignments.

Finally, a professional study of the type described by Schein is recommended to determine the present condition of cultures within the DOD and determine areas for focus, development and improvement.

APPENDIX A

Summary of Goldwater Nichols Directives[114]

TITLE I: Department of Defense Generally
- Amends Federal Armed Forces provisions to set forth the organization of the Department of Defense.

1. Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) annually provide:
    a) To the components written policy guidance for the preparation of the components' program and budget proposals.
    b) To the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) written policy guidance for the preparation and review of contingency plans.
    c) To inform the Secretaries of military departments of DOD military operations and activities which directly affect their respective responsibilities.

2. Establishes the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Allows armed forces officers to be detailed to the staff, but prohibits the establishment of a military staff in the office.

3. Provides for the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy.

4. Provides for a Director of Defense Research and Engineering.

5. Provides for a Comptroller of DOD.

6. Recognizes the appointment and duties of the Inspector General of DOD.

TITLE II: Military Advice and Command Functions

Part A: Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Revises Federal provisions relating to the composition and function of the JCS.

1. Includes the following as members in the JCS: (1) the Chairman; (2) the Vice Chairman; (3) the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and of the Air Force; (4) the Chief of Naval Operations; and (5) the Commandant of the Marine Corps.

2. Requires the President, subject to waiver, to assign to JCS only officers who have served in one or more joint duty positions for a substantial period of time.

3. Chairman of JCS shall be the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the SECDEF.

4. Requires the Chairman of JCS to:
    (a) convene regular JCS meetings

[114] This annex was extracted directly from the following source with changes to formatting and some paraphrasing or summarizing, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?do99:hr03622:@@@d/tom:bss/d099query.htm

(b) consult with and seek the advice of JCS members and commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands.
(c) Authorizes a member of JCS to present advice or an opinion in disagreement or in addition to advice provided by the Chairman.

5. Sets forth administrative provisions concerning: (1) the appointment and term of the Chairman; (2) the Chairman's presiding over the JCS; and (3) other functions of the Chairman relating to the planning of military manpower, strategy, and readiness capabilities.

6. Requires the Chairman, not less than once every three years or upon request from the President, to report to the SECDEF concerning recommended changes in the function assignments of the armed forces.

7. Establishes the position of the Vice Chairman of JCS.
(a) Duties as may be delegated by the Chairman with the approval of the SECDEF.
(b) Requires the Vice Chairman to act as CJCS in the event of a vacancy in that position.

8. Establishes in DOD a Joint Staff under the Chairman of JCS.
(a) Assists the Chairman and other members of JCS in their responsibilities.
(b) Requires the Joint Staff to include officers selected by the Chairman in approximately equal numbers from the various military departments.

9. Requires the Chairman, no later than one year after the enactment of this Act, to report to the SECDEF concerning recommendations for changes in the function assignments of Joint Staff members.

10. Authorizes the Chairman (or the Vice-Chairman) of JCS to attend and participate in meetings of the National Security Council (NSC), as principal military adviser to the NSC and subject to the direction of the President.

Part B: Combatant Commands
- Adds a new chapter to general military law concerning the operation in the armed forces of combatant commands.

1. Directs the President to establish unified and specified combatant commands to perform military missions and to prescribe the force structure of such commands.

2. Directs the Chairman of the JCS to periodically (and not less often than every two years):
(a) review the missions, responsibilities, and force structure of each combatant command.
(b) recommend to the President, through the Secretary, any necessary changes.

3. Directs the President to notify the Congress within 60 days after:
(a) Establishing a new combatant command; or
(b) Significantly revising the missions, responsibilities, or force structure of an existing combatant command.

4. Requires all combatant forces of the military departments to be assigned to combatant commands.

5. Provides that the operational chain of command for combatant commands shall run from the President to the SECDEF to the commanders of the combatant commands.

6. Allows the President to utilize the Chairman of JCS in the operational chain of command at his discretion.

7. Requires the Chairman of JCS to serve as spokesman for the combatant commanders concerning operational requirements.

8. Outlines provisions concerning assignment by the President of combatant commanders. Requires any commander so assigned to have previously served in one or more joint duty positions for a substantial period of time.

9. Outlines administrative provisions concerning the operational chain of command within each unified or specified combatant command.

10. Requires the SECDEF to provide for the administration and support of combatant forces assigned to each combatant command.

11. Provides that the Secretary of each military department is responsible for the administration and support of forces assigned by him to a combatant command.

12. Directs the Secretary to include in the annual budget of the DOD a separate budget proposal for activities of each of the unified and specified combatant commands. Outlines information concerning activities of such combatant commands to be included in such proposals.

13. Lists matters to be considered in the initial review of combatant commands.

14. Repeals the prohibition against consolidating certain functions of the military transportation commands, as contained in the DOD Authorization Act, 1983.

15. Repeals the prohibition against altering the command structure for military forces in Alaska, as contained in the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1986.

16. Authorizes the President to waive certain qualifications for assignment as combatant commander.

Title III: Defense agencies and DOD Field Activities

1. Authorizes the Secretary to provide for the performance of a supply or service activity that is common to more than one military department by a single agency of DOD, upon determination that such action would be more effective, economical, or efficient.

2. Provides that such single agency shall be designated as a defense agency or a DOD Field Activity.

3. Directs the Secretary to assign overall supervision of such designated entities to a civilian officer in the OSD or to the Chairman of the JCS.

4. Requires the Chairman of the JCS to review and advise the Secretary on the readiness of certain defense agencies to carry out their wartime support missions.

5. Requires the Chairman of the JCS to provide for the participation of certain defense agencies in joint training exercises.

6. Requires the Chairman of the JCS to develop a readiness reporting system for certain defense agencies.

7. Directs the Secretary, the Chairman of the JCS, and the Secretaries of the military departments to conduct separate studies of the functions and organizational structure of the defense agencies and Field Activities.

8. Directs the Secretary to undertake a biennial review of the defense agencies and Field Activities.
Reduces the number of headquarters and non-headquarters personnel serving in the defense agencies and Field Activities.

Title IV: Joint Officer Personnel Policy

1. Establishes joint officer management policies.

2. Establishes an occupational category, the "joint specialty," for the management of officers who are trained in and oriented to joint matters.

3. Provides that joint specialty officers (JSO) shall be selected by the Secretary from nominees submitted by the Secretaries of the military departments.

4. Requires such officers to have completed a joint education program and a full joint duty tour.

5. Requires that one-half of joint duty positions above captain/Navy lieutenant be filled by officers who have been nominated or selected for the joint specialty.

6. Directs the Secretary to designate at least 1,000 critical joint duty assignments that must always be filled by JSOs.

7. Requires the Secretary to establish career guidelines for JSOs.

8. Requires all officers promoted to general or flag rank to attend a CAPSTONE education course on working with the other armed forces.

9. Requires immediate assignment to joint duty for graduates of a joint school.

10. Sets forth a promotion review process for officers who are serving, or who have served, in joint duty assignments.

11. Requires the Secretary to ensure that the qualifications of officers assigned to joint duty assignments are such that certain promotion rates will be achieved.

12. Prohibits (subject to a waiver by the Secretary) promotion to general or flag rank unless the officer has served in a joint duty assignment.

13. Requires the Chairman of the JCS to evaluate the joint duty performance of officers recommended for three- and four-star rank.

14. Directs the Secretary to advise the President on the qualifications needed by officers to serve in three- and four-star positions.

Title V: Military Departments –

Part A: Department of the Army

1. Revises Federal provisions concerning the organization of the Department of the Army to require that the Secretary of the Army be appointed by the President, with the consent of the Senate.

2. Outlines various administrative functions for which the Secretary shall be responsible.

3. Establishes in the Department of the Army an Office of the Secretary of the Army to assist the Secretary.

4. Requires the Office of the Secretary of the Army to include the following: (1) the Under Secretary of the Army; (2) the Assistant Secretaries of the Army; (3) the Inspector General of the Army; (4) the Army Reserve Forces Policy Committee; and (5) the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army; (6) the General Counsel of the Department of the Army; and (7) such other offices or officers as the Secretary may designate. Limits the total number of personnel assigned to the Office of the Secretary.

5. Establishes the position of Under Secretary of the Army and five Assistant Secretaries of the Army (one of which is to be the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs and another the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works).

6. Establishes the position of Inspector General of the Army, and such deputies and assistants as the Secretary may prescribe.

7. Establishes the position of General Counsel of the Department of the Army, to be appointed from civilian life by the President.

8. Establishes in the executive part of the Department of the Army an Army Staff to assist the Secretary. Outlines the composition (including a Chief of Staff and a Vice Chief of Staff) of such Army Staff and limits, except in time of war and certain other times, the total number of personnel assigned to such duty.
9. Outlines various responsibilities of the Chief of Staff.
Limits the number of Deputy Chiefs of Staff to five, and of Assistant Chiefs of Staff to three.

Part B: Department of the Navy

1. Repeals and transfers current Federal law defining the composition of the Department of the Navy.

2. Revises provisions concerning the composition of the Department of the Navy to include in such Department the following: (1) the Office of the Secretary of the Navy; (2) the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations; (3) the Headquarters, Marine Corps; (4) the entire operating forces of

the Navy and Marine Corps; (5) all activities, forces, and functions under the control of the Secretary of the Navy; and (6) the Coast Guard, when it is operating as a service in the Navy.

3. Provides for a seal for the Department.

4. Requires that the Secretary of the Navy be appointed by the President, with the consent of the Senate.

5. Outlines various responsibilities of the Secretary. Authorizes the Secretary to make appropriate recommendations to the Congress relating to DOD and to delegate certain powers and duties.

6. Establishes in the Department of the Navy an Office of the Secretary of the Navy to assist the Secretary.

7. Requires the Office of the Secretary of the Navy to include the following: (1) the Under Secretary of the Navy; (2) the Assistant Secretaries of the Navy; (3) the Naval Inspector General; (4) the Chief of Naval Research; (5) the Judge Advocate General of the Navy; (6) the General Counsel of the Department of the Navy; and (7) such other offices or officers as the Secretary may designate.

8. Requires the Secretary to ensure that there is no duplication of functions within the Department.

9. Limits the total number of personnel assigned to the Office of the Secretary.

10. Establishes the position of Under Secretary of the Navy and four Assistant Secretaries of the Navy (one of which is to be the Assistant Secretary for Manpower and Reserve Affairs).

11. Provides for succession to the position of Secretary of the Navy if a succession is required, consistent with changes made under this Act.

12. Authorizes the Secretary of the Navy to appoint an Administrative Assistant in the Office of the Secretary of the Navy.

13. Establishes the position of General Counsel of the Department of the Navy, to be appointed from civilian life by the President.

14. Revises Federal provisions concerning the composition and functions of the Chief of Naval Operations to include in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations the following: (1) the Chief and the Vice Chief of Naval Operations; (2) not more than five Deputy Chiefs of Naval Operations; (3) not more than three Assistant Chiefs of Naval Operations; (4) the Surgeon General of the Navy; (5) the Chief of Naval Personnel; (6) the Chief of Chaplains of the Navy; and (7) other members of the Navy and Marine Corps and civilians assigned to such Office.

15. Limits, except in time of war and certain other times, the total number of military and civilian personnel assigned to such Office.
16. Requires the Office to furnish professional assistance to the Secretary, the Under Secretary, the Assistant Secretaries, and the Chief of Naval Operations.

17. Revises provisions concerning the Chief of Naval Operations to outline various powers and functions.

18. Requires the Chief, in addition to such specified duties, to also perform duties as a member of JCS.

19. Provides for the retirement of the Chief at the rate of admiral.

20. Establishes the position of Vice Chief of Naval Operations.

21. Establishes not more than five Deputy Chiefs of Naval Operations and not more than three Assistant Chiefs of Naval Operations within the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

22. Revises provisions concerning the organization of the Marine Corps headquarters to establish in the executive part of the Department of the Navy a Headquarters, Marine Corps, to assist the Secretary of the Navy in carrying out responsibilities connected with the Marine Corps.

a. Requires such Headquarters to consist of: (1) the Commandant of the Marine Corps; (2) the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps; (3) the Chief of Staff of the Marine Corps; (4) not more than five Deputy Chiefs of Staff; (5) not more than three Assistant Chiefs of Staff; and (6) other members of the Navy and Marine Corps and civilians assigned to the Headquarters, Marine Corps.

b. Requires such Headquarters to furnish professional assistance to the Secretary, Under Secretary, the Assistant Secretaries of the Navy, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Outlines specified functions and duties of such Headquarters.

23. Outlines the functions, powers, and duties of the Commandant of the Marine Corps, who performs such duties under the authority and control of the Secretary of the Navy. Requires the Commandant, in addition to such duties, to also perform the duties required as a member of JCS.

23. Establishes the position of Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps to perform such duties as prescribed by the Commandant.

24. Provides that the Secretary of the Navy has custody and charge of all department records and property.

Part C: Department of the Air Force

1. Revises Federal provisions relating to the composition and functions of the Department of the Air Force to require that the Secretary of the Air Force be appointed by the President, with the consent of the Senate.

2. Outlines various functions within the Department of the Air Force for which the Secretary is responsible.

3. Requires the Secretary, in addition to such specified duties, to also make recommendations to the Congress relating to DOD.

4. Establishes in the Department of the Air Force an Office of the Secretary of the Air Force to assist the Secretary. Includes in the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force the following: (1) the Under Secretary of the Air Force; (2) the Assistant Secretaries of the Air Force; (3) the Inspector General of the Air Force; (4) the Air Reserve Forces Policy Committee; (5) the General Counsel

of the Department of the Air Force; and (6) such other offices and officers as the Secretary may designate. Limits the total number of military and civilian personnel assigned to such Office, except in time of war or national emergency.

5. Establishes the positions of Under Secretary of the Air Force, three Assistant Secretaries of the Air Force (one of which is to be the Assistant Secretary for Manpower and Reserve Affairs) and Inspector General of the Air Force, with such deputies and assistants as the Secretary may prescribe.
6. Authorizes the Secretary of the Air Force to appoint an Administrative Assistant in the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force.

7. Establishes the position of General Counsel of the Department of the Air Force, to be appointed from civilian life by the President.

8. Revises Federal provisions relating to the composition of the Air Staff of the Air Force to include in such Air Staff the following: (1) the Chief of Staff and Vice Chief of Staff; (2) not more than five Deputy Chiefs of Staff; (3) not more than three Assistant Chiefs of Staff; (4) the Surgeon General of the Air Force; (5) the Judge Advocate General of the Air Force; (6) the Chief of the Air Force Reserve; and (7) other military and civilian employees assigned to the Air Staff.

9. Limits the total number of military and civilian personnel assigned to the Air Staff.

10. Outlines general duties of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, who is directly responsible to the Secretary of the Air Force. Requires the Deputy Chiefs of Staff and Assistant Chiefs of Staff to be general officers detailed to such positions.

Part D: General Conforming Amendments and Transition Provisions
- Sets forth general conforming amendments and transition provisions.

Title VI: Miscellaneous

1. Reduces the number of personnel serving on the lower-level headquarters staffs of the military departments and the unified and specified combatant commands.

2. Reduces the number of defense reports required by the Congress from the President and the DOD.

3. Requires the President to submit an annual report to the Congress on national security strategy.

APPENDIX B

Expanded Skelton Commission Conclusions

1. PME is vital to our national security.
2. PME is becoming increasingly important.
3. The best officers can and should have both operational duty and education. While today's readiness may suffer slightly when a fine commander goes to school, when he returns from school his increased knowledge should mean higher future payoffs.
4. The DoD military education system is sound.
5. Despite the soundness of the system, improvements can be made. … Department of Defense should have a clear and coherent conceptual framework for the PME school system as a whole.[115]
6. Defining the JSO is the crux of the problem. [116]
7. The effective joint officer is one who is expert (or competent) in his or her own service.
8. True joint education can only take place in an environment in which the military departments are equally represented and service biases minimized, and in which the joint curriculum is taught from a joint perspective.
9. Joint education is a major way to change the professional military culture so that officers accept and support the strengthened joint elements and is important both for learning facts and for affecting attitudes and values.
10. The major subject of professional military education should be the employment of combat forces.
11. As an officer ascends in rank and assumed broader responsibilities, his focus on both joint matters and strategy should increase.
12. The intermediate education level is the appropriate point to begin intensive study of joint matters and strategy.
13. JDAL is too large and "can and should be both improved and reduced significantly", which will reduce the amount of JPME required and save money.
14. Not knowing what should be done, defaults to doing what you know.

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[115] Ike Skelton (Chairman), Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives One Hundred First Congress, First Session. *Report of the Panel on Military education of the One hundredth Congress* [The Skelton Report], (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), 17-19. The first five bullets presented in this section are drawn directly from the Reports Introduction Chapter, a sub-section titled Overall Panel Views. The committee believed knowing the panel developed these views is necessary to understanding the report.

[116] The remaining conclusions were drawn from the text of the report and not necessary listed or acknowledged by the committee as conclusions. They are statements from the report, with as little paraphrasing as practical. This list should not to be considered an all-encompassing list of conclusions. The page references are listed with the bullet number preceding the reference page number in parentheses; 6(52), 7(69), 8(83), 9(11-12), 10(7), 11(14), 12(14), 13(14), 14(18), 15(24), 16(28), 17(50) and 18(70).

15. Service interests, unleavened by a larger perspective, have tended to dominate the development of U.S. military policy.
16. The goals of the PME system with respect to strategists should be two-fold: (1) improve the quality of strategic thinking among senior military officers and (2) to encourage the development of a more limited number of bona fide theoretical strategists. The panel believes these goals are realistic and achievable.
17. After review of the evolution of PME since WW II, a return to historical roots is indicated. The GNA, with its emphasis on the imperatives of joint warfare and the consequent strengthening of joint institutions, demands a reappraisal of the direction in which professional military education has evolved. What WW II military leaders learned from that war about how to structure military education is more consistent with the demands of the GNA than the PME system today [1989].
18. The curriculum as defined by the syllabus and the curriculum taught in the classroom varied significantly.

APPENDIX C

Summary of current PME and JPME Framework[117]

1. "A comprehensive frame of reference depicting the **sequential and progressive** nature of PME."

2. Divided into 5 military educational levels – designed to "**build upon** the **knowledge and values gained at previous levels.**"
   a. Precommissioning
   b. Primary
   c. Intermediate
   d. Senior
   e. General Officer/Flag Officer

3. Each educational level focus is defined in terms of the major levels of war; tactical, operational, strategic as outlined in the Universal Joint Task List.

4. "The framework also recognizes both the distinctiveness and interdependence of joint service schools in officer education. Service schools, in keeping with their role of developing Service specialists, place emphasis on education primarily from a Service perspective in accordance with joint learning areas and objectives. Joint schools emphasize joint education from a joint perspective."

5. PME entails the systematic instruction of professionals in subjects enhancing their knowledge of science and art of war.

6. JPME is that portion of PME that supports fulfillment of the educational requirements for joint officer management.

[117] Information for the Annex is drawn from CJCSI 1800.01A Appendix B "Officer Professional Military Educational Framework.

Table 8

OFFICER MILITARY EDUCATION FRAMEWORK[1] (Figure 1)					
GRADE	**CADET/MIDSHIPMAN**	**0-1/0-2/0-3**	**0-3/0-4**	**0-5/0-6**	**0-7/0-8**
EDUCATION LEVEL	**PRECOMMISSIONING**	**PRIMARY**	**INTERMEDIATE**	**SENIOR**	**GENERAL/FLAG**
EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND COURSES	SERVICE ACADEMIES ROTC OCS/OTS	- Branch, Warfare, or Staff Specialty Schools - Primary-Level PME Courses	- Air Command & Staff College - Army Command & General Staff College - College of Naval Command & Staff - Marine Corps Command & Staff College - Joint Forces Staff College[1] Joint & Combined Staff Officer School	- Air War College - Army War College - College of Naval Warfare - Marine Corps War College - Industrial College of the Armed Forces[2] - National War College[2] - Joint Forces Staff College[3] Joint & Combined Warfighting School	- CAPSTONE
LEVELS OF WAR EMPHASIZED	CONCEPTUAL AWARENESS OF ALL LEVELS	TACTICAL →	OPERATIONAL →	STRATEGIC →	
FOCUS OF MILITARY EDUCATION	Introduction To Services' Missions	- Assigned Branch, Warfare, or Staff Specialty	- Warfighting within the context of Operational Art	- Service Schools: National Military Strategy - NCW: National Security Strategy - ICAF: National Security Strategy with emphasis on the Resource Components	- Joint Matters and national Security - Interagency Process - Multinational Operations
JOINT EMPHASIS	*Joint Introduction* - National Military Capabilities and Organization - Foundation of Joint Warfare	*Joint Awareness* - Joint Warfare Fundamentals - Joint Campaigning	*JPME Phase I* - National Military Capabilities and Command Structure - Joint Doctrine - Joint and Multinational Forces at the Operational Level of War - Joint Planning and Execution Processes - Information Operations	*JPME Phase I* - National Security Strategy - National Planning systems and Processes - National Military Strategy and Organization - Theater Strategy and Campaigning - The Role of Technology in 21st Century Warfare	*Joint CAPSTONE* - National Security Strategy - Joint Operational Art
			JPME Phase II[3] - National Security and Military Strategy in development of theater strategies - Theater Engagement and Campaign Planning with joint, multinational and interagency organizations - JSPS, JOPES and operational-level battlespace systems integration through deliberate and crisis planning		

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