SECURITY OF REAR AREAS

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ABSTRACT

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This SRP deals with the problem of Rear Area Security, a subject that gained great importance during World War II. While being identified as one of the main causes for the defeat of the German Wehrmacht, Rear Area Security fell to oblivion quickly during the Cold War, due to the lack of depth in the areas of operation on both sides of the Iron curtain. Armed conflict was too strongly aimed at achieving a quick military decision, focusing almost exclusively on the front and the terrain before it. Due to nuclear weapons, conventional warfare seemed unlikely in the Post World War II era. Contemporary German command and control regulations, for instance, contain hardly any standards on coping with this specific military challenge. Only in the recent past, that is, in the context of the Peace Support Operations and Enduring Freedom / Iraq Freedom, has the problem come back into focus and most likely will remain there. Therefore the author deemed it necessary to write about this almost forgotten subject and to develop ideas for measures to be considered by responsible commanders.

This SRP provides the following recommendations:

- In future planning, an augmented employment of specialized forces for Rear Area Security should be considered. It is no longer a question of having enough soldiers or units; but using the right ones.
- Operational doctrine/manuals must give increased consideration to rear area security as part of “Force Protection”. A separate chapter specifically dedicated to this aspect in the future operations concept of the German Armed Forces should be included.
- A comprehensive sub-concept in the German Armed Forces Operations manual dedicated to “rear area security” should be established.

“Without doing the task of securing the Rear Area, a battle field triumph may amount to little. Probably you will win a battle in the front but lose the war in the rear.”

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SECURITY OF REAR AREAS

Our aim is not to provide new principles and methods of conducting war: rather, we are concerned with examining the essential content of what has long existed, and to trace it back to its elements.

- Clausewitz, On War, ²

This SRP deals with the problem of rear area security, a subject which gained great importance during World War II. While being identified as one of the main causes for the defeat of the Wehrmacht in the analyses relating to the history of the Second World War, rear area security quickly fell into oblivion during the Cold War and in view of the lack of depth of the potential areas of operation on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Armed conflict was aimed at achieving a quick military decision, focusing almost exclusively on the front and the terrain beyond. Due to nuclear weapons, conventional warfare had become almost unlikely over an extended period. Post war German command and control regulations, for instance, contained hardly any standards of coping with this specific military challenge. Only in the recent past, that is, in the context of the Peace Support and Enduring Freedom/Iraqi Freedom Operations has the problem come back into focus. Therefore, it appears necessary to deal with this subject again, which had been ignored for far too long.

This paper will analyze the issue through the following steps:

• The first step outlines the necessity for an analysis of rear area security.
• Next, the significance of this part of the "battlefield" will be illustrated by means of a historical example.
• In a third step, experiences from in the recent past will be compared and conclusions will be drawn. Part of these experiences has been covered by a previous study⁴, but this SRP offers conclusions or demands on a partially new approach to the structure or conduct of operations. Some of the results of the above mentioned report will be detailed or further developed within the scope of this study.

Due to the events of 11 September 2001 in New York and Washington and trends away from linear and toward asymmetric warfare, the rear area has changed. A clear distinction between "Deep, Front and Rear" can no longer be made. The organization of the operational area must be adapted permanently during the various phases of war. In many operations, for example in Afghanistan or Iraq, a linear front no longer exists. The rear area, thus, is actually everywhere. This applies particularly to operations, which have no actual end, where armed conflict continues at another lower level even after official termination of the armed conflict. ⁴
It is of particular importance in such situations to do an assessment of the risks in the respective areas of operation. Thus, one focus of this study is the risk analysis, as it relates to Rear Area Security. It is the key for the allocation of forces in any operation, especially in rear areas. Risk analyses should proceed as follows:

The first step is to determine possible rear area risks, with distinctions being made between risks posed by regular forces and those presented by irregular / paramilitary elements. The second step is to cover and classify facilities to be protected. Depending on the scenario, each twin set of risk category and facility category is given an assessment, which appraises the following:

- Probability of occurrence
- Degree of critical impact of this risk on the overall mission.

The level of threat is then determined by considering these two assessment factors. Depending on the respective situation, a threat level results in a sequence of priorities for the facility categories to be protected as related to the risk category.

Using this sequence of priorities, the next step is to assess which facilities are exposed to the “greatest” threat and which capabilities would be needed (required status) in order to protect these facilities against the threat. Then, to what extent these capabilities are available within the Armed Forces (on-hand status) must be examined.

On the basis of this assessment and in the context of the main mission of the battlefield units, an operation plan for the rear areas is developed establishing a relationship between risks and capabilities. Within the scope of this study, this issue will be dealt with only in the abstract and the results will be formulated only in a general manner. The study will conclude by summarizing the results of the considerations and experience both of the German Armed Forces (Bundeswehr) and their NATO Allies, as for instance the US, in the various fields mentioned earlier.

All too often the focus of military operations tends to be on strategy, units in contact, victories operational or tactical. Lessons learned studies also tend to focus on what went right, what went wrong on the battlefield. The importance of the Rear Area and its security in waging a successful campaign is too often neglected. If the rear and the lines of communication are overlooked, raids and partisan operations can cripple the operation. Then, the commander may have to dedicate a substantial amount of his resources in attempting to secure the Rear Area.
HISTORICAL EXAMPLE

“When the German Eastern Army attacked the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941 with the aim of crushing it within a matter of weeks in a “Blitzkrieg”-like campaign, Hitler had put all his eggs in one basket. As he saw it, only the rapid defeat and conquest of the Soviet Union - his overriding objective ever since he had conceived his foreign-policy expansion ‘program’ in the 1920s - appeared to offer a guarantee that he would be able to decide the war as a whole in his favor and attain his war aims both in the East and subsequently against the Anglo-American naval powers.

There has been a profusion of accounts, studies, and analyses examining - from strategic, operational, and tactical angles - why Germany did not succeed in bringing the campaign against the Soviet Union to a victorious conclusion in the second half of 1941 as planned, and why Operation ‘Barbarossa’ the core of Hitler’s overall war plan, failed.”

At the core of all this study and research work was the question why did Hitler’s plan “Barbarossa” fail? Were the fundamental principles of strategy violated, had the primacy of political authority caused the defeat, or was the determined Russian resistance the reason for culmination?

In the studies and analysis's, logistical aspects and questions of trans portation and supply, as a part of military activities in the rear areas, received hardly any attention. Indeed, the task — exceeding all previous dimensions — of providing the German Eastern Army with its wartime requirements was staggering. The enormous numerical strength of the attacking forces, the huge size of the front, the far-reaching operational objectives and the difficult infrastructure conditions of the Russian theatre of war, were cardinal problems, the importance of which should not be underestimated.

Some researchers/analysts were correct in seeing the reason for failure in the incorrect relation between area – force – time. They often are, however, too much frontline-oriented and the area of mission and command and control is not given the same degree of attention as the combat or combat support force. Often, the “Rear Area”, as a function of the overall battle areas, is not considered sufficiently.

A study was initiated by the US Army after World War II and conducted with selected high-ranking German prisoners of war. The subject of “Rear Areas” was investigated with particular consideration given to the logistics aspects. An important conclusion of this study was that protection of the Wehrmacht’s rear area on the Eastern Front could be ensured only sporadically due to the size of the area and the fact that too few units were available. In addition, many units were not equipped for their task. This enabled partisan units to attack and
neutralize facilities all over the Rear Area whenever and wherever they pleased. For example altogether, partisan activities from 1 to 31 August 1942 alone resulted in damage to 266 locomotives and 1373 railroad cars and about 160 miles of track were rendered unserviceable. In the end, these activities contributed to making the supply of the frontline unit increasingly difficult. In fact between December 1941/January 1942 supply in the Stalingrad region was almost brought to a standstill. The general security situation in the rear area was so poor that some frontline units, relocated there for refreshment purposes, asked to be sent back to the main battle line.

This example from WW II outlines the major causes and consequences of the rear area problem, which was primarily a problem of overstretching the area behind the front including the lines of communication and support. In addition, giving priority to the troops and assets in the front often slighted the troops, and the needed command structure for providing the necessary “Rear Area Security”.

DESCRIPTION OF THE PROBLEM AREA

Which are the consequences that so few lessons learned from the above experience seem to have entered today’s planning considerations? In World War II there were clearly defined rear areas based on linear battlefields. What if any changes have taken place?

Large areas, island locations, a great degree of transparency of the enemy situation and high mobility of the forces employed will characterize the non-linear battlefield of the future. The area forward of our own positions has caused us to upgrade the operational concept of the German army and is reflected in particular in “independent operations and operations in depth concepts”. Meanwhile, these operational concepts are being implemented and practiced as part of commanders’ training. The priority has been focused on the upgrading and implementation of the concepts related to independent operations or operations in depth. However, during all of this, the Rear Area hardly was a consideration.

In general this nonlinear battlefield has clear implications for rear areas. So far, little thought has been given to the question of how friendly forces will be able to protect themselves against an enemy who applies the combat-operations-in-depth doctrine itself. From the national and operational viewpoint, these issues are of unresolved but are quickly gaining major importance.

It must be assumed that enemies will be monitoring this development and, in the event of a conflict, will also use existing capabilities in a focused manner for combat operations in depth.
Today “rear areas” are no longer defined by “forward” and “rearward”. Particularly for conflict prevention/crisis management operations, the rear area can no longer be separated from the theatre of operations.

An excellent example of current problems with rear area security can be seen in U.S. operations in Iraq. Here U.S. military missions have been extended after the official termination of conflict in order to render a state viable again and establish democratic structures. An additional and special challenge for the conduct of operations in such circumstances is the increased appearance of irregular combat formations. The rear area is everywhere in this nonlinear battlefield. The separation of front and rear is increasingly difficult. In the Russian campaign, irregular forces – then called partisans – played an important role, although theater boundaries were absolutely clear. Most of these irregular forces, fought within the scope of an overall military-strategic or operational concept and were embedded in overall military planning. For the United States engaged in hostilities in Iraq, the situation has deteriorated. Al Qaeda, Taliban, Islamic Fundamentalists or faithful followers of Saddam Hussein not only fight according to their religious and political beliefs, but also as groups or individuals. Their objective is to inflict damage on the opponent wherever and whenever possible. Thus, the behavior of the opponent in most operational theaters increasingly assumes the character of guerilla warfare. There does not seem to be a military master plan behind these activities, but attacks and attempts [on peoples lives] exclusively aim at exerting terror. Within the scope of this study, this aspect can only be considered marginally. In the future the Bundeswehr as well as other armies must be sufficiently prepared to meet such non-linear threats.

The discussion that follows relies on lessons learned by the Bundeswehr during planning/exercises dealing with friendly combat operations or operations in depth, as well as, lessons learned from Bundeswehr operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan and out-of-area and of allied partners like the U.S. and NATO.

PART OF THE BATTLEFIELD?

The rear area for any particular command is the area intending forward from its rear boundary to the rear of the area assigned to the next lower level of command. This area is provided primarily for the performance of support functions. Secure Operations in the rear area assure freedom of action and continuity of operations, sustainment, and C². Sustainment operations are those that enable shaping and deciding operations by assuring freedom of action and continuity of operations, CSS, and C².
The objectives of Rear Area Security should include “to prevent or minimize disruption of support: prevent or minimize enemy interference with command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence; protect personal and facilities; protect lines of communications (LOCs); find, fix, contain, and defeat the enemy: plan and execute area damage control; and assess and prioritize bases.”

In this context, the main focus has to be on the protection of friendly forces in the rear area against an enemy who himself applies the doctrine of “combat operations in depth”. Therefore on the basis of a threat analysis and an analysis of weak points, the following essential questions must be answered:

- Which capabilities are needed to protect rear areas against a potential enemy who in turn applies the doctrine of combat operations in depth?
- What requirements and conclusions are there for force structure?
- What operational conclusions are there for friendly (army) forces?

To begin an evaluation of Rear Area Security, a risk analysis must be conducted. This includes description of friendly forces employed in the rear area of the threat confronting these forces (targets, enemy forces, mode of combat, structures). In this context, symmetrical and asymmetrical enemies including irregular forces must be considered. Next follows the identification of weak points based on the risk analysis. This process will be concluded by an assessment of the protection of friendly forces in the rear area based on different types of operations. Here, particular attention should be given to command and information structures, command posts, logistics and military units, as well as specified reserve units.

The result of this risk analysis should be the formulation of specific requests (addressed to army forces) during joint inter-services and/or multinational operations. Presenting conclusions and requirements related to the forces needed, the force structure and operational doctrine would conclude this process.

THREAT ANALYSIS

“The shock of a rear-area attack will leave the ‘air-conditioned office’ and other behind-the-lines types wishing the Army would have concentrated on basic survival skills in war instead of ‘diversity awareness’ and ‘consideration for other training’.”
A senior sergeant in Iraq says:

"I expect we'll pay a high price for getting away from the standard that saved the bringing-up-the-rear crowd in WW II, Korea and Vietnam." 9

The following proposal for threat analysis is made in order to enable correct risk assessment for the rear areas. These should contain four steps:

- Step 1: Identification of who or what might threaten us? (Risk Analysis)
- Step 2: What is threatened? (facilities, intentions) (Facilities to be protected)
- Step 3: Probability of activities?
- Step 4: To which extent do enemy activities threaten the operation as a whole? (Criticality)

Considering step 1, what risks should be well thought-out? According to the recent Bundeswehr draft manual,

"Risks in this context are those military and non-military potentials whose existence affect the stability and security of Germany or German forces in theatre"."10

In accordance with this definition, those risks that could occur in rear areas should be written down. Such a list would be a so-called “risk category list”, where one distinguishes between risks by regular forces and risks by irregular/paramilitary groups/forces. Examples of forces analyzed for such risk categories include mechanized forces, airborne forces, long-range artillery, helicopters, aerial strike forces, infantry/mortar, mines/booby traps, hand grenades/explosives, sabotage and espionage. The above listing does not represent a prioritization. These categories can be further evaluated by risks from regular and irregular/paramilitary groups/forces.

In the second step of this analytical process, the facilities to be protected in the rear areas must be identified and classified. Examples are command posts/support cells, assembly areas, rear positions of weapon systems, communication lines, long-range reconnaissance assets, supply facilities, logistic facilities/field camps, lines of communication, loading installations, transition points, control centers, airports/airfields and industrial plants. It is important to distinguish between military and civilian facilities. The list developed in this process does not include an evaluation which of these facilities are mission essential.

In step three, risks and facilities are set against each other to form a matrix. The probability with which the risk affects the respective facility is entered in this matrix for every risk type. The probabilities can be entered as very high probability to very low probability. The
probabilities, however, are not yet a suitable measure for the threat so that two additional steps must be taken.

This step four is the most important. The notion “criticality” describes the significance of a failure / loss of a facility for the success of a military operation. The high criticality of a facility means e.g. that its failure or its destruction has a significant impact on the success of an operation. Depending on the scenario, the facility categories to be protected are classified in step four also according to a scale from mission critical to no impact according to their criticality. Mission critical can be the “Center of Gravity” or the decisive point for the mission.

Based on the four steps of the threat analysis, a matrix should be developed which very expressively can give details on who is threatened where, when, how and by whom. On the basis of this threat evaluation, then, an operational plan for rear area protection can be developed. Contrary to the German approach the U.S. Army does not differentiate between Risk and Threat \(^1\)(Forces whose existence affect our Forces in the theatre). In Germany there is big difference between these two categories. The notion “threat” is described in German doctrine as:

> “These risks become threats if warring faction(s) are capable of employing military or non-military risk potentials or of rendering them effective, and one can insinuate the intent to employ these potentials based on a national evaluation of the situation” \(^2\)

**THE OPERATIONAL PLAN.**

This plan must correspond with the forces and means employed at the front or in the depth of enemy [territory] and be part of the operation as a whole. One can conclude that that without any doubt the highest risk, as to the conduct of operations in the rear area, exists with that operation which forms part of active Alliance defense. Here, combat is more intense than in any other operation, attrition is the heaviest, and the requirements in reinforcements, reserves, supplies, control links etc. are the largest. During this operation, the front is to the largest extent dependent on the rear areas. This situation may further deteriorate due to the increasing distances between logistic basis and theater of operations and by restricted availability or usability of few or inadequate lines of communication. Few single measures can isolate whole areas of operation, but interruption of possibly a single usable logistic line of communication can create emergency situations. \(^3\)
A considerable threat to rear facilities, as mentioned before, emanates from irregular forces. These will increasingly become active where the interests of the population of the country of deployment are not in line with those of the deployed Allied forces.  

**FRIENDLY FORCES AND OWN SITUATION**

Next to the threat, friendly forces are additional consideration. It can be assumed that the Allied forces employed have the same interests as our forces as to rear area protection. This applies above all to the host nation, which should have a vital interest in maintaining integrity of its own territory and the functioning of its state.

This particularly applies in case of Alliance defense. During peace keeping and peace enforcement operations, this might be completely different. Particularly when considering peace enforcement operations, one must assume that the armed forces and security forces of the country of deployment have been defeated or are in bad shape. It is entirely possible that parts of the national armed forces might turn against our forces. A further deterioration of rear area security must be expected if our forces form part of an international coalition force that has implemented a regime change and for this purpose had to occupy the country. In such a case, a whole country may be analogous to a rear area. Particularly here, all forms of open and covert resistance must be expected. This resistance will not only turn against military facilities; it will attack a number of targets in the economy, media, administration, governmental and non-governmental organizations. Most recent and clear examples are Iraq or Afghanistan.

Thus, the armed forces will have to assume responsibility not only for themselves or Allies, but also for other – direct and indirectly involved– parties of the conflict. This means the armed forces probably have to protect these noncombatants.

**RESPONSIBILITIES**

The threat analysis is the basis for the further considerations of this study. But there are additional factors that must be evaluated. For example the Area Management and Distribution of Tasks is another important consideration.

In theory, area organization – including transfer of responsibility – is easily done. This does, however, not mean that the threat is banned and the rear area is secure. The problem always is that the available forces of the various capability categories (Combat, combat support, logistics and command and control) are earmarked for the actual combat mission and usually our troops are not available for the secondary protection tasks. Since the forces usually can be employed only for one task at a time, mock responsibilities are created. For reasons of task distribution, local units and leaders are given responsibility although they are originally
 earmarked for another task and usually have neither sufficient means nor forces available for the security mission. Thus, weaknesses and deficiencies in this important field are foreseeable. Also problematic, is the separation of responsibilities for the forward combat zone and the rear area especially if the operational context is not regarded sufficiently.

COMMON ELEMENTS FROM CURRENT MISSIONS AND CONSEQUENCES

Evaluations of the current Bundeswehr missions have revealed the following common and potential problems influencing rear area security:

- No immediate link of the forces to the homeland, the forces are dependent on resource-intensive air- and sealift.
- Infrastructure or economy of the country of deployment do not allow for supplying the forces locally.
- Due to the very large distances and particularly time factors, most supplies can only be provided by airlift.

In view of the increasing threat situation, supplying vital materials by airlift is relatively unsecure since approach and landing bear considerable safety hazards. Geographic conditions, including weather, are not comparable to those of the homeland. Outside fixed installations, the forces’ sustainability is limited. Support by the armed forces of the country of deployment is often impossible and the threat by irregular forces will increase if the security forces of the country of deployment do not function.

Most of the above mentioned points do have an immediate impact on facilities in the rear area. Therefore, rear area protection, particularly, is again as significant as it was in the context of the Operation "Barbarossa", 50 years ago in Russia. Here, LOCs are of outstanding importance for the operation as a whole.

„Rear Area Operations ensure that sustainment is not degraded and do not limit the commanders freedom of maneuver while maintaining continuity of operation...“

Which operational measures are, in general, to be taken in order to ensure sustainability in the rear area? In summary, an studies conducted have led to the following results:

First Considerable forces and/or assets are required to protect the LOC’s. These will have to be planned for in the allocation of effort for the Operation. Second, the Operation can be conducted only with part of the available combat and/or combat support forces, since forces may already be allocated for Rear Area Protection.
PLANNING FOR THE REAR AREA OPERATIONS

As planning for rear area operations is conducted, planners must remember that the most important goal of the enemy is to disrupt our operations. He wants to disturb!

Enemy operations in rear areas must be anticipated and plans for defense and immediate reinforcements of sensitive areas must be made. As stated in current doctrine:

“Responses to enemy attacks in the rear area must be rapid and strong enough to defeat attacks with minimum disruption of friendly operations.” 18

Or, according to the logistical Handbook:

“Additionally, every effort must be made to defeat enemy forces while they are in the air or on a landing site, since once landed and dispersed, they pose a much greater threat to friendly forces”. 19

In addition, the whole spectrum of all areas in question, that is command and information structures, command posts, logistics, military units in the area, particularly reserves, must be taken into account during the planning process for rear area protection. Basis of all these planning efforts, however, remains the threat analysis, outlining the most probable threat and the risk we are facing. In view of his limited resources this is the only appropriated method by which the field commander can concentrate efforts. This cannot be repeated too often.

Failure to plan appropriately for rear area security has obvious consequences.

A lack of security in wide areas of Iraq has led to daily ambushes and the deaths of soldiers and civilians. These images projected every day on TV screens of the participating nations may ultimately lead to a popular demand for the entire withdrawal of troops. This is only one example of the importance of Rear Areas as previously defined. The author has no “silver bullet” to solve this dilemma, except again to emphasize the importance of planning adequate troops and sufficient assets to provide as much security as possible.

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

The following points must be considered in operational planning:

AREA MANAGEMENT AND DISTRIBUTION OF TASKS

Clear responsibilities are a blessing for the forces. Separation between fighting (also combat, deployment, command and support) forces and rear area protection forces is inappropriate since mission command and control must come from one hand. During the Russia campaign during World War II, the security forces of the SS, the Gestapo and the SD
established a system, which no longer corresponded with the priorities and needs of the field commanders. For Germany, this was the beginning of the end.

COMMAND POSTS

It is generally recommended, that a specific command post, responsible for command and control, planning and issuance of orders for the whole rear area, should be established. This command post must be manned and equipped in such a way that from it the command and control tasks in the respective rear area can be accomplished without restrictions. There must be 24-hour communication between the commanders responsible in the rear area and the rear area command post. It doesn't matter whether the Rear CP is co-located with the main command post. It must be ensured, however, that this command and control body accomplishes this task as its main function.

INTELLIGENCE

Effective, timely and accurate intelligence is essential for the planning and conduct of security measures. This is particularly important in the rear area so that the limited forces are available for tasks in a timely manner. The rear area command post needs the same intelligence resources and information as the front line commander. This allows him to maintain situational awareness of enemy capabilities, terrain, and other factors over the time necessary to complete his task. The rear area should not be regarded as a backwater of the combat zone. The commander should receive the same priority as the main battle area commander.

AREA MANAGEMENT

The rear area is to be subdivided in such a way that area and forces correspond. The assigned force must be capable to fulfill its mission. If it is not, reserves or reinforcement from other areas must be earmarked. If the forces as a whole are not capable of accomplishing the core tasks, the force mixture must be adapted accordingly. In other functional areas this is frequently done by means of assigning modules. In the context of rear area protection, however, this is still the exception. The author considers the employment of military police an interesting concept for accomplishing this task. However, this generally is no real solution to the problem instead.

RESPONSE FORCES

What forces are responsible for securing the rear area? Each unit, in theory, is capable of protecting itself and its facilities. In practice, however, this often looks differently. Level of skills, specialization, local positioning, command and control means etc. often hamper an efficient
employment as to the particular combat tasks. Here, however, considerable possibilities exist. Each service member, and especially each commander must be trained in such a way that he/she can be employed as a "warrior". Commanders of the specialized units must be trained in such a way that they can integrate "combat groups" and employ these against any kind of enemy in the rear area. They must become familiar with the equipment of those units that might provide support and, in addition, must be able to take recourse to a common basis of battle command. Therefore, the German approach that each officer during his/her tactical training learns how to command a mechanized infantry battalion is positive on principle. The use of this branch, however, must be questioned. From the author's perspective, a light infantry battalion would be more purposeful.

POSSIBILITIES TO REINFORCE TROOPS

Another way to use a more flexible force posture would be to examine the possibilities of reinforcing troops in both directions. This, too, offers possibilities which should be further investigated. If all forces employed are required at the front, all forces must accomplish any other mission. There are possibilities to also form reserves within the "forward" employed forces and to keep these available for in-depth missions. The respective "real reserve" is particularly apt for in-depth missions. Not bound right from beginning – although then it would not be a reserve – it usually is already in the depth of the own area (due to local advantages) from which it is to be led forward or beyond the front into the depth of the enemy or own area. These principles analogously apply to Peace Support Operations. The reserve should be earmarked, equipped and trained for deep, close and rear operations.

In sum, the whole system of combat task organization should become more flexible. The "Network Centric Warfare" System would provide the prerequisites. The demand for better training of commanders and a higher degree of flexibility as to the employment of bound forces and reserves are important factors.

ADDITIONAL FORCE MULTIPLIERS

Technical possibilities must be used more intensively. Fully automatic warning and alert systems for air, ground and NBC attacks are industrially available and in part are already in service in the armies of the world. These technical means make it possible to reduce personnel, to improve area protection and to reduce rear area vulnerability.

Technical possibilities must also be used in the extremely important field of area damage control. The military commander and his/her commander responsible for the rear areas must have available an automated system of damage identification in the area and in relation to the
facilities, forces and resources available. Such a system, of course, must be integrated in a command and control and information system.

Another way to restrict possible enemy movement in our own rear area is obstacles (obstacle planning). Since our conduct of operation must be based on mobility making use of the area, preventive employment of obstacles is out of the question. As with the above mentioned warning and alert systems, there must be ways to activate and deactivate obstacles depending on the respective operational objective. For instance, in case the enemy lands in an area close to a high value target, he should be stopped or directed in a direction favorable for us. This raises the demand that the commander responsible for rear area protection must have available a command and control means of equal value as those available to the front or other commanders.

Operational planning must pay particular attention to rear area air defense measures. Employment of the anti air and air defense forces must follow the threat analysis of the commander. If rear area protection requires such resources, these must be made available. Similarly, as with the employment of reserves, making these resources available for the operation requires flexibility. As soon as the enemy has identified the vulnerable spot in our operation, he will with all means try to take advantage of it. If there is only one operational airfield within an area of operations on which the whole of logistics is dependent, the point of main effort of air defense can only be there, and nowhere else. In one of areas German troops where deployed until recently, the situation was as described above.

In addition, planning for air defense, fire support planning and the use of air force has to be considered. Rear and deep target and concentration areas are no longer sufficient. Actually, the whole rear area – whatever its size – must be covered by a system of coordination in order to ensure by the appropriate regulations that all means can be employed if required. The Air Forces will have to guarantee CAS in the rear area.

Additional operational planning needs could be cited, this would, however go beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless, it must become clear that besides "deep" and "close" "rear" has become part of the battlefield and that the local commander must have available all means for the conduct of his/her part of the operation.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Through the larger exposure of our own forces during non-linear operational mobile warfare and Operations in depth, increased protection requirement of Rear Areas is required.
The changed threat situation posed by irregular forces and a changed protection requirement resulting from the use of modern information technology adds to the challenge of Force Protection.

The following conclusions can be drawn from this study:

- A definition of “Rear Area Combat Operations” or clear terminology for the operational level, does not exist in the German Armed Forces (Bundeswehr).
- The command structures, means and procedures are not adapted to the special tasks of Rear Area Protection (e.g. in the EU force a “Rear Area Component Commander” will be appointed).
- In the planning of the Army force structure and, in overall Bundeswehr planning, the forces required for the Rear Area have not been considered.
- An interservice stocktaking of the available and required capabilities for this operational task is lacking.
- Clear responsibilities of the services for this mission are not given.

The following recommendations are made:

- The capabilities of the troops with respect to self-protection must be reviewed.
- In future force structure planning an increased allocation of specialized forces for the security of rear areas should be considered. In the process, the two areas „active area protection“ and „convoy protection“ constitute the greatest challenges.
- The training of the specialized forces and the forces tasked with force protection must be adapted to the new force structure requirements.
- The operational principles/regulations should reflect an increased emphasis on Rear Area Protection. This applies both to adapting the regulations to new operational risks and to the operational doctrinal principles.
- It is recommended that a separate chapter on this subject matter be added to the future Bundeswehr Operations Manual.
- The process of capability analyses for Rear Areas must be initiated by preparing an interservice concept for this important function.
- Strategically the Rear Area begins behind friendly lines and ends in the homeland “The Rear Area is everywhere”. Therefore the topic „Home Defense” should be addressed in a separate study.
Final Statement:

“To be victorious in future Conflicts the Army must increase its awareness of the threat to the rear areas, improve training methods in rear area security and organize the Army with adequate resources to provide for its rear area security.”

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APPENDIX A

Definition of „Rear Area“

The GE Army Regulation HDv 100/100 provides the following definition of the rear area for the different command levels as shown in Figure 1:

Translation:
Brigadegebiet = Brigade Area
Divisionsgebiet = Division Area
Korpsgebiet = Corps Area
Rückwärtiges Divisionsgebiet = Division Rear Area
Rückwärtiges Korpsgebiet = Corps Rear Area
Rückwärtige Verbindungszone = Rear Communication Zone
Kriegsschauplatz = Theater Of War
Unterstützungszone = Support Zone
Bündnis-Operationsgebiet = Alliance Area Of Operation
Nationaler Verantwortungsbereich = National Area Of Operation

This results in the following hierarchical structure:

Division rear area
Corps rear area
Communication zone
Support zone.
Based on the draft of a new Operations Manual of the GE Armed Forces (Operative Leitlinie Streitkraefte), the COMMZ and the Support Zone will, in principle, be under the responsibility of the nation they belong to (host nation). Although it cannot be assumed in all cases that this nation will be able to handle the protective task and that it may need support for that purpose, these zones are not covered in this study.

The current draft version of the Manual mentioned above illustrates area management:

![Diagram of area management](image)

**FIGURE 2**

Figure 2 illustrates that „rear areas“ are no longer defined by „forward“ and „rearward“. For conflict prevention/crisis management operations, the rear area can no longer be separated from the theatre of operation.
ENDNOTES

1 DoD, Fm 71-123, App D

2 Clausewitz, Carl von, On War, p.389

3 IABG mbH, Abschlussbericht zur Studie 'Schutz ruckwaertiger Gebiete im Gegensatz zu Kampf/Operationen in der Tiefe, VS-NfD Ottobrunn 28.03.03

4 See as example the current situation in Iraq

5 Bernd Wegner, (Editor) From Peace to War, Chapter 12, p. 205

6 Department of the Army, Rear Area in Russia (Pamphlet 20-240), Washington DC 1951

7 A goal of these concepts was to attack the opponent in the depth of the opposing area as promptly as possible and reduce as much as possible. Parallel to its considerations were the attack-wise employment again taken up by major units and special troops in the deep backs or against high value goals of the enemy, like in World War II were practiced for example by Rommel.

8 DoD, Joint Pub 3-10, Joint Doctrine for Rear Area Operations, 28 May 1996, ix

9 David H. Hackworth, Soldiers for the Truth, Being in the Rear – No longer a Day at the Beach, Oct. 16, 2002


11 DoD, FM 3-19.1, Chapter 3, The Threat


13 So e.g. the German area of operation in the Kosovo was over long time absolutely dependent of a border crossing between MAZ and the KOSOVO (Blace). With blockage of this transition by ALB resistance fighter, the possibility was examined of opening the transition with force of arms again.

14 CBSNEWS>com, March 24, 2003 “Weather Slows Push to Baghdad”, ‘Gen. Franks, reacting to battles Sunday in which 20 U.S. forces were killed or missing as a result of ambushes and a fake surrender, said: “We know that the Fedayeen has in fact put itself in a position to mill about, to create difficulties in rear areas, and I can assure you that the contact with those forces is not unexpected.”

15 The securing of territory behind the area of “Rückwärtiges Heeresgebiet” was the direct responsibility of the German occupation authorities and the forces available to them – not of the front-line commanders or combat units.

16 These are SFOR – Bosnia, KFOR – Kosovo and ISAF Afghanistan

17 DoD, FM 3-100/MCWP, Chapter 12, Rear Operations, p.12-2
18 DoD, FM 63-4, Chapter 8, Rear Area Protection, p.3

19 DoD, Theater Logistics Handbook 2003, p. 17-1

20 In modification of a statement, Major B.M. Youngs, U.S. Marine Corps – The MAGFT Weak Link – Rear Area Security, April 6, 1984
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