STREAMLINING NATIONAL SECURITY

By COL Richard W. Dillon
Department of the Army Support Branch

September 11 saw America under attack by international terrorism. Just a few days earlier, more than sixty subject matter experts, representing state and federal agencies, the private sector, and academia, met at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, for a workshop conducted by the Center for Strategic Leadership to explore challenges and opportunities associated with the concept of Streamlining National Security Overseas and in the Homeland. Specifically, the 5 to 7 September workshop reviewed existing and conceptual national security organizations—their structures and their role in support of new concepts for military deployments and employment overseas and defense within the homeland—looking for insights and issues related to improved effectiveness and efficiency. These insights and issues will be further explored in future forums.

Distinguished speakers opened the workshop with presentations focusing on the difficulties of change. Dr. David E. Johnson of RAND presented Whither the American Blitzkrieg? Innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917–1945; The Honorable James R. Locher III followed with Defense Reform in the 1980’s: Congress to the Rescue; and COL (Ret.) Samuel C. Raines of Booz, Allen and Hamilton, concluded the opening presentations with Streamlining National Security and Our Military Forces. Subsequently, the workshop split into two working groups to examine organizations and processes related to Homeland and Overseas operations. Professor Mike Pasquaret, of CSL’s Operations and Gaming Division, led the Overseas Group, while COL Peter Menk, of the Strategic Studies Institute, guided the Homeland Security Group. The groups then shared their findings in a final plenary session.

Two outstanding special guest speakers, ADM (Ret.) T. Joseph Lopez and GEN (Ret.) Dennis J. Reimer, provided insightful presentations during evening social sessions for participants.

A number of recommendations and issues were developed by participants, many common to both Homeland and Overseas and several unique to a particular area. Papers describing the findings of both the Homeland and Overseas Groups may be found on the CSL Publications web page. A follow-up four-star roundtable is planned for early November to review key findings and collect additional insights.

CJCS SEMINAR ON PEACE OPERATIONS

By COL Michael Dooley
U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute

From 10 to 12 July 2001, the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute (PKI), in conjunction with the National Defense University (NDU), hosted the seventh annual Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff seminar on peace operations to focus on interagency planning and coordination in order to address the changing nature of complex crises since the end of the Cold War.

The seminar was designed to build on the work that had already been done in the Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) process. The first goal was to outline a simple yet useable format for the initial national security guidance. Second, the seminar was to discuss pol-mil plans and devise a methodology for bringing together the work of all departments in the U.S. Government. The final goal of the seminar was to discuss methods to help educate and train members of the interagency and to discuss mechanisms to review past crises to garner lessons learned.

Seminar participation from key elements of the U.S. Government, including the Departments of State (DOS), Justice (DOJ), and Defense (DOD), combined with participation from the Joint Staff, CIA, the Services, and all regional Commanders in Chief (CINC), ensured a broad and open ex-
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change of views. In all, 79 attendees (37 from the DOD community, 26 from State, and 16 from NSC, Justice, and the CIA) joined the seminar. Faculty members from the Army War College, NDU’s Institute for Strategic Studies, the National War College, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and a representative from the Department of State were used to facilitate work groups’ discussions and recommendations.

Vice Admiral Walter Doran, Assistant to the Chairman, began the seminar by stressing a need for more interagency cooperation. Noting that members of the Government needed innovative methods for dealing with complex contingencies, he charged participants to go beyond problem identification and implement action plans. Admiral Doran discussed the need for an effective system for decision making, an accountable authority for planning, and the key role that training plays in maintaining an effective system.

Admiral Joseph Prueher, former U.S. Ambassador to the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), was the keynote speaker. He spoke from his experiences as both the Ambassador to the PRC during the recent crisis involving the EP-3 aircrew held on Hainan Island and his time as CINC, Pacific Command. Ambassador Prueher stressed that we need to be proactive toward managing crises, rather than reactive. He also highlighted the many dimensions to these complex global issues—political, economic, and military; interagency members must avoid a myopic view of the problem. He also stressed that future crises may demand an international response; the United States should not tackle these unilaterally and needs to maintain open channels of communication with people from other nations.

The afternoon of 10 July was devoted to two panels. The first panel focused on the development of elements needed for national strategic guidance—guidance from the top. Representatives from the NSC, State, Defense, Justice, and the Joint Staff spoke on their department’s views on what is required in top-down guidance. Elliot Abrams, the Special Assistant to the President for Democracy, Human Rights, and International Operations, National Security Council, outlined National Security Policy Directive 1.

The second panel focused on pol-mil planning. Panelists came from NSC, Defense, State, and Southern Command. Dennis Skocz, Director for Contingency Plans and Peacekeeping Office, State Department, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, outlined the many pol-mil plans that had been developed in the last four years. The plans varied from very extensive to brief outlines. The previous administration’s directive on pol-mil planning was only the start. Interagency members need to synchronize and coordinate every facet of interagency planning.

The second day of the seminar began with a presentation by Ambassador Ruth Davis, Director General of the Foreign Service and Human Resources for the State Department. Ambassador Davis is responsible for the education, training, and management of all Foreign Service personnel. She stressed the need for interagency cooperation in preparing for the next crisis. Secretary Powell has charged her with the responsibility of ensuring personnel within the State Department undergo crisis management training. Ambassador Davis went on to mention the role of the Crisis Management Office in the Foreign Service Institute. It is the key agency within the State Department for training personnel on crisis management and reviewing the lessons from past crises.

Two key representatives from past administrations then focused on lessons gleaned from previous crises. Ambassador James Dobbins, former Assistant Secretary of State and Special Assistant to President Clinton, addressed his experiences managing Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Ambassador Dobbins analyzed each of these crises based on five factors: the mandate, communications, Washington crisis management, civil-military relations, and rule of law. Mr. William Martin, former Executive Secretary of the NSC under President Reagan, stressed that every member of the administration, including the President, needs education on the management of complex contingencies.

At this point in the seminar, participants divided into three work groups. One work group focused on the development of a national strategic guidance, the second group on a general guide for a pol-mil plan, and the third on recommendations for two objectives: to advance interagency members’ education and training and to develop a better review process.

Group One discussed the need for top-down guidance and agreed that some specific guidance is necessary to help the interagency members develop options to deal with potential crises. The guidance should come from the Principals Committee but will probably be drafted by the responsible PCC. Guidance should include the following elements: situation, strategic goals, conceptual strategic approach, planning factors, and planning coordination. The group also identified the need for guidance identifying a lead agency and on what is expected from other agencies and departments, fully recognizing that which agency will lead and what will be expected of other agencies will vary from one plan to the next.

Group Two focused on pol-mil planning. An outline of a comprehensive pol-mil plan had been used within the interagency community for several years, but it had no formal basis. The group came to the conclusion that there is a definite need for a common planning framework. The facilitators agreed with Group One that there is a need for some top-down guidance so that planning can begin in the right direction. Consensus was reached that a pol-mil plan may vary in length, and the group endorsed an extensive generic outline (sent to all participants as a read ahead) for a pol-mil plan, but only as a guide, not as a template. The essential elements that are needed in every pol-mil plan include an executive overview, a situation assessment, identification of U.S. interests, a concept of operation or options, preparatory tasks, major mission tasks, and agency plans. The group acknowledged that the generic pol-mil plan could serve to
create anything from a one to two page plan outline to a much more detailed plan.

The third working group looked at education, training and an after action review process for interagency members. This group recommended that NDU should act as the executive agent for these programs. The group also recognized that there is no need to create additional structures to perform these functions, rather the competence of existing institutions, such as War Colleges, National Foreign Affairs Training Center, PKI, and others should be leveraged for this effort. The group stressed the need for multilevel training and education. Every department should support these events and stress continued interagency coordination and communication. In addition, existing institutions should use innovative techniques to enhance learning, such as distance learning. Finally, work group three recommended institutionalizing an interagency after action review process.

The seminar closed with general expressions of praise for taking on this vitally important issue. Participants said this was the right subject at the right time. The Peacekeeping Institute will publish a complete record of this seminar in a few months.

DEPLOYMENT AND ACTIVATION REHEARSAL AND TRAINING

By COL Donald R. Kirk
Department of the Army Support Branch

The Joint Program Office, National Missile Defense (JPO NMD), of the Ballistic Missile Defense Office, conducted a weeklong exercise from 13 to 17 August at the Center for Strategic Leadership. The exercise, DART II, is part of the Deployment and Activation Rehearsal and Training (DART) series of exercises, which is designed to rehearse, train, and examine the National Missile Defense site activation process from “Deployment Readiness Review” through full operational capability.

DART II was an interactive simulation with four primary objectives: to assess the Alaska 04 missile defense system test bed, to assess and validate synchronization of the Block 04/06 program at each site, to exercise the Joint Deployment Operations Center, and to rehearse NMD plans from August 2001 to March 2003, with the mission of mitigating the risk in the deployment and site activation of the National Missile Defense System. The conference focused on essential short-term program milestones required to support site activation and initial testing. Key linkages and the synchronization of critical schedules were subjected to careful analysis. A detailed Senior Leader After Action Review was prepared.

The exercise concluded with a Senior Leader Seminar conducted for the Senior Leadership of the Site Activation Organization of the Joint Program Office. Participating senior leaders included MG William Nance, Program Manager, JPO, NMD; Mr. Harold Holmes, Deputy for System Deployment, JPO, NMD; and COL Steve Davis, Director, Site Activation Office. LTG Ronald Hite (Ret.) and LTG Jay Garner (Ret.) participated in the exercise as senior mentors. At the conclusion of the Senior Leader Seminar, MG Nance lauded the participants for their efforts and successes. He noted that DART II had taken the results and lessons learned from DART I and built upon that foundation in light of the new and changing environment now facing the JPO, which must develop a highly integrated and professional series of plans for future implementation.

Also contributing to this article was Mr. Ritchie Dion.

GLOBAL ‘01

By Professor James Kievit
Department of the Army Support Branch

As it has for several years past, the Center for Strategic Leadership supported the Department of the Army Staff’s participation in the Navy’s annual GLOBAL wargame. Conducted from 15 to 27 July 2001 in the Naval War College’s McCarty-Little Hall in Newport, Rhode Island, GLOBAL ‘01 was a classified wargame examining multiple draft U.S. Navy concepts—Network Centric Operations, Assured Access, Speed of Effects, and Information/Knowledge Advantage—in a Small-Scale Contingency set in 2011. The game design also incorporated the U.S. Air Force concept for Effects-Based Operations (EBO), JFCOM’s concept for Rapid Decision Operations (RDO), and the Army’s concept for its Objective Force. Thus, although sponsored and hosted by the Navy, the game was distinctly joint in concept and execution.

The Army Staff arranged for a cohesive and effective Army team from multiple Army commands and organizations to provide “role players” at every level, from the Joint Staff through the regional Combatant Commands to their subordinate Joint Task Forces. CSL’s participants once again demonstrated their exceptional expertise. Dr. Kent Butts (National Security Issues Branch) brought his in-depth knowledge of National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy to his role in the National Command Authority player cell. Multiple simultaneous operations across the spectrum of conflict, from humanitarian assistance through conventional combat actions, kept Professor James Kievit (HQDA Support Branch) fully engaged analyzing and evaluating the “red-blue” interactions in a futuristic environment in the ground forces assessment cell. Meanwhile, SFC Norris Livingston and SFC Sharon Masterson, both from CSL’s Operations and Gaming Division, ensured that every administrative detail for the entire Army contingent was handled smoothly and efficiently.
Unlike previous GLOBAL games, the Navy did not attempt to project specific “lessons-learned” to a Senior Leader Seminar immediately following the game. Nevertheless, CSL participants’ observations would indicate that, in addition to issues related directly to the experimental command and control structures and the “effects based” planning process, the game illuminated potentially significant insights regarding “limited” war, rules of engagement, theater air and missile defenses, asymmetric strategies, combined and coalition operations, and the importance of land power as a contributor to the joint military team.

CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT SYMPOSIUM

By Professor Bert B. Tussing and COL Jeffrey C. Reynolds
National Security Issues Branch

The Center for Strategic Leadership and the Center for Strategic and International Studies co-hosted the Consequence Management Symposium at Carlisle Barracks August 21 to 23, 2001. The symposium examined the evolving policy and infrastructure surrounding Consequence Management within the larger construct of Territorial Security, concentrating on the intergovernmental issues associated with this national challenge. Over eighty subject matter experts attended the conference, including representatives from the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Department of Justice, the Department of State, the Department of Defense, Congressional staffs, several research institutes, and emergency management officials from state, city, and regional organizations.

No small amount of attention is currently being devoted to the topic of Consequence Management and Territorial Security. Over forty agencies in the Executive Branch claim some degree of responsibility or authority over the issue. As many as twenty-five different committees of the United States Senate and House of Representatives claim oversight. Their disparate efforts will lead to expenditures of over $11.7 billion dollars in 2001; yet there is no central agenda over how these funds should be applied, nor is there a budget authority over how they should be distributed. These conditions sustain a vulnerability that the nation can ill-afford, leading the symposium attendees to identify three imperatives for Territorial Security: 1) establish an office within the Executive Branch accountable and responsible for territorial security issues; 2) conduct a threat-risk assessment of domestic vulnerability within the sovereign territory of the United States; and 3) develop a comprehensive strategy for homeland security.

Concluding less than three weeks before the terrorist attacks of September 11 and reflecting the findings and recommendations of the Gilmore and Hart-Rudman Commissions, the symposium joined in the call to clearly establish an office accountable and responsible for coordinating federal agency efforts in the evolving territorial security mission. This agency would oversee the mission and functions currently exercised by diverse federal organizations concerned with the issue, provide a degree of “stewardship” over the funding distribution among those organizations, and serve as a national focal point for coordination and cooperation involving federal, state, and local domestic preparedness. Confeerees agreed that a threat-risk assessment must precede the development of a coherent national strategy. One crucial product of such a disciplined approach would be a national assessment of capabilities to respond to domestic terrorism, considering the integrated sum of federal, state, and local capabilities. Such an assessment could result in prioritization of funding and resources on a more measured scale, addressing requirements by region rather than by individual city.

Symposium participants unanimously agreed on the need for a comprehensive national strategy for territorial security. The strategy would consider interagency federal, state, and local requirements and would serve as the cornerstone for the intergovernmental coordination of domestic response. With regard to the federal role, the strategy would identify the roles and missions of the diverse agencies currently addressing different components of the domestic threat. The strategy, viewed against a carefully constructed threat-risk assessment, would identify the fault lines between those agencies and their functions and fill identified gaps with the procedures and resources necessary to meet the given threat.

Consequence management and the territorial security mission present the National Command Authorities with a multifaceted, multitiered requirement that will require both intergovernmental and interagency coordination. Nontraditional partnerships between the civil and military, public and private sectors will be required if we are to achieve the levels of effectiveness and efficiency needed to address a spectrum of threats never before encountered on our shores. The key to success for these partnerships will be a central authority capable of fashioning and implementing a credible national strategy designed to secure our borders while preserving our way of life.