

**The Future Role of Iraq in the
Global War on Terrorism:
Divining the Strategy**

**A Monograph
by
Lieutenant Colonel Matthew P. Donovan
United States Air Force**



**School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Academic Year 03-04**

DISCLAIMER

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Army, or the Combined Arms Center.

Report Documentation Page

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

1. REPORT DATE 26 MAY 2004	2. REPORT TYPE	3. DATES COVERED -	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Future Role of Iraq in the Global War on Terrorism: Divining the Strategy		5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
		5b. GRANT NUMBER	
		5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Matthew Donovan		5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
		5e. TASK NUMBER	
		5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) US Army School for Advanced Military Studies, 250 Gibbon Ave, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 66027		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER ATZL-SWV	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)		10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
		11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited			
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The original document contains color images.			
14. ABSTRACT The catastrophic events of September 11, 2001, actively thrust the U.S. government into a war against terrorism, principally against the form of terrorism most closely associated with radical Islam, born in the Middle East region. President George W. Bush launched the war on terror with Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM in an effort to kill or capture the perpetrators of the latest terror attacks on New York and Washington, D.C., with the ultimate goal of eradicating terrorism against the U.S. as a feasible option for groups or nation-states that wish harm upon America. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM set out to topple the Saddam Hussein regime, liberate the Iraqi people, and enable the growth of a free and representative Iraqi government. However, the administration's strategy aims to rapidly withdraw U.S. forces from Iraq after a secure environment is attained and self-sustaining Iraqi rule is established, thus leaving the fledgling government to its own devices. An effective strategy to ensure a productive role for Iraq in the war on terror hinges upon the continued presence of U.S. military forces in that country.			
15. SUBJECT TERMS			
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified	1
			18. NUMBER OF PAGES 50
			19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON

ABSTRACT

THE FUTURE ROLE OF IRAQ IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM:
DIVINING THE STRATEGY by Lieutenant Colonel Matthew P. Donovan, USAF, 50 pages.

The catastrophic events of September 11, 2001, actively thrust the U.S. government into a war against terrorism, principally against the form of terrorism most closely associated with radical Islam, born in the Middle East region. The dark clouds of this war have been forming for decades since the end of World War II, with increasingly aggressive terror attacks on U.S. citizens and interests occurring worldwide, and shifting into high gear in the last decade. President George W. Bush launched the war on terror with Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM in an effort to kill or capture the perpetrators of the latest terror attacks on New York and Washington, D.C., with the ultimate goal of eradicating terrorism against the U.S. as a feasible option for groups or nation-states that wish harm upon America. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM set out to topple the Saddam Hussein regime, liberate the Iraqi people, and enable the growth of a free and representative Iraqi government. An intended consequence of the operation was to establish an island of democracy at the heart of a volatile and unstable region, with the subsequent spreading of democratic values throughout the region acting as a stabilizing and moderating influence.

However, the administration's strategy aims to rapidly withdraw U.S. forces from Iraq after a secure environment is attained and self-sustaining Iraqi rule is established, thus leaving the fledgling government to its own devices. History has shown in the cases of post-World War II Germany and Japan that establishing a democratic government in a former enemy state from the ashes of war is a lengthy and expensive proposition. In those two cases, continued U.S. military presence under the auspices of mutual defense and security cooperation agreements in the face of a common enemy not only served to eventually defeat the foe, The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, but also enabled those nations to flourish and become stalwarts of democracy and global economic powers. Examining the current strategy under the conditions of three possible outcomes of the current Iraqi reconstruction effort reveals flaws in the approach; the strategy relies primarily on optimism without regard to historical realities.

An effective strategy to ensure a productive role for Iraq in the war on terror hinges upon the continued presence of U.S. military forces in the country under a semi-permanent arrangement, lasting at least until victory in the GWOT. Strategic conditions to enable success must be set prior to the establishment of an Iraqi sovereign in the form of mutual defense and security cooperation agreements that allow for the presence of U.S. forces. Iraq's strategic and central geopolitical location in the Middle East region demands that the U.S. maintain its influence in that country, enabling a symbiotic relationship with the host nation of Iraq through military presence. Ensuring a strong future role for Iraq in the U.S. global war on terrorism is achievable only through a logical and coherent strategy, based on historical precedent and contemporary reality.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DISCLAIMER.....	ii
ABSTRACT.....	iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	iv
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND.....	1
Methodology.....	3
Scope and Focus.....	5
THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR, IRAQ, AND THE MIDDLE EAST.....	6
Strategy for the Global War on Terror.....	6
Transforming Iraq.....	9
Legacy U.S. Security Policy in the Middle East.....	11
The Cold War Years.....	12
Gulf War I.....	13
The Clinton Years.....	14
Mounting Animosities.....	15
THE NEW IRAQ: COMPARISONS TO POST-WORLD WAR II.....	18
Germany.....	19
Japan.....	21
Iraq.....	23
STRATEGY ANALYSIS AND ALTERNATIVE STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT.....	26
The Bush Administration Strategy.....	29
Scenario One – Friendly Iraqi Democratic Government.....	29
Scenario Two – Ambivalent Iraqi Government.....	30
Scenario Three – Limbo, or Worse.....	31
The Alternative.....	33
Setting Strategic Conditions.....	33
A Strategy of Presence.....	35
CONCLUSION AND PATH TO THE FUTURE.....	37
Conclusion.....	37
The Way Ahead.....	38
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	41

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

The terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, D.C. on September 11th, 2001, the first major assault by a determined enemy on American territory since Pearl Harbor, triggered the United States to take action on a global scale against international terrorism. Within a few short weeks following the attack (while benefiting from the sympathy of a shocked world and thus an understanding world opinion) President George W. Bush ordered the invasion of Afghanistan in order to rout the Taliban government and pursue, capture, or kill Usama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda organization, the terrorists responsible for the attacks.¹ This effort continues today under the moniker Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, and represents the first combat front opened by the U.S. on the war against terrorism.

While still militarily engaged in Afghanistan, the administration stepped up its rhetoric toward the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq, warning that the Iraqi regime was a grave and growing danger, portending a nearly unavoidable use of violence, and promising to help the Iraqi people rebuild and form a just government should violent overthrow become necessary.² To justify a possible use of force, in the months and weeks leading up to the invasion of Iraq the administration emphasized Iraq's noncompliance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) introduced as a result of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August of 1990.

These resolutions culminated in UNSCR 1441, Iraqi Material Breach of Disarmament Obligations, issued on November 8, 2002. This resolution, while recalling most of the previous

¹ George W. Bush, U.S. President, Presidential Address to the Nation, October 7, 2001. Available from The White House, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011007-8.html>.

² George W. Bush, U.S. President, President: *Iraqi Regime Danger to America is "Grave and Growing,"* Radio Address by the President to the Nation, October 5, 2002. Available from The White House, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/iraq/20021005.html>.

resolutions relevant to Iraq, codified the Security Council's recognition that Iraq's noncompliance with previous council resolutions, coupled with its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and long-range missiles, posed a threat to international peace and security.³ On the eve of the beginning of hostilities, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell made a last ditch effort to secure a UNSCR authorizing the use of force against Iraq.⁴ Abandoning that effort and thus avoiding the threat of veto, the U.S. and its primary coalition partner Great Britain elected to undertake military force to invade and disarm Iraq without UN sanction.

During the war, U.S. President George W. Bush declared the coalition's goals to the Iraqi people:

The goals of our coalition are clear and limited. We will end a brutal regime, whose aggression and weapons of mass destruction make it a unique threat to the world. Coalition forces will help maintain law and order, so that Iraqis can live in security. We will respect your great religious traditions, whose principles of equality and compassion are essential to Iraq's future. We will help you build a peaceful and representative government that protects the rights of all citizens. And then our military forces will leave. Iraq will go forward as a unified, independent and sovereign nation that has regained a respected place in the world.⁵

While these objectives provide clear guidance to coalition forces engaged in combat and post-combat operations as well as assure the Iraqi people of coalition intentions, scant mention is made by administration officials in open sources as to Iraq's future role relevant to U.S. national security interests, particularly in the short term in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The President clearly tied the war on Iraq with GWOT when he announced the end of major combat operations in Iraq, declaring, "The battle of Iraq is one victory in a war on terror that began on

³ The United Nations, Resolutions and Statements of the Security Council 2002, Press Release SC/7630, January 14, 2003. Available from The United Nations, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/sc7630AB.doc.htm#_S/RES/1441_Iraqi_material.

⁴ Colin L. Powell, U.S. Secretary of State, Remarks to the United Nations Security Council, March 7, 2003. Available from the Department of State, <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2003/18458.htm>.

⁵ George W. Bush, U.S. President, President's Message to the Iraqi People, April 10, 2003. Available from The White House, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/04/iraq/20030410-2.html>.

September the 11, 2001 -- and still goes on.”⁶

This monograph determines what the national strategy anticipates for the future role of Iraq in the war on terrorism. While much debate occurs over issues such as the conduct of the occupation, the transfer of governmental authority to the Iraqis, and the U.S. exit strategy, many longer term questions linger. Will the U.S. and Iraq establish a cooperative relationship in providing a united front against international terrorism, much as the U.S. entered into with post-World War II Germany and Japan while squaring off against the communist ideology represented by the former Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China? Are the president’s objectives as articulated to the Iraqi people thus congruent with U.S. national security objectives with regard to the GWOT, especially his statement, “And then our military forces will leave”?⁷

Methodology

The foundational research method in this monograph is through examination of primary sources of administration policy, White House and departmental press releases, and speeches by high-level administration officials including the President, Vice-President, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and other cabinet and administration officials. To provide balance and to assist in illuminating the strategic issues, writings from prominent strategic and defense policy analysis establishments are also examined. Specific historical circumstances are explored with regard to previous U.S. military occupations and their end-state objectives to use in comparison to current strategy, and possibly to provide analogies for recommended courses of action. Strategy components gleaned from public policy statements are

⁶ George W. Bush, U.S. President, “President Bush Announces Major Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended,” Remarks by the President from the USS Abraham Lincoln At Sea Off the Coast of San Diego, California, May 1, 2003. Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/04/iraq/20030410-2.html>.

⁷ President Bush, President’s Message to the Iraqi People, April 10, 2003.

then examined within a framework of three possible outcomes for meeting U.S. national security objectives. In the absence of explicit strategic guidance with regard to any future role of Iraq in the GWOT, a clear path to success will be charted by devising a strategy to fill that void. Alternative strategy or strategies are subsequently developed, and if recommended, a transition plan from the current to a new strategy is proposed.

Chapter Two frames the U.S. strategy and objectives of the GWOT to provide a basis for further examination of an Iraqi role in achieving those aims. Primary source documents such as *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* and the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* serve as points of departure for analyzing overall U.S. strategies. However, because of the generalized nature of these documents, precise administration strategy must be collated through the examination of specific policy statements by top level U.S. government officials. It also briefly summarizes through historical inquiry the relationship between the U.S. and Iraq since the rise to power of Saddam Hussein to determine the strategic environment of the Middle East region in general and of Iraq in particular. In addition, U.S. national security policy in the Middle East since World War II is reviewed for relevance to a future Iraq role both in its relationship to the U.S. and other regional actors.

Chapter Three examines U.S. involvement in post-World War II Germany and Japan, specifically with regard to the formation of cooperative military and security alliances that allowed the U.S. and its new allies to confront, and eventually defeat (albeit not militarily) the growing threat of the former Soviet Union. Analogies to the present situation with Iraq and the GWOT are extracted and refined to explore their relevance to future strategy proposals.

Chapter Four identifies, aggregates, and synthesizes the rhetoric and writings associated with the administration's strategy and policies with respect to a future role for Iraq in the GWOT. Any identified administration strategy is then analyzed using a framework of three possible outcomes in the current effort to establish a free and democratic Iraqi government. Alternative strategies are then proposed and evaluated under this strategy assessment framework.

Chapter Five fuses the strategy assessments and recommends a transition to an effective national security strategy with regard to Iraq and GWOT. Leveraging the coalition achievement of liberating an oppressed Iraq into the transition of those gains into a strong strategic partner in the Middle East region is crucial for realizing ultimate success for the U.S. in the Global War on Terrorism.

Scope and Focus

The scope of this monograph is limited to U.S.-centric viewpoints on strategy for the prosecution of the GWOT, specifically with regard to Iraq's future role in that endeavor. International opinion is only examined to the extent that it shapes U.S. policy. The inquiry does not attempt to evaluate and pass judgment on the justifications and rationale for initiating the invasion and subsequent liberation of Iraq from the Saddam Hussein regime, but merely acknowledges the military actions and the presence of U.S. and coalition troops in Iraq. In addition, on-going counterinsurgency and stability and support operations by coalition forces in Iraq are not ignored, but there is no in-depth analysis performed to make recommendations as to their conduct or efficacy. Further, this study assumes that continued progress will occur on the path to Iraqi self-determination and establishment of a legitimate Iraqi government will occur in the near term. Because new developments emerge nearly daily concerning the September 11th attacks, GWOT, and Iraq, research on the subject of this study was concluded in March 2004. This monograph attempts to impart a forward-looking perspective in its portrayal of Iraq's future role in the war on terrorism following the creation of such an Iraqi government, whatever form that may take.

CHAPTER TWO

THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR, IRAQ, AND THE MIDDLE EAST

The U.S. government codifies its strategy for the defeat of international terrorism in two primary documents, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* and the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*. To a lesser extent international terrorism is addressed with regard to WMD in the *National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction*.⁸ Iraq is mentioned only once in each of the first two documents, and not at all in the third. In the *National Security Strategy*, Iraq is mentioned in the context of its development and use of WMD around the time of the first Gulf War.⁹ In the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, Iraq is declared as one of seven state sponsors of terrorism.¹⁰ The dearth of specific strategic guidance with regard to Iraq requires deduction and inference from the overall strategy to determine the administration's approach to that country's future role in the GWOT.

Strategy for the Global War on Terror

In his 2002 State of the Union address, the President outlined two early objectives in the war against terror, "shut down terrorist camps, disrupt terrorist plans, and bring terrorists to justice. And, second, we must prevent the terrorists and regimes who seek chemical, biological or nuclear weapons from threatening the United States and the world."¹¹ Also, in the first explicit

⁸ The White House, Office of the President, *National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction*, December 2002, p. 6.

⁹ The White House, Office of the President, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, September 2002, p. 14.

¹⁰ The White House, Office of the President, *National Security Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, February 2003, p. 18.

¹¹ George W. Bush, U.S. President, The President's State of the Union Address, January 29, 2002. Available from The White House, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html>.

linkage to Iraq with the war on terror, the President declared Iraq, Iran, and North Korea an “axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world.”¹² The president posited that these regimes could place WMD in the hands of terrorists that would in turn threaten the United States.

While the president’s early objectives as stated in his 2002 State of the Union address sufficed for the opening blows of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, in February of 2003 the White House published the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*. This document provides the single open source collection of the goals and objectives for the GWOT. While its overview describes the expected lofty strategic goals of “political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity,” it is difficult for subordinate agencies of government to operationalize these into concrete objectives.¹³ However, unlike archetypal strategic-level guidance documents, the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* outlined specific actionable items for U.S. government agencies to execute through four primary goals.

The first goal is to defeat terrorists and their organizations. This is accomplished through identifying, locating, and destroying terrorist cells in a preemptive fashion, rather than waiting for a terrorist attack and then responding. Achieving this goal requires a high degree of intelligence fusion among all intelligence arms of the U.S. government, then combined with a coordinated effort of all elements of U.S. national power to defeat terrorist aims through an, “aggressive, offensive strategy to eliminate capabilities that allow terrorists to exist and operate.”¹⁴

The second goal is the denial of sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists. This goal focuses on diplomatic efforts of the U.S. to encourage all nations of the world to join the fight and either cease their support of terrorist organizations or increase their contributions to the global anti-terrorism effort. This is not just America’s fight, as witnessed by global terrorist

¹² Ibid.

¹³ National Security Strategy for Combating Terrorism, p.1.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 17.

organization attacks on other nations, such as those in Bali, Indonesia in October 2003, Istanbul, Turkey in November 2003, and Madrid, Spain in March 2004.¹⁵ Thus, according to the *National Security Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, the U.S. government is charged with assembling a “powerful coalition of nations maintaining a strong, united international front against terrorism.”¹⁶

The third goal is to diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit. This ambitious goal aims to garner international efforts to bolster the plight of weak and failed states in order to eliminate the conditions that are ripe for the growth and influence of terrorism as a form of political discourse. This effort to delegitimize terrorism and to win the “war of ideas” is a combined endeavor consisting of diplomatic influence, information operations, military security cooperation, and economic assistance. The U.S. government also recognizes that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a key factor in the proliferation of terrorism and that “lasting peace can only come when Israelis and Palestinians resolve the issues and end the conflict between them.”¹⁷

Lastly, the fourth goal in the strategy to combat terrorism is to defend U.S. citizens and interests both at home and abroad. The lead U.S. government agency for this effort is the newly created Department of Homeland Security. This facet of combating terrorism is viewed as of such importance that it is delineated in a separate supporting strategy codified as *The National Strategy for Homeland Security*.¹⁸ Elements in achieving this goal include the attainment of domain awareness, enhanced protection of critical infrastructure, integrated measures to protect U.S. citizens abroad, and the coordinated establishment of an incidence management capability.¹⁹

¹⁵ “Recent Terror Attacks at a Glance”, *The New York Times*, March 12, 2004. Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/international/AP-Attacks-Glance.html>.

¹⁶ National Security Strategy for Combating Terrorism, p.19.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 24.

¹⁸ The White House, Office of the President, *The National Strategy for Homeland Security*, July 2002.

¹⁹ National Security Strategy for Combating Terrorism, pp.25-27.

Jeffrey Record, in his piece *Bounding the Global War on Terror*, published at the U.S. Army War College, deduced an interpreted list of goals for the GWOT through analysis of the national strategy documents, as well as open source policy statements made by members of the Bush administration over the evolution of GWOT strategy from September 11th, 2001 until December of 2003. His list of goals include 1) destroying the perpetrators of 9/11 (al-Qaeda); 2) the destruction of other terrorist organizations of global reach; 3) delegitimizing and ultimately eradicating the phenomenon of terrorism; 4) transforming Iraq into a prosperous and stable democracy; and 5) transforming the Middle East into a region of participatory self-government and economic opportunity.²⁰ While all of these objectives are arguably necessary and sufficient in the quest for victory in the GWOT, Record's fourth goal of transforming Iraq merits closer examination in the context of this study.

Transforming Iraq

Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz removed any uncertainty as to the administration's linkage of the war in Iraq with the GWOT in his testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on the reconstruction of Iraq in July 2003, stating, "Mr. Chairman, the military and rehabilitation efforts now underway in Iraq are an essential part of the war on terror. In fact, the battle to secure the peace in Iraq is now the central battle in the war on terror."²¹ Dr. Condoleezza Rice, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs,

²⁰ Jeffrey Record, *Bounding the Global War on Terrorism*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, December 2003, p. 21.

²¹ Honorable Paul Wolfowitz, testimony to U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on Iraq: Status & Prospects for Reconstruction – Resources, Hart Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C., 29 July 2003. Available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2003/sp20030729-depsecdef0385.html>.

described the removal of the Iraqi regime with, “The war on terror will be greatly served by the removal of this source of instability in the world's most volatile region.”²²

How does the transformation of Iraq into a stable and prosperous democracy assist the U.S. in the prosecution of the GWOT? Transforming Iraq into a functioning democracy is indeed congruent with the stated U.S. national security objective of “building the infrastructure of democracy.”²³ At this point in time the jury is still out on the ability of the U.S. to achieve the establishment of a genuine democracy in Iraq. However, the emergence of a new Iraqi government that is at least cordial to the U.S. is a clear-cut requirement for any future role for Iraq in the GWOT.

The danger in the U.S. not enabling a representative government to flourish in Iraq is evident in a limited and objectionable menu of alternatives; an Islamic state hostile to the West, an anarchical, ungoverned region, or the rise of another dictator to replace Saddam Hussein. Of the regimes in the Middle East region that are not monarchies, most are based on the type of military government formed in 1952 by Gamal Abdel Nasser after leading a coup against King Farouk.²⁴ Nasser created a secular republic, with a strong army used not only for defense, but also as an instrument for modernization. Nasserism preceded a spate of Arab national revolutions against sitting monarchies, but ultimately his form of government succeeded in providing a conduit to military dictatorial rule by individuals, e.g., Saddam Hussein of Iraq, Moammar al-Ghadafi of Libya, or Hafez Assad of Syria.²⁵ A spin-off of Nasserism occurred during the

²² Dr. Condoleeza Rice, Remarks at the 28th Annual Convention of the National Association of Black Journalists, Dallas, Texas, 7 August 2003. Available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/08/20030807-1.html>.

²³ The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, p. 2.

²⁴ Donald Neff, “Nasser Comes to Power in Egypt, Frightening Britain, France, and Israel,” *Washington Report on Middle East Affairs*, July 1996. Available at <http://www.washington-report.org/backissues/0796/9607083.htm>.

²⁵ “The Middle East: The Rise and Fall of Nasserism,” *Forecasts: The Decade to Come*, Strategic Forecasting, 29 Dec 99, Available at <http://www.stratfor.com/services/giu/forecast/decadetocome/meafdecade2.asp>.

Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 when the Ayatollah Khomeini took the republican form of government Nasser proposed and combined it with traditional Islam, creating a new form called an Islamic Republic.²⁶ This form fuses Islamic fundamentalism with the republican structure of governance, allowing an open avenue for the teachings of Islam to correlate directly to traditional state activities. Neither of these alternatives are acceptable forms of government as it is not desirable to replace one despot with another, and certainly the Islamic Republic as practiced in Iran is openly hostile to the West in general and the U.S. in particular. The U.S. goals of transforming Iraq into a democracy could establish a foothold in an extremely volatile and unstable region.

Legacy U.S. Security Policy in the Middle East

To provide a basis for discussion of a future Iraqi role in the GWOT, it is important to understand the evolution of overall U.S. security policy toward the Middle East region from the end of World War II until the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001. Divided into three major periods, this section reviews the Cold War years that are generally accepted as beginning immediately following World War II until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, which many observers accept as the beginning of the end of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. It then describes the era of the first Persian Gulf War that followed the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, and encompasses the Clinton administration's *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, and *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*.

²⁶ "The Middle East: The Islamic Republican Alternative," *Forecasts: The Decade to Come*, Strategic Forecasting, 29 Dec 99. Available at <http://www.stratfor.com/services/giu/forecast/decadetocome/meafdecade3.asp>.

The Cold War Years

The end of World War II also marked the beginning of the bi-polar struggle between the two emerging superpowers, the United States and the USSR. During the nearly 50-year ensuing struggle, both countries strived to either gain influence in many regions of the world, or to contain the other's influence. Intrinsic to this struggle as it developed in the Middle East was the Israeli war of independence beginning in 1948. During the subsequent years of the Cold War, the U.S. and other Western powers sought to contain Soviet expansionism in that region of the eastern Mediterranean, primarily through a cordon consisting of Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey, and Iran. The Soviet bloc responded by increasing its influence in Syria and Iraq, supplying arms to the Arab side of the emerging Arab-Israeli conflict. The West once again countered by bringing Israel, Jordan, and the Arabian Peninsula deeper into its folds.²⁷ This attempt to contain Soviet expansionism became the first leg in the triad that would become U.S. security policy in the Middle East.

Closely intertwined with the policy for Soviet containment was the U.S. policy of ensuring the continued survival of the state of Israel. Washington responded in kind to Soviet arms exports to Arab nations such as Syria and Iraq (which were then used to attack Israel) with its own arms programs for Israel and Jordan.²⁸

The last leg of the U.S. Middle East policy triad during the Cold War years encompassed the ensured access to Arab oil for Western consumption. While U.S. dependence upon this source was only on the order of 5.3% of total Arab oil production in the Persian Gulf region in 1973, U.S. imports rose from 915,000 barrels per day in 1973 to 2,244,000 barrels per day by

²⁷ Larry E Cable, "Playing in the Sandbox: Doctrine, Combat, and Outcome on the Ground," in William Head and Earl H. Tilford, Jr., eds., *The Eagle in the Desert*, (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996).

²⁸ The Middle East: The Islamic Republican Alternative.

1990, or 13.2% of U.S. imported petroleum products.²⁹ This increase, coupled with the Arab oil embargo, the associated sharp price increases of 1973, and the greater dependence upon imported Arab oil for many important U.S. allies, served as a primary driver for U.S. security policy in the region during this period. According to a former National Security Council staff member who was involved in the negotiations that led to the Camp David Accords and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, “These three concerns—oil, Israel, and the Soviet Union—were the driving forces behind American Middle East policy throughout most of the period from the 1950s through the 1980s.”³⁰

Gulf War I

The first Persian Gulf War began in response to Iraq’s invasion and pilferage of its southeastern neighbor, Kuwait, in August of 1990. Of the three primary drivers for U.S. Middle Eastern security policy discussed above, the unfettered access to Persian Gulf oil by the West was certainly a high priority and impetus for the U.S.-assembled coalition that subsequently expelled Iraqi forces from Kuwait during the military operation known as Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.³¹ As the conflict developed, the U.S. concern for Israel’s survival once again became a priority, as Iraq began to threaten and then attack Israeli sovereign territory with ballistic missiles. Israel’s potential involvement in hostilities as a reaction to the missile attacks threatened to disrupt or destroy the U.S.-led coalition against Iraq, possibly severely hampering the attainment of U.S. objectives.³² The quandary that the U.S. found itself in during the Persian

²⁹ James Phillips, James, “Rethinking U.S. Policy in the Middle East,” The Heritage Foundation, Backgrounder No. 891, 10 Apr 92. Available at <http://www.heritage.org/Research/MiddleEast/bg891.cfm>.

³⁰ William B. Quandt, “American Policy toward Democratic Political Movements in the Middle East,” in Ellis Goldberg et. al., eds., *Rules and Rights in the Middle East* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1993), p.165.

³¹ William Head and Earl H. Tilford, Jr., eds., *The Eagle in the Desert*, (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996), p.17

³² Playing in the Sandbox: Doctrine, Combat, and Outcome on the Ground, p.190.

Gulf War represented a microcosm of a larger issue, the balancing of Israeli-Arab relations throughout the development of U.S. security policy in the Middle East. The previously held national security policy of preventing the Soviet Union from establishing hegemony in the region rapidly became an anachronism with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the reunification of Germany in October 1990; the crumbling USSR had greater worries than its previous forays into Middle Eastern regional affairs.

The Clinton Years

President Clinton took office in January 1993 following the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; therefore it is not unexpected that his administration's subsequent national security strategy development had dropped any reference to the containment of Soviet communism in the Middle East region. However, ensuring the security of Israel, the pursuit of a lasting Middle East peace, and of course, the free flow of oil at reasonable prices, remained at the center of U.S. security policy in the Middle East.³³

A new security concern emerged during the Clinton years for the U.S., consisting of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the systems capable of delivering them over substantial distances to threaten U.S. interests and allies in the Middle East region.³⁴ Reducing the proliferation of WMD and their delivery vehicles evolved during the decade of the 1990s as a rising priority not only in the Middle East, but worldwide.

One concept that materialized in the post-Cold War era of national strategy is that of classifying a government or state as "rogue." While it is difficult to locate a list of finite criteria

³³ The White House, Office of the President, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, February 1996. Available at <http://www.usemb.se/usis/1996strategy/integrat.html>.

³⁴ United States Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, *National Military Strategy--Shape, Respond, Prepare Now--A Military Strategy for a New Era*, September 1997. Available at <http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/nms/>.

for a state to be labeled in this manner, political rhetoric indicates that four misbehaviors must have occurred: active pursuit of WMD; terrorism support, human rights transgressions, and overt enmity toward the United States. Middle Eastern states that were declared “rogue” by the U.S. government included Iraq, Iran, and Libya. Labeling regimes in this way provided a basis for U.S. actions such as sanctions, covert actions, or military force.³⁵

Clinton’s strategy evolved from one of engagement (on diplomatic, economic, and military levels) and enlargement (the promotion of democracy and self-determination),³⁶ to that of shaping (through engagement), responding (with national instruments of power), and preparing for uncertain futures.³⁷ Despite engagement strategies of the 1990s intended to spread the influence and values of democracy worldwide, terrorist attacks began to increase on U.S. citizens and interests around the globe.

Mounting Animosity

Without doubt, the Middle East is filled with loathing and hatred. This environment is not only central to the Arab-Israeli question, but also increasingly relevant with Arab-Arab relationships and the growing influence of Islamic fundamentalism, and the effect it will have on the future construct of governments and intra-region policy.³⁸ The fervor created by the Jewish displacement of Palestinians subsequent to the Israeli war of independence is a common thread of antagonism throughout the turbulent history of the Middle East since World War II. Because of U.S. support for Israel, this issue has coalesced into the fault line between the West and the

³⁵ Meghan L. O’Sullivan, “Sanctioning ‘Rogue’ States: A Strategy in Decline?” *Harvard International Review*, Summer 2000. Available at <http://www.brook.edu/views/articles/osullivan/2000summerHIR.htm>.

³⁶ A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement.

³⁷ The White House, Office of the President, *A National Security Strategy for A New Century*, Washington, GPO, December 1999. Available at <http://clinton5.nara.gov/media/pdf/nssr-1299.pdf>.

³⁸ The Middle East: The Islamic Republican Alternative.

Middle East in particular and the Muslim world in general. In addition, when Western coalition forces descended upon the region for Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM and remained indefinitely due to continued UN sanction enforcement against Iraq, animosity grew over the perceived inculcation of Western mores into Islamic cultures, especially in Saudi Arabia, where the Islamic holy cities of Mecca and Medina reside.

Until a more moderate leadership rose to power in Iran during the mid-1990s, the United States had a policy of “dual containment” with regard to Iraq and Iran; essentially playing one off against the other to provide restraint and control over both volatile states.³⁹ While the efficacy of this technique was questionable, there is no doubt the policy contributed to the rancor building toward the West.

This loathing toward the West and America in particular resulted in an increase of terrorist acts directed toward U.S. citizens and interests both at home and abroad, culminating in the terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center in New York City on September 11th, 2001. The list of terrorist attacks that have caused American casualties or deaths by terrorist groups connected with the Middle East grew long and showed increasing aggressiveness during the past three decades: Americans taken hostage at the U.S. embassy in Tehran, Iran in 1979; the attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kuwait and Beirut, Lebanon, and the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983; the attack on a U.S. embassy annex north of Beirut in 1984; the hijacking of Kuwaiti Airways Flight 221 from Kuwait to Pakistan in 1984; the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 from Athens to Rome in 1985; the hijacking of the cruise ship Achille-Lauro in the Mediterranean in 1985; the bombing of the La Belle Discotheque in West Berlin in 1986; the downing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988; the truck bombing of the

³⁹ Anthony H. Cordesman, “US Policy, the Southern Gulf States, and the Changing Strategic Balance in the Gulf,” speech to the Middle East Petroleum and Gas Conference, Dubai, 16 March 1998. Available at <http://www.csis.org/mideast/gulfspch.html>.

World Trade Center in 1993; the truck bombing of Khobar Towers in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia in 1996; the attacks on the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania in 1998; and the attack on the USS Cole in a Yemeni port in 2000.⁴⁰

There is little doubt the Middle East region is a virtual powder keg, ripe for social upheaval due to waning economies, dictatorial leadership regimes, and increasing occurrences of Islamic extremism that adversely affect any effort, either internal or external, to provide stability and social order. The establishment of a legitimate, democratic government in Iraq, assisted by the U.S., is imperative to provide a foothold in this volatile region for the continuing prosecution of the GWOT. This course of action is also congruent with the stated U.S. national objective of promoting and building the infrastructure of democracy globally, which has its roots in the political science theory of *the democratic peace*. The virtues of the democratic (or liberal) peace have been widely extolled by international relations theorists since the 18th century writings of the political philosopher Immanuel Kant, when he posited that democracies almost never fight each other.⁴¹ The theory does have its denigrators, most notably Joanne Gowa, who maintains that the democratic peace was an artifact of the Cold War and the U.S. should base its foreign policy on building common interests rather than promoting democracy across the globe.⁴² However, the establishment of democracy in Iraq may satisfy both sides of the argument by providing Iraq as a strong democratic ally to the U.S. in a capricious area of the world, and binding the two nations together with the common interest of a mutual security alliance in the war on terrorism. This postulated outcome has precedence as it strongly resembles the policies and actions of the U.S. with regard to Germany and Japan following World War II.

⁴⁰ “Middle-East Connected Anti-American Terror Attacks,” *Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal*, December 2001, compiled by Caroline Taillandier. Available at <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2001/issue4/jv5n4a5.htm>.

⁴¹ Immanuel Kant, “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch,” in *Kant's Political Writings*.

CHAPTER THREE

THE NEW IRAQ: COMPARISONS TO POST-WORLD WAR II

In February of 2003, prior to the commencement of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, President Bush compared the postulated post-war situation of Iraq to that of the World War II countries that were defeated by the Allies. He noted, “many said that the cultures of Japan and Germany were incapable of sustaining democratic values. Well, they were wrong. Some say the same of Iraq today. They are mistaken.”⁴³ Currently the President’s confidence in the impending birth of democracy in Iraq remains strong; however, the outcome is still in question. Nearly a year after his remarks, while speaking at an exhibit honoring Prime Minister Winston Churchill, President Bush compared Churchill’s view of the incompleteness of the Allied victory in World War II because of the Soviet Union’s communist expansionism, to the necessity of establishing a free and representative government in Iraq. The President then stated simply, “We seek the advance of democracy for the most practical of reasons: because democracies do not support terrorists or threaten the world with weapons of mass murder.”⁴⁴

Perhaps there is an even more practical reason; a need to establish security cooperation and defense agreements with newly conquered nations in the face of yet another emerging enemy. The U.S. relationships with post-World War II Germany and Japan evolved into strong military alliances that contributed to the ultimate collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. However, in the process of examining the post-war U.S. occupation of Germany and Japan

⁴² Joanne Gowa, *Ballots and Bullets: The Elusive Democratic Peace* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 113-114.

⁴³ George W. Bush, U.S. President, Remarks by the President to the American Enterprise Institute, Washington Hilton Hotel, Washington, DC, February 26, 2003. Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030226-11.html>.

⁴⁴ George W. Bush, U.S. President, Remarks by the President on Winston Churchill and the War on Terror, February 4, 2004. Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040204-4.html>.

with an eye for analogies to the future role of Iraq in the GWOT, it is difficult to separate the organizational and administrative challenges of the post-World War II occupations that permeate the historical records, with those of subsequent security cooperation and defense agreements. To more clearly illuminate the issues, it is helpful to equate the contemporary threat the U.S. government labels “terrorism” (conflated as it may be, according to Jeffrey Record) to that of “communism” represented chiefly by the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China during the Cold War period.⁴⁵ The next section examines U.S. interactions with post-World War II Germany and Japan from the perspective of developing security cooperation and defense alliances, while contrasts and comparisons are explored in relation to a future role for Iraq in the GWOT.

Germany

The U.S. and its allies maintained a formal occupation force in Germany from the surrender of Hitler’s Reich in May of 1945 until the Paris protocols of October 23, 1955 ended the occupation régime and conferred sovereignty on the Federal Republic of Germany.⁴⁶ Four days later West Germany was admitted as a member in NATO. To this day, the U.S. continues to post thousands of land and air component personnel in Germany, although at not nearly the high levels assigned there during the Cold War. Germany became a stronghold for Allied power and a strategic location for the expected main effort by the Soviets if a shooting war broke out.

A keystone issue relating to Germany during the early Cold War years was the concern that she was a pawn caught between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and was not only the potential

⁴⁵ Record argues that grouping together rogue states and terrorist organizations with different agendas and threat levels to the U.S. veils critical differences among them. See *Bounding the Global War on Terrorism*, p. 16.

⁴⁶ Edgar Mcinnis, Richard Hiscocks, and Robert Spencer, *The Shaping of Postwar Germany* (New York: Praeger, 1960), p. 189.

trophy, but was also likely the battleground that the struggle would be fought upon. The outcome of such a struggle was viewed as the linchpin of the power balance in the region and would likely impact the overall Cold War security situation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.⁴⁷

Post-WWII European scholars of the time found that the imperative of a political democracy for post-war Germany was evident in “what must be sought is Germany's free collaboration as a member of a community of free nations. The only practical method, and certainly the only one that has any prospect of enduring success, is the creation of firm and clearly recognized bonds of mutual interest.”⁴⁸ The German population’s acceptance of democracy and its ideals was an important factor for assuring the Allies of Germany’s reliability as a partner, and a hedge against further independent hegemonic designs by totalitarian influences within the country. Germany’s eventual admittance into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization provided that bond of mutual interest and helped them become a full contributing partner in the global war on communism.

Another major debate in the case of Germany was the question of rearmament and remilitarization. As this country was one of the three primary aggressors of World War II, that debate was not unexpected. However, the imperative of mutual defense against the Warsaw Pact (as promulgated by the U.S. and Britain) served to accelerate Germany’s rearmament, as well as internal defense requirements inherent in national sovereignty.

The Germany example is in the context of a nation that had a long history of militancy and aggressive expansionism. Although an aggressor during both world wars, after World War II Germany was subsequently given massive economic assistance, folded into a community of like-minded democratic nations (NATO), and ultimately developed into a peaceful world power.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 156.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 163.

Japan

The U.S. maintained a formal occupation force in Japan following World War II until March of 1952, after the signing of peace and security treaties in September of 1951.⁴⁹ The occupation of Japan lasted a much shorter period of time than the German occupation, in part due to the lack of interest that the Soviet Union showed toward the occupation and reconstruction effort (and not discounting the sheer willpower of the Supreme Commander Allied Powers, General Douglas MacArthur). In stark contrast to the extreme involvement by the USSR in divided Germany, the Soviets only started to vigorously get politically involved in the Japanese question in 1948 once the U.S. endorsed an accelerated reconstruction for Japan.⁵⁰

During the Allied occupation, the already complex situation in that country became more convoluted in 1949 with the fall of mainland China to the Chinese Communists. This event, added to the growing Soviet communist menace, made security cooperation and defense agreements with post-occupation Japan of primary importance. A lively debate erupted between the Pentagon and the State Department concerning the drafting of the security agreement with Japan in anticipation of the end of the occupation. The Pentagon was insistent upon permanent military basing rights in Japan as a hedge to Soviet and Chinese aggression; while State favored a neutral Japan with no U.S. military presence in order to avoid provoking the Soviets.⁵¹ The Pentagon won its argument as Article I of the Security Treaty between The United States of America and Japan reads, in part, "Japan grants, and the United States of America accepts the

⁴⁹ E. J. Lewe van Aduard, and John Foster Dulles, *Japan, from Surrender to Peace* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1953), p. 338.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.* p. 106.

⁵¹ John Foster Dulles, "American Bases, Rearmament, and the China Questions in the Making of the Japanese Peace Treaty," in *Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945-1952* (Kent, OH: Kent State University, 1989), p. 241.

right, upon the coming into force of the treaty of peace and of this treaty, to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about Japan.”⁵²

As in Germany, the rearmament of Japan following World War II was a significant issue. However, the rearmament of Japan occurred under different circumstances than the German situation. Most significantly, the Japanese constitution, ratified by the Diet and put into effect in May of 1947, contained Article 9, the infamous “no-war” clause, excerpted below:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.⁵³

The Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, General Douglas MacArthur, felt strongly that the new constitution, especially with the inclusion of Article 9, would allow the Japanese people to maintain their national polity of an empire with an emperor, although under the new constitution the emperor was reduced to a symbol, rather than head of state. MacArthur felt this concept was key to the successful democratization of Japan.

While Article 9 appeared to expressly forbid formation of Japanese armed forces, the North Korean attack south in the summer of 1950 (perceived by the Japanese as a push toward Japan by the Soviet Union) provided impetus for the formation of a Japanese National Police Reserve (NPR) and Maritime Safety Agency (MSA). These agencies, manned primarily with former Japanese Army and Navy personnel and trained by U.S. armed forces members,

⁵² Aduard and Dulles, *Japan, from Surrender to Peace*, p. 337.

⁵³ Douglas MacArthur, "The Peacemaker and the Presidency," in *Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945-1952* *Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945-1952* (Kent, OH: Kent State University, 1989), p. 58.

eventually added an air arm and evolved into the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF), equipped with modern arms supplied by the U.S.⁵⁴

Over the course of the Cold War, Japan became an indispensable strategic partner in East Asia against the onslaught of the tentacles of communism reaching from the Soviet Union, People's Republic of China, and North Korea. How could an ancient culture so different from the West recover relatively quickly from a devastating military defeat to become an important democratic partner to the U.S. in the global war on communism? The answer may lie in the cultural sensitivities and realistic perspective displayed by the drafters of the Potsdam Declaration of July, 1945, the document that the occupation guidelines were based upon: "The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established".⁵⁵ The declaration never chartered the occupation forces to impose a democratic government for Japan, but merely to encourage a representative government based upon the free will of her people.

Iraq

Comparisons of Iraq to the immediate post-war environments in Germany and Japan are inevitable because those circumstances were the most recent large-scale occupations conducted by the U.S. after a major war. Also, these operations succeeded in transforming both countries into flourishing democracies and economic powers. There are some differences from the perspectives of establishing democracies, as well as different histories and cultural biases.

Germany and Japan have long histories as sovereign states and as powerful dominions

⁵⁴ Dulles, "American Bases, Rearmament, and the China Questions in the Making of the Japanese Peace Treaty," p. 269.

⁵⁵ Aduard and Dulles, Japan, from Surrender to Peace. p. 255.

prior to the time of the Treaty of Westphalia. Conversely, Iraq has a long history as a conquered land, and as colonial subjects through the first half of the 20th century. Occupying armies meant subjugation and exploitation of Iraq's resources, rather than freedom and assistance toward self-determination. In addition, in the case of Germany and Japan the Allies defeated a world-wide military aggression carried out by totally mobilized populations, while in Iraq the Bush administration made it clear that the fight was with the Hussein regime, not the Iraqi people. In 1990, the U.S. formed an international military coalition to expel Iraq from Kuwait, while in 2003 the U.S. attempted to form a similar international coalition to conduct its own occupation of Iraq. Therefore, the Iraqis became understandably confused as to the goals of the coalition presence.⁵⁶

With respect to rearmament, the U.S. view is that the Saddam Hussein regime was the aggressor faction, rather than the entire Iraqi population as part of a mobilized, warmongering nation. As the Ba'athist regime essentially fell apart and dissolved under the onslaught of coalition forces, the question of rearming regular Iraqi security forces during the reconstruction phase has not surfaced in the public debate (outside of criticism of U.S. military planning for post-conflict stability and support operations). In fact, the rebuilding of Iraqi security forces and the Iraqi military are key components of the Bush administration's reconstruction plan for Iraq.⁵⁷

As Germany and Japan were strategically placed in the struggle against communism, Iraq is strategically placed for the new world struggle against terrorism. In West Germany, the form the fledgling government would take was critical to the balance of power between the U.S. and Soviet Union during the Cold War. This correlates directly to the nature of the government that emerges in Iraq, as a new despot regime or Islamic republic there would likely favor the side of

⁵⁶ R.S. Zaharna, "Iraq is not a modern-day Germany," *The Christian Science Monitor*, August 21, 2003. Available from <http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0821/p09s02-coop.html>.

⁵⁷ The White House, Fact Sheet: Request for Additional FY 2004 Funding for the War on Terror, September 8, 2003. Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/20030908-1.html>.

terrorism, given the historical tendencies of these types of governments to provide support and sanctuary to terrorists. During the Cold War, both Germany and Japan were likely potential battlegrounds if the Cold War turned hot. Iraq has already taken on that role, even since the declared end of major combat operations, due to former Ba'athist loyalist insurgents and the influx of foreign fighters and terrorists. Iraq is referred to by Ambassador Bremer, the President's Special Envoy to Iraq, as "one of the battlefields on the worldwide war against terrorism."⁵⁸ Iraq's strategic location places it squarely in the vicinity of the origins of the radical Islamic variety of terrorism.

While there exist significant differences between the post-World War II environments in Germany and Japan and that of post-war Iraq today, the Bush administration does not view those as insurmountable. In fact, Vice President Cheney dismisses claims that the Islamic faith is incompatible with democratic values, citing Turkey as a shining example of an Islamic democracy, as well as the millions of Muslims who are citizens of democratic nations around the world.⁵⁹ The next chapter explores and analyzes the essential question: assuming democracy does take root in Iraq, what are the Bush administration's plans from that point forward with regard to Iraq's future role in the GWOT?

⁵⁸ Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, Global Message, remarks by Ambassador Paul Bremer, Presidential Envoy to Iraq, September 2, 2003. Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/20030903.html>.

⁵⁹ Richard B. Cheney, U.S. Vice President, Remarks by the Vice President to the World Economic Forum, January 24, 2004. Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040124-1.html>.

STRATEGY ANALYSIS AND ALTERNATIVE STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT

The President has declared that the U.S. “has adopted a new strategy, a forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East.”⁶⁰ Coupled with his declaration that, “The United States' strategy for combating terrorism focuses on taking the fight to the terrorists themselves,” it can be inferred that a free Iraq is pivotal to the global effort to defeat terrorism.⁶¹ While the administration is assertive in communicating their strategy for the establishment of a democratic government in Iraq, there is a scarcity of information concerning the strategy for the period *after* success, beyond that of withdrawing U.S. forces. While such planning, if it is taking place, may be of a classified nature due to the political sensitivities involved, it is paramount that this next step be addressed.

A sound strategy clearly articulates a shared vision and provides a roadmap to success. In answering the question of what the U.S. long-term plans are for the war on terrorism, President Bush stated, “What about the long-term plan against terrorists? Free societies do not breed terrorism. Free societies are peaceful nations. What we're doing for the long-term, we're promoting freedom.”⁶² While this policy is congruent with the President’s third goal for the GWOT of diminishing the underlying conditions that breed terrorism, it leaves many questions unanswered about the future role of Iraq in the war on terrorism. The administration’s strategy

⁶⁰ George W. Bush, U.S. President, President Bush Discusses Freedom in Iraq and Middle East, Remarks by the President at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy, United States Chamber of Commerce, Washington, D.C., November 6, 2003. Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106-2.html>.

⁶¹ George W. Bush, U.S. President, President Bush Releases National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, Press Release, February 14, 2003. Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030214-7.html>.

⁶² George W. Bush, U.S. President, President Discusses America’s Leadership in Global War on Terror, Remarks by the President on the War on Terror, Roswell Convention and Civic Center, Roswell, New Mexico, January 22, 2004. Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040122-6.html>.

hinges on the success of U.S. efforts to enable the establishment of a democratic government in Iraq. Failure to do so, according to the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, “would condemn millions to misery and embolden terrorists around the world.”⁶³ Perhaps even more damaging from the perspective of the war on terror would be the potential loss of vital, strategically located access bases in a region of the world closest to the origins of radical Islamic terror. Based upon the President’s message to the Iraqi people about coalition intentions during the war, once Iraq has a functioning representative democracy, all troops would then be withdrawn from Iraq. In direct contrast to this premise, when the occupations of Germany and Japan were rescinded, troop levels actually increased from occupation force numbers, under the auspices of mutual defense and security agreements viewed as necessary to provide a common defense against the growing communist threat. U.S. troops are still stationed in those countries nearly six decades after the war ended.

Does President Bush’s statement to the Iraqi people indicate an exit strategy from that country? On the surface it may appear so, but history would indicate that it is not a realistic goal. In his article *Exit Strategy Delusions*, Jeffrey Record cites many examples of prolonged occupations and other extended U.S. military stays that have occurred throughout American history, from the Civil War, World War II, Korea, the first Gulf War, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Record posits that “the demand for unconditional surrender implies an inescapable and open-ended military occupation and rule of the defeated side.”⁶⁴ Add to those examples Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan and the situation in Iraq today, it appears that U.S. forces stay for extended periods much more often than not. When U.S. forces do exit quickly or

⁶³ Dr. Condoleezza Rice, Remarks by National Security Advisor Dr. Condoleezza Rice at the McConnell Center for Political Leadership, University of Louisville, Louisville, Kentucky, March 8, 2004. Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/03/20040308-15.html>.

⁶⁴ Jeffrey Record, “Exit Strategy Delusions,” *Parameters*, Winter 2001-2002. Available from <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/01winter/record.htm>.

the strategy shifts to a rapid drawdown, the operation is normally graded as ineffective, for example, Vietnam, Somalia, and Haiti. Indeed, the U.S. government's decision to withdraw quickly from Europe after World War I may have predestined the need to return in the 1940s and stay through to the finish.⁶⁵ Although no ground troops remained in Iraq after the first Gulf War, air assets remained in the region to enforce UN sanctions and no-fly zones until after the commencement of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Viewed in that perspective, the second Gulf War was in fact more a continuation of the first Gulf War, not completing major combat operations until the President declared so on May 1, 2003. U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld articulated a more pragmatic view on an exit strategy from Iraq when he stated, "The goal is not to reduce the number of U.S. forces in Iraq, or to develop an exit strategy. Our exit strategy in Iraq is success. The objective is not to leave - it is to succeed in our mission."⁶⁶

The timeline for the strategy of Iraq's future role in the GWOT begins with the establishment of a sovereign Iraqi government that retains the independent authority to enter into (or decline) mutual defense and security cooperation treaties. There are three possible outcomes that may occur with respect to the nature of the government that is formed in Iraq. First, the ideal situation of a representative government that is friendly with the U.S. and willing to enter into security agreements and provide assistance in areas such as host nation support and access to military basing facilities. Secondly, a government emerges that is cordial to the U.S. but is politically unable to provide that level of support. The last possibility is an indeterminate state due to failure of the current effort to make progress, or worse, the emergence of a regime hostile to the U.S. Such a state would be unwilling to provide any assistance in the war on terror, and

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Donald H. Rumsfeld, U.S. Secretary of Defense, Global Message, from remarks by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Foreign Press Center, Washington, DC, November 11, 2003. Available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031111-3.html>.

may possess a tendency to return to its former ways of providing sanctuary and support to terrorist organizations. The administration's strategy is now analyzed using the outline of these possible futures as assumptions.⁶⁷

The Bush Administration Strategy

Scenario One – Friendly Iraqi Democratic Government

This scenario is the outcome envisaged by the Bush administration as a result of the current reconstruction effort in Iraq. It envisions a robust representative government in Iraq that assumes responsibility for governance *in toto*, including the guarantee of individual civil rights, security (internal and external), oversight of a general market economy, and vigorous administration of all other governmental functions associated with a democratic government. The administration assumes that a phased withdrawal of coalition forces would occur first by withdrawal from heavily-populated urban areas to consolidated locations in less-populated areas. Security responsibilities are transferred gradually to indigenous Iraqi security forces, with coalition forces providing supplemental quick reaction forces as required.⁶⁸ Eventually all U.S. forces are then withdrawn from Iraqi sovereign territory, with the possibility of multinational forces remaining to provide security assistance and UN monitoring functions. It is assumed that U.S. forces would remain in the region at current locations outside of Iraq as a return to the *status quo* of the pre-Operation IRAQI FREEDOM force posture. The new Iraqi government is friendly

⁶⁷ Assumptions in this context address gaps of critical knowledge that are required to continue the formation of a strategy for an uncertain future. Addressing the fewest assumptions as possible focuses strategy development by increasing the coherency of the process. Valid assumptions are based upon the characteristics that they are logical, realistic, and essential for the strategy development process to continue.

⁶⁸ General John P. Abizaid, General, U.S. Army, Commander, U.S. Central Command, Command Posture Statement before the House Armed Services Committee, 3 March 2004. Available at <http://armedservices.house.gov/openingstatementsandpressreleases/108thcongress/04-03-03abizaid.pdf>.

to the U.S., maintains liberal trade policies (particular free access to oil by the West), openly engages in military-to-military cooperation, and enters into mutual defense and security cooperation treaties with the U.S., Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, and other neighboring governments. As President Bush asserts, free and democratic nations do not tolerate or support terrorism, therefore the Iraqi government enthusiastically supports the U.S. GWOT, providing intelligence sharing, military forces, basing and overflight access, liaison personnel in planning headquarters, and other assistance as requested. Most importantly, a free and democratic Iraq in the heart of the Middle East provides an island of moderation in a volatile and unstable region. The administration's strategy predicts a variation of the "domino effect," with democratic values emanating throughout the region from Iraq, thus moderating the influences of radical factions in neighboring Middle East states.

While this postulated circumstance would seem to provide a panacea for the Iraqi problem and ultimately assist in the war on terror, it depends more on optimism rather than pragmatism, and although the best case, it is the least likely. In addition, once U.S. forces depart Iraq, for them to return by invitation to either provide internal security assistance or to prosecute the GWOT seems fortuitous at best. U.S. forces returning to accomplish these missions by brute force would invite international disdain and political backlash, thus once again beginning the outcries against U.S. unilateralism and heavy-handedness.

Scenario Two – Ambivalent Iraqi Government

Of the three possible outcomes for the Iraqi situation, the emergence of a sovereign Iraqi government that is ambivalent toward U.S. aims is most likely. While the current U.S. efforts will in all probability succeed in establishing some form of representative rule in Iraq, that government will likely zealously hail the departure of U.S forces from that country. Once determined self-sufficient by the U.S., who will then subsequently withdraw its forces, Iraq will likely distance itself politically, diplomatically, and militarily from the U.S. government.

Although the new Iraqi government will reach some level of competence as described above in Scenario One in providing security and essential services, it will likely be preoccupied with internal power struggles taking the form of Kurdish separatism and clashes between Shi'ia and Sunni enclaves. Former Ba'athist regime elements will still maintain pockets of resistance and conduct attacks on Iraqi leadership and infrastructure targets.

The new Iraqi government will likely focus its economic efforts on increasing oil production and then reinvigorate its membership in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). It may eventually enter into treaties and agreements with other GCC states in the region, but this will likely be a lengthy process because of its focus on internal security matters, and would not come to any immediate fruition. Iraq is not likely to enter into mutual defense or security cooperation agreements with the U.S. government of its own volition. U.S.-Iraqi military-to-military cooperation will drop to extremely low levels and internal Iraqi political pressures will downplay Iraqi involvement in the GWOT. As above in Scenario One, U.S. forces would remain in the region at current locations outside of Iraq as a return to the *status quo* of the pre-Operation IRAQI FREEDOM force posture, and would encounter political difficulties in returning forces to Iraq for further operations.

The administration's strategy does not address the circumstances for this type of Iraqi government department, nor how the U.S. would contend with such a situation. The new Iraqi government may well emerge as an independent and representative government, although not one necessarily standing staunchly beside the U.S. and the global war on terror.

Scenario Three – Limbo, or Worse

The most dangerous and second most likely of the three scenarios is the failure of U.S. efforts to establish a sovereign, self-sufficient government in Iraq, democratic or otherwise, necessitating an open-ended commitment of occupation forces. Under this condition, the specter of a deepening quagmire akin to the Vietnam experience begins to emerge. Growing

international pressure, the deflation of U.S. popular support for the reconstruction effort, combined with sensitivity to increasing casualties and the ever present U.S. domestic politics, would all serve to sway policy decisions in ways detrimental to U.S. national security objectives. Even the case of an early handoff of the reconstruction effort to a multinational force that excludes the U.S. is not desirable; U.S. influence in Iraq would then be nonexistent, and its regional influence on the whole would be severely degraded. Access, basing, and overflight rights at a minimum would drain away not only from Iraq, but most likely from other moderate Arab states in the Middle East.

A far worse variation on this scenario is if international pressure, evaporation of U.S. popular support, or a significant change in the U.S. political environment (i.e., a new administration) dictates a unilateral withdrawal of U.S. forces prior to a new Iraqi government's ability to assume a transfer of authority. Under those circumstances a period of anarchy will certainly reign over Iraq. This governance void will likely be marked by civil war, quite possibly in a three way struggle between Kurds, Shi'ias, and Sunnis as they all fight for ruling power. External influences from Iran, Syria, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia will serve to add confusion and mayhem to the situation. Vast areas of Iraq will become ungoverned territory, and combined with increasingly porous borders, will stimulate an influx of foreign fighters, terrorists, and other factions of nefarious groups. Middle East regional stability will take a severe downturn, fracturing alliances, and plunging regional and international politics into disarray. Finally, a new despot could rise to power in Iraq, seizing control of Iraqi security forces and the military, and complete a full circle back to the repressive dictatorial leadership to which the population of Iraq had grown accustomed.

The administration's strategy also does not take into account the possibility of this outcome, as to do so would be tantamount to admitting failure in its current reconstruction efforts. However, if this scenario were to occur, it would preempt any administration strategy designed to

integrate Iraq into a role in the GWOT, as it will likely remain a target of the war effort, rather than a contributing partner. To not retain a course of action for this eventuality is folly.

The Alternative

Iraq is but one battle in the global war on terror, therefore it is in the U.S. government's best interest to come to resolution as rapidly as possible with the reconstruction effort. The transition of governance authority to a stable and benevolent Iraqi government is requisite to any future role for Iraq in the GWOT. The examination of history proves, however, that this process can take a considerable period of time, on the order of many years rather than months. While the U.S. government, according to Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, is committed to "stay the course" in the reconstruction effort, establishing strategic conditions during this period is necessary for future success.⁶⁹

Setting Strategic Conditions

Before any strategy is executed that enables a role for Iraq in the GWOT, certain conditions must be set in the strategic environment to increase the likelihood of success. As shown above, Iraq's strategic and geopolitical positioning in the Middle East make it paramount that the U.S. exercises both politically and militarily influences there in order to successfully prosecute the GWOT. While political influence can be exercised from afar, military influence in the post-Cold War era is best accomplished by "boots on the ground."

The U.S. must continue to leverage its influence over the future nature of Iraqi governmental policy while continuing the ongoing reconstruction efforts. The successful

⁶⁹ Richard L. Armitage, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, "Armitage: U.S. 'Will Stay The Course' In Iraq," *Armed Forces Press Service*, March 16, 2004. Available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2004/n03162004_200403167.html.

institution on March 8, 2004 of the Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period (also known as the Transitional Administrative Law or TAL) is an example of the influence the U.S. can have on future Iraqi government actions. The TAL, acting as an interim constitution, provides the rule of law for a transitional Iraqi government from June 30, 2004 until such time that Iraqi elections can take place, a permanent constitution is negotiated, and a permanent government structure is emplaced.⁷⁰

The administration must pursue similar agreements and treaties concerning mutual defense and security cooperation using much the same approach as the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) accomplished with the TAL. The CPA must draft interim agreements for the interim Iraqi government to consider and sign, and provide the basis for enduring agreements and treaties for ratification later by a permanent Iraqi government. Much like the security and defense agreements with post-World War II Germany and Japan that were authored prior to the end of those occupations, these new Iraqi agreements require the full force of international law to provide maximum benefit in support of the GWOT.

These agreements must include, but are not limited to, military-to-military cooperation, access to logistics terminals, facilities for air and land force basing, status of forces, host nation support, training and exercise support, intelligence sharing, *et cetera*. The administration must also mediate security and defense agreements with Iraq's neighboring states as partners in regional security issues and the global war on terror. These agreements must be negotiated and set in place while the U.S. still has influence in Iraq.

In conjunction with these security agreements, the U.S. must construct or appropriate consolidated operating bases in unpopulated areas of Iraq, to include airfields and supply and

⁷⁰ Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period, 8 March 2004, Coalition Provisional Authority website. Available at <http://www.cpa-iraq.org/government/TAL.html>.

transportation facilities. In the event that Scenario One above comes to fruition, the Iraqi military and government can take over ownership and administration of these bases while combined U.S. and Iraqi forces operate from them. In the event Scenarios Two or Three unfold, these bases are then made defensible, providing protection for U.S. and coalition forces, and remain a foothold in Iraq and the Middle East for follow-on operations. If necessary, in the event a hostile Iraqi regime comes into power, one or more of these consolidated bases could become the “Guantanamo Bay of the Desert,” with legal basis in previously negotiated agreements or treaties.

A Strategy of Presence

The essence of a productive strategy for Iraq’s role in the GWOT hinges on the continued presence of U.S. influence through its military forces and other elements of U.S. national power in Iraq and the surrounding region. As in post-World War II Germany and Japan where U.S. military presence deterred Soviet designs on communist expansionism, the significant U.S. presence in Iraq has had desirable effects on other malevolent states in the region. In December of 2003, Libya’s Colonel Moammar al-Ghadafi publicly disclosed his commitment to divulge and dismantle his country’s WMD programs. In an unusual move for al-Ghadafi, his rhetoric was followed up by concrete action, as he allowed inspectors to inventory, and then remove, 500 metric tons of WMD material from Libya, including long-range missiles and launchers.⁷¹ The Islamic Republic of Iran and Syria, other intransigent regimes in the region with potential WMD programs, must certainly take heed of these regional developments.

As in both Germany and Japan, the common interest of mutual defense and security cooperation of the U.S. and Iraq will serve to strengthen national ties and provide invaluable

⁷¹ “Libya ships out last WMD parts,” BBC News website, March 7, 2004. Available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3539799.stm>.

strategic operations bases from which to prosecute the global war on terrorism. While the U.S. Department of Defense strives to restructure its forces to a more “expeditionary” construct, consideration must be given to a semi-permanent military presence in Iraq from which to prosecute the GWOT, at least until victory is attained in that endeavor. The concept of military forces stationed in Iraq is not unlike current U.S. forces arranged in the Republic of Korea, although those forces are positioned more for deterrent effect rather than operational use. If under the Administration’s strategy the current forces are withdrawn from Iraq and placed in garrison at home in the continental U.S. (CONUS), the response time is greatly increased for deployment to necessary operations supporting the GWOT in the Middle East region, whether for special operations or conventional forces. In addition, flight time for combat aircraft to deploy from CONUS bases, or even regional facilities such as Diego Garcia, become prohibitively long, reducing the efficacy of airpower effects such as time over target for close air support and persistence in strike operations.

Continued, active presence by U.S. military forces is the most effective strategy for enabling a future role for Iraq in the GWOT. Focusing all the elements of U.S. national power, most particularly of the military arm, on mutual defense and security cooperation agreements with Iraq can facilitate attainment of U.S. national objectives in the war on terror. As in post-World War II Germany and Japan, binding together national interests in the face of a common enemy will lead to a stronger Iraq and ultimate victory in the global war on terrorism.

CONCLUSION AND PATH TO THE FUTURE

Conclusion

The catastrophic events of September 11, 2001, actively thrust the U.S. government into a war against terrorism, principally against the form of terrorism most closely associated with radical Islam, born in the Middle East region. The dark clouds of this war have been forming for decades since the end of World War II, with increasingly aggressive terror attacks on U.S. citizens and interests occurring worldwide, and shifting into high gear in the last decade. President George W. Bush launched the war on terror with Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM in an effort to kill or capture the perpetrators of the latest terror attacks on New York and Washington, D.C., with the ultimate goal of eradicating terrorism against the U.S. as a feasible option for groups or nation-states that wish harm upon America. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM set out to topple the Saddam Hussein regime, liberate the Iraqi people, and enable the growth of a free and representative Iraqi government. An intended consequence of the operation is to establish an island of democracy at the heart of a volatile and unstable region, with the subsequent spreading of democratic values throughout the region acting as a stabilizing and moderating influence.

However, the administration's strategy aims to rapidly withdraw U.S. forces from Iraq after a secure environment is attained and self-sustaining Iraqi rule is established, thus leaving the fledgling government to its own devices. History has shown in the cases of post-World War II Germany and Japan that establishing a democratic government in a former enemy state from the ashes of war is a lengthy and expensive proposition. In those two cases, continued U.S. military presence under the auspices of mutual defense and security cooperation agreements in the face of a common enemy not only served to eventually defeat the foe, The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, but also enabled those nations to flourish and become stalwarts of democracy and

global economic powers. Examining the current strategy under the conditions of three possible outcomes of the current Iraqi reconstruction effort reveals flaws in the approach; the strategy relies primarily on optimism without regard to historical realities.

An effective strategy to ensure a productive role for Iraq in the war on terror hinges upon the continued presence of U.S. military forces in the country under a semi-permanent arrangement, lasting at least until victory in the GWOT. Strategic conditions to enable success must be set prior to the establishment of an Iraqi sovereign in the form of mutual defense and security cooperation agreements that allow for the presence of U.S. forces. Iraq's strategic and central geopolitical location in the Middle East region demands that the U.S. maintain its influence in that country, enabling a symbiotic relationship with the host nation of Iraq through military presence. Ensuring a strong future role for Iraq in the U.S. global war on terrorism is achievable only through a logical and coherent strategy, based on historical precedent and contemporary reality. As stated so succinctly by former U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Gordon R. Sullivan, "Hope is not a method."⁷² The path is now clear for the specific U.S. actions required to realize a successful future role for Iraq in the war on terror.

The Way Ahead

The U.S. government is currently fully engaged in the Iraq reconstruction effort, and must continue to persevere in its efforts to aid the Iraqis with establishing a secure environment. As regions of Iraq become secured, the U.S. should continue the current practice of transitioning internal security responsibilities to indigenous Iraqi forces.⁷³

⁷² Gordon R. Sullivan and Michael V. Harper, *Hope is not a Method*, (New York: Times Business, 1996).

⁷³ General Abizaid, Command Posture Statement before the House Armed Services Committee, 3 March 2004

The Bush strategy of taking the fight to the terrorists necessitates the presence of U.S. military forces in Iraq as a strategic base of operations, not only to fight terrorists in Iraq proper, but in the Middle East *writ large*. A full and equal partnership with the Iraqi government is desired, but not required in this matter for a successful future role for Iraq in the GWOT.

The U.S. national leadership must direct the U.S. Central Command commander to ascertain what permanently based air and land force levels in Iraq are required for the capability to apply overwhelming force as needed in localized situations, are self-sustaining, and have retained force protection capability independent of host nation support. These forces are then postured for operational use in the GWOT in the Middle East region. In addition, determine what command and control and headquarters organization construct should be used for these forces. A type of combined forces command similar to the U.S. – Republic of Korea arrangement is desired. A U.S. flag officer should permanently head this command.

The U.S. government must immediately commence the process of constructing and/or acquiring joint operations bases in unpopulated areas of Iraq. These bases must be easily defensible and possess or have unfettered access to airfield, railheads, or other logistics resupply facilities. Concurrent with this process is the initiation of negotiations to include U.S. access to these bases in interim agreements, and as a basis for the implementation of more permanent treaties for ratification by a permanent Iraqi government. The administration must also begin negotiations for more comprehensive mutual defense and security cooperation interim agreements.

The Bush administration must immediately begin a dialogue, first with the U.S. Congress, followed by domestic and international media outlets, that renders an understanding to the public of U.S. intentions to negotiate mutual defense and security cooperation agreements with the interim Iraqi government in anticipation of permanent accords. It would not serve the U.S. government's interests to endure political and media backlash subsequent to a sudden announcement of a change in strategy to U.S. troops remaining in Iraq.

The administration must also improve their methods in explaining to the U.S. public and international partners the importance of Iraq's role in the global war on terrorism. Clear linkages of the importance of Iraq to countering the threat of terrorism must be unequivocal. For example, the fact that U.S. troops stationed in the Republic of Korea for over 50 years has not caused significant public outcry in the U.S. population indicates the general understanding of the force's necessity in deterring aggression from North Korea. Similar linkages for Iraq and the war on terror must be drawn to stimulate world public support for the presence of U.S. forces in that country.

Primary responsibility for the execution of all these actions for future strategy implementation falls under the purview of the Bush administration and the executive departments. Military actions follow the command chain from the President through the Secretary of Defense to the responsible regional combatant commander, the commander of U.S. Central Command.

The U.S. Department of Defense is currently striving to transform itself into a more expeditionary force based on power projection from the CONUS with smaller, lighter force packages. However, serious consideration must be given to the historically advantageous method of having "boots on the ground" in the form of forward-deployed U.S. military forces, arrayed in Iraq and the Middle East to face the emerging threat from that region that takes the form of international terrorism.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abizaid, General John P., General, U.S. Army. Commander, U.S. Central Command. Command Posture Statement before the House Armed Services Committee, 3 March 2004. Available at <http://armedservices.house.gov/openingstatementsandpressreleases/108thcongress/04-03-03abizaid.pdf>. Internet. Accessed 14 March 2003.
- Albright, Madeleine K. "Where Iraq Fits In on the War on Terror," *New York Times*, September 13, 2002.
- Armitage, Richard L., U.S. Deputy Secretary of State. "Armitage: U.S. 'Will Stay The Course' In Iraq," *Armed Forces Press Service*, March 16, 2004. Available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2004/n03162004_200403167.html. Internet. Accessed 16 March 2004.
- Bell, Gertrude L. Review of the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia. London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1920.
- Bremer, L. Paul III, Ambassador. Global Message. Remarks by Ambassador Paul Bremer, Presidential Envoy to Iraq, September 2, 2003. Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/20030903.html>. Internet. Accessed 24 November 2003.
- Bush, George W., U.S. President. "President Bush Announces Major Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended." Remarks by the President from the USS Abraham Lincoln At Sea off the Coast of San Diego, California, May 1, 2003. Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/04/iraq/20030410-2.html>. Internet. Accessed 3 September 2003.
- Bush, George W., U.S. President. President Bush Discusses Freedom in Iraq and Middle East, Remarks by the President at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy. United States Chamber of Commerce, Washington, D.C. November 6, 2003. Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106-2.html>. Internet. Accessed 15 March 2003.
- Bush, George W., U.S. President, President Bush Releases National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, Press Release, February 14, 2003. Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030214-7.html>. Internet. Accessed 15 March 2004.

- Bush, George W., U.S. President. President Discusses America's Leadership in Global War on Terror, Remarks by the President on the War on Terror, Roswell Convention and Civic Center, Roswell, New Mexico, January 22, 2004. Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040122-6.html>. Internet. Accessed 14 March 2004.
- Bush, George W., U.S. President. President: Iraqi Regime Danger to America is "Grave and Growing," Radio Address by the President to the Nation, October 5, 2002. Available from The White House, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/iraq/20021005.html>. Internet. Accessed 3 September 2003.
- Bush, George W., U.S. President. President's Message to the Iraqi People, April 10, 2003. Available from The White House, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/04/iraq/20030410-2.html>. Internet. Accessed 3 September 2003.
- Bush, George W., U.S. President. The President's State of the Union Address, January 29, 2002. Available from The White House. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html>. Internet. Accessed 3 September 2003.
- Bush, George W., U.S. President. Remarks by the President to the American Enterprise Institute, Washington Hilton Hotel, Washington, DC, February 26, 2003. Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030226-11.html>. Internet. Accessed 6 February 2004.
- Bush, George W., U.S. President. Remarks by the President on Winston Churchill and the War on Terror, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, February 4, 2004. Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040204-4.html>. Internet. Accessed 6 February 2004.
- Cable, Larry E. "Playing in the Sandbox: Doctrine, Combat, and Outcome on the Ground," in Head, William and Tilford, Earl H., Jr., eds. *The Eagle in the Desert*, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996.
- Cheney, Richard B., U.S. Vice President. Remarks by the Vice President to the World Economic Forum, January 24, 2004. Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040124-1.html>. Internet. Accessed 14 March 2004.

- Cordesman, Anthony H. "US Policy, the Southern Gulf States, and the Changing Strategic Balance in the Gulf," speech to the Middle East Petroleum and Gas Conference, Dubai, 16 March 1998. Available at <http://www.csis.org/mideast/gulfspch.html>. Internet. Accessed 24 November 2003.
- Dulles, John Foster. "American Bases, Rearmament, and the China Questions in the Making of the Japanese Peace Treaty," in *Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945-1952*. Kent, OH: Kent State University, 1989.
- Friedrich, Carl J. *American Experiences in Military Government in World War II*. New York: Rinehart, 1948.
- Gowa, Joanne. *Ballots and Bullets: The Elusive Democratic Peace*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999.
- Head, William and Tilford, Earl H., Jr. eds. *The Eagle in the Desert*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996.
- Kant, Immanuel. *Kant's Political Writings*. Edited by Hans Reiss. Second edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991
- Lancaster, Pat. "Entering the second stage: President Bush is entering the second stage of his "war on terror" but is he starting in the right place." *The Middle East*, April 2002, 15+. Database on-line. Available from Questia, <http://www.questia.com/>. Internet. Accessed 3 September 2003.
- Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period, 8 March 2004, Coalition Provisional Authority website. Available at <http://www.cpa-iraq.org/government/TAL.html>. Internet. Accessed 16 March 2004.
- Lewe van Aduard, E. J., and Dulles, John Foster. *Japan, from Surrender to Peace*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1953.
- "Libya ships out last WMD parts," BBC News website, March 7, 2004. Available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3539799.stm>. Internet. Accessed 16 March 2003.
- Macarthur, Douglas. "The Peacemaker and the Presidency," in *Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945-1952* *Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945-1952*. Kent, OH: Kent State University, 1989.

Mathews, Jessica Tuchman, Minxin Pei, Anatol Lieven, Marina S. Ottaway, Edward C. Chow, Thomas Carothers, Husain Haqqani, Daniel Brumberg, George Perkovich, Joseph Cirincione, Vincent Cannistraro, and Robert Kagan. "From Victory to Success: Afterwar Policy in Iraq." *Foreign Policy*, July-August 2003.

"The Middle East: The Islamic Republican Alternative," *Forecasts: The Decade to Come*, Strategic Forecasting, 29 Dec 99. Available at <http://www.stratfor.com/services/giu/forecast/decadetocome/meafdecade3.asp>. Internet. Accessed 24 November 2003.

"The Middle East: The Rise and Fall of Nasserism," *Forecasts: The Decade to Come*, Strategic Forecasting, 29 Dec 99. Available at <http://www.stratfor.com/services/giu/forecast/decadetocome/meafdecade2.asp>. Internet. Access 24 November 2003.

Mcinnis, Edgar, Hiscocks, Richard, and Spencer, Robert. *The Shaping of Postwar Germany*. New York: Praeger, 1960.

"Middle-East Connected Anti-American Terror Attacks," *Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal*, December 2001. Compiled by Caroline Taillandier. Available at <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2001/issue4/jv5n4a5.htm>. Internet. Accessed 7 February 2004.

Neff, Donald. "Nasser Comes to Power in Egypt, Frightening Britain, France, and Israel," *Washington Report on Middle East Affairs*, July 1996. Available at <http://www.washington-report.org/backissues/0796/9607083.htm>. Internet. Accessed 24 November 2003.

Pollack, Kenneth M. *The Threatening Storm; The Case for Invading Iraq*. New York: Random House, 2002.

Powell, Colin L., U.S. Secretary of State. Remarks to the United Nations Security Council, March 7, 2003. Available at <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2003/18458.htm>. Internet. Accessed 18 Sep 2003.

Quandt, William B., "American Policy toward Democratic Political Movements in the Middle East," in Ellis Goldberg et. al., eds., *Rules and Rights in the Middle East*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1993.

"Recent Terror Attacks at a Glance", *The New York Times*, March 12, 2004. Internet. Available from <http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/international/AP-Attacks-Glance.html>. Accessed 12 March 2004.

- Record, Jeffrey. Bounding the Global War on Terrorism. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, December 2003. Available from <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/2003/bounding/bounding.pdf> . Internet. Accessed 15 January 2004.
- Record, Jeffrey. "Exit Strategy Delusions," *Parameters*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Winter 2001-2002. Available from <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/01winter/record.htm>. Internet. Accessed 14 March 2004.
- Rice, Dr. Condoleezza. Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Remarks at the 28th Annual Convention of the National Association of Black Journalists, Dallas, Texas, 7 August 2003. Available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/08/20030807-1.html>. Internet. Accessed 20 January 2004.
- Rice, Dr. Condoleezza. Remarks by National Security Advisor Dr. Condoleezza Rice at the McConnell Center for Political Leadership, University of Louisville, Louisville, Kentucky, March 8, 2004. Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/03/20040308-15.html>. Internet. Accessed 14 March 2004.
- Rumsfeld, Donald H., U.S. Secretary of Defense. Global Message, from remarks by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Foreign Press Center, Washington, DC, November 11, 2003. Available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031111-3.html>.
- Schonberger, Howard B. *Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945-1952*. Kent, OH: Kent State University, 1989.
- Simon W. Duke and Wolfgang Krieger, eds. *U.S. Military Forces in Europe : The Early Years, 1945-1970*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993.
- Sullivan, Gordon R. and Harper, Michael V. *Hope is not a Method*. New York, NY: Times Business, 1996.
- United States Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine Capstone and Keystone Primer*. Washington, GPO, 10 September 2001. Available from http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/primer.pdf. Internet. Accessed 18 October 2003.

- The White House, Fact Sheet: Request for Additional FY 2004 Funding for the War on Terror, September 8, 2003. Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/20030908-1.html>. Internet. Accessed 7 February 2004.
- The White House, Office of the President, *National Security Strategy for Combating Terrorism*. Washington: GPO, February 2003. Available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/counter_terrorism/counter_terrorism_strategy.pdf. Internet. Accessed 18 November 2003.
- The White House, Office of the President. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 2002. Available from The White House, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf>. Internet. Accessed 2 September 2003.
- The White House, Office of the President. *The National Strategy for Homeland Security*. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 2002. Available from The White House, http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/nat_strat_hls.pdf. Internet. Accessed 2 September 2003.
- The White House, Office of the President. *National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction*. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 2002. Available from The White House, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/WMDStrategy.pdf>. Internet. Accessed 2 September 2003.
- Wolfowitz, Paul. U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense. Testimony to U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on Iraq: Status & Prospects for Reconstruction – Resources, Hart Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C, 29 July 2003. Available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2003/sp20030729-depsecdef0385.html>. Internet. Accessed 18 September 2003.
- Zaharna, R. S. “Iraq is not a modern-day Germany,” *The Christian Science Monitor*, August 21, 2003. Available from <http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0821/p09s02-coop.html>. Internet. Accessed 5 September 2003.
- Zalmay Khalilzad and Ian O. Lesser, eds. *Sources of Conflict in the 21st Century: Regional Futures and U.S. Strategy*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1998.
- Zink, Harold. *The United States in Germany, 1944-1955*. Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand, 1957.