

NATIONAL SECURITY FELLOW

AIR UNIVERSITY

Assessing the Effects
Of Bush Administration National Security Policy
On the Air Force Active/Reserve Component Mix



Lt Col T. Glenn Davis, USAFR

National Security Fellows
Harvard University
JFK School of Government
79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

Distribution A: Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

Report Documentation Page

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

1. REPORT DATE 2003	2. REPORT TYPE N/A	3. DATES COVERED -			
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Assessing the Effects Of Bush Administration National Security Policy, On the Air Force Active/Reserve Component Mix		5a. CONTRACT NUMBER			
		5b. GRANT NUMBER			
		5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER			
6. AUTHOR(S)		5d. PROJECT NUMBER			
		5e. TASK NUMBER			
		5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER			
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Air University Press Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-6615		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER			
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)		10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)			
		11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)			
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release, distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified	UU	54	

Disclaimer

The conclusions and views expressed in this document are those of the author alone, cultivated in the freedom of expression, and academic environment at Harvard University and the Kennedy School of Government. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, or any of the Service or Reserve Components. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military Service or government agency.

Contents

Illustrations	4
Executive Summary	5
Chapter 1: Introduction	10
A. The Search for a Post Cold War Solution	10
B. The U.S. Air Force Matures as a Service of Choice	11
C. Methodology	12
D. Conclusions/Recommendations	13
Chapter 2: Assessing the RC/AC Mix	13
A. Historical Perspective	13
1. Pre-AVF Characteristics	13
a. Korea	13
b. Berlin Conflict	14
c. U.S.S. Pueblo Incident	15
d. Vietnam	16
2. The AVF Takes Shape	17
3. The Gulf War – AVF’s First Test	18
4. Post Cold War Drawdown & Global Engagement	19
5. Expeditionary Air Force (EAF) Arrives	21
6. Terrorist Attacks/September 11, 2001	23
7. Removing Reserve Component Autonomy	25
B. Analyzing Lessons Learned	26
C. Current Status	27
D. Challenges	28
Chapter 3: Identifying the Bush Administration Political Input	29
A. The National Security Strategy	29
B. The Quadrennial Defense Review	31
C. The Secretary of Defense	32
D. The Political Input	33
Chapter 4: Reference Framework: Applying the Political Input	35
A. Key Studies and Guidance	35
1. The RAND Study	35
2. Review of Reserve Component Contributions to National Defense	36
3. Reserve Component Employment (RCE) 2005	37
4. ANG Long Range Strategic Plan on Force Mix	37
5. A Composite Framework/Model	37
6. Beyond the Composite Framework	38
B. Analysis: Applying Political Input to the Model	39
1. The Approach	39
2. Political Input	39
3. Application	39
4. Weighing the Lessons Learned	40
5. Final Thoughts on Analysis	42
Chapter 5: Conclusions and Recommendations	43
A. Conclusions	43
B. Recommendations	45
C. Final Thoughts	47
Appendix	48
Acronyms	49
Works Consulted	50
Citations and Endnotes	52

Illustrations

Figure 1: Applying Political Input to RAND Model	7
Figure 2: ARC Contingency Participation	19
Figure 3: Effects of Global Engagement on Aircraft Deployed	20
Figure 4: EAF Overlay to Combat Global Engagement	21
Figure 5: RAND Force Mix Prediction Model	36
Figure 6: Applying Political Input to the RAND Model	40
Figure 7: Author Assessment of DoD Preferences for Force Mix Weighed Against AVF Lessons Learned	41

Executive Summary

Introduction

What effect will the Bush Administration's National Security Strategy (NSS) and Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) have on the Air Force's current reserve component/active component (RC/AC) mix? Recent studies and guidance regarding the force mix have typically attempted to predict how variables and planning factors can affect the proportion of the RC relative to the Air Force Future Total Force (FTF) team comprised of the active Air Force, the Air National Guard, and the Air Force Reserve. In this case, the political factor, represented by the current administration's new post Cold War strategy, has produced an unexpected result that *minimally* affects the relative proportions of the components, but significantly contributes to the Air Force redefining *volunteerism* (*i.e. participating in lengthy deployments without activation but in a volunteer status*) to avoid undesirable changes to its existing RC/AC mix.

In reaching these conclusions, the research sought to answer three questions: 1. What are the defining characteristics of the current Air Force RC/AC mix configuration? 2. What guidance do the NSS, the QDR, and senior administration officials prescribe for the current RC/AC mix composition that constitutes a modeling political input?? 3. What effect should/will these policies have on the current Air Force FTF?

Assessing the Reserve Component/Active Component (RC/AC) Mix

To assess the defining characteristics of the current FTF mix, the evolution of the All Volunteer Force (AVF), its lessons learned, the current RC/AC proportions, and the challenges the RC faces today were explored. The 55 years of Air Force unique history were subdivided into seven prominent segments or significant events that played a role in shaping the RC/AC force structure of today. This evolution has produced a modern RC force contributing 35 percent of the FTF,¹ and that is fully integrated into all ten of the Air Force's Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) combat elements.²

From these periods, two distinct categories of lessons learned emerged regarding the incremental development of the FTF. The first category is significant because it is comprised of lessons the Air Force “relearns” on a regular basis. The second category is developed from stand-alone lessons that are not repetitive in nature. Both sets of lessons are later applied to a theoretical RC/AC force model to enhance its predictive capabilities. The next section specifically addresses this administration’s departure from Cold War doctrine and its call for transformation.

Bush Administration’s Political Considerations

Determining the intentions of policy derived from the Bush Administration was not a straightforward proposition. Both the NSS³ and QDR⁴ are general in nature, and only through examination of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s personal comments and memoranda can light be shed on the administration’s true aim. After receiving an RC mission area briefing in November 2002, Rumsfeld issued a memorandum within the Department of Defense stating that, “it is very clear that some distinctive tasks [are] only found in the Reserves that are not found on active duty, which means if you want to do those things you have to activate Reservists. That seems to me to be unwise [...] put those critical skills back on active duty, rather than in the Reserves.”⁵ This short reference clearly highlights three of the Secretary’s concerns affecting the future of today’s RC/AC mix: 1. It is improper that some missions have migrated completely to the RC, 2. To access these affected units, an activation is required, and 3. The *critical* skills must be returned to the AC. Can a reference framework be developed to address how these Rumsfeld preferences might independently affect the RC/AC mix?

A Reference Framework: Building a Model to Apply Current Political Inputs

The purpose of this section was to first develop a composite framework drawn from widely accepted principles and guidance for determining RC/AC force mix, and then to use this model to analyze Bush Administration policy effects. Four documents were examined to build a fused reference structure: the 1999 RAND study entitled Principles for Determining the Air Force Active/Reserve Mix, the 2001 QDR-driven Review of Reserve Component Contributions to

National Defense released in February 2003, the Reserve Component Employment (RCE) 2005 Study, and finally the Air National Guard Long Range Strategic Plan on Force Mix. With only minor adjustments, the RAND predictive model served as the framework of choice for applying the Bush Administration's political philosophy.⁶

Once the framework model was built, the following methodology was used to assess the effects of the Bush Administration on the FTF. First, the actual political input was formulated from the NSS and the Secretary Rumsfeld's memorandum. Next, this input was applied to the RAND model, examining its affects on other variables and the overall RC/AC mix. Once these notional outcomes were discovered, their effects were weighed against the earlier lessons learned to improve the forecasting capability of the model.

The political input was formed by combining the global engagement requirement from the NSS, the lower RC involvement preference stated by Secretary Rumsfeld in his memorandum, and an assumption that there appears to be no planned, significant increase in Air Force end strength in sight.⁷ As this information was applied to the RAND model, it became readily




Figure 1 – Applying Political Input to RAND Model

apparent that adjusting this political constraint for a smaller RC would directly affect both the cost and personnel flow variables. Surprisingly, the availability factor would be affected as well due to the Air Force formalizing its avoidance of activations through enhanced volunteerism discussed earlier. Although the RAND study

predicts lower total costs for a larger AC in a globally engaged environment⁸, enormous initiation costs would occur as a result of moving all AEF related forces and missions currently residing wholly in the RC to a proportional level in the AC. Furthermore, the removal of these critical skills in the RC reduces or eliminates the method of capturing costly pilot and other essential skills as members elect to leave the AC.

Conclusions & Recommendations

Although the RAND model certainly reflected the robust and essentially counteracting relationship between the administration's political input and its impact on personnel flow, availability, and initial cost, the historical references provided supportive and more detailed insight as to how and why the Air Force might react as the model suggested. These reactions shape the conclusions and prompt the recommendations that follow.

After carefully reviewing the analysis of this report, five total findings emerged:

Finding 1: *The Expeditionary Air Force (EAF) concept not only reduced an OPTEMPO problem, it finally instituted a practice that would incorporate recurring lessons learned from the AVF development.* This integrated RC/AC endeavor was formalized near the end of the decade via the institution of the EAF concept and essentially guaranteed, at last, that the RC would participate in the daily mission (i.e. AEF rotations) of the Air Force, necessitating they retain relevant aircraft, equipment, and wartime skills.

Finding 2: *A strong sense of patriotism and commitment have created an enhanced form of volunteerism that, for the most part, precludes presidential activations when mobility requirements exceed RC member annual training requirements.*

Finding 3: *Some missions may be better suited to remain wholly in the RC.* There are missions where the tempo is such that training is more suitable to be accomplished within the RC.

Finding 4: *The lessons learned from the Air Force's AVF evolution serve as a seventh historical perspective constraint to the RAND study.* These lessons represent the youthful, but emerging culture that distinguishes the Air Force from its sister services.

Finding 5: *Depending on service perspective, the Bush Administration's call for transformation can be regarded as a signal for intense change, or as merely a progress check for a process that is already enthusiastically underway.*

There are two areas of focus for this report's recommendations. First, to preserve this enhanced personnel availability, the Air Force must anticipate difficulties that its people will encounter and remove those roadblocks before they occur. The second area involves making

the lessons learned from the AVF evolution more prominent in the hopes of ending the cyclical negative effects that not learning them has caused so frequently in the past.

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

What effect will the Bush Administration's National Security Strategy (NSS) and Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) have on the Air Force's current reserve component/active component (RC/AC) mix? Recent studies and guidance regarding the force mix have typically attempted to predict how variables and planning factors can affect the proportion of the RC relative to the Air Force Future Total Force (FTF) team comprised of the active Air Force, the Air National Guard, and the Air Force Reserve. In this case, the political planning factor, represented by the current administration's new post Cold War strategy, has produced an unexpected result that *minimally* affects the relative proportions of the components, but significantly contributes to the Air Force redefining *volunteerism* (*i.e. participating in lengthy deployments without activation but in a volunteer status*) to avoid undesirable changes to its existing RC/AC mix.

The following two sections deliver the background for the prominent questions this research sought to answer: 1. What guidance do the NSS, the QDR, and senior administration officials prescribe for the current RC/AC mix composition that constitutes a modeling political input? 2. What are the defining characteristics of the current Air Force RC/AC mix configuration? And ultimately, 3. What effect should/will these policies have on the current Air Force FTF? A brief description of the methodology is included and is followed by a summary of the report's conclusions and findings.

The Search for A Post-Cold War Solution

More than a decade after the end of the Cold War and after nearly 30 years of an All Volunteer Force (AVF), the Department of Defense (DoD) still seeks to redefine itself. As transformation occurs, a key element of this effort involves examination of the roles of the various service reserve components. Although DoD conducted numerous strategy and force structure reviews during the 1990's, their findings suggested no major policy changes until delivery of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)⁹ and President Bush's National Security Strategy

(NSS) of 2002.¹⁰ Despite the fact that these two documents begin call for transformation of the military, their language is quite vague and merely provides broad guidelines for change. Clear evidence exists, however, in comments generated by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld¹¹ and his key staff that specifically address the preferences of the administration with regard to blending of active and reserve forces. These communications possess language that suggests that major change is imminent for the reserve components in general. From the available literature, this research makes a key assumption that when addressing these transformational efforts DoD does not intend to increase end strength to accomplish the changes. Instead, it plans to realign some current military duties to the private sector to liberate elements of current end strength for more profound military applications.¹² These opinions and policies form the basis for one of the key questions of this research. *What changes do the NSS and QDR call for, and what can be gleaned from Secretary Rumsfeld's comments to develop a clear understanding of the administration's new vision for the RC/AC Mix?*

The U.S. Air Force Matures as the Service of Choice

During this same period of time, the U.S. Air Force, with its high-tech weaponry and precision munitions, emerged as a service of first choice when engaging America's enemies. From Iraq to the Balkans to Afghanistan, the Air Force's Future Total Force (FTF) team, comprised of 565,000 airmen¹³ from the Air National Guard (ANG), Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC), and active duty component, collectively provide global reach, air supremacy and precision attack to battle scenes around the globe. Of that force, over 206,000 airmen or 36.5 percent exist in the Air Reserve Component (ARC) comprised of both the ANG and AFRC.¹⁴ Although this cooperative effort has been hailed as DoD's benchmark for Total Force integration¹⁵, the NSS call for transformation broadly states that all institutions of national security require change. *What effect will the administration's policies have on the RC/AC Mix within the Air Force's FTF?*

Methodology

To measure the effect of the administration's policies, two additional questions had to be resolved: 1. *"What is the current Air Force mix?"* and 2. *"What sort of theoretical framework/model exists that might adequately predict how the current administration's preferences might affect that current Air Force mix?"* With the former question in mind, Chapter 2 lays a common foundation for discussion by quickly exploring the evolution of the Reserve Component/Active Component (RC/AC) mix within the Air Force with careful attention paid to the significant lessons learned during various periods. This historical account is followed by an evaluation of both the force mix construct as it exists today and the challenges it faces. In Chapter 3, the explicit language of the NSS, QDR, and comments by Secretary Rumsfeld are analyzed to determine the political preferences that exist for the FTF. Chapter 4 examines benchmark studies and recent DoD guidance specifically chartered to improve methods and principles for determining force mix, and then merges them to develop a composite reference framework for predicting how various inputs will affect the RC/AC mix. A key ingredient of this model is the political variable that enables the preferences developed in Chapter 3 to be applied. Furthermore, this analysis is taken an additional step by pairing the lessons learned in Chapter 2 with the notional outcomes of only applying the political factor to the composite model to better predict actual outcomes. Chapter 5 introduces this report's findings, conclusions, and recommendations. This method clearly illustrates that although DoD may not have yet redefined itself, its policies for the future will have profound effects on reserve participation in future conflicts.

Conclusions & Recommendations

When the NSS, QDR, and DoD specific preferences are applied to the RAND model, the robust and essentially counteracting relationship between these political inputs and their impact on personnel flow, availability, and initial cost are revealed. However, the historical lessons learned from AVF evolution provide supportive and more detailed insight as to how and why the

Air Force might react as the model suggested. These reactions shape the conclusions and prompt the recommendations that follow.

After carefully reviewing the analysis of this report, five total findings emerged:

Finding 1: *The Expeditionary Air Force (EAF) concept not only reduced an OPTEMPO problem, it finally instituted a practice that would incorporate recurring lessons learned from the AVF development.* This integrated RC/AC endeavor was formalized near the end of the decade via the institution of the EAF concept and essentially guaranteed, at last, that the RC would participate in the daily mission (i.e. AEF rotations) of the Air Force, necessitating they retain relevant aircraft, equipment, and wartime skills.

Finding 2: *A strong sense of patriotism and commitment have created an enhanced form of volunteerism that, for the most part, precludes presidential activations when mobility requirements exceed RC member annual training requirements.*

Finding 3: *Some missions may be better suited to remain wholly in the RC.* There are missions where the tempo is such that training is more suitable to be accomplished within the RC.

Finding 4: *The lessons learned from the Air Force's AVF evolution serve as a seventh historical perspective constraint to the RAND study.* These lessons represent the youthful, but emerging culture that distinguishes the Air Force from its sister services.

Finding 5: *Depending on service perspective, the Bush Administration's call for transformation can be regarded as a signal for intense change, or as merely a progress check for a process that is already enthusiastically underway.*

There are two areas of focus for this report's recommendations. First, to preserve this enhanced personnel availability, the Air Force must anticipate difficulties that its people will encounter and remove those roadblocks before they occur. The second area involves making the lessons learned from the AVF evolution more prominent in the hopes of ending the cyclical negative effects that not learning them has caused so frequently in the past.

CHAPTER 2

Assessing the RC/AC Mix

This chapter accomplishes four objectives. First, it examines the key historical segments or significant milestones within the FTF evolution providing a summary of the lessons learned at the conclusion of each period. In the second section, these lessons are sorted into three categories to point out peculiar or noteworthy characteristics for later application assessing the effects Bush Administration policy will have on the mix. Next, an assessment of the current RC/AC mix is developed. Finally, the challenges to this current construct are presented.

A. Historical Perspective

To assess the defining characteristics of the current FTF mix, the 55 years of Air Force history were subdivided into seven prominent segments or significant events that played a role in shaping the RC/AC force structure of today. These consisted of the following: 1. 1947-1970 The Pre-All Volunteer Force (AVF) Era, 2. 1970-1990 The AVF Takes Shape, 3. 1990-1991 The Gulf War – AVF's First Test, 4. The 1990's Post Cold War Drawdown & Global Engagement, 5. 1997 The Expeditionary Air Force (EAF) Arrives, 6. September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks, and 7. 1997-2003 Recent Attempts to Remove Reserve Component Autonomy.

1. Pre-AVF Period (1947-1970). Before the AVF, RC/AC relationships were genuinely strained as a result of the ARC funding levels, obsolete aircraft, and a lack of participation in the day-to-day mission of the Air Force. In this initial and most lengthy era, four major activations of the reserve component occurred: the Korean War, the Berlin Conflict, the U.S.S. Pueblo incident, and nominally, the Vietnam War. A brief characterization of these mobilizations provides critical insight into this period.

a. Korea: The Korean War was the first activation for both the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve. As the largest mobilization in the ARC's history, nearly 80 percent of the ANG entered federal service between 1950 and 1951. Most of these airmen

belonged to fighter and light bomber units. The call-up exposed significant ARC weaknesses as units lacked specific wartime missions before the conflict. Secondly, their equipment and aircraft were obsolete. Furthermore, once mobilized, they proved to be almost totally unprepared for combat. Although many were used as fillers elsewhere in the Air Force, some units took three to six months to become combat ready and some never did. By October 1953, all ANG units had been returned to state service and the difficulties experienced began what would become a slow reversal to what had become a deteriorating relationship between the Air Force and the ARC.¹⁶

b. Berlin Conflict: The second mobilization began on August 30, 1961 when President Kennedy declared a national emergency and ordered 148,000 Guard members and Reservists to active duty for not more than one year in response to Soviet construction of the Berlin Wall. In October 1961, 18 tactical fighter squadrons, four tactical reconnaissance squadrons, six air transport squadrons and a tactical control group were activated. Before deploying, however, these flying organizations would need additional personnel, spare parts and training. Because they were not trained and equipped for aerial refueling, they had to “island-hop” across the Atlantic Ocean. The United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) lacked spare parts needed to support the ANG’s aging fighters. Because some of the units had been trained to deliver tactical nuclear weapons, not conventional munitions, they had to be retrained once they arrived. The Air Force concluded that the Air Guard units sent to USAFE achieved little militarily. Although they prepared for deployment far more rapidly than they had during the Korean War, Air National Guard units still required extensive post-mobilization training and additional equipment. Their obsolescent aircraft were not interoperable with USAFE’s existing aircraft and logistics pipelines. By August 1962, all ANG units had been demobilized. Largely as a result of the Berlin experience, the Air Force decided as a matter of policy that its Guard and Reserve units must be prepared for rapid global deployment after a “call-up”. This would not become a reality until the ANG obtained modern equipment, generous funding and more realistic training after the Vietnam War.¹⁷

c. U.S.S. Pueblo Incident: The third crisis that produced an activation began on January 23, 1968 when the North Koreans seized the U.S.S. Pueblo. President Lyndon

Johnson ordered a partial mobilization of 14,000 air and naval reservists. The ANG mobilized 9,343 people on January 25, 1961, responding within 36 hours with approximately 95 percent of their personnel. Those units included eight tactical fighter groups, three tactical reconnaissance groups and three wing headquarters elements. The fighter units were rated "combat ready" when called into federal service. However, because of equipment shortages, the reconnaissance units took about a month to prepare for overseas service.¹⁸

d. Vietnam: On May 3, 1968, the first of four ANG fighter squadrons began arriving in Vietnam with their F-100 aircraft. An additional 1,333 personnel were activated on May 13th. Those units included two tactical fighter groups and a medical evacuation unit. Of particular interest, 85 percent of the 355th Tactical Fighter Squadron, "on paper" a regular Air Force unit, were ANG members. The units were quickly integrated into Air Force combat operations and performed well. In addition, two ANG F-100 squadrons were dispatched to Korea in the summer of 1968. Except for these two flying squadrons, the wing consisted of individually activated guardsmen and reservists from other units. As in previous conflicts, spare parts were also limited. The 123rd Tactical Reconnaissance Wing experienced a difficult tour of active duty, as it had not been rated combat-ready when mobilized on January 26, primarily due to equipment shortages. All Air National Guard units were returned to state control by June 1969. Despite enduring difficulties, the Vietnam mobilization demonstrated that ARC units could perform if they were fully trained and equipped before being called into service.¹⁹

Repeatedly characterized by lengthy mobilization times, poorly trained airmen, irrelevant equipment, and minimal return for the call-up effort, these mobilizations reflected RCs inadequate funding levels, obsolete aircraft, and lack of participation in the day-to-day mission of the Air Force. Although not primary causal factors for the AVF, these shortcomings would certainly be addressed as the DoD embraced a new force mix strategy.

Lessons To Be Learned:

1. Important for the RC to Have Part of the Day-to-Day Mission of the Air Force (Specifically, the RC must perform a proportional share of the Air Force's missions on a daily basis to remain viable in times of need)
2. Important for the RC to Have Modern Aircraft/Equipment/Spare Parts
3. Important for the RC to Be Fully Trained and Exercised

2. The AVF Takes Shape (1970-1990). On August 21, 1970, in an effort to cut defense spending and to build a military force that would more soundly resonate with the sentiments of the general population, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird forced reductions in the active forces and began a buildup of the reserve components:

“Within the Department of Defense,...economies will require deductions in over-all strengths and capabilities of the active forces, and increased reliance on the combat and the combat support units of the Guard and Reserves. Emphasis will be given to the concurrent consideration of the Total Forces, Active and Reserve, to determine the most advantageous mix to support national strategy and meet the threat. A total force concept will be applied in all aspects of planning, programming, manning, equipping and employing National Guard and Reserve Forces.”²⁰

It is critical to point out that the current look of the AVF is quite different for each service as they took unique approaches to placing missions in the RC during this period. For example, the U.S. Army placed many “combat support” and “combat service support” roles wholly in its RC, whereas the U.S. Coast Guard took a far more aggressive approach in integrating its RC members into the day-to-day activities of its active component. The U.S. Air Force approach fell between these extremes with a proportion of virtually all mission areas being placed in the RC. Only in rare cases did total mission areas migrate into the ANG or the Air Force Reserve. Due to the relative peace in the world from 1970 until the Gulf War, these service unique concepts were allowed to develop in diverse ways virtually unconstrained. This independent development will play a key factor later when applying the administration's current beliefs regarding RC/AC mix principles.

Although Secretary Laird's change in philosophy is a significant marker in the history of the composition of the armed forces of the United States, its path more recently has been shaped

by the effects of downsizing at the close of the Cold War and the nearly simultaneous increasing missions demands caused by global engagement of the 1990's through the present. Together, these three influences have made the most significant impact on the Reserve/Active relationship until the arrival of the Bush Administration.

Lessons To Be Learned:

1. Guidance will be interpreted differently by each of the Services.

2. Guidance will be implemented differently by each of the Services.

3. The Gulf War – AVF's First Test (1990-1991). The invasion of the tiny, but oil rich Kuwait by Iraq in August 1990 initiated the AVF's first Air National Guard and Reserve mobilization. By February 1991, there were more than 17,500 Air Force Reservists on active duty. About 3,800 were officers, 13,700 were enlisted personnel and about one in four were women. Approximately 1,800 were air reserve technicians (ART), 1,300 were individual mobilization augmentees (IMA) and more than 500 were members of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). More than 7,000 of those reservists were in medical specialties.²¹ Altogether, 12,404 Air National Guard members entered federal service during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM with 10,456 of them being mobilized.²² In 42 days of combat from mid-January through the end of February, the Air Force Reserve's 18 A-10s from the 706th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Naval Air Station New Orleans, La., flew more than 2,100 hours and 1,000 sorties. They expended almost 85,000 rounds of 30mm cannon ammunition, 300 Maverick air-to-ground missiles, 430 cluster bombs and 1,200 Mark-82 iron bombs. During a single day of combat, two pilots from that unit destroyed 10 mobile Scud launchers and a pair of ammunition depots, and then helped sister service F/A-18s destroy 10 more Scuds.²³ This level of performance characterized the contributions that the RC members made to this conflict and signaled what could be expected if they were properly trained, equipped, and included in the daily mission of the Air Force. After the war, lingering responsibilities in the area to enforce no-fly zone corridors in both northern and southern Iraq were initially handled by the AC. Once again, this practice began yet another saga where the RC would not participate in the day-to-day mission of

the service which would lead to a reduction of commonality in the areas of newer night vision (NVIS) and precision-guided munitions (PGM) capability for the RC. It is also interesting to note that although volunteerism to participate in the Gulf War was extremely high, the numbers of personnel who actually participated in the war in a non-activated status were minimal. That is to say, many RC members volunteered to participate, and once their volunteer status was acknowledged, they were typically activated as part of a unit that deployed for a designated period. In fact, no statistics could be found that reflect those negligible numbers of RC personnel performing duty in theater during the Gulf War in anything other than an activated status.²⁴ This practice will drastically change as the FTF matures in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks and will be discussed in detail later.

Lessons To Be Learned:

- 1. Important for the RC to Have Part of the Real World Mission (Repeat)**
- 2. Important for the RC to Have Relevant Aircraft/Equipment (Repeat)**
- 3. Important for the RC to Be Fully Trained and Exercised (Repeat)**

4. Post Cold War Drawdown & Global Engagement (1991-1998). Less than one year after troop withdrawal from the Gulf War, reductions-in-force and “buy-out” options were being offered to active duty Air Force members.²⁵ Defense spending dropped to one half the Cold War percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP).²⁶ With roughly 28 percent fewer




Figure 2 – ARC Contingency Participation

people, the Air Force suffered enormous shortages at the institutionally sensitive “pilot resource level”.²⁷ The turmoil created by this drawdown would be exacerbated by the Clinton administration’s increased use of the military on a global scale. In the initial 43-year period from 1947 to 1990, the Air Force RC component participated in 7 major contingencies.²⁸ From the Gulf War to 1999, that number rose to 34 in only nine years,²⁹ causing

people, the Air Force suffered enormous shortages at the institutionally sensitive “pilot resource level”.²⁷ The turmoil created by this drawdown would be exacerbated by the Clinton administration’s increased use of the military on a global scale. In the

participation of all reservists to reach and level at roughly 13 times the Pre-Gulf War rate until the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.³⁰

By the mid-1990's, the ARC began to participate in Operation NORTHERN and SOUTHERN WATCH contingency operations and soon thereafter found themselves involved in Operations DECISIVE EDGE and JOINT ENDEAVOR supporting operations in Kosovo and peacekeeping in Bosnia. Initially welcomed for their relief in offsetting the AC Operational Tempo




Figure 3 – Effects of Global Engagement on Aircraft Deployed


rush to equip the RC with relevant equipment. This conversion was hastened by creative leaders within the ARC and in large part by having access to funds appropriated in the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Account (NGREA). Funding for NGREA has become quite controversial and will be addressed later in this chapter. Nevertheless, relevant RC support was not available on demand and the AC was required to endure virtually intolerable deployment periods until the RC could modernize its force for use.

Lessons To Be Learned:

- 1. Important for the RC to Have Part of the Real World Mission (Repeat x 2)**
- 2. Important for the RC to Have Relevant Aircraft/Equipment (Repeat x 2)**
- 3. The rush to downsize post Cold War did not account for the requirements of global engagement**
- 4. NGREA provided a quick source of funding to quickly modernize RC forces**

(OPTEMPO) that had been created by the combined effects of a smaller force, but one more globally engaged, the RC fighter force was quickly assessed as irrelevant due to their absence of NVIS and PGM capability. Once again, there was a major

5. Expeditionary Air Force (EAF) Arrives (1998). As a direct result of the policies of the 1990's, the Air Force found itself with one-third fewer people, two-thirds less overseas basing, and deploying four times more frequently.³¹ To combat the associated unpredictability and strife, the Air Force developed the EAF concept. EAF is the Air Force's vision for the 21st Century to organize, train, and equip to deploy ready forces for contingency operations while remaining ready to meet national crises.³² EAF also helps create a mindset and culture that embraces the unique characteristics of aerospace power -- range, speed, flexibility,



and precision. Dividing itself into 10 Air Expeditionary Forces (AEF), the Air Force provides two of these AEFs essentially "on-call" for service to a regional combatant commander for a 120-day vulnerability period that rotates every 15

Figure 4 – EAF Overlay to Combat Global Engagement

months.³³ AEFs are a cross section of aerospace capabilities that can be tailored to meet a theater combatant commander's requirement to accomplish a desired effect. Included are the entities of 10 combat AEF lead wings, five Lead Mobility Wings (LMWs) and two permanent on-call Aerospace Expeditionary Wings (AEWs).³⁴ [which have recently been deleted and added to the 10 AEF force sizing]³⁵ A full AEF includes about 175 aircraft, necessary support equipment and about 15,000 Air Force personnel. The first AEF Cycle began Oct. 1, 1999 and lasted through Nov. 30, 2000. Dec. 1, 2000 marked the start of the second 15-month AEF Cycle. AEF Cycle three began March 1, 2002.³⁶

Initially, these AEFs were filled with AC units only, but by the end of the first year, RC units became integral members of each of the 10 AEFs.³⁷ As a Total Force organization, a typical AEF consists of a full spectrum of aerospace capabilities and is balanced, flexible, and sustainable.³⁸ Guard and Reserve units, for example, supply about 44 percent of the tactical airlift Air Mobility Command (AMC) sends to AEF deployments and about 30 percent of the tankers. With as much as 15 months lead time, the reservists are better able to plan with their employers when they can deploy as part of an AEF. That tends to keep reservists in the force, since they can accommodate their employers and vice versa.³⁹

It is important, however, to realize that the EAF concept was developed to combat the unpredictability and strife associated initially with the global engagement policies of the 1990's, not for prolonged war. The incorporation of the ARC, using their forces serving in a voluntary basis (essentially fulfilling their annual two-week training requirement), has considerably lessened the OPTEMPO for the active component. A major downfall of this system is that it places both the reservists/guardsmen and the President in a precarious position the moment that there is an escalation. At that moment, there is a need to retain what has now become an essential element of the AEFs in place for longer than the contracted two-week period. This precarious position is one of "Call-Up" to handle the early stages of war rather than the intended reinforcement position. General John Jumper, current Chief of Staff of the Air Force, addressed this very subject in an unclassified message regarding "Deviation from the AEF Battle Rhythm" to Air Force airmen on January 29, 2003. In the message, Gen Jumper reminds the Air Force that:

"when the time comes to build a force bigger than one AEF pair and/or deploy it for a time frame that may exceed 3-months [...] The combined efforts of the entire Air Force team - active, reserve component, and civilians- are needed to meet the challenges[...] Active duty and mobilized reserve airmen deployed as members of AEF 7/8 or deploying to the AOR as part of current crisis taskings, should anticipate remaining in place until further notice. Deployed/deploying mobilized reserve airmen will be extended on active duty as necessary. Reserve component airmen supporting our efforts are critical contributors; we will continue to utilize volunteers to the greatest possible extent. As necessary, extension of mobilization orders for deployed/deploying reserve airmen, and new mobilizations, will be worked in accordance with established laws and regulations."⁴⁰

The language of this message clearly illustrates the Air Force position regarding RC members participating in AEF rotations when escalation occurs: volunteer to remain in place or risk being mobilized for periods available to the administration through current statutes.

Lessons To Be Learned:

- 1. Incorporating ARC forces into the AEF construct, i.e. embedding them in all 10 AEFS, necessarily places them in the early stages of battle if escalation arises.**
- 2. Incorporating ARC forces reduces PERSTEMPO for active duty**
- 3. The ARC component satisfies its AEF commitments using volunteerism and “two week summer training” rotations until there is escalation.**
- 4. If escalation occurs, ARC participation in the AEF will require “volunteerism” or “Presidential Call-Up” or some blend of the two actions to sustain the AEF.**

6. Terrorist Attacks/September 11, 2001. Already stretched to previously unimagined levels, the RC would find itself asked to expand its contributions again on the morning of September 11, 2001. Interestingly, just prior to and on September 11, 2001, RC units fulfilling an AEF commitment and deployed in support of Operation SOUTHERN WATCH were among the first units to be redirected toward military objectives in Afghanistan. Back in the United States, tens of thousands of RC service members volunteered and others were mobilized in support of Operations NOBLE EAGLE (ONE) and ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) after the attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center towers. Many of these RC members have found their initial one-year requirement increased to the maximum two-year commitment. This prolonged activation has uncovered many subtle and several prominent problems for the AVF that were not previously seen due to the short duration of the Gulf War. For example, reservists encountered difficulties with dependent care, medical benefits, initiation of pay, employer support despite legal protections, and participation modes for their volunteerism.

The most significant of these issues is the volunteerism issue. There are essentially two overarching concerns that have emerged regarding the topic. The first deals with employer perceptions and support for RC members who “volunteer” and those who are

“activated/mobilized”. The second deals with the implications for long-term escalation and its effects on those who “volunteer” as opposed to being “activated/mobilized.”

a. Employer Support: Under the provisions of the 1996 Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), “there is no longer any differentiation between voluntary and involuntary military duty, [however] there is a 5-year cumulative service limit on the amount of voluntary military leave an employee can use and still retain reemployment rights.⁴¹ Nevertheless, many employers and even RC members still draw distinctions between the two as they relate to return privileges to jobs. In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, many reservists *volunteered* to perform duty in order to remain on the active rolls with their employers. Within weeks, others found themselves requesting to be activated to produce some stronger evidence that their presence was required away from their civilian occupation. These two conflicting situations, despite the provisions of USERRA, depict the true dilemma RC commanders face when deliberating whether to ask for *unit* or *individual* activations.

b. Implications for Volunteerism: To complicate this issue, there are questions regarding the long-term rights of reservists who volunteer as the Air Force requests. The primary concern involves prolonged periods of escalation where one group of reservist volunteers and another is activated. Under the current statutes, the President, under rules for a partial mobilization, may activate up to 1,000,000 reservists for a period not exceeding two years. At the end of the two years, the President has exhausted his executive powers and must call upon the Congress to maintain the military presence.⁴² Without Congressional approval, the members who have been activated must be deactivated, however, those who have volunteered may continue to serve. This pool of volunteers is now susceptible to presidential partial mobilization, even though they have served equivalent periods of time with those previously activated. As the second anniversary of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 approaches, the two-year mark in the presidential partial mobilization of many RC members will arrive as well. If hostilities in Iraq and the War on Terrorism have not subsided by that time, the Air Force may face temporarily restructuring its AEF construct, activating volunteers, or find its RC members continued through congressional mobilization.

Lessons To Be Learned:

1. RC participation (either in volunteer or activated status) can be problematic.
2. USERRA is not universally understood or enforced.
3. Decentralized activation (and possibly deactivation) authority may enhance RC contributions to AEFs and full scale war.
4. Protection for long-term volunteering RC members is not present.

7. Removing Reserve Component Autonomy (1997, 2002-2003). Several events illustrate a tendency to remove autonomy developed during the AVF period. They are the elimination of the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation (NGREA), possible elimination of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (ASD/RA), and an effort to commingle RC and AC personnel and operations & maintenance budgets.

a. NGREA: In the Post Cold War section, the NGREA was mentioned with regard to the key role it played in quickly modernizing RC aircraft to facilitate their role in AEF efforts. Interestingly however, “in 1997, an oral [DoD] agreement was reached to eliminate the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation (NGREA), through which the RC received a substantial portion of its funding.”⁴³ As a result of this action, “a quantitative analysis show[ed] that since the implementation of the DoD policy, there ha[d] been an overall decrease in procurement funding for the RC, with a commensurate drop in equipment readiness. Before Congress de facto reinstated NGREA (December 2001), RC procurement was at the lowest percentage of the DoD procurement since such data has been recorded.”⁴⁴ This temporary practice resulted in decreasing NGREA from a high of almost \$2.5 billion in Fiscal Year 1991 to \$149 million in Fiscal Year 2000,⁴⁵ clearly indicating that placing the future of RC spending in non-RC hands can lead to the demise of relevancy for the RC.

b. ASD/RA Elimination: According to a recently published *Washington Times* article, the Department of Defense has drafted a plan to give Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld the power to eliminate three senior posts including the assistant secretary of defense for reserve affairs. According to the article, the ASD/RA “elimination would be the most touchy, because part-time troops play a large role in the war against terrorism and have many supporters

in Congress.”⁴⁶ Mr. Spiegel said the Reserves play such a vital role in the war against terrorism, looming military action against Iraq and other crises that the post needs to be upgraded to the rank of an undersecretary of defense, with direct access to the defense secretary. “The chief policy-maker for Reserves needs to be elevated, not eliminated.”⁴⁷

c. Commingling of RC & AC Funding: In the accounting arena, Spiegel, indicates in another *Washington Times* article that his group is also gearing up to fight an additional new management reform from DoD that would commingle RC and AC personnel and operations & maintenance accounts. According to Spiegel, “the Guard and Reserve troops are paid out of three separate accounts annually appropriated by Congress. The Pentagon is proposing to do away with those separate accounts and put them under the control of the active force. This means the duty of paying reserves would shift from three reserve officer paymasters to three active-duty ones. Mr. Spiegel's fear is that the active force will use the salary pot to meet its expenses first, leaving no money in the fourth quarter in late summer, when many Guard and Reserves perform their required two-week training.”⁴⁸

As a result of the NGREA failure as recently as the late 1990's, the ARC has solid grounds to be concerned with recent efforts to eliminate both representation and autonomy for budgetary oversight of its resources.

Lessons To Be Learned:

- 1. Incorporating NGREA spending into AC budgets resulted in lowest ever funding for RC equipment and corresponding drop in equipment readiness.**
- 2. The NGREA lesson has not been applied to the decision-making regarding eliminating the ASD/RA position and the commingling of RC/AC funding.**
- 3. There is fear that the RC representation is dwindling compared to its participation.**

B. Analyzing Lessons Learned

From these periods, two separate categories of lessons learned emerged regarding the incremental development of the FTF. First, there is a sub-category of lessons that the Air Force appears to revisit regularly. Second, there were significant lessons derived from single isolated periods in history. Together, there is an overarching lesson that achieving the current RC/AC mix

has been a lengthy and difficult process and that its current construct should not be abandoned easily.

Category I (Repetitive Lessons): Across many periods, it was clearly evident that possessing adequate/relevant aircraft, equipment, and spare parts was a recurring theme. Secondly, having a role in all of the day-to-day activities of the Air Force played a vital role in the effectiveness of the RC. A third repetitive element was receiving proper training and exercise scenarios. The fourth persistent lesson is that the ARC satisfies its AEF commitments using volunteerism and “two week summer training” rotations until there is escalation. A final concept of a recurring nature is that separate funding is vital to the health of the ARC.

Category II (Significant, Stand Alone Lessons): Taken from the various historical periods, these lessons are highlighted, not for their interrelationships or repetitive nature, but for their stand-alone significance:

1. RC guidance will be interpreted differently by each of the Services.
2. Incorporating ARC forces into the AEF construct, i.e. embedding them in all 10 AEFs, necessarily places them in the early stages of battle if escalation arises.
3. Post Cold War drawdown did not account for the requirements of global engagement.
4. The NGRE lesson has not been applied to the decision-making regarding eliminating the ASD/RA position and the commingling of RC/AC funding.
5. USERRA is not universally understood or enforced.
6. Decentralized activation (and possibly deactivation) authority may enhance RC contributions to AEFs and full-scale war.
7. Protection for long-term volunteering RC members is not present.

C. Current Status

This evolution produced a modern RC force contributing 36.5 percent of the FTF⁴⁹ that is fully integrated into all ten of the Air Force's Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) combat elements.⁵⁰ Rare cases exist where whole Air Force missions have migrated in their entirety to the RC⁵¹, however, these roles are such that they would not normally be required unless full scale war was imminent.⁵² These roles fall specifically in the areas of C-130 aerial spraying, weather reconnaissance, and polar ski aircraft as well the Air National Guard's inherent air defense

interceptor mission. For the most part, all Air Force missions have been distributed carefully across the FTF to provide capabilities in all components and to enable the Air Force to retain difficult-to-train or costly wartime skilled airmen in a reserve capacity when they elect to leave the active force.

D. Current Challenges

As mentioned in the lessons learned, a prominent challenge to this increased RC involvement by the Bush Administration guidelines falls in the area determining activation/volunteer criteria for RC members participating in AEF efforts as they rotate through overseas contingencies when escalation occurs.⁵³ If reservists are required to remain in place longer than their normal two-week annual training period, deployed and local commanders, along with the president are faced with a dilemma of whether to activate them or chance filling personnel needs through heightened volunteerism. As new roles emerge for the Air Force, and relative budgets shrink, the FTF will need to search for creative ways to blend active and reserve forces when equipment or aircraft are limited. The next chapter specifically addresses this administration's departure from Cold War doctrine and its call for transformation.

CHAPTER 3

Identifying the Bush Administration Political Input

As the United States enters the 21st Century, it faces an era of greater uncertainty and rapid change.⁵⁴ America's national military capability must keep pace with the current, quickly emerging, and future threats posed by this new world order. According to the Bush Administration, its military must transform from its Cold War posture to one that can effectively deal with these challenges. A significant element of the transformation process is defining the proper blend of RC and AC forces that will be best prepared for the battlefields of the future. *What sources of information are available that help develop a clear understanding of the administration's new vision for the RC/AC Mix?*

In the case of the Bush Administration, political considerations are revealed from three sources. Both the 2002 National Security Strategy and the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review provide general guidance that has had a broad effect on the RC/AC mix. Although both documents signal a profound change in direction for DoD, they do not contain the specific details that have been revealed more recently through remarks made by the Secretary of Defense and key members of his staff. This tertiary source of political influence has provided the impetus for considerable discussion and debate as to the future of the RC/AC mix. The language from these three sources will be examined to determine their preferences and to formulate a political input to be applied to a predictive reference framework in Chapter 4.

A. The National Security Strategy

“The major institutions of American national security were designed in a different era to meet different requirements. All of them must be transformed.” (President George W. Bush)⁵⁵

In President George W. Bush's 2002 National Security Strategy, an entire chapter was devoted to a discussion of transforming “America's National Security Institutions to Meet the

Challenges and Opportunities of the Twenty-First Century.”⁵⁶ Within this chapter, the document outlines his goals, the new capabilities-based strategy, his commitment to global engagement, a call for an expeditionary approach, and finally a wider range of presidential military options.

1. Goals: The president calls for a “first rate force” with no caveats for tiered readiness within the reserve component. Additionally, he outlines four most basic requirements for today’s military that includes assuring our allies and friends; maintaining an ability to dissuade future military competition; deterring threats against U.S. interests, allies, and friends; and decisively defeating any adversary if deterrence fails.

2. Strategy: In this area, the president concurs with the findings of the 2001 QDR and finally departs from the Cold War Two Major Theater War (2MTW) mentality that caused military planners to program for capabilities that could simultaneously sustain major theater war in both the European and Pacific theaters. Specifically, the new capabilities based strategy calls for the “military structured to deter massive Cold War-era armies [to] be transformed to focus more on how an adversary might fight rather than where and when a war might occur.”⁵⁷

3. Global Engagement & Expeditionary Approach: The president reaffirms the United States’ commitment to be a guardian of peace and defender of freedom throughout the world. “To contend with uncertainty and to meet the many security challenges we face, the United States will require bases and stations within and beyond Western Europe and Northeast Asia, as well as temporary access arrangements for the long-distance deployment of U.S. forces.”⁵⁸ Furthermore, to complement this global engagement philosophy, the President specifically addresses developing skills and operating concepts that will enable the U.S. military to operate in areas that have been low on the list of planning contingencies. Specifically, he calls for “transformed maneuver and expeditionary forces to...ensure U.S. access to distant theaters”.⁵⁹

4. A Wider Range of Presidential Options for DoD: In this discussion, the President suggests that his current range of options is limited. In the same sentence, he mentions that he wants to maintain “near-term readiness”, while at the same time gain a “wider range of military options.” These comments are the closest the President comes to calling for reform in the RC/AC Mix. Specifically, the decision to activate, and for what duration has been a major source of

irritation to reservists, their families, employers, DoD, and the administration since the September 2001 attacks.⁶⁰ As was learned in the last chapter, mass activations of the past have been replaced by a blend of volunteerism and activation. As the Wars on Terrorism and in Iraq unfold, it is clear that the president will need new options for mobilizing and protecting RC members as the initial two-year activations come to an end.

B. The Quadrennial Defense Review

Both the NSS and the QDR concur on the necessity for post-Cold War transformation to protect future U.S. national security interests. The non-sequential order of these documents' public release certainly indicates that the case for transformation predates the NSS and dilutes the significance and uniqueness of its objectives. Although the QDR is no more revealing in terms of actual RC/AC mix guidelines, it is important to understand the origin for the report, its findings, and taskings that are associated with developing RC/AC mix criteria.

1. Origins of the QDR: Title 10, Section 118 of the U.S. Code requires the DoD to conduct a Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Specifically the U.S. Code directs DoD to inform Congress on "the anticipated roles and missions of the reserve components in the national defense strategy and the strength, capabilities, and equipment necessary to assure that the reserve components can capably discharge those roles and missions."⁶¹

2. Findings: Essentially, the QDR laid the groundwork for the DOD portion of the NSS chapter discussed previously. In broad terms, the need to transform from the Cold War 2MTW outlook to the new capabilities-based strategy was the central theme. There was no mention of abandoning the AVF approach, and considerable credit was given to the RC for its contributions to national security.

3. Taskings: Of significant relevance to this report, the QDR directed that in order to determine "the appropriate use of the Reserve Components, DoD will undertake a comprehensive review of the Active and Reserve mix, organization, priority missions, and associated resources. This review will build on recent assessments of Reserve Component issues that highlighted emerging roles"⁶²

Regrettably, the QDR, like the NSS, signals a grand departure from Cold War philosophy, but leaves few clues as to the principles it requires for developing the RC/AC blend that will suit the new capabilities-based strategy. Fortunately, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and key members of his staff have provided specific remarks that illustrate their preferences for the future.

C. Comments by Secretary Rumsfeld and Key Staff

The clearest evidence of this administration's preferences can be derived from Secretary Rumsfeld himself and comments made by his Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Dr. David Chu. Both officials acknowledge there are broad discrepancies with the RC/AC mix across the spectrum of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force. Their specific comments below provide insight into key assumptions and preferences that will form the administration's political input on the subject.

1. Dr. David Chu: In September 2002, Dr. Chu, speaking before an annual convention of the National Guard Association, commented that "while no definitive findings have been made," it was his opinion that "Reserve and National Guard units should seek out specialized missions rather than simply 'mirror' active-duty forces."⁶³ According to Chu at that time, "The quickest route to relevance is, 'How can you do things the active forces can't?'"⁶⁴ These comments should draw immediate attention for their opposition to the Air Force lessons learned that the RC should be involved in the day-to-day mission of the force and that there is a need to create a place in the RC to capture critical skills exiting the AC. During March 2003 U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee hearings, Dr. Chu indicated that "what's needed in the active-duty force is not more troops, but just some rearranging."⁶⁵ Specifically, Chu mentioned that the "administration wants to shift more jobs held by uniformed service members into civilian positions to allow active-duty members to be assigned to other, more pressing jobs."⁶⁶ These comments, although not specifically aimed at RC members, leaves Chu's audience with a key assumption that there is no intention of increasing force strength levels to offset the heavy personnel strains that the Wars on Terrorism and in Iraq have played.

2. Secretary Rumsfeld: After receiving an RC mission area briefing in November 2002, Rumsfeld issued a memorandum within the Department of Defense stating that, “it is very clear that some distinctive tasks [are] only found in the Reserves that are not found on active , which means if you want to do those things you have to activate Reservists. That seems to me to be unwise [...] put those critical skills back on active duty, rather than in the Reserves.”⁶⁷ This short reference clearly highlights three of the Secretary’s concerns affecting the future of today’s RC/AC mix:

1. It is improper that some missions have migrated completely to the RC,
2. To access these affected units, an activation is required, and
3. The *critical* skills must be returned to the AC.

Furthermore, Secretary Rumsfeld has on other occasions mentioned “that the Department of Defense is looking at changing the reserve- and active-component mix.”⁶⁸ Specifically, Rumsfeld has said that DoD is considering how it might migrate some active activities that are not always going to be needed into the Guard or the Reserve and vice-versa. When asked about the opinion that the Total Force Concept (TFC) is at risk due to repeatedly calling back reservists, Rumsfeld responded that you would still have a TFC with a certain amount of active soldiers and a certain amount in the National Guard and Reserve. “But you'd have it better allocated between the two so there would be less stress on Guard and Reserve on a continuing basis, since we now ought to be smart enough to be better able to see what those things are.”⁶⁹ “That’s my bias, that’s my preference. I think that’s where we’ll end up, but until I sit down with folks who are a lot smarter than I am and worry through all of this I won’t know precisely how it will shake out.”⁷⁰

D.The Political Input

After carefully reviewing the 2002 NSS, the 2001 QDR, and remarks by Secretary Rumsfeld and Dr. Chu, the preferences for the Bush Administration begin to take shape. As was mentioned earlier, both the NSS and the QDR provide only broad direction for transformation. Interestingly, Dr. Chu presents a view for the future of the RC that suggests that it should abandon missions that “mirror the active-duty” counter to the one of the repetitive lessons learned

by the Air Force. More importantly, an assumption can be drawn from Dr. Chu's comments regarding his projections that the administration will recommend that force strength levels remain relatively constant. Conveniently, Secretary Rumsfeld spells out the views that enumerate the preferences on future RC/AC mix that shape the political input from the administration. This input is namely: *The RC has absorbed too many critical mission tasks (either partially or in whole) that force activations; those missions need to be moved back to the AC.* In the following chapter, a reference framework will be developed to address how these preferences might affect the RC/AC mix.

CHAPTER 4

Reference Framework: Applying the Political Input

The purpose of this chapter is to review applicable RC/AC mix studies and guidance to form a composite framework or predictive model to which the Bush Administration's political input may be applied. As the Air Force has more heavily relied upon the RC since the conclusion of the Gulf War, the desire to discover the optimal balance of forces has served as a catalyst for a growing number of studies to be chartered and guidance to be provided. The first section of the chapter discusses and meshes the most relevant studies and prominent guidelines that have been published on the subject. In the second section, the political input from Chapter 3 is applied to the composite framework, examining its affects on other variables and the overall RC/AC mix. Once this notional outcome is projected, the effects are further weighed against the lessons learned derived in Chapter 2 to improve the forecasting capability of the framework.

A. Key Studies & Guidance

For the purpose of this research, four prominent documents were used to develop a fused reference framework from which to apply the current administration's philosophy. They were namely, the widely recognized 1999 RAND study entitled Principles for Determining the Air Force Active/Reserve Mix, the 2001 QDR-driven Review of Reserve Component Contributions to National Defense released in February 2003, the Reserve Component Employment (RCE) 2005 (RCE-2005) Study, and finally the Air National Guard Long Range Strategic Plan (ANG LRSP) on Force Mix. Specifically, these documents were simply assessed by comparison of their principles for force mix planning and modeling capabilities.

1. 1999 RAND Study: The purpose of the RAND report was two-fold: 1. Discover what principles should be considered in force structure decisions that affect the active/reserve mix and, 2. Examine how these principles interact with one another. The RAND study identified six variables that play a role in determining the Air Force RC/AC mix ratios. These were namely: *Social Considerations, Political Considerations, Readiness, Cost, Personnel Flow, and Availability.*⁷¹ The report considered the social and political considerations as variables that

determine the *lower bounds* for RC contributions to the FTF. RAND suggested that as total force size decreases, the RC is increasingly called upon, providing political utility through its enhanced presence. RAND indicated that the social utility of the total force is reliant upon the RC being of sufficient size to influence the values and culture of the active force majority. According to the study, the readiness and availability considerations set the *upper bounds* for RC percentages. RAND states and that there are no appreciable differences between RC and AC forces; the readiness factor does not constrain the mix. However, the availability variable is influenced by the constant demand for rapidly deployable forces. The personnel flow constraint also contributes to setting an upper bound as the RC depends on a critical flow of personnel from the AC. If the RC proportion increases too greatly, it can be restricted by the very source of its human resources. These first five variables form a feasible region where RC/AC proportions can exist. The final factor, cost, can push the feasible region in either direction depending on the sorts of activities the Air Force is engaging at various times.⁷²

The centerpiece for the study is a six-variable, predictive model based primarily on Two Major Theater War (2MTW) doctrine that accounts




Figure 5 - RAND Force Mix Prediction Model

for the opposing effects that lasting small-scale contingencies (SSC) cause on the RC/AC mix. Ultimately, the model predicts a range of appropriate force mix discussed in terms of RC to FTF ratios, favoring the lower end of the range if the Air Force continues to be globally engaged in SSCs, and more heavily toward the larger end if a 2MTW scenario is the prevailing strategy.⁷³ The RAND model shares core principles with both the RCE 2005 and ANG LRSP. However, the study shares only three of six determining variables with the QDR-driven report.

2. Review of Reserve Component Contributions to National Defense: Two themes emerge regarding reserve transformation within this 2001 QDR-driven report: 1. Rebalance the

RC/AC mix to enhance capabilities, and 2. Create flexibility in force management.⁷⁴ In following the “rebalance the mix” theme, only this study neglects social and political considerations as key factors in determining force mix.⁷⁵ This is quite interesting as the report was driven by the document signaling a grand political departure from Cold War mentality and was completed by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (ASD/RA) that has been marked for possible political elimination by Secretary Rumsfeld.⁷⁶ This effort narrowed criteria for assigning missions down to only four guidelines: tempo, predictability, timing, and availability.⁷⁷ No predictive model to accompany these variables was suggested.

3. RCE-2005: The RCE-2005 addressed nine considerations in its own “Force Mix Principles/Factors” found in Appendix 3 of the document.⁷⁸ In addition to the six variables included in the RAND study (RCE-2005 combines Political and Social factors into a single variable), this study added infrastructure, OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO, military effectiveness, and demographics to its list of factors to be considered when placing missions in the RC. This study similarly did not contain any examples of predictive modeling.

4. ANG LRSP: Perhaps the most comprehensive list of factors to be weighed when deciding whether a mission should be in the RC or AC can be found in this study’s “Force Mix Planning and Guidance Factors”.⁷⁹ This document mirrored both the RAND and RCE-2005 principles and added an additional four factors for consideration: deployment time frames, full time support requirements, overseas presence/rotation, and unique/high value skills needed. Once again, no modeling accompanied the additional factors presented in the ANG LRSP.

5. A Composite Framework: To develop this framework, the RAND model was used as an initial reference point. Because its variables were explicitly detailed as either upper or lower bound setting, the added planning factors found in the RCE-2005 and ANG LRSP were examined to determine whether they might actually be sub-factors or viable constraints not considered in the RAND study. In all cases, it was found that the RCE-2005 and ANG LRSP factors could be classified as subordinate to one or more constraints found in the RAND study. For example, the “OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO”, “deployment timeframes”, “full time support requirement”, and “overseas presence/rotation” factors can certainly be accounted for in the

RAND “availability” constraint. The “demographics” and “unique/high value skills” factors can be sub-categorized within the “personnel flow” variable. The RCE-2005 “infrastructure” element could certainly fall under RAND’s “cost” constraint, and finally its “military effectiveness” category is easily absorbed by the “readiness” factor. The QDR-driven report, as mentioned earlier, clearly missed the obvious political and social limitations covered by the RAND study. Although all the documents provide important considerations for determining force mix, the RAND study emerged with both the variables and model of choice to apply the Bush Administration input.

6. Beyond the Composite Framework: After the RAND study and planning documents had been carefully analyzed, the constraints of the model were then evaluated against the AVF lessons learned from Chapter 2 to discover if there were any links between the hypothetical model and the real world development the FTF had experienced during the last 33 years.

The most prominent disparity between the lessons learned and the RAND study was in the “readiness” constraint. According to RAND, “our hypothesis is that there are generally no appreciable readiness differences between Air Force active and reserve forces. Thus, readiness does not constrain the mix.”⁸⁰ This hypothesis certainly runs counter to the recurring theme that the RC has repeatedly fallen short in the funding, training, relevant equipment, and day-to-day involvement in the mission of the Air Force required to maintain true readiness.

Another inconsistency exists in the comparison of the RAND “availability” constraint with the current volunteerism phenomenon and current force sizing. The RAND model assumes “a constant demand for rapidly deployable forces that must be met predominantly with active forces. As total force becomes smaller, this constant demand calls for an increasing proportion of the force to be supplied by the active component.”⁸¹ In reality, the opposite has occurred. For FTF comparison, the Air Force shrunk from its 1990 force strength of 745,014 personnel to a low of 531,898 in 2000 reflecting a 28 percent decrease. Since 2000, the overall end strength has *increased* to 565,391, but exists still 24 percent lower than the 1990 figure. To illustrate the divergence between the model and reality, it is interesting to follow the growth of the RC from 1990 to present. In 1990, the RC represented only 26.8 percent of the force. By 2000, when the

FTF reached its lowest total strength in decades, the RC had climbed to 33.7 percent of the force. At present, the RC exists at an even greater 36.5 percent of the FTF, having benefited from more than 85 percent of the manning growth from FY 2000 - 2003.⁸² RAND's interpretation of these findings, however, is that, "we found no evidence that this shift occurred as part of a conscious force-mix strategy. Rather, it occurred as a result of many decisions, taken independently."⁸³ Furthermore, the case for RC increased involvement, counter to the "availability constraint", is made by both the total integration of the RC into the AEF construct and the enhanced volunteerism that has matured in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks described in Chapter 2.

Consequently, these inconsistencies drove a different approach from the originally intended application of the Bush Administration political input to the model. In the following section, the new methodology is clarified.

B. Analysis: Applying Political Input to the Model

1. The Approach: The following approach was used to assess the effects of the Bush Administration on the FTF. The political input formulated from the NSS, QDR, and Secretary Rumsfeld's memorandum in Chapter 3 was applied to the RAND model, examining its affects on other variables and the overall RC/AC mix. This outcome was treated as notional until the effects were weighed against the counteractive lessons learned in Chapter 2 to improve the forecasting capability of the model.

2. Political Input: The total political input was formed by combining the global engagement requirement from the NSS, the lower RC involvement preference stated by Secretary Rumsfeld in his memorandum, and an assumption developed from Dr. Chu's comments that there appears to be no planned, significant increase in Air Force end strength in sight.⁸⁴

3. Application: As this RC-reducing political factor was applied to the RAND model, it became readily apparent that adjusting this political constraint for a smaller RC would directly affect both the cost and personnel flow variables. Although the RAND study predicts lower total

costs for a larger AC in a globally engaged environment,⁸⁵ enormous initiation costs could occur as a result of moving all AEF related forces, and those missions currently residing wholly in the RC to a proportional level in the AC. Although Dr. Chu believes privatization must occur to free up end strength,⁸⁶ (which might accommodate these moves) this simply has not occurred, and therefore feeds the controversial and again costly possibility of swapping RC and AC roles.⁸⁷




Figure 6 – Applying Political Input to RAND Model

Furthermore, the removal of these critical skills in the RC reduces or eliminates the method of capturing costly pilot and other essential skills as members elect to leave the AC. Surprisingly, in reaction to the political desire to avoid activations, the availability factor has swung in the opposite direction that might have

been predicted by the model as a result of the enhanced volunteerism discussed earlier. As RAND noted in their study, “the principles generally do not prescribe a specific active/reserve mix. Rather, they tend to suggest constraints—the proportions of the mix should be above or below some specified boundary, which may vary as a function of total force size or other factors.”⁸⁸ Keeping this in mind, it is virtually impossible to exactly weigh the combined growth tendencies (comprised of costs of force rearrangement, enhanced volunteerism, and the need for an overflow for AEF skills in the RC) against the political preference of the administration to withdraw critical skills from the RC. It is clear, however, that the net effect of these inputs on the model does not appear to cause a major shift in either direction.

4. Weighing the Lessons Learned: As was just mentioned, the RAND model provided general constraints to form upper and lower bounds for the force mix ratio. Although the model essentially estimates negligible movement of the force within the feasible region, it does not suggest how the Air Force will respond to the specific preferences of Secretary Rumsfeld. In an

attempt to answer these questions, the lessons learned from Chapter 2 were examined for relevancy.

Regarding the question of removing critical skills from the RC, the most applicable lesson learned from AVF evolution was that of maintaining RC involvement in the day-to-day mission of the Air Force. Integrating the RC into each of the 10 AEF's (i.e. the daily mission) has finally eliminated at the source the enduring difficulties seen in terms of RC combat relevancy and effectiveness. Preserving this long awaited formal incorporation into the Air Force's daily business would be most highly jeopardized by the administration's preference to avoid activations to carry out these military operations. Operating with a greatly reduced force and a much higher OPTEMPO, the Air Force wisely and cleverly pushes volunteerism to new heights to provide the required RC rapidly deployable forces. Finally, although there are no specific prevailing lessons regarding missions existing wholly in the RC, the Air Force justifies three of the four C-130 unique missions as falling in line with steady-state requirements well managed by the RC and the final air defense interceptor mission possibly needing assistance from the AC in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks. This comparison is more clearly described in the following chart:

	As Is	DoD Desired State	Prevailing Lesson Learned	Probable Outcome
Political Input	RC = 36.5% of Total Force	RC < 36.5% of Total Force	Current construct shouldn't be abandoned	RC remains 36.5% of Total Force
Element I	RC integrated into AEFs performing critical skills	Move critical skills back to AC	RC needs to participate in daily mission of AF with relevant equipment to be ready for war	RC continues AEF participation
Element II	Some Whole Missions in RC	No combat missions entirely in RC	None	No missions wholly in RC migrate back to AC
Element III	RC Day-to-Day contributions make Total Force vulnerable to activations when escalation occurs	No "call-up" for Steady State Contingencies	OPTEMPO and force structure mandate heightened RC involvement	RC avoids activation requirement via enhanced volunteerism

Figure 7 - Author Assessment of DoD Preferences for Force Mix Weighed Against AVF Lessons Learned

5. Final Thoughts on Analysis: Although the lessons learned in Chapter 2 did not address each of the current administration's preferences for force mix, they did provide valuable Air Force cultural information not easily quantified in a scientific model. This information revealed the Air Force's commitment to continue its AVF evolution, even at the cost of heightened volunteerism not easily predicted by the administration or the RAND model.

CHAPTER 5

Conclusions and Recommendations

In the preceding chapters, the Bush Administration's call for transformation of the agencies of national security was closely examined to determine its preferences for the RC/AC mix. Once these preferences were isolated, they were applied to the 1999 RAND model for forecasting feasible regions for proportions of RC forces in relation to the FTF. Additionally, the evolution of the Air Force's AVF was traced to determine whether lessons learned from the various stages of development might be helpful in better predicting how the current administration's policies would affect the current mix of forces. Although the RAND model certainly reflected the robust and essentially counteracting relationship between the administration's political input and its impact on personnel flow, availability, and initial cost, the historical references provided supportive and more detailed insight as to how and why the Air Force might react as the model suggested. These reactions shape the conclusions and prompt the recommendations that follow.

A. Conclusions

After carefully reviewing the analysis of this report, two groups of findings emerged. The first dealt with the process by which the Air Force assimilated the actual RC/AC mix preferences set forth in Secretary Rumsfeld's comments and produced an unexpected, but acceptable position. The second set of findings arose from developing the AVF lessons learned and rethinking possibilities for the transformational decree of the National Security Strategy and Quadrennial Defense Review.

The following findings directly follow from Secretary Rumsfeld's memorandum preferences on the RC/AC mix:

Finding 1: *The Expeditionary Air Force (EAF) concept not only reduced an OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO problem, it finally instituted a practice that would incorporate recurring lessons learned from the AVF development. Although the RAND study suggests the path to the current force mix does not appear to follow any conscious strategy,⁸⁹ the inclusion of the Reserve Component in Operations NORTHERN and SOUTHERN WATCH in the mid-1990's following force drawdown was a conscious attempt to reduce OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO. This integrated Reserve/Active Component endeavor was formalized near the end of the decade via the institution of the EAF concept and essentially guaranteed, at last, that the Reserve Component would participate in the daily mission (i.e. AEF rotations) of the Air Force, necessitating they retain relevant aircraft, equipment, and wartime skills.*

Finding 2: *A strong sense of patriotism and commitment have created an enhanced form of volunteerism that, for the most part, precludes presidential activations when mobility requirements exceed RC member annual training requirements. It is important to note the emotional rather than logical source for this current phenomenon. Recommendations for solidifying this resource are detailed below.*

Finding 3: *Some missions may be better suited to remain wholly in the Reserve Component. There are missions where the tempo is such that training is more suitable to be accomplished within the Reserve Component. Other missions may not need Active Component involvement as that function is only required when the nation is engaged in a full scale war that necessarily requires the Reserve Component unit's presence.*

The last two findings result from general observations made during the analysis of this report's process:

Finding 4: *The lessons learned from the Air Force's AVF evolution serve as a seventh historical perspective constraint to the RAND study. These lessons represent the youthful, but emerging culture that distinguishes the Air Force from its sister services. This position is*

substantiated by the firm commitment the Air Force has shown by standing fast in retaining a viable RC within the EAF concept.

Finding 5: *Depending on service perspective, the Bush Administration's call for transformation can be regarded as a signal for intense change, or as merely a progress check for a process that is already enthusiastically underway.* The evidence contained within this report reflects that the Air Force has experienced a gradual, but significant shift in Reserve/Active Component mix since the end of the Gulf War. This shift, accompanied by the Air Force's incorporation of the Reserve Component into its EAF mindset, clearly reflect that transformation, at least in terms of Reserve/Active mix, has been ongoing for nearly 13 years. This successful journey has provided the Air Force with DoD's benchmark for Reserve/Active Component transformation.

B. Recommendations

"People are our most important asset. We need to take care of them, and they must feel their work is worthwhile and meaningful. They are highly skilled and we must maintain this experience to ensure our contributions to the total force are useful." Lt Gen James E. Sherrard, III, Commander, Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC)⁹⁰

There are two areas of focus for this report's recommendations. The first highlights the fact that the bar for volunteerism was raised to new heights in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks to avoid the need for presidential activations and to retain the recently adopted EAF concept. To preserve this enhanced personnel availability, the Air Force must anticipate difficulties that its people will encounter and remove those roadblocks before they occur. The second area involves making the lessons learned from the AVF evolution more prominent in the hopes of ending the cyclical negative effects that not learning them has caused so frequently in the past.

Preserving Volunteerism: If expanded volunteerism is the method by which the Air Force gets and keeps its Reserve Component members in the fight, then the guidelines across the Reserve Components need to be formalized in such a manner that there is conformity in

application that still provides local commanders with necessary latitude to effectively run their units. Specifically, the Air Force must:

Recommendation 1: *Take care of the military member by removing roadblocks that hinder his or her performance.* First, the military member must know and understand the new rules regarding volunteerism. These rules should not be implied, but covered during initial interviews as members join units. For members already serving in the Reserve Component, the rules should be covered in commander's calls. Secondly, the airman's family must be cared for during his or her absence, and particularly during the initial transition. Extreme attention-to-detail must be paid to ensuring that proper identification cards, medical care, pay issues, and child support for dependents are resolved before the military member departs the area. Third, the military member must be at ease that his employer understands the provisions of USERRA and that when the absence creates undue hardship on the employer that the government will seek ways to compensate via tax incentives, insurance, or other viable means. Fourth, the airman should know that his/her commander has great latitude in allowing members to volunteer for extended duty and that he/she will be fairly treated if, at a later time, activations are required. Presently, these very commanders have the authority to waive required (under statute) two-week annual summer training requirements when the member has volunteered for and completed sufficient commensurate training. Some form of this command option should be considered for military members who have volunteered for prolonged periods during national emergency when further activations are required.

Recommendation 2: *As the Air Force FTF continues to evolve, the lessons learned from its past should be placed more prominently in view in order to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past.* For example, this reported pointed out that as new missions emerge, the Air Force should continue to place reasonable proportions of those missions in the Reserve Component. As General Ralph E. Eberhardt, first Commander of Northern Command, said, "In the future, we need to standup new missions with the FTF mindset, rather than later convert!"⁹¹ Where future missions will be limited by hardware, search for ways to blend Reserve Component capability into

the unit. There was evidence that retaining separate funding accounts for the Reserve and Active Components kept both components healthy with regard to relevant equipment and aircraft. To ensure these lessons become more conspicuous, they should be briefed or forwarded to key planning staff members of the congressional armed services committees and military appropriations committees along with applicable planning or programming functions within the Departments of Defense and Air Force.

C. Final Thoughts

As the United States continues to use its unique abilities throughout the world as guided by the new National Security Strategy, the Department of Defense will continue to be called upon to provide a global presence. At the close of this report, some Air Force Reserve Component members are just beginning to return home from Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM. While there is certainly a sense of euphoria, accomplishment, and patriotism among the ranks, military members, families, and employers are already wondering when the next prolonged call for volunteerism will occur. Nearly 12 years elapsed from the peak activations of Operation DESERT STORM to this most recent mobilization. When will the next call come? How will the Reserve Component members be affected? For answers, many eyes will focus on diplomatic efforts with world hot spots such as Iran, Syria, and North Korea. Although these efforts will be significant, it is paramount that steps be taken now to implement the recommendations of this report to preserve the volunteerism this country currently enjoys.

Appendix

TOTAL FORCE COMPONENTS

FY	Active Duty	ANG	AFR	Total	AF Reserve % of Total Force
1984	597,000	105,012	70,318	772,330	9.1%
1988	576,000	115,221	82,116	773,337	10.6%
1989	571,000	116,061	83,214	770,275	10.8%
1990	545,000	116,200	83,814	745,014	11.2%
1991	530,000	116,300	84,539	730,839	11.6%
1992	478,000	118,900	81,874	678,774	12.1%
1993	450,000	117,626	80,562	648,188	12.4%
1994	424,000	117,676	78,172	619,848	12.6%
1995	422,000	112,873	78,011	612,884	12.7%
1996	392,000	109,400	76,138	577,538	13.2%
1997	388,000	107,000	73,160	568,160	12.9%
1998	371,409	108,002	73,447	552,858	13.3%
1999	370,882	106,991	74,242	552,115	13.4%
2000	354,411	105,715	73,708	531,898	13.5%
2001	353,393	106,759	74,358	534,510	13.9%
2002	358,800	112,075	74,700	545,575	13.7%
2003	359,000	130,791	75,600	565,391	13.4%

Appendix 1

Comparison of RC Planning Factors for Various Force Mix Studies

Factor/ Principle	RAND	RCE-05	ANG Adapted Study	ASD/RA Review
1	Social	Social/Political	Social/Political	
2	Political	Social/Political	Social/Political	
3	Readiness	Conversion	Conversion	Timing
4	Availability	Availability	Availability	Availability
5	Personnel Flow	Training Time	Accessibility	Predictability
6	Cost	Cost	Cost	
7		Infrastructure	Infrastructure	
8		OPSTEMPO/PERSTEMPO	OPSTEMPO/PERSTEMPO	Tempo
9		Military Effectiveness	Military Effectiveness	
10		Demographics	Demographics	
11			Deployment Time Frames	
12			Full-Time Support Requirements	
13			Overseas Presence/Rotation	
14			Unique/High Value Skills Needed	

Appendix 2

Acronyms

2MTW	Two Major Theater War
AC	Active Component
AEF	Air Expeditionary Force
AEW	Air Expeditionary Wing
AFRC	Air Force Reserve Command
AMC	Air Mobility Command
ANG	Air National Guard
AOR	Area of Responsibility
ARC	Air Reserve Component
ASD/RA	Assistant Secretary of Defense/Reserve Affairs
AVF	All Volunteer Force
DOD	Department of Defense
EAF	Expeditionary Air Force
FTF	Future Total Force
LMW	Lead Mobility Wing
LRSP	Long Range Strategic Plan
NGREA	National Guard & Reserve Equipment Appropriation
NSS	National Security Strategy
NVIS	Night Vision
OPTEMPO	Operational Tempo
PERSTEMPO	Personnel Tempo
PGM	Precision Guided Munitions
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
RC	Reserve Component
TFC	Total Force Concept
USAFE	United States Air Forces Europe
USERRA	Uniformed Services Employment & Reemployment Rights Act

WORKS CONSULTED

10 US Code. Sec. 118.

1996 Air Force Reserve Fact Sheets Series. "2003 Air Force Reserve Command Fact Sheets Series"

Air Force Air And Space Expeditionary Force Center. "Fact Sheet."

Alford, Rick LTC, LTC Rafael O'Ferrall, Lt Col Carl Rehberg, LTC Kevin Riedler. The Transformation of Reserve Component (RC) Modernization: New Options for DoD? Harvard U., 2002. Cambridge: National Security Program, 2002.

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. "Reserves 101 Presentation".

Author's personal observation during post 11 Sep. 2001 aftermath while assigned as Commander, 301st Logistics Group, 301st Fighter Wing, NAS JRB Fort Worth, Texas.

Brooks, Courtney. "DoD looking at changing reserve, active mix". Army LINK News 5 Nov 2000.

Correll, John T. "The Troop Losses Mount". Air Force Magazine Volume 74, No. 5, Issue (May 1992).

Crawley, Vince. "Reserves could see revamp of mission". Air Force Times 23 Sep. 2002.

DefenseLINK. "Reserve Component Employment Study 2005".

DefenseLINK. "Secretary Rumsfeld Remarks to the Reserve Officers Association". 20 Jan. 2003.

DefenseLINK. "Slides for Air Force News Briefing – Expeditionary Aerospace Force".

Duncan, Stephen. "Citizen Sailors and Soldiers: Designing the New Total Force".

Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve. "Questions and Answers for Employers and Employees who participate in the National Guard and Reserve."

Farringer, David Lt Col. "Re: CSAF AEF Memo." E-mail to Lt Col T. Glenn Davis. 21 Jan. 2003.

Farringer, David Lt Col. "Re: CSAF Memo – Deviation from AEF Battle Rhythm". E-mail to Lt Col T. Glenn Davis. 30 Jan. 2003.

Gertz, Bill. "Inside the Ring". Washington Times. 24 Jan. 2003.

Gross, Charles J. Dr. "Forging the Air National Guard".

Headquarters Air Force Reserve Command Public Affairs. "Official Air Force Reserve Command Public Access Web Site".

Hebert, Adam J. "Learning to Live with the Pilot Retention". Air Force Magazine Volume 84, No. 1, Issue (Jan. 2001).

Holt, Bryan A. Lt Col. "Commentary: The expeditionary story, everyone's responsibility". Air Force News Archive, Air Force Link. 16 May 2001.

Maze, Rick. "It's all in the balance, DoD says of force levels." Air Force Times 24 Mar. 2003.

Official Air Force Reserve Command Public Access Web Site. "Air Force Reserve key issues for 2002 Release No. 01036 - Jan 21, 2001".

Peters, F. Whitten. "Report of the Secretary of the Air Force". 1999 Department of Defense Annual Defense Report.

Rehberg, Carl Lt Col. "Re: Force Mix Principles/Unpublished document adapted from Air National Guard Long Range Strategic Plan". 6 Dec. 2002.

Reserve Forces Policy Board. "Funding". Report

Robberts, Albert, William Williams, and Cynthia Cook. Principles for Determining the Air Force Active/Reserve Mix. Santa Monica: RAND, 1999.

Rumsfeld, Donald. "Memorandum to Undersecretaries Dov Zakheim and Steve Cambone". Department of Defense, Washington, D.C. 14 Nov. 2002.

Scarborough, Rowan. "Rumsfeld seeks to cut three top posts". Washington Times 23 Jan. 2003.

Sega, Ron Maj. Gen. "Air Force Section Luncheon Presentation". Reserve Officers Association 2003 Mid-Winter Conference. Washington, D.C. 21 Jan. 2003.

Talley, Steven J. Maj. "Gulf War Volunteer Numbers". E-mail to Lt Col T. Glenn Davis. 20 Mar. 2003.

Tirpak, John A. "The EAF Turns One". Air Force Magazine Volume 83, No. 10, Issue (Oct. 2000).

Trowbridge, Gordon. "Balancing Act". Air Force Times 20 Jan. 2003.

United States Air Force, Reserve Personnel and Active Personnel Directorates & National Guard Bureau, Directorate of Personnel. "Total Force Components". Nov 2002.

United States. Department of Defense. 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. 30 Sep. 2001.

United States. Department of Defense. Review of Reserve Component Contributions to National Defense. 20 Dec. 2002.

United States. White House. 2002 National Security Strategy. 17 Sep. 2002.

Zakheim, Dov S. "Memorandum to Secretary of Defense". Department of Defense, Washington, D.C. 14 Nov. 2002.

-
- ¹ United States Air Force, Reserve Personnel and Active Personnel Directorates & National Guard Bureau, Directorate of Personnel. "Total Force Components." Nov. 2002. 18 Mar. 2003. <<http://www.afrc.af.mil/news/ff/>>.
- ² Tirpak, John A. "The EAF Turns One." *Air Force Magazine* Volume 83, No. 10, Issue (Oct. 2000): Enter the Reserve Components. 18 Mar. 2003. <<http://www.afa.org/magazine/Oct2000/1000eaf.html>>.
- ³ United States. White House. *2002 National Security Strategy*, 17 Sep. 2002. 18 Mar. 2003 <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html>>.
- ⁴ United States. Department of Defense. *2001 Quadrennial Defense Review*, 30 Sep. 2001. 18 Mar. 2003 <<http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr2001.pdf>>.
- ⁵ Rumsfeld, Donald. "Memorandum to Undersecretaries Dov Zakheim and Steve Cambone." Department of Defense, Washington, D.C. 1 Nov. 2002.
- ⁶ Robberts, Albert, William Williams, and Cynthia Cook. *Principles for Determining the Air Force Active/Reserve Mix*. Santa Monica: RAND, 1999. 18 Mar. 2003 <<http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1091/>>.
- ⁷ Maze, Rick. "It's all in the balance, DoD says of force levels." *Air Force Times* 24 Mar. 2003: 10-11.
- ⁸ Robberts 77.
- ⁹ QDR 23.
- ¹⁰ White House Chapter IX.
- ¹¹ Rumsfeld 1.
- ¹² Maze 10.
- ¹³ *Headquarters Air Force Reserve Command Public Affairs*. "Official Air Force Reserve Command Public Access Web Site." 18 Mar. 2003. <http://www.afrc.af.mil/news/missionbrf/index_files/frame.htm>.
- ¹⁴ *Headquarters Air Force Reserve Command Public Affairs*.
- ¹⁵ Peters, F. Whitten. *Report of the Secretary of the Air Force*. 1999 Department of Defense Annual Defense Report (ADR)., 2 Apr. 2003 <<http://www.defenselink.mil/execsec/adr1999/afstat.html>>.
- ¹⁶ Gross, Charles J. Dr. *Forging the Air National Guard*. Air National Guard 2 Apr. 2003 <<http://www.ang.af.mil/history/forging.asp>>.
- ¹⁷ Gross *Forging*.
- ¹⁸ Gross *Forging*.
- ¹⁹ Gross *Forging*.
- ²⁰ Duncan, Stephen. "Citizen Sailors and Soldiers: Designing the New Total Force"., 2 Apr. 2003 <<http://www.stratnet.ucalgary.ca/reserves/presentations/Duncan.pdf>>.
- ²¹ *1996 Air Force Reserve Fact Sheets Series*. "2003 Air Force Reserve Command Fact Sheets Series". 2 Apr. 2003 <<http://www.afrc.af.mil/news/factsheets/A-index.htm>>.
- ²² Gross *Forging*.
- ²³ *1996 Air Force Reserve Fact Sheets Series*.
- ²⁴ Talley, Steven J. Maj. "Gulf War Volunteer Numbers." E-mail to Lt Col T. Glenn Davis. 20 Mar. 2003.
- ²⁵ Correll, John T. "The Troop Losses Mount." *Air Force Magazine* Volume 74, No. 5, Issue (May 1992). 2 Apr. 2003 <<http://www.afa.org/magazine/editorial/05edit92.html>>.
- ²⁶ Gross *Forging*.
- ²⁷ Hebert, Adam J. "Learning to Live with the Pilot Retention". *Air Force Magazine* Volume 84, No. 1, Issue (Jan. 2001). 2 Apr. 2003. <<http://www.afa.org/magazine/Jan2001/0101pilots.html>>.
- ²⁸ *Headquarters Air Force Reserve Command Public Affairs*
- ²⁹ *Headquarters Air Force Reserve Command Public Affairs*
- ³⁰ Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. "Reserves 101 Presentation". 2 Apr. 2003. <<http://www.defenselink.mil/ra/ondemand/reserves101begin.html>>.
- ³¹ Holt, Bryan A. Lt Col. "Commentary: The expeditionary story, everyone's responsibility". 16 May 2001. Air Force News Archive, Air Force Link. 2 Apr. 2003. <http://www.af.mil/news/May2001/n20010516_4022.shtml>.
- ³² DefenseLINK. "Slides for Air Force News Briefing - Expeditionary Aerospace Force". 2 Apr. 2003. <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/eaf01_08041998.html>.
- ³³ Tirpak.
- ³⁴ *Air Force Air and Space Expeditionary Force Center*. "Fact Sheet". 2 Apr. 2003. <<http://www2.acc.af.mil/library/factsheets/aefc.html>>.
- ³⁵ Farringer, David Lt Col. "Re: CSAF AEF Memo." E-mail to Lt Col T. Glenn Davis. 21 Jan. 2003.

-
- ³⁶ *Air Force Air and Space Expeditionary Force Center.*
- ³⁷ Tirpak.
- ³⁸ *Air Force Air and Space Expeditionary Force Center.*
- ³⁹ Tirpak.
- ⁴⁰ Farringer, David Lt Col. "Re: CSAF Memo - Deviation From AEF Battle Rhythm." E-mail to Lt Col T. Glenn Davis. 30 Jan. 2003.
- ⁴¹ *Employer Support of the Guard and the Reserve.* "Questions and Answers for Employers and Employees who participate in the National Guard and Reserve." 2 Apr. 2003.
<<http://www.esgr.org/employers/employerFAQ.asp>>.
- ⁴² DefenseLINK. "Reserves 101 Presentation".
- ⁴³ Alford, Rick LTC, LTC Rafael O'Ferrall, Lt Col Carl Rehberg, LTC Kevin Riedler. The Transformation of Reserve Component (RC) Modernization: New Options for DoD?. Harvard U., 2002. Cambridge: National Security Program, 2002.
- ⁴⁴ Alford 5.
- ⁴⁵ *Reserve Forces Policy Board.* "Funding". 2 Apr. 2003
<http://www.defenselink.mil/ra/rfpb/chapter_2.html>.
- ⁴⁶ Scarborough, Rowan. "Rumsfeld seeks to cut three top posts". Washington Times 23 Jan.2003. 2 Apr. 2003. <<http://washingtontimes.com/national/20030123-77652210.htm>>.
- ⁴⁷ Scarborough.
- ⁴⁸ Gertz, Bill. "Inside the Ring". Washington Times 24 Jan. 2003. 2 Apr. 2003.
<<http://www.washtimes.com/national/20030124-7454848.htm>>.
- ⁴⁹ "Total Force Components."
- ⁵⁰ Tirpak.
- ⁵¹ *Headquarters Air Force Reserve Command Public Affairs.*
- ⁵² Zakheim, Dov S. "Memorandum to Secretary of Defense." Department of Defense, Washington, D.C. 14 Nov. 2002.
- ⁵³ Rumsfeld 1.
- ⁵⁴ Sega, Ron Maj. Gen. "Air Force Section Luncheon Presentation". Reserve Officers Association 2003 Mid-Winter Conference. The Washington Hilton and Towers, Washington, D.C. 21 Jan. 2003.
- ⁵⁵ NSS.
- ⁵⁶ NSS.
- ⁵⁷ NSS.
- ⁵⁸ NSS.
- ⁵⁹ NSS.
- ⁶⁰ Author's personal observation during post 11 Sep. 2001 aftermath while assigned as Commander, 301st Logistics Group, 301st Fighter Wing, NAS JRB Fort Worth, Texas.
- ⁶¹ 10 US Code. Sec. 118.
- ⁶² QDR 23.
- ⁶³ Crawley, Vince. "Reserves could see revamp of mission." Air Force Times 23 Sep. 2002: 22.
- ⁶⁴ Crawley 22.
- ⁶⁵ Maze 10.
- ⁶⁶ Maze 10.
- ⁶⁷ Rumsfeld 1.
- ⁶⁸ Brooks, Courtney. "DoD looking at changing reserve, active mix". *ArmyLINK News* 5 Nov. 2000. 2 Apr. 2003. <<http://www.dtic.mil/armylink/news/Nov2002/a20021105rumsfeld.html>>.
- ⁶⁹ DefenseLINK. "Secretary Rumsfeld Remarks To The Reserve Officers Association ". 20 Jan. 2003. 2 Apr. 2003. <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2003/t01202003_t20sdroa.html>.
- ⁷⁰ *DefenseLINK. Rumsfeld ROA Remarks.*
- ⁷¹ Robberts xiv.
- ⁷² Robberts xvi.
- ⁷³ Robberts xiv-xvi.
- ⁷⁴ Robberts 77.
- ⁷⁵ Review of Reserve Component Contributions to National Defense 22.
- ⁷⁶ Scarborough.
- ⁷⁷ Review of Reserve Component Contributions to National Defense 22.

-
- ⁷⁸ DefenseLINK. "Reserve Component Employment Study 2005". 2 Apr. 2003.
<http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/rces2005_0799a.html>.
- ⁷⁹ Rehberg, Carl Lt Col. "Re: Force Mix Principles/Unpublished document adapted from Air National Guard Long Range Strategic Plan." E-mail to Lt Col T. Glenn Davis. 6 Dec. 2002.
- ⁸⁰ Robberts xv.
- ⁸¹ Robberts xv.
- ⁸² *Headquarters Air Force Reserve Command Public Affairs*
- ⁸³ Robberts 1.
- ⁸⁴ Maze 10.
- ⁸⁵ Robberts 77.
- ⁸⁶ Maze 10.
- ⁸⁷ Trowbridge, Gordon. "Balancing Act." *Air Force Times* 20 Jan. 2003: 14-15.
- ⁸⁸ Robberts xiv.
- ⁸⁹ Robberts 1.
- ⁹⁰ *Official Air Force Reserve Command Public Access Web Site*. "Air Force Reserve key issues for 2002 Release No. 01036 - Jan 21, 2001". 2 Apr. 2003 <<http://paweb.jcs.mil/htdocs/afrcnews/01036.htm>>.
- ⁹¹ *Air University Library*. "Future Total Force: Raising the Bar for Force Integration". 2 Apr. 2003.
<<http://www.af.mil/lib/misc/ftf.pdf>>.