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**POLITICAL IMPACT OF STRATEGIC BASING
DECISIONS**

by

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POLITICAL IMPACT OF STRATEGIC BASING DECISIONS

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

Relationships between the United States and its worldwide network of allies has, since the inception of NATO, greatly revolved around the United States' ability and desire to permanently station troops overseas. Since 1941, the United States has entered into these basing agreements for a variety of strategic and sometimes political reasons. From NATO's inception, and as the cornerstone of its defensive structure, the United States has combined the idea of sending troops to different regions of the world with a global basing strategy founded on the concepts of overlapping protection and deployability. At times, to gain access to areas of strategic interest, the United States has offered aid and economic assistance along with a military presence. In other cases, positively affecting the political climate of the country was the stated goal of troop presence. This thesis will examine the effects of basing in Greece and Spain in order to uncover lessons learned which might be applied to the new US global basing plan and current troop positioning activities in Kyrgyzstan. In both cases the United States worked with openly dictatorial governments for the purposes of basing and did not foster the long term political situation initially desired.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Relationships between the United States and its worldwide network of allies has, since the inception of NATO, greatly revolved around the United States' ability and desire to permanently station troops overseas. Since 1941, the United States has entered into these basing agreements for a variety of strategic and sometimes political reasons. From NATO's inception, and as the cornerstone of its defensive structure, the United States has combined the idea of sending troops to different regions of the world with a global basing strategy founded on the concepts of overlapping protection and deployability. At times, to gain access to areas of strategic interest, the United States has offered aid and economic assistance along with a military presence. In other cases, positively affecting the political climate of the country was the stated goal of troop presence. In the case of Greece, the United States entered into a combined role of economic benefactor and political ally, as Truman began his plan to "support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressure."¹ Coupled with the idea of eradicating Greek communists were open statements from Truman to the Greek government that in return for economic aid, Greece would need to heighten its level of democracy and change its oligarchic image². Twenty years later, with the arrival of the junta, this openly stated goal of a democratic future was virtually forgotten. However, military aid continued despite diminishing freedom. Spain's Franco regime on the other hand, uninterested in opening democratic doors, gained both military and economic assistance by leveraging its strategic location and to receive a de facto membership in the Western alliance³. In one case, the United States seemingly lost track of its original goal; in the other, the goal of future democracy was never stated. In both cases, however, the United States worked with openly dictatorial governments for the purposes of basing. This thesis will examine the effects of basing in these authoritarian regions for strategic reasons and uncover whether or not there are lessons learned which should be applied to new US global basing plan and our current activities in Kyrgyzstan.

¹ Pogue, p 167

² Duke 310

³ Duke 293

The United States is currently undergoing a major restructuring that will lead to troops being placed in formerly communist countries with differing levels of democracy. This new plan (dubbed the “lily pad” approach to basing by the General James Jones, head of the European Command) will change how the United States views and deploys its overseas basing. As Jones stated in 2003, “All 26 Army and Air Force installations in Germany, except for the Air Force at Ramstein, might be closed. In effect this could mean transferring 5 army brigades, some 25,000 troops, to the east.”⁴

While the idea of restructuring America’s military has been around for many years, it was not until August of 2001, when Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld ordered a complete evaluation of basing in Germany and Korea, saying that both were remnants of the cold war, that the plan was formally put into place. With the impetus of the 9/11 attacks, the Department of Defense initiated a complete reexamination of the locations to which troops will be sent and the way in which they will deploy in the future. Reasons for the realignment are clear: change in mission, increased flexibility, and long-term support for the War on Terror necessitate a new way of doing business⁵. The new deployment arrangement calls for troops to leave large garrisons in Germany and man smaller garrisons around the world on what will become 6-month rotations. Families would not accompany the troops on deployments and would stay in the United States⁶, thus saving money on infrastructure and cutting the rather large cost of moving families around that globe every 2 to 3 years. Many of the locations being considered would have troops rotating through on a full-time bases. These locations might include places like Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria. Other locations could serve as smaller, minimally staffed, jump off points, closer to hot spots. These locations might be in countries like Kyrgyzstan, Romania, or the Philippines⁷.

Thus, it is important to examine how entering into basing arrangements with countries with such differing levels of democracy (in some cases authoritarianism) will

⁴ Lawrence J. Korb. “The Pentagon’s Eastern Obsession.” *The New York Times* (30 JUL 03): p A.17

⁵Schrader, Esther. “United States Expedites Reshuffling of Europe Troops.” *Los Angeles Times* (01 MAY 03)

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Jaffe, Greg. “Arc of Instability: The Pentagon Prepares to Scatter Soldiers in Remote Corners.” *The Wall Street Journal* (27 MAY 03) p A. 1

affect the long-term relationships between these countries and the United States. As more US decisions are made regarding where and how to deploy troops, this question will grow in significance as the US continues to opening express desires of developing democracy while working with newly democratic, ex-communist, countries possessing varying levels of freedom.

If increased authoritarianism is associated with US basing presence in the cases of Greece and Spain, and if the anti-American sentiment that stems from the association leads to an eventual decay in the relationship, should a predetermined level of democracy be a requirement for future basing decisions? With regard to Greece and Spain, many questions about basing must first be answered to properly apply any lessons learned to current decisions.

First, what were the stated political goals for basing in each location? In the case of Greece, what happened to the country internally when the declared purpose of the United States changed? Second, was basing that support these regimes justified, when compared with the strategic goals it attempted to meet? When considering the long-term effects, was it a solid decision?

Some might argue that in both cases the decisions were more reactions to strategic needs than part of any political plan. If this were the case, could the same mistake be happening again?

After covering the articles of NATO's charter and how US views towards basing evolved, this paper will look at the levels of democracy existent in Greece and Spain before the US became involved. Additionally, this paper will look at the global situation and outside influences which existed when the US entered into basing agreements with the two countries. All aspects of the decisions and their outcomes will be evaluated to reach conclusions on the important diplomatic questions involved in the process. In the cases of both Greece and Spain the United States continues to deal with repercussions of basing decisions made many years ago, the underlying question is whether or not there are lessons learned which should be applied to the approach the United States is taking in Kyrgyzstan.

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II. THE ATLANTIC CHARTER AND U.S. ENTRANCE INTO GLOBAL BASING

Western Europe's evolution from its post WWII destruction to economic prosperity was a difficult task for the countries involved. Yet amazingly, a mere six years after the Yalta conference, the democratic countries of Europe, along with the United States, were solidifying the world's first peacetime alliance⁸ based on self help and mutual aid instead of shared aggression and protection from an enemy. This evolution and how it led to basing Spain and Greece is key to the overall story. The primary question involved with this transition is: How did the shared goals and individual economic needs of the allies drive articles II, III and X of the charter, and how did they, along with key events, influence the Truman administration (originally uninterested in permanent European stationing) to make large commitments to the continent that ultimately led to basing in Greece and Spain? Additionally, how did the inception of NATO, coming at a time when the Korean War threatened world peace⁹, not only solidify the importance of the articles but encourage a western military buildup and help develop NATO's command and control structure.

This chapter will discuss the buildup with regard to NATO's charter and show how the process of creating the alliance was effected, in terms of burden shifting or sharing, by the emergence of a Soviet-led bloc and the Korean War. Burden shifting is the process in which countries, set on limiting their own contribution, encourage more from others, but not so much as to destroy the overall alliance¹⁰. This process of pushing and pulling amongst member countries strengthened the coalition while helping to encourage participation from member states¹¹. The chapter will also examine how this process drove strategic basing decisions. By focusing on major basing trends before and after NATO's creation, this chapter will show how the alliance itself drove the need for

⁸ NATO Office of Information and Press. NATO Handbook. Brussels, Belgium: 2001. p.421

⁹ Ibid. p 87.

¹⁰ Thies, Wallace J. *Friendly Rivals, Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO*. Armonk, NY.: M.E. Sharpe, 2003 p. 7.

¹¹ Ibid.

allied military basing in Europe and created a situation where the inclusion of US forces was vital to its success.

A. POST WORLD WAR II EUROPE: ECONOMIC CONCERNS AND ARTICLE II

In 1945, entire stretches of Western Europe lay in ruin. In Germany, as well as in most of the continent, railways, bridges and communication lines were totally destroyed¹². More than a million and a half Germans had been killed in action; an additional two million were missing and another half million were prisoners who would not likely return¹³. In France, more than a million and a half buildings were destroyed or seriously damaged. So extensive was the damage that experts viewing the destruction estimated that it would take the two countries 20 years to rebuild¹⁴. Industrial production, key to any recovery, had slowed to less than half of what it had been in 1938; in Germany it was close to nonexistent¹⁵. Foremost in the minds of many was quickly establishing an environment where the mistakes of World War I and the treaty of Versailles would not be repeated. As said by Sloan, a noted NATO historian, “As the end of WWII neared, US president Franklin D. Roosevelt was particularly sensitive to the fact that president Wilson’s failure at the end of WWI to engage the United States in the League of Nations had led to failure in Europe and the rise of Adolph Hitler”¹⁶. He wanted distant control; he wanted to be active in post WWII Europe but did not want to commit troops. Unfortunately, world events and economic conditions would ensure more US engagement than he originally wanted. By the time the war ended, neither the United States congress nor the next president, Harry S. Truman, showed any interest at all in becoming permanently involved in the basing of forces in Europe¹⁷. Demonstrating the feelings of the president and US public opinion alike (to bring the boys home quickly and effectively), of the 3.5 million US Army soldiers deployed in Europe at the end of World

¹² Wilkinson, James., Hughes, Stuart H., *Contemporary Europe, A History, 10th ed.* Upper Saddle River, NJ.: 2004. p 368

¹³ Ibid. p. 369

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Sloan, Stanley R. *NATO, The European Union, and the Atlantic Community.* Lanhan, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. p. 13

War II, 3.1 had returned home as of 1946¹⁸. As stated at the Yalta conference, Roosevelt's goal was to have the entire US contingent home within two years of the war's end¹⁹. The troops that did remain on foreign soil were increasingly oriented toward force projection and stability operations rather than toward defense of European territory²⁰.

As Roosevelt wished, troops not only returned home but left the military in what was the biggest military downsizing operation in American history. Similar to the end of the World War I, American leaders took full advantage of the relative calm after the war to conserve funds for other purposes. The total force dropped from 11.8 million soldiers in uniform in 1945 to just over 1.5 million in 1950²¹. The hardest hit was the Army, which fell from 8.1 million in 1945 to only 632,000 in 1950²². Building or maintaining military forces in Europe was clearly the furthest thing from most leaders' minds. What was important to western leaders, however, was the future economic success of Europe.

Bevin, the British Secretary of Defense instrumental in NATO's creation, wanted a unified Europe to have the same power as the United States. In his mind, Europe would eventually need to be equal in power to the United States. A situation like this, he reasoned, would enable the Europeans and the Americans to profitably and productively make the most of all available resources²³. He also knew that the fate of Europe was going to be decided very quickly and that action was needed soon²⁴. He soon made it known that the power of the United States was needed to build the confidence necessary to take Europe through its economic transition. In Bevin's line of thinking, democracy,

¹⁷ Thies, Wallace J. *Friendly Rivals, Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO*. Armonk, NY.: M.E. Sharpe, 2003. p 23.

¹⁸ Duke, Simon. *United States Military Forces and Installations in Europe*. New York.: Oxford University Press, 1989. p xxi.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Sloan, Stanley R. *NATO, The European Union, and the Atlantic Community*. Lanhan, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. p 7.

²¹ Department Of Defense. *Selected Manpower Statistics, Fiscal year 2002*. US DOD, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information, Operation and Reports. 2002.

²² Ibid.

²³ Thies, Wallace J. *Friendly Rivals, Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO*. Armonk, NY.: M.E. Sharpe, 2003. p 22

²⁴ Ibid. p 22

prosperity, and security were all inseparably linked²⁵, and he was not alone with regard to the important relationship between economic stability and peace. Thomas, author of The Promise of Alliance, said, “Early, conceptions about providing for the security of Europe rested on assumptions about the centrality of economic recovery, which would restore confidence and generate prosperity”²⁶. How the United States and other allies chose to deal with this question had a dramatically positive influence on Europe’s economic future and an enormous impact on perceptions among western allies toward permanent basing in Europe.

Foreshadowing some of the thoughts behind article II of the charter, George C. Marshall outlined the importance of an economic aid package to Europe during a speech to Harvard in 1947 by saying, “It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return on normal economic health to the world, without which there can be no political stability and assumed peace”²⁷. Fearing exactly what Bevin had warned, Truman, Marshall and their staffs feared that without massive US economic help, the continent would sink into permanent hopelessness that would in turn lead to political extremism and other problems²⁸. The ultimate goal of the Marshall plan was the hope that economic strength would lead to a Europe that could one day handle its own military defense²⁹. Completely opposite to the Treaty of Versailles, which required the Germans to pay billions of dollars to the victors³⁰, the Marshall plan was an offer of billions to rebuild the destroyed countries of Europe, including that of the loser, Western Germany. France and Great Britain saw this as a sign of long-term concern from Washington toward Europe’s long-term success and openly greeted the plan³¹. Giving over 3 billion dollars to England and 2.5 billion to France, the plan spread the wealth to

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Thomas, Ian Q.R. *The Promise of Alliance, NATO and The Political Imagination*. Boulder, Colo.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997. p 19.

²⁷ Ibid. p 10.

²⁸ Wilkinson, James., Hughes, Stuart H., *Contemporary Europe, A History, 10th ed.* Upper Saddle River, NJ.: 2004 p 415.

²⁹ Thomas, Ian Q.R. *The Promise of Alliance, NATO and The Political Imagination*. Boulder, Colo.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997. p 10

³⁰ Kissinger, Henry. *Diplomacy*. New York, NY.: Simon and Schuster, 1994. p. 257.

³¹ Sloan, Stanley R. *NATO, The European Union, and the Atlantic Community*. Lanhan, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. p 14.

every country that was willing to accept it³². The plan was a solid example of the United States beginning what was to be a long period of cooperation between the allies. The plan, which was actually known as the economic cooperation act of 1948³³, had a phenomenally positive impact. Not only did the expanded amount of aid lead to increased output, but overall production of goods and services rose by 25% during the first 4 years of its inception³⁴, and by 1950, the production levels in France and Italy stood well above what they had been in 1938³⁵.

As successful as it was, the Marshal plan itself had nothing to do with increasing America's desire for overseas basing. The entire concept behind the plan was in fact to strengthen the continent so that it could one day defend itself with very little US assistance. What was to open the door for American long-term positioning of troops overseas was a combination of these desires for long-term stability and a need to help protect the continent from the possibility of Germany ever returning to its once powerful and hegemonic ways. It was also a way to protect the world from the perceived and growing communist aggression in the region, and this would eventually lead to US intervention in both Greece and Spain.

Shortly after NATO's inception, these pre-existing concerns combined with the Korean War, to provide an impetus for a substantial US force in Europe³⁶. This was the key to substantial growth in US basing. The North Korean invasion into South Korea across the 38th parallel proved the views of Dean Acheson and others who were already expounding the importance of being able to counter offensive communist moves around the globe, particularly in Europe³⁷. While combat was raging on the Korean peninsula, the United States set out to prove its commitment to prevent aggressive Soviet actions in

³² Wilkinson, James., Hughes, Stuart H., *Contemporary Europe, A History, 10th ed.* Upper Saddle River, NJ.: 2004 p 415. p 422.

³³ Thomas, Ian Q.R. *The Promise of Alliance, NATO and The Political Imagination.* Boulder, Colo.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997. p 10.

³⁴ Wilkinson, James., Hughes, Stuart H., *Contemporary Europe, A History, 10th ed.* Upper Saddle River, NJ.: 2004 p 415. p 422.

³⁵ Ibid. p 422

³⁶ Duke, Simon. *United States Military Forces and Installations in Europe.* New York.: Oxford University Press, 1989 p 7.

³⁷ Ibid.

Europe by increasing the size of its existing contingent and planning for larger bases in the future. Actions in Korea necessitated US counteraction.

In the eyes of the allies, the only thing that could change or alter the way the European economy had been recovering was the threat of communist growth³⁸. This perception combined with a US desire to create an economically sound Europe and opened the door to overseas basing and articles II, III and X of NATO's charter. How the change in perception came about is clear, but the series of decisions and events that led to it were not necessarily assured at the end of WWII. They were, in fact, a combination of many conflicting allied goals and unforeseen events.

Britain, after 6 years of war, and the liquidation of their financial markets in former colonies, was in a horrible state³⁹. The steady drain they had experienced on their remaining funds for food had left them financially destitute⁴⁰. This situation led Bevin, one of the planners behind the Western Union concept and key player in the Brussels Treaty⁴¹, to inform the United States that Britain was no longer capable of maintaining its long-term aid to Greece and Turkey⁴², both of whom were involved in civil wars against communist aggression and required allied support.

Although it did not have to take on the burden, the United States, fearing what appeared to be a spread of communism and a threat to Europe's economic stability, decided to render aid. This action, coming before NATO's actual charter, set a strong example of what would later be considered "burden sharing" among allies and further solidified the relationship between the two continents. When the United States picked up the torch for freedom and began to send aid, it clearly accepted what was formerly a foreign responsibility and allocated the needed resources. The action of one country taking up responsibility, or desiring another country to share more of the burden, was

³⁸ Thomas, Ian Q.R. *The Promise of Alliance, NATO and The Political Imagination*. Boulder, Colo.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997. p 19.

³⁹ Pogue, Forrest C. *George C. Marshall: Statesman*. New York, NY.: Penguin Books, 1987. p 161.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Sloan, Stanley R. *NATO, The European Union, and the Atlantic Community*. Lanhan, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. p 11.

⁴² Thies, Wallace J. *Friendly Rivals, Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO*. Armonk, NY.: M.E. Sharpe, 2003. p 22.

what would later become the heart of NATO and ultimately, the reason for US troops being based in Europe.

President Truman, concerned with communist aggression in the region and confident that the burden formerly held by Britain was an important one, pledged 400 million in Greece to “support free peoples resisting subjugation by armed minorities”⁴³. This was the earliest commitment of the United States toward long-term stability through anything other than economic aid, and something that would solidify the relationship between the countries involved. The desire for an economically stable Europe combined with a fear of communism to lead President Truman to prescribe the containment concept as the new guiding principle behind US foreign policy⁴⁴. Coming as a radical shift to its pre-World War II diplomacy policy, the United States was clearly committed to match Soviet Union power by aiding in the growth of democratic countries that could add to the economic strength of the west. Eventually becoming an unstated part of the Transatlantic charter, containment was, at its core, fundamentally in agreement with article X’s open-door policy and a key guiding force behind NATO.

Far from the post-war American desire to bring the troops home, this new policy of containment had a dramatic effect on overseas deployments, the size of the military and the strategy driving it. It was not, however, in itself a troop stationing policy but a guiding principle that would allow changes in post-war stationing. Both of the projects toward European economic stability helped drive closer collaboration between the two continents but, it was the work of Bevin in regards to a possible future alliance for peace that Marshal found particularly interesting, and how it would ultimately drive basing changes⁴⁵. The Truman doctrine contributed to article II, and combined with goals of economic recovery, burden sharing and several key events, to lead to dramatic shifts in military spending and employment of US troops to both Greece and Spain.

⁴³ Duke, Simon W. and Krieger, Wolfgang. *U.S. Military Forces in Europe, The Early Years, 1945-1970*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1993 p. 309

⁴⁴ Duke, Simon. *United States Military Forces and Installations in Europe*. New York.: Oxford University Press, 1989 p xii.

⁴⁵Pogue, Forrest C. *George C. Marshall: Statesman*. New York, NY.: Penguin Books, 1987. p 316.

B. ARTICLES III AND X AND THREATS TO THE ALLIANCE

Even after publicly announcing that the Truman doctrine was to be the policy of the future, the United States still had not committed itself to long-term stationing in Europe or a strategy of shipping troops around the globe. While many different reasons exist, three of the primary factors needed by the allies were a strong reason to make such a commitment, proof that others were willing to share in the burden, and internal support within the individual countries to expend large amounts of money toward the alliance. Above all the United States, still leery of entering into long-term involvement, had already extended its hand toward re-creating Europe economically. However, this action was done precisely to keep the United States out of any long-term troop stationing in the continent, not to encourage it. In terms of an alliance that would require the White House to send troops back into Europe, major outside influences were needed to change US public and political perception.

Fear of communist expansion and concern over Germany's possible growth and re-armament encouraged European countries, striving for a peaceful future, to look for a common defense. The creation of NATO, from its roots as a security alliance and the inherent economic implications of that alliance, led to an easy transition into a military role⁴⁶.

Mutual collaboration and work toward an alliance began with the perception that without a strong military alliance, protection from military threat in Europe was not possible⁴⁷. Bevin's call for a common defense was influenced by outside events such as a communist coup in Czechoslovakia and the beginning of the Berlin Blockade. The French, originally concerned with the need for all of the allies to work toward controlling Germany, joined other countries in the Brussels treaty in an effort to restore their former grandeur. Soon after joining, they realized that the force of the Western Union were not enough to handle the Soviets⁴⁸. All of the signals being sent by the Soviets seemed to be contrary to the peaceful future the West was trying so hard to build. Soviet activities,

⁴⁶ NATO Office of Information and Press. *NATO Handbook*. Brussels, Belgium: 2001. p 29

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Thomas, Ian Q.R. *The Promise of Alliance, NATO and The Political Imagination*. Boulder, Colo.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997. p 11.

such as their attempted forced treaty of mutual defense with Finland, made it clear that action was needed to prevent collapse of the entire recovering system in Europe⁴⁹.

While other factors supported the plan for a treaty, Kissinger asserts that none had the impact on allied countries like the actions that were being taken by the Soviet Union⁵⁰. The actions of Stalin were particularly worrisome to countries involved in the treaty of Brussels, and it was fear that made them willing to join an alliance with a more-powerful, outside force⁵¹. Many experts agreed that their small alliance alone was not nearly enough to stop a large Soviet invasion⁵².

All of these actions led Marshall to bring to the President Bevin's idea of an alliance based on mutual goals and collective defense. The president agreed with the idea of a collaboration of democracies for peace⁵³. While the threat from the Soviet Union was clearly sufficient to demonstrate to the European countries that a military alliance, and in some ways basing, was necessary, it was not enough by itself to bring the United States on board. Concerned with becoming involved in another European war, the American public and congress were weary of any pact that would automatically get them involved. Keeping western Europe strong, however, was understood by many as vital to success on both sides of the Atlantic, and it was this that finally turned the argument.

Dean Acheson's primary concern was that the small but growing number of countries involved in the European alliance needed continued positive growth, and that it would not be possible unless the Union were to exist at the center of a broader Atlantic community⁵⁴. He felt that without this kind of relationship, all would fail. He knew that a strong WEU would mean a stronger overall alliance and a more peaceful world. A weak WEU, on the other hand, would only cause turmoil⁵⁵ and lead to world problems. He wanted the WEU to stay strong to make the free world more economically stable. This

⁴⁹ Pogue, Forrest C. *George C. Marshall: Statesman*. New York, NY.: Penguin Books, 1987. p 320.

⁵⁰ Kissinger, Henry. *Diplomacy*. New York, NY.: Simon and Schuster, 1994. p 457.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Kissinger, Henry. *Diplomacy*. New York, NY.: Simon and Schuster, 1994. p 457.

⁵³ Pogue, Forrest C. *George C. Marshall: Statesman*. New York, NY.: Penguin Books, 1987. p 316

⁵⁴ Thomas, Ian Q.R. *The Promise of Alliance, NATO and The Political Imagination*. Boulder, Colo.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997. p 39

⁵⁵ Ibid.

attitude, shared by the Truman administration, led the United States to approaching the thought of an alliance in a new way.

Ironically the United States' desire to remain uninvolved in an alliance that would work toward reducing aggression eventually directed the concept of the charter. Instead of being focused on violence, American participation in the project guaranteed focus on values and solutions for peace (instead of the calculations of national security that had formally been used to ensure European security)⁵⁶. This was the only way that it could have been sold to the United States. The benefits of this situation and its impact on the overall treaty were great. According to Thomas, the notions of self help and mutual aid formed the conceptual foundation for the north Atlantic treaty,⁵⁷ soviet aggression and control of Germany were left out. The US Senate greeted the charter because it upheld principle and was not directed against a particular country. Instead, it was directed solely against aggression⁵⁸. Also popular with the senate was the fact that the charter was not a mechanism to influence any shifting balance of power but strengthened the balance of principle⁵⁹. The lack of wanting to become involved in a military alliance, combined with knowledge that Europeans needed the United States for peace, created an alliance based on shared values and harmony. With this, there now evolved a charter that could spread strong economic growth and mutually shared desires for peace⁶⁰.

European and American fears of Soviet expansion, while not being named, found their way into the charter through several different articles. This is precisely what led to oversees basing. Ideas behind positive economic growth of the alliance led to both articles II, and X, and together with articles III and V (the mutual protection and defense articles), the alliance had in place the ideas that were to bring about eventual basing changes and later, ideas of burden sharing and debates among allies.

⁵⁶ Ibid. p 461

⁵⁷ Thomas, Ian Q.R. *The Promise of Alliance, NATO and The Political Imagination*. Boulder, Colo.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997. p 14.

⁵⁸ Kissinger, Henry. *Diplomacy*. New York, NY.: Simon and Schuster, 1994. p 458.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Thomas, Ian Q.R. *The Promise of Alliance, NATO and The Political Imagination*. Boulder, Colo.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997. p 33.

C. GERMAN RE-ARMAMENT: KEY TO THE CHARTER AND US LONG-TERM INVOLVEMENT

An increase in US troop deployments brought about questions that had, until that time, only vaguely been dealt with by the members of the alliance. Foremost among these questions was the issue of France and arms to Germany and other allies. France, still recovering from the effects World War II, was extremely concerned with allowing West Germany to arm. Zimmerman refers to this question as the major stumbling block of the entire NATO organization in its early years⁶¹. Amazingly, just 10 years after the end of WWII, the allies were forced to deal with integrating West Germany into the overall defensive structure of NATO⁶² and granting the country sovereignty. The US and UK reasoned that creating West Germany as a sovereign country and a member of NATO not only meant another partner in the alliance, but justified the defensive work and base creation that was already in progress. For reasons that were political as well as economic, the United States was set on carrying out this plan. In terms of article III's call for continuous work among the members "to develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack"⁶³, building Germany's defense capability would be unavoidable if they were to become a member of NATO. Strategically, to develop a strong defense in Western Europe, members of the alliance would have no choice but to begin the re-armament of Western Germany or dedicate large amounts of assets to defend it. Initially, much of Europe was nervous but tolerant of the idea⁶⁴. The French, in 1949, however, were set against ever allowing such a thing to happen.

D. KOREAN WAR AND ARTICLES II, III, X SOLIDIFY OVERSEAS BASING

When the US Senate approved joining the alliance, significantly changing the basing strategy of the nations was not an advertised part of the plan. Instead, it was something that quickly happened, more out of necessity than out of any kind of pre-planned wide-ranging strategic concept. Similar to the circumstances surrounding the

⁶¹Zimmermann, Hubert. *Money and Security*. New York, NY.: Cambridge University Press, 2002. p 11.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid. p 527.

⁶⁴ Duke, Simon. *United States Military Forces and Installations in Europe*. New York.: Oxford University Press, 1989. p 7.

creation of NATO, the activities that led the United States to increase its contingent in Europe, and in turn, to shoulder a larger portion the defense burden, were a combination of events unforeseen at the time of the original signing. As already discussed, world events heightened both the importance of European security and America's protection of it. The alliance, formed during times of peace for the purposes of peace, became an actual entity during times of war. Meeting for the first time on July 25, 1950, at a time when the young alliance was already struggling to fashion an effective response to the Korean War⁶⁵, the council of NATO was focused (as it had been from its inception) on the cold war and how to make its members safer. Already concerned with communist aggression and expansionism, the Korean war demonstrated the global threat of communism and provided the political momentum required to overcome congressional resistance to the substantial deployment of US ground forces in Europe⁶⁶.

The reasons were obvious. Once the alliance was set, the priority was not only to build on its economic prowess, but to protect investments being made by all of the countries involved. Korea heightened the need for self protection and asset preservation. As said by Thies, "the widely shared fear that Korea was but a prelude to war in Europe, concentrated the attention of governments on both sides of the Atlantic on the urgent need for more forces in Western Europe"⁶⁷. The countries realized that what was needed was fast action with regard to the Western European defense structure. As said by Acheson in December of 1950, "it is action which counts and not further resolutions or further plans or further meetings"⁶⁸. US troop basing in Europe was on the way.

The political maneuvering from 1950 to 1955 that fostered the change in NATO's perception of its basing is quite astounding. As previously mentioned, with the future economic prosperity of Europe as the central goal, both America and Britain agreed that West Germany would eventually be needed to shoulder more, if not all, of the burden for

⁶⁵ Thies, Wallace J. *Friendly Rivals, Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO*. Armonk, NY.: M.E. Sharpe, 2003. p 87.

⁶⁶ Sloan, Stanley R. *NATO, The European Union, and the Atlantic Community*. Lanhan, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. p 19.

⁶⁷ Thies, Wallace J. *Friendly Rivals, Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO*. Armonk, NY.: M.E. Sharpe, 2003. p 64.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

its defense⁶⁹. Economically, the cost of occupation was becoming high and thoughts of a prolong presence were out of the question. With the outbreak of the Korean War, it became even more imperative economically for the US and UK to convince others that a re-armed West Germany was vital to NATO's defensive structure⁷⁰.

In September 1950, Acheson confronted the NATO partners with the US intention of permitting and pursuing the partial reconstruction of Germany's military ability to use it in the defense of the West⁷¹. The United States made it clear that eventual German participation in the defense of Europe was critical to US participation in that defense. The biggest challenge in this plan was to convince the French that arming Germany was both a viable option and in their best interest. In 1950, in response to the American plan, the French proposed the Plevan Plan, which would integrate the armed forces of the region and thus prevent the need for Germany to have independent armed forces⁷². Additionally, since the plan would have given the French controlling interest in both the European Defense Community and the European Security force, it would have meant management of any token German troops serving in it⁷³. Control of Germany's re-armament was always the key issue for the French and is ultimately what caused the United States to change its course. While not completely supporting the plan, the United States found it at least a move in the right direction toward Germany's rearmament. In 1954, after years of debating the European Defense Community and its Security Force structure, the French parliament voted against acceptance of the Plevan Plan, and the French were thus forced deal with the fact that economically and strategically—arming Germany made sense. The French needed assurance that their security interests were being considered, as well as the interests of the rest of NATO. After much political wrangling, what solidified the deal was a proposal submitted by Acheson.

⁶⁹ Zimmermann, Hubert. *Money and Security*. New York, NY.: Cambridge University Press, 2002.p 13

⁷⁰ Duke, Simon. *United States Military Forces and Installations in Europe*. New York.: Oxford University Press, 1989. p 7

⁷¹ Zimmermann, Hubert. *Money and Security*. New York, NY.: Cambridge University Press, 2002. p 15.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Sloan, Stanley R. *NATO, The European Union, and the Atlantic Community*. Lanhan, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. p 21.

The French agreed to Germany's acceptance into NATO when Acheson proposed a package deal explicitly linking the feasibility of US troop commitments to West German rearmament⁷⁴, a package that greatly enlarged the American and British regional commitments while providing for German military growth. Oversight of West German rearmament being their biggest concern, the French were only satisfied when the United States agreed to supervise West Germany's growing military structure with a long-term troop deployment of their own⁷⁵. The US contingent then took on a two-pronged political role. First, the United States would be the chief supplier and overseer of West Germany's growing military might, capable of developing a new NATO ally, while providing the presence needed to ensure France that it was safe from its armed neighbor. Secondly, they performed their NATO role of ensuring that allies remained safe from any armed Soviet aggression⁷⁶. At an early stage, therefore, the commitment seemed to have relatively little to do with demonstrating the consequences of Soviet adventurism and much to do with European anxieties⁷⁷ over US presence and its relation to German rearmament. The Korean War forced the allies to deal with such problems⁷⁸, but it also added burden sharing as a new problem to the quickly maturing alliance.

E. ARTICLES AND BURDEN SHARING

At the war's end, what was difficult for the US to do was to convince their allies that they needed to *continue* spending while the United States began making cuts. Although the perfect situation for the United States, which would have been to provide only air and naval assets to the alliance⁷⁹, never fully arose, the bulk of the Cold War saw the European allies prepared to field even or greater numbers of ground troops than the Americans. This seems to make sense in light of the fact that air force jets, large navies and nuclear weapons are so costly to maintain and deploy. They were a smaller percentage of the total US expenditure, yet still out of reach for the smaller budgets of the

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Zimmermann, Hubert. *Money and Security*. New York, NY.: Cambridge University Press, 2002. p 19

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Duke, Simon. *United States Military Forces and Installations in Europe*. New York.: Oxford University Press, 1989. p 7.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid p 166.

allies. The outcome of this unstated burden sharing bargain was still evident in a 1988 US Department of Defense annual report to congress that stated that while the NATO allies accounted for less than 50% of the economic wealth of the total alliance, they maintained over 3.5 million troops on active duty, and in the event of a war, would have provided roughly 60% of NATO's total ground combat power⁸⁰. Articles II, III and X collided with the threat that came from the Korean War and produced a Europe willing to accept German re-armament, a Europe that was fully involved in different types of burden sharing arrangements with the United States. However, the biggest change in Europe, aside from their own spending increase, was the large influx of American troops and military spending.

The US effort to add to Europe's collective capacity to resist armed attack was extensive. Driven by the collision of supporting events, the United States would provide large deployments and place troops within an integrated NATO command structure⁸¹. Overall NATO forces in Western Europe grew from 15 division and less than 1000 aircraft in April 1951 to 35 divisions and 3000 aircraft by the end of 1951⁸². America's part in this increase was enormous.

America's post-war reduction lowered its total force to 1.46 million by 1950⁸³. Of that force, only 122,000 were serving in Europe when the Korean War broke out⁸⁴. The change came very fast, as between May and December 1951, 4 US divisions moved to Europe⁸⁵. Total US military forces in France shot from 802 troops in 1950 to almost 45,000 by 1954, the majority of which, 30 thousand troops, being in the Army⁸⁶. West

⁸⁰ Duke, Simon. *United States Military Forces and Installations in Europe*. New York.: Oxford University Press, 1989. p 2.

⁸¹ Sloan, Stanley R. *NATO, The European Union, and the Atlantic Community*. Lanhan, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. p 20.

⁸² Thies, Wallace J. *Friendly Rivals, Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO*. Armonk, NY.: M.E. Sharpe, 2003 p 70.

⁸³ Department Of Defense. *Military Personnel Historical Reports* US Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information, Operation and Reports. 2003.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Thies, Wallace J. *Friendly Rivals, Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO*. Armonk, NY.: M.E. Sharpe, 2003 p 70.

⁸⁶ Department Of Defense. *Military Personnel Historical Reports* US Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information, Operation and Reports. 2003.

Germany, the center of the defensive structure, billeted 407 thousand active-duty US troops by 1954, an increase of almost 350% from the 97 thousand troops that were there in 1950⁸⁷. The Army was not the only branch to experience massive growth in the country. With a growing importance being placed on nuclear weapons, the US Air Force also underwent large increases. In France alone, the Air Force grew from 169 personnel on site in 1950 to almost 40,000 in 1953⁸⁸. Overall, the Air Force in Europe tripled during this time from 28,000 in 1950 to 120,000 in 1953⁸⁹. Clearly, the largest proportion of troops were coming from the United States, and integrating this massive defense, made up of so many different countries, posed a problem.

When NATO was created it lacked a major command and control structure and was oriented more toward planning⁹⁰. With the invasion of Korea, leaders of NATO were forced to take a look at the inadequate command and control structure and lack of ability resist precisely the kind of attack that article III was intended to prevent. At the council's second meeting, along with creating basic plans for the integrated Europe's defense force, plans were developed for a central command authority that would ensure that national units allocated were properly trained and integrated into the force⁹¹.

The United States accepted the responsibility of filling the post of NATO's Supreme Commander⁹² and spearheaded most of this project. By 1954, the articles that had been agreed upon during NATO's inception had led to the United States becoming an essential part in the planning, controlling and manning most of the alliance's activities.

Toward the middle of the 1950s, the transition was complete. Shared goals for an economically stable environment for the United States and its allies led to article II of the NATO charter, and realization that peace was dependent on the alliance's ability to protect itself led to article III. These two, combined with article V, eventually guided the

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Duke, Simon W. *US Military Forces in Europe, The Early Years, 1945-1970*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993 p 15.

⁹¹ Duke, Simon W. *US Military Forces in Europe, The Early Years, 1945-1970*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993. p 17.

⁹²Ibid p 18.

United States down its path of picking up a large portion Europe's defense. Positioning troops in both Greece and Spain became part of this growing role.

It is clear that the major basing trends of the United States, in Europe, changed dramatically when a Korean-War scenario was applied to Europe. The articles, agreed to and created by the allies for the reasons discussed, led the United States to dedicate vast resources to NATO's defense and to become a driving force behind NATO's cold war leadership. The next two chapters will look at this growing leadership role and assess what drove the US to make the decisions it made in regards to Greece and Spain. In both cases the US entered into basing agreements with authoritarian regimes possessing differing levels of democracy. Lessons were learned from both endeavors that were either forgotten or misunderstood. In both cases, some of the long term political effects of the partnership were not positive. Now, as the US is entering into basing agreements with Kyrgyzstan, it is time to re-look at these decisions in order to insure similarly poor results, in terms of US perceptions within the country receiving the assistance, are not the ultimate result.

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III. COOPERATION WITH THE JUNTA OF GREECE AND ITS EFFECTS ON BASING IN THE REGION

In 1952, three years after the creation of NATO, the United States and Greece entered into a broad basing agreement which built on America's growing role in the Cold war while aiding Greek reconstruction. The agreement was beneficial to both countries, while containing very few constraints on US forces. Just over a decade later, in April of 1967, a military coup turned the political environment in Greece upside down and brought into question not only the original stated goals of the Truman doctrine but the long-term strategic goals of NATO as well. The questions that ultimately need to be answered are: Why did the United States forgo prior political objectives for near-term strategic goals, and how did this affect the long-term basing and political relationship between the countries? While many aspects surrounding this situation are important, the history of Greece from WWI to the take over by the junta is of particular interest to the story of how US basing and the strategic interests of NATO drove allied dealings with Greece once the Junta came to power. The saga of US basing in Greece is a story of interdependence between the two countries that began soon after the US began sending aid. The leadership of Greece found that for economic reasons, US presence and assistance was critical, while the US, for pre-stated strategic goals, was forced into supporting any government that came to power.

A. WORLD WAR I TO US PARTICIPATION

The tumultuous era of post WWI Europe had as much of a direct long-term impact on the people of Greece as in the rest of Europe. This poor economic situation created both the need for US support in the region, as well as a scenario in which dependence on economic aid would necessitate just the kind of long-term presence that the Greek people would come to resent.

Like other counties in the region, Greece was plagued with unemployment and economic problems far greater than they were ready to handle. Shortly after the war, the communist party began to grow, as revolutionary doctrines and cries of future equality

became appealing to many⁹³. The monarchist government and the prime ministers appointed by it tried to keep communist supporters in check with promises of improvements; however, the great depression of 1929 put an end to hopes the government had for a stable future. In 1936, after defaulting on international loans⁹⁴ and experiencing years of economic and political turmoil, a coup sent President Venizelos into exile and placed General Ioannis Metaxas in command⁹⁵. Metaxas's tenure ushered in more than a decade of havoc in Greece and carried the country, politically, far from the democratic entity it would one day strive to become⁹⁶.

Interestingly, General Metaxas, in an effort to avoid becoming involved in the growing conflict of WWII, discouraged the early alliances that might have helped protect Greece from the carnage that was to come. In 1941, his neutrality goals ended as an aggressive Italian force marched halfway through his country. Even though Greece was able to stop the Italians and eventually drive them back to Albania, the process of being attacked convinced Metaxas of the need for an alliance with a powerful force. His goals of finding an ally to offset German power were exactly what eventually brought major US support to the region. Direct US support, however, was not the first step in Greece's interaction with NATO. What came first was British intervention in the region. British influence, the true forbearer of American aid, began as assistance in an effort to defend against what looked like an impending German invasion. Sadly, differing views on how to use the force hindered rapid defensive deployment, and the small British contingent alone was not enough to defend the country. In April 1941, several months after British entrance into the region, Hitler's troops marched through Yugoslavia and Bulgaria on their way to Greece. The German force, overwhelming in its firepower and ability to maneuver, made quick work of the Greek and British forces and defense prepared on the "Metaxas line" quickly fell⁹⁷. The need for real assistance, in terms of money, food, and military aid, had only just begun.

⁹³ Clogg, Richard. A Concise History of Greece. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992. p 106.

⁹⁴ Ibid. p 109.

⁹⁵ Ibid. p 111.

⁹⁶ Clogg, Richard and Yannopoulos, George. Greece Under Military Rule. New York: Basic Books, 1972. p 191.

⁹⁷ Ibid. p 122

Similar to other strategic alliances and desperate pacts throughout history, in WWII “the enemy of our enemy was our friend,” and in Greece, this age-old slogan came back to haunt the British after the Germans were defeated. With the end of Nazi occupation being their goal, British support (in the forms of money and arms as well as troops) poured in during the occupation years. The United Kingdom, supported the Greek government as well as anyone else fighting the Germans, to include communist and other insurgents. While resistance numbers in Greece grew overall, the pro-communist movement swelled to more than 60,000 supporters before the war came to an end⁹⁸. Thus, the stage was set in 1944 for a civil war, and when the Germans retreated, the internal powers were well equipped and ready to turn on each other. The United Kingdom, formally the benefactor to both of the contributing sides, unable either to stop the conflict or to fully fund a successful counter communist force, turned to the United States for help with the problem. The stage was set for US intervention.

B. GREEK CIVIL WAR AND ITS CONNECTION TO FOREIGN AID

The already serious civil war fighting was turned into a cauldron of conflicting ideologies as British and Soviet funds worked to subsidize opposing forces. The post WWII civil war augmented the already poor economic state of the country and created horrible carnage at a time when the rest of Europe was trying to re-build. Hurt worst of all in this chaos were the civilians, who, along with the rest of Europe (which was in shambles) truly had no place to go. By the end of 1949, nearly a tenth of the population, having had their villages completely destroyed, was in need of new homes⁹⁹. Hyperinflation became so bad in many parts of the country that a lack of confidence in Greek currency became the norm, and an economic barter system became common place.

Driving the situation further into chaos was a completely destroyed communications system. Most cities had no way of communicating with the outside world¹⁰⁰. The economy was a wreck, more than 25% of all buildings were destroyed, and the total capital stock loss totaled 8.5 billion dollars US dollars¹⁰¹. Overall, the country

⁹⁸ Ibid. P 133

⁹⁹ Halevi, Nadav., Kawano, Shigeto., Mitani, Katsumi., Psilos, Diomedes D.. EconomicDevelopment Issues: Greece, Israel, Taiwan, and Thailand. New York: Praeger, 1968. p. 33.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid. p. 35.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

was in shambles and was in dire need of help from the outside. With only two Western Allied nations still able to supply any aid after the war, continued aid from the United Kingdom as well as additional help from the United States became more important as the conflict rolled on.

UN aid from 1944 to 1947, mostly from Britain, totaled 287 million US dollars. Its make up, half of which was military aid and the other half being for emergency food aid and other goods, significantly helped the suffering economy. American intervention, which had been present but small during this period, was increased in 1947 as the United Kingdom, due to financial problems of their own, bowed out of the conflict and left the United States as the region's primary non-communist benefactor.

Along with its humanitarian goals, US aid in Greece represented American participation in a growing conflict of a new kind. The Marshall plan's assistance to Greece (and later, the Truman doctrine's) was indicative of Greece's growing strategic role in the cold war and the bi-polar world that was developing. Additionally, and most importantly, these acts were a step, on the part of the United States, toward being involved in a European country, during a non-wartime period, for the purpose of creating and maintaining stability. The US government made it clear that the location was of vital importance, and for that reason, was prepared to allocate substantial amounts of aid to ward off communist aggression¹⁰². Were it not for other strategic world events occurring during this time, this would never have been the case. In the early 1950s, such events as the Korean War, the Soviet Union's first nuclear test, and their aggressive actions toward their satellite countries all solidified the vital importance of US presence.

The steadily rising global conflict between the east and the west could not have come at a better time in terms of the United States being willing to help the nationalists of Greece rid themselves of the communist insurgency. The Truman doctrine opened the door for other beneficial forms of aid, and soon money targeted at economic improvements, along with troops, began to flow into the country¹⁰³.

¹⁰² Duke, Simon W. and Krieger, Wolfgang. U.S. Military Forces in Europe, The Early Years, 1945-1970. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1993 p. 310

¹⁰³ Ibid. p 309.

Basing in the region was a natural step in the development of Greece as a strategic location in the NATO alliance. Interest in the region had grown for a variety of reasons including Greece's proximity to the northern coasts of Africa and the Middle East, as well as NATO's growing nervousness about Soviet expansionism. Additionally, Greece's location in the center of the Mediterranean made it a very attractive potential naval and air force hub¹⁰⁴ for US forces looking to increase their global presence.

American aid did not go unanswered. In return for the Civil War help and reconstruction aid, the Greek government graciously signed a friendly basing agreement that was as advantageous to the US as it was to NATO¹⁰⁵. It was an agreement that offered no restrictions to the US regarding military operations other than confining their deployments to areas within NATO's field of operations¹⁰⁶. In another signal of loyalty to the alliance, after Greece became a part of NATO, it assigned almost 90-95% of its armed forces to the alliance, demonstrating a strong commitment to the United States and western Europe¹⁰⁷. The initial aid from the United States hastened an end to the civil war and facilitated a solid beginning for the new government of Greece. The overall magnitude of the basing and its importance to the NATO strategic structure, however, was really the driving force behind US presence once the government failed and the Junta came to power. Thus, the seeds of the mutual dependence that would later tear US-Greek relations apart, were set when the United States first entered into an agreement in the region.

C. ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FOREIGN AID

When the US stepped in, it was clear that American intentions were not solely humanitarian. The secondary agenda (which clearly was to utilize Greece's strategic location as an outpost) may have been the true driving force behind the reciprocal relationship that was created through American presence. After all, if the United States had been focused solely on providing aid and assistance during and after the civil war,

¹⁰⁴ Duke, Simon. United States Military Forces and Installations in Europe. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. p 161.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Duke, Simon W. and Krieger, Wolfgang. U.S. Military Forces in Europe, The Early Years, 1945-1970. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1993. p. 317.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid. p 314.

would any of it have continued during the reign of the Junta? Thus, we can say that the prolonged aid associated with basing was truly the beginning of what we consider to be a major problem in US/Greek relations. As Walter Lippman remarked, Greece was selected, along with Turkey, “not because they are especially in need of relief, not because they are shining examples of democracy. . . but because they are the strategic gateway to the Black Sea and the heart of the Soviet Union”¹⁰⁸.

What is imperative to understand about the aid is that without the military help offered by the United States, the recovery that had begun with UK support prior to 1947 never would have continued. Also, assisting Greece in its recovery was the country’s slow movement toward being accepted as an associate partner into the European Economic Community. While this formal agreement did not begin until 1962¹⁰⁹, trading with European partners began shortly after the end of the Greek civil war and was important on driving up demand and supporting the recovery of Greek’s agriculture sector.¹¹⁰ Additionally, Greece becoming a key country in the stand against communist aggression meant that the aid associated with the US military remaining in the region would continue for some time. Therefore, it was the economic assistance that inadvertently solidified Greek dependence on US assistance.




Figure 1. US Assistance to Greece¹¹¹

¹⁰⁸ Gianaris, Nicholas V., Greece & Turkey, Economic and Geopolitical Perspectives. New York: Praeger, 1988. p. 28.

¹⁰⁹Clogg, Richard and Yannopoulos, George. Greece Under Military Rule. New York: Basic Books, 1972. p. IV

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Halevi, Nadav., Kawano, Shigeto., Mitani, Katsumi., Psilos, Diomedes D.. EconomicDevelopment Issues: Greece, Israel, Taiwan, and Thailand. NY: Praeger, 1968. p. 36.

Figure 1 shows the amounts of money flowing into Greece from the United States. During this period, US aid totaled 1.5 billion, most of which was economic but a good portion was military. By 1966, had Greece received a total of 4.6 billion; 26% of this was for military purposes¹¹². All told, during this time, 4 major bases and twenty smaller facilities were constructed. The infrastructure built in Greece was substantial. The most important of these was the port built in Souda Bay, Crete, which served as key submarine base for the United States¹¹³.

In 1953, partly as a result of US aid and partly as a result of entering into NATO, Greece began to make the internal changes necessary to develop a solid economic base which would continue to support their economic growth. To encourage foreign investment, the Papagos administration, the first elected after the civil war¹¹⁴, established rules making it easier for outsiders to have a controlling share of businesses¹¹⁵. Papagos's administration spoke openly about the advantages of a liberal economy, free enterprise, and a free market economy—all lessons learned from the United States and the post-war developing European countries. The plan behind deregulating foreign investment rules in Greece was to strive for an increase in demand which would support the highest level of employment, and in doing so raise the standard of living¹¹⁶. Dealings with the US drove this ideology. According to Williams, "This entire philosophy, which was instrumental in the recovery, was a derivative of the anticommunist political ideology found in American influence and was prevalent during the recovery"¹¹⁷. This policy, established by the government of Alexander Papagos and based on principles from the United States, was followed by all subsequent governments¹¹⁸ leading up to the Junta.

¹¹² Ibid. p. 44.

¹¹³ Gianaris, Nicholas V., Greece & Turkey, Economic and Geopolitical Perspectives. New York: Praeger, 1988. p. 179.

¹¹⁴ Clogg, Richard. A Concise History of Greece. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

¹¹⁵ Williams, Alan, Southern Europe Transformed, Political and economic change in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. London: Harper & Row Publishers LTD, 1984. p. 37.

¹¹⁶ Halevi, Nadav., Kawano, Shigeto., Mitani, Katsumi., Psilos, Diomedes D.. EconomicDevelopment Issues: Greece, Israel, Taiwan, and Thailand. NY: Praeger, 1968. p. 52.

¹¹⁷ Ibid. p. 37.

¹¹⁸ Williams, Alan, Southern Europe Transformed, Political and economic change in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. London: Harper & Row Publishers LTD, 1984.p. 37.

Aided by US influenced policies and strong regional growth, per person GNP rose in Greece from 632 US dollars in 1962 to 4380 in 1980. Western Europe’s recovery between 1950-1973, still referred to by many as “the Golden Years,” was one of the longest prolonged periods of growth and prosperity in the region’s history¹¹⁹. A convergence of factors inside and outside of the area is credited with creating this positive shift in the economic situation. First, and vital to the recovery, experts point to the very cheap, high-quality labor that was available in the region. Local labor unions were able to adapt existing European work and labor standards with imported technology to create success¹²⁰. When spurred by the world-wide investments that followed the Marshal Plan, overall productivity grew and demand quickly followed. The fact that low-cost, high-quality labor was essential to the recovery created a unique phenomenon that enabled the poorest of countries, in this case Greece and Spain, to witness a very powerful growth¹²¹.




Figure 2. Per Person GDP Growth in Europe

As shown in the above graph, while Greece’s per person GNP change was only a percentage point above those of Spain and Portugal, it was nearly 50% greater than that of France as well as many other European countries¹²². This period of rapid change greatly influenced Greece but still left it behind most of its European neighbors in terms

¹¹⁹ Sloan, Stanley R. *NATO, The European Union, and the Atlantic Community*. Lanhan, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. p. 3

¹²⁰Sloan, Stanley R. *NATO, The European Union, and the Atlantic Community*. Lanhan, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. p. 6

¹²¹Williams, Alan, *Southern Europe Transformed, Political and economic change in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain*. London: Harper & Row Publishers LTD, 1984. 112

¹²²Ibid. p. 113.

of overall living conditions¹²³. Sweden, for example, was the richest country before the recovery period, and after 23 years of averaging of only 3.1% per person GDP growth per year (low compared with the rest of Europe), they remained one of Europe's wealthiest countries. Greece, however, coming from such a state of utter destruction, greatly noticed its improvements in both productivity and economic growth as compared with other countries that had begun the period in much better shape.

A second factor that helped the region was the increase in cross-country trade all of Europe enjoyed during the recovery period. Brought on by a new sense of friendliness, countries participating in the European Economic Community were focused on mutual success and productivity¹²⁴ instead of war and destruction. This factor, more so than all the others, really made the post WWII economic recovery work for its participants. Demand grew as labor-rich countries were able to continually produce and build more. Thus, an environment was established in Europe that was perfect for Europe and the rest of the world to reap the benefits of recovery.

Improvements also were represented by the changes that Greek society underwent during this time. As a share of overall GDP, the industrial sector rose from 26% in 1962 to 32% in 1979, while that of agriculture dropped from 23% to 18%¹²⁵. As previously mentioned, the United States was key to this successful growth in terms not of only aid but also of ideology. According to Psilos, "the foreign assistance received by Greece undoubtedly influenced the rate of productivity in Greece in many ways"¹²⁶. Association with the United States not only facilitated faster growth, but it made Greece a partner with the largest trading member of the western alliance.

Years before the Junta came to power, the importance of relationships with trading partners was felt, and proven, as demand in other countries drove internal production and became associated with their own GDP growth. What is key to this

¹²³ Halevi, Nadav., Kawano, Shigeto., Mitani, Katsumi., Psilos, Diomedes D.. Economic Development Issues: Greece, Israel, Taiwan, and Thailand. New York: Praeger, 1968.

¹²⁴Gianaris, Nicholas V., *Greece & Turkey, Economic and Geopolitical Perspectives*. New York: Praeger, 1988. p. 66.

¹²⁵ Ibid. p. 34.

¹²⁶ Halevi, Nadav., Kawano, Shigeto., Mitani, Katsumi., Psilos, Diomedes D.. Economic Development Issues: Greece, Israel, Taiwan, and Thailand. New York: Praeger, 1968. p. 46.

relationship and needs highlighting is the fact that after the Junta came to power, their dynamic relationship with the United States would only grow in importance, for it was the relationship with the United States that helped maintain demand after many western European powers cut off relations with Greece. Known to the leaders of Greece was the fact that at the heart of this relationship was basing, which kept the large, benevolent trading partner interested in the enterprise. Before the US became involved in Greece it was struggling to become a democracy. Strategic location of the country and its integration into NATO's overall defensive posture quickly made it vital. Therefore, years before the Junta came to power, an environment was set in place that would almost guarantee that the United States would forsake its originally stated goals of promoting democracy in the region for one of maintaining its bases there. The government of Greece needed the United States, just as the United States needed Greece for its strategic location.

D. NUCLEAR ARRANGEMENTS STRENGTHEN THE BOND

In return for all this cooperation, the United States eventually established seven bases in the region and, from 1949 to 1969, provided 2 billion in military aid¹²⁷. In the late 1950s, nuclear weapons presented the only sticking point to the agreements between the United States and Greece. The Greek population, concerned with the negative complications that inherently accompany nuclear arsenals, was not happy with this new weaponry being situated on their homeland. With the help of NATO allies, the United States was able to convince the Greeks of the necessity of this basing, and on December 30, 1959, a secret agreement was signed to establish nuclear depots in NATO's newest member¹²⁸. Under the agreement, the Greeks would have control of the launch pads, while the US would control and maintain the missiles, thus mutual agreement would be needed for any nuclear decision¹²⁹. The final details of the plan were worked out, and a nuclear arrangement—one that would come to be one of the most important aspects of the alliance—was in place.

¹²⁷ Duke, Simon. United States Military Forces and Installations in Europe. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. p 161.

¹²⁸ Duke, Simon W. and Krieger, Wolfgang. U.S. Military Forces in Europe, The Early Years, 1945-1970. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1993. p 329.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

Quickly forgotten, however, once nuclear weapons were part of the picture, was the fact that in 1946, before any aid began, the US government stated clearly that it expected the Greek government to continually prove that it was not oligarchic and reactionary and that its population was continuously seeing democratic improvements¹³⁰. As serious as this breach would turn out to be for the people of Greece, it was not to be the only original goal overlooked for strategic purposes. In terms of NATO and the lasting pact made among members, the preamble to the Atlantic Treaty specifies that parties “are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law”¹³¹. Additionally, once a member of NATO, the population of Greece could have counted on Article II’s promise that all the signatory governments would “contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions. . . and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being”¹³² to ensure that their democratic growth would continue. Unfortunately, for the people of Greece, none of these pre-existing and pre-arranged guardians of democratic principles would prove indestructible. Nuclear weapons, as well as Greece’s strategic location in the scenario of a growing cold war, made these original goals very hard to uphold after the arrival of the Junta and their level of authoritarianism was pitted against the will of the United States and the US stand against the Soviets.

E. CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS SURROUNDING THE ARRIVAL OF THE “JUNTA”

The unique situation of divided nationalism and torn loyalties that led to the military taking power in 1967 was infused into the Greek society years before the event. What must be remembered is that members of the Junta, due to the torn loyalties that had existed between them and some of Greece’s civilian leadership, fully thought what they were doing was best for the country and for the armed forces as a whole. Prior to the civil war, there already existed in the country a background of disagreement between Republicans (those who believed a republic would be best for Greece) and those who

¹³⁰ Duke, Simon W. and Krieger, Wolfgang. U.S. Military Forces in Europe, The Early Years, 1945-1970. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1993. p 310.

¹³¹ NATO Office of Information and Press. NATO Handbook. Brussels, Belgium: 2001. p. 527

¹³² Ibid. p. 527

supported the monarchy¹³³. The Greek monarchy was in fact created by outside powers and feelings that the monarchy was inadequate had been long standing in the country, as many people saw them as nothing more than a transplant from other great powers with very little, if any, legitimate authority to rule.

The military ideology of Greece, and the history of how the Military dealt with civilian authorities is also vital to the story. The military, while at times supporting the monarchy, usually supported the side that backed ideals of a republic¹³⁴. Such were the views behind the 1909 coup of General Venizelos whose leadership had a tremendous impact on the belief system and makeup of the officer corp. During his reign, attempts to exert power into the Balkan wars extended the role of the Army and opened its officer corps up to a different class of soldiers. Prior officers had been from land-owning or upper classes. During Venizelos's tenure, in order to raise the additional troop numbers needed to watch over the frontiers, the army began allowing poor and lower classes of people to serve. This did not lower the professionalism of the corps. It did, however, over time, alter its political perspective from being generally conservative and not interested in active politics to being more open to political association and involvement¹³⁵. Thus, the ideology of the military was created and developed at a time when a strong military leader had taken political control of the country in order to protect it. The members of the Junta would use this lesson learned to later serve purposes of their own.

Thirty-five years later, the German occupation and communist insurgency brought all of this together as royalists and republicans joined to fight against the communists. This had a drastic effect on the officer corps as nationalism, loyalty to the king, became a defining trait for all active officers and a key to recruiting. This attempt of the corps, to purge itself of any republican views, sent much of its leadership into clandestine organizations, groups that were not fully against their political leaders, but still leery of monarchical legitimacy. This view among many army officers was both brought to the

¹³³ Clogg, Richard and Yannopoulos, George. Greece Under Military Rule. New York: Basic Books, 1972. p. 20

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Ibid p 21

forefront and solidified when, in July of 1965¹³⁶, in an effort to avoid scandal involving the son of Prime Minister Papandreou, an accused leftist who was being considered for the role of Defense Minister, the King, Constantine II, began to take direct action in parliament¹³⁷. His actions drove Papandreou from office and began the chain of events that directly led to the Junta. By hand selecting and controlling the three successors to the popular prime minister, King Constantine brought the legitimacy of himself and the parliament into question, weekend civilian control of the military, and heightened the already apathetic view that the population of Greece had toward its parliament and the King¹³⁸.

Most people in Greece were more concerned with the economy and felt that the King's meddling with parliament was responsible for some of their economic problems. This apathy toward who was in charge made it easier for the Junta to take control. After 18 months of not being able to resolve crises of continuously changing Prime Ministers, King Constantine, in order to restore order, announced that new elections were to take place in May of 1967¹³⁹. Before the elections could take place, and to the surprise of high ranking generals as well as the king, the Junta took charge in a rapid, well-executed coup. The group that took power, known as the Junta, were a collection of Army Colonels who were led by Colonel Georgios Papadopoulos. One can only assume that the fractured government and its failure to handle the previous 18 months of political turmoil played into the hands of the colonel's who assumed power considering themselves the caretakers of Greece. Shortly after taking power, in an effort to solidify support of much of the government and other military leaders alike, the leaders of the putsch used their need to ensure that communists were not able to take power as their reasoning for taking power¹⁴⁰. Contrary to the Junta's reasoning that a military take over would be better than the communist taking power, no evidence of anything close to a communist power

¹³⁶Clogg, Richard and Yannopoulos, George. Greece Under Military Rule. New York: Basic Books, 1972. p. 27

¹³⁷ Clogg, Richard. A Concise History of Greece. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992. p. 161

¹³⁸ Ibid. p.162

¹³⁹ Clogg, Richard. A Concise History of Greece. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992. p. 162

¹⁴⁰ Ibid. p. 163

struggle has ever been produced¹⁴¹ and in the time since the coup many have proven the idea of a communist take over to be totally manufactured¹⁴².

Something completely different appears to be the impetus of the takeover. First, engineers of the coup were aware that their membership in the western alliance was important because it ensured that the interest of Greece, or what they perceived to be Greek interest, would be protected by the United States. Additionally, it ensured that, through the basing and military aid that had already began, a sizable army would be maintained and developed¹⁴³. Also known is the fact that Andreas Papandreou, who was the clear poll leader in the upcoming May election, was campaigning on a Greek nationalist stance that presented a “Gaullist” approach to NATO. He felt that a neutralist foreign policy would increase Greek independence¹⁴⁴. Completely disagreeing with the man who was possibly going to be elected as the next prime minister, before the coup took place, the Junta was already aware that their future, and what they thought was the best future for their country, rested with NATO. As can be seen by evaluating the specific background of the civilian-military relationship leading up to the coup, the seeds were set for the US-Greek co-dependent relationship of the Junta’s reign before they even came to power. It can be seen that the leader’s of the coup needed NATO and alliance membership, just as the United States and its allies needed association with Greece.

F. THE “JUNTA” AND ITS AFTERMATH

Action taken by the colonels was swift. Proclamations made in the first couple of months included outlawing all organizations and associations deemed to be a threat to the country¹⁴⁵. These included labor unions, political parties, and civic and women’s clubs. The same month, the right wing National Unity Party found its doors closed and its leader arrested. Additionally, in what might have been the most direct immediate threat toward freedom and democracy, the Junta banned requirements allowing for elections of village

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² U.S. 93rd Congress. Hearing Before The Committee on Foreign Affairs, Testimony of John Zighdis on American Policy Toward Greece. U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, 1974. p. 6

¹⁴³ Clogg, Richard and Yannopoulos, George. Greece Under Military Rule. New York: Basic Books, 1972. p. 22

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ Munn, Donald C. Military Dictatorship in Greece (1967-1974): The Genesis of Greek Anti-Americanism. Thesis, Naval Post Graduate School: Monterey, California, 1980. p 69.

and municipal leaders—all of the occupations were turned over to junta-nominated personnel¹⁴⁶. The junta, through propaganda and threatening tactics, passed a new constitution through the country that severely limited civil rights, took many powers of appointment away from the king, and increased the overall power of the leaders of the coup. Public apathy toward politics and politicians, which had developed during the prior three years of turmoil leading up to the putsch, enabled the document to pass with a 95% majority. The new document was in place and active in the country before many really knew of its possible negative effects. Once in place, any opposition lost its ability to fight back¹⁴⁷.

Effects on the economy were not as rapid, but in the long run, they were equally as devastating. The junta initially used the excess growth of the previous decade to justify their expansionary monetary policies and protectionist actions. Conditions in the country dropped, as three years into their reign, inflation was up to World War II highs and the consumer price index was skyrocketing. Overseas, US papers were full of reports on atrocities and torture being committed by the regime¹⁴⁸. In a matter of years, the junta managed to destroy most of the things that the United States and the democratically oriented leadership of Greece had worked toward, and the question that remains is why, with all of this going on, the United States continued its support.

G. PERCEPTIONS AND REALITIES OF US SUPPORT

The United States, reliant on Greece for its vital location and role in the cold war, reacted to the coup in ways that clearly countered its long-term stated goals for the region. The ideals that had founded the relationship between the two countries were placed aside as the United States focused on short-term strategic objectives¹⁴⁹ that were perceived to be critical to the Cold War. Interestingly, the United States did not originally see this as a trade off or an all-or-nothing situation; it continued to see attainment of long-term political objectives possible. When the Colonels took over and the United States began to realize the dramatic changes being conducted by the administration, they

¹⁴⁶ Ibid. p 70.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid. p 74.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid. p 78.

¹⁴⁹ Clogg, Richard and Yannopoulos, George. Greece Under Military Rule. New York: Basic Books, 1972. p 197.

recognized three ways to deal with the situation. First, they could offer full support of the dictatorship and continue business as usual by providing the same amount of economic and military aid. Second, they could forgo all strategic interest in the nation and completely sever ties. However, a third method was selected, which was to maintain some support while encouraging a return to constitutional democracy¹⁵⁰. Summed up by one US official shortly after the coup, “We disagree with the political system which prevails in Greece and consider a return to Parliamentary rule essential to the long-term stability and prosperity. At the same time, we must preserve our important strategic interests in Greece as a valuable geographic area in the critical Eastern Mediterranean region”¹⁵¹.

Initial protest from the US government included an arms embargo along with major cuts in economic aid. The embargo, which was to cover all NATO countries and was to prevent shipments of major military items such as ships, aircraft, military helicopters, tanks, artillery, missiles, and ammunition¹⁵² did not last long. This embargo, to the surprise of Congress and NATO allies, was broken after several months by the State Department, which, after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, decided that it was time for a reassessment of the situation¹⁵³. The size of the arms embargo breach by the United States was large enough for many to see it as support for the regime. During the first year, the junta received F5 aircraft, F104 aircraft, other assorted boats and ammunition and self-propelled 155-mm and 90-mm artillery shells capable of firing nuclear shells from US armament depots in Greece. These shipments actually constituted an arms increase to the country¹⁵⁴.

In terms of continuing to receive the US support that helped them remain in power, the well-organized coup could not have come at a better time for the Junta. The mid to late 1960s, arguably the height of the Cold War, were a time of extremely high

¹⁵⁰ Woodhouse, C.M. The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels. New York, NY: Franklin Watts Publishing, 1985. p 87.

¹⁵¹ Duke, Simon. United States Military Forces and Installations in Europe. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. p 162.

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Munn, Donald C. Military Dictatorship in Greece (1967-1974): The Genesis of Greek Anti-Americanism. Thesis, Naval Post Graduate School: Monterey, California, 198. p 159.

tensions in the east-west conflict and a time when America's role in the ever-growing conflict was increasing in importance.

First among the worldwide events having a large impact during this time was the French expulsion of all NATO forces in 1966. De Gaulle, concerned with the independence of France, was convinced that his country needed its own nuclear capability to best promote its own interest¹⁵⁵. He was not happy what he perceived to be European dependence on the United States in terms of nuclear protection and did not believe that the United States was willing to risk nuclear destruction of an American city to defend an ally. Additionally, felt that the United States and the Soviets were working to collaborate together to ensure that only they controlled nuclear abilities¹⁵⁶. Forcing NATO to move 70,000 troops, relocate its headquarters (then in Paris) to Belgium, and to evacuate approximately 190 installations¹⁵⁷, the move by France forced the alliance's remaining military to shift the defense¹⁵⁸. France's leaving the military portion of the alliance could have been seen inside and outside of NATO as a weakening in the overall coalition. Both the United States and the United Kingdom felt it was in their interest to enlarge their commitments in order to maintain the credibility of the alliance¹⁵⁹. No one wanted to see it get smaller, look weaker, or appear to be falling apart.

Also tearing at the internal workings of the alliance was the Vietnam conflict and US commitment to southeast Asia. Perceptions of US commitment to western Europe grew as the continuing war in Vietnam had a dramatic effect on US force levels in the Federal Republic of Germany. By 1968, two thirds of one division and a cavalry regiment, 28,000 troops, had redeployed back to the United States to support its Vietnam commitment¹⁶⁰. After being moved out of France, the United States could not afford to

¹⁵⁵ Sloan, Stanley R. NATO, The European Union, and the Atlantic Community. Lanhan, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. p. 43

¹⁵⁶ Ibid. p. 44

¹⁵⁷ Duke, Simon. United States Military Forces and Installations in Europe. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. p.151

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Treverton, Gregory F. The "Dollar Drain" and American Forces in Germany. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1978.p. 34

¹⁶⁰ Duke, Simon. United States Military Forces and Installations in Europe. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. p. 63.

leave another NATO participating country, in this case Greece, at a time when its commitment to the alliance was being brought into question. Furthermore, working against the partners of the alliance in the late 1960s was a downward turn in western economies, which made strong cooperation among members critical to NATO's overall success¹⁶¹.

In 1966, for example, the Federal German economy fell into recession, and Chancellor Erhard was forced to seek relief from Washington in the form of asking to have the volume of their obligated weapons purchases lowered¹⁶². Conversely, and at a bad time for Germany, the US Congress was trying hard to find ways to limit money being spent overseas in the form of basing and troop deployments. Economic stagnation and the war in Vietnam were taking a toll on alliance members, but with Soviet actions such as the Prague spring offensive, in August 1968, the last thing that the United States and NATO could afford to do was appear irresolute with regard to members around the world. Finally, basing, it must be remembered, is a byproduct not of only membership in an alliance but also of strategic location, and events of the late 1960s made Greece's strategic spot in the Mediterranean more important to the alliance than ever before. This fact, above all others, most likely secured US cooperation with the Junta.

Two events underscored this fact. The first was the granting of over flight rights by the Junta to the United States during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War¹⁶³. Coming shortly after taking power, the Junta were quick to extend a helping hand in the form of blanket use of landing facilities and additional basing rights, both of which the United States took full advantage of during the conflict. The second incident, which was a direct consequence of the first, was slightly greater in terms of highlighting Greece's importance to the region. In 1967, in an effort to counter US vital interests in maritime activity in the region after the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the Soviet Union formed its

¹⁶¹ Sloan, Stanley R. NATO, The European Union, and the Atlantic Community. Lanhan, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. p. 83

¹⁶² Treverton, Gregory F. The "Dollar Drain" and American Forces in Germany. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1978.p. 2

¹⁶³Munn, Donald C. Military Dictatorship in Greece (1967-1974): The Genesis of Greek Anti-Americanism. Thesis, Naval Post Graduate School: Monterey, California, 1980. p 150

first Mediterranean sea squadron¹⁶⁴, capable of undertaking sea-based air operations. With the core mission of the squadron being surveillance of the US Sixth Fleet activity, shadowing of carriers and detection of US ballistic-missile submarines, US presence and ports in the area became more important than ever¹⁶⁵.

The US sixth fleet greatly increased activity during this time, and in 1971, in an effort to lower the time sailors were spending away from home and increase retention, actually began home porting in Greece¹⁶⁶. Coming at a time of particularly low junta popularity in Greece, this move by the navy was later seen as major support of the authoritarian regime. After analyzing the world events of the late 1960s, including the French pull out from NATO, Vietnam, economic influences, and other world conflicts, it is clear that many factors of Cold War friction contributed to the United States maintaining a relationship with, and in some ways supporting, the Junta during their earliest days. Unfortunately for the United States, other factors besides military aid and basing added to what was seen as support of junta rule in the eyes of the people of Greece and the world.

US official visits took place at regular intervals from 1969 to 1974, seemingly providing approval for junta activities. Strangely, while the United States continued to build on military-related connections, countries in Europe, which were formerly connected to Greece, cut off ties as soon as possible. In European diplomatic circles, even social contact between country representatives and the junta were discouraged and avoided¹⁶⁷. In the United States, on the other hand, official visits and meetings with junta leadership remained common. In 1971, two US congressmen made an official visit and returned with stories of rough treatment toward junta rivals and authoritarianism toward public news services. The congressman also reported that perception was building within the opposition that the United States was supporting enemies instead of friends. Another

¹⁶⁴ Goldstein, Lyle J., Zhukov, Yuri M., A TALE OF TWO FLEETS: A Russian Perspective on the 1973 Naval Standoff in the Mediterranean. *Naval War College Review*. Washington: Spring 2004, Vol.57, Iss. 2, p. 27.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Clogg, Richard and Yannopoulos, George. Greece Under Military Rule. New York: Basic Books, 1972. p 198.

Senator said during an interview that “we have been disappointed in the fact that there has not been more progress toward the establishment of a parliamentary government”¹⁶⁸.

After considering all the information, the Senate Foreign Relations committee felt it was bad news indeed but did not see an alternative. Reasoning that Greece was still a NATO member, the Senate Foreign Relations committee decided that they had no alternative but to continue their current and previously mentioned “two pronged policy”¹⁶⁹. Ironically, Greece was still in NATO mainly due to nothing other than US support and influence with other allies, and it was a stunning example of circular reasoning for the Senate to use that as a reason to continue relations. While members of congress recognized problems with the US policy towards Greece and may have felt more was needed to encouraging democracy, the Nixon administration was sending nothing but positive signals.

On April 22, 1971, Nixon’s secretary of commerce, while on an official visit to Greece, met with key leaders and praised both the economic and political stability of the country¹⁷⁰. What needs to be highlighted from this relationship is that these activities, seen as positive reinforcement from the US government, added to the junta’s ability to claim overall legitimacy. At the same time, US western European allies, which had confirmed rumors of torture and other human rights violations, kicked Greece out of the European Council¹⁷¹. Over half of the countries in NATO expressed doubts about why Greece, which did not seem to be representing the same shared democratic values, was allowed to remain in the alliance. The United States, to the dismay of some countries, made it clear that Greece was vital to NATO security and was to remain an active partner¹⁷². These actions overrode the political goals that had been established prior to entering into basing arrangements with Greece, and because of them, the United States

¹⁶⁸ Woodhouse, C.M. The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels. New York, NY: Franklin Watts Publishing, 1985. p 88.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid. p 89.

¹⁷¹ Clogg, Richard and Yannopoulos, George. Greece Under Military Rule. New York: Basic Books, 1972.

P 195.

¹⁷² Ibid. p 195.

was to suffer long-term problems during the next several decades, problems which may have made the short-term strategic goal appear insignificant.

H. EFFECTS OF SUPPORT

Successful intervention by Turkey during an attempted coup of Cyprus led to the downfall of the junta and restoration of the monarchy. The United States was to see rapid results in response to its continued junta support¹⁷³.

Prior to the coup, the US House of Representatives held a hearing before its Committee on Foreign Affairs to undertake a study on American policy toward Greece. The hearings star witness was John Zighdis, former Greek Minister of Industry prior to the Junta taking control. His testimony in 1974 highlighted the growing gap between the United States and the people of Greece and the many reasons why so many associated Junta authoritarianism with American basing and aid¹⁷⁴. Along with examples of US support and suggestions of American aid in the coup that had brought the Junta to power, Zighdis hit on the number one reason why the Greek population felt such a strong resentment toward the same government that just 25 years earlier had helped to end the Greek civil war. The primary reason for the downfall in relations between the two countries that he was predicting was the failure of the United States to fulfill its treaty obligations to defend democracy and freedom within Greece¹⁷⁵. He went further by saying that contrary to fighting authoritarianism, the United States had accepted, cooperated, and even assisted with the Greek dictators¹⁷⁶. It was clear that US basing agreements with the Junta created strong anti-US sentiment.

This was the perception present when Premier Constantine Caramanlis, the appointed leader of Greece, made several quick changes upon taking control. First, Greece pulled out of military participation in NATO. Political ties were to remain, but they were definitely not the same¹⁷⁷. This action was taken as a sign that the overthrow of

¹⁷³ Munn, Donald C. Military Dictatorship in Greece (1967-1974): The Genesis of Greek Anti-Americanism. Thesis, Naval Post Graduate School: Monterey, California, 1980. p 182.

¹⁷⁴ U.S. 93rd Congress. Hearing Before The Committee on Foreign Affairs, Testimony of John Zighdis on American Policy Toward Greece. U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, 1974

¹⁷⁵ Ibid. p. 4.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

the junta had given rise to political powers of the left, and fears existed that the backlash towards the United States might drive Greece closer to the Soviet Union. Secondly, and more devastating to the United States, the Caramanlis government, after threatening to kick all US forces out of the country, decided to renegotiate the basing agreement¹⁷⁸. When the new basing agreement was finally completed, after much negotiating by the State Department, the United States was to lose 3 of its 7 key bases in Greece and pay an additional 700 million dollars¹⁷⁹ over a ten-year period. Additionally, the Greeks gained one of their biggest requests, which was to have a Greek commander in charge of all four remaining bases. The United States was still in charge of overall activities, but its troops not allowed to move on or off post without the local commander's authority¹⁸⁰. Worst of all, the realization of the how valuable these US locations were would encourage almost every succeeding administration to extract significant concessions after any disagreement. This was the case in 1980 when Greece wanted to return back to NATO, again in 1987 over an oil dispute and repeatedly through the 1970s and 1980s as a way to ensure that NATO would prevent Turkey from attacking¹⁸¹. Attitudes built up during the reign of the junta would cause problems, both militarily and politically, well into the next decade. As said by John Zighdis during his congressional appearance, "it is within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance that Greek territory was transformed into a vast concentration camp for its people"¹⁸², and this was precisely what led to the anti-Americanism after the junta was gone. He went on to say that this massive wave of anti-Americanism was developing due to the perception that American activity both support the regime and kept it in power¹⁸³. By choosing to support a regime in order to protect short-term military goals, the United States, through a series of policy adjustments, forgot the main purpose of its initial entrance into the country. In doing so, the United States

¹⁷⁸ Duke, Simon. United States Military Forces and Installations in Europe. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. p 163.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid. p 164.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ Ibid. p 166-167

¹⁸² U.S. 93rd Congress. Hearing Before The Committee on Foreign Affairs, Testimony of John Zighdis on American Policy Toward Greece. U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, 1974

¹⁸³ Ibid.

fostered resentment in the young officer corps of Greece and the population it had originally tried to help. Moreover, it damaged the cornerstone of trust and confidence that had existed in the past. The United States would spend the next 30 years overcoming this decision and in some ways is still dealing with its outcome.

In the next chapter we will see that, unlike the situation that existed in Greece, Spain was not making and strides towards democratization when the US began basing. The situation was actually completely the opposite. The country's leader Franco, one of the world's last remaining dictators, made no conciliatory promises of democratic legislation. His attitude towards the entire basing process was completely different than that of Greece. Very similar to US actions in Greece, however, was the measures the US took, the overall global situation, and the overall outcome of the relationship.

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IV. COOPERATION WITH FRANCO AND ITS EFFECTS ON LONG-TERM US-SPANISH RELATIONS

Spain's entrance into the worldwide basing network of the United States and NATO was much different from that of Greece. When the United States began dealing with Greece, the country was already making moves toward democracy and was open to making their own level of democracy part of the basing plan. Spain on the other hand, was an international pariah in the post World War II years and was far from being considered an equal partner with any NATO members. As the Cold War intensified, Spain moved from being an international outcast to a country courted by the United States, because its location (within striking distance of the Soviet Union and the Mediterranean) made it vital to America's plan for the defense of Europe. Acting against the recommendations of its NATO partners the United States entered into a basing agreement that offered unlimited access to Spain in terms of basing, while in an effort to avoid criticism from allies, not promising, or guaranteeing for the mutual defense of Spain should they enter into a war¹⁸⁴. Just as in the chapter on Greece, the questions that need to be answered are: Why did the United States forgo prior political regional objectives for near-goals in regards to basing in Spain, and how did this effects the long-term basing and political relationship between the two countries?

Lacking a mutual defense clause, the pact's designers hoped that it would not be taken as proof that the United States was interested in supporting Franco and his authoritarian regime. As the United States would discover, attempting to have strategic relations without providing official political support was a dangerous tightrope to walk. Relations with the United States clearly boosted Franco's legitimacy within Spain. As we shall see, the fact that the US government sent a delegation to Madrid in September of 1948 to discuss future military relations¹⁸⁵, actually provided him with a great political success before official basing and the economic the aid associated with it even began¹⁸⁶.

¹⁸⁴ Arango, Ergaso Ramon. The Spanish Political System: Franco's Legacy. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1978, p. 139

¹⁸⁵ Preston, Paul. Franco, A Biography. New York, NY: Harper Collins Publisher Inc., 1994 , p. 581

¹⁸⁶Duke, Simon W. and Krieger, Wolfgang. U.S. Military Forces in Europe, The Early Years, 1945-1970. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1993 p. 295

As the Cold War's intensity grew, and Spain's strategic location continued to become important, the United States, to continue their strategic goals, succumbed to Franco's insistence that the United States provide funds far greater than what had been initially offered¹⁸⁷. From the relationship's inception, it is clear that a form of mutual dependence would develop between the two partners—a dependence that, similar to what happened in Greece, would ultimately sour political relations between the two countries.

Franco, aware that US recognition would assist in his own political viability as well as Spain's recovery, took great advantage of US openness¹⁸⁸ and used US presence to further his own causes. The United States on the other hand, risked entering into a basing plan that was reliant on a questionable dictator to secure strategic basing locations, and in doing so, placed the relationship itself in jeopardy by supporting a leader who represented the opposite of the democratic values it normally fought to defend. In the end, both parties in the pact needed each other and were willing to risk political fallout to reach their goals. For Franco, this was an easy bargain. For the United States, on the other hand, the price of admission it has had to pay continues to rise, as the anti-American views that developed during this period continue to affect Spain's political viewpoints and elections even today. Of vital importance to the story, is that the seeds of mutual dependence that drove the parties together were set in as US basing began. For the United States, not seeing that the economic aid associated with the plan would work to prop up the Franco regime was to have long-lasting results.

A. ECONOMIC FACTORS IN SPAIN BREED DEPENDENCY

As discussed in the previous chapter, the last century was a time of amazingly positive growth for much of the Western world. Beginning in 1913, Spain experienced its best phase of accelerated per-capita growth and structural change. Experiencing a noticeable boost in its own macroeconomic performance, the country came closest to reaching the levels of France and the United Kingdom, as far as GDP, prior to 1930¹⁸⁹.

¹⁸⁷ Salisbury, William T., Theberge, James D., Spain in the 1970s – Economics, Social Structure, and Foreign Policy. New York: Praeger, 1976. p 143.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid

¹⁸⁹ Salisbury, William T., Theberge, James D., Spain in the 1970s – Economics, Social Structure, and Foreign Policy. New York: Praeger, 1976. p. 357.

The 1930s brought global depression, of which Spain was not exempt¹⁹⁰, but Spain was forced to deal with in a far different way than her European counterparts. As we shall see, the depression induced civil war in Spain, forced it to deal with much of its economic problems in a bubble, and, in an ironic twist, resulted in seclusion that eventually made US basing so attractive to Franco. What is important to note is that in the pre-Franco years, Spain was a partner with the rest of the world during the period of massive growth prior to the great depression¹⁹¹. It was not until after 1939 and the Franco years that internal growth was hindered by economic protectionism and its own somewhat self-induced seclusion.

Additionally, much of what was happening in the United States before World War II had a very negative effect on Spain, and just like the rest of Europe, they were tied economically to the fortunes of the United States. Interestingly, in many ways, the anti-capitalist views that stemmed from the global breakdown of the Great Depression, would later allow many to see Franco, and authoritarianism, as a viable option to other forms of government. The 20th century, which began as a period of solid growth for the Spanish economy, turned into a spiral of discontent in the 1930s, as global recession dropped per person GDP to 1910 levels¹⁹². Clearly, the depression had a disastrous effect on Spain and its economy, but it was nothing close to the disaster that was to come about through the Spanish Civil War.

The self-induced carnage brought to Spain during the Spanish Civil War served as a precursor to the worldwide devastation that would result from World War II. All of what was not destroyed or lost during the great depression was destroyed in the battle that ensued¹⁹³. The majority of the Spain's infrastructures, including roads, bridges, and train tracks were all destroyed. Additionally, all of their existing financial mechanisms were gone. Destruction and loss of life were so complete that Franco, while siding with Hitler

¹⁹⁰ Crafts, Nicholas., Toniolo, Gianni, Economic Growth In Europe Since 1945.United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1996. p. 355.

¹⁹¹ Salisbury, William T., Theberge, James D., Spain in the 1970s – Economics, Social Structure, and Foreign Policy. New York: Praeger, 1976. p. 138.

¹⁹² Crafts, Nicholas., Toniolo, Gianni, Economic Growth In Europe Since 1945.United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1996. p. 357.

¹⁹³ Baklanoff, Eric N., The Economic Transformation of Spain and Portugal. New York, NY: Praeger Publishers, 1978. p 11

during the war, refrained from actively participating in World War II besides sending just over a Brigade's worth of fighters. The effects experienced by Spain in its post-civil war years, in terms of the overall welfare of the population, were clearly the worst it experienced during the last century¹⁹⁴ and were greatly exacerbated by the fact that since the rest of the world was involved in World War II, Spain had to handle much of it on its own. How Franco was able to make a series of political moves and actually drive the United States and Germany to compete for his allegiance during the war was an amazing act, but also what later led to him to being ignored by Europe. Additionally, by balancing what little help he did receive from Germany, with the oil shipments and payments he received from the West, he was able to strengthen his hold on Spain, crush many of his competitors, and set himself up for a future alliance with the United States. However, as we shall see, it was precisely this double dealing in terms of how he chose to deal with his own economic situation, that led to many of his political problems, both inside and outside of Spain.

Franco's association with Hitler and his standing as being one of the only dictators to remain in power after World War II led to his becoming the true pariah of Europe in the eyes of other recovering countries. As previously mentioned, in the initial post-Civil War years, Franco received almost no outside aid other than the oil that the United States was sending as a token to keep him from siding completely with the Nazis. From all of his speeches and actions during early World War II, it is evident that Franco truly believed that the Germans would be victorious and that it was on their side that he would hedge most of his bets.

The United States, in return for petroleum shipments, had requested that Franco remain neutral in the growing World War II conflict. In February 1944, in a complete surprise to Franco, the United States shut down petroleum shipments, stating that the ports and listening posts Franco had been offering to the Nazis, as well as the shipments of wolfram (material used in tungsten and other war materials) he had been making over the line, would have to stop¹⁹⁵. Interestingly, it is commonly known that once the war

¹⁹⁴ Crafts, Nicholas., Toniolo, Gianni, Economic Growth In Europe Since 1945.United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1996. p 358.

¹⁹⁵ Preston, Paul. Franco, A Biography. New York, NY: Harper Collins Publisher Inc., 1994. p 508

had begun, authoritarianism, as popular as it was in the Spain, was seen by the United States and United Kingdom as the center of what was becoming the driving force behind the evil empire and was looked at with any deal of respect. For this reason and others, Franco was regarded by Roosevelt as a “satellite Hitler,”¹⁹⁶ and just after Franco’s victory in 1939, all US support, other than these token oil shipments, came to and end.

By 1944, the tungsten and iron that were being shipped out of Spain to Germany were thought of as being key to Germany’s war effort, and the United States and other allies were concerned about their impact on Germany’s war fighting capability. Cutting the oil supplies to Spain, at an already difficult time for the Spanish economy, had a powerful effect on an already declining situation. Things became so bad that by April 1944, when Franco had his victory parade in Madrid, there was no fuel for armored cars or tanks¹⁹⁷. Wagons were again common, and Spain was being set back years by the embargo.

What is interesting about this struggle with the West is the way Franco seemed to handle it with ease. He simply used it as a reason to continue his internal fight against communist insurgents and as a way to stay in power by arguing that the country should rally behind him and he would work to keep Spain out of the war, while the whole world was against them. In the years after the war, Franco would use Spain’s outcast status in much the same way to strengthen his internal position while solidifying the support of the Spanish people behind him¹⁹⁸. During the riff over oil, he had control of the press and was able to continually repeat this mantra. By the time of his oil embargo incident in the west, even though he continued to covertly back Germany, it was apparent that Hitler might have a hard time turning the tide on his eastern Russian front. Franco took advantage of the situation by offering a conciliatory gesture to the United States. He satisfied the accusations that he was helping the Germans and solidified his popularity at home by brining back his Spanish Legion and air squadron from the Russian front. In

¹⁹⁶ Salisbury, William T., Theberge, James D., Spain in the 1970s – Economics, Social Structure, and Foreign Policy. New York: Praeger, 1976. p. 140.

¹⁹⁷ Salisbury, William T., Theberge, James D., Spain in the 1970s – Economics, Social Structure, and Foreign Policy. New York: Praeger, 1976. p. 511.

¹⁹⁸ Department of the Army, Spain, A Country Study. Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1990 p. 261

return for this, he requested a return of oil shipments as well as arms¹⁹⁹. Initially, not interested with the deal and involved in an election, the United States went against the United Kingdom, which had already resumed shipments and denied any kind of bargain. The public in America was clearly, at least for the time being, against further support of Franco.

Finally, on May 2, 1944, when it looked like the Germans were going to supply petroleum, wheat, and machinery to Spain, the United States decided to resume oil shipments. This done not only because Franco was bringing back his troops from the Russian front, but because he had agreed to reduce his German wolfram shipments to almost nothing²⁰⁰. Other than the little oil and wheat from the West, which had begun flowing again after this agreement, Franco was treated with open contempt²⁰¹. Despite these efforts and others by the allies, Franco publicly continued to support Germany throughout the war. It was this fact, more so than his dictatorship, that solidified his outsider status and hostile treatment by the West once the war was over²⁰². His control of all forms of media inside of Spain allowed him to perpetuate his view that dictatorships were the best form of government. He did this by continuing to broadcast positive stories, making it appear as though the war would eventually turn back in favor of Germany.

It was as though he wanted Spain to believe that the Germans were falling back in an effort to lure the ally's in for a big final massacre. He successfully sent this message out through all radio broadcasts and continued the propaganda unceasingly²⁰³. Additionally, Franco allowed German radio listening posts and radar stations to operate in Spain until the end of the war²⁰⁴. This hardcore support of the German regime came to an end when Franco finally realized that Germany was not going to win the war and

199 Preston, Paul. Franco, A Biography. New York, NY: Harper Collins Publisher Inc., 1994. p. 508

200 Preston, Paul. Franco, A Biography. New York, NY: Harper Collins Publisher Inc., 1994. p. 511

201 Salisbury, William T., Theberge, James D., Spain in the 1970s – Economics, Social Structure, and Foreign Policy. New York: Praeger, 1976. p. 140.

202 Payne, Stanley G., Politics and Society in Twentieth-Century Spain. New York: New Viewpoints., 1976. p. 161.

203 Preston, Paul. Franco, A Biography. New York, NY: Harper Collins Publisher Inc., 1994. p. 513.

204 Ibid.

began to openly talk about siding with the Allies to work together to defeat communism, Spanish relations in terms of US basing were on the way.

Strategically, using his anti-communist stance as a foot in the door, Franco early on began positioning himself as the West's only option in the global fight against a spreading Soviet influence. In October of 1944, he wrote a letter to Churchill that proposed the beginning of a Spanish-British anti-Bolshevik coalition²⁰⁵. Thus, before the war had ended, Franco, for reasons that were both economic as well as political, began reaching out to the West to maintain his viability and power. He was aware that there were strong communist guerrilla forces still operating in the North and East of his country and that an alliance to fight communism would allow him to continue his grip on his own country while opening up important alliances with others²⁰⁶. In the end, what really got the United Kingdom and the United States to look at Franco as a serious partner was the fact that many knew that if help was not sent, Franco would either succumb to, or turn to, communism. Just as the Junta had been allowed to stay in power for their important location and anti-communist sentiment, Franco got his first official recognition from the West because of the help he could provide in the emerging cold war—this, in 1944, before the founding of NATO and true rifts between the West and Russia had arisen. Churchill declared in November 1944, “Should the communist become masters of Spain, we must expect the infection to spread very fast through Italy and France”²⁰⁷. As the Second World War was drawing to an end, it was apparent that Franco, as well as Spain's strategic location, were going to play a vital roll in the developing Cold War and the struggle that was to come between capitalism and communism.

B. YEARS OF EXILE TURN TO COOPERATION

Franco's double dealings with both sides and his standing as one of the last the dictators to remain in Western Europe proved detrimental to Spain. Franco was offered no part of the Marshall Plan aid, this, despite his best efforts to open a dialogue with the

²⁰⁵ Ibid. p. 517

²⁰⁶ Department of the Army, Spain, A Country Study. Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1990 p.46

²⁰⁷ Preston, Paul. Franco, A Biography. New York, NY: Harper Collins Publisher Inc., 1994. p. 521.

British and Americans before the war came to an end. One cause in the difference in recovery levels between Spain and other European countries obviously was the presence of Franco. Immediately after the war, London and Washington made it clear that they really would like to see Franco gone, but, in reasoning similar to decisions made in regards to Saddam after the first gulf war, were not ready to attempt to dislodge him for fear it would spark another civil war in an already unstable region²⁰⁸.

After the end of the Civil War, Franco answered calls from Western powers to resign and hand over power by saying “No.” He found himself without foreign trade or diplomatic ties²⁰⁹ and in the middle of his darkest moment²¹⁰. When looking at the rapid development of other destroyed countries, most notably France, it is obvious that Franco’s banishment from Western alliances and his not receiving Marshall Plan aid played a major factor in the slow development of Spain between the end of World War II and the mid 1950s. The biggest gap between France and Spain with regard to per person GDP was during 1939-50²¹¹. The 1950s in particular, while being a time of great growth and recovery for the rest of Europe, are only associated with poor performance in Spain²¹².

Spain’s poor economic performance after the war seems to imply that problems were caused by more than a lack of Marshall Fund aid. It shows the negative effects that the protectionist autocratic government had on the country. Similar to the end of the war in Iraq in the early 90s when allies of the United States assumed that the major defeat suffered by the Iraqis would lead to the implosion of their leading regime and the downfall of Saddam Hussein, many Western allies did not see the long-term viability of the Franco Regime. It is clear that an additional reason for Spain’s poor performance was simply that many Western states did not see Franco’s long-term staying power²¹³;

²⁰⁸Preston, Paul. Franco, A Biography. New York, NY: Harper Collins Publisher Inc., 1994. p. 523

²⁰⁹ Salisbury, William T., Theberge, James D., Spain in the 1970s – Economics, Social Structure, and Foreign Policy. New York: Praeger, 1976. p. 140.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

²¹¹ Crafts, Nicholas., Toniolo, Gianni, Economic Growth In Europe Since 1945. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1996. p. 357.

²¹² Ibid.

²¹³ Crafts, Nicholas., Toniolo, Gianni, Economic Growth In Europe Since 1945. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1996. p 355.

instead, they hoped for his failure. It is debatable whether or not outside countries would have participated had they realized Franco might be there for an extended period of time. It is clear that outside support, or even trade, would have helped Spain develop quicker²¹⁴ compared to their go-it-alone ways. Instead, it remained exactly what other countries saw it to be, a backward and non-industrialized, non-competitor.

While his country was failing economically, he continued to use his international exile status, and the idea of international aggression that was building against him, to build support for his Francoist regime, increase pressure in his ongoing counter guerilla battle, shut down his frontiers and cut off relations with other countries. Bottom line is that he used the perceived siege and his exile status to justify not only the bad economic times in Spain but to increase his efforts to rid the country of any competitors, communist guerillas, and monarchist alike²¹⁵.

The international community supplied Franco with ample reasons to see himself as one man going against the entire world. In November 1946, the UN Security Council openly stated that the answer to the “Spanish Question” (as the issue of how to deal with Franco was spoken of in the UN) was to have Franco cede power to a representative and elected government. If this did not happen, or until it did, all of the countries involved pledged to break ties with him economically and pull all of their ambassadors out of Spain²¹⁶. After this happened, one way that Franco continued to keep channels open with the United States and Britain during his time of international isolation was through his continuing battle against communism. While continuing to rid his own region of communist aggressors, he continued to speak outwardly that his regime in Spain served the United States better than any communist option. In the end, this idea proved true, as Cold War actions of the Soviet Union heightened the importance of basing in Spain. From the 1946 resolution onward, Franco continued to push the idea that Spain was the

²¹⁴Ibid. p 363.

²¹⁵ Preston, Paul. Franco, A Biography. New York, NY: Harper Collins Publisher Inc., 1994. p. 559

²¹⁶ Ibid. p. 562.

heart of anti-communist operations. Despite this, he continued to be out of favor internationally²¹⁷

C. FRANCOISM

Inside the country, this go-it-alone mentality, in regard to their own economy, led the autocratic regime to look for internal ways to fix their problems and built a fascist government focused on protectionist ideas and policies. Behind the beliefs and ideas of this new government was a complex political order that worked to change the demography, industry, agriculture, cities, and social classes of the country²¹⁸. The goal of Franco's government was to embody the supreme rule of one leader. The smaller governmental entities were given very little power. They were merely institutions created to implement different forms of political repression. His regime was considered to be far more fascist than anything else that existed²¹⁹. The regime's initial actions made the downfall of their economy even worse. Everything that other countries were trying to implement in regards to free trade and international participation, the totalitarian leader of Spain was busy fighting. All trade unions were banned, and a massive complicated bureaucracy known as the "vertical syndicate" was established in its place²²⁰.

Actions taken were meant to raise state government power while limiting any power from falling into the hands of competitors. These actions had an interesting effect on the economy and future development of the country. Selected groups that were given special protection (certain employer's associations, Catholic organizations, some colleges that agreed with the government) became stronger because they no longer had to worry about competition. This had the effect of allowing the select groups to grab resources and gain influence and privilege but did not in any way help the country²²¹. Instead of helping the country overall, Franco made it easier for select individuals to prosper and for

²¹⁷ Salisbury, Willion T., Theberge, James D., Spain in the 1970s Economics, Social Structure, Foreign Policy. New York, NY: Praeger Publishers. p. 251.

²¹⁸ Williams, Alan, Southern Europe Transformed, Political and economic change in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. London: Harper & Row Publishers LTD, 1984. p. 115.

²¹⁹ Ibid. p. 116.

²²⁰ Ibid. p. 117.

²²¹ Williams, Alan, Southern Europe Transformed, Political and economic change in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. London: Harper & Row Publishers LTD, 1984. p. 119.

the ruling groups to become more powerful, while the bulk of Spain remained in a dismal economic state.

Trade unions were not the only way his authoritarian regime tried to control economic activity. The regime also made an effort to control the exchange rate with an official fixed rate within certain pre-defined inflation levels. The end state of this effort, or experiment, was that the government became very strained trying to maintain a constant value, and the currency exchange rate was actually lowered in regard to other countries. Along with the currency, commodities prices were also regulated²²². Strong government intervention and regulation were felt in all aspects of the economy. Each step of economic activity, from a new licensing system to the oversight of larger industries, was regulated and controlled²²³. All of these actions had the effect of lowering overall investment and savings, which in turn slowed overall economic growth. Without outside help, it was clear that the regime, as it was designed, would not have lasted long.

D. COOLING OF TENSIONS

What finally changed the UN's ruling of 1946 were the many actions taken by the Soviet Union and the growing fear of communist bloc countries. Actions such as the communist takeover in Czechoslovakia in February of 1948 and the Berlin blockade from June 24, 1948, to May 1949, all worked to focus allied attention on the development of a solid and integrated defense of Europe. Additionally, statements made by the United States during this time slowly began moving in Franco's direction. Theodore C. Achilles, the Chief of the State Department's western European Affairs division, outlined US policy toward Franco by stating that efforts to remove him had only served to strengthen his resistance and increase support for him in Spain²²⁴. Contrary to Franco's many negative, anti-democratic moves, actions taken by the Soviet Union were making Franco more presentable to the United States as threats to the developing NATO alliance grew.

In 1948, the US Defense department began looking toward Spain as a viable piece of the growing NATO defense structure and sent its first military mission to the country

²²² Crafts, Nicholas., Toniolo, Gianni, Economic Growth In Europe Since 1945.United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1996. p. 364.

²²³ Ibid. p. 365.

²²⁴ Preston, Paul. Franco, A Biography. New York, NY: Harper Collins Publisher Inc., 1994. p. 575

to discuss possible basing agreements²²⁵. During these early meetings, representatives from the United States expressed interest in having the right to use several military bases to build strong naval and air forces in the region²²⁶. Franco also was given the opportunity to make it clear that in return for basing rights on his soil, he wanted solid US economic support for his economy²²⁷. During the meetings, Franco appeared willing to pay any price for an agreement with the United States that would solidify and legitimize his regime internationally²²⁸. Fortunately for Franco, Spain's incredible geographic location, next to some of the world's major land, air, and marine communications, made it an extremely potential partner for the alliance²²⁹. Additionally, the Iberian Peninsula, being 5000 km from the United States and only 2500 km from the heart of the Europe and part of USSR, offered a perfect option for the short-range bombers of the United States²³⁰.

The key to the later basing agreement would actually come to be the medium-range B-47 bombers of the United States. The backbone of the US Air Force throughout the 1950s, they were to be accompanied by fighters and several spread out but interconnected, ground surveillance posts²³¹. Most western trading partners and even members of NATO completely disagreed with US plans for entering into an agreement with Franco. The British, led by their Parliamentary Under-Secretary Ernest Davies said that because Spain's country and government were opposed to the democratic way of life, entering into an agreement with them would run counter to the goals of NATO. Additionally, he stated that because Franco opposed the Atlantic Charter's preamble goal of safeguarding freedom, heritage, and rule of law, any organizational dealing with him

²²⁵ Ibid. p. 583

²²⁶ Duke W., Simon. US Military Forces in Europe, The Early Years, 1945-1970. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc. p. 295

²²⁷ Ibid.

²²⁸ Duke W., Simon. US Military Forces in Europe, The Early Years, 1945-1970. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc. p. 302.

²²⁹ Department of the Army, Spain, A Country Study. Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1990 p. 263

²³⁰ Salisbury, Willion T., Theberge, James D., Spain in the 1970s Economics, Social Structure, Foreign Policy. New York, NY: Praeger Publishers. p. 252

²³¹ Duke W., Simon. US Military Forces in Europe, The Early Years, 1945-1970. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc. p. 302.

would be a complete embarrassment²³². In addition to British disagreement, the French government actually made a formal protest against US talks with Spain²³³. The only dealing with Franco, according to the British would have to be outside of NATO in the form of a Spanish-US bilateral agreement²³⁴.

While the United States worked to bring other allies into the plan to open basing and economic dealings with Spain, Soviet action would again play into the hands of Franco. In September 1949, Truman announced that the Soviets had detonated their first atomic bomb. Pressure was intensified to solidify a basing agreement with Spain, and later in 1949, in an effort to increase US presence in the Mediterranean, for the first time, a squadron from the US Eastern Atlantic Fleet anchored at the El Ferrol harbor and stayed for 5 days²³⁵. US basing in Spain and a bilateral agreement was on the way.

Tragic among the international developments that took place toward the end of Spain's isolation was the fact that Franco was able to take all of his negotiations with the United States and use them to strengthen his already authoritarian regime. Visitors from the United States helped legitimize his regime. They were used to show that he had been just in his ruling of the country, and that there was no need to make changes to his political system. Furthermore, even after such domestically and economically troubling times in his own country, association with the US allowed him to boast that it was in fact the United States who came to him and he could claim no need to have made concessions²³⁶. It was during time of the initial talks that Franco also began to arrest several prominent monarchists in secret night swoops conducted by the official police force. Anyone suspect of conspiracy to restore democracy was subject to detention. US talks with Franco served to strengthen NATO's defense but also to fortify him domestically and internationally²³⁷.

²³² Preston, Paul. Francisco, A Biography. New York, NY: Harper Collins Publisher Inc., 1994. p. 606.

²³³Duke W., Simon. US Military Forces in Europe, The Early Years, 1945-1970. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc. p 295

²³⁴ Preston, Paul. Francisco, A Biography. New York, NY: Harper Collins Publisher Inc., 1994. p. 606

²³⁵Preston, Paul. Francisco, A Biography. New York, NY: Harper Collins Publisher Inc., 1994. p. 590

²³⁶Arango, Ramon E. The Spanish Political System: Franco's Legacy. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1978 p 138

²³⁷ Ibid

The final step in the cooling of tensions between Spain and the United States came in November 1949 in the State Department's call to allow US ambassadors to return to Madrid²³⁸. It is obvious that actions by the communist bloc and cold war tensions of which the United States was rapidly becoming a large part, turned the tide on world policy toward Spain and opened up the door for true US association with the Franco regime and his government.

E. US BASING ASSOCIATION WITH SPAIN

The Cold War and the growth of NATO had a great deal to do with Spain's successful economic revival. The affirmation of the defense agreements between Spain and the United States in 1953 began the end of Spain's seclusion and opened it up to the rest of the world²³⁹. The Pact of Madrid, the original basing agreement, was signed in August of 1953 and was the end of Spanish isolation²⁴⁰.

In line with the military meetings that were held in 1948 and 1949, the goal of the pact was to "strengthen the capabilities of the West for the maintenance of international peace and security" and was to cover the construction and use of military facilities as well as the amount and aid to Spain²⁴¹. The US goals of entering into a basing pact with Franco were met in that the pact offered almost no limit to the amount of armament the United States could place on Spanish soil²⁴². Additionally, the United States was allowed to develop, build, and use jointly with Spanish forces, certain naval facilities and military airfields in the country²⁴³.

It is clear that the military basing eventually opened the country up to other countries, and added an influx of aid, but this was spread out over time. Nothing,

²³⁸ Preston, Paul. Francisco, A Biography. New York, NY: Harper Collins Publisher Inc., 1994. p. 593.

²³⁹ Salisbury, William T., Theberge, James D., Spain in the 1970s – Economics, Social Structure, and Foreign Policy. New York: Praeger, 1976. p. 141.

²⁴⁰ Department of the Army, Spain, A Country Study. Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1990 p. 52

²⁴¹ Arango, Ramon E. The Spanish Political System: Franco's Legacy. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1978 p. 139

²⁴² Department of the Army, Spain, A Country Study. Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1990 p. 52-53

²⁴³ Arango, Ramon E. The Spanish Political System: Franco's Legacy. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1978 p. 139

however, compared to the massive boost that would have been offered with the Marshall Plan. The aid associated with the basing agreement did not arrive or come until about 1953²⁴⁴. When it did arrive, it was 1.1 billion spread out over a 10-year period. The Marshall Plan would have brought 676 million in a single year, this would have amounted to 20% of that year's GDP for Spain²⁴⁵. Under the plan's provisions, beginning in 1954, Spain would receive 226 million in economic aid, 141 of it was to be military and 85 million was for nonmilitary purposes²⁴⁶. The key point to be taken from the treaty is that unlike the Atlantic Treaty, the agreement was not a mutual defense pact in that the United States did say they would aid in terms of providing for the defense of Spain, but the commitment was not open-ended and would only be enacted under certain conditions. Foremost of these conditions was that any action could not conflict with pre-established obligations of the Atlantic Charter²⁴⁷. In other words, the United States did everything they could to make it appear that they were not willing to disagree with NATO or fully enter into a defensive agreement with a dictator. Regardless of US intentions to appear ambivalent toward the dictator (after 17 years of isolation), Spain's reestablishment of relations with the United States began an era that was to have a profound impact on its political, economic, and social life²⁴⁸. Not only did US goals of having strategic locations in Spain open up trade with the United States, but it legitimized Franco as a ruler and slowly, over the next 20 years, encouraged others to deal with the regime.

From 1953 to 1958 the United States poured close to 400 million into Spain to build major SAC bases at Zaragoza, Torrejon, and Moron de la Frontera²⁴⁹. Additionally, military aspects of the agreement contained many building projects that poured immediate funds into the country. Examples include a 500-mile pipeline from Rota to Zaragoza and numerous early-warning and radar sites along with naval and ammunition

²⁴⁴ Salisbury, William T., Theberge, James D., Spain in the 1970s – Economics, Social Structure, and Foreign Policy. New York: Praeger, 1976. p. 143.

²⁴⁵ Ibid.

²⁴⁶ Ibid.

²⁴⁷ Ibid p. 140.

²⁴⁸ Arango, Ramon E. The Spanish Political System: Franco's Legacy. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1978 p. 140.

²⁴⁹ Salisbury, William T., Theberge, James D., Spain in the 1970s – Economics, Social Structure, and Foreign Policy. New York: Praeger, 1976. p. 141.

facilities²⁵⁰. New US associated military installations sprang up around the country. In total, US investments associated with basing amounted to around 405 million. Furthermore, during the period from 1959 to 1975, America poured roughly 7 billion in military assistance to Spain²⁵¹. This massive figure was composed of 1.9 billion in economic aid for the country, 2.2 billion in training and equipment for the Spanish military, and approximately 3 billion for the maintenance and production of bases²⁵². This massive figure amounted to more than Spain's gold reserves during that period and clearly had a positive impact on its economy²⁵³.

In return for accepting the US facilities, Spain was able to use its bilateral relations with the United States as the key to its foreign policy. Through US association, Franco was able to slowly move back into the western family of nations²⁵⁴. Were it not for its association with the United States, it is debatable whether or not Spain would have ever made a recovery under Franco. While the United States was more interested in strategic locations of basing, Franco, made sure to get all that he could out of the arrangement.

Weary of NATO entanglements, he focused on getting as much as he could from the United States, and then used his alliance with them to parley into trade and partnerships with other nations. As directed by the US Congress, the original agreement only provided that the United States provide "support of Spanish defense efforts for agreed purposes and to provide military end-item assistance to Spain"²⁵⁵. Once the agreement was set, Franco was cleared to begin negotiations as a leader with US backing, and this affected the economy of Spain in more positive way than any aid from the United States. Additionally, the United States ultimately wanted Spain to be a part of NATO, thus giving others a chance to share in the cost. However, most European

²⁵⁰ Ibid.

²⁵¹ Duke, Simon W. U.S. Military Forces in and Installations in Europe. New York: Oxford Press, 1989 p 255

²⁵² Ibid. p.254

²⁵³ Ibid. p. 255

²⁵⁴ Salisbury, Willion T., Theberge, James D., Spain in the 1970s Economics, Social Structure, Foreign Policy. New York, NY: Praeger Publishers. p. 136.

²⁵⁵ Ibid. p. 143.

countries did not consider this an option. Franco's unpopularity continued throughout his rein, and most Western allied countries (except Belgium, Holland, Denmark, and Norway) were extremely vocal about Franco not being allowed into alliance²⁵⁶. Once he was in, he was able to scrape together business deals, reform his banking sector and currency restrictions, and was able to solicit admission into international financial and economic organizations.

The non-military aid tied to the deal was substantial. In 1953, the United States sent wheat, cotton, tobacco, oil, and other commodities worth over 1.2 billion to the country²⁵⁷. This action set a bad tone for the growing alliance because Franco was able to learn how important the strategic side of the basing agreement was to the United States. Due to this, it was really no surprise that 10 years after his original deal, he came back to the table and requested greater payments from the United States²⁵⁸. This was easy for him to do because by 1963 the facilities in Spain were a vital piece of the defense of Western Europe and the Mediterranean. Areas vital to the United States were the submarine base in Rota, which along with its sister base at Holy Loch, Scotland, served a primary role in US naval force. Additionally, the 16th Air Force in Torrejon had two support squadrons at Zaragoza and Moron. So in 1963, after requesting greater payments, it is easy to see why compensation to Spain and Franco almost doubled.

While bases and the facilities associated with them supported Spain, world recognition was the portion of the basing agreement that benefited Spain the most. In an effort to broaden the burden sharing with regard to Spain, the United States pushed for greater amounts of global acknowledgment and for Spain's admittance to important associations like the World Bank, the IMF, and the OEEC²⁵⁹. Being a part of these organizations had the effect of making Spain into the trading partner others wanted. The United States might have pushed for Spain's admittance, but once involved, Spain needed to make serious changes to remain a member. Wishing to remain in the IMF and World

²⁵⁶ Salisbury, William T., Theberge, James D., Spain in the 1970s – Economics, Social Structure, and Foreign Policy. New York: Praeger, 1976. p. 149

²⁵⁷ Heywood, Paul, The Government and Politics of Spain. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995 p. 145.

²⁵⁸ Salisbury, William T., Theberge, James D., Spain in the 1970s – Economics, Social Structure, and Foreign Policy. New York: Praeger, 1976. p. 143

²⁵⁹ Ibid.

Bank required Franco to lift many restrictions on foreign investment. In July 1959, the Franco regime drew up a stabilization program that had been designed by the OEEC and the IMF²⁶⁰. These plans began the Spanish turnaround. Additionally, with every new investing partner, Franco gained a country that had a vested interest in ensuring Spain's safety²⁶¹. Becoming a part of these organizations could therefore be considered his back door into NATO.

Once a recognized ally of the United States and a member of the important global trading organizations, the Spanish economy began to improve. Along with the reforms made, recognition by other economically recovering countries brought about improvements in the mid to late 50s and an economic growth rate in the 60s of 7.6%, second only to Japan²⁶². Relations with other countries were great for many reasons but primarily because they allowed Spain to push tourism as a major part of its economy. In 1960, tourism amounted to 51% of the country's visible exports; by 1970 this number had grown to 70%. With so many tourists coming every year, all visitor-related industries grew rapidly, industries that might not have ever existed were it not for the Spanish relations with the United States²⁶³. In the end, it was European support that turned out to be Spain's biggest trading partner and by 1972, Europeans had purchased 2 billion from the country. Arguably, this blossoming partnership never would have happened had the United States not moved in and helped to erase the country's pariah status. US basing in Spain had a rapid positive effect on the country, but it was acceptance into the world organizations that US basing brought that ultimately had the biggest effect on Spain's economy. However, in regard to assisting with Franco's political viability to secure basing rights, a good deal of anti-Americanism was to develop.

²⁶⁰ Davis, David H., The Economic Development of Spain. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963. p. 46

²⁶¹ Salisbury, William T., Theberge, James D., Spain in the 1970s – Economics, Social Structure, and Foreign Policy. New York: Praeger, 1976. p. 143

²⁶² Salisbury, William T., Theberge, James D., Spain in the 1970s – Economics, Social Structure, and Foreign Policy. New York: Praeger, 1976. p. 143.

²⁶³ Ibid.

F. CONCLUSION: ASSOCIATION WITH FRANCO BREEDS ANTI-AMERICANISM

Spain's transition to democracy began 20 years after US basing began in the region and actually had nothing to do with US participation. Franco had named his successor to be Prince Juan Carlos years before his demise was imminent²⁶⁴. While many worried that Franco's absence would create a vacuum or political void that might lead to social unrest²⁶⁵, others more correctly assumed that since the Spanish Civil War remained fresh in the minds of many, and since Franco's repression had continued until his death, (with the last 5 political executions taking place in 1975, months before his death) the people of Spain would look forward to change and a peaceful transition to Juan Carlos²⁶⁶. This, even though many considered him to be tarnished, or compromised, because it was Franco, after all, who had delivered him to power²⁶⁷.

What the population of Spain received was much better than a simple transition from Franco to Juan Carlos. On November 20, 1975, when Franco died, the full authority for leading the country was placed in the hands of the young king²⁶⁸. He very quickly named as his prime minister Arias Navarro, a hard-line supporter of the monarchy but also someone open to ideas. The two went on to fill their cabinet with many liberal thinkers who were open to redefining the government and from there the transition did not take long. On January 29, 1976, Arias announced a program of political reform that created a two-house parliament with the lower house elected. This allowed for political groups (as long as they were not subversive or totalitarian) and a change in the laws to allow freedom of assembly²⁶⁹. This was approved by the acting president, Cortes, who also agreed to set an election time for his own position later that year. Juan Carlos

²⁶⁴Arango, Ergaso Ramon. The Spanish Political System: Franco's Legacy. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1978 p. 245

²⁶⁵Salisbury, William T., Theberge, James D., Spain in the 1970s – Economics, Social Structure, and Foreign Policy. New York: Praeger, 1976. p. 115

²⁶⁶Ibid.

²⁶⁷Arango, Ergaso Ramon. The Spanish Political System: Franco's Legacy. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1978, p. 249

²⁶⁹Ibid. p. 249.

became very popular²⁷⁰. In a short amount of time, there was a transition from monarchy to democracy, a change that twenty years of US support of Franco had not come anywhere close to accomplishing. The fact that US presence in the country was looked at by many as a factor in Franco's staying power was not lost on Spain's inhabitants²⁷¹. After Franco's death, many in Spain felt that without US support, his regime would have only lasted 2 or 3 years and that the help he received from the US helped him greatly²⁷². This fact clearly did not go unnoticed for the people of Spain as well as for its future elected officials. From the time of Spain's initial democratically elected government, the US began to see the effects of having supported Franco as official relations between the countries began to fade as more and more constraints were created and placed on US basing abilities.

What was happening was a natural result of Spain's overall negative perception of the United States and having US troops on Spanish soil. While anti-Americanism had developed in different places throughout Europe for a variety of reasons, anti-Americanism in Spain was very specific²⁷³. Much of it actually existed before the Spanish Civil War and World War II as a result of Spain losing all of its colonies and its world status as a superpower to the United States during the Spanish American War. This already provided for a negative outlook toward the United States that grew much worse during the time of Franco for several reasons. First, the segment of the population that did support Franco resented the United States for its democratic form of government²⁷⁴. Second, and more importantly, the many opposed to Franco perceived the United States as the primary benefactor of his ruthless regime and, contrary to the actual goals of the United States when they began basing in the region, a major obstacle to the democratization of Spain. Many in Spain always resented the presence of US troops on Spanish ground and many would always remember seeing a widely publicized photo of

²⁷⁰ Ibid. p. 250

²⁷¹ Meisler, Stanley "Anti-Americanism Clouds Spanish Vote, Use of Bases Figures in NATO Referendum." Los Angeles Times 09 Mar 1986, natl. ed. p.6

²⁷² Ibid.

²⁷³ Heywood, Paul. The Government and Politics of Spain. New York, NY: 1995
p. 277

²⁷⁴ Department of the Army, Spain, A Country Study. Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1990. p. 266

president Dwight D. Eisenhower embracing Franco at the time of the first agreement's signing²⁷⁵. This act was always used to highlight American support of the authoritarian leader that so many in Spain grew to despise.

The anti-American sentiment created by these years of support had many different effects on the relations between the two countries. Beginning dramatically in the early 1980s, anti-American sentiment contributed to the socialists coming to power as limiting US presence in Spain was used as a major portion of the platform. In 1982, after running for election on a platform that promised to reduce US military presence, Gonzalez leader of the Socialist party, was elected President of Spain²⁷⁶. Interestingly, after Spain was finally admitted into NATO in early 1982, Gonzalez's party steamed into office with anti-NATO rhetoric and promises of placing Spain's in the alliance to a general election²⁷⁷. He attacked Spain's presence in NATO continually during the campaign and used this viewpoint, as well as the anti-Americanism associated with it, to drive much of his support.²⁷⁸ In 1986, when Gonzalez finally put membership in the alliance before the Spanish population as a general vote, many in the country were still greatly anti-NATO as well as anti-American. At the time of the vote, anti-Americanism was at the heart of the argument and was very much linked to any association with NATO²⁷⁹. Many Spaniards in the mid 1980s considered the United States more of a global threat to peace than the Soviet Union²⁸⁰. They also saw the UN as something that the US controlled, and for both these reasons, were frightened about being involved. All of these beliefs stemmed from US political association with Franco. Not forgotten among the Spanish people was the fact that not a single world leader had visited Franco from Western

²⁷⁵ Department of the Army, Spain, A Country Study. Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1990 p. 266.

²⁷⁶ Heywood, Paul. The Government and Politics of Spain. New York, NY: 1995, p 278

²⁷⁷ Facts on File News Services. "Unfinished Business: the United States and Franco's Spain". Volume 11, Issue ID no 1, March 2000, pages 129-162

²⁷⁸ Meisler, Stanley "Anti-Americanism Clouds Spanish Vote, Use of Bases Figures in NATO Referendum." Los Angeles Times 09 Mar 1986, natl. ed. p.6

²⁷⁹ Facts on File News Services. "Unfinished Business: the United States and Franco's Spain". Volume 11, Issue ID no 1, March 2000, pages 129-162

²⁸⁰ Ibid.

Europe, while presidents Eisenhower, Nixon, and Ford all did²⁸¹. When, in 1986, Spain began to push forth the idea of placing their membership in NATO before a general vote, people of many NATO countries became nervous. Many feared that a vote out of NATO might encourage Greece to do the same²⁸². Luckily for NATO and its member states, a majority of the people of Spain chose the political and economic stability associated with NATO states over their existing anti-Americanism and voted to remain in NATO by a slim 52% of the majority²⁸³.

Interesting in the vote were the concessions that were thrown in that helped it pass. It was not simply a “yes” or “no” vote to stay in NATO, but was a vote on whether or not to stay in NATO under certain conditions. Most important of these conditions was a reduction of US troops on Spanish soil and the continued ability of Spain’s forces to operate outside of NATO’s integrated command²⁸⁴. Shortly after the vote, anti-American sentiment was strong, as ten of thousands gathered to protest the arrival of President Reagan and the continued presence of US bases in Spain²⁸⁵. After the country’s NATO vote, Gonzalez moved quickly to take action. In 1987, the United States would have to have all of its seventy-two F-16 fighter bombers removed from Spain²⁸⁶. The news that the US was going to move its 72 warplanes from Spain was seen by most of NATO as an attempt to work with Prime Minister Gonzalez who was focusing on appeasing the anti-American left in his country²⁸⁷. Before moving the planes, the United States was able to reach an agreement that called for a marked reduction of US presence in Spain and terminated US military and economic aid that had been tied to the defense treaty²⁸⁸.

²⁸¹ Meisler, Stanley "Dancing with the Dictator." Los Angeles Times 04 Jan 2004, natl. ed. p.M2

²⁸² Facts on File News Services. "Unfinished Business: the United States and Franco’s Spain". Volume 11, Issue ID no 1, March 2000, pages 129-162

²⁸³ Ibid.

²⁸⁴ Ibid.

²⁸⁵ Meisler, Stanley "Anti-Americanism Clouds Spanish Vote, Use of Bases Figures in NATO Referendum." Los Angeles Times 09 Mar 1986, natl. ed. p.6

²⁸⁶ Heywood, Paul. The Government and Politics of Spain. New York, NY: 1995, p. 278.

²⁸⁷ Wall Street Journal. "Hasta Luego, NATO?" 19 Jan, 1988.

²⁸⁸ Department of the Army, Spain, A Country Study. Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1990 p 267

More recently, anti-American views showed themselves again in the dramatic lack of support that Prime Minister Jose Aznar received inside of Spain when he decided to support the recent US-led invasion of Iraq. The overwhelming opposition of the Spanish population did not sway Aznar in his support of the war and his deployment of troops to the region²⁸⁹. It did, however, play a significant role in his not being re-elected.

While many in Spain have always been somewhat isolationist, not interested in meddling in foreign wars, the US-led invasion of Iraq was unpopular for reasons that went beyond the country's normal isolationist tendencies²⁹⁰. Foremost of these reasons was the fact that Aznar moved away from his European neighbors by his actions supporting the US-led invasion, and this created the worst perception possible. The Spanish population as a whole, still weary of the US dealings with Franco, was not interested in taking part in US-led operations and this is one reason why Luis Zapatero, the newly elected president of Spain, was able to upset the sitting, and economically successful, Jose Aznar²⁹¹. What Aznar found out was that while there are many differing political factions existing in Spain, the one thing that continues to connect all of the ideologies together is an unconditional devotion to anti-Americanism²⁹².

Currently, the United States enjoys access to the naval base at Rota and the airfield of Moron. While no large troop deployments are permanently stationed in either location, they both have played an important part in recent worldwide troop deployments and flights with regard to the war on terror. Politically, however, Spain is still recovering from the shadow of Franco's authoritarian rule and any US presence at all is an unfortunate reminder of that fact. Spain will continue to remain an important partner in the NATO alliance, but, as most of the Spanish population continues to associate the United States with Franco, the country will most likely only continue to be an indifferent supporter of US military actions around the world.

²⁸⁹ Benhold, Katrin "Spanish Prime Minister Steers His Nation Back Into European Fold." The New York Times" 14 Sep 2004, p.A 3.

²⁹⁰ Lyden, Jacki. "Profile: Spanish Prime Minister Coming Under Fire For His Support of the US Possible War With Iraq", All Things Considered: National Public Radio transcripts, February 8, 2003.

²⁹¹ Benhold, Katrin "Spanish Prime Minister Steers His Nation Back Into European Fold." The New York Times" 14 Sep 2004, p.A 3

²⁹² Lyden, Jacki. "Profile: Spanish Prime Minister Coming Under Fire For His Support of the US Possible War With Iraq", All Things Considered: National Public Radio transcripts, February 8, 2003.

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V. SIGNIFICANCE OF KYRGYZSTAN TO US TROOP REPOSITIONING: WHY THE MISTAKES LEARNED THROUGH BASING IN GREECE AND SPAIN MUST NOT BE REPEATED

As demonstrated in the preceding two chapters, US collaboration with the authoritarian regimes of both Greece and Spain eventually contributed greatly to complications in America's basing plans for both countries. Additionally, the people of these countries saw continued US commitment as approval for the very dictatorial governments that they were struggling to live under and were growing to disdain. Today, the United States continues to regain some of the respect lost during these periods in these 2 countries.

Just as the growing Cold War (and American participation in it) led to US military alliances with these questionable regimes, another global conflict and emerging troop positioning plan is once again helping to define global posturing for a generation of US leaders. In the cases of Greece and Spain, their strategic location and potential role in the battle against the growing Soviet threat, as well as the possibilities of political unrest and civil strife, led to their being considered attractive locations for US basing. Today, a regional hot spot is once again attracting the United States' attention as a potential locale for basing. This time, it is not the Cold War and any particular country's position with regard to Soviet area of operations that is important to US global positioning. Instead, it is the war on terror and the global "Arch of Instability."²⁹³ This time, it is not the Mediterranean that is of interest (as was the case with Greece and Spain), it is the Middle East. It is the Kyrgyz Republic, a country struggling to escape its recent communist past, that is arising as one of America's primary allies close to this area of interest. This chapter will take into account the lessons learned from US participation with the Junta and Franco to uncover whether or not mistakes are again being made that could negatively affect our long-term goals in the Kyrgyzstan and Central Asia.

²⁹³ Garamone, Jim. "Rumsfeld, Myers Discuss Military Global Posture" American Forces Information Service News Articles (24 SEP 04)

Similar to Greece and Spain, there are many reasons why this area is attractive. Also similar is the fact that along with a growing US presence, government crackdowns and other authoritarian actions appear to be on the rise. While there are many similarities between what made Greece and Spain attractive for basing and what is now drawing the United States to Kyrgyzstan, what needs to be avoided now are the negative consequences of dealing with, and appearing to support, authoritarian regimes. If the United States is not concerned with this, the populations of Central Asia, as we learned with Greece and Spain, surely will be.

Three years ago, no American could have predicted being stationed in remote regions of Kyrgyzstan, but after 9/11 and the subsequent war in Afghanistan many things are different. As previously mentioned, drastic changes began in the late 90s, when the United States found itself burdened with a troop deployment plan that was based more on wars from decades past than on any predicted threat from the future. In addition, with national defense spending down from its earlier record levels but still higher than any other nation in world, many in the United States were beginning to question whether or not the practice of keeping large numbers of troops in Germany (which had existed since World War II) was still practical. Surprisingly, administrations for decades had sought ways to lower the number of troops required inside of Europe while encouraging others to pick up a share of the burden. It was not until the fall of the Soviet Union that the United States could finally reexamine its troop stationing plan and decide how well it matched its armed forces strategy. Recent events, including the attacks of 9/11, have enabled the current administration to begin a massive change in its overall troop deployment plan.

According to General James Jones, Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, all Air Force and Army facilities in Germany, with the exception of the Air Force base at Ramstein, might close. The news, which surprised some US allies, could affect over 25,000 troops²⁹⁴ that might soon find themselves stationed in some of the more-remote regions of the world such as Central Asia or Eastern Europe. America's new troop basing plan will focus on spreading out the military's overall footprint in an effort to increase

²⁹⁴ Lawrence J. Korb. "The Pentagon's Eastern Obsession." *The New York Times* (30 JUL 03): p A.17

readiness and facilitate quicker response times to emergencies²⁹⁵. This chapter will discuss the background of the plan as it relates to Kyrgyzstan and discuss the strategic interest that the region holds to the United States. It will also look at the questionable authoritarian practices taking place that, after learning from US basing strategies in Greece and Spain, the United States should want to avoid.

Because of its location, Kyrgyzstan is beginning to play an important role in geopolitical politics. After September 11, 2001, Kyrgyzstan opened its doors to support NATO's battle against the Taliban. The terms of the invitation were both open and unquestioning. However, as more and more countries rush to claim ground in the area, and the government of Kyrgyzstan grows in internal strength from the support they are receiving from so many large allies, the doors might not remain open for much longer on such friendly terms.

A. AMERICA'S NEW TROOP DEPLOYMENT PLAN

What is being considered the largest change in America's troop deployment plan since World War II had its beginnings in the early 90s at the end of the Cold War. In 1990, President Bush was beginning a re-alignment of stationing in conjunction with a major cutback of the total world force. The US Army cut more than 500,000 troops overall and lowered the number of troops in Germany by 125,000. In all, 275 sites were closed in the United States and around the world²⁹⁶. Strangely, the reduction of troops in Europe and the United States did not come with any radical change in the way US soldiers were trained and deployed around the Globe. The numbers were smaller but the overall deployment plan remained the same.

Prior to the attacks of 9/11, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld had already given the order to begin a total reevaluation of our troop posture in Korea and Germany²⁹⁷. After 9/11, a new impetus was given to the re-shuffle and to how the United States could conduct its growing role in the war on terror. The new deployment plan

²⁹⁵ Jaffe, Greg. "Arc of Instability: The Pentagon Prepares to Scatter Soldiers in Remote Corners." *The Wall Street Journal* (27 MAY 03) p A. 1

²⁹⁶ Gellman, Barton. "Pentagon Outlines Plan to Shut Bases in Europe" *The Washington Post* (31 JUL 91): p A.9

²⁹⁷Schrader, Esther. "U.S. Expedites Reshuffling of Europe Troops." *Los Angeles Times* (01 MAY 03)

called for (among other things) troop transitioning away from the large Cold War style garrisons to smaller locations around the globe that will facilitate short-term combat-ready deployments. Families would not accompany troops on deployments, and this would alleviate the need for the big ‘mall of America’ style of post the that the United States grew used to in Germany²⁹⁸. This is known as *forward-basing strategy* and is less focused on long-term troop deployments and more focused on extending military capabilities around the globe. The goal is flexible, rapid, and efficient projection of strength into regions of the world from which threats seem to be emanating²⁹⁹. The underlying result is a slow move of America’s troop posture from Western Europe to the Middle East and other areas³⁰⁰.

Many of the areas being considered would have troops rotating through on a full-time bases, these locations might include places like Hungary, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria. Other locations could serve as smaller, minimally staffed, jump-off points closer to possible hot spots and areas like the Middle East. Kyrgyzstan, for a variety of reasons both strategic and economic, might serve as one of these locations³⁰¹ to expand the military’s reach into troubled spots³⁰². The military is even considering more rigorous locations such as Azerbaijan, Kenya, and other places around the Horn of Africa. Following the guidelines of the plan and the impetus of 9/11, the United States has expanded or created military facilities in Diego Garcia, the Philippines, Djibouti, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Romania, Bulgaria, Oman, Kuwait, and Qatar³⁰³. More change is on the way.

²⁹⁸ Ibid

²⁹⁹ Tyson, Scott. “New US strategy: ‘lily pad’ bases; US forces are repositioning overseas forces, opting for smaller, transitory bases in places like Kyrgyzstan” *The Christian Science Monitor* (10 AUG 04) p. 07

³⁰⁰ Cornell, Svante E. “The United States and Central Asia: In the Steppes to Stay?” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* (Volume 17, Number 2, July 2004)

³⁰¹ Jaffe, Greg. “Arc of Instability: The Pentagon Prepares to Scatter Soldiers in Remote Corners.” *The Wall Street Journal* (27 MAY 03) p A. 1

³⁰² Tyson, Scott. “New US strategy: ‘lily pad’ bases; US forces are repositioning overseas forces, opting for smaller, transitory bases in places like Kyrgyzstan” *The Christian Science Monitor* (10 AUG 04) p. 06

³⁰³ Cornell, Svante E. “The United States and Central Asia: In the Steppes to Stay?” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* (Volume 17, Number 2, July 2004)

This collection of trouble spots runs through the Caribbean Rim, Africa, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East, and North Korea³⁰⁴ is becoming known as the ‘arc of instability’ and is playing in major role in how the United States contracts and deals its next series of troop locations in places like Kyrgyzstan. As said by Colin Powell, “We want to put in place facilities that give us access to training areas in different countries or facilitate the movement of our forces through Europe to other parts of the world as we change the strategy of NATO not to deal with the Soviet Union, but to deal with terrorism, to deal with regional crises in other parts of the world”³⁰⁵. For a variety of reasons, as the plan nears fruition and while the war on terror in Afghanistan and Iraq continue without a clear end in site, Kyrgyzstan’s importance in the overall plan grows with each passing day. As said by US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Air Force General Richard B. Myers, “This plan is in the best interest of national security and of our troops, it will leave us better positioned to engage our allies and promote regional stability. It will allow us to promote regional stability while position us better to prevail in combat when war cannot be prevented.”³⁰⁶

B. US STRATEGIC INTEREST IN KYRGYZSTAN

The attacks on the twin towers on 9/11 encouraged Western powers to look at Central Asia in a new way. America, after discontinuing its support of Afghanistan over a decade before, now looked at the political regime controlling the country, the Taliban, as an enemy. Several Central Asia countries offered help by allowing basing rights and fly over privileges. Kyrgyzstan was one of the first to open its door. The country’s southern neighbor, Uzbekistan, also agreed to allow basing, while Kazakhstan and Tajikistan agreed to allow only fly overs³⁰⁷. This open door policy was seen by some as a way for Kyrgyzstan to become less dependent on Russia by seeking to become closer to the West. For economic and strategic reasons the West, including the United States, was eager for a

³⁰⁴ Tyson, Scott. “New US strategy: ‘lily pad’ bases; US forces are repositioning overseas forces, opting for smaller, transitory bases in places like Kyrgyzstan” *The Christian Science Monitor* (10 AUG 04) p. 06

³⁰⁵ Jaffe, Greg. “Arc of Instability: The Pentagon Prepares to Scatter Soldiers in Remote Corners.” *The Wall Street Journal* (27 MAY 03) p A. 1

³⁰⁶ Garamone, Jim. “Rumsfeld, Myers Discuss Military Global Posture” American Forces Information Service News Articles (24 SEP 04)

³⁰⁷ Economist.com. “At the Crossroads” *The Economist, Print Edition* (24 JUL 03)

mutually beneficial relationship with the country located in the southern rim of Russia³⁰⁸. In her October 2003 testimony to congress, Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, Elizabeth Jones, stated that the three primary sets of security interests that the United States has in Central Asia are encompassed under the headings of energy (maintain reliable access to global markets), security (initially anti-terror focused), and internal reform (mostly economic but also political)³⁰⁹.

There are several clear economic reasons why the United States was eager for the relationship with Kyrgyzstan. First, most recent estimates place the amount of oil in Central Asia and the Caspian region at nearly 100 billion barrels (without any additional finds) worth 2.7 trillion dollars³¹⁰. At its high point in 10 to 15 years, Central Asia could provide 3 to 4.5 percent of the world's total output³¹¹. Clearly, the United States is interested in stability in this region. Kyrgyzstan is not one of the areas oil producers, but its help in the war on terror offers the United States a foothold in a region where stability and future democracy are of utmost importance. Stability is the second reason why the area is vital to the United States and its Western allies. The United States does not want Central Asia to turn into a hotbed for terrorism and discontent, and Kyrgyzstan, being one of the poorest countries in the region, is an important place to provide help. Without US presence in the region, it is feared that Iran and Russia would be able to establish energy exporting monopolies and have the ability to wrestle fuel away from NATO-allied countries. Strategically, blocking Iran's influence and encouraging autonomy from Russian is one of the reasons why the area is important to the United States. Lastly, Kyrgyzstan's location is strategically important in the War on Terror. Of all the reasons why the US military moved so fast into Central Asia and Kyrgyzstan, geography was most likely the most important³¹². Interestingly, most of the old bases that US troops fell

³⁰⁸ Ibid.

³⁰⁹ Wishnick, Elizabeth. "Strategic Consequences of the Iraq War: US Security Interests in Central Asia Reassessed." *Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), US Army War College*. (MAY 2004)

³¹⁰ Starobin, Paul and Mukhin, Vladimir. "Moscow's Muscle, A new rivalry with the U.S. is emerging south of Russia." *Business Week (30 JUN 03)*: p 48

³¹¹ Oliker, Olga, and Szayna, Thomas. *Faultlines of Conflict in Central Asia and the South Caucasus*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Arroyo Center p. 112

³¹² Cornell, Svante E. "The United States and Central Asia: In the Steppes to Stay?" *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* (Volume 17, Number 2, July 2004)

in on leading up to and during the war in Afghanistan were former Soviet bases that were used for the exact same reason³¹³.

America's largest air base in Germany, Ramstein, is close to 3,000 miles away from Afghanistan, meaning that supply, as well as combat planes, have to refuel in route to their destination. For this reason, the United States has established a collection of 13 bases in the region, the largest of the newer ones being Manas Air Force Base³¹⁴ (recently re-named Peter Ganci Airbase³¹⁵ in honor of the New York city fire chief who died during the World Trade Center attacks³¹⁶). With the current withdrawal of attack and support aircraft out of Turkey, Ganci airbase has become much more important and attractive³¹⁷. All of these are very compelling reasons why the United States should project its presence in Kyrgyzstan, but it is the country's potential to become a global hot spot and its proximity to the "Arc of Instability" that makes basing there particularly important.

C. POTENTIAL "HOT SPOT"

Kyrgyzstan, being the poorest state in the region, is on precarious grounds for a variety of reasons, and the United States, along with other allies, plans to prevent it from becoming a breeding ground for terrorism. Just as the initial aid that was sent into Greece after the United Kingdom realized that they could no longer support the counter communist groups of the region, aid is needed in Kyrgyzstan to ensure that it does not sink into a pit of destruction and despair that would create more terrorism in the region. Several key factors are making other counties concerned.

First, crime and corruption are present and make up a large part of the overall economy. The black market is estimated to be the same size at the official financial system. This adds a significant amount of stress to an economy that is struggling to transform from a communist to a capitalist society. The large amount of debt Kyrgyzstan

³¹³ Ibid.

³¹⁴ Hendren, John. "U.S. Base Looks a lot Like Home; Kyrgyzstan: The Air Force has built an almost comfy tent city in an ex-Soviet republic." *The Los Angeles Times* (4 APR 02): p A.3

³¹⁵ EIU Views Wire. "Kyrgyz Republic Politics: Political Outlook" (13 AUG 04)

³¹⁶ Wishnick, Elizabeth. "Strategic Consequences of the Iraq War: US Security Interests in Central Asia Reassessed." *Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), US Army War College.* (MAY 2004)

³¹⁷ Ibid.

owes to Russia has contributed to low amounts of investment from Western investors. This has also added to low standards of living and overall unrest³¹⁸. A recent survey conducted by USAID found that close to 60% of the country, upset with a continuing drop in the standard of living, would like to return to some kind of communist rule. USAID also reports a sharp drop in the country's internal expenditures on health and education from 10.5 percent of GDP in 1995 to only 6.2 percent in 1999³¹⁹. Sadly, this is as much a cause of internal turmoil as it is a result of additional demands on an overburdened government. Secondly, while Kyrgyzstan does export a small amount of energy in the form of electrical power, it is predominantly an energy importer with most of its oil being imported from Russia. A total of 85% of its oil is imported, increasing its inability to gain complete autonomy from Russia. With all of these problems being experienced by Kyrgyzstan, slow growth is the best that can be hoped for through the next 10-15 years³²⁰. Clearly, there is much work for the United States in the region. It is an important country that would benefit from a strong, stable form of democracy. US commitment toward improving the economic and political situation in Kyrgyzstan could only prove positive.

D. US AND NATO MILITARY ACTIVITY

Manas air base in Kyrgyzstan offers the United States the best base it has access to in the region. An ex-Soviet bomber base, Manas has a runway capable of supporting the largest American bombers and is close enough to Afghanistan to provide excellent support for the war on terror. With the speed at which American troops deployed to the Afghan theatre, the condition and size of the runway is vital³²¹. With its 13,800-foot long runway, Manas has provided support and staging areas for C5s, C17s, C141s, and French and Turkish refueling tankers, along with civilian 747s being used as troop transports³²².

³¹⁸ Olikier, Olga, and Szayna, Thomas. *Faultlines of Conflict in Central Asia and the South Caucasus*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Arroyo Center p.284

³¹⁹ USAID. *USAID Assistance Strategy for Central Asia 2001-2005*. July 2000

³²⁰ Olikier, Olga, and Szayna, Thomas. *Faultlines of Conflict in Central Asia and the South Caucasus*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Arroyo Center

³²¹ Cornell, Svante E. "The United States and Central Asia: In the Steppes to Stay?" *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* (Volume 17, Number 2, July 2004)

³²² Hendren, John. "U.S. Base Looks a lot Like Home; Kyrgyzstan: The Air Force has built an almost comfy tent city in an ex-Soviet republic." *The Los Angeles Times* (4 APR 02): p A.3

The base is positioned a mere three hours from Kandajar, less than 1,000 miles³²³. The initial contract carried with it a lump sum payment of 100 million dollars and will bring in around 60 million a year through US payments and estimated building contracts on the facilities³²⁴. Initially, the agreement was for a one-year period, later it was stretched to two years by a mutual accord of both governments, and in June of 2003, the United States made the situation more permanent by signing a three-year extension to the contract³²⁵. Monetary aid from the basing package is substantial. In 2003, the cash flow generated by the base was about \$156,000 a day, coming to about 52 million for the year.

Incredibly, this one base amounted to about 5% of Kyrgyzstan's gross national product, second only to the nation's gold mine with regard to its effect on the economy³²⁶. Troops on the ground will also make an impact. The size of the force serving there could grow to 3000. Currently over 300 locals are employed in the base³²⁷. By the end of 2003, US leaders recognized a long-term plan to sustain existing bases in the region³²⁸ and by August 2004, what had begun as a tent city had developed into many permanent or air conditioned tents, gyms, a small library, and an Internet café³²⁹. All signs point to a long stay. Currently, Air Force and contract engineers are busy carrying out a 60 million dollar year-long overhaul of the existing facility³³⁰. All of the work has

³²³ Ibid.

³²⁴ BBC Monitoring Service, "Kazakh weekly examines views on US military presence in Kyrgyzstan" *Delovaya Nedelya web site, Almaty, in Russian.* (13 SEP 03

³²⁵ Wishnick, Elizabeth. "Strategic Consequences of the Iraq War: US Security Interests in Central Asia Reassessed." *Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), US Army War College.* (MAY 2004)

³²⁶ Tyson, Scott. "New US strategy: 'lily pad' bases; US forces are repositioning overseas forces, opting for smaller, transitory bases in places like Kyrgyzstan" *The Christian Science Monitor* (10 AUG 04) p. 06

³²⁷ Wishnick, Elizabeth. "Strategic Consequences of the Iraq War: US Security Interests in Central Asia Reassessed." *Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), US Army War College.* (MAY 2004)

³²⁸ Cornell, Svante E. "The United States and Central Asia: In the Steppes to Stay?" *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* (Volume 17, Number 2, July 2004)

³²⁹ Tyson, Scott. "New US strategy: 'lily pad' bases; US forces are repositioning overseas forces, opting for smaller, transitory bases in places like Kyrgyzstan" *The Christian Science Monitor* (10 AUG 04) p. 06

³³⁰ BBC Monitoring Service, "Kazakh weekly examines views on US military presence in Kyrgyzstan" *Delovaya Nedelya web site, Almaty, in Russian.* (13 SEP 03

benefited the local population greatly. As said by an Air Force captain spokesman, “We are pouring a lot of new concrete”³³¹.

The US operation is larger than anything else in the region, and for many reasons it is important to the troop repositioning plan. First, when Kyrgyzstan opened its doors to allow the United States access to Manas Air base, it signed a contract that did not limit uses of the base. The base, which pumped 110 million dollars into the economy of the region during its first two years of existence, can be used for combat missions and troop deployments as well as for humanitarian missions. The strategic air hub executed more than 18,000 sorties in both Iraq and Afghanistan from its inception to August of 2004³³². Other bases in the region only allow the humanitarian missions³³³. Its location, almost in between China and Russia, might offer another, often unmentioned, use for Manas. The base offers both the United States and Russia the opportunity to work together to limit China’s influence in the region³³⁴. As the United States works with Moscow to fight Islamic extremist, the base affords both countries the ability to limit Chinese influence in the region³³⁵. Similar to the US basing experience in Greece and Spain, NATO and US basing is also expected to have a dramatically positive effect on the willingness of investors, mostly Western, to devote money to the area³³⁶.

With American military investment, the region also will see an increase in other types of aid. According to the most recent USAID pamphlet, “Assistance Strategy for Central Asia,” money into the region has increased, and Kyrgyzstan is receiving a large portion of the region’s overall aid³³⁷. The amount of money in the region has grown steadily after 1991. Kyrgyzstan’s 36.5 million dollar aid package for 2003 will be second

³³¹ Ibid.

³³² Tyson, Scott. “New US strategy: ‘lily pad’ bases; US forces are repositioning overseas forces, opting for smaller, transitory bases in places like Kyrgyzstan” *The Christian Science Monitor* (10 AUG 04) p. 06

³³³ Hendren, John. “U.S. Base Looks a lot Like Home; Kyrgyzstan: The Air Force has built an almost comfy tent city in an ex-Soviet republic.” *The Los Angeles Times* (4 APR 02): p A.3

³³⁴ Kupchan, Clifford and Kupchan, Charles. “Central Asia; A Budding Partnership; At their summit, Bush and Putin should build on two countries’ cooperation” *The Los Angeles Times* (19 MAY 02)

³³⁵ Ibid.

³³⁶ Ibid.

³³⁷ USAID. *USAID Assistance Strategy for Central Asia 2001-2005*. July 2000

in total money received in the region and highest with regard to aid per capita, at almost \$7 per person. Kazakhstan is a distant second with regard to per capita donations at just over \$2³³⁸. While US money and military aid is pouring into the area, other countries have shown an interest in Kyrgyzstan, and like America, not all of their interest is purely military. As already mentioned, Russia has agreed to work with the United States in the War on Terror and is doing so on several fronts. In Central Asia, however, Russia is beginning to show signs that it does not want the United States to have complete autonomy and is strengthening its resolve.

E. RUSSIAN INTEREST AND ACTIVITIES

It is clear that Russia considers the five formerly communist states of Central Asia to be part of their area of influence. Interestingly, Putin initially agreed to US presence in the region. For reasons already mentioned, US entry was welcomed as part of the War on Terror, but the Russian people are beginning to show that they to have reasons to exert influence in Central Asia. First, like the United States, oil in the region is very important to Russia, and it wants to make sure benefits do not just go to the United States and its allies³³⁹. Secondly, Russia is not comfortable with any possible US plan for regime change in Iran and other things which it sees as meddling in the Middle East³⁴⁰. For these two reasons, it can't completely turn the area over to the United States. Lastly, with regard to dealing with drug trafficking and Islamic extremism flowing out of Afghanistan, many feel that Russia would prefer to have autonomy and freedom to maneuver by owning the entire battle space. These conflicting goals of two major world powers have placed Kyrgyzstan in the middle of a chess game.

Russia, in an effort to maintain presence in the region recently opened its first base outside of Russia since the fall of the Soviet Union. At the inaugural ceremonies for the new base, Putin said that the NATO base of Manas will be temporary and the new Russian facility, at Kant, will be open on a permanent basis³⁴¹. He went on to say that the

³³⁸ Ibid.

³³⁹ Starobin, Paul and Mukhin, Vladimir. "Moscow's Muscle, A new rivalry with the U.S. is emerging south of Russia." *Business Week* (30 JUN 03): p 48

³⁴⁰ Ibid.

³⁴¹ Holley, David. "Russia Opens a New Base in Kyrgyzstan." *The Los Angeles Times* (24 OCT 03): p A.11

base, which is just 20 miles down the road from the American base, will help to complement the US War on Terror in Afghanistan. Experts argue that this is more of a show of force on the part of Moscow, and that the planes used at the facility would not help to fight against terrorists in the region³⁴². The Moscow claim, however, is that if the base would have been in place in the early 90s, many terrorist atrocities would have been prevented³⁴³. In addition to the base at Kant, Russia is planning to post its 201st Motorized Division at a new base outside Dushanbe, Tajikistan³⁴⁴. Based on these actions, it is apparent that Russia agrees with the United States that the region and Kyrgyzstan are of significant importance.

F. INCREASED AUTHORITARIANISM IN KYRGYZSTAN

Just as the United States, in an effort to fight communism in the Cold War, mistakenly relied heavily on sketchy authoritarian regimes in Greece and Spain, the United States must avoid doing the same thing in Central Asia. The added support felt by Kyrgyzstan's government from the world's only remaining superpower, as well as its large neighbor, the Soviet Union, is creating an environment in which it is easy to silence any political competitors.

The challenge, as we learned in the Greece and Spain chapters, is clear. Authoritarian governments which receive assistance from the US gain legitimacy through the partnership and the US often finds itself on the losing side, politically, when the regime is gone. This situation must be avoided in Central Asia. As said by Elizabeth Wishnick of the Strategic Studies Institute, "Commitment to democratization in Iraq, while relying on authoritarian Muslim regimes elsewhere to persecute the war on terrorism, reveals inconsistencies in US policy"³⁴⁵. The goal of the United States is to avoid destroying its long-term relationship with the people of Central Asia by avoiding the same mistake it made during the Cold War. As the United States works to expand its

³⁴²Holley, David. "Russia Opens a New Base in Kyrgyzstan." *The Los Angeles Times* (24 OCT 03): p A.11

³⁴³ Ibid.

³⁴⁴ Starobin, Paul and Mukhin, Vladimir. "Moscow's Muscle, A new rivalry with the U.S. is emerging south of Russia." *Business Week* (30 JUN 03): p 48

³⁴⁵ Wishnick, Elizabeth. "Strategic Consequences of the Iraq War: US Security Interests in Central Asia Reassessed." *Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), US Army War College*. (MAY 2004)

presence and support in the region, actions by the areas local governing regimes must be taken into account and made a part US overall decision whether to increase or call off support in terms of basing and political aid. If this is made clear from the beginning of the relationship, many problems can be avoided. If US support is looked at as a blank check to support any actions made by the government of Kyrgyzstan, just as it was in Greece and Spain, many problems will follow.

Currently, the government of Kyrgyzstan, led by President Akayev, seems to be moving in a direction that seems opposite of true democracy, and many of the country's worst actions began to take place prior to 9/11 and US intervention in the region. In 1993, after 50 years of Soviet rule, Kyrgyzstan signed into effect its first constitution³⁴⁶. While the initial constitution provided for term limits to the president and ample share of governing between the president, parliament, and the rest of government, Mr. Akayev, the first elected president, was quick to add changes to the document—changes that increased the power of the president and limited parliament's role in governing. Additionally, in 1998, Mr. Akayev was able to circumvent the apparent rule that limited him to serving two terms by claiming that his first term was not completed totally under the new constitution³⁴⁷. This was upheld by the Constitutional Court and since then, his assault on the decision-making ability of parliament has only continued a manner so as to make the population question whether or not he is every going to fully turn over power to another elected president. Rumors and ideas abound in the country as to what the president plans to do for the next election. Many locals who opposed him are afraid that he is going to make name Nikolai Tanayev, currently serving as the president's hand-picked prime minister of Parliament, as his replacement³⁴⁸. In reality, the Economist Intelligence Unit has recently stated that it expects Mr. Akayev's supporters to once again press for some kind of change to the constitution that would allow him to stay in office another term³⁴⁹. This, in spite of the fact that Akayev has repeatedly stated that he will step down after this term when elections take place in February 2005. It is quite likely

³⁴⁶ EIU Views Wire. "Kyrgyz Republic: Constitution and Institutions" New York, Aug 6, 2004.

³⁴⁷ Ibid.

³⁴⁸ Ibid.

³⁴⁹ EIU Views Wire. "Kyrgyz Republic Politics: Political Outlook" New York (13 AUG 04)

that after the fall of Georgian president, Shevardnadze, Akayev spoke opening in an effort to keep public sentiment down³⁵⁰.

Actions such as those taken by Akayev over the last ten years or so is one reason why, on a recent ranking of the world's most corrupt governments, Central Asian states and Kyrgyzstan ranked so high. Transparency International's 2003 survey of the worst 133 countries ranked Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan as 100th (with 133 being the top) and Kyrgyzstan as 118th, second in Central Asia only to Tajikistan, which was 124th³⁵¹. Various actions taken by the government in Kyrgyzstan are adding to questions of their own legitimacy. The authorities have also increased their hold on all broadcast media³⁵², a very dangerous action in a country openly saying that it is making strides toward democratic freedom. Recently, both local networks, Pyramid TV and Osh TV, have been interrupted or shut off at times³⁵³. Additionally, Akayev's efforts to fight Muslim fundamentalism have been used as a way to imprison many political competitors along with possible terrorists. The result is that almost no secular competitors to the government exist. Feliks Kulov, leader of the Ar-Namys party, one of Mr. Akayev's biggest competitors, has been in prison on questionable corruption charges since the 2000 presidential campaign³⁵⁴. Worse, as members of the Ar-Namys protest his imprisonment, they too are finding themselves being incarcerated. Another expected competitor for the 2005 election, Almaz Atambayev, leader of the Social Democratic Party, recently found himself arrested and imprisoned for the murder of a high-ranking official³⁵⁵. Many are suggesting that this arrangement actually allowed Akayev to eliminate two possible competitors at once. While the West agrees with the aggressive fight against competitors, it does not wish to support crackdowns on innocent people. Worse yet, the government announced in May that it was conducting internal investigations on its own secret service for placing listening device in several different outside Non Government Organizations

³⁵⁰ Ibid.

³⁵¹ Wishnick, Elizabeth. "Strategic Consequences of the Iraq War: US Security Interests in Central Asia Reassessed." *Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), US Army War College*. (MAY 2004)

³⁵² EIU Views Wire. "Kyrgyz Republic Politics: Political Outlook" New York (13 AUG 04)

³⁵³ Ibid.

³⁵⁴ Ibid.

³⁵⁵ EIU Views Wire. "Kyrgyz Republic Politics: Political Outlook" New York (13 AUG 04)

including human rights organizations and the OSCE. The investigation that revealed the information was actually started by opposition forces in parliament³⁵⁶.

These actions, being taken by the majority-ruled Akayev government, are adding to a weak economy and widespread poverty by scaring off legitimate investors and are creating a potentially dangerous situation, one in which outside assistance is almost vital to maintain strength and security in the region. Authoritarianism in Kyrgyzstan is on the rise, and the United States is in a perfect position now to do something about it. The decisions made in the next several years with regard to how strictly the United States adheres to its stated security goals in the region, including democratization, will make all the difference in how the increase funds brought about through basing either positively or negatively affect the long-term relationship between the United States and Central Asia.

G. CONCLUSION - HOW THE UNITED STATES SHOULD BASING IN CENTRAL ASIA

In the region, China, Iran, India, Turkey, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia all have committed actions, openly and subversively, which show some interest in the region. Interests are not all based on oil and most which do not fall in that category are on either preventing or fighting terrorist organizations and the poverty which usually helps to create it. Kyrgyzstan, being the poorest nations in the area, is of particular interest to China who wants to ensure that instability in the region does not spread to its mostly Islamic region of Xinjiang, and for this reason, China is committed to fighting terror in the region. China, in 1996, pushed for the formation of the Shanghai Five. Still existent today, it currently strives to coordinate security matters and battle drugs throughout the region³⁵⁷. Iran, which established contacts to the region shortly after 1991, lacks the ability to exert much influence due to a lack of trust between Shiite Iran and mostly Sunni Central Asia. Saudi Arabia and Pakistan attempted to develop religious extremism in Central Asia during the 1990s, as they have in other parts of the world, but as of yet, they have not been overly successful³⁵⁸.

³⁵⁶ Ibid.

³⁵⁷ Atal, Subodh. "Central Asian Geopolitics and US Policy in the Region: The post 11 September Era" *Mediterranean Quarterly* (03 vol. 2) p 95 – 109

³⁵⁸ Ibid.

It is clear that Kyrgyzstan is important and America's policy in the region exemplifies this fact. Whether or not allies are developed in the area or enemies created depends on how the next several years are handled by both the United States and NATO. In addition, after examining the influence of other countries, Kyrgyzstan's importance to the new US troop repositioning plan is clear. Moscow's continued focus on the region almost mirrors that of the United States, and, as NATO action in Afghanistan continues, Kyrgyzstan promises to become more militarily and economically interesting to both sides of the Atlantic.

What is important for the United States is that it must commit to openly promoting and maintaining its plan of promoting democracy in the region. Unlike when the United States entered into basing agreements with both Greece and Spain, the United States does have certain human rights standards which must be met prior to the commitment of funds but they are not always upheld in the strictest fashion possible. The Nunn-Lugar Act requires the State Department to certify that a certain level of human rights exists in a country prior to the United States releasing nonproliferation funds. In January 2004, the State Department for the first time used this act to say no to a country receiving funds, in this case, Uzbekistan³⁵⁹. This did raise concerns about Uzbekistan's human rights lapses, but it failed to stop the money completely. Interestingly, the Nunn-Lugar Act has in it provisions for waiver in the case of national security considerations, and in this case, because the country does have uranium and relations are important, Bush has waved the violations³⁶⁰.

After uncovering the lessons learned from the basing mistakes in Greece and Spain, it is clear that the United States must stick to its originally stated goals and avoid becoming involved in a situation where it is inseparably attached to an authoritarian government. Currently, it is not too late for the United States to reiterate its goals clearly and then stay the course. Central Asia, unlike the situations that occurred in Greece and Spain, does offer several options with regard to which country the United States can maintain solid relationships with. By striving to work with the country or countries most

³⁵⁹ Wishnick, Elizabeth. "Strategic Consequences of the Iraq War: US Security Interests in Central Asia Reassessed." *Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), US Army War College*. (MAY 2004)

³⁶⁰ Ibid.

committed to human rights improvements, the United States can advance democracy and freedom in the region as a whole, as well as in Kyrgyzstan.

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