

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**BALTIC DEVELOPMENT AND ENGAGEMENT WITH THE  
COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES**

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## **ABSTRACT**

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The intent of the project is to show how the Baltic States have developed since independence and how they can help democracy develop in the Commonwealth of Independent States after joining the Europe Union and NATO.



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## BALTICS DEVELOPMENT AND ENGAGEMENT WITH THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES

After enlargement of the Europe Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 2004, both organizations will border Russia and other countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Therefore for the closest neighbors of Russia, who are going to be NATO and EU members, it is necessary to start thinking about cooperation with the CIS in the framework of security. When I speak about the closest neighbors I mean Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania – the Baltic States.

What is common between two persons, one who is rich another poor, one who is intelligent and the other not educated, or between two people who speak different languages? Can long-term relations between such parties be established? From these perspectives, it cannot be established. If there are not mutual interests and appropriate levels of development, such relations cannot be recognized. These relationships are also applicable for countries. Therefore for good cooperation we need to find something common to help develop this “something” to a suitable level. Are there common human values on the world? I am going to argue that there are and they are written in such documents as the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights” and the *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*: “... the rule of law; limits on the absolute power of the state; free speech; freedom of worship; equal justice; respect for women; religious and ethnic tolerance; and respect for private property.”<sup>1</sup> People will continue to think differently because there are various cultures, traditions, and levels of education. The goal is not to change a way of thinking but to convince all to respect common human values.

The main reason for Baltic cooperation with the CIS is to promote these common values in countries that lack them and of course to build security in the region. It is not enough to have just good defense forces that can protect a homeland; something else is required. This “something else” is based on the previously mentioned values and includes political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, respect for human dignity, and democracy. Many scholars have researched these topics and most of them agree that peace can be achieved between neighboring countries if they follow democracy. On a daily basis we associate democracy with common human values. In this essay I am going to pay more attention to democratization, keeping in mind economic freedom and peaceful relations as well. But before we proceed with this topic, I will look back in history to find out why the Baltic States chose this specific way of development.

### ***Historical background of the Baltic States***

The Baltic States have been the target of conquest by numerous foreign powers due to their strategic location on the Baltic Sea, separating East and West. Because of their common occupation, many perceive these countries as a single entity. There are more examples, such as size of the countries, culture, and common language group for Latvians and Lithuanians.<sup>2</sup> Of course there were some differences in the past, but as a Latvian citizen I will look back to the Latvian history to provide a common understanding of security in the Baltic States.

The development of the Latvian nation was interrupted on several occasions by different kinds of conquerors. Outlined below are several significant historical actions that happened during the last 8 centuries in the territory of Latvia:

1. During the 12<sup>th</sup> century the independent development of the Latvian nation was interrupted by the arrival of crusaders from Germany and elsewhere.
2. The Livonian War (1558-1583) started with Russia's attempt to overrun Livonia (the region of Latvia), but later turned into a division of these lands between Sweden and the Polish-Lithuanian Empire.
3. The expansion of the Russian Empire started in 1700 and led to the complete incorporation of Latvian lands in 1795.
4. During World War I Germans occupied West-Latvia. 1/5 of the 2.5 million inhabitants became refugees. This occupation started the first significant Latvian independence movement.
5. During World War II, Latvia was first occupied by the Soviet Union, then Germany, and then the Soviet Union again.

The collapse of the Russian Empire after World War I provided the opportunity for the Baltic States to establish independent countries that remained sovereign states until 1940. They retained, however, strong influence from both the west and the east. Later the Soviet Union forcefully annexed the Baltic States after the Soviet-German Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (signed August 23, 1939) in 1940. None of the mentioned countries fought against the Soviet occupation and there were no hostile movements against the conquerors from the Baltic governments. Genocide against the Baltic nations in the form of bloody terror and massive deportation to Siberia took place in 1941. During World War II, the Baltic States suffered three invasions and occupations.

After the war, the Soviet Union subjected the Latvian republic to social and economic reorganization. Severe political repression accompanied radical socioeconomic change while extreme russification numbed national cultural life. Several waves of mass deportation to

northern Russia occurred involving at least 100,000 people. The rural economy of the republic was rapidly transformed to heavy industry. Only the political and economic situation in the Soviet Union during the 1980s enabled Latvians to pursue a bolder nationalistic program. The same situation also developed in Estonia and Lithuania. In 1991, the Baltic States asserted their independence and broke away from the crumbling Soviet state.

From my point of view, we can pull out some lessons from these historical details:

1. To retain independence a small state must be part of an international (security) organization.
2. Security treaties should only be made with countries that follow democratic rules.
3. Good relations with neighbor countries are one of the conditions for prosperous development.
4. A country must have good leaders, well educated, and with experience at leading government.

The Baltic States learned from history and therefore the main issue for them from the beginning of the second independence in 1991 was security. There were several ways to achieve it and the Baltic States seem to have chosen the correct one.<sup>3</sup> It was possible to do so after Russian troops withdrew from Baltic territory.

In 1994 in Tallinn, the Baltic countries signed the Agreement on Baltic Parliamentary and Government Cooperation between Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The Agreement includes the following frameworks for cooperation:

1. The Baltic Assembly (founded in 1991).
2. The Baltic Council of Ministers (established in 1994).
3. The Baltic Council as a joint body for governments and parliaments.

This was just beginning. Later on I cover this topic more deeply when the military role in the democratization process is discussed, but next I look at the theoretical basis of democracy to give greater understanding of the ways the Baltic States can affect the CIS.

### ***Theoretical aspects of democracy***

I will begin my observation of this topic with the definition of democracy. It is derived from the Greek word: demos (the people) and kratos (authority, rule): "A system of government in which ultimate political power rests with a country's population at large, either directly or through elected representatives. Citizens have the right to participate in political decision-making. Democracy is not an Ideology, but rather an ideal that can be reached or embodied by various

institutional arrangements according to one's ideological conception of Freedom, Participation, Rights, etc.”<sup>4</sup>

Historical facts have shown that if a country follows the rules mentioned above they will often develop successfully; if not, the state will have difficulties in the different domains. This is because democracy itself establishes a harmony between the powers of the state and its citizens. History also shows that good cooperation between neighboring countries can be established if they follow the democratic convention.




Figure1. Relationship between democracy, international organization, economical interdependence and peace<sup>5</sup>

Democracy can also be promoted through cooperation with neighbors and through international organizations. Good theoretical evidence for this subject can be found in Bruce Russett and John Oneal's book *Triangulating Peace, Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations*. The authors argue that if countries fulfill several criteria they are not going to fight against each other. The book begins with the statement: "... through careful statistic analysis, the chance that any two countries will get into a serious military dispute can be

estimated if one knows what kinds of governments they have, how economically interdependent they are, and how well connected they are by a web of international organizations.”<sup>6</sup> These associations are illustrated in Figure 1 and show us the relationship between democracy, international organizations, economical interdependence, and peace. Because the three elements of theory are interrelated, changes in one can influence the others.

Immanuel Kant is one of the founders of modern liberalism. In his treatises on perpetual peace, Kant refined the liberal argument by suggesting that peace among democratic nations would be the consequence of three complementary influences. First, republican constitutions eliminate autocratic caprice in waging war. Second, an understanding of the legitimate rights of all citizens and of all republics comes into play with the spread of democracy, resulting in the creation of a moral foundation for the liberal peace upon which eventually an edifice of international law can be built. Lastly, economic interdependence reinforces constitutional constraints and liberal norms by creating transnational ties that encourage accommodation rather than conflict.<sup>7</sup> Thus material incentives add their force to law and morality.

My attention will be directed more to the topic of democracy and international organizations. From my experience, the NATO security umbrella and the EU membership requirements have helped to expand all three elements of Kantian theory. I will focus on the topic of democracy, international organizations, and the military. What, for example, is the role of the military in promoting democracy?

### ***Role of the Armed Forces in developing democracy***

To achieve success in promoting democracy in former communist countries there is a need to allocate resources from all elements of state power (diplomatic, economic, military, and information). This task is very broad, but the purpose of my research is to argue that the military can play an important role in this task. Saying that, I remember that we need to be very careful in assigning the democratization function to the military because the military already fulfills several other important tasks. The prioritization of those different roles results from domestic and international factors and influences that we are going to discuss in the next section. The second reason I am concerned about military cooperation is that it is one of the elements of national power and has a very close relationship with state policy. In the Baltic States, militaries have become part of the process of democratization, but in the CIS militaries are developing in the wrong direction. Most of the militaries in the region are politicized and may be the largest and least reformed institutions in those countries.<sup>8</sup>

The existing debates on the nature of particular civil-military relations are multifunctional and diverse. However, it is possible to identify five broad roles for the military, each of which has important implications for the character of civil-military relations in every country. These are: national security, national builder, regime defense, domestic military assistance, and military diplomacy.<sup>9</sup> If we investigate the topic of military diplomacy more deeply we can recognize that it involves international peacetime cooperation between armed forces, defense ministries, and related national security structures, and includes four types of activities:

1. Bilateral and multilateral military cooperation agreements, training, and exchange programs.
2. Military reform assistance.
3. Assistance to states in developing defense and broader security sector management structures.
4. Military confidence building measures and military support for arms control and defense conversion as part of broader conflict prevention strategies.<sup>10</sup>

My argument is based on NATO's experience because it remains the most influential politico-military organization and one the Baltic States will shortly join. First of all, let us look to the Alliance's Strategic Concept that states: "Based on common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the Alliance has striven since its inception to secure a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe. It will continue to do so."<sup>11</sup> According to this statement all members of NATO need to contribute their efforts to peace and democracy in the region. From the previous section we can also conclude that regional security cannot be achieved without good relations with neighboring countries, therefore the Baltic States need to be concerned about the CIS. This topic will be discussed in the following sections.

One of my tasks in this section is also to look at what NATO is doing in relations with the CIS and how the Baltic States can take over some of responsibilities. Therefore I propose to look again to the Alliance's Strategic Concept which states that: "The Concept emphasizes the Alliance's determination to pursue its long-standing policy of partnership, cooperation and dialogue with all democratic Euro-Atlantic countries, in order to preserve peace, promote democracy and contribute to prosperity and progress. It points out that this approach is aimed at enhancing the security of all, excludes nobody, and helps to overcome divisions that could lead to conflict. It also describes the principal instruments of this policy - the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the Partnership for Peace, the special relationships with Russia and Ukraine, and the Mediterranean Dialogue." A very important role in achieving of those objectives is played by the Partnership for Peace (PfP) – a major program of practical cooperation

between NATO and individual Partners, which promotes transparency in defense planning and budgeting, democratic control of armed forces, and the capacity for joint action with NATO in peacekeeping operations. The invitation to join PfP has since been accepted by 30 countries, three of which have become members of the Alliance (Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland). Those from the CIS are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.

NATO's most extensive efforts at cooperation are with Russia and Ukraine. If we look specifically to NATO and Russia cooperation, then we can recognize that it is very broad and includes activities from the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council meetings to combating new security threats.<sup>12</sup>

Enhanced PfP cooperation covers a wide spectrum of possibilities, both in the military field and in the broader defense-related but not strictly military area. The areas of cooperation listed in the current Partnership Work Program 2001-2002 covers all activities from airspace management/control to language training. There are many opportunities for cooperation and all of them can help in promoting democracy, including military to military cooperation.

As a positive example I would like to mention the Baltic States and their cooperation in the PfP framework. Those activities helped develop armed forces and prepared states for entering NATO and the European Union. NATO's PfP draws on a history of international cooperative effort to promote democracy and development in foreign countries. A successful example where the military had been involved in promoting democracy was the Marshal Plan. Then the Alliance helped to rebuild Germany after World War II. NATO played a vital role in solving the German question in the twentieth century by engaging and integrating Germany into a democratic alliance. A big role in solving post war problems belongs to Germany itself. Without good leadership and a willing population it would not have been possible to achieve such good results in such a short time. I will return to this statement because of the specific situation in Russia.

#### ***Cooperation of the Baltic States in the framework of NATO***

Since August 1991, when Latvia regained its independence, extensive cooperation with neighboring Estonia and Lithuania has always been among the main priorities of Latvia's foreign and security policy. The process took a significant leap forward with the launch, in 1994, of the Partnership for Peace. The last ten years have shown to all the success of the program. In discussion, with high-level foreign representatives I have recognized that NATO views the Baltic States as one entity. This cooperation is a priority that was mentioned in the Latvian National Security Concept.<sup>13</sup> Some of the most successful practical projects include: Baltic Battalion

(BALTBAT), Baltic Naval Squadron (BALTRON), Baltic Air Surveillance Network (BALTNET), Baltic Defense College (BALTDEFCOL), Joint Military Personnel Registration and Administration System of the Baltic States (BALTPERS). Right now there is an on going “baltification” of those joint projects, meaning that responsibilities are being taken on by the Baltic States themselves.

Additional projects are also being developed:

1. Baltic Information System (BALTCISS). BALTCISS is going to establish a common command and control center for the Baltic States that is going to support the complete command and control process with its important situation assessment, decision definition, operation planning, and realization supervision components.
2. Baltic Distance Learning (BALTDISTLEARN). BALTDISTLEARN is the distance education system established in all military academies of the Baltic States and BDCOL for the purpose of officer and civilian employer training.
3. Baltic Logistic System (BALTLOG) which, in the long-term perspective, would coordinate and integrate acquisition and logistics systems in the Baltic States both for economic as well as interoperability reasons.
4. Baltic Medic Unit (BALTMED) is established for the purpose of deploying for international missions.

Bilateral and multilateral support of defense structures in the Baltic States is coordinated by the Baltic Security Assistance Forum (BALTSEA), established in 1997. Multinational steering groups, chaired by the supporting lead nation, have been established for each project in order to secure the development and coordination of the projects.

On the doorstep of NATO, the Baltic States are transforming themselves from a security consumer to a security donor that includes their commitment in the war against terrorism. The most tangible evidence of this is participation in international missions and initiatives that demonstrate the Baltic States commitment to international peace, security, and the common values of the Euro-Atlantic family. The countries are focusing on areas where their contribution to the Alliance’s activities would produce an added value to NATO’s overall capabilities. These include combat support and service support units such as medics, military police, explosive ordinance disposal, and NBC in the future.

Latvia as well as the other Baltic States supports the development of the Kiel Initiative, which is aimed at regional cooperation in areas such as search and rescue, environment protection, and defusing mines. In 1999 the Swedish and German Defense Ministers initiated a process to exchange views between involved countries concerning practical PfP cooperation in

the Baltic Sea Region – the Kiel Initiative. The aim is to take stock of achievements so far, and to discuss steps to further develop practical PfP cooperation at a Defense Ministers' meeting during the second half of next year. Russia is associated with the initiative. Latvia's long-term interests regarding Russia are cooperation in combating organized crime and non-traditional security threats such as cross-border cooperation, frontier security, transit industry, and other forms of economic cooperation.

But this is just a small beginning. We need to think about extending this cooperation. To understand how the Baltic countries can help the CIS, we need to have a clear picture of the regional security and geopolitical situation in the region.

### ***Security in the Baltic Sea region after joining NATO and the European Union***

The objective of this section is to analyze political security after the three Baltic States join NATO and the European Union. Therefore the analysis will be more concentrated to the East because Northern and Western neighbors will be EU and/or NATO members.

On 21 November 2002 the Baltic States received an invitation to join NATO. This invitation coupled with the current international situation has proven very challenging for NATO and its future new members. As current events show, many threats remain and will continue into the future.

Some weeks later the Baltic States were invited to join the European Union as well. Without any doubt, these two events will change the situation of the Baltic States in the security area. Baltic security has been one of the most neglected issues of countries after the proclamations of independence in 1991, but it was the primary factor used by all three governments in working to join both NATO and the European Union.

Latvia has problems in the political, military, economic, informative, social, ecological, and criminal spheres as do all Baltic States.<sup>14</sup> Political stability in the region is the most important factor for successful development of each country. As long as Latvia's neighbors have some political instability, like Russia and Belarus have, there will be security threats also for the Baltic States and Europe.<sup>15</sup> Most analysts were very optimistic about Russia's development at the end of the last century with statements that the situation was gradually improving, such as during the NATO Prague Summit.<sup>16</sup> Unfortunately, as several scholars have discovered, Russia's cooperation with the United States and NATO can be perceived as reluctant.<sup>17</sup> The reason why Russia had not strongly protested against of enlargement of NATO was Russia's domestic priorities and limited means. From my prospective, I can mention several reasons why Russia and, to a lesser extent, Belarus concerns for the Baltic States.

### ***Russian and Belarusian political development***

The recent parliamentary election in Russia demonstrates its flawed democracy. Most foreign observers agree that the results are going to help President Vladimir Putin perfect his “managed democracy”, which means that only one person is going to decide the ways of development in the country. There is ongoing discussion about amending the Russian Constitution to allow a president to serve more than two terms. We can see some examples of this “managed democracy” right now: attacks on the independent media, a largely absent rule of law, and declining respect for human rights which Russia demonstrates in Chechnya. The recent visit of US Secretary of State Colin Powell to Moscow was a case in point. The United States has objected to Russia's failure to withdraw troops from Georgia, where Powell attended the inauguration of newly elected President Mikhail Saakashvili, before heading to Moscow. Powell also criticized Russian democracy: "Russia's democratic system seems not yet to have found the essential balance among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. Political power is not yet fully tethered to law. Key aspects of civil society – free media and political party development, for example – have not yet sustained an independent presence."<sup>18</sup>

We need to remember also that Russia possesses weapon of mass destruction. It is clear that this tool can be used as a final argument in disputes. The new National Security Concept of Russia states that the foreign policy of the Russian Federation should be designed to protect the lawful rights and interests of Russian citizens abroad, through the use of political, economic, and other measures. At the same time we can read that the Russian Federation should possess nuclear forces that are capable of guaranteeing the desired extent of damage against any aggressor state or coalition of states in any conditions and circumstances.<sup>19</sup>

Another difficult neighbor of the Baltic States is Belarus. The Belarus authoritarian regime is to some extent a unique phenomenon in contemporary European democratic society. Belarus receives considerable criticism from various international organizations.<sup>20</sup> Its authoritarian regime may not exist for long, but until then we must be cautious. I can only say that after changes in leadership, Belarus will follow Russia's influence because of their strong economic and cultural relationship.

### ***Russian speaking population in the Baltic States***

The Russian-speaking population in the Baltic States is also an issue which Baltic governments need to consider carefully. A wrong decision can be inappropriately translated by

the government of Russia, which has occurred several times in the past. It can raise unnecessary friction between the states.

In 1995, the indigenous population composed 79.6% of Lithuanian, 62.5% of Estonian, and 52% of Latvian inhabitants.<sup>21</sup> Russians were the biggest ethnic group in the USSR both in number and in ideological influence. With Baltic independence, Russian-speaking minorities became a controversial domestic and international topic.

Latvia has the most difficult situation. It is still a big challenge for the Latvian parliament when it makes decisions concerning issues such as education, use of language, and citizenship. Latvia was the place where consolidation of Russian-speakers on the basis of their mother tongue was successfully put into effect. The Russian language also formed a new group of Russian speaking Byelorussians, Ukrainians, Poles, Jews, and Germans of Latvia. A highly developed infrastructure was developed in Latvia on the basis of the Russian language, such as the system of secondary and higher education, science, means of mass media, state-party control of economy and social life. Right now, one of the biggest news in Latvia is the new education law. Russia has several times announced their interest in the final decision concerning the new law and tried to influence Latvia with various economical and political means.

### ***The case of Kaliningrad***

One of the key security issues in the Baltic Sea region is the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad. Lithuania has a 247-kilometers-long border with Kaliningrad, where approximately 930,000 Russian inhabitants live. After the Cold War and especially after the Baltic States join the European Union and NATO, this region will continue to suffer from a difficult geopolitical situation. The main challenges are:

1. Kaliningrad's main line of communication with the rest of Russia is through Lithuania.
2. Abolition of a visa-free regime on Kaliningrad borders with its neighbors (Poland, Lithuania) will undermine local business (especially tourism).
3. The EU Schengen rules could hinder the development of a regional transport infrastructure and create new bottlenecks on borders.

There are three main approaches to the solution of the Kaliningrad problem among Russian political and academic elites.<sup>22</sup> First are the political realists and geopoliticians. They see Kaliningrad as a manifestation of an eternal geopolitical rivalry between Russia and the West. Liberal institutionalists hope that Kaliningrad will be further opened up for international

cooperation and become a “gateway region” that could facilitate Russia's gradual integration into European multilateral institutions. Globalists go further than liberals in terms of Kaliningrad's possible place in international cooperation. They believe that globalization and regionalization are worldwide processes that Russia cannot avoid. Right now it is hard to predict which approach will be chosen, therefore I am going to assume that the region will developed as a free trade zone. My assumptions are based on EU willingness to solve this problem more positively. It will not be an easy solution. At the same time, it is necessary to mention that Lithuania has very good cooperation with Kaliningrad, which can be expanded to the rest of Baltic States.

### ***Border agreements with Russia***

Borders agreement with Russia is a major unsolved issue. Estonia and Latvia lost some territories after the occupation of these countries by Russia in 1940. There has been ongoing discussion about gaining the land back. After the Latvian invitation to join the European Union these discussions were eliminated and now there is a ratification process toward a border agreement. Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia Vladimir Chizov believes that the Russian State Council ratification of the border agreement between Latvia and Russia would be possible only after a positive interstate atmosphere is achieved. He regards the repeal of education reform, the acceleration and facilitation of the naturalization process, and the ratification of the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities as the most effective positive signals from Latvia.

### ***Transnational threats***

The Baltic States are also becoming more vulnerable to so-called transnational threats, which may be either deliberate or driven by natural forces. This process is related to globalization and affects every country. Examples of the threats are international terrorism, crime, drug production, smuggling, and people trafficking. We should also keep in mind climate change and depletion of the ozone layer, degradation of the environment, natural disasters, AIDS, SARS, and other human and animal diseases. These threats may increase in the future.

We need to remember the consequences of the Cold War. There are still all too many stocks of rusting, obsolete, unwanted equipment lying around especially in the eastern part of our continent, ranging from Russian nuclear submarines to literally millions of now-prohibited landmines. They can give rise to accidents and damage to health and the environment; they can be stolen by criminals or terrorists and used for violent demonstrations.

The current dimensions of global organized crime present a greater international security challenge than anything Western democracies had to cope with during the Cold War. Worldwide alliances are being forged in every criminal field from money laundering and currency counterfeiting to trafficking in drugs and nuclear materials. This issue is very important in the Baltic region especially if we speak about Russia where organized crime is powerful.<sup>23</sup> Some of the examples are apparent today in Lithuania with discussion about impeachment of the country's president.

After joining NATO and the European Union, the Baltic States will have the same neighbors and threats. Therefore a task for them will be maintaining good relations and, from my point of view, to influence countries from the CIS positively. Threats cannot be solved in isolation and therefore it is necessary to mention the importance of all international organizations that are involved in the region. The main players in the region are the UN, European Union, NATO and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). As the only forum which brings together all the countries of Europe, as well as Canada and the United States, the OSCE represents a key component of Europe's security architecture. It provides a comprehensive framework for cooperation in the areas of human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy, and the rule of law, security, and economic issues. The Baltic States have to play their own role in these organizations, at times related to the CIS.

#### ***The Baltic States and cooperation with the Commonwealth of Independent States***

Success in widening further the zone of stable peace depends significantly on the successful integration of Russia and other members of the CIS into the Kantian system of the West.<sup>24</sup> At a time when the 'asymmetrical' nature of the super-terrorist threat arises, it is better to have Russia as a partner and not an enemy.

As discussed previously, survival of the state and the Baltic region are the vital interest of the countries located there. Therefore, all governmental bodies of the states must be involved in questions that deal with regional security, the European Union, and NATO. It will only work when all elements of power (diplomatic, economical, military, and informational) are involved in accomplishing the objective. For the people of the Baltic States, participation in NATO is just a means to ensure the greater goal of sovereignty of the state. However, for the Ministries of Defense and National Armed Forces, the main objectives are active participation in this organization to provide security in the region. To achieve this goal, Ministries of Defense and National Armed Forces must organize:

1. Active participation in NATO activities.

2. Developing military leadership in the Armed Forces.
3. Cooperation with neighbors and expanding this cooperation to the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Cooperation is one way to leverage democracy in the region. The Baltic States need to use all elements of power to do so. This cannot be achieved without the CIS willing to develop as democratic countries. Therefore, what we need to get from them is their willingness to receive help from Western countries. Positive results in this question cannot be achieved without EU, NATO, and especially US and European major power involvement.

Concerning the organization of cooperation, I would like to add that this help must not just be material but should also positively change the attitude of people in these countries, increase willingness to develop democratic civil-military relations and security in the region. It will be very difficult regarding the armed forces of Russia, because the Russian military is still hiding everything behind a security curtain.

The main objective of my research is military issues. Therefore I am going to make some proposals in this domain. At the same time I would like to mention the importance of all elements of power, especially informational. NATO and the United States have been the main adversaries of the people who live in the CIS for more than fifty years, therefore most of them still do not view them favorably.

Cooperation in the defense and military area might include defense budgeting, public relations, legislative relations, social problems within the armed forces, problems associated with the transition from conscript to professional militaries, and the role of non commissioned officers. Baltic projects can be extended to the CIS, such as:

1. Involving the CIS in the Baltic States common military projects (BALDEFCOL, BALTLOG, BALNET, BALTRON, BALTDISTLEARN, BALTPERS, etc.).
2. Studies at common education institutions, such as BDCOL.
3. Participation in combined military exercises to prepare contingency plans for dealing with the threats on their common borders.
4. Regular meetings of representatives from the ministries of defense and commanders of Armed Forces.
5. Cooperation in the field of civil-military relations.
6. Information sharing between intelligent services.
7. Cooperation in the security of common borders.
8. Establishing common crises prevention institutions.

9. Areas of military industry: countries from the CIS can produce some of the material that is necessary for NATO.

10. Bilateral cooperation between NATO and the CIS countries.

From my experience I would like to mention that the hardest task for the Latvian National Defense Academy in 1997, when several foreign countries offered their help, was to choose cooperation priorities and countries with whom to work in the decided direction. Most of countries offer the same cooperation fields so there is a need for the good planning and prioritizing of objectives. For some projects, supporting countries are reluctant to be in the same project with other countries. Sometimes there is a need to decline offers of cooperation with an appropriate explanation. Annual evaluation of cooperation is very important for improvement, therefore there is a need for an institution that can deal with these issues. Such an organization can be established under the auspices of NATO or in the framework of the PfP. The Baltic countries could lead this effort. Experienced leaders of NATO countries together with representatives from the CIS need to develop the main objectives of this cooperation. Cooperation needs to be more bilateral.

I would like to conclude that cooperation between the Baltic States and the CIS should be organized for the security of the region. This cooperation should involve most of the state institutions of the CIS and Russia, as a main player, needs to be involved in its development. This cooperation would be very challenging, but success can be achieved. Certainly it will take time and resources, but it is a worthy endeavor for the Baltic States and the CIS as they work with NATO and the European Union for a better and more secure future.

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## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002), 3.

<sup>2</sup> Gražina Miniotaitė, "The Baltic States: In Search of Security and Identity," in *Almost NATO: Partners and Players in Central and Eastern European Security*, ed. Charles Krupnick, (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003), 264.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 274.

<sup>4</sup> "Social Science Dictionary," Elmer, available from <<http://www.elissetche.org/dico/D.htm>>; Internet; accessed 17 November 2003.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 81.

<sup>6</sup> Bruce Russett and John O'Neal, *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations* (New York: Norton, 2001), 9.

<sup>7</sup> Immanuel Kant, "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch," available from <<http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/kant/kant1.htm>>; Internet; accessed 23 December 2003.

<sup>8</sup> "The Next Step in Democracy Assistance to Russia: Targeting Military Reform Sarah Mendelson," *PONARS Policy Memo 12 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 1997*, available from <[http://www.csis.org/ruseura/ponars/policymemos/pm\\_0012.pdf](http://www.csis.org/ruseura/ponars/policymemos/pm_0012.pdf)>; Internet; accessed 20 October 2003.

<sup>9</sup> Timothy Edmunds, Anthony Foster and Andrew Cottey, "The Armed forces and Society: A Framework for Analysis," available from <<http://civil-military.dsd.kcl.ac.uk/TCMR%20Papers/TCMR%201.13.htm>, Internet>; Internet; accessed 23 December 2003.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>11</sup> "The Alliance's Strategic Concept," approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. on 23rd and 24th April 1999, available from <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm>>; Internet; accessed 23 December 2003.

<sup>12</sup> *NATO Handbook*, available from <<http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb030204.htm>>; Internet; accessed 27 December 2003.

<sup>13</sup> "In strengthening the security of the Baltic Sea region special attention is paid to the development of practical joint projects and programs in the sphere of security and defense and joint contribution to international security – Baltic Battalion (BALTBAT), Baltic Naval Squadron (BALTRON), Baltic Air Surveillance Network (BALTNET), Baltic Defense College (BALTDEFCOL), Joint Military Personnel Registration and Administration System of the Baltic

States (BALTPERS) and other regional projects": "The Latvian National Security concept," approved by the Latvian Parliament on 24.01.2002, available from <<http://www.am.gov.lv/en/?id=2862>>; Internet; accessed 16 October 2003.

<sup>14</sup> "The endangerments may arise in political, military, economic, informative, social, ecologic and criminal, etc. spheres separately and can be closely related and mutually interacting": "The Latvian National Security Concept," approved in Parliament on 24.01.2002, available from <<http://www.am.gov.lv/en/?id=2862>>; Internet; accessed 16 October 2003.

<sup>15</sup> Susanne Nies, "Between Chirac, Bush and Putin: The Baltic States, from Factors to Actors in the New Europe", (*Baltic Defence Review*, no. 9 Volume, January 2003), 93-96.

<sup>16</sup> "Prague Summit Declaration," Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the *North Atlantic Council* in Prague, on 21 November 2002, available from <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm> >; Internet; accessed 16 October 2003.

<sup>17</sup> Ove H.-G. Hoff, "NATO and the Baltic preparations after invitation to join the Alliance," (*Baltic Defence Review*, no. 6 Volume 2001), 23.

<sup>18</sup> International Relation and Security Network, "Putin, Powell discuss relations in Moscow," available from <<http://www.isn.ethz.ch/infoservice/secwatch/index.cfm?service=cwn&parent=detail&sNewsID=8184&menu=1>>; Internet; accessed 19 January 2004.

<sup>19</sup> "The National Security Concept," available from <[http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000\\_01-02/docjf00.asp](http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_01-02/docjf00.asp)>, Internet; accessed 30 January 2004.

<sup>20</sup> "At present, Belarus shows severe democratic deficits and does not yet meet the Council of Europe's relevant standards. The electoral process is imperfect, human rights violations continue, civil society remains embryonic, the independence of the judiciary is doubtful, local government is underdeveloped, and, last but not least, Parliament has limited powers." "Resolution 1306 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe," (Amnesty international, Report 2003, Belarus), available from <<http://web.amnesty.org/report2003/Blr-summary-eng>>; Internet; accessed 16 October 2003.

<sup>21</sup> Gražina Miniotaitė, "The Baltic States: In Search of Security and Identity," 265.

<sup>22</sup> Mark Kramer, "Kaliningrad Oblast, Russia, and Baltic Security," (*PONARS Policy Memo* 10 Harvard University, October 1997), available from <[http://www.csis.org/ruseura/ponars/policymemos/pm\\_0010.pdf](http://www.csis.org/ruseura/ponars/policymemos/pm_0010.pdf)>; Internet; accessed 20 October 2003.

<sup>23</sup> "Transnational Threats Update," (Center for Strategic and International Studies, Volume 2 Number 2 November 2003), available from <[http://www.csis.org/tnt/ttu/ttu\\_0311.pdf](http://www.csis.org/tnt/ttu/ttu_0311.pdf)>; Internet; accessed 27 December 2003.

<sup>24</sup> Bruce Russett and John O'Neal "Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations," 272.



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