The Developmental Gap in Army Officer’s Education and Training for the Future Force

A Monograph
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Throughout this century and particularly during the Army of Excellence era, a concerted effort was made to match leader knowledge and experience to the appropriate level of responsibility. A robust leader and training development program emerged in the late 1970's that provided leaders a progressive and sequential educational system to prepare them for the different levels of responsibility. Today, however, there is evidence of changes occurring in areas which, if left unattended, may dramatically alter the relevance and the effectiveness of the Army’s leader development system now, and even more profoundly, by 2025 for the Future Force. The first change is a shift in leader focus from information gathering to rapid learning. The most direct implication for leader development is an increasing need to focus on "how" to think as opposed to "what" to think, and to accelerate the development of rapid learning skills. The second area of change is as a shift from a linear and compartmented relationship between tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war to a more over-lapping and inter-connected relationship. The most direct implication for leader development is the need to purposefully nurture operational / strategic know-how earlier in professional development, as opposed to waiting until the 20th year of service. The information age clearly demands redefining leader thinking requirements. The challenge for leaders is to shift from information deficit to information overload; to know how to use that abundance of information and have the wisdom to relate it to an increasingly complex operating environment. The Army must shift focus from teaching what to think, to how to think, and adopt rapid learning techniques to exploit the knowledge advantage. It must also shift toward more rapid experiential growth in order to exploit a wisdom advantage. It must also shift toward more rapid experiential growth in order to exploit a wisdom advantage. The Army’s reluctance to make this transition will almost certainly broaden the gap between cognitive challenges in the future information environment and current leader development preparation. This paper argues that all three of the core domains (Institutional, Operational, and Self-Development) that shape the critical learning experiences throughout a leaders’ career need adjustment, additionally, action needs to be taken to assist those officers that will not receive this training and education and yet be expected to succeed in the future force.
ABSTRACT

Throughout this century and particularly during the Army of Excellence era, a concerted effort was made to match leader knowledge and experience to the appropriate level of responsibility. A robust leader and training development program emerged in the late 1970’s that provided leaders a progressive and sequential educational system to prepare them for the different levels of responsibility. Today, however, there is evidence of changes occurring in areas which, if left unattended, may dramatically alter the relevance and the effectiveness of the Army’s leader development system now, and even more profoundly, by 2025 for the Future Force.

The first change is a shift in leader focus from information gathering to rapid learning. The most direct implication for leader development is an increasing need to focus on “how” to think as opposed to “what” to think, and to accelerate the development of rapid learning skills. The second area of change is as a shift from a linear and compartmented relationship between tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war to a more overlapping and inter-connected relationship. The most direct implication for leader development is the need to purposefully nurture operational / strategic know-how earlier in professional development, as opposed to waiting until the 20th year of service. The information age clearly demands redefining leader thinking requirements.

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This paper argues that all three of the core domains (Institutional, Operational, and Self-Development) that shape the critical learning experiences throughout a leaders’ career need adjustment, additionally, action needs to be taken to assist those officers that will not receive this training and education and yet be expected to succeed in the future force.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Start Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BACKGROUND</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTION</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUBORDINATE QUESTIONS</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>METHODOLOGY</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OUTLINE</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRITERIA</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. TRANSFORMATION</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BACKGROUND</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEW COMPETENCIES</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. LEADER DEVELOPMENT MODEL</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSTITUTIONAL DOMAIN</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPERATIONAL DOMAIN</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPERATIONAL ASSIGNMENTS</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRAINING EVENTS</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMBAT TRAINING CENTERS</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPERATIONAL MISSIONS</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SELF- DEVELOPMENT DOMAIN</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. CONCLUSION</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Books</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I. INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

“Developing and conducting effective leader development programs is a critical issue for organizational success in the new millennium.”

“Nothing is more important to the Army than building confident, competent, adaptive leaders for tomorrow.”

“Transformation begins and ends with people. The human dimension of the military’s transformation remains the crucial link to both the realization of future capabilities and the enhanced effectiveness of current ones.”

“The military has historically invested considerable time, energy, and talent in education and leader development. Senior leaders have long recognized that it takes a quality force consisting of professional, well-trained, and highly creative men and women to harness new technology by transforming organizations and adopting innovative doctrine.”

Most of the material published about Army transformation attest to the continued importance of leader development, unfortunately, until recently, leader development was usually relegated to only one paragraph and became almost insignificant in the overwhelming concentration of information on technological advances envisioned for the future. Even with the publication of the Army Training and Leader Development Panel Officer Study (ATLDP) Report to the Army in 2001, which clearly demonstrated that “junior officers [were] not receiving adequate leader development,” very little was done to remedy the problem.

3 Department of the Army, Army Transformation Roadmap (2003), 8-1.
5 ATLDP Office Chief of Staff of the Army, Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 2001), OS-2.
Throughout this century and particularly during the Army of Excellence era, a concerted effort was made to match leader knowledge and experience to the appropriate level of responsibility. Lieutenants were responsible for directing and executing tasks in a relatively well-bounded tactical environment, consistent with their level of training and experience. Colonels, on the other hand, were performing in a more abstract and complex environment, consistent with 20(+) years of experience and education. A robust leader and training development program emerged in the late 1970s that provided leaders a progressive and sequential educational system to prepare them first for the tactical, then operational, and ultimately the strategic level of responsibility. The result was a fairly strong match between level of thought, level of war, and level of institutional training and leader development. Recent operational experience reinforced the fundamental importance of the human dimension, particularly in leadership. There is little disagreement that leader development played a central role in the Army’s decisive combat victories in conflicts from Panama to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), as well as in the military operations other than war in Haiti and Bosnia. Most senior military leaders point to the Army’s institutional commitment to leader development since 1973 as a central component in this series of overwhelming successes. Today, however, there is evidence of changes occurring in areas, which, if left unattended, may dramatically alter the relevance and the effectiveness of the Army’s leader development system now, and even more profoundly, by 2025 for the Future Force.

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6 Kevin J. Bergner, “Information, Knowledge and Wisdom: Leader Development Implications for the Army After Next,” *Future Leadership, Old Issues, New Methods* (Strategic Studies Institute: June 2000), 5-22.


8 Bergner, Future Leadership, Old Issues, New Methods, 5-22.
The first change is a shift in leader focus from information gathering to rapid learning. It is driven by the broad application of information technology and results in information overload. The most direct implication for leader development is an increasing need to focus on “how” to think, as opposed to “what” to think, and to accelerate the development of rapid learning skills. The second area of change is as a shift from a linear and compartmented relationship between tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war to a more over-lapping and inter-connected relationship. Leader decisions at the tactical level now may have direct consequences at the strategic level. This change is driven by the increasing complexity of operations such as peace keeping in Bosnia and broader access by the media. The most direct implication for leader development is the need to purposefully nurture operational/strategic know-how earlier in professional development, as opposed to waiting until the 20th year of service. The information age clearly demands redefining leader thinking requirements.

The challenge for leaders is to shift from information deficit to information overload; to know how to use that abundance of information and have the wisdom to relate it to an increasingly complex operating environment. The Army must shift focus from teaching what to think, to how to think, and adopt rapid learning techniques to exploit the knowledge advantage. It must also shift toward more rapid experiential growth in order to exploit a wisdom advantage. The Army’s reluctance to make this transition will almost certainly broaden the gap between cognitive challenges in the future information environment and current leader development preparation.

According to Field Manual (FM) 7-1, the Army’s Battle Focused Training Manual, the continuously changing operating environment will have major implications for the Army’s leader training and leader development requirements. Full spectrum operations, non-linear and non-contiguous battlefields, asymmetric threats, technological advances in command, control,
communication, intelligence, security, reconnaissance (C4ISR) and changes in Army organizations will demand higher order cognitive skills, including rapid synthesis of information, intuitive assessments of situations, and rapid conceptualization of friendly courses of action. On the battlefield, leaders will be geographically distributed, heightening the need for a shared understanding of the commander’s intent, and teamwork built on trust. Operation orders will be intent centric; rehearsals both physical and virtual; and static CPs will give way to battle command on the move. In this type of operational environment, leaders must be able to think critically, define their information requirements clearly, and, most importantly, develop and effectively communicate their intent. Integration within joint, inter-agency, and multi-national (JIM) and with special operation forces (SOF) teams are expected requirements that will place further demands on leaders at all levels.

Although the Army has proposed changes to the leader development program many officers that will have to operate in this complex environment will not benefit from the training and education envisioned for the new leadership development model. The current leader development model does not adequately develop the skills necessary to operate in this environment. Leader training and leader development occur in the institutional, operational, and self-development domains. The ultimate goal of the Army’s new leader training and leader development program is to develop leaders who are self-aware, adaptive, competent, and confident. According to FM 7-1, leader development is defined as: “the deliberate, continuous, sequential, and progressive process, grounded in Army values, that grows soldiers into competent and confident leaders capable of decisive action.” It is the developmental process oriented on teaching leaders how to think in complex environments. It is achieved through the lifelong

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synthesis of the knowledge, skills, and experiences gained through the synergy of the three domains of the Army Leader Training and Development Model—institutional, operational, and self-development. Although these domains are necessary, they are not achievable unless significant changes occur in the future.

“The Army intends to prepare leaders for an uncertain and ambiguous future through the application of outdated and dependency-oriented concepts linked to new goals.”¹¹ For quite some time a gap has developed between the leadership model and the new environment that threatens to undermine the Army’s transformation. This has occurred in part due to the emphasis given to technology over the human dimension. Only recently has the Army rediscovered the importance of leadership development and begun to institute some changes. Unfortunately, as this paper will demonstrate, these changes are late in coming and leave behind numerous officers that will not benefit from them and yet will still be expected to adapt to the new environment and lead effectively. This paper argues that all three of the core domains (Institutional, Operational and Self-Development) that shape the critical learning experiences throughout a leaders’ career need adjustment, additionally, action needs to be taken to assist those officers that will not receive this training and education and yet be expected to succeed in the future force.

PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTION

Will the delay in initiating changes to the leadership development model have an adverse effect on the Army’s transformation and are the future force commander competencies improperly aligned with the expectations of company grade officers?


¹¹ Milford H. Beagle, Jr., “U.S. Army Self Development: Enhancer or Barrier to Leader Development” (SAMS Monograph, Ft Leavenworth, 2002-2203), 20.
SUBORDINATE QUESTIONS

What will the effect be on the countless officers who have not, and will not, receive the required leader development and still must operate in the changing environment? Are the changes that the Army has proposed for the leader development program sufficient enough to prepare junior leaders for the types of complex, strategic circumstances they will find themselves in now and in the future? If the current, sequential, progressive approach to leader development, which espouses a balance between the three domains, does not fully prepare junior leaders for the types of complex, strategic circumstances they will find themselves in now and in the future, what can be done to bridge the gap until the new leadership development model is fully operational?

METHODOLOGY

OUTLINE

This paper first defines what the Army means by transformation and then identifies its goals and measures of success. It only briefly identifies the degree to which the Army intends to transform. This is necessary to establish what the future force will look like and what the demands on the future leaders will be. It only goes into detail over the transformation initiatives that are pertinent to this paper. Next, this paper explores the competencies required of the future force leaders and the new strategic environment in which they must operate. With the changes in the strategic environment, new skills, knowledge and attributes (competencies) have been identified which will be necessary in order to succeed in the future force. These requirements coupled with a new organizational structure in the Army will set the stage for the type of leadership development necessary to meet the demands of the future force.

After identifying the requirements of the future force leader, the examination of the leader development model will be conducted by looking at each of the three domains independently. In this way the paper clearly demonstrates whether or not the delay in initiating changes to the
leadership development model will have an adverse effect on the Army’s transformation and if the future force commander competencies are improperly aligned with the expectations of company grade officers. This paper looks at each domain and identifies its goals, demonstrates the shortcomings that officers will have to overcome on their own in order to adapt to the new strategic environment and then shows the effect that the deficiencies will have on those individuals. Until the proposed Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC), Combined Arms Staff Course (CASC) and Combined Arms Battle Command Course (CABCC) are implemented in the third quarter of fiscal year (FY) 06, all junior officers will still progress through the old leader development model. Since requirements for the leaders in the future force had already been identified by General Gordon Sullivan in 1993, it could be argued that a much larger pool of officers have gone through the old leadership development process and have had to adapt to the new environment on their own. This might indicate that the delay in implementing a new model might have some long reaching consequences. Unfortunately, the formative parts of an officer’s leadership development, once lost, cannot be regained.

The paper also examines the changes proposed for the new leader development model and compares them to the old model’s shortcomings to see whether they are sufficient to meet the needs of the future force officers. Additionally, it addresses the problems that may be encountered by the leaders who will not receive the benefit of the new leadership development model and what implications they hold for the Army. The paper then finishes with recommendations to bridge the gap between expectations of company grade officers and the future force commander competencies which should mitigate some of the risks to the Army’s transformation.

This paper will limit itself primarily to the leadership development of officers in the rank of cadet to major and will not address warrant officers or non-commissioned officers. It will look at all three leadership development domains but will place more emphasis on the institutional and operational domain than the self-development domain. This approach hopes to show the gap that
exists between what our officers are being taught, and what they need to know and thus answer
the primary research question of this monograph.

CRITERIA

In the Army’s 2003 Transformation Roadmap it says “transformation begins and ends with
people. The human dimension of the military’s transformation remains the crucial link to both the
realization of future capabilities and the enhanced effectiveness of current ones.”12 If the human
dimension is the crucial link, then the Army cannot fully transform until its leaders do also.

Question- Has the leadership development model which, at least in part, will continue to be used
until at least 2006, developed the self-aware and adaptive leaders required of the future force? If
the answer is yes, then delay in initiating changes to the leadership development model should
not have any adverse effects on the Army’s transformation. If the answer is no, then the then
delay in initiating changes to the leadership development model will most likely adversely effect
the Army’s transformation. To determine whether the individuals that have gone through the
leadership development process have acquired the competencies required of the future force, the
paper will compare the goals and objectives of each domain in the leadership development model
to data that indicates how well the education and/or training they received prepared them to
operate in their next assignment. Question- Did the education/training the individual received
correspond to the stated goals of the institutional, operational and self-development domains? If
the answer is yes, then the individuals should have acquired the competencies necessary to
operate in the future force and the delay in initiating changes to the leadership development
model should not have any adverse effects on the Army’s transformation. If the answer is no, then
the individual has not acquired the necessary competencies required to operate adequately in the

12 Army Transformation Roadmap 2003, 8-1.
future force and the delay in initiating changes to the leadership development model will most likely adversely effect the Army’s transformation.

II. TRANSFORMATION

BACKGROUND

“Even before Desert Storm, the “battlefield” was changing as the Army was called upon to respond to numerous, lengthy operations short of war rather than occasionally to defeat a large army.”

In the 1990's a major initiative was launched to create Army Force XXI, based on the “digitization” of the battlefield, now dubbed “network-centric warfare.” Modern computers and communications systems would connect all weapons systems and give U.S. soldiers and commanders advantages in situational awareness and speed of decisions. In October 1999, the Army announced its priority program to transform into a force that could better meet future requirements to be both rapidly deployable and lethal. The vision described soldiers that would be persuasive in peace, invincible in war and an Army that would be more responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable. General Shinseki, the Army Chief of Staff, envisioned the Army as comprised of three elements. The first was a legacy force consisting of the current equipment and doctrine that would be necessary to fight the nation’s wars while the rest of the Army transformed. The second was the interim force which would use existing technology but different organizational structure to meet the requirements of the new Army vision. His last was the objective force which would drastically change their organizational structure and use new undeveloped technology to see first, understand first, act

General Gordon R. Sullivan and Colonel James M. Dubik, War in the Information Age (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, June 6, 1994), 23
first and finish decisively as the means to tactical success. Now referred to as the Future Force, it will be the “Army's future full spectrum force; organized, manned, equipped and trained to be more strategically responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable across the entire spectrum of military operations from major theater wars through counter terrorism to homeland security.”  

This new Vision came about due to the changing, complex environment which the Army was consistently finding itself in.

**STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT**

The new strategic environment has changed the relationship between the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war in ways that must be considered when determining an effective way to educate officers for the complexities of the future. Today's young officers are very likely to be confronted by decisions that may have operational or even strategic consequences. Today's missions in places such as Bosnia, Kosovo or Afghanistan are more politically and culturally complex than were almost any Cold War missions.

While students at the Army War College in the 1980s could essentially understand the American national security strategy by simply comprehending deterrence and containment, the same is certainly not true today. No few words can convey the complex nature of the international environment our leaders are confronted with today. Today’s officer must acquire a much more detailed understanding of the integration of all the elements of national power, diplomatic, informational, military, and economic, (DIME) in the pursuit of national objectives. This is due primarily to the Army's expanded professional jurisdiction, in which its officers are now required to provide advice and perform more tasks in an increasingly complex environment.

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“The post-Cold War expansion of the Army's professional jurisdiction has created a gap between the knowledge that its officers receive during their professional military education and the professional knowledge that they need to effectively complete the missions they are being assigned in today's complex security environment.”  

“Young officers leading tactical units deployed far from higher headquarters are making decisions that have far-reaching strategic implications.”  

The inescapable lesson of Somalia and of other recent operations, whether humanitarian assistance, peace-keeping, or traditional war-fighting, is that the outcome may hinge on decisions made by junior leaders, and by actions taken at the lowest level. Today's leaders will often operate without the direct supervision of senior leadership and will be asked to deal with a myriad number of challenges and threats. In order to accomplish their missions under such demanding conditions they will require unwavering maturity, judgment, and strength of character. Most importantly, these missions will require them to confidently make well-reasoned and independent decisions under extreme stress. These decisions will likely be subject to the harsh scrutiny of both the media and that of public opinion. In many cases, the individual junior leader will be the most obvious symbol of American foreign policy and will potentially influence not only the immediate tactical situation, but the operational and strategic levels as well. The clear lesson of our past is that success in combat, and in the barracks for that matter, rests with our most junior leaders.  

**ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES**

“As we prepare for the future, we must think differently and develop the kinds of forces and capabilities that can adapt quickly to new challenges and to unexpected circumstances.”

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17 Ibid.
“…a future force that is defined less by size and more by mobility and swiftness, one that is easier to deploy and sustain, one that relies more heavily on stealth, precision weaponry and information technologies.”21

In order to effectively meet the challenges of the changing strategic environment the Army realized that it needed to transform in order to remain relevant. “Transformation is necessary to ensure U.S. forces continue to operate from a position of overwhelming military advantage in support of strategic objectives. Our strategy requires transformed forces that can take action from a forward position and, rapidly reinforced from other areas, defeat adversaries swiftly and decisively while conducting an active defense of U.S. territory. Transformed forces are essential for deterring conflict, dissuading adversaries, and assuring others of our commitment to a peaceful world.”22 In order to be more responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable, future forces conducting Army, joint, interagency and multinational operations which must see first, understand first, and finish decisively at the strategic, operational and tactical levels needed to change their organizational structure.

The Army is transforming into a knowledge based organization by leveraging advances in technology. Supporting this transformation is the development of a theater-oriented Unit of Employment (UE) and a tactically oriented Unit of Action (UA). Enabled by UEs and UAs, the (future force) will be characterized as being capable of decisive maneuver against dynamic threats through increased situational awareness, maneuverability, and lethality.23 UEs will perform tasks assigned to service headquarters above brigade level and thus will not be addressed in any more detail since this paper is primarily concerned with leaders at tactical level who will inevitably find themselves in the operational and strategic environments. The UA will be the

tactical warfighting echelon of the future Force, and comprises echelons at brigade and below toight tactical engagements and win battles. The UA is designed to win on the offensive, across the
spectrum of conflict, against any expected adversary as part of a UE or Joint Task Force (JTF). A
UA can serve as an Army Forces (ARFOR) component headquarters for the joint task force (JTF)
in this framework. The future combat system (FCS) equipped UA represents a capability critical
to the future force and the accomplishment of the goals of the Joint and Army Vision.

To accomplish the full spectrum of missions the Army is expected to perform peacetime
military engagements, small scale contingencies, and major combat operations. In order to do
this, the Army today draws from nine combat formations which include: special operations forces
(SOF), Ranger Regiment, airborne and light infantry, Stryker brigades, heavy and mechanized
forces, Armored Cavalry Regiment and air assault formations. The UA will account for all the
mission sets of these combat formations with the exception of SOF, Rangers and airborne forces.
The Army’s UA will be part of a joint team that is decisive in any operation, against any level
threat, in any environment.

The UA accounts for these mission sets by operating as a Family of Systems (FoS) and a
System of Systems (SoS). The mix of systems can be adjusted to provide desired capabilities
dependent on the situation. Family of systems however does not describe how the UA will
accomplish the core missions of current operating forces. Operating as a system of systems, with
all elements linked by the C4ISR network, enables improved ISR, better battle command, real
time sensor to shooter links, and more lethal and survivable units. Commanders who are expert

in using terrain and knowing the enemy, and who also have the instincts to “feel” the battle, will lead this force.24

“Unlike the Cold War Army which was optimized for mass, momentum and attrition warfare against a single well defined opponent; the UA must fight and win across a wide range of conflict situations; against various opponents with differing capabilities, from high to low ends of the operational spectrum, from Major Combat Operations (MCO) to Peacetime Military Engagement (PME), and under a more expansive framework employing all elements of national power. Thorough analysis of the variables suggest that difficult terrain, adverse weather, and adaptive enemies, within a social, physical and economic context of failed states, fractured societies, rampant crime with international linkages, and religious and ethnic tension will likely characterize the UA’s operational environment.”25

Because of the combined arms framework of the UA, it will be essential to develop soldier and leader skills. There will have to be an improved level of competency in leaders and soldiers. Within the UA formation, the Army is resurrecting the importance of quality in the contribution of tactics in doctrine, training and leader development. Although these areas have always been considered important, the requirements of the UA place an even greater emphasis on them now.

Due to the combined arms framework of the UA within the joint, inter-agency, and multi-national (JIM) spectrum, it is essential to develop Soldier and leader skills and a high level of unit cohesion. Fundamental tactical competencies will be key to readiness of the UA formation. Future leaders at all levels must be educated and trained to develop and maintain correct situational awareness under high workload and high stress situations to achieve the operational


25 Ibid., 2-2.
and strategic intent and the full spectrum of operational and tactical options available to the UA. These conditions require a leader development system that can compress and accelerate development of expertise and maturity, enhance leaders’ conceptual and team building skills, and develop adaptive and self-aware leaders. The UA requires a new standard of competency in our soldiers, leaders, staffs and units.26

NEW COMPETENCIES

The leader of the future force must be self aware, adaptive, comfortable with ambiguity, multifunctional, perform as a combined arms leader, able to predict 2nd and 3rd order effects, and able to reconcile tactical and operational dilemmas. The objective of leader training and development is to build tactical competence and confidence to successfully handle complex tactical dilemmas. Small unit leaders must be competent in selecting and employing tactics, techniques, and procedures that allow their small units to deal with the changing situations that will occur in tactical combat. The Army cannot be satisfied with ‘localized’ ways of doing business that must be learned anew each time leaders change duty station.27

Each leader should develop the competencies required in the future force and understand its standard operating procedures (SOP) in order to facilitate its plug and play capability. The Objective Force Training and Leader Development Operational and Organizational Concept states that leader development must focus on developing the following competencies: self-awareness, adaptability, interpersonal, conceptual, technical, tactical, mental, physical, and emotional with renewed emphasis on training conceptual, adaptability, self-awareness, technical, technical.

26 Ibid., 5-1.
27 Ibid., 5-19.
and interpersonal competencies.\textsuperscript{28} Other publications add intent centric, comfort with ambiguity, initiative, systems of systems integrator, multi-functional, life-long learner, strategic focus, and full spectrum operations capable.\textsuperscript{29}

The ATLDPane reported that the Army depends on leaders and units that have the requisite leader competencies to execute full spectrum operations. They must thrive in a complex environment marked by the challenge of high-intensity combat and the ambiguities inherent in stability operations and support operations. They require competencies that will enable them to operate in the new strategic environment and support the requirement for lifelong learning which emphasizes the leadership skills and attributes to help the leader and unit become aware of the need for new competencies in rapidly changing, environments. Additionally, they will need to know how to develop those new competencies, transfer that learning and associated competencies to other leaders and units, institutionalize learning in the Army’s culture and systems to increase self-awareness and adaptability.\textsuperscript{30}

The panel concluded that because of the ambiguous nature of the future force’s strategic environment, leaders should focus on developing the enduring competencies of self-awareness and adaptability. Self-awareness and adaptability are symbiotic; one without the other is useless. Because these two competencies are so important, the panel describes them as meta-competencies. They enable lifelong learning and their mastery leads to success in using many other skills required in full spectrum operations.\textsuperscript{31}

Leader training focuses on attaining the competence (knowledge, skills, and abilities) required for a leader’s current duty position and level of responsibility, whereas leader development

\textsuperscript{28} TRADOC PAM 525-3-0-7, Training and Leader Development Operational and Organizational Concept, 22.
\textsuperscript{29} TRADOC, \textit{FM 7-1}, A-2.
\textsuperscript{30} ATLDP Office Chief of Staff of the Army, \textit{Army Training and Leader Development Panel Officer Study}, (Washington D.C., Department of the Army,2001) OS-3.
focuses on attaining the competencies required to perform increased responsibilities in the future. Leader training is just one portion of leader development. Leader training is driven by specific requirements and competency development. 32 “The most important design requirement of the (future force) UA is the training and development of leaders and Soldiers; leaders and Soldiers who are multi-faceted, self-aware and adaptive. This process of leader training and development is accomplished through the implementation of the leader development model which includes the institutional, operational and self-development domains. 33

III. LEADER DEVELOPMENT MODEL

“The pressure of increased responsibility at lower levels, coupled with jurisdictional expansion, requires careful examination. As a result, the Army should consider a more holistic approach to officer education and professionalism. As an officer achieves higher rank his training requirements decrease, while his corresponding education requirements increase. What is needed is more than just getting officers to think at the strategic level of war and politics earlier, but educating officers to think broadly and contextually, and providing them a wider and deeper way of seeing the world. This suggests a greater fusion between training and education across the officer’s career.” 34

“Leader development is the deliberate, continuous, sequential, and progressive process, grounded in Army values, that grows soldiers and civilians into competent and confident leaders capable of decisive action. Leader development is achieved through the lifelong synthesis of the knowledge, skills, and experiences gained through institutional training and education,

31 ATLDP, OS-3.
32 TRADOC, FM 7-1, A-2.
33 TRADOC, PAM 525-3-0-7, Training and Leader Development Operational and Organizational Concept, 5-20.
34 McCAUSLAND and MARTIN, Parameters, 17-33.
organizational training, operational experience, and self-development. Commanders play the key role in leader development that ideally produces tactically and technically competent, confident, and adaptive leaders who act with boldness and initiative in dynamic, complex situations to execute mission-type orders achieving the commander’s intent.”

The Army Training and Leader Development Model centers on developing trained and ready units led by competent and confident leaders. The model identifies an important interaction that trains soldiers now and develops leaders for the future. Leader Development is a lifelong learning process. The three core domains that shape the critical learning experiences throughout a leader’s career are the institutional, operational, and self-development domains. Each domain has a specific way in which it develops our leaders.

Educating and training the soldiers and leaders of our Army falls under the institutional domain. It emphasizes educating and training them on the key knowledge, skills, and attributes required to operate in any environment. Included in this are individual, unit and joint schools, and advanced education.

Home station training, combat training center (CTC) rotations, joint training exercises, and operational deployments are all part of the operational domain. Every one of these events form a foundation of experience for the soldiers and leaders.

The last domain is the self-development domain which can be informal or structured, and concentrates on reducing or eliminating the gap between operational and institutional experiences. The operational, institutional, and self-development domains are influenced by and adapted based on the overall strategic context of the Army, Joint, interagency, and multinational

35 TRADOC, FM 7-0, 1-26
36 Ibid.,1-20

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training, education, and individual assignment experiences that shape the competence and confidence of leaders and units.  

INSTITUTIONAL DOMAIN

Institutional training includes all of the training and education leaders receive in the schoolhouse. During institutional training, leaders train to perform critical tasks while learning the values, attributes, skills and actions essential to high-quality leadership. When these same leadership dimensions are tested, reinforced and strengthened by follow-on operational assignments and meaningful self-development programs, leaders develop true competency in the profession. Institutional training provides the solid foundation upon which all future development rests (author’s emphasis). Institutional training provides the progressive, sequential education and training required to develop branch/functional area technical and tactical competencies as well as the core dimensions of leadership. It develops competent, confident, disciplined, and adaptive leaders and soldiers able to succeed in situations of great uncertainty. The institution provides the framework to develop future leadership characteristics that produce critical thinkers capable of full spectrum visualization, systems understanding, and mental agility. Institutional training and education enhances military knowledge, individual potential, initiative, and competence in warfighting skills. It infuses an ethos of service to the Nation and the Army, and provides the educational, intellectual, and experiential foundation for success on the battlefield. The institution teaches Army doctrine and provides the experiences that train leaders and soldiers. It trains them to adapt to uncertainty and be creative and innovative problem solvers as members of lethal units and battle staffs in combined arms, and JIM operations. The primary

37 Ibid.
38 Department of the Army, Pamphlet 600-3 Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management, (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 1 October 1998), 3.
39 TRADOC, FM 7-0, 1-27.
element of the institutional domain consists of professional military education (PME). The institutional Army, consisting of schools and training centers, is where lifelong learning begins. It should develop competent, confident, disciplined, and adaptive leaders and soldiers who are able to succeed in situations of great uncertainty. The institution should provide the framework to develop leadership traits that produce critical thinkers capable of full spectrum situational understanding, systems understanding, and mental agility. Institutional training and education should enhance military knowledge, individual potential, initiative, and competence in warfighting skills. The institution should teach Army doctrine and provide the experiences that train leaders and soldiers. It should train them to adapt to uncertainty and be creative and innovative problem solvers as members of lethal units and battle staffs in combined arms, and JIM operations.  

PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION

“The early years of the young officer are particularly critical. If his initial education and training are inadequate to give him the confidence he needs, the potentially important first assignment will be an ineffective … experience.”

PME provides hands-on technical, tactical, and leader training focused to ensure leaders are prepared for success in their next assignment and higher-level responsibility. PME is progressive and sequential, provides a doctrinal foundation, and builds on previous training, education and operational experiences The Officer Education System (OES) is supposed to develop officers who are self-aware and adaptive to lead Army units to mission success. With the ongoing and future changes occurring to the Officer Education System (OES), it is apparent that a need for change has been identified.

40 TRADOC, FM 7-0, 1-27.
42 TRADOC, FM 7-0, 1-29.
The Objective Force Training and Leader Development Operational and Organizational Concept (OFTLD O&O) stated that the “PME must provide strategic level skills earlier, and provide scaled curricula tailored to meet different development needs of [future] force soldiers and leaders by grade. The end-results being the development of self aware, adaptive, multi-functional leaders with combined arms integration skills.”\(^{43}\) The ATLDP indicated that OES is out of synch with Army needs and that it needs to adapt to meet the needs of the transforming Army and the realities of the Operational Environment.\(^{44}\) No where else is the gap between the knowledge that officers receive during their professional military education and the professional knowledge that they need to effectively complete the missions they are being assigned in today's complex environment more evident than in the officer basic course and the captain’s career course.

As evidenced in both Afghanistan and Iraq, lieutenants and captains are having to operate in an extremely complex, combined arms and joint environment and expected to understand their commanders intent, accomplish the mission, which may have strategic level consequences, all while out of contact with their own superiors. The most successful of these have been the Special Forces (SF) captains leading their teams in missions most of which had strategic implications.

One of the primary differences between a SF captain and any other Army captain is the amount of time he has had in service which usually equates to more experience and a higher level of maturity.

Until the implementation of the new Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC) in the third quarter of 2006, all new lieutenants will undergo a basic course similar in structure to the one that prepared their predecessors for the cold war adversary. Despite early evidence that clearly

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\(^{43}\) TRADOC, PAM 525-3-0-7, Training and Leader Development Operational and Organizational Concept, 16.

\(^{44}\) ATLDP, OS-22.
showed the changing nature of our environment, beginning with end of the Cold War in the late eighties, the Army has resisted changing what was taught and how it was taught in the schoolhouse. This was further reinforced by the Combat Training Centers (CTC) which until 2001 were still using the Soviet order of battle as the template for the opposing Forces (OPFOR). Clearly there exist a gap between what our young leaders are taught and what they need to know for their first assignment. What this also demonstrates is the large number of officers that have and will arrive at their first assignment without the benefit of the education necessary to succeed in the future force. If one takes a conservative estimate and only includes the officers in the year groups since General Shinseki introduced the concept of the future Army in 1999, it would mean there will be seven year groups who will have to adapt to the new environment on their own. This will also mean that these officers will be the UA and UE commanders of the future who will have to coach, teach, mentor and lead the next generation of officers in a complex environment in which their subordinates are not only more comfortable but perhaps even more proficient.

The Army has responded to the ATLDP by transforming the old basic course into a three phase BOLC. “BOLC will ensure a tough, standardized, small unit experience that flows progressively from pre-commissioning (BOLC I) to the initial entry field leadership experience (BOLC II), and then to branch technical/tactical training in BOLC III.”

Each of the three phases has an important part to play in developing the young officers for the future force.

Beginning with BOLC I, the Army can potentially identify some individual characteristics or traits that individuals posses before entering the military that can assist them in the future force. “Current research indicates that both, factors that are innate to the individual and those that are

learned, appear to contribute to the development of expertise in a given domain.\textsuperscript{46} “It is clear that some individuals possess attributes that facilitate quick and easy comprehension of requisite knowledge, and a natural aptitude for synthesizing relevant information…(therefore) it is sufficient to accept that individual differences in ability affect how quickly expertise is developed, and may represent some ceiling on developmental potential.”\textsuperscript{47} If an individual with these attributes or limitations can be identified early, then perhaps it will facilitate selecting, educating and training the right individual for the future force. Additionally, BOLC I should be structured in such a way that the future officer develops a second language, cultural aspects and political realities of various regions throughout the world and is exposed to the combined arms and joint mentality before he is even commissioned.

Joint Vision 2020 describes the leaders of the future as “composed of individuals of exceptional dedication and ability. Their quality will matter as never before as our service members confront a diversity of missions and technological demands that call for adaptability, innovation, precise judgment, forward thinking and multicultural understanding.”\textsuperscript{48} The key to the process should not be to have a goal of “meeting missions” and filling quotas. Instead, it should focus only on having candidates that meet the standards; in other words, quality, not quantity. With the recent shortage of officers in the Army this is probably an unrealistic expectation; and expecting a college student to take more courses (language, culture, politics) in order to qualify for a commission in the Army would probably require a cultural shift within the public’s view of the military. In order to get the number of officers the Army requires young students in much larger numbers would need to see the Army officer’s job as an honorable,

\textsuperscript{47} Maren Leed, Keeping the Warfighting Edge: An Empirical Analysis of Army Officer’s Tactical Expertise Over the 1990’s, (RAND, 2000), 8.
distinguished life-long profession. Without a good add campaign and cultural shift, the lieutenants paycheck alone will probably not be enough to attract enough quality leaders to fill the Army’s ranks. Having said this, it would appear that the Army might not be able to supply its transformed UAs and UEes enough leaders with the adaptability and self awareness required of the future force.

BOLC II is set to be a seven-week follow-on course to train competent, confident leaders steeped in Warrior Ethos, war-fighting skills, field craft, maintaining equipment and leadership skills. Regardless of branch, the officers will go through a common experience to ensure the desired attributes are present in all officers. The end-result should be an officer who is trained in warrior tasks and the warrior battle drills, who is self-aware and adaptable; who demonstrate the characteristics of an Army leader while living the Army Values; and who embodies the warrior ethos. The proposed program will include: 80% to 90% of all training executed in a field environment; contemporary operational environment (COE) vignette based STXs; interaction with international military officers and multiple shared leadership opportunities. It will be trained, coached and mentored by experienced and trained cadre who will embed the warrior ethos and values, evaluate leader attributes, skills, and actions and provide 270 feedback counseling. 49

In a survey conducted by LTC Bob Pricone at the U.S. Army War College in 2002, only 16% of all his fellow students thought that the Army’s institutional training bases adequately adjusted their core curriculums to prepare junior leaders to lead in an ambiguous full spectrum environment. Additionally, 72% agreed that all newly commissioned lieutenants should attend a

49 Ft Benning BOLC Brief, 9 Feb03,http://www-benning.army.mil/BOLC/content/9FEBBolc brief.ppt
common basic officer leader course prior to attendance to their basic branch course. With most of the training conducted in a field environment the young officers should learn better and retain more because they learned from the experience instead of just being part of an event. It is the experiential based training and education which will enable them to immediately take charge and competently assume their duties when they arrive at their first assignment. This is in sharp contrast to the old basic course where each branch trained and educated their lieutenants and no one, with some exceptions, received the intensive experiential training proposed for the 2006 year group.

BOLC III will be composed of the branch technical and tactical training needed by each individual officer. The danger here presents itself once again in the level of proficiency the officer is trained to before he leaves for his first assignment. The worst case scenario is the aviation officer who is given just enough time in flight school to master the basics of flight before he reports to his first unit. It then normally takes eight months to a year before he becomes qualified enough to be rated as a Pilot in Command (PIC). This is a credibility and competency issue which needs to be addressed. If the current timeline is not changed then perhaps new lieutenants should go to their first units as pilots (in the case of aviators) in order to give them time to gain the proficiency and competency required of a platoon leader in the future force. This topic will be explored further in the last chapter of this paper.

It is precisely this experiential training that our officers need in order to prepare them for operations in our current environment as a member of a platoon in the future force UA. Unfortunately, the Army is presently already undergoing organizational changes in order to activate the new UAs and UEs. With the implementation of BOLC still two years away it leaves many officers having to adapt to not only a complex environment but also a new organizational

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50 Bob Pricone, Are We Appropriately Developing Leaders to Fight and Lead in the Future Full
structure that they are unfamiliar with. What is most alarming is the fact that all these officers have now begun their Army careers without a strong foundation to build upon and thus are not equipped to make the most of later opportunities.

The captain’s career course has also been identified as being “out of synch” with the needs of our new captains. The Army has developed the Combined Arms Staff Course (CASC), and the Combined Arms Battle Command Course (CABCC), which are supposed to prepare officers for staff assignments and company command. Commanders and installations will have to provide them the time to prepare for these positions through completion of distributed training completed at a local digital training facility or educational center followed by short, intensive, hands-on, experientially based courses at their branch school. If successful this will give younger captains the training and education they need to succeed in their next assignment.

CASC will focus on the execution of command and control battle staff functions required in full-spectrum operations. CASC’s goal is to produce a competent, confident battle staff leader who can analyze and solve problems and communicate, interact, and coordinate as a member of a staff in response to the commander's critical information requirements (CCIR) across the operational spectrum. All officers will need to complete CASC just prior to assuming their new staff officer positions.

CABCC will prepare officers for company command. This education will be centered on an experiential-based combined arms approach versus a branch-specific focus. CABCC will be a pre-command course that will prepare officers for successful, effective company-level command in today’s environment. Attendance will be a pre-requisite for company command and will take precedence over all other requirements.

The CABCC curriculum will focus on combined arms, training doctrine, and full spectrum operations at the company and battalion level. Emphasis on development of the core competencies of leadership and command, the single most important piece will be instruction in training doctrine. Distance learning instruction will be used to work on combined arms tactics, techniques, and procedures; training doctrine; history and tradition. This will be followed by an immersion experience in a hands-on performance oriented resident component taught by OCs/SGIs under the supervision of the Assistant Commandants at the branch schools. This phase will be tailored to the type of unit an officer will command, such as: light or mechanized infantry, field artillery, or aviation.

What has not been addressed is the amount of experience that will be required to attend CABCC. The current timeline has the young officer attending at the 4-6 year mark. Given the limited amount of experience that the officer might have accumulated by this time it would benefit not only the individual, but the Army much more if he attended at the 8-10 year timeframe in order to fully exploit his competencies in the complex environment of the future.

This is in sharp contrast to the type of instruction which our current officers are receiving; which concentrates heavily on the military decision making process (MDMP) and in many cases excludes almost any training for company command. Once again, until the new courses are implemented in 2006, many officers will have to adapt to not only a complex environment but also a new organizational structure that they are unfamiliar with without the benefit of any training and education. This, coupled with the weak foundation they experienced in their basic course now makes it even more difficult for them to succeed in a complex environment with the future force.

ILE is the result of the Army’s commitment to provide the best possible intermediate level education to all majors. Beginning in Academic Year 2005/6, all Army majors and promotable captains, regardless of component, will receive the same ILE Common Core curriculum. The 3-month course will be taught to operations career Field (OPCF) officers at Fort Leavenworth.
Majors from the institutional support (ISCF), operational support (OSCF), and information operations (IOCF) career fields will receive this same course at various course locations throughout CONUS. OPCF officers will remain at Fort Leavenworth to complete the Advanced Operations and Warfighting Course (AOWC) while their contemporaries will attend field grade credentialing courses/programs managed by their Career Field proponent. The result should be a command and staff capable officer who will lead a force to fight and win in the full spectrum operational environment from brigade to Echelons Above Corps (EAC)

ILE was designed to meet the requirements identified by the ATLDP. The new program is supposed to provide the Army an adaptive, self-aware, field grade leader of character and competence, who can shape the joint operational environment while overcoming the friction and fog of war. He must meet the challenges and threats by exploiting opportunities through leveraging and applying Army resources and all available systems resulting in an over match of combat and non-combat multipliers.  

MEL 4 was completely re-worked and looks to be very different than its legacy predecessor. The focus is supposed to be on students learning how (versus what) to think, problem solving and decision-making skills. The 2001 ATLD Study identified, among other things, that the Army needs officer who are adaptable and capable of thinking in a fast-paced, constantly changing environment. This is a foundation of lifelong learning, and therefore, the need for the ILE curriculum. The core course will include: war-fighting within full spectrum operations (FSO) and today’s operational environment, balancing how to think vs. what to think, complex problem solving across FSO, balancing focus on current ops, future ops and plans functions, staff  

principles and concepts / less TTP, knowing how to synchronize actions to attain effects (principles and concepts) and be effects-oriented.

While the ISCF, OSCF, and IOCF career field Majors attend field grade credentialing courses/programs managed by their career field proponent, the OPCF officers will remain at Fort Leavenworth to complete the Advanced Operations and War-fighting Course (AOWC). AOWC will emphasize a War-fighting focus through: integrated full spectrum scenario with an execution centric focus, simulation performance based execution, theory and doctrine of war, conduct of war with Army and JIM, command leadership & decision making in battle, planning, synchronization and execution of operations, battlefield functional Areas and full spectrum dominance, and ARFOR, JFLCC, Division and Brigade exercises. This should send field-grade officers back to the Army much better prepared to run staffs, support commanders, and eventually command battalions and brigades.52

Until this new program is implemented in the fourth quarter of FY 05 will still limit the number of Majors who receive this necessary education. The Army has been using a selection process to pick the top 50% of the active component majors in each year group to attend the resident course at Fort Leavenworth. Those not selected could only attain their MEL 4 education through the correspondence course. Because of this, only half of the Army’s majors developed the technical, tactical and leadership competencies and skills needed to be effective in their next jobs. It can be argued that even those that attended the resident course were not adequately prepared for the environment in which they would find themselves in the future force. LTC Pricone’s War College survey revealed that only 16% of all his fellow students thought that the Army’s institutional training bases adequately adjusted their core curriculums to prepare junior leaders to lead in an ambiguous full spectrum environment. Additionally, only 50% thought that
the current OES system (Basic Course, CCC, CGSC) supported training and developing the type of leader needed to face the future full spectrum threat environment.53

Until at least 2005, a large number of Majors will be officers who did not develop the appropriate knowledge in their basic course, were still prepared for a cold war adversary in their CCC, and will now arrive at their first assignment as a field grade officer not fully prepared to operate in a complex environment with a new organizational concept. The ATLDp concluded that “the quality and relevance of OES instruction from OBC through CGSC [did] not meet the expectations of many officers and that OES [did] not satisfactorily train officers in combined arms skills or support the bonding, cohesion and rapid teaming required in full spectrum operations.”54

As a final note on the institutional domain, there is an overarching problem which if not corrected could render all these new concepts completely ineffective. This deals once again with the human element and concerns the quality of teachers in all aspects of the officer’s professional development. “The Army’s most experienced instructors teach the most experienced students (e.g., Senior Service college) while less experienced instructors teach the least experienced students (e.g., OBC). The ATLDp recommended changing “the faculty selection and assignment strategy to ensure the best qualified, most experienced instructors (former battalion commanders) are used throughout OES and focused on providing the least experienced students a quality educational experience.”55 Although this would definitely be a painful, and perhaps an impossible process due to worldwide commitments, “degrading the training base to support the operational Army provides only the most illusory and transitory short-term gains in readiness. Degrading

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53 Pricone, Are We Appropriately Developing Leaders, 9-10.
54 ATLDP, OS-11.
55 Ibid.
institutional training will jeopardize future readiness by placing more training and developmental responsibilities on units and individuals, something they currently cannot do effectively due to time, resources and elusive methodology.\textsuperscript{56}

The Army needs to place a much higher value on its officers who are educators. One easy and clear way to demonstrate this would be by increasing the value it places in educator assignments at the command and general staff and war colleges. The United States Military Academy does a much better job than TRADOC at bringing in interested and qualified officers to teach; most of who are able to pursue their graduate degrees. Congressman Ike Skelton frequently refers to the following historical statistic: “of the 34 corps commanders who led the American Army to victory in World War II, 31 had taught in the Army school system. They were able to apply the professional knowledge they had developed over years of teaching into the practical business of raising a force, training troops, and leading them successfully in combat.”\textsuperscript{57}

“There is nothing like teaching and thinking deeply about strategy to develop strategic leaders for the future … Consideration should be given to providing officers at the lieutenant colonel and colonel ranks the opportunity to return to graduate schooling and completing a doctorate en route to an extended tour as an Army educator. This would not only serve to enhance the quality of the military school faculties but also encourage the retention of a larger percentage of senior experienced leaders until they reach mandatory retirement. Moreover, it would send the message that education is important and highly valued by the institution.”\textsuperscript{58}

In most Western armies, the top officers go to be instructors at their service schools. This also occurred in the Army in the

\textsuperscript{58} McCausland and Martin, \textit{Parameters}, 17-33.
1930’s and 1920’s with CGSC and the War College. Officers and academics picked for a faculty assignment should be among the best in their area of expertise. Aside from command, no assignment should be sought after more than instructing and teaching. The Army needs to institutionalize this mindset among the officer corps, especially its senior leaders, and inculcate our juniors with the desire to become instructors and help shape the officer corps. This would almost certainly entail a cultural shift in the mindset of the current officer corps and would certainly take considerably more time than the Army can afford; so every effort should be made to begin the process now.

OPERATIONAL DOMAIN

“Institutional training is the foundation, but there is no substitute for operational experience.”

“Soldier and leader training and development continue in the unit. Using the institutional foundation, training in organizations and units focuses and hones individual and team skills and knowledge.” In the operational domain, leader development should be accomplished in units and organizations through individual and collective training at home-station, during major training exercises, through participation in the combat training center program and while conducting full-spectrum operations. In this domain, leader development is enhanced by individual commitment and organizational support to self-development through individual and organizational assessment and feedback systems.

59 These ideas are based on MAJ Donald V. Vandergriff’s discussions with LTC Robert Chase, USMC, and Dr. Charles White. This included Marshall’s legacy where several of his instructors at the Infantry School Ft. Benning later became general officers in World War II

60 Major Donald E. Vandergriff, Culture Wars, http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/culture_wars.htm

61 Pricone, Are We Appropriately Developing Leaders, 23.

62 TRADOC, FM 7-0, 1-30.

OPERATIONAL ASSIGNMENTS

“The primary method of leader development is on-the-job training and the best experience is operational experience. This remains true because the best way to learn is by doing.”

Usually upon completion of institutional training, leaders are assigned to operational positions. This experience provides them the opportunity to use, perfect and build on what they should have learned through the education process. If, as was demonstrated earlier in this paper, the individual has not yet developed the requisite skills, knowledge or attributes necessary to operate in his new environment he must then try to “learn as he goes” in order to succeed. Experience gained through on-the-job training in a variety of assignments should prepare the officers to lead and train soldiers in garrison and in the field. The commander plays an important role in this area. Commanders are responsible for an officer’s mentoring. They also introduce the officer to their unit and should establish a leader development programs; explain both unit and individual performance standards; and provide periodic assessments and continual feedback to the officer.

Beyond accomplishing the mission, developing subordinate leaders is a professional responsibility that has to be carried-out to ensure the future leadership of our Army.

According to the Objective Force Training and Leader Development Operational and Organizational Concept in order “to meet the emerging leadership requirements of the [future force], operational assignments must develop leaders for the conduct of full-spectrum operations. The [future force] will develop its leaders through experiential training and by observing officers utilizing their skills in realistic training exercises. Leaders learn the conduct of war by fighting, maneuvering, supporting, and sustaining their unit in a field-training environment. They learn

65 TRADOC, FM 7-0, Para 1-30.
management and leadership requirements of the next major career phase through successive
operational assignments where experiential training and assessment and feedback are the norm.”

One of the key ingredients to gaining the requisite experience necessary for the officer’s future is training in a variety of assignments throughout one’s career and serving in those positions as long as possible. As with any other profession, experience is the “active participation in events or activities, leading to the accumulation of knowledge or skill.” In 1996 the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Reimer, formed an Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) task force to look into changes required to best meet the challenges in the 21st century. It’s most important finding was that in order to “attain the maximum organizational performance from the organizations they lead, officers must be given adequate time, education, and developmental experience as individuals to become outstanding leaders.” This finding came about due to negative responses to a survey that the task force developed which asked the following three questions. Does the current system give officers the operational experience they need to become competent and effective field-grade commanders? Does the Army develop officers who possess functional area specialty expertise and experience? How is individual officer experience contributing to the development of competent, cohesive, and well-integrated leadership organizations across the Army?

Using feedback from the CGSC class of 2000, LTC Kappenman found that the officers felt not enough time was given to lieutenants in leadership developing positions; captains were put into command too early, not given enough time in the position and were rarely if ever given the

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66 TRADOC PAM 525-3-0-7, Training and Leader Development Operational and Organizational Concept, 17.
69 Ibid.
opportunity to command twice, and majors did not get enough time for their branch qualifying (BQ) assignments. This is particularly alarming when one considers that these are the individuals who did not receive the initial training and education necessary for today’s complex environment and are now, or soon will be the leaders of the future force’s UA. By allowing the individual less time as a platoon leader, company commander and S3/XO the institution has robbed the officer of invaluable experience which he needs in the future force.

A review of education and training for officers conducted in 1978 identified an officer’s first assignment as potentially the most important one of his career because it defines everything that happens thereafter.70 If the individual is not fully prepared for his first assignment, due to his educational shortcomings, and then is reassigned just as he begins to develop the expertise in his leadership role, he is once again forced to continue to the next level unprepared for his new assignment. The RAND think tank conducted an analysis of Army officer’s tactical expertise over the 1990’s and found decreases in the amount of time all officers spent in platoon leader assignments plus strong indications that it would only get worse in the future. “Developmental theory suggests that they are not likely to derive as much tactical benefit from future commands as earlier cohorts, which had more platoon leader experience to draw upon, because starting with a weaker foundation constrains learning during subsequent assignments.”71

The next assignment inevitably involves company command which has become increasingly more challenging because among other reasons, from 1993 to 2002 the Army has continually decreased the amount of time necessary for promotion to captain from 54 months to 38. This means among other things that an officer, who has only had 12 months of platoon leader experience, has to lead a company in the future force’s UA, in an infinitely more complex environment, with missions that may have strategic consequences, with 16 months less

experience than his predecessors who only had to worry about one real adversary. Ironically, the
time an officer has to command his company is also curtailed; primarily because of competing
demands throughout the rest of the Army for branch qualified captains. A junior (unprepared)
captain assumes command of his company and spends the first six months “figuring it out” and
then usually has only six more to hone his skills and concentrate on trying to train his unit. When
officers move rapidly through the ranks they do not have the opportunities to fully learn the skills
that should be the foundation of further development. Practical experience is “critical to
establishing a strong basic foundation that can grow, with additional practice, into expertise.” 72

In the CTC’s 4th Quarter Bulletin of FY95, leader development was discussed and the article
found that our current “assignment policies are simply not producing the quality of combined
arms commanders that we need now, much less for the 21st century. Officers are simply unable to
serve in key assignments long enough to develop the knowledge, skills and cognitive abilities
required to train and effectively employ the combined arms team in combat. Unfortunately, this
deterioration will occur at the same time the world of a combined arms commander grows even
more complicated, complex and uncertain.” 73 Seven years after the CTC Bulletin’s article about
time in key assignments, LTC Pricone’s survey at the Army War College indicated that 71% of
all his fellow classmates indicated that in their opinion our junior leaders (lieutenant-major) still
did not have sufficient time in critical troop leading assignments to provide them the experiences
needed to serve at the next higher levels of responsibility. 74

Other research indicates that captains with only 38 months time in service might not be mature
enough to take command of a company in a UA. In The Future of the Army Profession, George

71 Maren Leed, Keeping the Warfighting Edge, 13.
72 Ibid.
74 LTC Bob Pricone, Are We Appropriately Developing, 10.
B. Forsythe indicates that, “many officers are in over their heads from a psychological
development perspective.” He demonstrates in his research that the environment in which we
operate has changed and that our leader development institutions have not developed our junior
officers in such a way that they are prepared enough for the complexities of command when they
become commanders. “The bottom line of the research concluded that the professional
competency expectations placed on leaders are unbalanced with their psychological development.
Simply, vertical professional development is out pacing horizontal mental development. The
implications that they reveal are that traditional training and educational models will not suffice
in transforming the officer corps of the future.”75 “Company commands are becoming
increasingly important. They ought to have served seven or eight years’ experience in a battalion
before taking command because they need to gain experience to be truly effective. Also, the
Army must conduct a more thorough assessment and selection process, choosing only the best
and leaving the officers in position longer.”76

Majors were not much better off than their subordinates because they too were not afforded the
time in branch qualifying jobs that they required. LTC Pricone’s War College survey also
indicated that most officers believed that majors did not receive enough time in their assignments
to provide them the experience needed to serve at the next higher levels of responsibility.77 It
seemed as though the further the officer progressed in rank the wider the gap became between the
competencies he needed to develop and those that he actually had. This has been demonstrated
numerous times over the last decade at the various CTC’s where only a select few of the Army’s
battalion and brigade commanders and their staffs could effectively plan, synchronize and employ

75 Beagle, U.S. Army Self Development, 36.
76 Huba Wass de Czege and Major Jacob D. Biever, “Soldiers – Not Technology – Are the Key to
77 Pricone, Are We Appropriately Developing Leaders, pg. 10.
all elements of the combined arms team. These lack of competencies do not even begin to address the issue of fighting in the JIM world.

Dietrich Dorner, the director of the Cognitive Anthropology Project at the Max Planck Institute in Berlin, conducted a number of experiments to determine how people plan and make decisions. What he found was that effective decision makers realized that they needed an experiential database in order to form acceptable courses of action. When confronted with a new problem they could look back at their experiences and decide whether or not any related to the current problem and whether the past solution might work to fix the current problem. Obviously, anyone with a smaller experiential database would not have as much information to draw from and was thus limited in the number of possibilities that might apply to the current situation. Effective decision makers translated their past experiences into knowledge which they could use in future decisions.

Col. John R. Boyd, a retired Air Force Colonel who developed the observation, orientation, decision and action (OODA) loop, believed that human behavior followed a specific decision making cycle. The four steps involved in this cycle were: observation, orientation, decision and action. The most critical of these steps is orientation which consists of taking many pieces of possibly disconnected information and forming them into a mental picture that the individual can then use to make a decision. Personal experiences, education and training empower the leader to form mental constructs. Boyd’s theory emphasized the leader’s ability to think which allowed the individual the ability to take the knowledge from past experiences, education and training and

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78 Opinions derived from B70 JRTC Brigade TOC Observer Controller and COL Rosenberger, NTC OPFOR Commander.
adapt it to the imperfect information of the present situation to arrive at a timely, sound, and workable solution to that situation.”

Psychological research has identified two primary methods, algorithmic (rational) and heuristic, of how people arrive at decisions. The military officer is more inclined to use the heuristic approach because it is faster and relies on trying to match the current situation to one in the past. As situations become more stressful (combat), people tend to rely more heavily on their experiences and less on rational decision-making processes. There is a high probability then that an officer with a limited experience base, in a highly complex environment, utilizing the heuristic method, may make a decision that is not sound.

Brigadier General (RET) Huba Wass de Czege, one of the Army’s spokesmen for leadership development during transformation, wrote that “doctrine, training and experience will be even more important in the future.” The lack of such experience, and thus knowledge, makes it infinitely more difficult, and perhaps even impossible, to become the adaptive and self-aware leader required for the future force’s UA and may result in bad decisions with unforeseen consequences.

Fortunately, the Army has already instituted changes that it believes will help alleviate some of the problems discussed earlier. With OPMS XXI all majors had to choose one of four career fields, only one of which, (OPCF), would require S3 or XO branch qualifying time in a line unit. With a smaller pool of offices to draw from, it almost guaranteed those individuals in the operations career field more time in branch qualifying positions. With command emphasis put on

81 Papal, Preparation of Leaders, 16-17.
giving majors more time in the S3 and XO assignments, it gave them more time to develop the necessary competencies and more importantly, gain the experience they would need to command a battalion or brigade later in their careers. The real question is, was this the right place to start fixing the problem and will it be effective enough, considering the how much they have already missed out on? Giving them more time in the S3 and XO assignments certainly can only help the individual’s professional development but at what cost to the unit in the current environment. If the particular major cannot adapt to the new organizational structure and complex environment due to the insufficient education and training he has been given as a lieutenant and captain, then a longer period of time in those important assignments may in fact jeopardize the unit he is in. This is not to say that it was not a necessary step, but starting BOLC, CASC, CABCC, Universal MEL 4, and longer times in all leadership positions simultaneously, might have initiated quicker results across the entire officer corps.

In recent months the Army has also initiated a new policy which stabilizes first term soldiers in their initial post for at least six to seven years. This could have a great impact on the officer corps if the right measures are taken to implement a program that would allow the lieutenants and captains to stay in the leadership positions longer. This would give them a firm experiential base from which to draw upon in their future assignments. This should be standardized across the whole Army, but if not, this type of program would require the senior leadership’s involvement at each installation to insure that young officers are afforded the opportunity to gain the requisite experience for operations in the future force. Of course time in a leadership assignment does not provide an individual the experience he needs unless he is able to train.

TRAINING EVENTS

“If operational experience is not available, then the next best thing is rigorous training.”

“Opportunities for deliberate practice are the most important mechanism through which tactical expertise is developed.”

According to FM 7-0, “Leader training and development continues during operational missions and major training events. These enhance leader development and combat readiness. They should improve leader skills and judgment while also increasing the unit’s proficiency through realistic and challenging training and real-time operational missions. Major training events which include: situational training exercises (STX), EXEVALs, and deployment exercises, provide feedback to assist commanders in assessing the effectiveness of their leader, unit, and maintenance training programs. Leaders learn to solve tactical problems, and to give appropriate and meaningful orders. They get feedback on the quality of their decisions and obtain an understanding of impact that the frictions of the battlefield have on their decisions. Adaptive leaders are tactically and technically competent, confident in their abilities, and routinely demonstrate initiative within the framework of their commander’s intent. Major training events provide experiences that contribute to developing leader, soldier, and unit adaptiveness.”

One could easily argue that all training events, not just major ones, should provide experiences that contribute to leadership development. Unfortunately, there is ample evidence to suggest that not only has time allotted for training diminished, but its quality has eroded as well. “Younger officers in 1998, were in battalions with a less experienced group of majors overall, which likely affected not only the quality of the

85 Papal, Preparation of Leaders, 48.
86 Leed, Keeping the Warfighting Edge, 18.
87 TRADOC, FM 7-0, Para 1-37.
tactical coaching, teaching and mentoring those officers received, but may also have had an impact on the overall quality of the training events that took place during their tenure.”

Throughout the 1990’s many of the home-station training opportunities diminished; to include maneuver training, which “implies that more recent officers have less knowledge of the challenges associated with unit synchronization than did officers of the past. Similar significant falls in lower echelon events imply that junior officers have had fewer opportunities to develop tactical initiative and confidence, skills which the Army places a high value.”

Other training that has been impacted includes: a decrease of time spent in the field, live-fire training, and all platoon, company, battalion and brigade level training. This implies that since officers spent less time in the field “opportunities for repetition became more constrained, and therefore that tactical knowledge became based on a narrower set of experiences than had been the case in the past... These declines may mean recent officers would be less able to cope with the fog and friction that is characteristic of war, and that their ability to lead effectively under such circumstances could be lower than was the case for like officers earlier in the decade. With much less practice in synchronization and coordination, the challenge for recently-trained officers to meet rising expectations of facility in such areas looms large.”

The ATLDP cited an undisciplined application of Army training doctrine, exacerbated by an excessive operational pace, resource shortages, and non-mission training requirements, as the reasons why home-station training is often not conducted to standard... It reduces the quality of operational and educational experiences adversely affecting leader development. If the Army truly expects to transform then it must address these issues in order to give its officers the opportunities to adapt to a new

88 Leed, Keeping the Warfighting Edge, 28.
89 Ibid., 33.
90 Ibid., 41.
91 Ibid., 46-49.
92 ATLDP, OS-8-OS-14.
organizational structure, and learn how to fight in a combined arms and JIM environment. If the artillery has no ammunition, the Army aviators are not proficient due to a lack of flight hours, the engineers and military police are conducting installation police call, the S2 has no contact with outside intelligence assets, and the Air force is unavailable, there is little benefit in trying to train an individual how to efficiently employ all combined arms, joint, interagency, and multi-cultural elements at his disposal.

Simulation exercises of various types have been used as tools to train commanders and staffs without expending larger amounts of money to actually put troops in the field. These have great procedural benefits because they can effectively train those individuals on the complexities of the MDMP or crisis action planning but they have a difficult time substituting for the reality encountered in the field. It is much simpler to walk from one room to another to deliver an operations order (OPORD) in a simulated environment than it is to have to fly it several miles to an adjacent unit. Even in our emerging digital environment it becomes much more challenging having to battle not only digits but weather as well when trying to make it work. Situational awareness usually seems to be much better in simulation than in the real world. Battle damage assessment (BDA) is fairly accurate (to the point of near perfection) in simulation and thus can give the individuals the impression that this is the norm. With this type of intelligence available, the officers work in a fairly structured environment that allows them to continue building on their plan with relative ease because they are fairly sure of the outcome of the last battle. This sets a dangerous precedent because in discussions with several participants in OEF and OIF a common thread seems to be that the initial reports of BDA, if available at all, were quite often wrong. Logistics, which have also been the topic of many recent discussions regarding OIF, are also not represented well in simulation. Quite often it only takes a push of a button to re-supply an entire unit that normally might take days. These inconsistencies are just one other thing that make it necessary for the commander to learn how to become adaptable at the worst possible moment; in
combat. Adjusting the software to reflect reality would be a seemingly easy task however, many of the programs utilized for simulation purposes have not been able to accomplish this task.

In his book *Men Against Fire*, S.L.A. Marshall wrote that the intent behind all training should be developing the mental skills necessary in modern warfare that emphasize “how to think, not what to think.” Training scenarios should also place subordinates in situations which may require them to re-task themselves, or even violate their control measures, in order to accomplish their commander’s intent. The key to training our future leaders rest in creating as much friction and ambiguity as appropriate in their training events so that they have already adapted to uncertainty before they have to execute a real world mission. It is precisely for these reasons, among others, that the CTC’s provide the best training anywhere in the world.

COMBAT TRAINING CENTERS

FM 7-0 states that “the CTC Program provides highly realistic and stressful joint and combined arms training based on current doctrine. Commanders fight with the equipment they would expect to take to war, arrayed against a free-thinking, opportunistic opposing force (OPFOR) with an equal chance to win, monitored by a dedicated, well-trained, and experienced observer/controller team. Consequences of tactical decisions are fully played out in scenarios where the outcome is not assured. Doctrine-based after action reviews (AAR) identify strengths and shortcomings in unit planning, preparation, and execution, and guide leaders to accept responsibility for shortcomings and produce a fix. The CTC Program is the Army's premier training and leader development experience.”

distribution, and synchronization of fires. Exposure to many of these challenges is not available in any other venue (or at least not to the same degree), so that for many officers CTC rotations represent the only opportunity short of war itself to practice some of the crucial aspects of combined arms operations. Features such as a dedicated OPFOR, a trained group of observer/controllers (O/Cs), and numerous after-action reviews contribute to making the CTC experience an important (and many would argue imperative) component in the development of tactical expertise.96

Although the CTC’s are the best training tool, the ATLDP found they need to be “re-capitalized, modernized, staffed, and resourced to provide [the] full spectrum, multi-echelon, combined arms operational and leader development experience in all types of environments, across the full spectrum of conflict”97 that our leaders need. Training at the four CTC’s has recently been changed to match that of the evolving threat and there is discussion of a joint combat training center which would facilitate joint operations easier than the existing CTC’s because it would be a global network of live virtual and constructive training events for combat commanders. Unfortunately, all the officers that had participated in one of the earlier rotations did not necessarily come away with the experience that would be useful for operations in the complex environment of the future force. Additionally, “in January 1999, the Inspector General (IG) briefed the service’s senior leaders that there was a continuing trend of units arriving at the combat training centers (CTCs) at a declining level of combat skill proficiency.”98 This simply points out that leaders and units are unable to execute tasks as competently as comparable leaders and units had in the past. This lower level of expertise does not allow them to fully maximize the training opportunities at the CTCs. More often than not the OPFOR was restricted from operating

95 TRADOC, FM 7-0, 1-38.
96 Leed, Keeping the Warfighting Edge, 53.
97 ATLDP, OS-14,15.
at its full potential so that the training unit would at least get some training value out of the rotation. As a result, “many commanders come away from their training with an unrealistically high assessment of their individual and unit capabilities because they think that their units performed well, when serious unit weaknesses might have been uncovered had training conditions not been adjusted to reduce exercise complexity.”

The standards need to remain high in order to give all leaders an accurate assessment of their units and their own skills and deficiencies. Only then can they truly develop and become adaptive and self-aware. If every commander were to come to one of the CTC’s within six months of assuming command it would give them time to integrate themselves with their unit, identify any weaknesses while at the CTC and then have at least 18 months left to correct them. Presently the rotational schedule has nothing to do with the turnover of the unit’s commander or staff so many units arrive at the CTC just shortly before a large leadership turnover.

The issues of resourcing and staffing still need attention. Without the proper equipment the observer controllers (O/C) cannot do their job properly and so the training unit is not given the full benefit of the rotational experience. Additionally, and most importantly, the CTC’s must be staffed with the right quantity and quality of personnel. The consistent need for augmentee O/C’s for every rotation indicates a shortage in manpower which needs to be addressed. Pulling augmentees from a training unit not only deprives the unit of those individuals but usually does not really assist the O/C’s as much, due to their lack of experience. Most units, if forced to give up personnel, will not usually give their best or most experienced leaders because they need them

for the rotation. The one who usually benefits the most is the augmentee who can experience first
hand what the unit does right and what it does not.

OPERATIONAL MISSIONS

“Operational missions, whether they are combat operations, such as in Afghanistan, or stability
operations, such as in Bosnia, continue training and leader development. These missions provide
significant experience for our leaders, soldiers, and units. The experiences from these missions
feed back to the institution to support doctrine development, and other leader, soldier, and unit
training.”

The experience that individuals have collected from the operational missions that
they have participated in has been invaluable. Due to the gap in what was still being taught at the
school houses and what was needed to operate in the emerging environment there was no better
place to get educated than in places like Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti and Afghanistan. Of course the
level of risk is much higher since one learns as much from his mistakes as from his successes.
There is no better way to learn something than by doing it, and if properly trained
and educated an individual has a fairly high chance of succeeding. Attempting to do this when
one is unprepared, a member of an unfamiliar organizational structure, and operating in an
extremely complex environment carries with it a level of risk that should give any commander
reason to pause.

If Operational missions and major training events are supposed to enhance leader development
and combat readiness and improve leader skills and judgment while also increasing the unit’s
proficiency through realistic and challenging training and real-time operational missions as
described in FM 7-0, the preceding examples clearly show that much work needs to be done in
the operational domain in order to properly train our future leaders. In the absence of adequate

\[100\] TRADOC, *FM 7-0*, 1-39.
education in the institutional domain there is no quicker and more effective way to educate and train our leaders than to implement a few relatively painless changes to the operational domain and turn our leaders into the adaptive and self-aware individuals required of the future force.

**SELF-DEVELOPMENT DOMAIN**

“Army training and leadership doctrine does not adequately address it, the Army leaders do not emphasize its value, and the Army does not provide the tools and support to enable its leaders to make self-development an effective component of lifelong learning.”

Institutional training and operational assignments alone do not ensure that Army officers attain and sustain the degree of competency needed to perform their varied missions. Thus, self-development must interrelate with each of these other two areas of leader development. Self-development is defined as a planned, progressive and sequential program followed by leaders to enhance and sustain their military competencies. Self-development consists of individual study, research, professional reading, practice and self-assessment. Self-development is accomplished via numerous means (i.e., studying, observing and experiencing), all consistent with an officer’s personal self-development action plan and professional goals. Exploiting reach-back, distributed learning, and continuing education technologies support these programs. Self-development is the key aspect of individual officer qualification that solidifies the Army leader development process. According to the TRADOC News Service, “self-development, is an essential component of lifelong learning. Self-development is a standards-based, feedback-driven, structured program of activities and learning that contributes to professional competence, organizational effectiveness and personal development.”

Unfortunately, the ATLDP found that most officers believed that distance learning (the key to self-development) “increases their

101 _ATLDP_, OS-9.
102 _TRADOC, FM 7-0_, 1-40.
103 [http://www.tradoc.army.mil/pao/Web_specials/FocusAreas/leader.htm](http://www.tradoc.army.mil/pao/Web_specials/FocusAreas/leader.htm)
workload and decreases what little personal time they have. Distance learning is acceptable in the field for self-directed self-development. “There had been some serious consideration given to the idea that most of CCC could be accomplished through distance learning. This money saving measure, (distance learning would have made a permanent change of station [PCS] move unnecessary), clearly demonstrated a disconnect between the time that the Army thought a captain had to accomplish this and the real world demands placed on him that made it almost impossible to do so.

The self-development domain is presently missing at least five components in order to make it successful. These are: a good mentor for the young officer, leaders who are self-aware and know what they do not know, senior leaders who emphasize its value, tools provided by the Army accessible through reach back and available anytime and anywhere, and lastly a change in today’s cultural outlook on life-long learning. Each one of these areas has certain problems associated with it.

“A structured and disciplined self-development plan that includes a mentor or coach is essential.” What makes this difficult is the number of officers who have not been given the benefit of education and training necessary for the new environment we are facing, and yet now find themselves in positions of authority that require them to mentor young officers in their command. Once again, they do not know what they do not know and so cannot very well mentor others on the subject.

The institutional and operational domains are supposed to create a self-aware officer who can then bridge the gap of knowledge that he did not receive with the self-development program. In theory this seems to be a rational approach, and may one day be attainable, however, as this paper

\footnote{104} ATLDP, OS-79.  
has demonstrated there are many officers that do not fit in the self-aware category that the Army manuals describe. They are good officers who have fulfilled their expected roles but might have a difficult time adapting to a new organizational structure in a complex environment because they do not know and have not been prepared for these sorts of changes.

The Army’s senior leadership needs to take the lead in emphasizing the importance of self-development and it needs to start at the cadet level. Officers must realize that there is always something that can be learned in order to make himself a better leader. Although, many officers continue to learn through various means, just as many, or more, do not. Leaders at all levels must inculcate a strong desire for continued learning in their subordinates in order to ensure they continually broaden their horizons.

The Army has made some effort to facilitate the leaders’ ability to reach back and access information from anywhere and at anytime. Army Knowledge Online and the Reimer Library are a couple of examples of great tools available, however, when officers have to create their own web sites to access or share information about company command or S3/XO assignments there is obviously much left to be done. “To address these voids, proponent schools must identify and develop materials that provide the information necessary for [leaders] to become proficient.”

What ties all these components together is the culture. “This educational transformation will not happen overnight. Rather, it must be part of a reformation in Army culture so that officers accept life-long learning and education as an obligation of their profession. It should become a fundamental part of the Army professional ethic. In addition, if the Army acknowledges that education is indeed valuable, then it must build time into the professional culture for officers to routinely read, write, discuss, and learn.” Only when the right elements are in place, good

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106 TRADOC PAM 525-3-0-7, Training and Leader Development Operational and Organizational Concept, 19.
107 McCausland and Martin, Transforming Strategic Leader Education, Parameters, 17-33.
mentors, leaders at all levels that support the idea of lifelong learning, self-aware individuals and tools developed for the voids of knowledge, will the self-development program ever be able to bridge any gap between the institutional and operational domains.

Lastly, the idea espoused by the Army, that self-development is supposed to bridge a gap between the institutional and operational domains is reactive in nature. The idea in itself indicates a shortcoming and proposes to be a band-aid in order to provide a short term fix in the leader development process. Instead, it should be viewed as a means for “the pursuit of deep comprehension, knowledge, and understanding” and as something which is reactive and “provides long term improvement for the Army.”

IV. IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

“Our current officer professional development patterns, educational system, and assignment policies are simply not producing the quality of combined arms commanders that we need now, much less for the Army of the 21st century.”

“The tactical and technical proficiency of battalion and brigade combined arms commanders will continue to decrease given current turbulence, professional development patterns, and assignment policies…bad as it may be today, without intervention we should not be surprised to see an ineffective level of combined arms commandership by 2006-08 and a corresponding decrease in the quality of training and readiness.”

The numerous challenges examined in the leader development program that have been discussed in this paper can only lead one to believe that the Army is accepting considerable risk in delaying implementation of the necessary changes needed to adequately prepare the junior officers for the future force. The adverse effect on transformation will present itself primarily in the leaders inability to fight in a complex full spectrum environment while employing all the joint

108 Schwartzman, Transforming Leader Development, 65.
inter-agency, and multi-cultural elements at his disposal. Without selecting only the best qualified civilians for commissioning (institutional), educating them adequately in the schoolhouse (institutional) and giving them enough time to train and develop the experience necessary to become the adaptive and self-aware officers that are required of the future force (operational/self-development), the Army has essentially decided to accept the fact that the officers that will not benefit from this training and education will be able to hold down the fort until the class of 2006 (implementation date for BOLC) can take the future force into the 21st Century.

Numerous studies, panels and surveys have indicated that the institutional domain does not adequately prepare our officers for future force operations. The mere fact that the Army has instituted changes to all parts of the OES is proof enough. The impact of waiting two more years to start with these changes manifests itself in the number of officer that will still be educated under the old system and prolong the time it will take for the Army to cycle out the old and bring in the new. By limiting those officers’ first educational experience, the Army is putting them down the wrong road before they even get to their first assignment. Since the Army is already transforming its organizational structure to UEs and UAs every effort should be made to start BOLC, CCASC, and CABCC earlier. If not possible, then measures need to be taken at the unit level to ensure that those officers benefit from the others’ experience.

The operational domain also does not adequately train our officers to be adaptive and self-aware. LTC Rosenberger believed that the art of battle command could only be gained through experience. This paper has shown that with diminishing training opportunities, shorter times in leadership assignments, accelerated promotions to captain and decreasing skill levels, the competency of our officer corps has in fact eroded. In January 1999, the Inspector General (IG) briefed the service’s senior leaders that there was a continuing trend of units arriving at the

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combat training centers (CTCs) at a declining level of combat skill proficiency.\textsuperscript{111} “Unfortunately, this deterioration will occur at the same time the world becomes even more complicated, complex, and uncertain. In the next 15-20 years, dozens of new systems and capabilities will be added to the combined arms team at battalion and brigade levels, not to mention a corresponding increase in the tempo and lethality of battle.”\textsuperscript{112} In a time where “mature, experienced and highly skilled leaders at lower levels”\textsuperscript{113} are needed, the Army is faced with leading its UAs and UEs with younger, less experienced officers whose skills are not even equal to their predecessors.

The implications for the future are enormous. This paper, through opinions of respected senior officers and scientific studies, has demonstrated the critical importance of experience as a foundation for effective leadership in the type of environment which we can expect to find ourselves in the future. With a flawed start, the officers who are deprived of the critical foundational experience in leadership assignments and training opportunities will soon become the battalion and brigade commanders of the future. They will be less adept at decision making, will not be able to train their units as well, will not be able to mentor their subordinates adequately, and might not be able to operate in the complex full spectrum environment with their new organizational structure without possibly jeopardizing the safety of their unit. “A Department of Defense sponsored study of casualty rates during the Vietnam war determined that units fighting under experienced battalion commanders suffered casualties at two-thirds the rate of units under inexperienced commanders. There was also a clear positive correlation between a company commanders experience and battle deaths in his unit.”\textsuperscript{114}

\textsuperscript{111} Naylor, Army IG Confirms, 20.
\textsuperscript{112} Rosenberger, Military Readiness Subcommittee Hearings http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/security/has05030.000/has057030.of.htm.
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid., 12.
The Army’s plan to stabilize first term soldiers in their first assignment for 6-7 years is a step in the right direction. This will at a minimum, keep them in one unit where they can gain that invaluable experience which they will need for future assignments. Whether or not this succeeds will depend entirely on how their time is spent while at this crucial first assignment. They need to be assigned to positions where they can learn experientially in order to retain the knowledge and use it later. “It is through exposure to various leaders and assignments that officers become aware of who they are and what they are capable of doing. Officers with a greater variety of experiences are generally more adaptive and even better postured to meet changing threats and changing environmental conditions because they know themselves and they know and understand more about their environment.”

The Army has recently adopted a train, alert, deploy philosophy which means that inexperienced leaders no longer have the luxury of a train up period before being deployed. In view of diminished training opportunities, accelerated promotion times, and a new philosophy which eliminates the train up period, “the complex nature of future operations may require leaders of greater experience and rank commanding at lower levels than ever before.” With all the evidence pointing to the fact that our officers are not as competent or proficient as they were in the past, coupled with scientific data indicating the “professional competency expectations placed on leaders are unbalanced with their psychological development, the implication is that traditional training and education models will not suffice in transforming the officer corps for the future.” If our training and education models alone cannot transform the officer corps for the

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future then another approach must be taken in order to ensure the Army’s successful

transformation.

“The Army suggests that it wants to produce a specific type of leader earlier and faster. The
OES system cannot afford to allocate more time than is currently allotted for formal schooling.
Likewise, the operational environment is barely affording leaders the necessary time in
developmental positions for them to fully synthesize the learning received from institutional
experiences with those occurring in the operational setting. It is necessary to match vertical
progression provided through operational and institutional experiences with the horizontal
progression provided through individual development.”118 “MG Robert Scales, former
commandant of the Army War College, believed that Army transformation will require platoon
leaders with three or four years experience to master the complexities of that position”119 and BG
Huba Wass de Czege believed that “company commanders ought to have seven or eight years
experience in a battalion before taking command because they need to gain experience to be truly
effective.”120

The Army already recognizes the need for more experience in company command in several
instances. 75th Ranger Regiment, LRSD, RTB, Division HHC, and Recruiting company
commands all require a captain who has already commanded another company. There are even
some commands, Special Forces and Chinook companies to name just two, that require a major
as a commander. If these companies which, arguably, may not be as difficult to command as a
company in a UA’s combined arms battalion require a major as a commander, then why,
especially given the deficiencies in the officer corps mentioned earlier, shouldn’t the company in

118 Ibid., 40-41.
119 Kathleen T. Rehm, “Tomorrow’s Grunts Need to be Cream of the Crop,” In
120 Wass de Czege and Biever, Soldiers-Not technology, 1.
the future force have one also? This would certainly mitigate some of the risk of having inexperienced and unprepared officers leading those companies.

With a major as a company commander the Army would could gain as many as 8 years experience at the company level. In a complex environment that demands more from our officers than ever before, while offering them the least amount of help in preparing for it, time to gain experience will be crucial to averting any adverse effect on the Army’s transformation. The precedent has already been set. Besides our own examples, the Marine Corps uses majors as company commanders for their Fleet Anti-terrorist Security Team companies and the British have majors as all their company commanders.

If the Army shifted its policy, and allowed majors command companies, they would benefit tremendous and the second and third order effects would also address many of the issues that have been discussed in this paper. The majors would gain invaluable time to further develop their combined arms, joint, inter-agency and multicultural skills which will become crucial when they assume command of a battalion and it would allow a more experienced leader to better mentor his subordinates and prepare them for their upcoming assignments. It would also mean that captains, who have not been developed adequately, would now also have the time to develop the competencies and experience required of the future force. They would be exposed to more training events, have the time to rotate through more assignments (LNO, Staff, Observer/Controller) and become more adaptive and self-aware. Lieutenants would likewise benefit from the same experiences but should remain at the platoon and company level to give them a doctrinally sound first assignment which they can build on with later institutional, operational and self-developmental experiences.
V. CONCLUSION

“Knowledge requires time and experience to evolve.”\textsuperscript{121}

“Developing this new type of leader may require more time. [future force] leaders will require increased maturity, thoughtfulness, and ability to act appropriately without explicit orders or guidance.”\textsuperscript{122}

“Developing officers with the appropriate levels of tactical competence at each grade, whose perspectives are sufficiently wide to meet challenges that range from prevailing in immediate operational missions to ensuring the long-term viability of the institution, requires a delicate balance that will probably shift over time.”\textsuperscript{123}

It is abundantly clear that there are some large hurdles looming ahead of the officer corps, however, the U.S. soldier has always adapted to the situation and overcome any obstacles in order to accomplish the mission. Leaders in OEF and OIF have aptly demonstrated the American soldiers ability to adapt and overcome, unfortunately, they have had to do this in a combat environment with on the job training (OJT) and dire consequences for those that do not adapt correctly.

The Army is morally responsible to ensure that all our leaders are as fully prepared as possible for the demands that will be placed upon them in the future force. By selecting majors for company command, or perhaps tying command to years of experience rather than rank, the Army could bridge the knowledge gap between those officers that have not been adequately trained and educated for operations in the future force, and those that have been sufficiently prepared. This would also mitigating some of the risk the Army has accepted in waiting until


2006 to start the leader development transformation process and begin preparing the new officers for the future force. If an officer could only assume command of a company after a minimum of eight years in service, he would have much more experience and knowledge to effectively lead that unit in the complex environment of the future force. In our current state, any major should have the requisite experience in order to competently lead a company in the future force’s combined arms battalion. With the Army’s new organizational structure and all the new evolving technology available to our leaders, the demands on a company commander will only increase over time. If the future force companies are commanded by majors the ripple effect will be significant. The resource and manning implications associated with this sort of change would require some investigation which this paper has not conducted. However, most if not all the problems addressed in this paper would be solved. The necessary experience, maturity, knowledge, and competencies would all be present to ensure that the leader could properly employ all the assets at his disposal and be the adaptive and self-aware leader required to command a company in the future force.

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123 Leed, Keeping the Warfighting Edge, 102.
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