
A thesis presented to the Faculty of the US Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Military History

by

RANDY G. MASTEN, MAJ, USA
M.A., University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas, 2002

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2004

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Name of Candidate: Major Randy G. Masten

Thesis Title: The Path to Srebrenica: United Nation’s Peacekeeping Missions of the 1990s: Failures of the Maxim of Neutrality, International Political Will, Legitimacy, and Unity of Effort

Approved by:

____________________________________, Thesis Committee Chair
Donald P. Wright, Ph.D.

____________________________________, Member
Lieutenant Colonel Colin G. Magee, B.M.Sc.

____________________________________, Member
Lieutenant Colonel Tommy J. Tracy, M.A.

Accepted this 18th day of June 2004 by:

____________________________________, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the US Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT


In the post-Cold War environment of the 1990s, the United Nations (UN) found itself grappling with the means and mechanisms to resolve conflicts that had increasingly shifted from interstate to intrastate hostilities. The thesis examines four faults common to UN peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations in Somalia (UNOSOM), Rwanda (UNAMIR), and Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNPROFOR). During the 1990s, UN peacekeeping operations consistently acted with neutrality, versus impartiality, when confronting forces in grievous violation of the peace process. The UN failed to maintain international political will for its operations, thus leading to reduced force structures and reluctance to act decisively. The UN did not preserve the legitimacy for its missions, either in the eyes of the peacekeepers or the belligerent parties. Lastly, the UN failed to properly ensure unity of effort and unity of command, which had a profoundly negative impact on its operations. The result of these errors was the failed humanitarian effort in Somalia (1993), genocide in Rwanda that claimed 800,000 lives (1994), and the ethnic cleansing of eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina that climaxed at Srebrenica with the execution of 8,000 Muslim men and boys (1995). The final chapter makes several recommendations to prevent further UN failures of this magnitude in the future.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First and foremost I want to thank my wife, Kathleen E. King-Masten, for inspiring me to undertake this endeavor and giving me her unwavering support over the past year. Without her patience and understanding none of this would have been possible. I would also like to express my sincerest thanks to my thesis committee, Dr. Don Wright, LTC Tommy Tracey, and LTCol Colin Magee, for their honest critiques, informative advise, motivation, and patience. When the going got tough, they kept me going. Additionally, I would like to express my appreciation to the staff of Watson Library at the University of Kansas for their continued efforts at maintaining one of the finest research libraries in the nation. All of these people share in any success that this paper may enjoy, while any faults or failures contained within are solely the responsibility of the author.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACRONYMS</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILLUSTRATIONS</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The United Nations</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations and Peacekeeping Operations</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 2. THE SIMILAR PATHS OF UNOSOM, UNAMIR, AND UNPROFOR</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR): Mission Overview</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Similar Paths of UNOSOM, UNAMIR, and UNPROFOR</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Peacekeeper’s Maxim of Neutrality</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Political Will</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unity of Effort</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 3. UNPROFOR AND THE CONFLICT IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Significance of Srebrenica</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Debates and Resolutions on Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vance-Owen Peace Plan</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR and the Mission of the Safe Areas</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR and NATO</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness of the Safe Areas, 1993 to 1994</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 4. AUTOPSY OF THE FALL OF SREBRENICA</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Fall of Srebrenica</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maxim of Neutrality</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Political Will</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Legitimacy of the Mission ................................................................. 87
Unity of Effort ...................................................................................... 90

CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION: CHANGING UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS .... 97

Breaking the Maxim of Neutrality ......................................................... 98
Maintaining International Political Will ............................................... 101
Establishing and Preserving Mission Legitimacy .................................. 104
Ensuring Unity of Effort ..................................................................... 106
Detailed and Proactive Resolutions ..................................................... 109
The Brahimi Report ........................................................................... 113
Final Notes ......................................................................................... 117

GLOSSARY ........................................................................................... 123

APPENDIX A. PREAMBLE TO THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS ...... 124
APPENDIX B. CHAPTER VI TO THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER ............... 125
APPENDIX C. CHAPTER VII TO THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER ............. 127
APPENDIX D. US PUBLIC OPINION REGARDING UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS ........................................................................................................ 130
APPENDIX E. UN MEMBER STATE TOTAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNPROFOR (1992-1995) ............................................................................................................ 132

BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................. 133
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .................................................................... 138
CERTIFICATION FOR MMAS DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT .................. 139
ACRONYMS

ARBiH	Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
VRS	Bosnian Serb Army (also referred to as VRS)
CAS	Close Air Support
DGDP	Directorate of Graduate Degree Programs
DPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Dutchbat	Dutch Battalion (3rd Dutch Airmobile Battalion)
GDP	Graduate Degree Programs
HV	Croatian Army
HVO	Croatian Defense Council
ICFY	International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, commonly referred to as the London Conference
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
LTC	Lieutenant Colonel
LTCol	Lieutenant Colonel
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
UN	United Nations
US	United States of America
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda
UNDPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNOSOM	United Nations Operations in Somalia
UNPA	United Nations Protected Area
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNSAS  United Nations Standby Arrangements System
UNSC  United Nations Security Council
UNSCR  United Nations Security Council Resolution
VRS  Bosnia Serb Army, same as VRS
## ILLUSTRATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Map of Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Map of Bosnian Cities</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Srebrenica Observation Posts</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Dutchbat’s Chain of Command</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1. Geographical Distribution of UN Membership ..................................................5
INTRODUCTION

The United Nations’ expanded peacekeeping role during the past ten years has been a disappointing experience. The hopes for a truly global security role for the United Nations, in part through the principled application of traditional peacekeeping and not-so-traditional peace enforcing, were shattered in Somalia, Bosnia, [and] Rwanda.  

Albrecht Schnabel and Ramesh Thakur

*United Nations Peace Keeping Operations*

The 1990s proved to be a troublesome decade for United Nations’ (UN) peacekeeping operations. The organization fell under harsh scrutiny for the perceived failures of its peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. As the Cold War came to an end, a new world order began around the globe. The bipolar configuration of world power had given way to a new structure comprised of one “hyperpower,” the USA, and many subpowers. The collapse of the Soviet empire left many areas of the world with temporary power vacuums that were quickly filled by smaller regional powers, such as in the Caucasus, or erupted into armed conflict between those groups and individuals vying for the right to rule, such as in the Balkans. In addition to the emergence of these smaller nation-states, the old colonial boundaries imposed on the African Continent began to be contested and dismantled. War swept across Africa, as the old superpowers of the Soviet Union and the West were now entangled in a stalemate to control the ideologies and economies of these regions. The end of the Cold War did not bring the peace that many idealists had dreamed of, but resulted in a new “Spring of Nations.” Like the revolutions that swept across Europe in
1848, civil wars and wars for independence began to erupt once again in Europe, but now included the African Continent as well. The new conflicts sought to dismantle and reform the political boundaries that had divided ethnic groups and served to enflame long held grievances between them.²

The UN attempted to resolve many of the post-Cold War conflicts through diplomacy, economic aid, or peacekeeping operations. While some of the smaller operations met with success, the UN operations in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia met with disaster. The purpose of this thesis is to show that there exist several systemic problems with the manner in which the UN peacekeeping operations have been conducted since the conclusion of the Cold War. Key among these problems were the UN’s continued insistence on their maxim of neutrality; a failure to generate and maintain international political will for the missions, a failure to maintain the legitimacy of the missions, and the absence of unity of effort within the UN for attaining a desired end state for these peacekeeping missions. The combined effect of these four factors proved to be disastrous for the UN’s peacekeeping efforts during the 1990s. Special emphasis will be given to the UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Force) surrender of its safe haven of Srebrenica in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as it is an excellent example of how these factors can manifest themselves during peacekeeping operations and lead to the mission’s unsatisfactory conclusion.

The introduction of this thesis will focus on the significant change that UN peacekeeping has made since the end of the Cold War, as the organization intervened to preserve peace and stability in ever increasingly complex environments. The chapter will examine the change from interstate conflicts, between two or more nation-states, to
Chapter 2 will examine three of the UN’s post-Cold War peacekeeping operations, which have severely tarnished the organization's reputation and credibility: UNOSOM (United Nations Operations in Somalia), UNAMIR (United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda), and UNPROFOR. It will show that these three UN missions experienced similar problems due to a lack of international political will, a failure to maintain the mission’s legitimacy, and a lack of unity of effort. The chapter will conclude with an examination of the UN sponsored study of its peacekeeping mission, commonly referred to as the Brahimi Report.

Chapter 3 is to show how the dissolution of Yugoslavia led to military confrontations across the Balkan Peninsula and how UNPROFOR became entangled in trying to resolve the conflict. It will take an in-depth look into UNPROFOR’s mission, in order to show how political and military decisions were made regarding the UN’s operations in Bosnia. The chapter will also address the concept of “Greater Serbia” and how it impacted eastern Bosnia and the UN declared safe areas. It will set the stage for chapter 4 by examining the UNPROFOR mission in detail and highlighting the problem areas for the UN peacekeepers that eventually led to their surrender at Srebrenica.

Chapter 4 will examine the surrender of the safe area of Srebrenica by the Dutch Battalion (Dutchbat) to the Bosnia Serb Army (VRS), as well as the tragic consequences for its Muslim population. The chapter will go on to explain how the UN’s reluctance to take decisive military action, combined with a lack of political will, a failure to maintain
legitimacy, and a lack of unity of effort directly contributed to this tragedy. It will show how these factors resulted in an inability of the UN to stop the VRS offensive against the safe area of Srebrenica, the surrender its peacekeeping forces, and the ultimate need for NATO to replace UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Chapter 5 will present a series of conclusions and recommendations for conducting future UN peacekeeping operations. It will stress the need for the UN to undergo a dramatic shift in the manner in which it conducts and supports its peacekeeping operations. This shift must include changes in the approach the UN takes towards those who violate the agreements, accords, or resolutions that introduced UN peacekeepers into the conflict; the generation and maintenance of international political will; the preservation of the mission’s overall legitimacy; and the need for Security Council resolutions that ensure unity of command and unity of effort, which is focused on a desired end-state for the mission.

The United Nations

The purpose of the UN as set out in its charter is, “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war” and to “unite our strength to maintain international peace and security.”3 The founding fifty-one member states signed the UN Charter on 26 June 1945, at the San Francisco Conference. It was a generally accepted principle that, during the post-World War II era, the world’s peace and stability would be contingent upon the continued cooperation of the five principal Allied Powers: the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China. It was expected that when sovereign nations could not settle their disputes peacefully, the permanent five (P5) members of the UN Security Council would act together, in a concerted manner, to deter or mitigate
armed conflict. However, the Cold War divided the P5 and its members often found themselves on opposing sides of conflicts around the globe. Despite the divisions in the Security Council over its more than fifty-year history, it has remained a flawed yet indispensable institution striving for peace and cooperation among all nations.

Since its inception in 1945, the UN has grown from 51 to 191 member states, as of 22 February 2004 (see table 1). The UN Security Council has fifteen members comprised of five permanent members, the P5, and ten nonpermanent members. The nonpermanent members are elected positions and serve for two-year terms. They are selected from the UN General Assembly according to a geographical formula: Africa-three, Asia-two, Eastern Europe-one, Latin America-two, and Western Europe and other states-two. The nonpermanent members of the council are allowed to vote on all issues put before the Security Council. However, all members of the P5 have veto authority regarding Security Council resolutions; thus, all members of the P5 must agree with the majority for the issue to be passed. If there is dissension or disagreement among the P5, it is quite common for resolutions to be vetoed or never put before the Security Council.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Membership in 1945 (51)</th>
<th>Membership in 2004 (191)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>8 (16 percent)</td>
<td>25 (13 percent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>6 (12 percent)</td>
<td>20 (11 percent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas</td>
<td>22 (43 percent)</td>
<td>35 (18 percent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>4 (8 percent)</td>
<td>52 (27 percent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>9 (17 percent)</td>
<td>45 (24 percent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia and Pacific</td>
<td>2 (4 percent)</td>
<td>14 (7 percent)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Cold War quickly evolved, following the creation of the UN; and, by the 1950s, the organization found itself in a quandary regarding its commitment to maintain international peace and security. As the P5 became embroiled in an international nuclear standoff centered on the idea “mutual assured destruction,” UN peacekeeping operations served to solidify agreements between the superpowers regarding more than a dozen interstate conflicts. However, prior to any resolution being presented before the Security Council, the superpowers agreed to the terms and conditions of the peace accords, as well as the roles of the peacekeepers. Thus, the peacekeepers entered missions where more powerful forces, such as the United States and the Soviet Union, exerted a considerable degree of control over the belligerents, such as UNMOGIP, 1951, (United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan) or UNEF, 1956, (United Nations Emergency Force) in the Sinai. During the 1990s, the end of the Cold War dramatically changed the role of UN peacekeeping missions.

United Nations and Peacekeeping Operations

The first UN peacekeeping mission has commonly come to be referred to as the Korean War (1950-present). Less than three years after its creation, the UN found itself conducting its first peacekeeping or peace enforcement operation. The UN Charter gives the Security Council the authority to employ numerous conciliatory and coercive means to bring about a peaceful conclusion to hostilities: negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judgment by a court, the use of regional agencies, and other means parties may choose. Chapter VI of the Charter allows for a wide range of methods to be employed to bring about a peaceful settlement to an armed conflict, but limits the organization to the use of persuasion. Chapter VII allows for coercion (force) to be used
if there exists “any threat to peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression,” in order to “restore international peace and security.” These two chapters of the UN Charter serve as the foundation for UN peacekeeping operations.

Chapter VI of the UN Charter is titled *Pacific Settlement of Disputes*. The basis for conducting UN peacekeeping operations is inferred from this chapter; however, it does not specifically mention or authorize peacekeeping operations. Article 33 instructs “the parties of any dispute . . . [to] seek a solution by . . . peaceful means of their own choice” as an option for the peaceful resolution of conflicts (see Appendix C for the complete text of Chapter VI). From this, peacekeeping has evolved into a method by which to uphold the UN’s Article 1 responsible to maintain international security and peace. In essence, it suspends a military conflict in order to facilitate the peace process, without resorting to Chapter VII peace enforcement operations. The UN has “created [the] peace observer and peacekeeping as an approved method of fulfilling its primary purpose.”

Chapter VII is titled *Action With Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression*, commonly referred to as peace enforcement operations. Just as the UN Charter does not specifically address peacekeeping, neither does it specifically address peace enforcement. Chapter VII authorizes the use of military force to be directed against a nation-state or belligerent parties; where as, strict adherence to Chapter VI limits the use of force solely to self-defense. The first UN mandated peacekeeping operation under Chapter VII was the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 814 on 26 March 1993 for UNOSOM II in Somalia.12 Prior to this date, the Security Council had vetoed 279 Chapter VII resolutions between 1945 and
During the Cold War the UN had authorized numerous pseudo-peace enforcement operations, where member states were “invited” to take offensive military action on behalf of the UN, such as in Korea 1950 or in Iraq 1991.

More is involved in transitioning from Chapter VI to Chapter VII operations than may immediately be apparent. The most obvious change involves whom and under what justification UN forces may engage with offensive militarily actions. The Brahimi Report, a UN sponsored review and analysis of peacekeeping operations headed by an Algerian diplomat, Lakhdar Brahimi, stated in 2000, “No failure did more to damage the standing and credibility of UN peacekeeping in the 1990s than its reluctance to distinguish victim from aggressor.” Under Chapter VI the use of force is restricted to self-defense, where as Chapter VII authorizes the use of force in the accomplishment of its mission (the phrase ‘by all means necessary’ is typically included in the accompanying United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR)). The transition to peace enforcement operations also changes the legal status of the UN forces and the protection afforded them under international law. A 2001 article in the “Air Force Law Review” describes the difference as such:

The international law of armed conflict does not apply to the classic “blue helmet” UN peacekeepers because they are not combatants, that is, they are not engaging in military offensive operations. Blue helmet peacekeepers are authorized to use force only in self-defense. Conversely, it is well settled that the law of armed conflict does apply when forces authorized by the UN are engaged in hostilities as a belligerent. . . . In such cases the UN forces are treated exactly the same way as armed forces of a state.

During the first forty-years of the UN, 1947-1987, the organization established a total of the thirteen peacekeeping operations. The majority of these missions were established to monitor borders and declared demilitarized zones in order to end or prevent
a conflict between two or more nations. Examples of this type of mission include the UN operations in the Golan Heights, Kashmir, and Cyprus. These operations typically involved lightly armed troops from small and neutral UN member states. Missions during this period of time, which roughly corresponds to the Cold War era, were primarily involved in interstate conflicts.

In 1988, as the Cold War began to come to an end, the UN was actively engaged in five peacekeeping missions: Kashmir, Cyprus, Korea, and two operations in the Middle East. Between 1988 and 1996, the UN created another twenty-nine peacekeeping missions, which equates to an increase in the number of missions by a factor of ten (from 0.325 to 3.22 missions per year). Accompanying this increase in the number missions was a fundamental change and expansion in the nature of the missions; they now include traditional “interstate” and now “intrastate” peacekeeping missions. This shift from interstate to intrastate conflicts is the result of an increase in ethno-political borders that are not internationally recognized, the lack of legitimate governments and legitimate political leaders, and the emergence of autonomous or semiautonomous paramilitary groups. All of these factors have served to add to the confusion and obfuscation surrounding peacekeeping missions involved in the resolution of intrastate conflicts.

The change in the nature of peacekeeping operations, during the 1990s, caught the UN unprepared. Mounting interethnic violence and strife in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia compelled the UN to intervene in their intrastate conflicts. Unfortunately, the UN continued to treat these missions in the same manner as it had the Cold War missions of the preceding forty years. The peacekeepers received missions with ambiguous mandates, limited authority, minimal combat capabilities, and convoluted chains of command.
While organizations of this type could function in the Cold War environment, they proved to be largely inadequate for missions lacking the direct involvement and oversight of the superpowers. Thus, the 1990s ushered in a new era for peacekeeping operations. The challenges of the post-Cold War era, as characterized by intrastate conflicts, have called into question the manner in which the UN conducts its peacekeeping operations. The UN’s missions in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia tested the UN’s capacity to deal with the challenges of the post-Cold War environment. Their failures have brought about damning assessments in academic literature, as well as political challenges to the UN’s ability to successfully conduct future missions. In the decade following the first Gulf War, public opinion of the UN suffered a tremendous blow as a result of these failures.

The role of the UN in peacekeeping operations will continue to grow and evolve, as nations strive to find an acceptable equilibrium in the new world order. This thesis will show that the path for the UN to follow is not one of timidity, avoidance, and political ambiguity, but one of assertion with a clear and unrelenting focus on the maintenance of peace and security around the world. President George H. W. Bush, in a 1991 speech to the US Congress, foresaw “a world where the United Nations, freed from Cold War stalemate is poised to fulfill the historic vision of its founders.”

Perhaps President Bush’s prediction can be realized through the careful analysis of how the UN conducted these peacekeeping missions and, from this, suggestions and recommendations can be made that will assist in the planning and conduct of future peacekeeping missions.

---

2The first “Spring of Nations” occurred in 1848 and involved revolutions in France, Germany, Italy, and the Austrian Empire. Although these revolutions failed, they foreshadowed the events that would occur over the next 100 years in Europe.

3See Appendix B for the complete text of the Preamble to the UN Charter.

4The Russian Federation assumed the permanent position of the Soviet Union in 1991.

5United Nations, General Guidelines for Peacekeeping Operations (Turin, Italy: International Training Centre of the ILO, 1995), 3. It is also listed as UN document UN/210/TC/GG95.

6United Nations Website, www.un.org/Overview/unmember.html, accessed 22 February 2004. During the 1960s, the African and Asian states came to occupy a dominant numerical position within the UN (see table 1); however, they do not have a permanent representative on the Security Council.

7The exception to this rule is procedural matters, where a simple 2/3 majority (10 members) is required. The P5 veto power does not come into effect here.

8The United States did not ask for a UN peacekeeping force during its war in Vietnam, as it was certain that a Chinese or Russian veto would prohibit the passage of the required Security Council resolution.

9United Nations, Chapter VII to the UN Charter, 26 June 1945. See Appendix D for the complete text of Chapter VII.

10Charter of the United Nations, Article 33, Paragraph 1.


13Bialke, 4.

14Brahimi Report, Executive Summary, 2.

15Bialke, 1.

16No new UN missions were established between 1979 and 1988.

17Wibke Hansen, Oliver Ramsbotham, and Tom Woodhouse, “Hawks and Doves Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution” Berghof Handbook for Conflict Resolution,
The UN established 13 missions over a 40-year period, equaling 0.325 new missions per year. Between 1988 and 1996, a 9-year period, it established 29 new missions. This equates to an average 3.22 missions per year, an increase of a factor of ten.

CHAPTER 2

THE SIMILAR PATHS OF UNOSOM, UNAMIR, AND UNPROFOR

It should come as no surprise to anyone that some of the missions of the past decade would be particularly hard to accomplish: they tended to deploy where conflict had not resulted in victory for any side. . . . United Nations operations thus did not deploy into post-conflict situations but tried to create them. ¹

Brahimi Report, 21 August 2000

The UN Charter places the maintenance of “international peace and security” as the foremost objective for its existence. The stated purpose of the organization is “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.” ² While its objective is to maintain peace, the Charter also allows for the use of military force “in the common interest.” ³ The intent of the founders of the UN was not to have the organization sit idly by during armed conflict, but to work to bring about its successful resolution. Methods for resolving conflicts include Chapter VI peacekeeping operations and Chapter VII peace-enforcement operations.

The failure of three UN missions during the 1990s, whether perceived or actual, has brought about intense public scrutiny on the role of the UN in preventing or minimizing the effects of armed conflict and ethnic cleansing. The missions under review in this chapter are the United Nations Operations Somalia (UNOSOM) in 1993, United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) in 1994, and the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in 1995. The chapter will examine these three missions and show how the UN maxim of neutrality, a lack of international political will, a failure to maintain legitimacy, and a lack of unity of effort were the main factors in the ultimate failure of these missions.

Independent media reports estimate that close to 350,000 Somalis died between 1990 and UN intervention in 1992: 250,000 from starvation and another 100,000 from inter-clan conflicts, out of a population of approximately 10 million. Once a ceasefire had been negotiated, the UN Security Council passed UNSCR 751 on 24 April 1992, which established UNOSOM I to monitor the ceasefire in Somalia. With the passage of UNSCR 767 on 27 July 1992, the UN mandate directed the deployment of 50 UN peacekeepers to provide protection and security for UN personnel, equipment and supplies at the seaports and airports in Mogadishu, and to escort deliveries of humanitarian supplies. On 28 August 1992, UNSCR 775 expanded UNOSOM's mandate to enable it to protect humanitarian convoys and distribution centers throughout Somalia. Additionally, the resolution increased the UN observer strength to nearly 3,000 soldiers.

The ongoing crisis in Somalia captured the attention of the American media and the US Congress; and, on 13 August 1992, the US offered to provide logistical support for the mission. The US support included transporting the Pakistani peacekeepers into Somalia, the immediate airlift of UN emergency rations, and the donation of 145,000 tons of food supplies. The US aid did not stop the continued deterioration of the conditions in Somalia. On 3 December 1992, the UN declared the situation in Somalia to be ‘intolerable’ and the Security Council passed UNSCR 794. The resolution authorized the deployment of a Unified Task Force (UNITAF), led by a UN member state to establish a safe environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. In concept, UNITAF was to work in coordination with UNOSOM, in order to secure the major population centers and ensure humanitarian assistance was delivered and distributed.
The Pentagon drafted UNSCR 794 to satisfy the force protection concerns of CENTCOM (United States Central Command). The resolution transitioned the mission from UN Chapter VI peacekeeping, to Chapter VII peace enforcement, and authorized “all means necessary” for the accomplishment of its mission. The US led UNITAF (Unified Task Force) was joint task force comprised of approximately 28,000 US soldiers. The task force deployed to Somalia in mid-December 1992, in order to open and secure lines of communication throughout Somalia and to protect the airports, seaports, and warehouses for the distribution of vital humanitarian aid to the Somali people. Following the successful arrival of US force to Mogadishu, “thirty nations suddenly promised to send troops [10,000], and seventeen of them had forces on the ground in Somalia within a matter of days.”

When it became evident that a replacement force was required for UNITAF, the same Pentagon-CENTCOM team composed a draft resolution, which detailed the establishment of UNOSOM II to take over from UNITAF and the current UNOSOM mission. The United Nation’s approved UNSCR 814 on 26 March 1993 (referred to as “the mother of all resolutions” by one senior UN official), which was an amended version of the Pentagon draft. Resolution 814 was the first time a peace enforcement operation was mandated under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (by convention the term peacekeeper will continued to be used). The approved resolution now included nation-building tasks that the Pentagon drafters and CENTCOM had not wanted. The Security Council required UNITAF and UNOSOM II to provide humanitarian and other assistance to the people of Somalia in an attempt to restore their political institutions and economy, as well as to promote political stabilization and national reconciliation. Its mission now included
the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons within Somalia, the reestablishment of national and regional institutions and civil administration across Somalia, the reestablishment of Somali police, and mine-clearing operations.¹⁵

On 6 June 1993, following the 5 June premeditated attack by the Aideed militia against the Pakistani members of UNOSOM II, the Security Council reaffirmed that the secretary-general was authorized under UNSCR 814 (26 March 1993) to take “all necessary measures” against all those responsible for such attacks. The resolution authorized actions against those responsible for publicly inciting attacks and to establish the “effective authority of UNOSOM II” throughout Somalia (a country of approximately 637,600 square kilometers, roughly the size of New England). It also gave the UN peacekeepers the legal grounds upon which to conduct investigations of those people and organizations responsible for the attacks, as well as the arrest, detention, trial and punishment of those accused of perpetrating these crimes.¹⁶ Although not specifically stated, the resolution was directed towards the apprehension of the Somali warlord Mohamed Farah Aideed.

Following the bloody firefight on 3 and 4 October 1993, between US soldiers and Somali militiamen, the US announced its intention to withdrawal from its missions in Somalia. The UN responded with UNSCR 878 on 29 October 1993, which extended UNOSOM’s mandate to 18 November 1993, but decreased its force strength to less than 20,000 peacekeepers. Following the US withdrawal, the UN continued the mission until 31 March 1995. While the UN undertaking in Somalia is often regarded as a failed mission, it is estimated that two million people would have died from armed conflict or famine without the intervention of the US and UN.¹⁷
Following my return from Rwanda, a Canadian padre asked me how, after all I had seen and experienced, I could still believe in God. I answered that I know there is a God because in Rwanda I shook hands with the devil. I have seen him, I have smelled him and I have touched him. I know the devil exists, and therefore I know there is a God. Peux ce que veux. Allons-y.\textsuperscript{18}

Lieutenant General Romeo Dallaire
Commander, UNAMIR, July 2003

Unlike UNOSOM, UNAMIR was not established to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid. The UNAMIR mission was established by the UN under UNSCR 872, on 5 October 1993, in order to assist with the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement.\textsuperscript{19} Representatives from the various Rwandan factions had signed the accords on 4 August 1993.\textsuperscript{20} Prior to the signing of the resolution, a UN fact-finding mission, headed by a Brigadier General (BG) Romeo Dallaire of Canada, had determined that the minimum number of peacekeepers required for the mission was more than 4,000; however, the UNAMIR force was comprised of only 2,500 UN peacekeepers. (The maximum force deployed during the mission was 2,548).\textsuperscript{21} BG Dallaire, who had conducted the fact-finding mission, was selected to be the commander of UNAMIR. The mandate for UNAMIR was to assist in ensuring the security of the capital city of Kigali; monitor the ceasefire agreement, including establishment of an expanded demilitarized zone and demobilization procedures; monitor the security situation during the final period of the transitional Government's mandate leading up to elections; assist with mine-clearance; and assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance activities in conjunction with relief operations.\textsuperscript{22}

UNAMIR forces began arriving in Kigali on 21 October 1993 and by 27 December the force numbered 1,260 and was comprised of Belgian, Bangladeshi,
Tunisian, Ghanaian, and Canadian soldiers. By January 1994, UNAMIR had discovered the Hutu plans to launch large-scale attacks against their Tutsi neighbors. General Dallaire faxed a report to the UN on 11 January 1994, which detailed the Hutu’s genocidal plans against the Tutsi. A senior commander in the Hutu militia, the Interahamwe, had provided BG Dallaire with information that included details of the plans and preparations for the coming attacks against the Tutsi:

- the drawing up of lists of victims—all Tutsi living in the capital city, Kigali, but also Hutu officials and human rights activists willing to collaborate in a power-sharing government along the lines agreed to in the Arusha Accords; the stockpiling and location of arms for the Hutu militias, with which to do the killing; the rate of killing that Interahamwe had projected: 3,000 persons per hour; and the plan to attack the Belgian peacekeepers in the UN’s UNAMIR force as the genocide began, in order to precipitate the withdrawal of the force.

The source of the information was considered to be unreliable by the UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and not forwarded to the Security Council. Thus, the UN failed to act on the information contained in General Dallaire’s letter or to allow UNAMIR forces to confiscate the known weapons caches. Despite a second request by BG Dallaire to confiscate the weapons, neither the UN nor UNAMIR took any action to preempt the Hutu’s plot. In a few months, these caches would provide the Hutu masses the weapons they required to carry out their genocidal plot.

The UN mission in Rwanda had been designed as a classic Chapter VI peacekeeping operation, having attained the consent of all belligerent parties to assist in the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement. However, by April 1994, less than five months after the arrival of UNAMIR forces, the country erupted into widespread and brutal Hutu genocide of their rival ethnic group, the Tutsi. Within the following fourteen week period, more than 800,000 people would be murdered, 4 million displaced from
their homes, and 2.3 million fled the country as refugees. The numbers are more staggering when it is taken into account that Rwanda’s population at the time was less than 7 million. US Army Colonel Scott R. Feil with the Carnegie Institute wrote, “Had the same force [as the US force for Somalia] landed in Kigali with Chapter VII authority to reinforce UNAMIR, the killings would have been stopped in a week with less than ten percent of their ultimate deaths.” Four years later a Carnegie Institute sponsored panel of ten western generals agreed with this conclusion.

The devastating loss of life that began to occur in April 1994 caused the UN to adjust UNAMIR’s mandate. The approval of UNSCR 912 on 21 April 1994, allowed UNAMIR forces to act as an intermediary between the warring Rwandan parties. The UN force’s stated objective was to support the warring factions agreement to a ceasefire; assist in the resumption of humanitarian relief operations, and monitor developments in Rwanda. Additionally, their mission included affording the safety and security to civilians who sought refuge with UNAMIR. At the time, however, the United States and other countries pressed in the UN Security Council to withdraw the UNAMIR force entirely, even as estimates of the numbers killed reached into the hundreds of thousands. The approved resolution kept the number of peacekeepers fixed at 2,548.

After the situation in Rwanda deteriorated further (nearly 10,000 people a day were being killed), UNAMIR's mandate was expanded by UNSCR 918 on 17 May 1994, which enabled it to contribute to the security and protection of refugees and civilians at risk, through means including the establishment and maintenance of secure humanitarian areas, and the provision of security for relief operations to the degree possible. On 9 June 1995, following the ceasefire and the installation of the new Government, the
Council decided to further adjust the mandate of UNAMIR through UNSCR 997, which remained the primary mission for UNAMIR until its withdrawal in April 1996. It required the UN via UNAMIR to:

exercise its good offices to help achieve national reconciliation; assist the Government of Rwanda in facilitating the voluntary and safe return of refugees and their reintegration in their home communities, and, to that end, to support the Government of Rwanda in its ongoing efforts to promote a climate of confidence and trust through the performance of monitoring tasks throughout the country with military and police observers; support the provision of humanitarian aid, and of assistance and expertise in engineering, logistics, medical care and demining; assist in the training of a national police force; contribute to the security in Rwanda of personnel and premises of United Nations agencies, of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, including full-time protection for the Prosecutor's Office, as well as those of human rights officers, and to contribute also to the security of humanitarian agencies in case of need.  


Unlike UNOSOM and UNAMIR, which were intrastate conflicts, the UNPROFOR mission and mandate evolved from an interstate conflict between the former states of Yugoslavia. (However, the civil wars that resulted in the dissolution of Yugoslavia were intrastate conflicts.) UNPROFOR received its mandate on 21 February 1992 with passing of UNSCR 743, which approved the establishment of UNPROFOR for an initial period of twelve months and was primarily related to the conflict between Croatia and Serbia. The Security Council declared that the UN peacekeeping force should serve to create the conditions of peace and security required for “the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis within the framework of the European Community's Conference on Yugoslavia.” The operational mandate of UNPROFOR extended to five republics of the Former Yugoslavia: Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia. Additionally, a liaison presence was established with the sixth republic, Slovenia.37

Although the mandate of UNPROFOR originally related only to Croatia, it was forecast that after the demilitarization of the UNPAs (United Nations Protected Areas), 100 UNPROFOR military observers would be transferred from Croatia to various locations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina continued to deteriorate, as Serbian and Croatian forces continued military offenses across the country. On 30 April 1992, the secretary-general ordered the deployment of an additional 40 military observers to the Mostar region of BiH. On 14 May, it was determined that the risks to UN peacekeepers had reached an unacceptable level and the observers were withdrawn from Mostar and redeployed to Croatia. About two thirds of UNPROFOR headquarters personnel also withdrew from Sarajevo on 16 and 17 May, leaving behind only 100 military personnel and civilian staff to promote local ceasefires and humanitarian activities.38 Forces were again deployed to Sarajevo in July under UNSCR 761.39 UNPROFOR's mandate and strength in Bosnia-Herzegovina were enlarged under UNSCR 776, 14 September 1992, for the purpose of securing the Sarajevo airport and a separate Bosnia-Herzegovina Command was established within UNPROFOR, in order to implement the resolution.40

The Security Council, on 9 October 1992, adopted UNSCR 781, which banned all military flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina, except for those of UNPROFOR and other flights in support of UN operations, including humanitarian assistance. On 31 March 1993, the Security Council adopted its resolution 816, by which it extended the ban on military flights to cover flights by all fixed-wing and rotary-wing
aircraft in the airspace of Bosnia-Herzegovina. From the establishment of the "no-fly zone" in the airspace of BiH through 1 December 1994, the total number of flights assessed as apparent violations of the ban was 3,317.\textsuperscript{41}

On 16 April 1993, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, adopted UNSCR 819, in which it demanded that all parties treat Srebrenica and its surroundings as a "safe area," which should be free from any armed attack or any other hostile act. It demanded the immediate withdrawal of Bosnian Serb paramilitary units from areas surrounding Srebrenica and the cessation of armed attacks against that town. The Council requested the secretary-general to take steps to increase the presence of UNPROFOR in Srebrenica and to arrange for the safe transfer of the ill and wounded, and demanded the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance to all parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in particular to the civilian population of Srebrenica. On 4 June, the Security Council, through resolution 836 (1993) and acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, further expanded the mandate of UNPROFOR to enable it to protect the safe areas, including to deter attacks against them, to monitor the ceasefire, to promote the withdrawal of military or paramilitary units other than those of the Bosnian Government and to occupy some key points on the ground.\textsuperscript{42}

On 5 February 1994, a 120-millimeter mortar round fired at the central market in Sarajevo killed 58 civilians and wounded more than 140 others, in what served as the worst single incident of the previous twenty-two months of war. This attack came on the heels of a similar attack on one of the suburbs of Sarajevo on 4 February 1994, in which 10 civilians were killed and 18 injured. On 17 February 1994, following a meeting with Russian officials in Bosnia, the Bosnian Serbs agreed to withdraw all of their heavy
weapons outside of a NATO declared demilitarized zone. The Security Council reassessed the feasibility of the protection afforded to the cities of Maglaj, Mostar, and Vitez under resolutions 824 (1993) and 836 (1993), “taking into account all developments both on the ground and in the negotiations between the parties.”

On 31 March 1994, the Security Council, by UNSCR 908, extended the mandate of UNPROFOR for an additional six-month period (through 30 September 1994) and decided to increase the Force's strength by an additional 3,500 troops. The Security Council also decided to take action no later than by 30 April 1994 on further troop requirements recommended by the secretary-general in his reports of 11 March and of 16 March 1994 and his letter of 30 March 1994. On 27 April 1994, the Security Council passed UNSCR 914, which authorized an increase in the force strength of UNPROFOR of up to 6,550 additional troops, 150 military observers and 275 civilian police monitors, in addition to the 3,500 reinforcement already approved in resolution 908 (1994). The total UNPROFOR strength by December 1994 was over 18,000 and more than 40,000 peacekeepers had served in UNPROFOR (See Annex F).

During March 1994, the Bosnian Serb forces launched an infantry and artillery offensive against the UN declared safe area of Gorazde. The indiscriminate shelling of the city and of the outlying villages led to considerable casualties among the civilian population. Despite the Bosnian Serbs' repeated agreements to declared ceasefires, the heavy shelling of the Gorazde continued. On 18 April, after the situation in and around Gorazde continued to deteriorate, the secretary-general requested that NATO authorize the use of air strikes against VRS, artillery, mortar positions, and tanks attacking civilians in Gorazde, but only upon the request of UN peacekeepers. The secretary-general also
requested CAS for four other declared safe areas: Tuzla, Zepa, Bihac and Srebrenica. According to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), permission for NATO air strikes had already been approved for the area surrounding Sarajevo and “the tragic events in Gorazde demonstrated the need for the NATO Council to take similar decisions on the other safe areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”

The Similar Paths of UNOSOM, UNAMIR, and UNPROFOR

The 1995 failure of the UNPROFOR mission came in the wake of the peacekeeping failures of UNOSOM in 1993 and UNAMIR in 1994. While the three missions were independent of one another, the specter of the failed missions continued to haunt UN peacekeepers in their subsequent undertakings. Thomas Weiss, a leading humanitarian scholar, refers to weak conflict resolution efforts as demonstrating “Rwanda-like diplomatic timidity.” Lieutenant General (LTG) Sir Michael Rose stated that UN forces under fire or taken prisoner by Serbian forces were expected to turn the other cheek for fear of “crossing the Mogadishu line.” Rose reportedly coined this phrase to describe the perceived need to maintain absolute neutrality in the face of all provocation, in order to avoid becoming unwilling participants in a civil war. These three missions share striking similarities in regard to their reluctance to use force and violate their maxim of neutrality, the lack of international political will, their failure to maintain legitimacy for the mission, and in their lack of unity of effort.

The Peacekeeper’s Maxim of Neutrality

During the 1990s UNOSOM and UNPROFOR transitioned to Chapter VII operations in order to protect the civilian population and aid workers in their area of
responsibility. However, UNAMIR did not change its mandate until after it was forced to evacuate the majority of its peacekeeping personnel following the initiation of the Hutu’s genocidal campaign and UNPROFOR was reluctant to conduct operations against VRS units in clear violation of peace agreements. Each of these missions was originally designed to facilitate ceasefire agreements; however, they collectively failed to adequately plan for the potential escalation of hostilities within their areas of responsibility. The result was incremental increases in troop strength and the mission mandates in Somalia and Bosnia, an inadequate force strength in Rwanda, and an inability or reluctance to act decisively against violations of the ceasefire agreements in order to protect the civilians and aid workers involved in all three missions.

UNOSOM received its mission mandate from the UN on 24 April 1992, in order to monitor a negotiated ceasefire in Somalia. This was a typical Chapter VI peacekeeping mission, where all warring factions had agreed to the ceasefire and the UN presence to monitor the agreement. The UN monitoring of a ceasefire quickly developed into peacekeepers and the international media standing witness to widespread starvation and disease. The international uproar created by daily reports of the massive suffering in Somalia forced the UN to expand its role in the country. UNOSOM rapidly increased its presence and mission in order to provide security for humanitarian relief. Unfortunately, the clan leaders used the aid as a means of controlling the civilians in the region and continued to limit its distribution or hijacked the convoys and stole the medical and food supplies they contained. The UN force, acting under Chapter VI authority, was inadequate to accomplish its peacekeeping mission.
By December 1992, it became apparent that a greater military force would be required and the Security Council approved the US led and manned UNITAF. These forces (and the remaining UNOSOM forces) were given Chapter VII authority to ensure the delivery of critically needed humanitarian aid across Somalia. While the objective of the mission appeared to be clear enough, to provide security for humanitarian relief operations, and included the authority to make “necessary arrangements for the unified command and control of the forces involved,” the resolution lacked clear guidance on how this was to be accomplished. The result was a disjointed mission between UNITAF and UNOSOM I, with UNITAF conducting a short-term mission focused on reestablishing the ceasefire and the UN establishing a more long-term occupation-type operation focused on developing Somali civil authorities and securing the delivery of humanitarian aid. The result was a disjointed effort that led to the creation of UNOSOM II in March 1993. UNOSOM II was designed as a replacement force for UNITAF and an expansion of UNOSOM I’s mission to include a more concerted humanitarian and political strategy.

“We can do this thing” was BG Dallaire’s response to his fact-finding mission for a potential peacekeeping operation in Rwanda. The UN supported his conclusion with the passing of UNSCR 872, on 5 October 1993, which established UNAMIR. (Between 3 and 4 October, the US Army Rangers had fought their ill-fated battle in Mogadishu.) Like UNOSOM I, UNAMIR was to be a classic Chapter VI peacekeeping operation to oversee a ceasefire, which had been agreed upon by the representatives of the major factions in Rwanda. The UN peacekeepers found very quickly that the political agreement for a ceasefire, the Arusha Agreement, had not translated into an agreement among the actual
belligerents on the ground in the war. BG Dallaire received, and subsequently passed, credible information in January 1994 that the Hutus were preparing to launch a large-scale operation against the Tutsi tribesmen. The UN and its key member nations, such as the US, largely ignored this warning. No resolutions were passed to either increase the number of UN peacekeepers, give Chapter VII authority for the use of force, or to authorize UNAMIR to take preemptive actions against the weapons caches. In fact, there is no evidence that the UN made any attempts in to reinforce UNAMIR, allow it to transition to Chapter VII peace enforcement operations, or to prepare contingency plans in the event of a major Hutu offensive. All indications are that the UN sat idly by, while the situation in Rwanda developed.

Despite several requests by the UNAMIR commander, BG Dallaire, to broaden his mandate in order to prevent or ameliorate the potential Hutu attack, the UN only responded with increased diplomatic efforts in Rwanda. The warning signs and violence continued to increase in the capital city of Kigali and across the country. When the Hutu’s genocidal plan was put into motion on 6 April 1994, UNAMIR peacekeepers were among their earliest targets. Ten Belgian peacekeepers were captured, detained, and then brutally murdered on the first day of the Hutu attack. The UNAMIR peacekeepers failed to establish a unified defensive effort, as they were too dispersed around Kigali and Rwanda, they were operating under a very restrictive ROE (rules of engagement), and they lacked adequate troop strength to respond to decisively or effectively the situation.

The UNAMIR forces put up little resistance against the overwhelming Hutu genocidaires (troops committed to the Hutu program of genocide). Within fifteen days the genocidaires were able to force the majority of the UNAMIR peacekeepers to
evacuate from Rwanda through the Kigali airport. According to Bruce Jones, formerly with the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and a specialist on Rwanda:

Belgian peacekeepers cut up their blue berets in disgust, forced as they were to abandon a mission that had already claimed the lives of ten Belgian soldiers. Apart from the small contingent left behind, the United Nations effectively left Rwanda’s genocide planners a clear field to put their killing machine into motion.69

The UN’s decision to transition from Chapter VI peacekeeping to a Chapter VII peace enforcement operation came too late to prevent the massacre of the Tutsi. By the time the UN was able to pass resolution authorizing a Chapter VII mandate for Rwanda more than 250,000 people had been killed (primarily Tutsi) and 1.5 million had crossed into neighboring countries to avoid the bloodshed or retribution.60 Six weeks into the renewed conflict, the UN organized a 5,500-peace enforcement operation, UNAMIR II on 17 May 1994, which had Chapter VII authority.61 However, no UN troops were sent to Rwanda to augment the UNAMIR contingent on the ground until mid-August 1994, four months after the withdrawal of the majority of UNAMIR.62 The genocidal bloodshed continued largely unabated during this period of time, while the UN was deciding if, when, and how to react to the situation.

UNPROFOR never completely evolved into a true Chapter VII peace enforcement mission, as the force reacted in self-defense to threats made against them, either through CAS or armed engagements, and chose not employ armed force in an offensive or preemptive capacity. The clear delineation between Chapter VI and Chapter VII is somewhat difficult to define succinctly and an example is therefore offered. When UN peacekeepers called for CAS for self-defense purposes, the aircraft only engaged
those targets presenting them with an immediate threat, which clearly falls under the auspices of Chapter VI. However, had NATO been required to launch suppressive strikes against Bosnian Serb air defenses in order to conduct their missions, this would have been considered a Chapter VII engagement. The reluctance of UNPROFOR commanders to use preemptive or decisive force against illegal roadblocks, mortar and artillery positions firing on the civilian population, or Serbian ground forces conducting ethnic cleansing operations evolved from unclear UN resolutions. The Security Council resolutions were not written in terms easily translated into military mission statements and thus set ambiguous tasks for the peacekeepers. However, UNPROFOR was clearly authorized to use Chapter VII force under the auspices of UNSCR 824 (8 May 1993).

Whether or not a UN peacekeeping mission is expanded to Chapter VII peace enforcement is only one aspect of the mission, several other factors are key to the successful accomplishment of the operation. Whether it is a peacekeeping or peace enforcement mission, the success of a UN operation is highly dependent upon the maintenance of international political will, the legitimacy of the mission in the eyes of the belligerents, and the unity of effort for the forces directly involved in the conflict. Failure in any one of these areas can lead to the failure of the overall mandate.

**International Political Will**

Vere Hayes, a retired brigadier general in the British armed forces, speaks of international political will in terms of strategic level consent.

Countries contributing to the forces deployed [for UN operations] need to secure the backing of both their own publics and the wider diplomatic community if the political will to intervene is to be sustained. The cost of the intervention, especially in terms of casualties, is a key factor governing the public support for the operation, and thus political will to sustain it. There is also a need for
“acceptance” of the mission with in the UN, by the parties to the conflict at the highest levels, and amongst the general population of the country to which it is to deploy. 64

When General Aideed’s forces captured Mogadishu in January 1991, the event gathered little initial attention in the international media, as the world’s attention was focused on Desert Storm in Kuwait and Iraq. With the end of the Cold War and the subsequent Russian withdrawal from East Africa, the US had little strategic or political interest in Somalia. However, Aideed’s capture of Mogadishu served as the spark that ignited international interest in Somalia, not because of his military conquest, but because of the dire humanitarian crisis that followed shortly there after. Over the next eighteen months international aid began flowing into Somalia from the US State Department, USAID, Save the Children (US and UK), Medecins Sans Frontieres (Netherelands), UNICEF, the World Food Program, the UNHCR, the UN Children’s Fund, the ICRC, and the Catholic Relief Services. 65 The international community acted to ease the famine caused by the continuing conflict in Somalia, but the UN Security Council was much slower to act. In January 1992, one year after Aideed’s offensive in Mogadishu, a UN fact-finding mission reported that the UN should refrain from trying to broker a ceasefire, as the situation was “total anarchy.” 66

Aside from the risks associated with the mission, international political will for intervention in Somalia was weak due to the high costs of ongoing peacekeeping missions (The UN peacekeeping mission in Cambodia alone was costing more than $2 billion a year), which was further compounded by the peacekeeping arrears owed by both the US and Russia to the UN. 67 Additionally, European concerns were not on a peacekeeping mission in Africa, but in their own backyard, as the Former Yugoslavia
was falling into disarray. Lacking the support to authorize a peacekeeping operation in Somalia, the UN passed UNSCR 733 (23 January 1992), which urged an increase in humanitarian aid to the nation and appointed a special coordinator to oversee its delivery. During this time, the UN’s diplomatic efforts appeared to be producing favorable results, as the main warring factions in Mogadishu agreed to a ceasefire on 3 March 1992. However, the ceasefire did not extend outside of the capital city and aid convoys and distribution points were recurrent victims of roaming armed bands of paramilitary forces.

International political will for a peacekeeping mission in Somalia was slow to develop and was even slower to materialize. Attention in the West was focused on integrating the former Warsaw Pact nations into the European markets. Western military efforts were directed towards the Middle East and Operation Provide Comfort in Iraq. To further compound matters America was in the midst of an economic recession and Russia was reeling from the collapse of the Soviet Union. Thus, a majority of the politicians and the general public were focused on matters external to the African Continent.

Donated food and medical supplies did flow into the country, but more often than not they fell victim to thieves and failed to reach the starving victims of the famine. Despite the warring in the countryside, the UNSCR was reluctant to provide security for the movement and distribution of humanitarian aid, even aid provided by the UNHCR, UNICEF, and the UN Children’s Fund. By the time UNOSOM arrived in Somalia, 1,500,000 (one-quarter of the population) was at immediate risk of starvation, one-fourth of the children under the age of five had died, and 800,000 Somalis were declared to be displaced persons or refugees.
UNAMIR was established in 1994 as a peacekeeping force and was given a limited mandate to oversee a ceasefire agreement between warring factions in Rwanda. The international community and the UNSC lacked the will for a large commitment of forces in the nation. The lack of a robust international political will for the operation stems partially from the fact that at the same time Russia was attempting to gain support for a UN operation in Georgia, the US was seeking support for a UN operation in Haiti, and, of the permanent Security Council members, only France wanted a UN mission in Rwanda. Additionally, there was little support within the council for another mission fraught with risk, as the specter of Somalia still loomed in the halls of the UN and the mission in Bosnia was not producing the desired level of stability. Rwanda had not garnered sufficient international attention or sympathy to justify the political risks associated with sending a large peacekeeping force into the country.

The peacekeeping mission for UNAMIR was approved, but the limited support it received greatly reduced its force structure and narrowed the scope of its mission mandate. The UN certainly didn’t plan for failure, as Mathew Vaccaro contends “within the constraints imposed by the Security Council, UNAMIR was a well-planned operation, reflecting newly developed competencies within the UN Secretariat.” However, the Security Council did fail to critically analyze the situation, opting instead to act on the most favorable course of action and dismissing the most likely or dangerous outcomes for the situation. The UN and its member states were aware of the problems in Rwanda and in the region, on the day the advance party for UNAMIR arrived in Kigali on 21 October 1993, the President (a Hutu) of neighboring Burundi was assassinated by his Tutsi dominated military. The ensuing civil conflict in the country killed nearly 150,000
Burundians and the region became a hotbed of ethnic unrest and the threat of conflict remained omnipresent. However, UNAMIR remained severely undermanned and well below BG Dallaire’s minimum requirement of 4,000 peacekeepers. Additionally, the UN lacked the political will to expand UNAMIR’s mandate to a more preemptive and father reaching mission. International will to prevent the pending conflict came too late. It was not until the shocking and vivid images of tens-of-thousands of genocide victims in Rwanda began appearing in international publications and television that the UN expanded its mission mandate and created UNAMIR II, a Chapter VII peace enforcement operation.

The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia entered a period of rapid disintegration in 1991, with independence declared by the Republics of Slovenia and Croatia on 25 June 1991. The European Community (EC) recognized the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina on 6 April 1992, as the sporadic fighting in the country began to intensify. On 12 May 1992, the secretary-general reported to the Council that “All international observers agree that what is happening is a concerted effort by the Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the acquiescence of, and at least some support from, JNA, to create ‘ethnically pure’ regions . . . [in] the Republic.”73 The international community was reluctant to intervene militarily to defend the newly independent Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, opting instead to allow the EC to pursue a peace accord between the warring factions in BiH. It was a common perception in the West that the conflict was actually a civil war and was no place for peacekeepers. For example, public opinion in the US was supportive of bringing an end to the war and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, but did not support the direct involvement of US ground forces.74 A study published in 1993
shows that the American public did not consider the war in Bosnia as a high priority, as it ranked well behind stopping international drug trafficking, strengthening the domestic economy, stopping illegal immigration, and protecting the global environment.\textsuperscript{75}

The United States, its NATO Allies, and many other nations were still consumed with the fall of the Berlin Wall, Somalia, the first World Trade Center bombing, and the Gulf War, which were held by many to presage a coming new world order. The events that transpired in Bosnia caught the international community off guard, both in regard to their acts of ethnic cleansing and the nationalistic nature of the conflict. The Axis Powers had exploited these characteristics during World War II and their reappearance on European soil sparked concern among European journalists and politicians. However, in the absence of strong international will, the UN response to the first two years of the conflict appears to have been slow, disjointed, and unproductive.

\textbf{Legitimacy}

For a UN peacekeeping operation to be approved by the UNSC there must be agreement and consent among the belligerent parties to stop the conflict. Thus, there cannot be a peacekeeping operation unless there is a peace to keep. Using the same logic, there must exist a minimum amount of consent among the belligerents for the UN to conduct peace enforcement operations. According to Brigadier General (UK) Vere Hayes, chief-of-staff of UNPROFOR from 1993-1995, “You cannot fight wars from white-painted vehicles.”\textsuperscript{76} Thus, the UN mission must have legitimacy in the eyes of the belligerents with respect to its principle objectives, which must be viewed feasible and worthwhile. The majority of the parties involved in the conflict (and its termination) must view the UN’s mission within the country or region as valid, justifiable, and committed to
the intent of the agreement. The UN missions of the 1990s that are under review here suffered from a lack of commitment by both the warring factions and the international community. Thus, they failed to maintain their legitimacy in the eyes of the belligerents.

UNOSOM was established to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid to the famine-stricken people of Somalia. The initial humanitarian mission that UNOSOM was designed to support was viewed as valid among the starving masses and the warring factions, as millions were at risk of death by starvation. However, the humanitarian aid, primarily foodstuffs, quickly became a mechanism of control in the country. The warlords used the food to ensure loyalty and control among the general population. When UNOSOM proved unable to ensure the delivery of this aid to its intended recipients, it quickly lost legitimacy in the eyes of the warlords and the general population. In failing to provide the required degree of security against the local warlords and criminal bands, the UN proved itself to be weak in the eyes of the Somalis.

UNITAF was able to establish legitimacy in Somalia, owing both to its overwhelming force strength and its ability to maintain a perception of neutrality among the warring factions. No warlord was willing to engage UNITAF in armed conflict and the humanitarian aid began to flow across Somalia, thus preventing mass starvation. However, as UNITAF began its transition to UNOSOM II several warlords, such as Mohammed Farrah Aideed, began renewed attempts to exert their will over Mogadishu and across the country. UNOSOM II lacked the same overwhelming force that UNITAF had enjoyed and thus became a target for the warlords. Aideed was particularly aggressive against the new UN forces and began focusing his efforts on undermining the legitimacy of the mission. Failing at his political efforts, Aideed decided to employ his
military instrument of power and attacked the Pakistani peacekeeping force on 5 June 1993. The death of the twenty-four Pakistani peacekeepers at the hands of Aideed’s militia resulted in an immediate condemnation by the UN. The UN decided to violate its declared neutrality in Somalia, in light of the murder of members of its peacekeeping force.

The UN sanctioned offensive actions against Aideed served as fodder for the warlord’s campaign to undermine the legitimacy of the UN mission. Yet, Aideed had only limited success in undercutting the legitimacy of the peacekeeping force between June and September 1993. It was not until the events of 3 and 4 October 1993, when eighteen members of Task Force Ranger (the US reaction force for UNOSOM II) were killed and seventy-five wounded that Aideed’s forces achieved any degree of success against US soldiers. Aideed had succeeded in striking a major blow to the legitimacy of UNOSOM II, as the attack on US forces caused not only some Somalis to question the UN mission, but more significantly the American public. America watched the body of one of its soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu and saw the pictures of a wounded helicopter pilot being held as Aideed’s prisoner on their television sets. In short order President Clinton announced the phased withdrawal of all American forces from Somalia. The loss of legitimacy in the eyes of the belligerents had been surpassed by the loss of legitimacy in the eyes of America.

The first contingent of UNAMIR observers (eighty-one troops) began deploying across Rwanda on 1 November 1993. By 27 December 1993 UNAMIR had 1,260 troops on the ground from Canada, Belgium, Bangladesh, Tunisia, and Ghana. General Dallaire, the commanding general of the force, later described it as being “a large,
immobile and largely ineffective force in the middle of an increasingly hostile
environment." There was little support for the mission among the key members of the
UN, as the Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) was running into a serious
shortage of funds due to the ongoing UN peacekeeping missions in Cambodia, Somalia,
and Bosnia. The United States, who was providing 33 percent of the funding for the
DPKO missions, was reluctant to increase the mandate or manning for UNAMIR. Thus,
the political will to expand the UNAMIR was generally absent among those countries
with sufficient capacity to do so.\textsuperscript{81}

UNAMIR’s primary mission was to “monitor the observance of the ceasefire
agreement” and “to monitor the security situation during the final period of the
transitional government’s mandate, leading up to the elections.”\textsuperscript{82} Their mission failed to
include authorization to intervene if compelling evidence existed that parties had violated
the Arusha Peace Accords or were openly planning to do so. Thus, factions involved in
the conflict quickly began to disregard major aspects of the Arusha agreements and
engage in an active campaign of demonization, mobilization, and polarization to discredit
the accords and undermine the legitimacy of the UN mission. The inaction of UNAMIR
to counter these rapidly rising threats to their mission and the people of Rwanda further
diminished the legitimacy of their mission in the eyes of the Rwandan people.\textsuperscript{83}

The extremists in Rwanda overtly planned and executed their campaign to gain
control of the Rwandan government under the impotent monitoring of the UN.
Demonization was accomplished through a flood of pamphlets, radio broadcasts, and
newspapers that depicted the Arusha agreements as a sellout and the Tutsi’s as a threat to
the existence of the Hutu people. Mobilization was accomplished through the arming of
anti-Tutsi militias and establishing weapons caches. The polarization of the population was accomplished through direct and indirect threats towards Hutu moderates and the general Tutsi population. All of this was accomplished under the watchful eyes of UNAMIR, which dutifully reported these activities back to the UN in New York. The impotence of the UN to act in effect handed their legitimacy in Rwanda over to the extremist *interahamwe* and *impuzamugambi* militias. Thus, the legitimacy of UNAMIR’s mission was not taken away by the warring factions, but was handed to them through the UN’s inability to act.

The UN peacekeepers arriving in Bosnia-Herzegovina were warmly received in July 1992, as the local population believed that an end to their bloody conflict had arrived. However, once the war weary population realized the purpose of the UN troops was to provide humanitarian aid (food, shelter, and clothing) in the midst of their conflict, the local sentiment towards the peacekeepers quickly turned hostile. With the arrival of the UN peacekeepers came an expectation among the general population that the troops would intervene to stop violations of the ceasefire; however, the UN mandate was only to monitor the ceasefire and not enforce it. Subsequent resolutions only served to decrease the credibility of UNPROFOR, as they failed to give the command the ability to forcefully act against those who were not in compliance with the agreed upon peace process. This was done in order to maintain the perception of neutrality among the belligerent parties. Unfortunately, the resultant effect was to offer little incentive for compliance with the declared ceasefire or observance of the safe areas, as there was no effective punishment to deter violators. Thus, the combatants continued to maneuver and conduct offensive operations in order to gain the upper hand in future negotiations.
The Serbian offensives resulted in nearly one-half of the civilian population of Bosnia being displaced by December 1994 (1.025 million out of a total population of 2.214 million).\textsuperscript{85} As the Serbs gained territory, UNPROFOR lost legitimacy in the eyes of all ethnic groups involved in the conflict. The Serbs attacked Muslim population centers and hijacked UN convoys, the Muslims attacked lightly armed Serbian positions, and the Croats maneuvered their forces in order to acquire more land along the Bosnia border with Croatia. The initial and subsequent peace plans that UNPROFOR was mandated to implement did little to stop the Serbs from creating an ethnically homogenous Serbian population in eastern Bosnia to facilitate its claim over the territory. Thus, the legitimacy of the UN mission continued to wane.

\textbf{Unity of Effort}

Successful military operations are characterized by unity of effort at all levels of war: strategic, operational, and tactical. The failure of the UN to ensure their mandates were drafted to ensure unity of effort, directly contributed to mission failure in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The first step towards ensuring unity of effort is to designate a competent commander, who is given the necessary authority, weapons, and force strength to ensure a reasonable chance of success. Without a designated commander of all operations within the mission’s area of responsibility and a clearly defined chain of command, success is very elusive and will likely come at a much higher cost than necessary. The UN peacekeeping missions had to relearn this basic principle of military operations repeatedly during the 1990s.\textsuperscript{86}

The key external players involved in attempting to settle the humanitarian crisis in Somalia, UNOSOM and UNITAF, did not have a consensus as to their actual mission,
thus they lacked a unity of effort. During the autumn of 1992, the humanitarian situation in Somalia continued to worsen. UNPROFOR was unable to provide sufficient protection to food and aid convoys across the country. As a result, on 3 December 1992, the UNSC accepted a US offer to lead a coalition force to create a “secure environment for humanitarian relief operations.” The scope and duration of the UNITAF mission came into dispute less than three weeks after its authorization. The secretary-general, in a report to the Security Council on 19 December 1992, stated that the transition from the UNITAF coalition back to a UN peacekeeping force should be contingent on “the establishment of a ceasefire, the control of heavy weapons, the disarming of lawless gangs, and the creation of a new police force.” However, the US had maintained from the onset that the US mission was to be of short duration and for the explicit purpose of establishing a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations.

The arrival of UNITAF, in December 1992, dramatically changed the power dynamic on the ground in Somalia. UNOSOM no longer controlled the major land force in the country and the Pakistani battalion was UNOSOM’s only operational unit. Additionally, the UNITAF commander reported to and through his US military chain of command, effectively bypassing the UNOSOM command structure. The two forces were pursuing different desired end states for their respective missions. The US was focusing on security for humanitarian aid deliveries and UNOSOM was focused on the much longer goal of rebuilding the nation. The coexistence of the UN and coalition forces made for an awkward relationship, as despite UNITAF’s overwhelming force structure, the UN maintained that UNOSOM “remained fully responsible for the political aspects and humanitarian assistance.”
The more the UN prodded UNITAF to broaden its scope, the more entrenched UNITAF became in adhering to its UN mandate of establishing “a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations.” The UN was focused on a nation-building policy, which included a plan for establishing a police force, rebuilding the infrastructure, and creating a democratic governing system, while UNITAF was accomplishing its mission and departing Somalia. An unstated goal of UNITAF was to be out by 20 January 1993, the presidential inauguration day (transition from President Bush to President Clinton). However, it became apparent that the UNITAF mission would need to be continued, UNSCR 814 was passed on 26 March 1993 and established a follow-on mission to be called UNOSOM II. The United States established a target date for transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II of 1 May 1993; however, as 1 May became publicized and politicized it quickly evolved into a “no later than” departure date. UNITAF held firm to its departure date, despite concerns raised by the UN and UNOSOM about the diminished troop strength during the transitional period.

The problem with unity of effort in UNAMIR was not among the troops on the ground, but between UNAMIR and UN leaders in New York. General Dallaire (UNAMIR commanding general) and his peacekeepers consistently called for an increase in troop strength for their mission. Their request for more troops did not evolve over time, as from the initial fact-finding mission to Rwanda; General Dallaire maintained that the mission required an optimal number of 8,000 soldiers and minimum of 4,500 to 5,000. The UN, however, was determined to keep the number of forces in Rwanda to a minimum and UNAMIR’s maximum troop strength was 2,548. Despite the fact that UNAMIR was established to assist in the implementation the Arusha Accords, the UN
intentionally omitted a key aspect of the accords from their mission statement. The omitted task was that of ensuring overall security in the country (Rwanda), primarily providing security for the civilian population, halting weapons trafficking, and neutralizing armed gangs.\textsuperscript{94}

On 11 January 1994, the commander of UNAMIR sent an urgent fax to the UN that warned of a plan for a major Hutu campaign against the Tutsi. The fax gave specific information regarding the Hutu weapon caches, intended high profile Tutsi victims, and the scale of the intended genocide. Iqbal Riza, Kofi Annan’s deputy, received the fax on 11 January and presented it to Kofi Annan and Boutros Boutros-Ghali on 13 January 1994. Neither of the UN officials reacted to the information on the pending genocide in an official capacity. Neither Annan nor Boutros-Ghali requested a UN response to the Hutu threat and both failed to make the fax known to the Security Council.\textsuperscript{95} General Dallaire requested permission to intervene in the situation by confiscating the weapons caches and disarming Hutu gangs. The UN rejected his requests and ordered him to comply with the UNAMIR mandate to \textit{monitor} the Arusha Accords.\textsuperscript{96}

The mission in Rwanda continually faced the need to expand its mandate in order to prevent a widespread and violent attack by the Hutus against the Tutsi population. In contrast, the UN in New York wanted to keep the mission in Rwanda as small as possible. Ironically, the UN initially viewed the UNAMIR mission in Rwanda as a way to help reestablish the UN’s credibility, following the aftermath of the UN mission in Somalia and their ongoing troubles with the mission in Bosnia.\textsuperscript{97} Unfortunately, the desire for a successful peacekeeping mission was not matched with a desire to fund and
equip UNAMIR in order to ensure mission success. The UN mission in Rwanda lacked a
unity of effort between the UNAMIR Headquarters and the UN leadership in New York.

Yasushi Akashi, special representative of the secretary-general for the former
Yugoslavia from 1994-1995, described the lack of unity of effort during the UNPROFOR
mission as such:

The setbacks experienced by the United Nations in former Yugoslavia,
particularly in . . . Bosnia, were due to the almost complete lack of unity of
outlook among the major powers, namely the USA, Russia, France, the UK, and
Germany, and the lack of readiness by the internal parties in the conflict to
replace arms with diplomacy, and the lack of coordination within the United
Nations between the executive body in New York (that is, the Security Council)
and the operation in the field.  

From its inception UNPROFOR’s mandate was threefold: humanitarian -- to
provide assistance for the delivery of UNHCR (United Nations High Commission for
Refugees) humanitarian aid; political--to facilitate the ongoing peace negotiations; and
military--to monitor the cease fire agreements. There are several difficulties with a
mission of this type for conventional western militaries. There was no clear objective, no
clear enemy, and no clear definition of mission success. The peacekeeping mission of
UNPROFOR crept into a peace enforcement mission, while the military command was
attempting to interpret and implement more than fifty-one Security Council resolutions
between January 1992 and July 1995. UNPROFOR suffered from an incremental
creeping of both its mission and its mandate, which led to a failure in its unity of effort.

Facilitating the UNHCR to provide humanitarian aid was the most clearly defined
of UNPROFOR’s missions. However, even this portion of the operation was not provided
with a clear mission statement and was ambiguous as to the actual parameters of the
mission and the definition of success. UN convoys continued to be illegally stopped,
taxed, robbed, and hijacked while under UNPROFOR guard across BiH throughout the duration of UNPROFOR’s mission. Commanders were reluctant to use ‘all available measures’ even when they were authorized. This may have been caused by the number of UN peacekeepers taken hostage by the warring factions or due to an overly conservative interpretation of their UN mandate. Regardless of the rationale, the result was the severely diminished delivery of humanitarian aid and UNPROFOR supplies to their rightful destinations, in particular the declared safe areas. The inhabitants of the safe area of Srebrenica suffered from an inadequate supply of food and medical supplies from its establishment until its fall to Serbian forces in July 1995.

The political situation often had a profound effect on the UNPROFOR troops on the ground. As the Security Council passed successive resolutions, UNPROFOR was left with an unclear mandate and unclear authority. Air strikes against Serbian forces were approved or disapproved in an apparent correlation to ongoing peace talks. If peace negotiations were underway, the UN representative Mr. Yasushi Akashi seldom approved air strikes, regardless of the Serbian offensive actions against Croat and Muslim populations or the UN peacekeepers. This left the peacekeepers uncertain as to the reliability of NATO air support and often led to calculated Serbian offensive actions under the veil of peace negotiations. The UN’s political and diplomatic efforts to attain a peaceful resolution to the Bosnian situation were often willfully blind to the realities on the ground.

The peacekeeping mission to monitor the ceasefire agreements suffered from a lack of unity of effort. The original resolution, which authorized UNPROFOR’s fifty liaison officers, addressed all belligerents in BiH on equal terms and called for their
adherence to the declared ceasefire of 23 November 1991. As time passed, the resolutions became more focused on stopping the actions of the Serbian forces and their actions against both Muslim and Croat civilians. However, the Security Council would not declare the Serbians as the enemy and authorize the full implementation of Chapter VII. This inhibited the ability of UNPROFOR to protect the civilian population of BiH or to force the VRS to stop offensive operations.

The UN did little to promote the principle of unity of effort within UNPROFOR. Throughout the operation several parallel chains of command existed simultaneously. Some of the more notable examples are: logistics and finance fell under the Chief Administration Officer (CAO), civilian affairs and police reported to the Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM), and the unarmed military observers reported to the Chief Military Observer (CMO). No single commander or chief of mission was ever appointed or give control over the entire UNPROFOR operation, thus a disjointed effort to provide humanitarian relief and monitor the ceasefire emerged and ultimately failed, as the next chapter will clearly show.

__________________________

1Brahimi Report, Executive Summary, 2. Italics are from the original document.

2United Nations Charter-Preamble. The full text of the UN Charter is available at www.un.org/aboutun/charter/preamble.htm, or see Appendix 1.

3Ibid.


9Clark and Herbst, 256. United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) is headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida and is one of nine Unified Combatant Commands assigned operational control of US combat forces. USCENTCOM’s area of responsibility includes 25 nations located throughout the Horn of Africa, South and Central Asia, and Northern Red Sea regions, as well as the Arabian Peninsula and Iraq.


12Leitenberg, 18.

13DPKO-Somalia Website, 29 December 2003.


15DPKO-Somalia Website, 29 December 2003.


17Leitenberg, 19.


19The Arusha Peace Agreement was signed on 4 August 1993 and was to have been implemented within 37 days, beginning with the establishment of the Presidency, the Cabinet, and the National Assembly. The Arusha Peace Agreement was never implemented, although its principal provisions now constitute the Fundamental Law of the Republic of Rwanda.


Following WWI the Belgians gained control of the Rwandan territory from the Germans. The Belgian colonists relied on the Tutsi for administration of Belgian Congo. This caused the Tutsi to be equated with the ruling class. The Tutsi traditionally dominated the Hutu. Following WWII, the Hutu were allowed to take administrative positions and an elite Hutu began to emerge in Rwanda. Definition taken from Jones, *Peacemaking in Rwanda*, 18-19.

Leitenberg, 26.


Alison Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, 15-16. Some estimates are as high as 800,000, see Gerard Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 281-295.


Leitenberg, 27.


Leitenberg, 27


DPKO-UNPROFOR Website.


41 DPKO-UNPROFOR Website.

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid.


45 DPKO-UNPROFOR Website.


47 DPKO-UNPROFOR Website.

48 Ibid.


50 Clark and Herbst, Learning From Somalia, 3.


53 Clark and Herbst, 8-9.


55 Jones, 105.

56 The CIA prepared a paper that forecast a worst-case scenario of 500,000 people being killed by a concerted Hutu attack against the Tutsi. However, this paper was not shared with the UN Jones, 114-115.

57 Jones, 116-117.


59 Jones, 121.
60Baehr and Gordenker, 87.


62 Jones, 122-123.

63 Bierman and Vadset, 142.


65 Clark and Herbst, 152.


69 Clark and Herbst, 154.

70 Jones, 109.


76 Thakur and Schnabel, 131.
Although UNOSOM II was mandated to have the same troop strength as UNITAF, in actuality it had only 14,000 peacekeepers or one-half of UNITAF’s strength.


Jones, 108.

Ibid.

Vaccaro, 374.


Jones, 111-112.

Bierman and Vadset, 125.

Burg and Shoup, 171.


Clarke and Herbst, 175-176.


Jones, 105.

Ibid., 108.


Gourevitch, 102-106.


CHAPTER 3

UNPROFOR AND THE CONFLICT IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

Except for a few days in April 1992, Muslims remained in control of Srebrenica through three years of war. It became a symbol of Bosnian resistance and was featured in Bosnian pop songs. But on 11 July 1995 the existence of Muslim Srebrenica came to an abrupt end. On that day Bosnian Serb television broadcast an announcement by General Ratko Mladic, the commander of the Bosnian Serb Army. Clearly on a high, the Serb general told television viewers that the moment for revenge against the “Turks” had finally come. Speaking from “Serbian Srebrenica” he gave the city as a “present to the Serb nation.”

J. W. Honig and Norbert Both, Srebrenica

The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) serves as an excellent example of the complex missions that the United Nations (UN) has faced since the late 1980s. UNPROFOR began as a mission to help bring about an end to the civil wars that plagued Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. However, once the warring stopped between Croatia and Serbia, the two republics turned their expansionist eyes towards Bosnia-Herzegovina and UNPROFOR was directed by the UN to intervene. This chapter will explain the complexity of the situation in Bosnia, its multicultural society, the betrayal of the various peace accords by their signatories, and the use of ethnic cleansing to achieve political and territorial gains. Additionally, this chapter will show that the member states of the UN had good intentions in attempting to resolve the Bosnian conflict; however, they failed to develop a good plan, in order to achieve their desired intent. Like the missions in Somalia and Rwanda, the design and mandate of the UNPROFOR mission caused the operation to suffer from an overly strict interpretation of neutrality, a failure to generate and maintain international political will,
a rapid deterioration of the mission’s legitimacy, and a lack of unity of effort focused on
the operation. The disjointed political, military, and humanitarian efforts to resolving the
conflict created the seams that eventually allowed the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) to
commit the largest massacre of civilians on European soil since the atrocities committed
during World War II.

The Significance of Srebrenica

Bosnians (be they Serb, Croat, or Muslim) are all Southern Slavs of similar
appearance, racial composition, and sharing a mutually intelligible language.² The
defining difference between the three groups is their religion. On the Balkan Peninsula, a
person’s religion is closely linked to their perception of their own nationality. The various
states of the Yugoslav confederation used language and religion to define their respective
identities.³ For example, one’s identity as a Serb has more to do with religion than it does
with genetics. A person can be born to two Serbian parents, but changing one’s religion
from Orthodoxy will effectively change their ethnicity to that of either a Croat or Bosniak
in the eyes of the general population. Religion has divided the Croats and Serbs in
language according to the alphabet they use: the Catholic Croats use the Latin alphabet
received from Catholic missionaries, while the Eastern Orthodox Serbs use the Cyrillic
alphabet that was adopted from Byzantine (Orthodox) missionaries. The Bosniaks share
the common language of the region in which they live (either Serbian or Croatian) and
use the predominant alphabet as well.⁴ Despite being linked by language and divided by
religion, Bosnia was the most ethnically integrated of Yugoslavia’s six republics and
intermarriage between Muslims, Croats, and Serbs was common in the major cities and
larger towns.⁵ The percentage of mixed marriages in Bosnia was approximately

53
12 percent and occurred primarily among the urban elite and the blue collar working class. The most frequent mixed marriages were between Croats and Serbs; however, since 1945 there has been a significant increase in the number of Muslim mixed marriages.\textsuperscript{6}

It can be said that Yugoslavia, to which a stable and multiethnic Bosnia belonged, died on 4 May 1980 with the death of its founder and dictator, Jozip Bros Tito.\textsuperscript{7} In short order, nationalist movements quickly sprang from the soil where Tito was laid to rest. A rotating presidency designed to avoid internal dissension was put into effect immediately in an attempt to avoid the clash of Yugoslavia's multiple nationalities and regions. Over the next decade, Milan Kucan in Slovenia, Franjo Tudjman in Croatia, and Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia all vied for power and control of Yugoslavia. When no one leader could unify Yugoslavia’s confederation as Tito had, they quickly turned to nationalist rhetoric in order to secure their position in their respective republics. On 25 June 1991, Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence from Yugoslavia. The Serbs had \textit{de facto} control of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) and turned it against the two breakaway republics. Slovenia stubbornly resisted the JNA and was able to win its independence in ten days. However, the war in Croatia lasted more than six months and resulted in the death of more than 10,000 people. In January 1992 the European Community (now the European Union), led by Germany, acknowledged the independence of Slovenia and Croatia. The United States acknowledged each state’s independence in April.

By the time a UN-sponsored ceasefire was signed in Sarajevo on 2 January 1992, the JNA had defeated the Croatian military in the eastern region of the republic (Krajina accounted for approximately one-third of Croatia) and claimed it as part of “Greater
Serbia.” The idea of “Greater Serbia” was a common theme put forth by Milosevic as he laid claim to the republics of Kosovo, Montenegro, and Macedonia, as well as Serbian populated areas of BiH. Tudjman’s nationalist rhetoric also included the concept of a “Greater Croatia,” which was to include the land gained by the Serbs (Krajina) and the Croat populated areas of BiH. A result of the nationalist movements in the Former Yugoslavia was the rapid escalation of the conflict in BiH, which left the Muslims caught in the crossfire.

In April of 1992, following the European Community’s recognition of Bosnian independence, Serbian forces began moving into the eastern regions of BiH and either killing or evicting the majority of the non-Serbian inhabitants. This was the case for the city of Srebrenica, which was located less than ten miles from the Drina River, Serbia’s border with BiH. According to the 1990 Yugoslav census more than 75 percent of the 36,000 people inhabiting Srebrenica were Muslim, in both the town and the municipality. However, the Serbs considered these lands along the Drina River to be a rightful part of “Greater Serbia” and the Muslim inhabitants to be merely “Turkish” squatters. Over the next 3 1/2 years, of the nearly 5 million inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina, more than 200 thousand would be killed, 2.7 million displaced, hundreds of thousands would seek refuge in foreign countries, and the country of Bosnia-Herzegovina would be divided into two ethnically pure substates: the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was comprised of Bosnian Croats and Muslims and the Republika Srpska, which was comprised of Bosnian Serbs. (See figure 1.)
The Serbian advances across the Drina were met initially with success. The Serbs captured Srebrenica in April 1992 and expelled its Muslim population, many of whom took refuge in local wooded areas of the region. Naser Oric, a charismatic twenty-six-year-old Muslim police officer and former bodyguard of the Serbian President Slobodan
Milosevic, led a group of Muslims that retook the town in May 1992. This was the first major defeat of the Serbs by Muslim forces in eastern BiH. Naser Oric quickly became the principal Muslim leader in Srebrenica and the commander of its Muslim territorial defense forces. The Serbian leaders would not forget Oric or the losses and embarrassment that he had inflicted upon them.

Ethnic cleansing of the region by Serb forces continued throughout the region, even after safe areas were declared by UN Resolution 819(1993). Prior to passing the resolution, Vance Owen warned the UN Security Council that the creation of safe areas could actually encourage ethnic cleansing in eastern BiH. His logic being that declared ‘safe areas’ could lead to areas outside of these boundaries being considered as ‘unsafe’. It did not take long for Mr. Owen’s warning to materialize, as Serbian military and paramilitary units began forcing Muslims from their towns and villages and into the various UN safe areas. Often Muslims who were not forced out of their homes by Serb forces fled to avoid the fighting and shelling of the Bosnian war. Srebrenica and other safe areas had become the linchpin to Milosevic achieving his objective of a Greater Serbia. The actions of Serbian forces demonstrated their belief that success in ethnically cleansing more Muslim land would equate to more land concessions to the Serbs at the negotiation table. Serbia’s goal was to have de facto control of the lands in eastern BiH, as these lands would have only Serbs living on them.

UN Debates and Resolutions on Bosnia-Herzegovina

The UN did not sit idly by while Milosevic was executing his plans for a Greater Serbia. A Report of the secretary-general on 15 November 1999 states:
As the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina deteriorated, the activity of the Security Council increased. During the 18-month period from the opening of full-scale hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina on 6 April 1992 to 5 October 1993, 47 Security Council resolutions were adopted and 42 statements of the President of the Council were issued on matters relating to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. The majority of them dealt directly with the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. To this date, no issue in the history of the Security Council has engendered more resolutions and statements over a comparable period.\textsuperscript{14}

As the debates raged in the UN, all belligerents in the conflict continued to quickly maneuver into the best positions, from which they could negotiate to claim more land. Despite the land grab, no clear fronts developed during the war, a situation which only served to complicate any attempts at international intervention. The war was truly asymmetrical, most often being fought by local, irregular forces that operated close to their homes. The belligerents on all sides used ethnic cleansing as a tactical and strategic tool, with each side attempting to create an ethnically/religiously pure state for their people. To further complicate the situation, most of the various paramilitary units were engaged in a war of terrorism and gangster-ism, pursuing wealth and power instead of any clearly defined military or political objectives. The result was the widespread rape, murder, and dehumanization of hundreds of thousands of Bosnian civilians.

The UN sponsored ceasefire between the warring factions in Croatia was signed in Sarajevo on 2 January 1992. This brokered ceasefire agreement, often referred to as the Vance Plan, allowed for the establishment a UN peacekeeping force in Former Yugoslavia. The UN Security Council approved Resolution 743(1992) on 21 February 1992, which established a United Nation Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to be headquartered in Sarajevo, to assist in implementing the Vance Plan. A report on Srebrenica by Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 1999 stated:
Although Resolution 743(1992) provided for United Nations military observers to patrol certain limited areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina, this was to take place after the demilitarization of the United Nations Protected Areas in Croatia, which did not occur. Until June 1992, the force had no other mandate in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  

On 1 March 1992, the voting population of Bosnia-Herzegovina overwhelmingly approved a referendum on Bosnian independence, which the Bosnian-Serbs were actively encouraged to boycott. The referendum for “a sovereign and independent Bosnia-Herzegovina, a state of equal citizens and nations of Muslims, Serbs, and Croats and others who live in it” was approved by a 99.5 percent affirmative vote. The European Community (now the European Union) recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent nation on 6 April 1992 and it was recognized by the United States on the following day. In response to these actions, on 7 April 1992, the Serb forces intensified their attacks on Muslims and Croats across Bosnia, to include Srebrenica. In addition to the increased number of attacks, the Serbs began to severely restrict the flow of humanitarian aid to Srebrenica and other Muslim enclaves. The Serbs gained control over the airport in Sarajevo, which further limited the UN’s ability to deliver aid. The UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) delivered approximately 750 tons of humanitarian aid per day to BiH throughout the war; however, after 7 April 1992 the majority of the aid went to areas not under control of Serbian forces.

UN Security Council document S/23900 shows that by May 1992, the situation in Sarajevo and across BiH had deteriorated even further,

The fighting and intimidation have led to massive displacement of civilians. . . . Freedom of movement is virtually nonexistent: a recent UN convoy had to negotiate its way through 90 roadblocks between Zagreb and Sarajevo, many of them manned by undisciplined and drunken soldiers of undetermined political affiliation. . . . Relief supplies are stolen, vehicles hijacked and international aid workers threatened and abused.
The deteriorating conditions in BiH led the Security Council to pass Resolution 757 (1992) on 30 May 1992, which imposed severe sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In response to these sanctions, an agreement was reached between the UN and Serbian authorities on 6 June, which allowed for UNPROFOR to take control of Sarajevo’s airport and control of the security zone that surrounded it. This resulted in the passing of Resolution 758 (1992) on 8 June 1992. Resolution 758 “proposed the immediate deployment of UN military observers to the airport, to be followed by an UNPROFOR infantry battalion . . . marking the formal beginning of the UNPROFOR mandate in Bosnia-Herzegovina.”

**Vance-Owen Peace Plan**

The first major advance in ending the war in the Former Yugoslavia came during the London Conference, 26 and 27 August 1992. Cyrus Vance, who represented the secretary-general of the UN, and David Lord Owen, representing the Presidency of the European Community jointly chaired the conference. The conference failed to develop a plan that was acceptable to all the parties involved; however, it did set the stage for developing other courses of action designed to bring an end to the conflict. In October 1992, the ICFY (International Conference of Former Yugoslavia) staff presented Mr. Vance and Mr. Owen with five different options for the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina: (1) a centralized state; (2) a centralized federal state with significant functions carried out by 4 to 10 semiautonomous regions; (3) a loose federal state of three ethnic regions, which were not geographically contiguous; (4) a loose confederation of three ethnically determined republics with significant independence, and (5) a Muslim state, created
through partition, with Bosnian-Serb territory becoming part of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and Bosnian-Croat territory becoming part of Croatia.  

Vance and Owen selected option number two, but modified it to be a decentralized federal state consisting of ten regions. By the end of October, a draft constitution had been written that would form the basis of the core of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan. The Vance-Owen Peace Plan was officially presented to the three Bosnian ethnic groups on 2 January 1993. According to the plan (see figure 2), the regions of Tuzla (including Srebrenica), Bihac, and Zenica would be under Muslim control; Banja Luka, Bijeljina, and Nevesinje under Serbian control; and Mostar, Bosanski Brod, and Travnik under Croat control. Sarajevo and its surrounding area were to be given a special status and not placed under the control of any of the three ethnic groups. The plan was designed to undo the ethnic cleansing that had already occurred and discourage further activities of this nature. The Dutch Official Report on Srebrenica claims, “Of all the peace plans put forward, this was the one which came the closest to combining peace with justice. That, however, was also exactly what made it so difficult to implement.”
Figure 2. Map of Bosnian Cities


The Croatian delegation was the first to accept all parts of the plan: the constitutional principles, the ceasefire, and the geographical divisions. The Croats constituted only 17 percent of the population in Bosnia-Herzegovina; however, the three regions they would receive under the plan comprised one-third of the country. Additionally, all three of their regions, while not contiguous, shared a common border with Croatia. The plan was acceptable to those favoring an end to the war, as well as those in favor of a “Greater Croatia.” In response to the plan, the initials of the Bosnian Croat Army, HVO, were reinterpreted by some Croats to stand for Hvala (thank you) Vance Owen.²⁷
The Serbian delegation was less receptive to the plan. The VRS (Bosnian Serb Army) was in control of nearly 70 percent of Bosnia when the peace plan was proposed and the Vance-Owen Plan offered the Serbs only 40 percent of territory, thus requiring them to concede one-third of the land that they occupied. Additionally, they would not share a geographical border with the region of Banja Luka, which had a Serb majority population prior to and during the war. While they were prepared to agree to a ceasefire, they would not agree to either the constitutional principles or the geographical divisions of Bosnia.28

The Muslims strongly believed that the plan failed to give them a proportionate amount of land commensurate with their population. The Bosnian Muslim comprised 44 percent of the population, but they were given only 25 percent of the land in Bosnia under the plan. While the ARBiH (Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina – predominately Muslim) held just over 10 percent of Bosnia at the time, they believed that they were entitled to 40 to 50 percent of the land. Additionally, under the constitutional provisions, they would share power equally with the Serbs and Croats, despite having a plurality of the population. Notwithstanding these disagreements, the Muslim leaders initially accepted the plan. However, on 22 January 1993, Alija Izetbegovic (leader of the Bosnian Muslims) announced that they would accept only the ceasefire and the constitution, as they believed that the proposed map sanctioned the Serbian ethnic cleansing and their conquests.29

In spite of the agreed upon ceasefire, on 13 April 1993, Serbian military leaders informed a representative of the UNHCR that they would attack Srebrenica on 15 April, unless the town surrendered and the Muslim population was evacuated.30 Srebrenica lay
within ten miles of the Serbian border and represented the Muslim’s resolve to remain on their land, despite Serbian claims to the contrary. This sent officials at UNPROFOR and the UN scrambling for new options to curtail Serbian attacks on the safe areas. UN officials and the Serbian political leadership undertook diplomatic negotiations, while the UNPROFOR commander began negotiations with the Serbian military leaders in the area. The result was a temporary delay in a renewed Serbian offensive against Srebrenica and eastern BiH.

UNPROFOR and the Mission of the Safe Areas

In response to the safe areas created under UN Resolution 819 (1993), a senior US administration official was quoted as saying the resolution created “six little West Banks in Western Europe.” This discouraging comment summarized many of the worries and doubts that were prevalent at the time. However, the UN moved forward with the implementation of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan and Resolution 819. On 18 April 1993, 145 Canadian soldiers were sent to Srebrenica to monitor the agreed upon ceasefire and supervise the demilitarization of the Muslims in the safe area. In actuality, the town of Srebrenica was demilitarized while the surrounding area was not. The limited disarmament was due, in part, to the UN head of the DPKO (Department of Peace-Keeping Operations), Kofi Annan, who warned against a too rapid or complete disarmament. He stated that, “UNPROFOR takes on a moral responsibility for the safety of the disarmed that it clearly does not have the military resources to honour beyond a point.” Sharing Mr. Annan’s view of UNPROFOR’s capabilities in Srebrenica, the Canadian commander wrote to the DPKO chief that if the safe area was attacked,
They [the Canadian troops in Srebrenica] would fire back in self-defence; this includes defence of their mission, i.e. they would use force if armed elements attempted by force to intrude into the demilitarized area. However, as you have also stressed to us, UNPROFOR has deployed in Srebrenica with the agreement of the parties and the threat of the use of force in this context is intended to apply in a situation where a small number of armed elements violate this agreement. We understand, of course, that 145 peacekeepers cannot be expected to resist a full-scale invasion by the Bosnian Serb Army; and that should heavy artillery shelling occur, UNPROFOR will take shelter like everyone else.33

Bosniak leader, Alija Izetbegovic, was also in favor of the disarmament, as he believed that the Bosniaks in Srebrenica would turn over their weapons in exchange for UNPROFOR protection. The Muslim leaders in Srebrenica, however, turned in less than 300 weapons: 1 armored vehicle, 2 tanks, 23 mortar or artillery pieces, and 260 handguns.34

On 6 May 1993, the Bosnian Serb Assembly announced that it had rejected the Vance-Owen Peace Plan. Having anticipated this possible outcome, on 8 May, UNSCR (United Nations Security Council Resolution) 824 was passed, which now included the surrounding area of Srebrenica in the demilitarized zone and called for the ARBiH to turn over all of their weapons, mines, and ammunition to UNPROFOR. Following the ARBiH weapons turn over, the resolution promised that the Serb “heavy weapons and units that constitute a menace to the demilitarized zones which will have been established in Zepa and Srebrenica will be withdrawn.”35 The implementation of the resolution caused a series of debates between UNPROFOR and the UN. The UNPROFOR command believed it lacked adequate troop strength and resources to protect and enforce the declared demilitarized zone. France proposed a change to the UN mandate that clearly expressed the requirement for UNPROFOR to provide security for the safe areas and authorized the use of force “by all means necessary” in the completion of their mission.36 Conceding to
the French political pressure, the UN Security Council approved the more forceful resolution.

UNSCR 836 (1993) was passed on 4 June and extended the UNPROFOR mandate. The new resolution gave UNPROFOR the authority to deter attacks into safe areas, monitor the ceasefire, promote the withdrawal of belligerent forces from the safe area, and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid. Additionally, the resolution authorized the use of force to respond to artillery fire or armed attacks on the safe area, as well as against the deliberate obstruction of humanitarian convoys. Critical to this resolution was the specific mention of the use of air power to assist UNPROFOR in the accomplishment of their mission.\textsuperscript{37} It must also be noted that Resolution 836 did not mention the words “protect” or “defend” and linked the use of force to self-defense. On 18 June 1993 UNSCR 844 (1993) was passed, which authorized the use of 7,600 troops in BiH to provide increased support for Resolution 836 and reaffirmed the threat and use of air power in reply to violations of the safe area.\textsuperscript{38}

The UN resolutions did little to curb the Serbian aggression against UNPROFOR protected areas. On 30 July 1993, the Bosnian Serb forces launched an attack to seize key terrain features around Sarajevo and by early August they controlled all but one major road into the city. The Serbs began a siege of Sarajevo accompanied with heavy shelling of the city itself. On 23 July, the Serbs fired more than 3,500 artillery rounds into Sarajevo within a sixteen-hour period.\textsuperscript{39} By 2 August, the Serbian offensive had the unintended consequence of drawing NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) into the conflict. In response to the sealing off of Sarajevo by the Serbs, NATO offered air support for the UNPROFOR mission. The UN accepted the offer, after a series of
negotiations, announced on 18 August that the UN now had the operational capability to call for and launch NATO air strikes in support of their mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The air strikes, however, would only be launched with the concurrent agreement of the UNPROFOR Force Commander and the NATO Commander-in-Chief of Allied Forces South. This process was commonly referred to as the “dual key” arrangement. The dual key would eventually become a “duel key” between UNPROFOR and NATO, leading to delays, debates, and arguments over the employment of air power. However, at the time the threat of air strikes precipitated the withdrawal of Serbian forces from around Sarajevo and drove their leaders back to the negotiations table.

**UNPROFOR and NATO**

On 5 February 1994, an explosion, believed to be a mortar round, occurred in the Markale marketplace in central Sarajevo killing 68 and wounding another 200. Within the hour television crews were broadcasting the tragedy around the world, provoking anger against the Serb military and sympathy for the Bosniak civilians. The following day in Sarajevo, another mortar hit a group of civilians standing in line for water. The public outcry, created from these television reports on these two attacks, caused political leaders to demand NATO air strikes against Serb artillery and mortar positions. On 6 February, the secretary-general wrote the President of the Security Council and the Secretary-General of NATO requesting that they prepare to launch air strikes against Serbian targets that are determined by UNPROFOR to be responsible for the attacks.

The UNPROFOR Commander in Sarajevo objected to the planned air strikes, fearing that they may “drag the United Nations into the war.” He proposed to the Bosniak and Serbian forces around Sarajevo that they agree to a ceasefire and the
removal of all heavy weapons within 20 kilometers of Sarajevo, UNPROFOR troops be positioned along their battle lines, and that a new Joint Commission be formed to review and implement the agreement. The UN and NATO proceeded with the authorization for air strikes and received this plan coolly; however, the belligerents on the ground quickly approved it. In a compromise, NATO and the UN agreed to give the combatants ten days to remove their weapons from the 20 kilometers “Sarajevo Exclusion Zone.” The plan resulted in the removal of the majority of the weapons from the exclusion zone, the stabilization of the battle lines, and laid the groundwork for further negotiations. Despite the decrease in hostilities around Sarajevo, the Serbs continued to shell Srebrenica and block humanitarian convoys into the city.

The first request for NATO air strikes came on 12 March 1994, when a Serb tank near Bihac began firing in the vicinity of a French UNPROFOR position within the safe area. The NATO mission was not launched in support of UNPROFOR, as it encountered numerous delays in the approval process. The first engagement of a Serbian target by NATO aircraft came on 10 April 1993. Following a sustained attack against the city of Goradze, from 31 March through 10 April 1993, a US F-16 destroyed a VRS artillery command facility. The Serbs halted their bombardment of Goradze, but General Mladic (Commander of Serb forces in the region) warned that UN personnel would be killed if the NATO air strikes did not stop. The Serbs resumed their tank and artillery fire against Goradze the following day. NATO responded with air strikes that destroyed one tank and two APCs (armored personnel carriers). Again, the Serb attacks ceased and General Mladic issued his same threat to strike UN personnel.
On 14 April 1994, the Serbs took approximately 150 UNPROFOR soldiers hostage, primarily from heavy weapons collection points near Sarajevo. They continued their assault against Goradze while the UN and NATO debated their response. NATO launched a CAS mission on 16 April in the vicinity of Goradze and lost one aircraft to Serbian antiaircraft fire while it was engaging a tank formation. Later that day the Serbs agreed to stop their siege on Goradze in exchange for a halt to combat air patrols over the safe area. The Serbs had used the agreement as a means to delay air strikes and CAS while they continued offensive operations against the safe area. NATO and the UN released an ultimatum to the Serbs on 22 April 1993, which demanded: the Bosnian Serb attacks against Goradze cease immediately, the Serbs withdrawal from a 3 km zone around the city, and that humanitarian relief convoys and medical teams must have free and unimpeded access to Goradze.\textsuperscript{47} This was supported by the UNSCR 913 (1994), which demanded a Serb withdrawal from the safe area, as well as a limit on the ARBiH troop movements in the area. For their efforts the Serbs were rewarded with fifteen percent of what had been the “safe area” of Goradze.\textsuperscript{48}

**Effectiveness of the Safe Areas, 1993 to 1994**

The effectiveness of the safe areas from 1993 to 1994 is open for debate. On the positive side, it can be said that these areas limited the effectiveness of the Serbian policy of ethnic cleansing. Aside from 15 percent of Goradze, the Serbs were unable to take and hold any of the safe areas under UNPROFOR protection. While their shelling of the civilian centers in the safe areas did cause several hundred deaths in 1993 and 1994, UNPROFOR did avoid many more deaths through the establishment of the safe areas. The impeded flow of food supplies and medical aid to the safe areas resulted in needless
suffering for the Bosniak population, but the safe areas were able to avoid large-scale famine and disease.

A more negative assessment of the UN safe areas affixes blame on the encampments for encouraging Serbian ethnic cleansing in the areas surrounding the compounds. The Serbs were able to force Bosniaks into the safe areas under threat of death. Additionally, the war itself caused many Muslims to leave their homes and enter the camps out of fear. Either method resulted in a diminished population across the lands of Bosnia-Herzegovina and a concentrated population in the safe areas. Additionally, living conditions deteriorated rather quickly and the inhabitants of the safe areas suffered from alcoholism, petty theft, and boredom. These conditions served to breed resentment among the inhabitants against the soldiers protecting them and the UN Attacks by the Serbs against the safe areas often resulted in retaliatory strikes by angry Bosniak men in the safe areas. While the number of the retaliatory attacks was relatively few, and usually directed against Serb military units, they did serve as useful propaganda for the Serbian media, which paid particular attention to attacks on non-military targets.

The UN, UNPROFOR, and NATO were often at odds over the specific role that the safe areas were to fulfill, as well as their role regarding the camps. While the UN and NATO often wanted more robust air strikes than UNPROFOR, both had logical reasons for their positions. The UN and NATO believed that the air strikes would force the Serbs to stop their offensives and their attacks against the safe areas, while the UNPROFOR command believed that most air strikes only served to provoke the Serbs and endanger their troops. Regardless of their positions, both sides agreed that they needed to protect the safe areas against Serbian attacks. However, to accomplish this UNPROFOR felt they
needed a more robust mandate and more troops. The UN and NATO held the position that the troop strength (7,600) was adequate, if properly augmented with CAS and strategic air strikes.49

The failure of UNPROFOR at Srebrenica in July 1995, a subject that will be looked at closely in the next chapter, compelled the UN General Assembly to call for a “comprehensive report, including an assessment, on the events dating from the establishment of the safe area of Srebrenica.”50 The report found:

The United Nations had a mandate to “deter attacks” on Srebrenica and five other “safe areas” in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Despite that mandate, up to 20,000 people, overwhelmingly from the Bosnia Muslim community, were killed in and around the safe areas. In addition, a majority of the 117 members of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) who lost their lives in Bosnia and Herzegovina died in or around the safe areas.51

The Dutchbat surrender at Srebrenica serves as evidence that the good intentions of the UN could not compensate for the poor planning, ambiguity, and confusion inherent in the UNPROFOR peacekeeping mission. The UN’s and UNPROFOR’s reluctance to use force, combined with a lack of international will, a failure to maintain legitimacy for the mission, and disregard for the principle of unity of effort were exploited by the Bosnia Serb military and directly contributed to the failure of the Dutchbat mission at Srebrenica.

---


2Some linguists may dispute this comparison; however, the Serbian and Croatian languages are so closely related that nationalist scholars are actively attempting to draw a clear delineation between the two. The greatest difference between the two is found in idiomatic expressions.

4 Ivo Banac, *The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1984), 22. This is evidenced in the memoirs of Father Martinac from Grobnik, who noted with sorrow in 1493 that the Turks “fell upon the Croatian language” and took it as their own.

5 Rohde, *Endgame*, xi.


8 Bosnia-Herzegovina declared its independence on 1 March 1992. It was recognized by the European Community (now called the European Union) on 6 April 1992 and by the United States on 7 April 1992.

9 Honig and Both, *Srebrenica*, xviii.

10 The Bosniaks were pejoratively called ‘Turks’, as the Muslim faith was introduced to the Balkan Peninsula under the Ottoman Empire by the Turkish people. A person’s ethnicity in the Balkans is often determined by their religion, thus the term Turk refers to people of the Islamic faith and not necessarily of Turkish heritage.


12 Honig and Both, *Srebrenica*, 78.


14 Ibid., para. 41.

15 Ibid., para. 14.


20. UNSCR, A/54/549, para. 28.

21. The formal name of the London Conference was the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY).


29. Ibid., 224-225.


33. NIOD, *Srebrenica*, Part I, Ch. 10, Sect. 10, p. 3.

34. Ibid., 2.

35. UN, A/54/549, para. 65.

36. UN Security Council document S/25800, paras. 3-4.


40 UN, A/54/549, para. 106-110.


44 Ibid., 47-48.


46 UN, A/54/549, para. 132-135.

47 Ibid., para 140.

48 Ibid., 143.


51 UN General Assembly Document A/54/549, para. 3.
CHAPTER 4

AUTOPSY OF THE FALL OF SREBRENICA

With a consensus absent in the Council, lacking a strategy, and burdened by an unclear mandate, UNPROFOR was forced to chart its own course. There was only limited support for a ‘robust’ enforcement policy by UNPROFOR. UNPROFOR thus chose to pursue a policy of relatively passive enforcement, the lowest common denominator on which all Council members more or less agreed.  

Yasushi Akashi, UN Special Representative

The Fall of Srebrenica

On 6 July 1995, the VRS (Bosnian Serb Army) began *Operation Krivaja 95* as part of a continuing effort to ethnically cleanse all the remaining pockets of non-Serbs from eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH). The primary purpose of the operation was to eliminate the UN declared safe areas of Srebrenica, Gorazde, and Bihac, as well as, the expulsion or execution of their Muslim populations. Over the course of the next six days (6-11 July 1995), the Dutch peacekeepers would surrender the safe area of Srebrenica, the VRS would capture the safe area’s Dutch peacekeepers, expel more than 20,000 Muslims from the area, and execute more than 8,000 Muslim men and boys. In examining the events that transpired in the first phase of Operation Krivaja 95, the flaws inherent in the UN peacekeeping missions of the 1990s readily present themselves. This chapter will examine how the maxim of neutrality, lack of international political will, failure to maintain the legitimacy of the mission, and a lack of unity of effort directly contributed to the Dutch battalion’s surrender of the UN safe area of Srebrenica (see figure 3).
In order to better understand the impact of the UN’s actions regarding their failure to protect the safe area of Srebrenica, it is necessary to review the events surrounding the
VRS attack on the safe area between 6 and 11 July 1995. On 6 July 1995, at approximately 0300, the VRS launched an attack on Srebrenica safe area, which was under the protection of 428 Dutch soldiers from the 3rd Dutch Air Mobile Battalion (Dutchbat) and commanded by Lieutenant Colonel (Dutch) Ton Karremans. The opening phase of this operation was comprised of a series of small mortar, rocket, and artillery attacks on Bosnian Army (ARBiH) positions along the perimeter of the safe area, as well as into the enclave. The main effort of the VRS attack was from the southeast and by 0500 OP Foxtrot and OP Hotel were reporting the presence of VRS tanks engaging ARBiH forces in their vicinity. The purpose of the VRS attack was to capture OP Foxtrot, situated on top of Mount Javor, which would give them control over the main road into the Srebrenica and control over an important supply route to the south of the enclave.³

The VRS continued shelling positions around the perimeter of the Srebrenica safe area, as part of the shaping operations in support of their main effort to the south of the enclave.⁴ VRS rounds impacted in the vicinity of Dutchbat OPs throughout the morning; however, the first OP to be directly targeted by the VRS occurred at 1255. At this time OP Foxtrot was fired upon by a VRS tank, which damaged a defensive wall of the observation post.⁵ Attacks by the VRS continued throughout the day and were reported by Dutchbat; however, no reports of these events were forwarded to the UN in New York until the following day (see figure 4 for the structure of the chain of command).

Due to heavy fog, the second day of the attack, 7 July 1995, began with little military activity by either side. However, that evening the VRS fired sixteen artillery rounds into Srebrenica, with several rounds impacting near the Dutch base. The gravity
Figure 4. Dutchbat’s Chain of Command
of the situation still had not presented itself to the Dutchbat chain of command and that evening LTC Karremans reported that he believed the VRS activities were designed to “provoke and intimidate the ARBiH and Dutchbat.”\(^6\) However, LTC Karremans ended his report with an “appeal on behalf of the population of the enclave of Srebrenica” requesting “assistance by all means: ground and air.” Apparently the request was not forwarded by North-East Sector, as there is no evidence that it was received at headquarters, either at UNPROFOR or UNPF.\(^7\) During the night of 7 to 8 July, the VRS renewed the firing mortar and artillery rounds into Srebrenica and by morning 275 explosions had been recorded in the enclave.

Poor weather on the morning of 8 July again limited any serious engagements in and around the Srebrenica enclave. The fog and mist began to subside toward midday and at 1230 OP Foxtrot found itself under fire from a Serb T-54 tank. Reports show the VRS continued to shell the perimeter of the Srebrenica enclave, in addition to its attack on OP Foxtrot. By 1345 the tank was being support by artillery and the commander of OP Foxtrot requested and received permission to evacuate the observation post. However, prior to their withdrawal, the seven peacekeepers occupying the OP were compelled to surrender their weapons to VRS soldiers. As the Dutchbat soldiers retreated from OP Foxtrot, one crewmember (Private Raviv van Renssen) was killed when ARBiH soldiers engaged them in order to discourage their retreat.\(^8\) At approximately 1830, a second observation post, OP Uniform, surrendered and VRS soldiers took its peacekeepers to the Serb held city of Bratunac. LTC Karremans maintained that the purpose of these attacks was to gain control of the key terrain around the enclave and did constitute an attack on
the actual safe area of Srebrenica. He based his assertion on the fact that there were no attacks on the other OPs that comprised the enclave’s perimeter.

The following day, 9 July, proved LTC Karremans’ opinion to be rather hasty. At 0900, OP Sierra surrendered to VRS soldiers and its peacekeepers were forced to drive to Bratunac. The five-man crew of a Dutchbat APC (armored personnel carrier) reported at 1348 they had surrendered to a VRS force, which had disarmed them, taken the APC, and ordered them to walk to Bratunac. At 1358 OP Kilo, south of the enclave, reported that it had come under attack and there was heavy fighting between VRS and ARBiH forces in its vicinity. Less than two hours later OP Mike, northwest of the enclave, reported it had come under fire from VRS troops and the peacekeepers had abandoned the observation post for a position one kilometer away that offered better cover. By 1700, OP Delta reported that it too had come under attack by VRS forces. OP Hotel reported at 1830 that an element of approximately eighty Serbs had assembled on a hilltop overlooking Srebrenica and was beginning an assault into the town. At approximately the same time, OP Delta reported that it had surrendered to VRS soldiers. By the end of the day the VRS had advanced four kilometers into the safe area and were positioned one kilometer to the south of the town of Srebrenica.  

Dutchbat began the morning of 10 July by establishing a blocking position along the four major approach routes into the town of Srebrenica (see figure 3). The blocking force was comprised of fifty soldiers and six APCs operating from hastily constructed fixed positions on each of the routes, with two APCs on the two larger roads and one APC on each of the narrower roads. B Company was augmented with Forward Air Controllers (FACs) at one blocking position and other FACs on a hilltop near OP Hotel.
Throughout the day the VRS continued to shell the enclave, as well as several Dutchbat vehicles traveling in the vicinity of B Company’s blocking position. On several occasions during the day, CAS (close air support) was requested by Dutchbat, but denied by UNPROFOR (more discussion on the use of CAS will come later in this chapter). Thus, Dutchbat’s requests were not forwarded to NATO.

During the course of the days events, several erroneous reports were forwarded to the United Nation’s Protection Force (UNPF), headquartered in Zagreb, which claimed the ARBiH had attacked B Company’s blocking position and fired on Dutchbat forces. However, by evening it was confirmed that all attacks against UNPROFOR troops had been committed by the VRS. The French UNPF commander, Lieutenant-General (LTG) Bernard Janvier, had rejected all further CAS requests throughout the day. However, that evening LTG Janvier did authorize the UNPF to coordinate with NATO in order to have aircraft airborne and ready to conduct CAS missions against VRS targets by 0600 on 11 July.

At approximately 0400 on 11 July 1995, Dutchbat was informed that forty targets had been identified and NATO aircraft would begin engaging them at approximately 0650. NATO began launching more than sixty aircraft (to include AWACS, fighters, electronic jamming aircraft, tankers, and others) to support the expected CAS missions against VRS military targets. There was widespread confusion over the requested CAS from 0700 to 1000 when Dutchbat forwarded another CAS request and was informed it would not be available until 1400. The VRS, who had been formally warned of the pending CAS missions against their positions, waited until 1100 to resume their offensive against the town and safe area of Srebrenica. Their first targets were OP Mike and OP
November, both of which began receiving tank and artillery fire by 1130. At 1230 OP Hotel came under artillery fire and by 1330 the B Company compound (containing 4,000 to 5,000 Bosniak civilians) also came under fire. The VRS encountered little resistance as they entered the town of Srebrenica and at 1407 the Serbian flag was hoisted above a bakery at the southern end of the city. By 1600, Srebrenica had fallen without a shot being fired by the Dutch peacekeepers or a single air strike by NATO.\(^\text{12}\)

When evening fell on 11 July 1995, the Serbian forces had effectively captured more than 20,000 Bosniaks who had sought shelter in the UN safe area.\(^\text{13}\) The next day Serb forces began to separate the men, between 15 to 70 years of age, from the women and children. MAJ Rob Franken, the Dutchbat Deputy Commander, believed the Bosniak men were going to be questioned by the VRS soldiers as prisoners of war in accordance with the Geneva Conventions.\(^\text{14}\) Thus, he directed Dutch soldiers to assist in the segregation of the Muslim men. The women and children were placed on buses and sent west to Bosniak city of Kladanj or farther north in the enclave to the city of Potocari. As for the men, a more sinister fate was awaiting them. Over the course of the next five days, more than 8,000 of the men and boys would be summarily executed or killed while attempting to evade the Serbs in the local countryside. The dead where subsequently buried in various mass graves located across eastern BiH. The International War Crimes Tribunal Prosecutor, Judge Fouad Adbel-Moneim Riad of Egypt, stated:

After Srebrenica fell to besieging Serbian forces in July 1995, a truly terrible massacre of the Muslim population appears to have taken place . . . scenes of unimaginable savagery: thousands of men executed and buried in mass graves, hundreds of men buried alive, men and women mutilated and slaughtered, children killed before their mothers’ eyes. . . . These are truly scenes from hell, written on the darkest pages of human history.\(^\text{15}\)
The failure of the UN peacekeepers at Srebrenica can be attributed to the four factors that are under review in this thesis: maintaining the maxim of neutrality to the point of inaction, a lack of international political will, failing to maintain the legitimacy of the mission, and a lack of unity of effort--particularly in relation to unity of command. The remainder of this chapter is dedicated to examining each of these factors as they pertain to the fall of Srebrenica between 6 and 11 July 1995. The subject of close air support is prevalent within the analysis all four factors and thus will appear as a central theme in the following discussion.

Maxim of Neutrality

The concept of neutrality, as practiced by UNPROFOR peacekeepers in July 1995, had devolved to the point of inaction. All levels in the chain of command were hesitant to use CAS against VRS forces that were actively shelling and threatening the safe area, its civilian population, and the UN peacekeepers. The UNPROFOR Force Commander, LTG Bernard Janvier, believed the use of CAS was a last resort and would be viewed by the VRS as a violation of UNPROFOR’s declared neutrality. On several occasions between 6 and 10 July, Dutchbat was hesitant to request CAS and allowed the VRS to successfully maneuver closer to Srebrenica and cutoff its supply lines. When Dutchbat did request CAS, it was denied by either UNPROFOR or UNPF. Only on the night of 10 July, when the surrender of Srebrenica was imminent, did UNPROFOR approve Dutchbat’s CAS request. Unfortunately, the CAS mission arrived too late to prevent the VRS from capturing the Srebrenica enclave. A review of the resistance by UNPROFOR units to employ CAS will serve to illuminate how the maxim of neutrality,
as held by the UN leadership regarding BiH, contributed to the Dutchbat surrender at Srebrenica.

The French LTG Janvier, UNPF Commander in Zagreb, believed the use of air strikes against the VRS would only escalate hostilities and demonstrate support for the ARBiH. According to MG Frank Van Kappen (Dutch), military advisor to the UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, LTG Janvier was only prepared to use CAS when UNPROFOR was under fire from heavy weapons and there was no other method in which to resolve the situation. Janvier’s strict adherence to the maxim of neutrality, and his desire to remain impartial, were products of his desire to “do things right” rather than a desire to “do the right thing.” Critiques of Janvier claim that his stated desire to maintain the perception of neutrality and to protect UNPROFOR troops, actually served as an excuse for inaction.

British LTG Rupert Smith believed UNPF’s reluctance to use force gave UNPROFOR an inferior position in relation to the VRS, to the point of being its hostage. As the events of 6-11 July 1995 began to unfold, LTG Smith analysis of the effects of inaction proved to be prophetic. On 6 July, Dutchbat requested CAS at approximately 1330 as OP Foxtrot had come under direct attack by the VRS. Sector Northeast approved the request and forwarded it to UNPROFOR, where it was disapproved for not meeting LTG Janvier’s criteria to be used only as a last resort. Dutchbat again requested CAS on 8 July as OP Foxtrot had come under fire by a VRS tank and artillery. Again the request was denied by UNPROFOR in Sarajevo with the concurrence of UNPF in Zagreb. At 1426 the Dutch soldiers surrendered OP Foxtrot to
the VRS. This sequence of events was repeated throughout the Serb offensive against the UN declared safe area of Srebrenica.

The reluctance to use force by UNPF and UNPROFOR against the VRS, even when it was openly engaged in hostile acts against UN peacekeepers, gave the VRS the capability to conduct offensive operations in an unimpeded manner. Only on the night of 10 July after the surrender of seven OPs, did the UNPF Commander request CAS from NATO. Even then, the VRS was warned by UNPF of the pending CAS missions against their positions and their probable time of attack. When the CAS missions did not materialize within the specified time on 11 July (addressed later in this chapter), the VRS resumed their assault on Srebrenica. The maxim of neutrality, as practiced by UNPF and UNPROFOR, directly contributed to the failure of the UN’s mission in Srebrenica.

**International Political Will**

Bosnia is a brutal reminder of the power of ethnic and nationalist hatreds, how dangerous this power is to the peace not just of a particular part of Europe, but to Europe as a whole, and how important it is to defuse ethnic grievances before they explode. . . . The failure to respond properly in the first phase of the Yugoslav tragedy [was] the greatest collective failure of the West since the 1930s.”

US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke, North Atlantic Assembly, May 1995

International political will for the UN peacekeeping mission in BiH was weakening by July 1995. The US and Great Britain believed UNPROFOR needed an enhanced ability to enforce the pertinent UN resolutions and to punish those who threatened the civilian population or the UN mission. Their policy of choice was to “lift and strike.” First, lift the arms embargo on BiH and then use air strikes to force VRS compliance with the peace accords. However, this was in direct contrast to the views
held by the countries with substantial ground forces in Bosnia, primarily the French and Dutch, which believed the mission required an increase in troop strength or a revision to its mandate. The troop contributing nations held that lifting the arms embargo would result in an escalation of violence and air strikes would be ineffective against the VRS. The lack of consensus resulted in the maintenance of the status quo, thus leaving UNPROFOR in an increasingly complex and hostile environment, without adapting either the mandate or the troop strength to the actual conditions in BiH.

The commanders at different levels in the mission’s chain of command often espoused their nation’s theories on how the situation could best be resolved. The French LTG Janvier, Commander UNPF, was reluctant to authorize the use CAS or any form of military retaliation against the VRS for obstructing the flow humanitarian aid or resupply convoys in BiH. He maintained that such actions would only escalate hostilities. In contrast, the British LTG Rupert Smith, Commander UNPROFOR, was in favor of using both CAS and other military means to open the supply routes and to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid. Like the debate their countries were engaged in at the UN over the use of force, Smith would request CAS and Janvier would deny the request.

The international community remained split over the situation in BiH. The US, Canada, and Britain sided with the Bosniak population and believed that strong military action needed to be taken against the VRS. However, none were willing to deploy a large contingent of ground forces to the region. The US was willing to commit air force and naval assets to support UNPROFOR, but only under the umbrella of NATO. Additionally, following the withdrawal of its ground forces from Somalia, President
Clinton and US public were unwilling to deploy ground troops in support of another peacekeeping mission.

Russia was also vocal in the international community regarding the conflict in BiH. The Russian political leadership was firmly on the side of the Orthodox Christian and Slavic VRS. They maintained that the best course to follow for the successful resolution of the conflict was to maintain the weapons embargo against BiH and use diplomacy to stop the fighting. With three permanent members of the UN Security Council (the US, France, and Russia) each in favor of different courses of action to resolve the conflict in BiH, only resolutions appealing to the lowest common denominator could make it through the Security Council. The lack of consensus among these three nations kept any one course of action being adopted and carried through to fruition. International political will for the mission in BiH was a victim of high-powered politics more than a victim of international apathy. Thus, the inability to build consensus for a viable course of action in dealing with the crisis in BiH left Dutchbat undermanned, under equipped, and without a comprehensive mandate to deal with the situation around Srebrenica.

Legitimacy of the Mission

By July of 1995, Dutchbat had yet to come to terms with its two demanding missions: to protect the inhabitants of the safe areas from aggression and to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid to the safe areas. The reluctance by key UN commanders throughout the chain of command to use CAS against those acting against the peace process allowed violators to benefit from their misdeeds. The benefits of noncompliance often outweighed the associated costs of compliance or the low probability of limited
UNPROFOR or NATO retaliation. UNPROFOR’s reluctance to use CAS allowed the VRS to shell the safe area of Srebrenica hundreds of times per day between 6 and 10 July, without suffering from Dutchbat, UNPROFOR, or NATO reprisal. The result was a ratio of 20:1 for artillery and mortar rounds being fired into the safe area by the VRS versus those fired against them by the ARBiH (UN forces did not return fire until 11 July).27

The result of the UN forces resistance to request CAS against hostile targets, aside from the continued VRS shelling, was that Dutchbat found itself unable to provide safe transit for humanitarian aid convoys into the safe area of Srebrenica. The trucks were not permitted to pass through an assortment of blockades established and manned by the VRS or various gangs and paramilitary groups in the area. Once stopped, many of the vehicles in the convoy were often robbed or ‘taxed’ at the roadblocks. In several instances the vehicles were hijacked, the cargo was stolen, and the drivers and peacekeepers were forced to return home on foot. Respect for the legitimacy of the UN mission was nearly nonexistent, as the warring factions manipulated the situation to best serve their own interests.

Due to the continuous harassment and hijacking of humanitarian aid convoys by the VRS and its constant shelling of the safe areas, the Bosnian government claimed that Dutchbat was biased towards the VRS and Slobodan Milosevic’s desires for a Greater Serbia. The Netherlands Institute for War Documentation (NIOD) stated in its formal report on Srebrenica that the Bosnian Government believed that the UN mission had lost its impartiality and “the Bosnian Government broadcast that point of view with fervor, both in the media and in confrontations with UNPROFOR.”28 In the eyes of the Bosniak
population, UNPROFOR was too light handed with the VRS in regard to carrying out their mandated mission.

The VRS and the Bosnian Serb population’s opinion of UNPROFOR held that the UN peacekeepers were openly biased towards the Muslim population. The VRS viewed the safe areas as providing a haven for the ARBiH and Bosniak paramilitary forces and served as staging bases for raids against the ethnic Serb population. While the VRS claims were far from the truth, they used the media to perpetuate their anti-UNPROFOR propaganda in both the Balkans and the West. In turn, they used the claims of partiality towards the Bosniak population to justify the banning of humanitarian aid and Dutchbat resupply convoys into the safe area of Srebrenica. The continuous media assault by the VRS against the UN mission in BiH contributed to UNPROFOR’s loss of public support among the local Serbian population and in Europe, and thus contributed to the loss the mission’s legitimacy.

Dutchbat and the civilian population of Srebrenica directly suffered from the loss of legitimacy for the mission in the eyes of the belligerent parties. The VRS’s ability to choke off of supplies caused Dutchbat’s morale suffered due to limited food supplies, an inability to properly maintain their equipment, and general frustration with their inability to move freely between Srebrenica and Sarajevo. The civilian population suffered to a greater extent than did Dutchbat. The VRS’s ability to control vehicular travel into and out of the safe area of Srebrenica resulted in severe food and fuel shortages, limited hygiene and medical materials, an inability to remove trash and waste, and no access to advanced medical care. Additionally, the VRS’s activities limited the Bosniak
population’s ability to communicate with friends and family outside of the safe area, which also had a negative impact on their morale and emotional well-being.\textsuperscript{31}

David Rohde, the Pulitzer Prize winning author for his work on Srebrenica, described the conditions caused by the VRS blockade of Srebrenica:

The stench from the overcrowded apartment buildings where the refugees lived twelve to a room was unbearable. Every inch of floor space was used. At night, kitchen and bathroom floors became beds. Dozens of people shared the same toilet. The town’s sewage system was constantly overflowing and filling the air with the smell of feces. Fetid heaps of garbage lay where they had been dumped six months earlier. With the Serbs blockading resupply convoys, there was no fuel for trash removal. Lice, fleas and rats thrived inside and outside the buildings.\textsuperscript{32}

With the VRS and the ARBiH both viewing Dutchbat and UNPROFOR as acting in a manner favorable to their opposition, the legitimacy of the UN mission was virtually absent by July 1995. Both parties actively circumvented the criteria, rules, and objectives for the peace process and those set forth in UNPROFOR’s mandate. The UN mission was reliant upon the impartiality of the peacekeeping force, actual and perceived, in order to maintain the legitimacy of its mission. However, the mission’s legitimacy was equally dependent upon the cooperation and consent of the belligerent parties. While the actions and inactions of UNPROFOR contributed to the diminished legitimacy of the peacekeeping mission, the VRS and ARBiH share a large portion of the blame for their failure to cooperate with the peacekeepers and failing to consent to the rules and restrictions placed upon them.

\textbf{Unity of Effort}

Unity of effort, aside from a desire for the conflict in BiH to end, was absent among the UN Security Council members by July 1995. Their inability to build consensus on how to best deal with the situation even permeated into the chain of
command. As shown in figure 4, the UNPROFOR headquarters was staffed with 182 officers from twenty-three countries. The officers lacked a common language, had widely varied competency levels, and often would only follow instructions from their own countries. As previously discussed, many of the contributing countries had divergent opinions for ending the conflict, which translated into the recommendations the officers provided. This resulted in the creation of two staff structures: one functional and the other for show. The functional staff was comprised of officers from NATO countries or who were NATO trained. The “show staff” was created to satisfy the requests of troop contributing countries to have representation on the staff commensurate to their troop strength on the ground. This staff was comprised of officers, filling UN mandated billets, who lacked the requisite skills to effectively communicate, competently plan, or culturally integrate with the other staff officers. Thus, there did not exist a coherent unity of effort even within the staff of UNPROFOR.\textsuperscript{33}

In addition to the disunity of the staff, UNPROFOR suffered from an overly convoluted chain of command. The parallel politico-military structure hindered the commands' ability to coherently execute its mandated mission. LTG Smith, UNPROFOR Commander, had only four properly equipped battalions under his command to which he could issue orders without prior coordination with their respective governments. In order for UNPROFOR to gain permission to use many of the ground forces, LTG Smith often had to rely on LTG Janvier, UNPF Commander, to negotiate directly with the nation that had contributed the peacekeepers. If a problem or issue was encountered, LTG Janvier would report it back to the UN in New York. However, there was no General Staff for him to deal with directly. Thus, he was forced to answer to, and seek strategic guidance
from, the secretary-general, the UN Security Council, and the DPKO. As might be expected, this was often a long, drawn-out, and unproductive process. The command structure designed by the UN did not serve to promote unity of effort.

The convoluted chain of command had a detrimental effect on the ability of Dutchbat to employ its most powerful weapon--CAS. The manner in which CAS was requested was a direct consequence of the design of the command structure. CAS was not provided by UN forces but by NATO aircraft stationed in Italy. The disunity regarding the employment of CAS began with the purpose of CAS missions. The UN viewed CAS as a means to deter VRS aggression against the peacekeepers and the civilian population. NATO viewed CAS as a means of retribution for violations or a mechanism by which to destroy aggressors. In addition to disagreements over the purpose of CAS, the UN command structure caused CAS requests to take more than three hours to be employed, by the time the mission was requested, approved, launched, directed to the target, and released its ordnance.\(^{34}\)

The process for requesting CAS failed to work for Dutchbat during the VRS offensive against Srebrenica, even after it was finally approved on 10 July. Following a series of meetings on the evening of 10 July, LTG Javier approved Dutchbat’s request for CAS, referred to as a ‘Blue Sword’ mission to attack VRS positions beginning at 0650 on the following morning, 11 July. LTG Janvier informed the VRS of his decision and, following his notification, LTC Karremans informed the Bosniak leadership in Srebrenica of the Blue Sword mission. “The Serbs have received an ultimatum. They have to withdrawal by 0600. Otherwise there will be bombing everywhere.”\(^{35}\)
The CAS mission, however, arrived too late. The next morning at 0650 Dutchbat, the ARBiH, and the VRS awaited the arrival of the NATO aircraft. At 1000 Dutchbat contacted Sector Northeast to inquire as to the location of the CAS mission. They were informed that Dutchbat had not requested it, so LTC Karremans faxed a request. The request was transmitted to UNPROFOR forty minutes later at 1040. The delay was caused by the redeployment of a Canadian air liaison on 1 July. His duties had been shifted to the Pakistani contingent in the operations section. The Pakistanis were unfamiliar with NATO procedures and format and thus had problems completing the NATO CAS request form. At 1100 the Serbs resumed their offensive.

The Blue Sword package of aircraft had been circling outside of BiH airspace since shortly after 0600 that morning. When the CAS request was finally received, the aircraft needed to return to base and a new package of 18 aircraft was launched. The new Blue Sword mission was expected to arrive over their targets at 1345. Unfortunately, they had difficulty establishing contact with the FACs and did not arrive until 1430. This delay has been attributed to a lack of training between the FACs and NATO aircraft since the establishment of a no fly zone over BiH in June 1995, following the downing of US Air Force Captain Scott O’Grady. These particular aircrews and FACs had not trained together. The CAS arrived too late as the members of Dutchbat in Srebrenica began surrendering at 1407. The VRS ordered UNPROFOR to turnoff the CAS or they would begin executing Dutchbat soldiers. Further CAS missions were cancelled by UNPF, which gave the VRS unimpeded access to the safe haven and its Bosniak inhabitants. Within hours the VRS began their systematic expulsion of the Muslim population from the enclave and the executions soon followed.
The UN and Dutchbat’s failure at Srebrenica resulted in worldwide condemnation and a great loss of credibility for the organization. The reluctance to use force, the inability to gain and maintain international political will, lose of legitimacy, and a disunity of effort all served to perpetuate the eventual outcome of the mission.

UNPROFOR showed the world the some of glaring faults with the manner in which the UN conducted its peacekeeping missions. The next chapter will make recommendations to help improve the UN peacekeeping operations with the hope that these tragic lessons will not be repeated again.

---


5Ibid., para. 241.

6Honig and Both, Srebrenica, 9.

7UN document A/54/549, paras. 246-249.

8Honig and Both, Srebrenica, 9.

9UN document A/54/549, paras. 262-276 and Honig and Both, Srebrenica, 12-18.

10UN document A/54/549, paras. 281-282.

11Honig and Both, Srebrenica, 18-22.
Honig and Both, *Srebrenica*, 24-26, and UN document A/54/549, paras. 300-305. NATO aircraft arrived at 1430 and completed one CAS mission destroying one tank and damaging another. However, they were called off when the VRS threatened to kill captured Dutchbat soldiers if any more VRS targets were engaged.

The term *Bosniak* refers to a person of the Islamic faith living in Bosnia-Herzegovina. A common pejorative term is ‘Turk’.


NIOD, Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2, p. 1-2.

Ibid., p. 3-4.

Ibid., p. 3-4.

NIOD, Part III, Chapter 1, Section 3, p. 1.

UN document A/54/549, para 242-243.

Ibid., para 250-253.

Ibid., paras 289-293.


UN document A/54/549, para 75.

NIOD, Part II, Chapter 10, Sections 10-12.

NIOD, Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2, p. 2-4.

NIOD, Part III, Chapter 6, Sections 5-13. Average was compiled from daily accounts referenced in the report.

NIOD, Part II, Chapter 10, Section 1, p. 4.

Ibid.

NIOD, Part II, Chapter 8, Section 11, p 1-5.

32 Rohde, 55.

33 NIOD, Part III, Chapter 6, Section 3, p 1-2.

34 NIOD, Part III, Chapter 6, Section 4, p 1-2.

35 Honig and Both, Srebrenica, 21-22.

36 NIOD, Part III, Chapter 6, Section 3, p. 3-5.

37 NIOD, Part III, Chapter 6, Section 4, p. 4.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION: CHANGING UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

There have been 54 United Nations mandated peace, humanitarian, and observer missions through December 31, 2000. Thirty-five of these were initiated during the 1990s and one--the UN Mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia (UNMEE)--in 2000.¹

The preceding chapters have shown the UN mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the massacre of UN protected civilians at Srebrenica were not anomalies, but part of a systemic failure of the UN to successfully counter aggression directed against, or in violation of, its peacekeeping missions. The UN must undergo a dramatic shift in the manner in which it conducts and supports its peacekeeping operations. This shift must include changes in the approach the UN takes towards those who violate the agreements, accords, or resolutions that introduced UN peacekeepers into the conflict; the generation and maintenance of international political will; the preservation of the mission’s legitimacy; and must ensure that there exists a prescribed, coherent, and effective unity of effort, which is focused on the desired end-state for the mission.

The end of the Cold War brought an end to the bipolar hegemony in international affairs exercised between Eastern communist and Western capitalist powers, primarily between the Soviet Union and the United States of America. The dissolution of the Soviet Union has resulted in the division of the world into a multipolar collective of nations whose political stabilization or equilibrium has yet to occur. Thus, over the past decade, nation states have disintegrated into more ethnically and culturally homogenous subunits, such as in Yugoslavia, while others (primarily on the African Continent) have begun to question the validity of borders imposed by foreign powers.² The probability for future
UN peacekeeping mission remains very high for the foreseeable future. The UN can continue to approach these missions as it did during the 1990’s, with predictably the same results, or it can reevaluate and transform the manner in which it conducts peacekeeping operations. The following recommendations are offered to help mitigate the problems that have plagued UN peacekeepers over the past decade. The UN must break its maxim of neutrality, maintain international political will, establish and preserve the operation’s legitimacy, and ensure unity of effort for the mission.

### Breaking the Maxim of Neutrality

Once deployed, United Nations peacekeepers must be able to carry out their mandates professionally and successfully and be capable of defending themselves, other mission components and the mission’s mandate, with robust rules of engagement, against those who renege on their commitments to a peace accord or otherwise seek to undermine it by violence.\(^3\)

Brahimi Report, Executive Summary, 21 August 2000

The UN has been overly restrictive in the interpretation of neutrality during its peacekeeping missions of the 1990s. It has viewed neutrality as treating all parties in the conflict as equals, regardless of the actions of those parties. Even when peacekeepers or civilians under their protection were taken hostage, raped, or murdered the UN commanders at all levels were reluctant to use force against those responsible for the violent actions. Rather, they continued to maintain their guise of neutrality by treating all parties in relatively the same manner. The UN’s applied definition of neutrality, often as an excuse for inaction, has served as implied consent to those in violation of the peace treaties and applicable UN resolutions, instead of contributing to the achievement of the desired end state for the mission.
Chapter VI of the UN Charter (Articles 33 to 38) is the basis for conducting peacekeeping missions; however, peacekeeping is not specifically addressed in the Charter. In fact the concept and practice of peacekeeping was developed by the UN during the Cold War, as a “peaceful means” to assist in bringing about the culmination of hostilities between two belligerent parties. Traditional UN peacekeeping missions are initiated at the request of the belligerent parties and typically follow, or are a part of, a peace agreement. Thus, the peacekeepers enter into the country or region with the consent of the belligerent parties as a neutral third party, in order to facilitate the peace process. Unfortunately, as shown in the preceding chapters, the “consenting parties” are often in violation of the peace accords to which they are signatories. This has placed the UN peacekeepers in a position where their declared neutrality has left them ineffective in preserving the peace and, as the Charter promises, “saving future generations from the scourge of war.”

In Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia the peacekeeping forces on the ground had little trouble identifying those parties who were intent on destabilizing and undermining the peace process. In Somalia, the identities and operating areas of the warlords and gangs that continuously attacked UN and NGO (non-governmental organization) convoys were well known to the peacekeepers. However, preemptive or offensive actions were seldom initiated against them. In Rwanda, General Dallaire had solid information on the location of the Hutu weapon’s caches, but his superiors at the UN would not allow UNAMIR to seize them, despite several written requests to do so. In Bosnia it was clear that Serbian leaders and military forces were conducting a campaign of ethnic cleansing. However, in the name of neutrality, UNPROFOR continued to treat Bosnian Serbs, Croats, and
Bosniaks alike. Thus, through their strict definition of neutrality and inaction, UNPROFOR allowed the VRS to continue their campaign of ethnic cleansing. In all of these cases, the UN and its peacekeepers failed to take appropriate action to stop the spread and increase of violence against civilian populations within their areas of operation.

The UN must clearly identify violators and threats to their mission, in order to take appropriate actions to neutralize or mitigate the threats. In areas that have undergone prolonged or intense warfare, military strength is often the most powerful motivator to deter future violent acts. UN mandates, which send troops into complex and dangerous peacekeeping environments, must clearly articulate the penalties for non-compliance with the terms of the peace accords. Failing to properly identify the penalties for violations can lead to unfortunate speculations and expectations among all parties involved. It must be clearly mandated and understood from the outset of the mission that force directed against peacekeepers or civilians will be met with decisive and overwhelming force. The peacekeepers are involved in the peace process at the request of the factions involved in the conflict and its resolution. The parties involved in the conflict must clearly understand what the commitment of peacekeepers will entail to the peace process, both near and long term.

Alongside more robust and well-defined UN mandates, there must also exist a commensurate upgrade in the weapons, force structure, and command and control of the peacekeepers assigned to these missions. The department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) must carefully analyze the potential military capabilities of the belligerents involved in the conflict and properly arm
and equip the peacekeepers to deter the potential threat posed by these parties. The UN forces must be adequately trained, manned, and equipped to ensure a high probability for success against any potential military threat within their area of operations. If these conditions are absent, the result is the raising of false hopes and expectations for an end to hostilities and the risk of further damaging the UN’s credibility.

**Maintaining International Political Will**

As we step over the threshold from one century to the next, the United Nations is faced with growing demands for collective intervention alongside declining confidence in its effectiveness and efficiency, diminishing financial support for its activities by some leading industrialized countries, and gathering storm clouds in the direction in which it seems to be headed, propelled by the challenge of humanitarian intervention.¹⁵

Joseph Nye, the Dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, wrote, “The ties that bind the international community may be weak, but they matter. Failure to pay proper respect to the opinion of others and to incorporate a broad concept of justice . . . will eventually come to hurt us.”¹⁶ The UN remains reliant upon its member nations to contribute troops and fund its peacekeeping missions. The politicians and diplomats from the member nations are unlikely to go against domestic public sentiment or risk their careers for issues that do not pose a clear and imminent threat to the interests of their nation. It must be expected that independent nations will act as independent nations and in accordance with their own national self-interests. The problem of maintaining international political will is one of economics, domestic politics, and international agreement on how the mission is to be carried out.
The economics of peacekeeping is a complex issue. The cost of UN peacekeeping missions is typically quite high (in the tens-of-millions of dollars range annually), while the cost of half-hearted actions or inaction can be considerably higher, such as in Rwanda. The funding required for a peacekeeping mission is not part of the annual dues paid to the UN, but is paid separately by contributing nations to the DPKO. The DPKO budget soared during the 1990s in direct correlation to the number of peacekeeping missions that the UN decided to undertake. The peacekeeping budget grew from $230 million in 1988 to $3.61 billion in 1993 and was $3.8 billion for 2003. It has been common practice for the Security Council to pass a resolution without receiving a commitment from member nations for funding, troops, and equipment. Political will for the peacekeeping mission is expressed here as financial and military contributions to the peacekeeping mission. The UN secretary-general must be allowed to canvass member states prior to the passing of a UNSCR, to ensure that adequate funding and troops will be available to conduct the mission. It is one thing to debate and vote for a peacekeeping mission on moral or humanitarian grounds, while it is quite another to tangibly demonstrate support for the mission through substantial financial or military contributions.

Demonstrating political will, through financial or military contributions, is intertwined with the contributing country’s domestic policies. Depending on their particular political and economic situation, countries are concerned to greater or lesser degree with amount of money spent on a UN operation. During times of recession or economic instability, countries are more reluctant to contribute funds to UN missions outside of their own continent. It is thus necessary to clearly articulate the necessity of the
mission and the expenditures required to support it to the general public. According to Leon Gordenker, Professor Emeritus of Politics at Princeton University, the United States experienced this situation in the late 1980s:

Combined with a broad public distaste for financing foreign ventures, opposition to UN expenditures gradually permeated the United States Congress. By early 1988, the failure of Congress to honor requests from the President for appropriations for UN contributions built up the United States debt to the United Nations to more than $1 billion. . . . The consequence of the reluctance by the US Congress to spend taxpayers’ money, even the relatively small amounts involved in the UN budget, was a gradually increasing threat of bankruptcy for the organization.9

By 2001, unpaid peacekeeping arrears were $2.5 billion, of which the US owed more than 60 percent.10

A perpetual problem for the UN over the past two decades has been the manner in which the UN manages and conducts peacekeeping operations. The US, UK, Russia, and other key monetary contributors to the UN believe the organization’s bureaucracy needs to undergo a major reform. Nations calling for reform claim the organization is over-manned, mismanages its funds, and wastes money on administrative excesses. (The current Oil for Food scandal regarding UN funds mismanagement and corruption will certainly strengthen the case and demands for reform.) This has led to a resistance to continue funding numerous peacekeeping operations that appear to be never ending and a reluctance to allow the establishment of new, robust peacekeeping operations.11 The questions surrounding how contributions to the UN are managed has led to a decrease of confidence in the UN among its larger member states; thus, a decline in the political will required to maintain support for peacekeeping operations.
Establishing and Preserving Mission Legitimacy

For a UN peacekeeping mission to be established and ultimately successful, the mission must be able to maintain its legitimacy. Legitimacy for UN peacekeeping missions exists at three levels: international or collective legitimacy, legitimacy among the belligerents, and legitimacy among the peacekeeping force. If legitimacy fails to exist at any one of these levels, the peacekeeping mission will certainly be at risk of failure. Collective legitimacy, according to the scholar Inis Claude, “sets the conditions under which violence in international relations may be acceptable.” Perhaps the best example is the broad approval given to the US by the UN to conduct military operations to support South Korea in 1950.12 This form of legitimacy is the hardest to establish, as it depends on the ability of the UN to gain widespread approval for the mission among its members. Diplomats and politicians must often invest a serious amount of political capital in order to bring about a Security Council resolution for a peacekeeping mission.

When there exists a wide division among the member states, seeking and attaining collective legitimacy seldom occurs. An example of this can be found in either the Vietnam War or Operation Iraqi Freedom, where the US was unable to attain UN approval for its desired military actions. When the US has conducted offensive military operations without UN approval, the UN has often served as a forum were other nations could denounce the actions of the US. While collective legitimacy is often the hardest to establish, it erodes at a comparatively slower rate than the other forms of legitimacy. This is due to the fact that the nations, their diplomats, and their key political figures have a vested interest in the successful outcome of the peacekeeping mission. If the UN mission they supported fails, it will become political cannon fodder during the next election.
Peacekeeping operations must also maintain legitimacy among the belligerents and the civilian population entangled in the conflict. This can be accomplished through the maintenance of neutrality and predictability in the actions of the peacekeepers, while accompanying a cessation in hostilities. The maintenance of neutrality, as previously addressed, does not imply absolute neutrality regardless of the actions of the parties involved. Instead, it implies impartiality by the peacekeepers and the maintenance of the perception that everyone is given just, fair, and even treatment. Humanitarian aid, in all of its forms, must be distributed evenly among the citizenry, not predominantly to the locations that are nearest to the ports and airfields. Additionally, aid must be distributed to the inhabitants of areas that potentially place the peacekeepers in harms way. Neutrality, in regard to peacekeeping operations, must be the perception that all actors involved in the conflict are entitled to and receive the same system of rewards and punishment.

A peacekeeping mission must also ensure it maintains legitimacy among the members of the peacekeeping force assigned to the operation. UN peacekeepers are traditionally soldiers, which by the nature of their profession are trained and equipped to operate in hostile environments. If the UN is perceived to be risk averse during the mission, as in dealing with the VRS in Bosnia, the peacekeepers will question the validity of the mission. Risk must be managed, not avoided, through the proper application of the operational art and science of warfare. While it is agreed that peacekeeping is not warfare, the elements of combat power, principles of war, and tenets of army operations remain true and pertinent. Peacekeeping operations must be approached with the same level of planning as combat operations. The potential threat of armed combat remains
ever-present for the soldiers on the ground until peace has been established and their presence is no longer required.

Peacekeepers, as soldiers, must not be expected to stand idly by and watch atrocities being committed around them, serving only as mechanisms to report violations to the powers that be in New York. In no way does serving as witnesses to atrocities support the UN ideal of maintaining international peace and security.\textsuperscript{14} As shown with the Dutch soldiers at Srebrenica, failure to receive permission to conduct decisive operations against those committing atrocities in their area of operations led to low morale, anger, and resentment towards their higher command. The peacekeepers lost faith in the legitimacy of their mission.

**Ensuring Unity of Effort**

Security Council resolutions should meet the requirements of peacekeeping operations when they deploy into potentially dangerous situations, especially the need for a clear chain of command and unity of effort.\textsuperscript{15}

Brahimi Report, 2000

One of the nine principles of war, unity of command, contends that “for every objective, ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander.”\textsuperscript{16} This is often difficult to achieve for UN peacekeeping operations, as the level of command authority given to the commander of a multinational force is established by agreement among the multinational partners.\textsuperscript{17} The lead-nation command structure, where one nation is assigned the lead role and its command and control predominates, is most commonly employed for this purpose. For example, Canada was assigned the role of lead-nation for the UNAMIR mission in Rwanda. This system works well for the military structure of peacekeeping operations. However, the UN exists as a political body and thus it feels
compelled to play an active role in the operational and tactical side of the mission. Therefore, there existed a parallel command structure in UNOSOM, UNAMIR, and UNPROFOR that was comprised of both a military and a political side.

As clearly illustrated in the chapter on Srebrenica, the politico-military parallel command structure can lead to severe problems in the conduct of peacekeeping operations. The dual-key system for requesting and authorizing NATO air strikes remains a glaring example of the inadequacies of the parallel command structure. The UN must avoid placing the equivalent of a 1920’s Soviet political commissar in the military command structure of peacekeeping missions.\(^{18}\) The UN representative acts like the political commissar in the fact that he parallels the military commander and must effectively concur with operational orders. Additionally, the parallel command structure can lead to debates about the appropriate action to take during a time sensitive situation, where lost seconds can equal lost lives. Therefore, the parallel command structure may weaken unity of effort and should be avoided if possible.

Another manner, in which a parallel command structure can exist, is when contributing nations retain control of their forces deployed in support of a UN operation. In some instances, this may be the only command structure that can satisfy a nation’s sensitivities regarding the control of their military forces. For example, the United States maintains that the President retains command authority over US forces, as President Clinton maintained over UNITAF and JTF-Ranger in Somalia. In this system, decisions are made through the coordinated efforts of the political and senior military leadership of member nations. However, US military manuals warn against creating a parallel command structure, as it may weaken unity of effort and should be avoided if possible.\(^{19}\)
The UN must provide a clearly defined chain of command, which includes both the military and civilian leaders, for its peacekeeping missions. As discussed in detail with the UNPROFOR mission at Srebrenica, the UN failed to establish a clear chain of command. The failure to establish and adhere to an effective chain of command resulted in a lack of unity of effort within UNPROFOR, confusion regarding NATO air support, and an inability to effectively counter Bosnian Serb aggression. UNOSOM and UNAMIR also suffered from a poorly established chain of command. UNOSOM failed to integrate with the UNITAF forces once they arrived, thus a disjointed effort developed regarding the goals and objectives of the mission. UNAMIR’s chain of command on the ground in Rwanda was well defined; however, confusion arose as to who in the chain of command had approval authority to conduct missions against those in violation of the peace accords: the commander of UNAMIR, the UN secretary-general, or the Security Council. This confusion led to large Hutu weapons caches, which were known to UNAMIR, remaining undisturbed until their use in the Hutu’s genocidal campaign against the Tutsi.

The disunity apparent in the command structure of these missions must be corrected for future operations, if the UN desires to have more favorable outcomes than those missions addressed in this paper.

In addition to the creation of a clearly defined chain of command, DPKO must ensure mission planning concentrates on achieving unity of effort. Unity of effort must be formulated through the strategic guidance and operational focus given to the peacekeeping force by the UN and its Security Council. By clearly identifying the objectives and the desired end state for the mission, the UN can better ensure unity of effort among all of those involved in the resolution of the conflict. The aim of unity of

108
effort is to synchronize UN operations, coordinate the activities of governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and to direct the actions of the peacekeeping force. This serves to focus the efforts of those involved on the accomplishment of the same objectives. The operations discussed in this paper suffered from a lack of unity of effort throughout the duration of their missions. The UN must ensure that future peacekeeping operations are well planned, directed, and coordinated in order to ensure that unity of effort is maintained throughout the operation.

The words of General Eisenhower, who orchestrated one of the largest multinational operations in history, remain true for those charged with conducting current or future UN peacekeeping operations:

You must be prepared . . . to accept minor inefficiencies as long as that is promoting the great and common purpose. . . . You should not try to change ideas and concepts on the part of some subordinate of a different nationality because you disagree with him. If you can achieve the great overall unity of purpose [effort] that inspires loyalty, inspires teamwork, never bother your head about things in seeking perfection because too many difficulties can arise out of minor irritations and frustrations. You must not lose your sense of humor because if you do your allied command will blow apart.20

**Detailed and Proactive Resolutions**

The UN must ensure its peacekeeping mandates are adequately detailed and proactive, as provided for in their Security Council resolutions. The Security Council resolution is the key to forming and conducting successful UN peacekeeping operations in the future. Ambiguous, poorly worded, shortsighted, and weak resolutions produce ill-defined, confused, self-limiting, and ineffective peacekeeping missions. The Security Council resolution serves as the cornerstone from which the framework for the peacekeeping mission is built. The UNSCRs regarding UNOSOM, UNAMIR, and
UNPROFOR resulted in missions that were undermanned, had a convoluted chain of command, were ill prepared for potential escalation, and had poorly defined authority for conducting their peacekeeping operations.

The UN has been too reluctant in the past to provide an adequate number of peacekeeping forces with respect to the actual realities on the ground. An example of this was the weak peacekeeping force created for UNAMIR. Following a fact-finding mission to Rwanda, General Dallaire claimed that the minimum force required for the mission was between 4,000 and 4,500 soldiers and, in turn, the UN authorized only 1,428 peacekeepers for the mission. The results of this undermanned mission proved to be disastrous. As discussed earlier, UNOSOM and UNPROFOR were also inadequately manned to deal with the harsh realities of their situations. Both missions saw incremental troop strength increases, as they proved unable to effectively conduct their missions. Eventually, these two missions required major force augmentations from the US or NATO: UNITAF for the UNOSOM mission and IFOR to replace the UNPROFOR mission. The UN must properly predict and provide the necessary number of peacekeepers required to effectively conduct their mandated mission.

The UN must realize and plan for the potential for an escalation of hostilities during the conduct of peacekeeping operations. Once UN forces are involved in a peacekeeping operation, they must have the capability to protect themselves, the civilian population, and their mission mandate. In UNOSOM, UNAMIR, and UNPROFOR the peacekeeping force on the ground were unable to properly react to the escalation of force used against them and the civilian population within their areas of operation. In all three cases, there existed adequate indicators and evidence that one or more of the parties
involved were intent on committing severe and violent breaches of the peace accords to which they had agreed. The UN reacted in all of these cases with very reserved, unproductive, and ultimately failed policies. The result was the widespread lose of life, which severely undermined the credibility of the UN. The combined death total for civilians in the UN peacekeeper’s areas of operation during the 1990s is in excess of one million people.  

During the 1990s the UN was reluctant to develop and execute contingency plans to counter military activities directed against their missions. The mechanisms that can be employed against aggressors are many and include the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic elements of national and international power. However, the proper employment of these instruments of power requires prior planning, in order to ensure they are synchronized, mutually supporting, and effective. The reaction by the UN to grievous violations of the peace accords must be swift and decisive if they expect to attain their desired outcome. The UN’s method of ‘wishing away problems’ is no longer an option in light of the unfortunate outcomes of their missions during the 1990s.  

As previously addressed, UNOSOM, UNAMIR, and UNPROFOR all witnessed incremental increases in violent actions directed against their missions. In 1991, UNOSOM saw the militia groups around Somalia tightening their death grip on the civilian population. While the UN watched, the warlords gained control over Mogadishu, Baidoa, and Bardera, which became known as “the triangle of death”; they established control over the ports and highways, and clan leaders took control of humanitarian aid shipments. Rather than massing their forces and aggressively acting against these violators, UNOSOM remained largely ineffective, to the point that the 28,000 troop
UNITAF was needed to restore security for humanitarian supply lines. UNPROFOR followed the same path as UNOSOM and was replaced by the NATO led IFOR. UNAMIR fared worse than the other two missions, as the UN in New York ignored requests by the UNAMIR commander to act early and decisively against the planned Hutu offensive. UNAMIR was subsequently forced to withdrawal from Rwanda and abandon its mission once the Hutu’s launched the genocidal campaign. These three cases demonstrate the reluctance the UN has had to acting early and decisively against those forces intent on undermining and destroying the peace process through the escalation of hostilities.

UN missions of the 1990s suffered from a poorly defined authority under which to conduct their peacekeeping operations. The authority for a peacekeeping operation is derived directly from the UN Charter and Security Council resolutions surrounding the mission. During the 1990s, the UN remained reluctant to authorize peacekeepers to use force other than for self-defense. Only in the later stages of these missions did the UN authorize the use of force to protect civilians or to complete their assigned mission. UNSCR 775 (1992), in reference to the UNOSOM mission, states the UN was “deeply disturbed by the magnitude of human suffering, . . . deeply concerned about the availability of arms and ammunition, . . . [and] alarmed by the continued sporadic outbreak of hostilities” in Somalia. The conclusions of the Security Council were to stress the “need for observance and strict monitoring of the general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia,” and it decided “to remain seized of the matter until a peaceful solution is achieved.” While these words conjure up
the idea of helping to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war,” it fails to authorize any actions for the peacekeepers other than to watch and report.\textsuperscript{24}

UNAMIR and UNPROFOR also suffered from similarly ambiguous wording and the lack authorization for action by the UNSCRs related to their missions. The UN must strive in the future to clearly articulate the role of the peacekeepers who are acting on their behalf. This will benefit the peacekeepers by allowing them to more clearly understand the parameters and scope of their mission. It will also serve to benefit all parties involved, as it will help to alleviate the false hopes and expectations surrounding the mission, which are commonly made by the civilian population involved in the conflict or the world community at large. Clearly defining the role of the UN force and its authority to ensure the success of its mission are paramount to the overall success of the operation.

\textbf{The Brahimi Report}

The failures and errors made by UN, regarding the planning, organization, and conduct of its peacekeeping operations, did not go unnoticed by the UN. On 7 March 2000, the UN secretary-general convened a high-level Panel to undertake a thorough review of the UN peace and security activities, and to present a clear set of specific, concrete and practical recommendations to assist the UN to better conduct these activities in the future.\textsuperscript{25} On 23 August 2000, the Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations was released, which is more commonly referred to as the Brahimi Report (after the panel’s chairman, Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi of Algeria).\textsuperscript{26} The Brahimi Report makes fifty-six recommendations to the UN DPKO (Department of Peacekeeping Operations) in
order to improve its planning, preparation, and conduct of its peace operations. (The UN’s *Summary of Recommendations* for the Brahimi Report can be found in annex G.)

The recommendations made by the Brahimi Report are divided into twenty categories; however, these categories can be further subdivided into four main groupings regarding future peacekeeping operations: neutrality, political will, legitimacy, and unity of effort. Neutrality during the first post-Cold War decade became synonymous with inaction by peacekeeping forces. The UN leadership appeared to apply the *Webster’s Dictionary* definition “giving no active aid to any belligerent” rather than the UN definition that “neither side should gain unfair advantage as a result of the activities of a peacekeeping operation.” While the difference may at first appear to be a matter of semantics, it is actually central to the issue of neutrality. The peacekeeping missions of UNOSOM, UNAMIR, and UNPROFOR all failed to take action against those entities violating the agreed upon peace process. As shown previously in this chapter, failure to effectively react against violations allowed their perpetrators to gain an advantage over those abiding by the rules of the peace process. Recommendation three of the Brahimi Report helps to clarify the intention of neutrality, by specifying “United Nations peacekeepers must be able to carry out their mandates . . . with robust rules of engagement against those who renege on their commitments to a peace accord or otherwise seek to undermine it by violence.” Thus, the purpose of neutrality by the peacekeepers is to ensure that their presence does not aid any of the belligerent parties.

Regarding international political will, the Brahimi Report recommends the secretary-general have a “firm commitment of troops and other critical mission support elements . . . from member states” prior to authorizing missions with “sizeable troop
Additional it recommends the secretary-general be given the “authority to formally canvass member states . . . regarding their willingness to contribute troops to a potential operation.” These recommendations will help to ensure that missions have the requisite number of troops to fulfill the peacekeeping mission requirements, prior to the authorization of a Security Council resolution. As has been shown in the past, it is one thing to vote for the approval of a peacekeeping operation and quite another to commit personnel in support of it.

Maintenance of legitimacy for UN peacekeeping missions was also of concern to the contributors of the Brahimi Report. Their recommendations would help to foster legitimacy for UN missions by focusing on the rule of law in the post-conflict environment. The panel recommends, “developing an interim criminal code . . . pending the reestablishment of local rule of law and local law enforcement capacity.” The criminal code would allow for the prosecution of criminal activities outside the venue of the Internal Criminal Tribunal or a military-style tribunal within the country. It would serve to legitimize the role of the peacekeeping mission and the rule of law among the belligerent parties, as criminal actions such as robbery and assault could more easily be punished. “Increased focus on strengthening rule of law institutions and improving respect for human rights,” is essential for restoring confidence among the citizenry for their government.

The Brahimi Report also recommends “bringing demobilization and reintegration programmes . . . in order to facilitate the rapid disassembly of fighting factions.” This would help to reduce the possible recurrence of hostilities and assist in legitimizing the ruling government. Members of the warring factions would be more apt to lay down their
arms if they believed that they were to be integrated back into society in a fair manner. Additionally, the report sees the necessity of bolstering the local economy through the presence of the UN forces. A key recommendation in this area is for the peacekeeping missions to procure “all goods and services that are available locally and are not covered under the systems contracts or standing commercial services contracts.” This would help the local population to believe that the mission is legitimate, and exists to contribute to the local society, rather than to rule over it.

At least seven of the Brahimi report recommendations relate to unity of effort. Recommendation 4 addresses *clear, credible and achievable mandates* as follows;

“Security Council resolutions should meet the requirements of peacekeeping operations when they deploy into potentially dangerous situations, especially the need for a clear chain of command and unity of effort.”

The call for a clear chain of command is a departure from the organization of the peacekeeping missions under review in this thesis. As previously noted, post-Cold War peacekeeping mission were plagued by the lack of unity of command and parallel command structures.

Unity of command and unity of effort would also be improved through several other recommendations, such as “systematizing the method of selecting mission leaders,” involving the intended leadership in “key aspects of the mission planning process,” and requiring the Secretariat to “routinely provide the mission leadership with strategic guidance and plans for anticipating and overcoming challenges to mission implementation.”

Additionally, the report recommends that troops nominated for peacekeeping missions be evaluated on their training and equipment requirements prior to deployment. If they fail to meet the standard, then they will not be deployed.
recommendations would ensure that peacekeepers and civilian police components would receive common training prior to deployment and would deploy with common equipment and communications equipment. The combined effect of these recommendations would be to ensure unity of command, better command and control, and a more focused unity of effort. The Brahimi Report provides valuable insight into how to best improve the conduct of UN peacekeeping operations. It would be a travesty if future UN operations were to fail due to a reluctance or inability to incorporate these recommended changes.

While the majority of the recommendations of the Brahimi Report have yet to be implemented, the report has been generally well received. On 23 August 2000, Richard Boucher, a spokesman for the US State Department, said, “the [Brahimi] report accurately reflects our main concerns about UN peacekeeping operations.” This Brahimi Report serves as evidence that the UN has not ignored the lessons of UNOSOM, UNAMIR, and UNPROFOR; however, it has yet to aggressively implement corrective actions. The paths that the warring factions and the UN followed in these conflicts ultimately led to their bloody climax. The seeds of disaster can and should be distilled from these tragic events and used to benefit future peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions. The following chapters will show the tragic outcomes that can occur if these changes are not fully implemented.

Final Notes

There is an inseparable relationship between the scaling down of national armaments on the one hand and the building up of international peacekeeping machinery and institutions on the other. Nations are unlikely to shed their means of self-protection in the absence of alternative ways to safeguard their legitimate
interests. This can only be achieved through the progressive strengthening of international institutions under the United Nations . . . to enforce the peace as the disarmament process proceeds.  

*US State Department, Freedom From War, 1961*

As the new millennium begins, the UN continues to face situations that call for collective international intervention, while it suffers from declining confidence in its efficiency and effectiveness. Since its inception in 1945, the UN has undertaken more than fifty operations in support of the maintenance of international peace and security. These missions have occurred in Africa, Asia, Central America, and Europe. New missions are being contemplated for UN peacekeepers in Iraq and Afghanistan as this thesis is being composed. The UN must rise to meet these challenges if it is to maintain its rightful place in helping to create a more peaceful world. However, for the UN to remain solvent it must have the support of its constituents, to include the Permanent Five (P5): the United States, France, Great Britain, Russia, and China; as well as the countries of the Middle East, Europe, and Africa. The UN has no standing military forces, thus it must rely solely on the contributions of its member states.

The post-Cold War world has brought with it a change in the role of the UN. For more than four decades, the UN served as an instrument that could be introduced between two warring parties to forestall direct confrontations between the massive militaries of the Western and Eastern power blocks. Today, the United States exists as the world’s only superpower, often referred to as the hyperpower, and has shifted the global power dynamic from being bipolar to a unipolar structure. The UN has currently assumed the role of lead negotiator in resolving conflicts that have developed across the globe, as many of the boundaries established by the colonial world or the Treaties of Versailles.
have begun to unravel. Unless the US desires to serve as the world’s police force, chief
negotiator, and humanitarian relief agency, it must work to solidify, and not undermine,
the authority of the UN.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt, one of the cofounders of the UN, stated on
21 October 1944 at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York: “Peace, like war, can
succeed only where there is a will enforce it, and where there is available power to
enforce it. The Council of the UN must have the power to act quickly and decisively to
keep the peace by force, if necessary.” President Roosevelt’s words ring true today, in
an era where war, starvation, and genocide are occurring within intranational conflicts, as
opposed to the international conflicts of the past. The United States must not lose its will
to work with other nations in order to ensure that peace succeeds, as it often has the sole
means necessary to enforce it.

---


2Reference here is made to the Berlin Conference of 1886, which established colonial boundaries across Africa, with little regard for traditional indigenous societies or ethnicities.

3The Brahimi Report, Executive Summary, 21 August 2000.

4Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations.

5Kofi Annan, Facing the Humanitarian Challenge: Towards a Culture of Prevention (New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1999).


UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), Middle East, established June 1948; UN Military Observer Group in India-Pakistan (UNMOGIP), Kashmir, est. January 1949; UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), est. March 1964, UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), Golan Heights, est. June 1974, and many others. See the UN website, www.UN.org, for other missions. Reference here is made to the reluctance of the US, France, Russia, Great Britain, and China to support robust UN mission mandates in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia during the 1990s.


United Nations Charter, throughout its text.


FM 3-0, *Operations*, ch. 4-44.


For a more thorough discussion of the roles of the political commissar see: Dale Herspring, *Soldiers, Commissars, and Chaplains: Civil-Military Relations since Cromwell* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001), 103-123.

FM 3-0, *Operations*, chs. 2-48 through 2-50.

As quoted in US Army Field Manual 100-8, *The Army in Multinational Operations* (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 1997), ch. 5-0.

350,000 under UNOSOM, 500,000-800,000 in UNAMIR, and more than 200,000 in UNPROFOR.


Ibid., recommendation 4b.

Ibid., recommendation 9b.

Ibid., recommendation 6.

Ibid., recommendation 2b.

Ibid., recommendation 2c.

Ibid., recommendation 4c.

Ibid., recommendation 8a-c.

Ibid., recommendation 9c.


GLOSSARY

Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. (ARBiH) Officially establish on 15 April 1992. It was comprised of territorial defense, police, and paramilitary forces.

Bosniac. Known until 1993 as Muslims or Bosnian Muslims. They constituted 43 percent of BiH’s population of 4.4 million. They were dominant in the ARBiH.


Croat. Catholic inhabitant of BiH or Croatia. They constituted 18 percent of BiH’s population of 4.4 million. They were dominant in the HVO.

Republika Srpska. Bosnian Serb territory in BiH took this title following the Dayton Peace Accords.

Serb. Eastern Orthodox inhabitant of BiH or Serbia. They constituted 35 percent of BiH’s population of 4.4 million. They were dominant in the VRS.

Turk. The Bosniaks were pejoratively called ‘Turks’, as the Muslim faith was introduced to the Balkan Peninsula under the Ottoman Empire by the Turkish people. A person’s ethnicity in the Balkans is often determined by their religion, thus the term Turk refers to people of the Islamic faith and not necessarily of Turkish heritage.
APPENDIX A

PREAMBLE TO THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS

We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom, and for these ends to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours, and to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples, have resolved to combine our efforts to accomplish these aims.
APPENDIX B

CHAPTER VI TO THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

Article 33
1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.
2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.

Article 34
The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 35
1. Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly.
2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter.
3. The proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of matters brought to its attention under this Article will be subject to the provisions of Articles 11 and 12.

Article 36
1. The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.
2. The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the parties.
3. In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.

Article 37
1. Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council.
2. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to
take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.

Article 38
Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37, the Security Council may, if all the parties to any dispute so request, make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute.
APPENDIX C

CHAPTER VII TO THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

Article 39
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Article 40
In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.

Article 41
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

Article 42
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

Article 43
1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.
2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.
3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to
ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

Article 44
When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfillment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that Member's armed forces.

Article 45
In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined, within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 46
Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 47
1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.
2. The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires the participation of that Member in its work.
3. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently.
4. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional subcommittees.

Article 48
1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine.
2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members.
Article 49
The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council.

Article 50
If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any other state, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems.

Article 51
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
APPENDIX D

US PUBLIC OPINION REGARDING UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Since its establishment in 1947, Americans have had an ambivalent relationship with the UN. The tide of public sentiment has risen and fallen in accordance with the international environment. When the decade of the 1990s began, the UN was riding a wave of public support, particularly following the end of the 1991 Gulf War. In October 1991, when a New York Times/CBS poll asked whether “the UN is doing a good job or a poor job in trying to solve the problems it has to face,” sixty-seven percent of respondents said that it was doing a good job. In November 1991, a poll conducted by Greenberg Research showed that 78 percent of those polled approved of the job being done by the UN. As the UNOSOM mission began to lose control of the situation in Somalia, US public opinion for UN operations fell correspondingly. A March 1992 poll showed that only forty-five percent of Americans believed that the UN was doing a good job, a drop of twenty-two percent from October 1991.

The downward slide of public sentiment continued as the UNAMIR and UNPROFOR missions also met with widespread criticism. By April 1995, a poll taken by PIPA (Program on International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland) concluded that seventy-nine percent of Americans believed that UN peacekeeping operations “do just enough to keep the situation from getting totally out of hand, but not enough to really solve the problem.” Polls taken in August, September, and October 1995 showed that only thirty-five to thirty-six percent of those Americans polled believed that the UN was “doing a good job in trying to solve the problems it had to face.” Additionally, the same poll shows that seventy-five percent believe “UN peacekeeping operations are ineffective
and even dangerous . . . UN troops end up being sitting ducks.” The failed UN missions of the 1990s (UNOSOM, UNAMIR, and UNPROFOR) had a profound negative impact on public perceptions in the US, of the UN’s ability to conduct peacekeeping operations.

Surprisingly, the negative sentiment Americans had towards the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations that developed during the early 1990s did not translate into decreased support for UN peacekeeping missions. The same polls showed that Americans did not want less involvement, but increased assertiveness by the UN peacekeepers. PIPA reported in its April 1995 poll that seventy-four percent of Americans agreed the UN should “strengthen its reputation for following through on its threats to use military force, even if it means taking some risks.” When PIPA asked when military actions by UNPROFOR would be appropriate in Bosnia: eighty-seven percent of respondents favored using force when aid convoys were attacked, sixty-five percent to defend civilians in the safe areas, sixty-two percent to enforce the peace agreements, and sixty-four percent to intervene with a large military force to stop ethnic cleansing.


2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

4 PIPA, 19-23 April 1995.

5 Americans and the World.

6 Americans and the World.

7 PIPA, April 1995.

8 Americans and the World.
APPENDIX E

UN MEMBER STATE TOTAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNPROFOR (1992-1995)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>POLICE</th>
<th>TROOPS</th>
<th>OBSERVERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>854</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1,235</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,038</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>2,091</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>971</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>1,230</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>4,493</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>3,367</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>967</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1,550</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>899</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1,803</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>826</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3,017</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1,109</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Fed.</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>1,464</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak Republic</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,267</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1,212</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia, 12,</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,464</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1,147</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3,405</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>748</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL** 727 38,130 680

*Source: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations.*
BIBLIOGRAPHY


**Periodicals**


**US Government Documents**


**United Nations Documents**

General Assembly


**Security Council Documents**


**Security Council Resolutions**


Internet Sources


INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

Combined Arms Research Library
US Army Command and General Staff College
250 Gibbon Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2314

Defense Technical Information Center/OCA
825 John J. Kingman Rd., Suite 944
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6218

Dr. Donald Wright
CSI
USACGSC
1 Reynolds Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352

LTCol Colin Magee
DJMO
USACGSC
1 Reynolds Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352

LTC Tom Tracy
DJMO
USACGSC
1 Reynolds Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352
CERTIFICATION FOR MMAS DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT

1. Certification Date: 18 June 2004

2. Thesis Author: Major Randy G. Masten

3. Thesis Title: The United Nations’ Safe Area of Srebrenica: A Disunity of Command

4. Thesis Committee Members: 

   Signatures:

   

5. Distribution Statement: See distribution statements A-X on reverse, then circle appropriate distribution statement letter code below:

   A    B C D E F X SEE EXPLANATION OF CODES ON REVERSE

   If your thesis does not fit into any of the above categories or is classified, you must coordinate with the classified section at CARL.

6. Justification: Justification is required for any distribution other than described in Distribution Statement A. All or part of a thesis may justify distribution limitation. See limitation justification statements 1-10 on reverse, then list, below, the statement(s) that applies (apply) to your thesis and corresponding chapters/sections and pages. Follow sample format shown below:

   EXAMPLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Limitation Justification Statement</th>
<th>Chapter/Section</th>
<th>Page(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct Military Support (10)</td>
<td>Chapter 3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical Technology (3)</td>
<td>Section 4</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Operational Use (7)</td>
<td>Chapter 2</td>
<td>13-32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   Fill in limitation justification for your thesis below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Limitation Justification Statement</th>
<th>Chapter/Section</th>
<th>Page(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. MMAS Thesis Author's Signature: 

   

   139
STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. (Documents with this statement may be made available or sold to the general public and foreign nationals).

STATEMENT B: Distribution authorized to US Government agencies only (insert reason and date ON REVERSE OF THIS FORM). Currently used reasons for imposing this statement include the following:

1. **Foreign Government Information.** Protection of foreign information.

2. **Proprietary Information.** Protection of proprietary information not owned by the US Government.

3. **Critical Technology.** Protection and control of critical technology including technical data with potential military application.

4. **Test and Evaluation.** Protection of test and evaluation of commercial production or military hardware.

5. **Contractor Performance Evaluation.** Protection of information involving contractor performance evaluation.

6. **Premature Dissemination.** Protection of information involving systems or hardware from premature dissemination.

7. **Administrative/Operational Use.** Protection of information restricted to official use or for administrative or operational purposes.

8. **Software Documentation.** Protection of software documentation - release only in accordance with the provisions of DoD Instruction 7930.2.

9. **Specific Authority.** Protection of information required by a specific authority.

10. **Direct Military Support.** To protect export-controlled technical data of such military significance that release for purposes other than direct support of DoD-approved activities may jeopardize a US military advantage.

STATEMENT C: Distribution authorized to US Government agencies and their contractors: (REASON AND DATE). Currently most used reasons are 1, 3, 7, 8, and 9 above.

STATEMENT D: Distribution authorized to DoD and US DoD contractors only; (REASON AND DATE). Currently most reasons are 1, 3, 7, 8, and 9 above.

STATEMENT E: Distribution authorized to DoD only; (REASON AND DATE). Currently most used reasons are 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10.

STATEMENT F: Further dissemination only as directed by (controlling DoD office and date), or higher DoD authority. Used when the DoD originator determines that information is subject to special dissemination limitation specified by paragraph 4-505, DoD 5200.1-R.

STATEMENT X: Distribution authorized to US Government agencies and private individuals of enterprises eligible to obtain export-controlled technical data in accordance with DoD Directive 5230.25; (date). Controlling DoD office is (insert).