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Newport, RI**

**The Maritime Component Commander:
The U. S. Coast Guard? Can It . . . Will It . . . Should It?**

By

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A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract

Since mid-March 2004, the U. S. Coast Guard has assumed the duties as Maritime Component Commander for the combined Joint Task Force-Haiti under the direction of Southern Command. The duties, described in a March 2004 Southern Command press release were to “continue to support stability operations by providing support for port security in Port-au-Prince harbor and conducting port assessments to help restore commercial and humanitarian operation in other Haitian ports.”ⁱ

The purpose of this research project is to examine the strategic settings under which a Combatant Commander is expected to conduct maritime operations and evaluate the duties of the Maritime Component Commander. Some review of Coast Guard history, principles and capabilities will be presented. The study will then analyze data regarding survey respondents’ perceptions of the Coast Guard’s ability to perform these duties in both combat and non-combat environments and examine the debate regarding the competing demands for Coast Guard people and platforms, particularly in a post 9-11 homeland security environment. Finally, it gives recommendations for a Combatant Commander’s consideration, presents some lessons learned for operations typical for Coast Guard coordination, and concludes with a view on how the Coast Guard fits into the national interests, as defined by the President of the United States

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INTRODUCTION

Sea power in the broad sense . . . includes not only the military strength afloat that rules the sea or any part of it by force of arms, but also the peaceful commerce and shipping from which alone a military fleet naturally and healthfully springs, and on which it securely rests. Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Seapower Upon History*

Combatant Commanders have challenges across a spectrum of situations involving U.S. national interests and security. Whether through conflict resolution or preserving stability through a theater-wide engagement strategy, operations will normally involve maritime forces in some capacity. Frequently, executing these duties is delegated to the Maritime Component Commander (MCC) in order to make recommendations on how to use available military forces to perform their duties.ⁱⁱ In March 2004, U.S. Southern Command designated the U. S. Coast Guard (USCG) to act as the Maritime Component Command for the combined Joint Task Force-Haiti to help support the stability operations.ⁱⁱⁱ

Having the Coast Guard perform these duties is not unprecedented, but it is a rare occurrence. Is this because the Coast Guard does not have the capability or capacity to perform these functions? When should the Combatant Commander use the U. S. Navy? Are there circumstances under which the Coast Guard can provide the Combatant Commander coordinating support in order to meet national strategic objectives? And, if the USCG has the capability and capacity to perform these duties, should it?

This paper will examine the strategic settings under which a Combatant Commander is expected to conduct maritime operations and evaluate the duties of the MCC. Some review of USCG history, principles and capability will be presented. The study will then analyze data regarding survey respondents' perceptions on the Coast Guard's ability to perform these duties in both combat and non-combat environments and examine the debate regarding the competing demands for Coast Guard people and platforms, particularly in a

post 9-11 homeland security environment. Finally, it gives recommendations, presents some lessons learned for operations typical for Coast Guard coordination, and concludes with a view on how the Coast Guard fits into the national interests.

MARITIME POWER AND STRATEGY: WHY?

The current *National Security Strategy* sets the stage for conducting operations using U. S. maritime power. The strategy's major categories address reducing terrorism and conflict, preventing the use of weapons of mass destruction, enhancing economic growth, cooperating with other powers and transforming security institutions. One specific example includes the principle of investing "time and resources into building international relationships and institutions that can help manage local crises when they emerge."^{iv}

Applying the concepts in a national maritime strategy would include protecting national interests against hostile nations, reducing or eliminating transnational threats of terrorism or associated crime, addressing threats to sovereignty, and achieving economic prosperity goals through natural resource and environmental management, commercial shipping safety and security operations.^v In fact, the United States' maritime strategy must align international relations with both commercial and naval relationships.^{vi} It needs to address not only the ability to project military power to achieve national goals, but options that include diplomatic and economic aspects because maritime affairs differ widely among nations around the world. Thus, the means and ways to achieve national ends through an international maritime strategy will be as different as are the individual countries, particularly when compared against other countries with large economies and robust maritime power.^{vii}

The Coast Guard has a wide variety of authorities codified in U.S. law, which give it the ability to act as an instrument of maritime security.^{viii} Four specific laws provide

direction to the Service regarding national defense responsibilities: “Armed Forces” includes the USCG (10 USC 101), to act as a military service and branch of the Armed Forces (14 USC 1), to be ready to function as a specialized service in the Navy (14 USC 2) and to assist DoD in any activity for which it is qualified (14 USC 141). The list of other legislative mandates is long and crosses the spectrum of strategic maritime objectives set forth in national policy, including the *National Military Strategy*.^{ix} In fact, the need for a maritime force that can contribute to full spectrum dominance is not a new concept; Captain/Coast Guard Commandant Bertholf discussed this issue over eighty years ago.^x

The fundamental reasons for the two services are diametrically opposed. The Navy exists for the sole purpose of keeping itself prepared for . . . war. Its usefulness to the Government is therefore to a large degree potential. If it performs in peace time any useful function not ultimately connected with the preparation for war, that is a by-product. On the other hand, the Coast Guard does not exist solely for the purpose of preparing for war; . . . the Coast Guard exists for the particular and main purpose of performing duties which have no connection with a state of war, but which, on the contrary, are constantly necessary as peace functions.^{xi}

Today, naval doctrine acknowledges the need to operate in a variety of waters, oceans and littoral regions through a flexible force in order to handle any contingency in which a Combatant Commander may use naval forces.^{xii} Maritime forces, including the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard, provide “the National Command Authorities the tools to respond to a full range of needs, from disaster relief and humanitarian assistance to forcible entry and strike operations”^{xiii} through two elements of national strategy, forward presence and crisis response.^{xiv} Recently, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Coast Guard updated a National Fleet policy agreement that commits, “to shared purpose and common effort focused on tailored operational integration of our multi-mission platforms, infrastructure and personnel.”^{xv} This agreement has beneficial impact for a Combatant Commander; the services will have compatible and complementary capabilities as well as

Coast Guard interoperable assets and expertise to provide “force depth for peacetime missions, homeland security, homeland defense, crisis response, and wartime tasks.”^{xvi}

SETTING THE STAGE: TRENDS IN MARITIME CONCERNS

In 1997, the Center for Naval Analysis studied future maritime trends. It included changing issues based on society, technology, political, economic and environmental trends. New territorial sea, contiguous zone, and exclusive economic zone standards have since become nearly standard worldwide. However, these standards remain the source of neighboring state conflicts for resource management and will continue making freedom of navigation exercises more difficult but more crucial globally.

Changes in worldwide maritime use were also examined. Inter-Asian trade was expected to have the largest growth. Extracting oil and natural gas offshore was expected to continue to grow, the size of the U.S. flag shipping industry was predicted to shrink even further, the numbers of ships carrying hazardous material and high capacity passenger ships were expected to grow and containerized traffic would be concentrated in fewer, deeper draft ports.^{xvii} Although they have no direct impact on a Combatant Commander’s missions in contingencies, these items do shape the maritime domain in which forces would operate, whether during war or peacetime operations, and may have direct ties to the *National Homeland Security Strategy*.

The study also acknowledged that contingencies occur, ones that are high visibility with immediate repercussions.^{xviii} As part of the post 9-11 *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, goals involving international cooperation are outlined that are intended to improve border security and better secure international commerce and transportation networks and other transnational critical infrastructure.^{xix} Clearly, interagency operations for the

Combatant Commander will continue to involve a variety of interested parties when conducting maritime prevention, engagement or contingency operations.

THE MARITIME COMPONENT COMMANDER

Joint Doctrine defines the range of military operations that a Combatant Commander is expected to be prepared to execute, either in combat or non-combat situations. Appendix A provides the general goals and examples of the types of duties that could be encountered. An extensive discussion regarding the use of force in non-combat operations is given, and the different objectives are outlined.^{xx} Also, the principles for using the national instruments of power are given to minimize confusion as to how to conduct maritime military operations (see Figure 1):

| Principles for Combat Operations ^{xxi} | Principles for Non-combat operations (Other than War) ^{xxii} |
|--|---|
| Objective Mass Maneuver Offensive Economy of Force Unity of Command Simplicity Surprise Security | Objective Unity of Effort Security Restraint Perseverance Legitimacy |

Figure 1

Once principles are defined, then Joint Doctrine provides some operational art guidance with regard to space, through the maritime and/or littoral areas. Specifically, “control of the littoral area is often essential to dimensional superiority”^{xxiii} in order to operate from a position of advantage in whatever maritime situation exists. Operating in narrow seas requires different techniques as well.

In a narrow sea, a stronger navy can sometimes find itself contesting command of the sea with a much weaker navy that occupies more advantageous geostrategic positions; . . . To exercise operational or tactical control, a blue-water navy must operate within the confines of a narrow sea, and that in turn will provide even a small coastal force with the opportunity to challenge a blue-water navy.^{xxiv}

Maritime operational art also is shaped by the available force. Depending on the type of operation that a Combatant Commander desires the MCC to execute, the use of Coast Guard forces may be desirable as a supplemental or primary maritime prevention or response capability. The standing Memorandum of Agreement between DoD and DoT defines some of the national defense missions including maritime interception operations, environmental defense operations and port operations, security and defense.^{xxv} As an example, in peace operations, joint procedures describe maritime forces as ones to “provide a secure environment ashore . . . establish both a psychological and stabilizing effect.”^{xxvi} Definitions for peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations are given; both support diplomatic efforts, and are guided by the principles earlier listed for non-combat operations. The major difference is that peace enforcement operations apply military force or the threat of its use in order to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions; however, both are capabilities that the Coast Guard possesses.^{xxvii} Support capabilities for both Navy vessels and Coast Guard units are provided in the joint publication, which allows the MCC to select the type platforms needed based on operational requirements.

In maritime coalition operations, the need for structured procedures remains as the numbers of navies continues to grow. In 1946, *Jane’s Fighting Ships* listed fifty-two navies whereas fifty years later there were 166 listed.^{xxviii} These navies are often used in a more restricted fashion than a larger navy with mission profiles similar to the U.S. Coast Guard because of their limited industrial and economic bases. Smaller navies that concentrate primarily on coastal operations enforce their jurisdiction management in the maritime environment; by maintaining consistent enforcement procedures throughout the Exclusive Economic Zone, conflict among nations can be reduced.^{xxix} In order to assist allies in

influencing unstable regional situations, principles of multinational maritime operations are recommended: readiness, flexibility, self-sustainment, and mobility. Concepts of waterspace management and expeditionary operations are also outlined.^{xxx} All assist the MCC in applying operational art to achieve the strategic, theater, or operational objectives.

The MCC must also be concerned about operational functions, such as command and control and the supporting systems which accommodate effective operations across the spectrum of operations. Whether conducted at sea or ashore, the structure selected to conduct maritime operations must allow unit commanders the “freedom to operate, delegate authority, place themselves in the best position to lead and integrate and synchronize actions throughout the operational area.”^{xxxix} Sufficient systems that can provide ways to implement command decisions and direction are required, as well as speed and precision in information sharing in order to optimize situational awareness. Some debate exists whether small navies have a place in network-centric warfare, but managing the U.S. ability to communicate with coalition partners is crucial in order to effectively conduct multi-national maritime operations, whether in a coordination relationship or via direct tactical control as defined by the Combatant Commander or national authority.^{xxxii} One of the lessons learned from maritime operations in Vietnam was that U. S. forces tended to perform missions themselves and not allow the South Vietnamese, with their limited naval capability and traditions, to learn by doing. This inhibited allowing the Vietnamese to evolve and develop the necessary technical skills and art of naval warfare.^{xxxiii} Careful consideration of the C2 structure and supporting systems is crucial, particularly in coalition or non-combat operations involving smaller navies.

COAST GUARD HISTORY AND PRINCIPLES

As noted in an earlier study, *The U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the Twenty-First Century*, there was a significant lack of historical case studies, reports, and interviews on significant events in the Coast Guard.^{xxxiv} A concerted effort to document USCG activities and decisions post 9-11 is underway, but examining command and control relationships during previous crisis events was nearly impossible. It appears that the USCG had a limited role as a functional command before it assumed its current role for CJTF-Haiti. In Vietnam, squadrons of cutters conducted both naval gunfire support and interdiction operations for Operation Market Time; the senior USCG person typically coordinated Coast Guard participation. It was reported that this operation “produced significant results and is credited with forcing the enemy to change his logistics operations extensively.”^{xxxv} Operations in the riverine environment proved very challenging both in coordination and execution, though; a blue-on-blue mishap occurred in 1966 when U.S. aircraft strafed CGC POINT WELCOME, killing two (including the commanding officer) and wounding five.^{xxxvi}

During recent migrant operations in this hemisphere (Cuban boatlifts in 1980 and 1994), the Coast Guard has typically assumed duties as the MCC, and Navy units have operated under USCG tactical control (TACON).^{xxxvii} In 1989, a non-combatant evacuation of 600 people in St. Croix was conducted after Hurricane Hugo; this operation was coordinated by Coast Guard and Navy units operating under USCG TACON. There have been other operations when Navy presence would have been beneficial but not politically acceptable, so USCG cutters remained. In 1990, JTF-Four proposed using the USS JOHN F. KENNEDY to conduct forward presence/maritime interdiction operations off Colombia, but the proposal was rejected threatening other sea-based operations.^{xxxviii} During the Haitian

crisis in the early-mid 1990s, a Navy amphibious ship was turned away from Port-au-Prince. At the same time, migrant repatriations continued from USCG cutters while concurrently keeping open communications channels to Haitian officials.^{xxxix} During Operation Uphold Democracy, “in Cap-Haitien, the land and water force commanders (10th Mountain Division and Coast Guard) coordinated responsibilities closely.”^{xl} Since the mid-1990s, both Joint Interagency Task Forces (South and West) under Combatant Commander control (SOUTHCOM and PACOM, respectively) have been commanded by USCG flag officers. Maritime Intercept Operations (MIO) enforcing UN sanctions against Iraq were coordinated under the command of the USCG from 1991 through 1994 until control was shifted back to the U.S. Navy.^{xli}

Beyond the ability to provide a flexible force to the Combatant Commander, the Coast Guard has established principles of operation and provided legislative frameworks to foreign governments with safety and security measures designed to protect mariners at seas and the environment while exercising internationally recognized regimes of sovereignty.^{xlii} However, Coast Guard C4I capabilities and operational fleet resemble other “navies around the world. With an average age of more than thirty years, the Coast Guard’s fleet . . . is older than all but two of the thirty-nine worldwide fleets of similar size and mission.”^{xliii} Nevertheless, the Coast Guard has satisfied previous Combatant Commanders as General Wilhelm noted in 1999 when he was Commander of U. S. Southern Command: “The USCG is without a doubt my most valuable resource for maritime engagement in the Caribbean basin, making robust security assistance, military to military contact and exercise contributions.”^{xliv}

COLLECTING AND ANALYZING INFORMATION

Because of the small amount data readily available on historic USCG C2 relationships and about current operations in Haiti, a survey was prepared to measure the perceptions of USCG capabilities to perform MCC duties across the spectrum of conflict. The survey questions were developed to assess respondents' experience levels, understanding of how and when the USCG could assume MCC duties, their familiarity with USCG principles and their views on using the USCG as an instrument of diplomatic and economic power. Most questions used a five point Likert scale to evaluate degrees of responses.

The survey was prepared and sent to 33 units, including JCS, CNO, CG Headquarters, Combatant Commanders, CG Areas, District Seven, USN Numbered Fleets and both JIATFs. Forty-two surveys were mailed out, and 13 were returned in time to prepare a substantive analysis. Though not statistically sufficient to draw universal conclusions, for the purposes of this report, the number of responses received was judged acceptable. Respondent officer pay grades ranged from O-4 to O-9, with two civilians, one GS-13 and one GS-15. Their experience includes at least forty-eight years of coordinating large scale maritime operations. Respondents had experience in Operations Iraqi Freedom, Able Manner/Vigil, Uphold Democracy, Desert Fox, Desert Shield/Storm, Provide Comfort, Restore Hope, and extensive training at the carrier battle group to submarine group level. Respondents had experience in combat (62 percent) and non-combat (56 percent) operations.

The heart of the survey can be found in responses to three questions, which all dealt with the conditions and capabilities of the Coast Guard to perform duties as the MCC, as specified in joint or service doctrine.^{xlv} Specific trends were identified and conclusions can be drawn from each.

The first question dealt with combat mission coordination. Historical research as well as both doctrine and practice lead to the conclusion that the USCG has very limited capability to perform MCC duties in combat. The data, as viewed below through an area chart (a composite of all responses), supports this view although there appears to be some feeling that the USCG is capable of coordinating operations to support Naval Coastal Warfare; respondents (61 percent) said the USCG was very capable or expert in this mission.




Figure 2

Comments included: “Not capable in high threat environments of optimizing friendly force ops due to unfamiliarity with threats, counters and weapons exploitations.”^{xlvi} Another was “USCG has great capability to command MIO, VBSS, but poor choice for ops requiring NSW/EOD and combining air, surface and sub picture.”^{xlvii}

The second question dealt with the USCG’s capability to perform duties as the MCC non-combat circumstances. Because the question contained numerous missions, the data was broken into alphabetized sections for better analysis. Historical background, lessons learned,

doctrine and practice indicate that the USCG has some capability to coordinate these operations. The data supported this position. The predominant view was that most (63 percent) felt USCG ability ran from capable to expert. One exception was arms control: 61 percent said USCG capability ranked somewhat or not capable. The results are inconsistent, though, likely because many of these operations involve the use or threat of use of military force, even in a limited capacity. Results for these are shown in Appendix C but not here due to space limitations.

Because of the inconsistency, the data was recategorized based on comparable international naval standards and expected use of force levels.^{xlviii} “In the important military to military contact program between U.S. and former Warsaw Pact navies, the Coast Guard often is more compatible with coastal navies than the Navy.”^{xlix} Questions involving military force were removed and the composite percentages recalculated (see Figure 3). The results support the view that the USCG has capability to coordinate some non-combat operations.




Figure 3

For validation purposes, questions regarding the Coast Guard's ability to coordinate USCG Publication 1 stated missions were also in the survey. The results of these questions were expected to be quite similar to the responses listed above; in fact, they are almost identical as seen in Appendix C, pages 35 and 36. Comments about the USCG and its capabilities were received, many with the theme as reported by a U.S. Navy O-9, "I'm high on the Coast Guard! The CG can do all! Only limited by platforms and people!!"¹

CAN THEY? UNDER SOME CIRCUMSTANCES . . . BUT WILL THEY?

Following Operation Iraqi Freedom, the CNO responded to a number of questions by Secretary Rumsfeld regarding how much the Navy had to rely on the USCG. A Pentagon spokesman acknowledged that the USCG, "possesses unique military capabilities no other service has."^{li} The USCG has long been a 'low density, high demand' force undergoing its own changes due to the move to DHS. There is increasing political pressure on the Administration to demonstrate how security at home has improved in the last two years. The USCG does have established C2 procedures for working with Joint Terrorism Task Forces for domestic prevention and response situations but limited interoperable communication or sensor systems that accommodate both defense and law enforcement agencies. Also, scenarios that move from maritime homeland security to homeland defense have been minimally exercised across a full spectrum of scenarios. Finally, the USCG service culture may be an issue; saving lives, protecting the environment and enforcing regulations are primarily law enforcement missions, for which the training and rule set is grounded in principles of minimum use of force and restraint, as opposed to using the principles of war.

Nevertheless, the USCG's military role is not likely to change in the near future, and Combatant Commanders should incorporate their capabilities as appropriate. SOUTHCOM

would not have assigned MCC duties to the Coast Guard if it did not have the capacity to perform as requested. In an interview, Gordon England (former Deputy DHS and now Secretary of the Navy) said, “One aspect I have particularly enjoyed in DHS is working with the U.S. Coast Guard; . . . The Coast Guard is a superb military organization.”^{lii}

FOR THE COMBATANT COMMANDER: YOU WON’T KNOW UNTIL YOU ASK

A study conducted in 1992 asked a number of Unified Commanders whether they planned for USCG participation, and whether they should include USCG in their force planning requirements. Overall, the commanders spent the majority of staff time planning for larger combat operations and understood the conflicting demands of the USCG as both a law enforcement agency as well as a military organization. U.S. Coast Guard forces were viewed as resources of opportunity; accepted if offered, but “you can’t count on timely commitment.”^{liii} At the time, they were unanimous in their view that DoD requirements for USCG units should not be included in their force planning requirements.^{liv}

However, there have been significant changes since this study that might alter a Combatant Commander’s point of view, including the standup of U.S. Northern Command. In a statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General Eberhart provided several examples of the types of missions that NORTHCOM is performing on a daily basis. Regarding the USCG, operations in infrastructure protection for support to OIF, maritime interception (USCG lead), theater security cooperation, and C2 advanced concept studies are listed as measures for deterring and defending threats against the United States and Canada.^{lv} USCG participation in OIF and support for CJTF-Haiti have provided Combatant Commanders with a more recent understanding of USCG capabilities and capacity to meet national objectives, when balanced with a full look at global requirements. Including the

USCG, as well as other interagency needs, in force planning requirements would better evaluate the national needs to meet national security demands. To “not show Coast Guard forces as part of the potentially available assets understates U.S. defense capability.”^{lvi} Appendix E contains more specific recommendations for a Combatant Commander, in considering whether to use USCG capability to coordinate maritime operations.

U. S. COAST GUARD: INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER

At West Point in June 2002, President Bush outlined his updated National Security Strategy, “We will defend the peace against the threats from terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. And we will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent.”^{lvii} The USCG can act as an instrument of national power to meet the diplomatic, economic and military missions, thereby increasing regional stability and enhancing Combatant Commander effectiveness. It does so by balancing domestic with international needs, and to preserve its relevance, “the Coast Guard’s unique skill sets must be continually capitalized on and maintained.”^{lviii}

One of the survey respondents, a U.S. Navy officer, summarized this perspective, “USCG is often the best asset to use in diplomatic and economic type missions, particularly those where the nation being engaged may be suspicious of U.S. intentions or have to contend with significant internal political opposition to increased ties to the U.S. Unfortunately, U.S. military commanders are often skeptical (unjustifiably so) of USCG abilities or are foolishly reluctant to relinquish control of operations to USCG commanders due to parochial interests.”^{lix} Combatant Commanders should understand that the Coast Guard can capably perform various maritime component commander duties in a wide spectrum of non-combat operations.^{lx}

ENDNOTES

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- ¹ U. S. Southern Command, Situation Report for Media (Press Releases), 16 March 2004, <<https://www.southcom.mil/home/>> [04 April 2004].
- ⁱⁱ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, DC: 10 September 2001), II-16.
- ⁱⁱⁱ U. S. Southern Command, 16 March 2004.
- ^{iv} President, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: 17 September 2002), 9.
- ^v Thomas H. Collins, "Change and Continuity: The U.S. Coast Guard Today," Naval War College Review 62, No. 2 (Spring 2004): 19.
- ^{vi} John B. Hattendorf, "The Anglo-American Way in Maritime Strategy," Naval History and Maritime Strategy (Malabar, FL.: Krieger Publishing 2000), 119.
- ^{vii} *Ibid.*, 256-257.
- ^{viii} Bruce Stubbs and Scott C. Truver, America's Coast Guard (Washington, DC: U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters, January 2000), 80.
- ^{ix} JCS, National Military Strategy (Washington, DC: 1997), 21.
- ^x JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, III-19.
- ^{xi} Robert Erwin Johnson, Guardians of the Sea (Annapolis, MD.: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1987), 59.
- ^{xii} Navy, Naval Warfare, 10.
- ^{xiii} *Ibid.*, 11.
- ^{xiv} *Ibid.*, 21.
- ^{xv} Collins, 20.
- ^{xvi} *Ibid.*, 21.
- ^{xvii} Richard D. Kohout, Christopher Joyner, W. Seth Carus, and Richard Houck, Looking Out to 2020: Trends Relevant to the Coast Guard (Alexandria, VA.: Center for Naval Analyses, May 1997), 73-112.
- ^{xviii} *Ibid.*, 2-3.
- ^{xix} President, National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington, DC: Office of Homeland Security, July 2002), 59-61.
- ^{xx} JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, I-2.
- ^{xxi} Navy, Naval Warfare, 43-47.
- ^{xxii} JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, V-2.
- ^{xxiii} *Ibid.*, IV-17 to IV-19.
- ^{xxiv} Milan N. Vego, Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), 294-95.
- ^{xxv} Kohout, 61; Although the CG currently works under the Dept of Homeland Security, the MOA was signed in 1995 while under the Dept of Transportation; it remains in effect, as the legislation which created DHS provided that all standing agreements under DoT would move with the agencies.
- ^{xxvi} Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Peace Operations, Joint Publication 3-07.3 (Washington, DC: 12 February 1999), II-6-8.
- ^{xxvii} *Ibid.*, I-6 to I-7.
- ^{xxviii} Hattendorf, 255.
- ^{xxix} *Ibid.*, 260-261.
- ^{xxx} Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, Joint Publication 3-16 (Washington, DC: 5 April 2000), IV 5-7.
- ^{xxxi} JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, II-19.
- ^{xxxii} Paul T. Mitchell, "Small Navies and Network-Centric Warfare," Naval War College Review 46, No. 2, (Spring 2003): 1-16; JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, II-10 to II-12.
- ^{xxxiii} The BDM Corporation, A Study of Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam, Volume VI, Book 1, Draft (McLean, VA.: 9 May 1980), EX-17.
- ^{xxxiv} Bruce B. Stubbs, The U. S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the Twenty-First Century (Newport, RI.: U.S. Naval War College, June 1992), 185.
- ^{xxxv} The BDM Corporation, 7-18.
- ^{xxxvi} Johnson, 336-37.

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- ^{xxxvii} Stubbs, The U. S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the Twenty-First Century, 113.
- ^{xxxviii} Stubbs, America's Coast Guard, 66.
- ^{xxxix} Ibid., 76.
- ^{xl} Margaret Daly Hayes and Gary F. Wheatley, Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations: Haiti, A Case Study (Washington, DC: National Defense University, January 1996), 54.
- ^{xli} JP 3-07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Peace Operations, A-G-8.
- ^{xlii} James M Loy, U.S. Coast Guard: America's Maritime Guardian, Coast Guard Publication 1, Washington, DC: 1 January 2002 49; Stubbs, America's Coast Guard, 75.
- ^{xliii} Patrick M. Stillman, "Debate and Response: Small Navies Do Have a Place in Network-Centric Warfare," Naval War College Review 47, No. 1 (Winter 2004): 94.
- ^{xliv} Stubbs, America's Coast Guard, 79.
- ^{xliv} Categories for combat operations were used based on information contained in NDP-1, pp. 61-70. Categories for operations in other than war were based on information from JCS Joint Pub 3-0, pp. V-6. Categories for the principles of CG operations and mission profile were taken from CG Pub 1.
- ^{xlvi} At Appendix B is a survey that was developed by the author to assess attitudes toward USCG capabilities in conducting a variety of missions in support of the Combatant Commanders. Subsequent respondent comments will be annotated in notes as "Respondent Remarks." Respondent Remarks, College of Naval Warfare Research Project, Cari B. Thomas, (06 Apr 04) 38.
- ^{xlvi} Ibid.
- ^{xlvi} After examining the data, comparing information in joint doctrine, international naval standards for smaller navies as well as USCG service doctrine led the author to hypothesize that inconsistencies in data were due to the variety of types of missions listed in military operations other than war, including ones in benign environments to ones requiring hostile actions with possible large-scale use of force. Questions involving arms control, show of force operations, strikes and raids, support to counterinsurgency and support to insurgency were removed to normalize the data.
- ^{xlix} National Defense University, Strategic Assessment 1999: Priorities for a Turbulent World (1999); quoted in Stubbs, America's Coast Guard, 80.
- ^l Respondent Remarks, 39.
- ^{li} John Mintz and Vernon Loeb. "Coast Guard Fights to Retain War Role." The Washington Post, August 31 2003.
- ^{lii} Gordon I. Peterson, "One War, One Team, One Fight," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (October 2003): 70.
- ^{liii} Stubbs, The U. S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the Twenty-First Century, 112.
- ^{liv} Ibid., 110-113.
- ^{lv} Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Statement of General Ralph E. Eberhart, USAF Commander North American Aerospace Defense Command and United States Northern Command Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., 25 March 2004, D 290.
- ^{lvi} Stubbs, The U. S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the Twenty-First Century, 112.
- ^{lvii} President, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 1.
- ^{lviii} James Hull, Cari Thomas and Joe Dizenzo, "What Was the Coast Guard Doing in Iraq?" U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (August 2003), 38-40.
- ^{lix} Respondent Remarks, 39.
- ^{lx} Ibid.

APPENDIX A
Range of Military Operations
Joint Publication 3-0

| RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS | | | |
|--|--|---|---|
| Military Operations | General US Goal | Examples | |
| C O M B A T | <i>War</i> | Fight & Win | Large-scale Combat Operations: Attack / Defend / Blockades |
| | N O N C O M B A T | Deter War & Resolve Conflict | Peace Enforcement / Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) Strikes / Raids / Show of Force Counterterrorism / Peacekeeping Counterinsurgency |
| | | Promote Peace & Support US Civil Authorities | Antiterrorism / Disaster Relief Peacebuilding Nation Assistance Domestic Support Counterdrug / NEO |
| | <i>Military Operations Other Than War</i> | | |

Figure I-1. Range of Military Operations

APPENDIX B
The Survey



06 April 04

From: Commander Cari B. Thomas, U. S. Coast Guard
To: Survey Respondent

Subj: COLLEGE OF NAVAL WARFARE RESEARCH PROJECT

1. As part of curriculum of the Naval War College, the Joint Military Operations Department requires us to do a research project relevant for a Combatant Commander, Fleet Commander, or Joint Task Force Commander. Since mid-March 2004, the U. S. Coast Guard has assumed the duties as Maritime Component Commander for the combined Joint Task Force-Haiti under the direction of Southern Command. The duties, described in a 16 March 04 SOUTHCOM press release were to “continue to support stability operations by providing support for port security in Port-au-Prince harbor and conducting port assessments to help restore commercial and humanitarian operation in other Haitian ports.”
2. The purpose of my project is to examine the duties of a maritime component commander (MCC) throughout the spectrum of conflict and the type of operations that an MCC is most frequently used. Following this, an examination of the capabilities of the U. S. Coast Guard and an assessment of their capacity to carry out these duties will be prepared. Based on my findings, recommendations and courses of action will be forwarded for consideration.
3. The survey is intended to be unclassified. Please feel free to copy the survey and administer it to other interested parties who you feel may have valuable insight. I can provide an electronic version of the survey if you need it. Use the enclosed envelope to return the survey to me.
4. Should you have any questions, please contact me at: cari.thomas@nwc.navy.mil or at 401-849-1168. I request you return the survey by 25 April 2004. Thank you again for your time and consideration.

C. B. THOMAS

Maritime Component Commander: College of Naval Warfare Research Project
CDR Cari B. Thomas, U. S. Coast Guard

Command Assigned to: _____ Service (USA, USN, etc.): _____
Active, Reserve, or Civilian: _____ Paygrade: _____

1. Approximately how many years do you have in planning or overseeing maritime operations at the Combatant Commander, Fleet or JTF level (or equivalent)?

2. Under what combat conditions have you planned or overseen maritime operations:
 - a. Power projection ashore Y N
 - b. Sea control, battlespace dominance Y N
 - c. Amphibious operations Y N
 - d. Naval coastal warfare Y N
 - e. Special operations Y N
 - f. Force sustainment Y N

Describe your experiences:

3. Under what operations other than war have you planned or overseen maritime operations:
 - a. Arms control Y N
 - b. Consequence management Y N
 - c. DoD support to counterdrug operations Y N
 - d. Domestic support operations Y N
 - e. Enforcement of sanctions and maritime intercept operations Y N

 - f. Enforcing exclusion zones Y N
 - g. Ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight Y N
 - h. Foreign humanitarian assistance Y N
 - i. Nation assistance Y N
 - j. Noncombatant evacuation operations Y N

 - k. Peace operations Y N
 - l. Protection of shipping Y N
 - m. Recovery operations Y N
 - n. Show of force operations Y N
 - o. Strikes and raids Y N

 - p. Support to counterinsurgency Y N
 - q. Support to insurgency Y N

Describe your experiences:

4. In your experience, how often have you been involved with conducting these types of maritime combat operations?

N—Never, I—Infrequent, F—Frequently, VF—Very Frequently, NC—Nearly Continuously

- | | | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|---|---|---|----|----|
| a. Power projection ashore | N | I | F | VF | NC |
| b. Sea control, battlespace dominance | N | I | F | VF | NC |
| c. Amphibious operations | N | I | F | VF | NC |
| d. Naval coastal warfare | N | I | F | VF | NC |
| e. Special operations | N | I | F | VF | NC |
| f. Force sustainment | N | I | F | VF | NC |

Comments:

4. In your experience, how often have you been involved with conducting these types of maritime operations other than war?

N—Never, I—Infrequently, F—Frequently, VF—Very Frequently, NC—Nearly Continuously

- | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|----|----|
| a. Arms control | N | I | F | VF | NC |
| b. Consequence management | N | I | F | VF | NC |
| c. DoD support to counterdrug operations | N | I | F | VF | NC |
| d. Domestic support operations | N | I | F | VF | NC |
| e. Enforcement of sanctions and maritime intercept operations | N | I | F | VF | NC |
| f. Enforcing exclusion zones | N | I | F | VF | NC |
| g. Ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight | N | I | F | VF | NC |
| h. Foreign humanitarian assistance | N | I | F | VF | NC |
| i. Nation assistance | N | I | F | VF | NC |
| j. Noncombatant evacuation operations | N | I | F | VF | NC |
| k. Peace operations | N | I | F | VF | NC |
| l. Protection of shipping | N | I | F | VF | NC |
| m. Recovery operations | N | I | F | VF | NC |
| n. Show of force operations | N | I | F | VF | NC |
| o. Strikes and raids | N | I | F | VF | NC |
| p. Support to counterinsurgency | N | I | F | VF | NC |
| q. Support to insurgency | N | I | F | VF | NC |

Comments:

5. What is your perception of U. S. Coast Guard capability to coordinate the following combat missions as a Maritime Component Commander (vice as a force provider of tactical units in support to the MCC)?

N—Not Capable, S—Somewhat Capable, C—Capable, VC—Very Capable, E—Expert

- | | | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|---|---|---|----|---|
| a. Power projection ashore | N | S | C | VC | E |
| b. Sea control, battlespace dominance | N | S | C | VC | E |
| c. Amphibious operations | N | S | C | VC | E |
| d. Naval coastal warfare | N | S | C | VC | E |
| e. Special operations | N | S | C | VC | E |
| f. Force sustainment | N | S | C | VC | E |

Comments:

6. What is your perception of U. S. Coast Guard capability to coordinate the following missions in operations other than war as a Maritime Component Commander?

N—Not Capable, S—Somewhat Capable, C—Capable, VC—Very Capable, E—Expert

- | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|----|---|
| a. Arms control | N | S | C | VC | E |
| b. Consequence management | N | S | C | VC | E |
| c. Counterdrug operations | N | S | C | VC | E |
| d. Domestic support operations | N | S | C | VC | E |
| e. Enforcement of sanctions and maritime intercept operations | N | S | C | VC | E |
| f. Enforcing exclusion zones | N | S | C | VC | E |
| g. Ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight | N | S | C | VC | E |
| h. Foreign humanitarian assistance | N | S | C | VC | E |
| i. Nation assistance | N | S | C | VC | E |
| j. Noncombatant evacuation operations | N | S | C | VC | E |
| k. Peace operations | N | S | C | VC | E |
| l. Protection of shipping | N | S | C | VC | E |
| m. Recovery operations | N | S | C | VC | E |
| n. Show of force operations | N | S | C | VC | E |
| o. Strikes and raids | N | S | C | VC | E |
| p. Support to counterinsurgency | N | S | C | VC | E |
| q. Support to insurgency | N | S | C | VC | E |

7. Are you familiar with the Coast Guard Principles of Operations? Coast Guard Publication 1:


<http://www.uscg.mil/overview/Pub%201/contents.html>

N—Not Familiar, S—Somewhat Familiar, F—Familiar, VF—Very Familiar, E—Expert

- | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------------|---|---|---|----|---|
| a. Principle of clear objective | N | S | C | VC | E |
| b. Principle of effective presence | N | S | C | VC | E |
| c. Principle of unity of effort | N | S | C | VC | E |
| d. Principle of on-scene initiative | N | S | C | VC | E |
| e. Principle of flexibility | N | S | C | VC | E |
| f. Principle of managed risk | N | S | C | VC | E |
| g. Principle of restraint | N | S | C | VC | E |

Comments:

8. Coast Guard Publication 1 has the following spectrum of CG-DoD missions:



What is your perception of the Coast Guard’s capability to perform the duties of a Maritime Component Commander under these conditions?

N—Not Capable, S—Somewhat Capable, C—Capable, VC—Very Capable, E—Expert

- | | | | | | |
|--|---|---|---|----|---|
| a. Environmental protection and law enforcement | N | S | C | VC | E |
| b. Maritime safety/search and rescue | N | S | C | VC | E |
| c. Migrant, drug and arms interdiction | N | S | C | VC | E |
| d. Peacetime engagement | N | S | C | VC | E |
| e. Disaster relief and humanitarian operations | N | S | C | VC | E |
| f. Maritime sanctions enforcement | N | S | C | VC | E |
| g. Peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations | N | S | C | VC | E |
| h. Noncombatant evacuation operations | N | S | C | VC | E |
| i. Counterterrorism operations | N | S | C | VC | E |
| j. Force protection | N | S | C | VC | E |
| k. Major theater war | N | S | C | VC | E |

9. Please comment on your perception of the Coast Guard capability to coordinate and use its platforms (ships, boats, aircraft and personnel) to achieve diplomatic or economic missions (vice military missions) in support of a Combatant Commander's requirements.

10. Any other comments?


APPENDIX C Data Results

Experience Indicators

Question 2: Combat Conditions for Planning/Overseeing Maritime Operations

| Type of Operation | % Yes | % No | Total |
|---------------------------------------|-------|------|-------|
| a. Power projection ashore | 38% | 62% | 13 |
| b. Sea control, battlespace dominance | 85% | 15% | 13 |
| c. Amphibious operations | 23% | 77% | 13 |
| d. Naval coastal warfare | 54% | 46% | 13 |
| e. Special operations | 46% | 54% | 13 |
| f. Force sustainment | 46% | 54% | 13 |


Experience: Planning Combat Operations




Question 3: Operations Other than War Conditions for Planning/Overseeing Maritime Operations

| Type of Operation | % Yes | % No | Total |
|---|-------|------|-------|
| a. Arms control | 0% | 100% | 13 |
| b. Consequence management | 69% | 31% | 13 |
| c. DoD support to counterdrug operations | 92% | 8% | 13 |
| d. Domestic support operations | 77% | 23% | 13 |
| e. Enforcement of sanctions and maritime intercept operations | 69% | 31% | 13 |
| f. Enforcing exclusion zones | 54% | 46% | 13 |
| g. Ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight | 54% | 46% | 13 |
| h. Foreign humanitarian assistance | 38% | 62% | 13 |
| i. Nation assistance | 38% | 62% | 13 |
| j. Noncombatant evacuation operations | 62% | 38% | 13 |
| k. Peace operations | 38% | 62% | 13 |
| l. Protection of shipping | 46% | 54% | 13 |
| m. Recovery operations | 46% | 54% | 13 |
| n. Show of force operations | 69% | 31% | 13 |
| o. Strikes and raids | 54% | 46% | 13 |
| p. Support to counterinsurgency | 15% | 85% | 13 |
| q. Support to insurgency | 0% | 100% | 13 |

Experience: Planning Operations Other than War




Experience: Planning Operations Other than War



Question 4a: Involvement in Conducting Combat Operations

| | N | I | F | VF | NC | Total |
|---------------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|----|-------|
| a. Power projection ashore | 46% | 23% | 15% | 15% | 0% | 13 |
| b. Sea control, battlespace dominance | 8% | 46% | 23% | 15% | 8% | 13 |
| c. Amphibious operations | 54% | 31% | 0% | 15% | 0% | 13 |
| d. Naval coastal warfare | 31% | 23% | 31% | 15% | 0% | 13 |
| e. Special operations | 46% | 23% | 15% | 8% | 8% | 13 |
| f. Force sustainment | 46% | 23% | 15% | 15% | 0% | 13 |


Experience: Conducting Combat Operations




Question 4b: Involvement in Conducting Operations in Other than War

| | N | I | F | VF | NC | Total |
|---|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------|
| a. Arms control | 92% | 8% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 13 |
| b. Consequence management | 23% | 31% | 46% | 0% | 0% | 13 |
| c. DoD support to counterdrug operations | 0% | 15% | 54% | 15% | 15% | 13 |
| d. Domestic support operations | 23% | 8% | 38% | 31% | 0% | 13 |
| e. Enforcement of sanctions and maritime intercept operations | 31% | 15% | 8% | 46% | 0% | 13 |
| f. Enforcing exclusion zones | 38% | 31% | 15% | 0% | 15% | 13 |
| g. Ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight | 38% | 15% | 38% | 8% | 0% | 13 |
| h. Foreign humanitarian assistance | 46% | 23% | 23% | 8% | 0% | 13 |
| i. Nation assistance | 62% | 15% | 23% | 0% | 0% | 13 |
| j. Noncombatant evacuation operations | 23% | 62% | 8% | 8% | 0% | 13 |
| k. Peace operations | 69% | 15% | 15% | 0% | 0% | 13 |
| l. Protection of shipping | 38% | 8% | 38% | 15% | 0% | 13 |
| m. Recovery operations | 38% | 31% | 23% | 8% | 0% | 13 |
| n. Show of force operations | 38% | 38% | 8% | 15% | 0% | 13 |
| o. Strikes and raids | 46% | 31% | 0% | 23% | 0% | 13 |
| p. Support to counterinsurgency | 62% | 38% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 13 |
| q. Support to insurgency | 85% | 15% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 13 |



Experience: Conducting Operations Other than War



Experience: Conducting Operations Other than War




| CG Capability: Coordinate Combat Missions | NC | S | C | VC | E |
|---|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| a. Power projection ashore | 69% | 23% | 8% | 0% | 0% |
| b. Sea control, battlespace dominance | 15% | 23% | 46% | 8% | 8% |
| c. Amphibious operations | 46% | 46% | 8% | 0% | 0% |
| d. Naval coastal warfare | 8% | 8% | 23% | 38% | 23% |
| e. Special operations | 23% | 38% | 23% | 15% | 0% |
| f. Force sustainment | 23% | 15% | 54% | 8% | 0% |
| Average | 31% | 26% | 27% | 12% | 5% |




| CG Capability: Coordinate Operations Other than War | NC | S | C | VC | E |
|---|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| a. Arms control | 38% | 23% | 38% | 0% | 0% |
| b. Consequence management | 0% | 23% | 23% | 23% | 31% |
| c. Counterdrug operations | 0% | 8% | 0% | 15% | 77% |
| d. Domestic support operations | 0% | 8% | 0% | 31% | 62% |
| e. Enforcement of sanctions and maritime intercept operations | 0% | 15% | 8% | 23% | 54% |
| f. Enforcing exclusion zones | 0% | 8% | 23% | 31% | 38% |
| g. Ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight | 0% | 23% | 15% | 15% | 46% |
| h. Foreign humanitarian assistance | 0% | 23% | 15% | 23% | 38% |
| i. Nation assistance | 8% | 8% | 54% | 23% | 8% |
| j. Noncombatant evacuation operations | 15% | 15% | 38% | 23% | 8% |
| k. Peace operations | 8% | 46% | 15% | 8% | 23% |
| l. Protection of shipping | 0% | 15% | 31% | 31% | 23% |
| m. Recovery operations | 8% | 15% | 8% | 54% | 15% |
| n. Show of force operations | 15% | 54% | 15% | 0% | 15% |
| o. Strikes and raids | 54% | 23% | 23% | 0% | 0% |
| p. Support to counterinsurgency | 31% | 54% | 15% | 0% | 0% |
| q. Support to insurgency | 46% | 46% | 8% | 0% | 0% |
| average | 13% | 24% | 19% | 18% | 26% |


CG Capability: Coordinate Operations Other Than War (Perceived)




CG Capability: Coordinate Operations Other than War (Perceived)



CG Capability: Coordinate Operations Other than War (Perceived)



CG Capability: Coordinate Operations Other than War (Perceived)




CG Capability: Coordinate Operations Other than War


(Minimal Use of Force)

| | NC | S | C | VC | E |
|---|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| b. Consequence management | 0% | 23% | 23% | 23% | 31% |
| c. Counterdrug operations | 0% | 8% | 0% | 15% | 77% |
| d. Domestic support operations | 0% | 8% | 0% | 31% | 62% |
| e. Enforcement of sanctions and maritime intercept operations | 0% | 15% | 8% | 23% | 54% |
| f. Enforcing exclusion zones | 0% | 8% | 23% | 31% | 38% |
| g. Ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight | 0% | 23% | 15% | 15% | 46% |
| h. Foreign humanitarian assistance | 0% | 23% | 15% | 23% | 38% |
| i. Nation assistance | 8% | 8% | 54% | 23% | 8% |
| j. Noncombatant evacuation operations | 15% | 15% | 38% | 23% | 8% |
| k. Peace operations | 8% | 46% | 15% | 8% | 23% |
| l. Protection of shipping | 0% | 15% | 31% | 31% | 23% |
| m. Recovery operations | 8% | 15% | 8% | 54% | 15% |
| Average | 3% | 17% | 19% | 25% | 35% |

CG Capabilities: Ops Other than War (Minimal Use of Force)




CG Capabilities: Non-Combat Ops (Minimal Use of Force)




| Familiar with Principles of Operations | %N | %SF | %F | %VF | %E |
|--|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| a. Principle of clear objective | 31% | 8% | 15% | 31% | 15% |
| b. Principle of effective presence | 23% | 15% | 23% | 23% | 15% |
| c. Principle of unity of effort | 23% | 15% | 15% | 31% | 15% |
| d. Principle of on-scene initiative | 31% | 8% | 15% | 31% | 15% |
| e. Principle of flexibility | 31% | 8% | 15% | 31% | 15% |
| f. Principle of managed risk | 23% | 15% | 15% | 31% | 15% |
| g. Principle of restraint | 23% | 23% | 8% | 31% | 15% |
| Average | 26% | 13% | 15% | 30% | 15% |

| CG Capability: Missions | N | SC | C | VC | E |
|--|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| a. Environmental protection and law enforcement | 0% | 0% | 0% | 15% | 85% |
| b. Maritime safety/search and rescue | 0% | 0% | 0% | 8% | 92% |
| c. Migrant, drug and arms interdiction | 0% | 0% | 0% | 38% | 62% |
| d. Peacetime engagement | 0% | 0% | 15% | 54% | 31% |
| e. Disaster relief and humanitarian operations | 8% | 0% | 8% | 62% | 23% |
| f. Maritime sanctions enforcement | 0% | 8% | 8% | 38% | 46% |
| g. Peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations | 8% | 23% | 31% | 31% | 8% |
| h. Noncombatant evacuation operations | 8% | 31% | 38% | 23% | 0% |
| i. Counterterrorism operations | 8% | 8% | 62% | 23% | 0% |
| j. Force protection | 8% | 8% | 38% | 31% | 15% |
| k. Major theater war | 46% | 23% | 23% | 8% | 0% |
| Average | 8% | 9% | 20% | 30% | 33% |

CG Capability: Perform Missions (Perceived)



CG Capabilities: Performing Missions (CG Pub 1)



APPENDIX D

Survey Respondents' Comments

2. Under what combat conditions have you planned or overseen maritime operations:

Describe your experiences:

- Service planning to requirements for OIF including NCW requirements in theater, enroute, transit security, choke point ops. Service force level planning to requirement capabilities to conduct indicated operations includes gaming and exercises. CTU commander of maritime forces conducting control ops—Haiti, Cuba, Haiti 94 (USCG GS-15, Ret O-6)
- As Deputy CFFC, I'm in the middle of all planning!! (USN O-9)
- J3 for combatant command control, sea space off Haiti (USA O-7)
- Assigned to C5F staff as primary liaison for amphibious, logistics over the shore, and naval coastal warfare matters during OIF. (USN O-5)
- At COMCARGRU-1, we were responsible for carrier strike group training, we participated in planning and oversight of the operations listed above—essentially at the JTF level. (USN O-5)
- Planner and watch team leader during Desert Fox for NAVCENT (Tomahawk's into Iraq). Naval Forces Korea planner and current ops for real world counter infiltration ops and during ROK engagements at sea. (USN O-5)
- Attack bombardier 84-98. Strike ops officer/team planning 92-95. S-3 dept head and commanding officer 98-03. Staff tours CCDG-5 92-95, CCDG-1 99-00. (USN O-5)
- Recent Able Sentry ops in Haiti, we provided complete spectrum of operational capability in the maritime perspective as listed above. The question above is a rather narrow scope. I have personal combat experience in Combat SAR support for Operation Urgent Fury and in Special Operations during Operations Desert Shield, Desert Storm and Provide Comfort I and II. My personal experience is primarily with the C-130 aircraft. I am an aviator, however I believe as with the Navy that ones specialty isn't necessarily a negative in determining capability. I have 76 combat sorties flying Air Force C-130s during an exchange tour. (USCG O-6)
- Operation Eastern Access, taking back the Vieques Bombing ranges from Puerto Rico insurgents.

3. Under what operations other than war have you planned or overseen maritime operations:

Describe your experiences:

- Service level requirements for DOD requirements to maritime counterdrug operations. Enforcement of UN sanctions (Iraq, Haiti), Conduct FON ops in Caribbean. (USCG GS-15, Ret O-6)
- Extensive background in various amphibious operations including Operation Restore Hope (Somalia), disaster relief/consequence management (Exxon Valdez clean-up and Alaska Air sar/recovery) (USN O-5)
- At US NORTHCOM, we have conducted strategic level planning in CM, CD, AMIO and Domestic Support. My experience in NEO, show of force, recovery and strike have been in fleet operations. (USN O-5)
- Directed submarine operations in the Pacific at the tail end of the Cold War. (DOD GS-13)

3. Under what operations other than war have you planned or overseen maritime operations: Describe your experiences (continued):

- Watch team leader for UN sanction ops for NAVCENT. FON coordinator for naval forces Korea. Planner/current ops for CNFK, emphasis on ensuring sustainability from sea and counter infiltration ops by NK SOF B-E as Northcom Maritime Ops and DWC watch chief. (USN O-5)
- EOD support to amphibious ops, counterdrug dive ops iso USCG, support to USCG, USSS, FBI and local law enforcement domestically, EOD support to NSW/MIO boarding teams, ordnance and aircraft recovery, and EOD support to USMC in Kuwait. (USN O-4)
- Most I cannot comment on. I was a member of a Special Operations Squadron from 89-91. I have been involved in support for counterinsurgency ops in Central America. CD ops since 1982. (USCG O-6)

4a In your experience, how often have you been involved with conducting these types of maritime combat operations?

Comments:

- Never served in combat zone. Participated in national level planning for maritime combat ops associated with OIF. (USCG GS-15, Ret O-6)
- In training and exercise role. (USN O-4)

4b In your experience, how often have you been involved with conducting these types of maritime operations other than war?

Comments:

- Execution of normal at sea USCG operations involve enforcement of sanctions (Haiti and Cuba), MIO, FON, counterdrug ops with DOD (JIATF-E ops). HQ level planning of DOD requirements to CD ops as G-OPL (office of law enforcement for defense ops). LEDET requirement to CENTCOM MIO ops throughout 1990s. (USCG GS-15, Ret O-6)

5. What is your perception of U. S. Coast Guard capability to coordinate the following combat missions as a Maritime Component Commander (vice as a force provider of tactical units in support to the MCC)?

Comments:

- Capable of executing against low threat maritime/air opponent. Not capable in high threat environments of optimizing friendly force operations due to unfamiliarity with threats, counters and weapons exploitations. (USCG GS-15, Ret O-6)
- Depends of the operation and preponderance of forces. USCG has great capability to command MIO, VBSS, but poor choice for ops requiring NSW/EOD and combining air, surface and sub picture. (USN O-4)

6. What is your perception of U. S. Coast Guard capability to coordinate the following missions in operations other than war as a Maritime Component Commander?

- Not enough ships. (Questions e-q) (USN O-5)

7. Are you familiar with the Coast Guard Principles of Operations?

Comments:

- Utilized daily by CTU commanders and cutter CO's in positioning, conducting, and assigned operations. (USCG GS-15, Ret O-6)
- Yes, as I've worked frequently with USCG but I've never read their book. (USN O-4)

8. What is your perception of the Coast Guard's capability to perform the duties of a Maritime Component Commander under these conditions?

- Not enough ships. (Questions e, k) (USN O-5)

9. Please comment on your perception of the Coast Guard capability to coordinate and use its platforms (ships, boats, aircraft and personnel) to achieve diplomatic or economic missions (vice military missions) in support of a Combatant Commander's requirements.

- After the first 10 large navies of the world, the other all really coast guards in size, capability, and mission set, except for a few with selective units armed with ASCMs. Coast Guard is better role model for these. USCG does not have the available asset time to devote to this effort beyond the floor established by G-C (370 days away from homeport of major cutter time, ITD, and some dedicated LEDET effort). (USCG GS-15, Ret O-6)
- I'm high on the Coast Guard! The CG can do all! Only limited by platforms and people!! (USN O-9)
- Very capable (USA O-7)
- USCG is often the best asset to use in diplomatic and economic type missions, particularly those where the nation being engaged may be suspicious of U.S. intentions or have to contend with significant internal political opposition to increased ties to the U.S. Unfortunately, U.S. military commanders are often skeptical (unjustifiably so) of USCG abilities or are foolishly reluctant to relinquish control of operations to USCG commanders due to parochial interests. (USN O-5)
- The Coast Guard is a critical component of the NORTHCOM mission. Although part of DHS, we have a great working relationship and the USCG performs the vast majority of homeland security missions in conjunction with their diplomatic and economic mission responsibilities. (USN O-5)
- Probably capable on a diplomatic stance. I have no idea what CG capability is wrt an economic mission. (DOD GS-13)
- In many cases USCG better than USN. USCG shares missions consistent with primary missions of many smaller navies...navies which share little in way of missions with USN. (USN O-5)
- Outstanding. (USN O-4)
- The hard nucleus about which the Navy and other DOD entities form about in time of national crisis. (USCG O-6)

10. Any other comments?

- New DHS oversight of USCG activities will hinder expansion of requirements to COCOMs until threat to US security abates (not near term). (USCG GS-15, Ret O-6)
- I love the Coast Guard—call me if you have any questions. (USN O-9)

10. Any other comments? (continued)

- Our capability includes planning competences which have been sorely overlooked in the last decade. As a result, our capacity to plan operations (or run our business) has diminished. (USCG O-6)
- CG capability to act as MCC would be best used in littoral arrangement—not as much open ocean. (DOD GS-13)
- USCG has been the lead military force in adjusting to post-9-11 world. Very impressive. USCG has made quantum leap in cultural and operational capability. Good thing theirs is an “S” in both safety and security...USCG does not have to change acronyms as the shift focus! (USN O-5)
- We perform the missions that you have described above daily in the Seventh District. We are actively engaged with SOUTHCOM and act on many occasions as the Maritime Component for their theater ops. (USCG O-6)

APPENDIX E
Recommendations for Combatant Commanders

I. Theater Engagement Plan: Coordination and Cooperation. Develop an expansive regional maritime security strategy that includes interagency partners supporting the *National Strategy for Homeland Security*. John Hattendorf, in *Naval History and Maritime Strategy* recommends cooperative ways to build multinational naval forces, including finding navies (or coast guards) that share similar interests. For example, they could share, train or exercise: regulating maritime resources, preventing pollution, enforcing fisheries laws, controlling immigration, interdicting contraband, and suppressing piracy.¹ This list could be expanded to include managing security issues of ports, waterways, facilities, vessels and cargoes as well as mariner credentialing. A USCG MCC could provide expertise in the majority of these areas, depending on regional goals of the U. S. Mission or Combatant Commander.

II. Operational Art for the MCC: The USCG can use each of the operational factors of time, space and force in support of regional objectives. Regarding time, much of the service is geared toward mission response, with specific time on scene requirements defined; including response and patrol times into ways an MCC manages an AOR is one method of effectiveness. In regards to space, the USCG is generally accepted as the U.S. coastal zone specialists and can adapt to most environments, including operating in ice, rivers, lakes and bays as well as the coastal approaches through the entire EEZ. Regarding force, two items are advantageous. First, what is not devoted to response is often dedicated to prevention or deterrence; this can reduce a Combatant Commander's force requirements due to prevention measures or strategies. Secondly, the USCG has a large network through the international

¹ Hattendorf, *Naval History and Maritime Strategy*, 263-64.

maritime community, commercial maritime trade and the IMO (UN's advocate for maritime affairs) to provide a broad force multiplier not typically considered by an MCC.

III. Principles of Operation. Survey respondents varied greatly on whether they knew about or understood established principles of operation. They are similar to principles of operations other than war, particularly unity of effort, objective and restraint. However, USCG principles also include on scene initiative (through decentralized execution), flexibility (inherent in multi-mission platforms and people), effective presence (others view of the Coast Guard as primarily humanitarian as earlier described) and managed risk. These principles could be considered by a Combatant Commander when conducting non-combat operations, and adapted as needed, particularly managing risk. Flexible deterrent options can be implemented by the USCG, many as listed in Joint Publication 5-00.1 for not just military, but also economic, informational and political purposes because of their ability to function as both a military force as well as a law enforcement agency.² Sustainability and persistence for the CG may be problematic due to its size and infrastructure constraints.

IV. Leadership. A June 2000 study, *Leadership Development for MOOTW: An Analysis of Tactical Lessons Learned*, found that the most difficult challenge in conducting non-combat operations was the need for leadership different from what is needed in traditional warfare. The study recommended further focusing on decision making, incorporating more MOOTW specific training programs, and defining and developing leaders that specialize in MOOTW. Implementing the final recommendation is a long term responsibility that will need to be addressed at OSD. However, USCG organic capability to meet short term periods of crisis, engagement or other mission needs can be provided to the Combatant Commander.

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² JP 5-00.1, Joint Publication for Campaign Planning, A-3 to A-4.

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