PEACE OPERATIONS – MEANS VERSUS WAYS

by

Lieutenant Colonel David R. Draeger
United States Army

Colonel Steve Kidder
Project Advisor

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. REPORT DATE</th>
<th>03 MAY 2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. REPORT TYPE</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. DATES COVERED</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</td>
<td>Peace Operations - Means Versus Ways</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5a. CONTRACT NUMBER</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5b. GRANT NUMBER</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5d. PROJECT NUMBER</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5e. TASK NUMBER</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. AUTHOR(S)</td>
<td>David Draeger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</td>
<td>U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</td>
<td>Approved for public release; distribution unlimited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. ABSTRACT</td>
<td>See attached file.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. SUBJECT TERMS</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. REPORT</td>
<td>unclassified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. ABSTRACT</td>
<td>unclassified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. THIS PAGE</td>
<td>unclassified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. NUMBER OF PAGES</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See attached file.
The Bush Administration has been criticized for failing to successfully transition from phase III Decisive Operations to phase IV Stability Operations in Iraq. Do we have numbers of forces needed with the proper skill sets necessary for future peace operations? Can lessons in training and preparing forces for peace operations be learned from the past? This paper will explore these questions, discuss proposed courses of action for new U.S. peace operations forces, and review past successful peace operations using conventional U.S. forces. This discussion will hopefully assist planners and commanders with reducing risk to U.S. forces engaged in future peace operations.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEACE OPERATIONS – MEANS VERSUS WAYS</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEFINITIONS AND A BRIEF HISTORY OF PEACE OPERATIONS</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CURRENT FORCE STRUCTURE LIMITATIONS &amp; EFFORTS TO FIND A SOLUTION</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MODIFY MEANS - COURSES OF ACTION FOR A NEW FORCE STRUCTURE</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MORE MILITARY POLICE (MP)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE (CBO) REPORT</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY STUDY</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UTILIZE AVAILABLE WAYS - TRAIN AND TAILOR THE CURRENT FORCE, AS NEEDED</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMPLEMENTATION FORCE (IFOR) TRAINING</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STANDARDS FOR SUCCESS</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TASK FORCE EAGLE COMPOSITION</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFOR SUCCESS</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENDNOTES</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I was blessed with being surrounded by many experienced peace operators while writing this paper. One in particular, Colonel Tom Muir, an Army War College seminar class mate, greatly assisted me as I struggled with the idea of force structure and/or training forces for peace operations. This was not the first time I was fortunate enough to be coached, trained, and mentored by this outstanding warrior. In the 1990’s he, I, and others now attending this institution spent many long hard days and nights in the 1st Armored Division Tactical Operations Center in Tuzla, Bosnia. Then Lieutenant Colonel Muir – as the 1st Armored Division G3 – was as hard, fair, and straight as he is now. He demanded the very best out of us as young Majors at a time when nothing but our very best would do. As I write this acknowledgment, another soldier has died from an Improvised Explosive Device in Iraq. These times also demand the very best from us and I thank those like Colonel Tom Muir who make darn sure we stay on azimuth every day.
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

FIGURE 1 .......................................................................................................................................7
FIGURE 2 .......................................................................................................................................8
FIGURE 3 .....................................................................................................................................13
What I am selling to everyone, and it’s a lesson learned, is that I am thoroughly convinced that our success is directly proportional to our credibility and proficiency at warfighting. The environment has some differences, yes, but the differences are more tactics, techniques and procedures than doctrine... the thing to remember is that we are warfighters.”

– MG Nash, Task Force Eagle Commander

On 11 September 2001, the U.S. was faced with an asymmetrical threat the likes of which the world has never seen. This generation’s “Pear Harbor” launched us into a new kind of war requiring new strategies and new requirements.

President Bush declared an end to combat operations in Iraq on 1 May 2003. By 12 September 2003, 150 U.S. Soldiers were killed in Iraq. The U.S. Service Member body count hit 180 on 23 November 2003 when a soldier from the 4th Infantry Division was killed by a roadside bomb and two soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division were stoned, shot, attacked - one with his throat slit – beat to death and left to die on the street in the City of Mosul. This incident, reminiscent of the 1993 American experience in Mogadishu, Somalia, brought grave concern to military officials doing their best to bring stability to the war torn region. According to Defense Department figures, 570 U.S. troops were wounded in combat during U.S. led operations in spring of 2003. Following combat operations, 1,052 soldiers have been wounded and numbers of U.S. troops killed in action per month range between 29 and 46.

As the U.S. prepared for war with Iraq, the Department of Defense (DoD) dominated planning efforts with a clear focus on combat operations. The State Department (DoS), however was very concerned about regional stability after the war. DoS tried to communicate those concerns to DoD, but there were serious disconnects between what they believed was needed following combat operations, and what DoD said they needed to win the war.

High ranking members of President Bush’s own party also had reservations and were concerned. Pennsylvania Republican Curt Weldon, Vice Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee “… believed security planning was flawed and that the ground force of 140,000 was insufficient.” Prior to his retirement, Army Chief of Staff, General Eric Shinseki proposed a peacekeeping force in Iraq of several hundred thousand. On 27 February 2003, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz told the House Budget Committee, “It’s hard to conceive that it would take more forces to provide stability in post-Saddam Iraq than it would
take to conduct the war itself and to secure the surrender of Saddam’s security forces and his army.”

An article discussing U.S. peacekeeping missions recently appeared in *Proceedings*, a Naval Institute Journal. The article, *Iraq after Saddam*, pointed out that “Winning the peace in Iraq will be as challenging as winning the war. From Somalia to Afghanistan, the U.S. has executed combat operations effectively only to stumble through post conflict reconstruction.” Post-conflict operations could become the center of gravity for success or failure in U.S. foreign policy.

Many have jumped on the band wagon to use Iraq as an example of why the U.S. needs new peace operations forces. The reality, however, is that after U.S. forces made the transition to peace operations in Iraq and began slugging through the hard knocks of “on the job” peace operations training they did some amazing things.

New Iraqi army and police forces have been recruited, trained and equipped in Iraq; 58 of 89 Iraqi cities have hired new police forces; over 82,000 tons of ammunition and thousands of AK-47s, grenades, and other weapons have been seized; more than 11,000 Iraqi security guards have been hired; many of the top 55 most wanted Iraqis have been captured or killed to include Saddam Hussein and his sons, Uday and Quasy; an Iraqi Civil Defense Force has been formed; 500 river police have been on patrol in Basra since June 2003; and 148,000 U.S. service members and more than 13,000 troops from 19 countries continue to work to secure Iraq.

One must ask if we will allow perceptions and intangibles - such as the public’s low tolerance for casualties – to become yardsticks by which we will ultimately measure success. Regardless of weather one claims that the U.S. has either been successful, or so far failed in post war Iraq, the U.S. experience there has many calling for additional means in U.S. force structure. Should the U.S. design a peace operations force, a standing force specifically tailored for peace operations, or does current U.S. force structure possess the means necessary to perform successful peace operations?

**DEFINITIONS AND A BRIEF HISTORY OF PEACE OPERATIONS**

DoD Joint Publication 1-02, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, categorizes peace operations as falling under Operations Other than War (OOTW). “The phrase military Operations Other than War can be used interchangeably with contingency operations and small-scale contingencies.” There are essentially three types of peace operations. *Peacekeeping* operations monitor and maintain agreements between disputing
parties. They occur in areas where former disputing parties are no longer fighting, where all former combatants have consented to a peace agreement, and where all disputing parties approve of the presence of peacekeeping forces. Peace Enforcement operations use either threat or use of military forces to compel disputing parties to cease hostilities. Most of these operations are undertaken with international agreement. Disputing parties may or may not approve of the introduction of forces to maintain order. And, Support to Diplomacy operations involve deploying forces to areas of potential conflict to deter action by potential combatants.\textsuperscript{12}

The United Nations (UN) Security Council approved 13 peace operations between 1948 and 1978, none from 1979 to 1987, and 38 between 1988 and 1999 (almost a three fold increase from the previous 40 years). As the number of missions began to increase in the late 1980s so did mission creep.\textsuperscript{13} Peace operations missions expanded from separating former adversaries and ensuring orders, to monitoring elections, guarding confiscated or surrendered weapons, ensuring delivery of humanitarian relief supplies, and [as we are seeing now in Iraq] helping to reconstruct governmental police functions.\textsuperscript{14}

In the 1980s about 9,000 troops were committed to Grenada, and about 14,000 additional troops were committed in Panama to the 13,000 already in the country. The 1990s saw the U.S. commit over 20,000 service members in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Iraq, and Kuwait.\textsuperscript{15} As large as these numbers are, however, they are dwarfed by the 130,000 U.S. service members conducting post-conflict peace operations in Iraq today.

**CURRENT FORCE STRUCTURE LIMITATIONS & EFFORTS TO FIND A SOLUTION**

The U.S. possesses the most technologically advanced military the world has ever known. However, large conventional forces complimented with high tech gadgetry do not always spell success on America’s battlefields.

Michael P. Noonan and John Hillen warn against a view of warfighting focused solely on high tech silver bullet solutions. They suggest military force structure should be designed to operate across the [entire] spectrum of conflict and include the ability to defeat asymmetrical threats "Conflicts from Somalia to Haiti to the Balkans proved that adversaries, while not always successful, had indeed learned that asymmetrical strategies worked best against the American conventional juggernaut."\textsuperscript{16} The enemy in Iraq has used asymmetrical strategies against our soldiers, and leaders have learned that peace keeping missions are not won by smart bombs.

Peace operations require specific soldier skill sets. Conducting patrols and performing area security missions, operating checkpoints, identifying terrorists tactics and operations, identifying improvised explosive devices, identifying and collecting street intelligence, riot
control, field investigation techniques, search and seizure, detaining techniques, coordinating and implementing the internment and resettlement of displaced civilians, identifying and controlling enemy prisoners of war, performing battlefield circulation control, identifying and implementing physical security measures, and dealing with domestic violence are the types of skills U.S. soldiers now need in Iraq. These tasks are also the same tasks organically trained to Military Police (MP) at the U.S. Army Military Police School. In an effort to build more of these skill sets into U.S. force structure, U.S. planners have been working to bring more organically trained peace operations type units into the force. As a result, MP forces have become the force of choice for peace operations.

There are essentially two ways to attack the problem: either modify the means (change the force structure), or modify the ways – the way we prepare the force for its mission.

MODIFY MEANS - COURSES OF ACTION FOR A NEW FORCE STRUCTURE

MORE MILITARY POLICE

MPs are trained and equipped for peacekeeping; however, the U.S. simply does not have enough of them. “Out of a total fighting force of about 490,000, the U.S. has only around 37,000 MPs – a figure that has not changed much in decades... 12,000 MPs are currently assigned to Iraq.” Those 12,000 are but a small fraction of the 130,000 U.S. soldiers now serving in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

However, on 23 September 2003, the Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs approved an MP Provisional Concept Plan that will take selected National Guard Field Artillery units and convert them to Provisional MP Units. This created 15 MP companies which will be used to support law and order backfill missions at Army installations throughout the Continental U.S., Hawaii, and Europe as early as January 2004. This short term solution will allow relief of Regular Army MP from Law and Order Installation Support missions so that they can be reassigned to areas outside of the U.S.

Although a long term solution to grow MP force structure is still being worked, one must remember that MP units act only as force multipliers. Increasing MP strength will not solve total force requirements.

THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE (CBO) REPORT

The CBO report, Making Peace While Staying Ready for War: The Challenge of U.S. Military Participation in Peace Operations, December 1999, looked at four possible Courses of
Action (COA) that could be used to modify the force structure for peace operations. The report contained no recommendations because of CBOs mandate to provide objective nonpartisan analysis. Below is a summary. The CBO did not consider specific COA for use of reserve units in their report.

COA 1: Cycle the Readiness of Some Active Army Units. Select three existing active Army brigades; cycle each through high state of alert every six months; rely on alert brigade to carry out peace operations.

A brigade from three active component divisions would be placed on call for peace operations missions. Brigades would rotate on six month cycles. While one brigade would be ready to be deployed to a peace operation, another would be preparing and training for its peace operation mission. A third brigade would be in stand down, recovery. This COA would require no change to current Army force structure.

COA 2: Reorganize Existing Active Army Forces for Peace Operations. Designate four existing brigades to carry out peace operations, and create three standing headquarters to lead them. (Increase size of active Army by 750 to 900.)

Unlike COA 1, this option gives peace operations forces a standing task-force headquarters of division size. Three headquarters would be available for long term peace operations commitments and a fourth brigade would be added to give flexibility in case of simultaneous deployments.

COA 3: Convert Some Combat Units in the Active Army into Support Units.

Convert one active-duty heavy division into support units.

This COA takes a heavy active component division and reorganizes it into support units. This means that combat units in the division would be converted to MP, Civil Affairs, and other units (water purification units, etc.) typically utilized for peace operations. Support units in those divisions would remain organized in their current configuration.

COA 4: Add Forces to the Active Army for Peace Operations. Create four brigades designed to carry out peace operations and three standing headquarters to lead them. Increase size of active Army by 20,000.

This COA would look like that of COA 2, however, peace operations brigades and associated command and control headquarters would be added to the current active component force structure. Equipping this force could be partially accomplished by taking weapons and vehicles from National Guard combat units currently earmarked to convert to support units.

Problems exist with each of the COAs presented above. In COA 1, the brigade cycled and ready for deployment would most likely have to plus-up in personnel and equipment. Plus-
ups needed for the ready brigade would have to come from active component divisions that support them, which could affect their ability to perform their wartime mission. Also, frequency of deployment on peace operations contingencies could have an adverse impact on moral and retention. Finally, training for brigades in peace operations cycles would not be focused on warfighting tasks, this could delay their entry into conventional wartime operations.

COA 2 would have an overall adverse impact on the Army’s warfighting capability because it takes units out of the force’s warfighting structure to perform peace operations. Although units in the peace operations force could be trained-up for warfighting, train-up would take time which would delay their introduction into warfighting operations. Soldiers assigned to these peace operations units might be deployed frequently which could lead to low moral and retention issues.

COA 3 would reduce the amount of active forces available for warfighting and cause more reliance on the reserve component during wartime. Also, the frequent integration of reserve and active component units, now occurring during peace operations which brings civilian skills and expertise to our formations and improves active and reserve soldier relationships, would be effected. Reorganizing units in the active force without changing the overall structure of the Army would mean that some combat duties would have to be transferred to the Reserve Component. An increased reliance on reserves during wartime combined with the turbulence this COA could cause in the force structure could result in political issues.

Under COA 4 the Army would incur a recurring cost of almost $2 billion annually to staff three additional headquarters and four brigades. Offset costs due to a reduction in deployed reservists are not significant when stood up against this price tag. Also, peace operations forces would need significant train-up time in order to introduce them into combat operations.


THE NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY STUDY

Arthur K. Cebrowski, Director of the Pentagon’s Office of Transformation, a leading advocate of designing forces for peace operations, has sponsored another study recently completed by “a National Defense University team [this study] called for a larger force of two division-size elements - one on active duty, one reserve – totaling about 30,000 troops.22

Chapter 3 and 4 of this study propose that the U.S. design a new force composed of two division type structures. A diagram of this new organization, a Strategic & Reconstruction Joint Command (S&RJCOM), is seen below in Figure 1. 23
Organizing for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations (S&R Joint Command)

FIGURE 1

One of the above S&R JCOMs would be composed primarily of active component units. The second organization would be in the reserve component, but possess an active component headquarters and cadre at lower commands. Although the basic design would stay the same, two alternative models are also presented. One model would be for a theater where U.S. forces are present, another for operations where U.S. forces are not present.

This force is modular, can be tailored to mission requirements, has digital C4ISR capability, is capable of limited combat operations, is joint and potentially multinational, possess regional and linguistic expertise, has interagency, civil-military and contractor capability, and it can respond to combatant commands. If the force were to be deployed independently it would need a logistic element and additional tactical combat forces might also be needed depending on mission. 24

Although this force looks good on paper, there are problems with the National Defense University (NDU) study assumptions. Authors of the study say current core units needed for this force such as civil affairs, MPs, engineers, medical, and psychological operations already exist in the current force structure (either active or reserve); therefore, organizing such a force would not be a major end strength issue. 25 Yet the NDU study also acknowledges the fact that these same units represent the most striking shortfall in our current force structure. 26 Taking already overstretched units and using them for another requirement does not make sense. Figure 2
shows numbers of these units needed for S&R JCOMs and on-hand Active Component (AC) & Reserve Component (RC) forces. Using MPs as an example, if 4 of the 12 on-hand AC MP Battalions and/or 4 of the 14 on-hand RC MP Battalions are used for new S&R Organizations, what units will fill the mission requirements those battalions had prior to being attached to S&R Organizations?

### Availability of Forces (Proposed vs. On-Hand)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposed S&amp;R Org</th>
<th>Army On-Hand (above divisions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AC/RC Bns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Police</td>
<td>4/4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Affairs</td>
<td>4/4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Const Engineers</td>
<td>4/4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area Medical</td>
<td>4/4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Info Ops (PSYOPS)</td>
<td>4/4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training/Sec. Assist.</td>
<td>1/1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FIGURE 2**

Authors of the NDU study also suggest reorganizing the Army’s two active Component/National Guard integrated divisions, the 7th Infantry (Light) and the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) (24th ID(M)) to form the headquarters command and staff for the S&R JCOM. Like recommended COAs presented in the CBO Report, this concept is also problematic. The 24th ID (M) is currently composed of three Enhanced Separate Brigades (eSBs). Integrated Division Commanders are responsible to Command Organic Installations, provide Training Oversight (TRO) for assigned AC units, provide TRO for eSBs, operate Power Projection Platforms (PPP) and execute other missions, as required. During the Afghan and Iraqi Wars, the 24th ID (M) provided command and control for a U.S. Forces Command Installation of over 10,000 soldiers, families and support personnel, provided TRO for the deployment of all Fort Riley assigned active component forces to Southwest Asia (1st Brigade, 1st AD; 1st Brigade, 1st ID and 937th Engineer Group), provided TRO for assigned eSBs (to
include the deployment of 30th eSB to the National Training Center), operated a 5th Army PPP for the mobilization of over 10,000 reserve component soldiers, and provided TRO and mobilization support for the 35th Division Stabilization Forces – 13 (SFOR-13) mission. Operations Tempo (OPTEMPO) has already stressed this unit to the extreme. What unit would take these missions if the 24th was assigned as the headquarters for the S&R JCOM?

Authors of this study must remember that in this era of zero sum game there is no free lunch. In order to form the headquarters command and staff for S&R JCOMs – headquarters command and staffs that could remain focused on mission – new AC and/or RC command and staffs would have to be formed. This would be costly in terms of dollars and would require building additional force structure. In today’s demanding OPTEMPO environment, one can not rob Peter to pay Paul and come out ahead.

**UTILIZE AVAILABLE WAYS - TRAIN AND TAILOR THE CURRENT FORCE, AS NEEDED**

Tailoring, training, and rehearsing forces as needed is a COA that those who wish to create new peace operations forces seem to ignore. This COA has been our primary approach to post-conflict stability as far back as WWII, and has been our methodology during peace operations contingencies of the 1990’s.

Major General Ernest N. Harmon, Commander of the battle hardened 4th Armored Division, converted his division into a Constabulary Force on 1 July 1946. Converting battle tested armored division warfighters into peacekeepers worked well. From 1946 to 1952 constabulary troopers “… controlled the borders, established temporary and permanent road blocks, conducted small and large scale raids, and involved themselves deeply in the suppression of black marketing… [they also] possessed the power of arrest, [and] search and seizure.”

A half century after 4th Armored Divisions successful constabulary mission many military professionals continue to point to similarities between warfighting and peace operations tasks. Soldier proficiency in tasks such as land navigation and marksmanship are important both in wartime and in peace operations. General Frederick M. Franks, while commanding U.S. Training and Doctrine Command in the mid 1990’s, stated, “we will not have room for specialists… we must develop a team that plays both ways, a team that is scrappy, and willing to perform many missions, a team that is versatile and agile.” However, the Center for Army Lessons Learned has noted that, “units selected for peacekeeping duty require 4-6 weeks of specialized training.”
Can forces train for both warfighting and OOTW? Can conventional, even heavy forces, be trained to be successful at both warfighting and peace operations? The following example provides insight to these issues and provides valuable lessons learned to both planners and commanders.

OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR

When 1st Armored Division (1AD) soldiers arrived home after the successful battles of Operation Desert Storm they faced a new paradigm. Reunification, new democracies, and a new North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) vision drove a new mission focus and forced 1AD warfighters to confront the challenges of peace operations. Training with partner nations – to include some formally belonging to soviet block nations – exposed the soldiers and leaders of the division to a variety of military cultures and began to prepare the way ahead.

Regardless of the changing environment, however, 1AD stayed true to battle focused training principles. Battle focus training remained the central vision for leaders and soldiers regardless of the training scenario. And, although peace operations tasks were added to unit Mission Essential Task Lists (METL) leaders insisted that training concentration would remain on combat operations. 1AD leadership firmly believed that “Training for combat develops leaders that have the moral courage to demand adherence to standards at the most remote outposts and soldiers with the self discipline to do what is right – even when no one else is watching.”

IMPLEMENTATION FORCE (IFOR) TRAINING

In 1995 1AD prepared to assume duties as the IFOR for the Dayton Peace Agreement. This mission required leaders to institutionalize versatility and provide a training bridge that would allow the division to be proficient at both warfighting and peace operations. Therefore, 1AD designed a Contingency METL (CMETL) specifically for IFOR which gave soldiers proficiency on peace operations tasks while allowing them to remain true to their warrior ethos. The 1AD mission statements, METL andCMETL Tasks, and Contingency Operations Battle Tasks for IFOR are seen below.

1AD Mission: On Order, 1AD deploys within the U.S. European Command or U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility to conduct Joint and/or Combined military operations.

1AD METL Tasks: Tailor force and deploy by air, rail, sea, and self deployment; Conduct Offensive Operations; Conduct Defensive Operations; Conduct multinational peace operations
with NATO and/or UN forces; Preserve and protect the force; Provide Battle Command in Joint and/or Combined operations; Sustain combat forces in an austere Theater of Operations.

**Task Force Eagle Mission:** On Order, TASK FORCE EAGLE deploys to AOR TUZLA, Bosnia-Herzegovina and conducts peace enforcement operations to implement the military provisions of the Peace Accord; ensures force protection.

**Task Force Eagle CMETL:** Form and Train the Team; Deploy by Air, Rail, and Self Deployment; Attack, Defend; Conduct Peace Enforcement Operations; Command and Control Multinational Forces; Sustain the Force; Conduct Information Operations.

**Contingency Operations Battle Tasks:** Execute Validation Training; Implement Rear Detachment Plans; Execute Push Plan for Division Deployment; Self Deploy Army Aviation; Tactical Road March; Security Operations; Reconnaissance Operations; Direct Special Operations; Establish and Operate a Coalition Information Management Integration Center; Conduct Civil Affairs Operations; Conduct Public Affairs Operations; Conduct Electronic Warfare Operations; Conduct Psychological Operations; Conduct Joint Military Commissions; Conduct Route Clearance/Security Operations; Conduct Countermine Operations; Conduct Movement to Contact; Execute Passage of Lines; Conduct River Crossing Operations; Conduct Air Assault Operations; Conduct Link-up Operations; Execute Counter fire; Conduct Artillery Raids; Plan/Execute Joint Fires; Conduct Hasty Attack/Hasty Defense; Enforce ROE; C2BCT’S up to 100km from DMAIN; Coordinate w/ National Support Element for Combat Service Support; Conduct Split-based Operations; and Execute Multinational Command and Control (up and down).

In September 1995, the division deployed to Grafenwohr for tank, Bradley, and artillery gunnery - 2nd Brigade’s Combined arms Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) rotation at Hohenfels would follow. As Bosnia moved toward a ceasefire, however, 1AD training began to focus on peace enforcement.  In late September 1995, United States Army Europe developed an exercise designed to prepare the division for IFOR named Mountain Eagle. Mountain Eagle put 1AD through a series of unit Field Training Exercises (FTX), and Command Post Exercises (CPX) at the 7th Army’s Training Centers at Grafenwohr and Hohenfels Germany. Training focused on the following tasks: Enforce terms of the Treaty; Establish and enforce the Zone of Separation; Identify/separate belligerents; Establish a Joint Commission; Establish Command and Control over belligerents/collocate command posts; Remove mines and hazards; Exercise Rules of Engagement; Facilitate relocation of displaced persons and repatriation of Enemy Prisoners of War; Conduct inspections of facilities and forces; Be prepared to conduct combat operations.
The core training program was complimented by simultaneous multi-echelon training events which included five situational training exercises, a five day stability operations FTX, joint military commission training, and information operations and media training. Individual and collective training tailored for 1ADs deployments also took place supported by over 300 role players and Observer-Controllers who gave daily feedback sessions and After Action Reviews (AAR).\(^4\)

**STANDARDS FOR SUCCESS**

On 21 November 1995, representatives from the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia initialed the Dayton Peace Accords. The Dayton Peace Accords contained many annexes, the Military aspects of that agreement (Annex 1-A) set the standards for 1AD - they are summarized below.\(^4\)

- The cease-fire that began with the agreement of 5 October 1995, will continue;
- Foreign combatant forces currently in Bosnia are to be withdrawn within 30 days;
- The parties must complete withdraw of forces behind a zone of separation of approximately 4 km within an agreed period. Special provisions relate to Sarajevo and Gorazde;
- As a confidence-building measure, the parties agree to withdraw heavy weapons and forces to cantonment/barracks areas within an agreed period and to demobilize forces which cannot be accommodated in those areas;
- The agreement invites into Bosnia and Herzegovina a multinational military implementation force, the IFOR, under the command of NATO, with a grant of authority from the UN;
- IFOR will have the right to monitor and help ensure compliance with the agreement on military aspects and fulfill certain supporting tasks. The IFOR will have the right to carry out its mission vigorously, including with the use of force if necessary. It will have unimpeded freedom of movement, control over airspace, and status of forces protection;
- A Joint Military Commission is established, to be chaired by the IFOR Commander. Persons under indictment by the international war crimes tribunal cannot participate;
- Information on mines, military personnel, weaponry, and other items must be provided to the Joint Military Commission within agreed periods;
- All combatants and civilians must be released and transferred without delay in accordance with a plan developed by the International Red Cross.
In December of 1995, 1AD deployed to become the nucleus of Task Force Eagle. Task Force Eagle was a multinational force made up of more than 20,000 service members and civilians from Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia, Sweden, Turkey, and the U.S. Approximately 18,000 U.S. personnel from 1AD and multinational personnel formed Multinational Division (North). Task Force Eagle was made up of the 1st and 2nd Brigade of the 1AD, Nordic-Polish Brigade, Turkish Brigade and Russian Brigade. 1AD’s Artillery, Engineers and Support command also deployed.

**FIGURE 3**

*Note:* The V U.S. Corps augmented the division with engineer, logistics, and signal units. Each country provided logistical support to their tactical units.

Task Force Eagle was primarily a combat arms formation tailored and trained for peace operations. Its formation was both functionally and culturally important. The former warring factions of the Balkan War respected military power which meant that Task Force Eagle’s ability to conduct High Intensity Conflict (HIC) was essential. Therefore, while in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1AD trained for HIC. Pre-deployment training events - which also included HIC tasks - were complimented by additional post-deployment HIC training. While in theater 1AD continued to
train its forces on Table VII, Joint Air Attack Team, small arms ranges, squad training, dry fire drills, and patrolling.43

“Pure and simple, the Implementation Force’s credibility as a combined arms, day-night, all weather warfighting organization is what [moved] the Armies of Bosnia from their trenches to a peacetime disposition in barracks and cantonment areas. Deterrence is only effective when the alternative is both credible and unacceptable. The perceived threat of overwhelming force, combined with the proper authority for its use [was] an essential aspect of [1ADs] success in implementing the military provisions of the GFAP [General Framework for Peace].” 44

1ADs formation, HIC, and peace operations training reinforced a flexible warrior ethos. It allowed the soldier to realize that the battlefield could range the entire spectrum of conflict on short notice. IFORs conventional but tailored organization, combined with its training philosophy, ensured that soldiers were trained and equipped for any challenge. It was right and logical for the mission and demonstrated the strength of a flexible and adaptable organization.

IFOR SUCCESS


Although the report stated that a certain amount of ad hoc-ery (adjustments to plans, etc.) occurred during Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR (OJE), 1AD performance in OJE spelled success and this conventional heavy division received a “GO” in Peace Operations by the U.S. Army Peace Keeping Institute after their first year in Bosnia.

“An almost universal opinion shared by the BHAAR conferees during the conference was that Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR (OJE) must be considered a success… Despite incredibility difficult, multinational coordination challenges, our leaders and troops have been able to achieve near impossible feats in meeting seemingly unachievable deadlines.”46

Adding to success, 1AD also proved it could recover and resume HIC training and its other commitments upon redeployment. Three months after 1AD returned to Germany - after a
year in Bosnia-Herzegovina - 1AD went through a Battle Command Training Program train-up, and completed a War Fighter Exercise. In addition, the division performed redeployment Gunnery, Brigade CPXs, and Battalion CMTC Rotations.47

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

There are no hard, long term, approved solutions that will give U.S. forces the peace operations skill sets, or numbers of forces required, for all peace operations scenarios. COAs, however, basically boil down to either modifying our means (through changes in force structure), or changing our ways (through innovative training).

An effort to modify means in our high OPTEMPO environment in order to meet current mission requirements will require force structure increases. And, creating specialty units like S&R Organizations proposed by NDU will result in units that can only be used for limited operations. Conventional force structures can be tailored, sized, and packaged for both high intensity conflict and peace operations. Research supports the fact that trained and flexible soldiers and leaders in conventional formations can perform multiple missions - from peace operations to high intensity conflict – and conventional force lethality provides great deterrence to any force that might challenge it.

U.S. planners and commanders have a template for success. 1AD’s performance in OJE is an example of what can be accomplished if leaders and soldiers remain flexible and are rigorously trained both prior to and during deployment. The Bosnia AAR Conferences stated the following. “The Army appears to have correctly anticipated its mission for OJE and conducted the necessary tactical training to ensure the Military success of the General Framework Agreement for Peace.”48 With proper train-up, a conventional heavy division is capable of performing successful peace operations.

The three key factors of success emerged from OJE “… an overwhelming, credible warfighting capability; a coherent coalition of multinational forces directed to a single purpose; and the importance of the ground combat soldier.”49 The American combat soldier, properly trained, is very flexible.

“Throughout preparation, deployment and execution… the ground combat soldier [proved] invaluable to [1ADs] achievements in the Balkans… Properly trained and prepared during transition from battle focused training to peace enforcement operation, the ground combat soldier [gave] peace a chance in Bosnia.”50

As planners and leaders continue to stress over answers for the peace operations “dilemma”, and academia and governmental agencies weigh in with COAs designed to improve
U.S. means available for peace operations, one must remember that training is the COA that has a proven track record. Training will continue to prepare our forces for any challenge. Tough, realistic, high OPTEMPO training of soldiers and leaders in conventional organizations is the preferred COA which will reduce risk to U.S. forces engaged in any future challenge.

WORD COUNT= 5481
ENDNOTES


7 Ibid.

8 Slevin, and Dana Priest. “Wolfowitz Concedes Iraq Errors,” 3.


12 Ibid.

13 Ibid. Chapter 1, p. 5

14 Ibid. Chapter 1, p. 6.

15 Ibid.


21 Ibid, Chapter 4, p. 1-2.


24 Ibid. p. 58 - 60.

25 Ibid. p. 56.

26 Ibid. 71.

27 Ibid. p. 63.

28 Bart Howard <barthoward@comcast.net>, “Integrated Division,” electronic mail message to David Draeger <tfepm@comcast.net>, 13 December 2003.


30 Ibid.

31 Ibid.


34 Major Samuel A. Guthrie G3 Plans, “CGs Article Submissions,” memorandum for Lieutenant Colonel Jones, 1AD G3, Tuzla, Bosnia, 02 June 1996.

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.


40 Ibid. p. 143.


42 1st Armored Division, II-2.

43 Thomas Muir <thomas.muir@us.army.mil>, “abrams26, ARCONF,” electronic mail message to David Draeger <david.draeger@us.army.mil>, 18 November 2003. 9.

44 Guthrie, “CGs Article Submissions.”


46 Ibid.

47 Muir, ARCONF, 17.

48 U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, 11.

49 Guthrie, “CGs Article Submissions.

50 Ibid.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Borer, Douglas A. “A Battle is won, but the war on ‘bin Ladenism’ is not.” *The Roanoke Times Commentary*, 10 September 2002, sec 1A, p. 11.


Cadwallader, Gretchen <GRETCHEN.CADWALLADER@HQDA.ARMY.MIL>, “RE: (U) RE: SRP Topic (Constabulary Force).” *Electronic mail message to David Draeger <tfepm@comcast.net>*, 17 October 2003.


Guthrie, Sam, G3 Plans. “CGs Article Submissions.” Memorandum for Lieutenant Colonel Jones 1AD G3. Tuzla, Bosnia, 02 June 1996.


Howard, Bart <barthoward@comcast.net>. “Integrated Division,” Electronic mail message to David Draeger <tfepm@comcast.net>. 13 December 2003.


Muir, Thomas <thomas.muir@us.army.mil>. “abrams26, ARCONF.” Electronic mail message to David Draeger <david.draeger@us.army.mil>. 18 November 2003.


