CANADIAN ARMY TRANSFORMATION: WHERE IT NEEDS TO GO

by

Colonel P.J. Atkinson
Canadian Forces

Dr Douglas Johnson
Project Advisor

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
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ABSTRACT

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The Canadian and United States Armies are both going through a transformation right now. Although this paper will examine the direction the United States Army is going, the focus will be on the Canadian Army. The author contends that the Canadian Army must deliver a combat capable, sustainable force structure that is both relevant and interoperable with her allies, particularly the United States. Canada will likely never be in a position where she would act unilaterally; therefore, being a part of a United States led coalition is the most likely task for the Canadian field force. This paper will recommend what actions need to be taken, as well as the organization and capabilities that Canada's field force needs to bring to the table as it transforms to meet the challenges of the future.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................................ iii

CANADIAN ARMY TRANSFORMATION: WHERE IT NEEDS TO GO ....................................................... 1

FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT ........................................................................................................ 1

CANADIAN WHITE PAPER ON DEFENCE ........................................................................................... 2

QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW ...................................................................................................... 3

THE FISCAL REALITIES FACING THE CANADIAN MILITARY .............................................................. 3

CANADIAN MILITARY OPERATIONS SINCE THE END OF THE COLD WAR ....................................... 5

CANADA’S DECISION NOT TO SUPPORT THE UNITED STATES IN IRAQ ............................................. 6

DEFENCE COOPERATION PRINCIPAL AGREEMENTS ........................................................................ 7

NORTHCOM AND HOMELAND DEFENCE ............................................................................................ 9

INTEROPERABILITY AND COALITION OPERATIONS ........................................................................... 9

CANADA - UNITED STATES DEFENCE INDUSTRY RELATIONS .................................................... 11

DEFENCE PROCUREMENT AND SUSTAINMENT .................................................................................. 12

UNITED STATES ARMY TRANSFORMATION PLAN ............................................................................ 13

CANADIAN ARMY TRANSFORMATION PLAN .................................................................................... 14

THE RIGHT FORCE STRUCTURE FOR CANADA (THE STRYKER BRIGADE) ...................................... 15

RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................................................................................................ 15

CONCLUSION – INDEPENDENT, CREDIBLE AND RELEVANT .......................................................... 16

ENDNOTES .............................................................................................................................................. 19

BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................................................................... 23
CANADIAN ARMY TRANSFORMATION: WHERE IT NEEDS TO GO

The Canadian Army is in the midst of a transformation. If we are to prevail on the battlefields of tomorrow, if we are going to operate effectively with our allies, particularly the United States Army, we must become a more agile, more lethal and knowledge based Army with equipment, doctrine and training suited to a force which is strategically relevant and tactically decisive.¹

—Lieutenant-General Mike Jeffery - Commander Canadian Army 09 May 2002

The Canadian and United States Armies are both going through a transformation right now. The United States started first when General Eric Shinseki unveiled his Army Vision at the October 1999 AUSA Annual Meeting in Washington, D.C.² Canada followed when Lieutenant General Mike Jeffery announced his Army Strategy in Ottawa, Ontario in May 2002.³ Since that time the world has not stood still and the respective transformation strategies of both countries have continued to evolve. The leadership of both armies changed in the summer of 2003 with General Peter Schoomaker taking over as the Chief of Staff the United States Army and Lieutenant General Rick Hillier the Canadian Army. The leadership changes, if anything, have sped up the transformation process in both militaries. Although this paper will examine the direction the United States Army is going, the focus will be on the Canadian Army. The author contends that the Canadian Army must deliver a combat capable, sustainable force structure that is both relevant and interoperable with her allies, particularly the United States. Canada will likely never be in a position where she would act unilaterally; therefore, being a part of a United States led coalition is the most likely task for the Canadian Army. This paper will recommend what actions need to be taken, as well as the organization and capabilities that Canada's Army needs to bring to the table as it transforms to meet the challenges of the future.

FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Threats of regional conflict, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the dangers of trans-national terrorism and crime form the headlines in the media every day. There have been few periods in history when the geo-political landscape has been in such a state of flux. The use of the military as an extension of political means has remained constant and the scope of possible military employment options is increasing around the globe.⁴

The Canadian Forces Strategic Operating Concept 2020 contends that “the focus of strategic planners has shifted away from preparing for interstate war and towards meeting the challenges of intrastate conflicts. Along with an increase in intrastate war, is a rise in combatants who operate independent of formal government structures. International terrorists,
trans-national criminals and other non-state actors have emerged as major security challenges and will continue to preoccupy defence and security forces for the next decade and beyond. Failed states often provide havens for terrorist organizations and organized crime because the lack of central government control enables them to operate relatively unhindered by state authorities. For the next few decades, the problems generated by failing states and failing regions will command much of the world’s attention. Failure in the developing world will result from a combination of factors, but three interconnected issues will be paramount: the inability of some countries to compete in the global economic system resulting in persistent poverty; the difficulties arising from resource scarcity, especially fresh water and energy supplies; and the pressures of rapid urbanization, environmental degradation, and pandemic disease. These problems will be brought home to the publics of the world’s wealthiest countries through the global media and will likely be accompanied by an increasing expectation for intervention.  

In this environment the United States has emerged as the dominant military force with a technological edge that will not be challenged in the foreseeable future. Increasing global unrest and the broad threat to national security will ensure that the Canadian government will want to remain engaged and will demand a capable Canadian Forces (CF) that is strategically relevant and credible in a multi-lateral coalition scenario.

CANADIAN WHITE PAPER ON DEFENCE

Military capability is an essential element among a host of fundamentals that together provide the foundation for decisions on the ends, ways and means of national defence. Reports prepared by the Senate and the House of Commons of Canada, the Auditor General of Canada, the Conference of Defence Associations, and others by academics and research institutions all note that the very long-term survival of Canada’s military capabilities are in question. The Canadian government last produced a White Paper on Defence in 1994. As it is the key guidance document for setting the defence strategy, identifying capabilities required and allocating the necessary resources, it can be easily argued that a new White Paper is now long overdue. In an interview with Jane’s Defense Weekly (JDW) in September 2003, Defence Minister John McCallum told JDW that his government is committed to a defence policy review and by implication a new White Paper, but when that will take place is as yet not confirmed. Paul Martin was chosen as the new leader of the Federal Liberal party on 15 November 2003 and took over as the Prime Minister from Jean Chrétien on 12 December 2003. With a new Prime Minister and an election expected in the spring of 2004, a review is not likely for at least a year. Douglas Bland argues in his new book, Canada without Armed Forces, that the lack of a
credible defence review and a new White Paper properly funded, is a national crisis for the new
Prime Minister Paul Martin. Despite the clear requirement for a defence review and a new
White Paper, the author contends there remains some value in the 1994 White Paper. The
direction as it pertains to multi-national operations remains valid today.

The Government has concluded that the maintenance of multi-purpose, combat-capable forces is in the national interest. It is only through the maintenance of such forces that Canada will be able to retain the necessary degree of flexibility and freedom of action when it comes to the defence of its interests and the projection of its values abroad.…. Canada needs armed forces that are able to operate with the modern forces maintained by our allies and like-minded nations.

QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW

The current United States Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) was published on the heels of 9/11. Like the Canadian White Paper on Defence, the QDR provides the United States Department of Defense (DoD) with direction on defence strategy, force structure, capabilities and a vision for how United States forces will be employed into the future. Of note in the 2001 version is the direction given on strengthening alliances and partnerships.

The need to strengthen alliances and partnerships has specific military implications. It requires that United States forces train and operate with allies and friends in peacetime as they would operate in war. This includes enhancing interoperability and peacetime preparations for coalition operations, as well as increasing allied participation in activities such as joint and combined training and experimentation.

This theme is further reinforced in the November 2003, *The Army in 2020 White Paper*, that contends the “events from Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF) demonstrated the advantages of maintaining a relevant Army as part of a Joint, Interagency, and Multi-national Team and the true value of Joint interdependency and Interagency/Multi-national interoperability.”

THE FISCAL REALITIES FACING THE CANADIAN MILITARY

The CF and their capabilities have been a low priority for the government of Canada for many years. The defence budget has been too small to sustain basic capabilities, and no serious thought has been given to significantly increased military spending. The dangerous resource situation of the CF is beyond dispute. Its implications have been set out in great and painful detail in a number of reports and studies, including those by the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans’ Affairs, the Centre for Military and
Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary, the Council for Canadian Security in the 21st Century, the Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence, the Conference of Defence Associations, and the Center for the Study of the Presidency in Washington. The conclusions of these studies are that the CF cannot meet the missions assigned them in a 1994 White Paper—namely, to maintain combat capable forces able to protect Canada, to cooperate with the United States in the defence of North America, and to contribute to international security. 13

Again, Douglas Bland in his new book, Canada without Armed Forces, contends that, “If the Canadian government continues to manage and fund the CF with the same policy structure and at near the same activity rate as over the past thirteen years, then basic defence capabilities will collapse and the planned transformation of capabilities to meet emerging threats will not be possible.” 14 The reality is that either the government’s commitments of the 1994 Defence White Paper must be greatly modified, or the capital component of the defence budget must be increased by $2-3 billion per annum beginning in 2004/05 for the next fifteen years. 15 If the government decides not to provide a capital renewal budget, then they must deliver a clear policy statement to the Canadian Department of National Defence as to which capabilities need to be maintained and which need to be dropped. The decision is not so much a choice for the next government as a dilemma with profound implications for foreign policy and national sovereignty. 16 It is interesting to note in a recent press release from Canberra, that Australia’s government appears to be ready to input $50 billion into the Australian Defence Forces capital program to do exactly what is required in Canada for the CF. 17

The Canadian military have always had their backs to the wall when it comes to defence spending. Never before has the military been on the front page of the media as much as they have for the past couple of years. The subject has been consistent, the under funding of the CF by the government. There is however, optimism within the CF, and it is shared by the author, that the government under the new leadership of Paul Martin will conduct a timely defence review and make the necessary funding adjustments to the military budget.

The United States has always maintained in interest in Canadian defence spending and in fact has been quite critical at times about the amount of dollars dedicated towards defence. It is not enough to criticize the levels of defence spending. The United States should be more specific in their suggestions about what they would like to see Canada do, and why. Specificity, in my view would be more helpful to Canada no matter what the Canadian government decides to do about particular matters. 18
CANADIAN MILITARY OPERATIONS SINCE THE END OF THE COLD WAR

Canada has enjoyed a long-standing reputation for active involvement and support of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations. But Canada is more than just peacekeeping and is inclined to act multilaterally as a part of the international community when international security and stability is threatened. As the UN, NATO and the United States have increased their activities in the post-Cold War era, so has Canadian participation. Since 1989, the CF have been deployed to the Persian Gulf to participate in the United States-led Operation Desert Storm and on a multitude of peacekeeping missions, including in Angola, Bosnia, Cambodia, the Congo, East Timor, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Haiti, Kosovo, Kuwait, Macedonia, Namibia, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Rwanda, the Western Sahara and Zaire. The missions in Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia all had UN mandates but were NATO led coalition operations. Canada is still committed in Bosnia as part of Stabilization Force with a 1,200 man contingent. Ongoing commitments in the Congo, Sierra Leone, the Sinai and the Golan Heights continue under the auspices of the UN. 19

The mission in Somalia was carried out by a multi-national coalition known as the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) and Canada contributed 900 troops to the United States led operation. Canada had already committed to the original UN mission in Somalia and it was not until President George W. Bush contacted Prime Minister Brian Mulroney in December 1993 to encourage Canadian participation in the United States-led peace enforcement mission that Canada changed its commitment to UNITAF. The fact that Canada already had a unit trained and ready to deploy was no doubt a factor in the United States decision to ask Canada to be a contributor to UNITAF, but they also wanted other like minded nations to lend credibility to the coalition.20

Haiti was another United States led mission in which Canada contributed soldiers under a UN mandate. Canada took over responsibility for the mission from the United States for an additional two years as outlined in this March 1996 DoD press release, “Our mission in Haiti ended on February 29th. And most of our troops have come home. From a peak of 23,000 troops, we now have fewer than 600 in Haiti; and all of the United States peacekeeping forces will be out by April 15th. A new UN mission, led by Canada, has taken over in Haiti.”21 One of the principal reasons why the United States and the UN both encouraged Canada to participate in the mission was because Canada could provide French speaking soldiers to the mission. There was also an identifiable Haitian community in Canada and this gave credibility to the Canadian contribution.
Zaire was an interesting case as can be seen in an excerpt from the following White House Press release of 13 November 1996; “Part of this process has involved extensive consultations with the government of Canada, which as I think many of you know, has offered to lead a multi-national humanitarian force. The United States welcomes Canada’s offer to lead the multi-national force. It is a move that will clearly demonstrate the will of others in the international community to assume a fair share of the burden for the operations that we project will be underway to save lives in Zaire...United States forces would remain at all times under United States command while serving under the operational control of a Canadian Commanding Officer.” Although the Zaire mission never manifested itself, it was a good example of the level of defense cooperation between Canada and the United States.

Since the United States launched the War on Terrorism, Canada has been an active coalition partner in Afghanistan providing an Infantry Battle Group, Special Forces, air support and a Naval Task Force. Canada is currently fully committed to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) with 2000 soldiers and is scheduled to take over command of ISAF in February 2004. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, at a news briefing in February 2003 made the following statement, “The Canadian Minister of Defence announced Canada’s willingness to commit a battle group and a brigade headquarters to the ISAF in Afghanistan for a period of one year. Canada has been a solid ally in the global war against terrorism, and we thank the Canadian people for their support in defending freedom around the globe.”

This goodwill was not to last long as the Canadian Prime Minister announced that without a UN resolution Canada would not be supporting the United States in Iraq.

**CANADA’S DECISION NOT TO SUPPORT THE UNITED STATES IN IRAQ**

While Canada did not officially support OIF, Canada did not withdraw her exchange officers serving in United States and United Kingdom units, nor did it withdraw the Naval Task Force that was integrated with the United States fleet in the Persian Gulf. The leader of the opposition in the House of Commons criticized the Prime Minister’s decision saying, “We have seen nations in the past support a military action without sending forces, but this is the first time we have seen a country not support a military action and send forces anyway.” The decision to not support the United States had the potential to sour relations between the two nations and in fact for a number of months that occurred. Diplomatic efforts to mend relations appear to have been successful, as this excerpt from a meeting between Secretary of State Colin Powell and Foreign Affairs Minister Bill Graham on 11 September 2003 shows, “Powell conceded that the United States and Canada had differed over the matter of military intervention in Iraq, but
stressed that both nations are committed to maintaining a strong, productive partnership. Graham indicated -- despite Canada’s reservations about the decision to confront the regime of former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein -- that the rebuilding of Iraq is critically important. And that’s why Canada has committed $300 million to help the reconstruction of Iraq.”

Although Canada views its relationship with the United States as crucial to a wide range of interests, it also occasionally pursues policies at odds with the United States. Two significant examples of these differing policies involve UN treaties. Canada strongly supports the UN created International Criminal Court (ICC) for war crimes, chairing the negotiations which led to its creation. The United States opposed the creation of the ICC due to perceived fundamental flaws in the treaty that leave the ICC vulnerable to exploitation and politically motivated prosecutions. The United States and Canada also differ on the issue of landmines. Canada is a strong proponent of the Mine Ban Treaty, also known as the Ottawa Convention, which bans the use of anti-personnel mines. The United States, while supporting de-mining initiatives, declined to sign the treaty due to unmet concerns regarding the protection of its forces and allies. What these two cases and Canada’s decision on Iraq demonstrate, is that allies do not always have to agree. Sovereignty and national interests will often force allies to take different paths.

DEFENCE COOPERATION PRINCIPAL AGREEMENTS

Over the long history of Canada-United States defence cooperation, the two countries have negotiated and signed a number of documents that have established the mechanisms for cooperation. In all, there are over 80 treaty-level defence agreements, over 250 memoranda of understanding, and some 145 bilateral forums for the discussion of various defence matters. Highlighted here are three key agreements that provide the framework for Canada/United States defence cooperation.

- **Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD).** Established in 1940, the PJBD is a bilateral defence forum which provides for critical senior military and diplomatic contact. The Canadian and United States co-chairs act in an advisory capacity, reporting directly to the Prime Minister and President respectively on matters affecting the defence of the northern half of the Western Hemisphere.

- **Military Cooperation Committee (MCC).** Formed in 1946, the MCC manages cooperation at the military planning level. Its subcommittee responsibilities include mapping and charting, meteorology, oceanography, communications and electronics, and logistics planning.
• **ABCA**(Australia/Britain/Canada/America). Although ABCA is not a bi-lateral agreement as such, it is considered to be one of the principal defence agreements. The raison d'etre of the ABCA Program remains clear - enhancing the interoperability of the signatories through standardization, so that they are better able to contribute to effective coalition operations. This theme has remained constant and since the inception of this program in 1950. The coalitions entered into by these Armies have produced highly effective operational results.  

These three agreements when considered together provide an unequalled forum for discussion and cooperation between the two nations. All issues related to defence can be considered, debated if necessary and solutions found. The model of bi-national agreements is the joint commitment to the Defence of North America through NORAD that has been the foundation of United States-Canada defense cooperation since 1957. It is emblematic of the special relationship between the United States and Canada, and is a natural complement to the extensive political, economic and social ties that link the two countries. NORAD provides a comprehensive warning capability against ballistic missiles, while also providing a level of defense against cruise missiles and intruding aircraft. NORAD, in cooperation with the RCMP and United States drug law enforcement agencies, also assists in the detection and monitoring of aircraft suspected of illegal drug trafficking. NORAD has evolved over the years in response to changes in the international security environment. When the Agreement was last renewed in 1996, NORAD was transformed from a Cold War defence arrangement to one appropriate to the new security environment.  

The NORAD response and particularly the Canadian reaction and actions taken during the 9/11 crisis was a disciplined and coordinated act of cooperation taken while the bulk of the world was reacting in shock to the events that were unfolding. Canadian National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) reacted immediately to control Canadian airspace in support of NORAD. Plans were quickly put in place to safely ground all flights inbound for Canada that had been diverted from United States airspace. In the aftermath, support was provided for more than 30,000 stranded passengers at airports large and small across Canada. The CF was placed on a higher state of readiness and the Canadian disaster relief team was placed on standby to deploy. United States authorities have repeatedly praised Canada’s efforts since 11 September, in particular, for accepting the diverted flights and for the increased information and intelligence sharing that occurred.
NORTHCOM AND HOMELAND DEFENCE

In the aftermath of 9/11 President George Bush directed the establishment of United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) to provide unity of command among the American armed forces for homeland defence. Shortly after the stand up of NORTHCOM, General Ralph Eberhart the commander of NORTHCOM made this statement, “To defend this nation, we have to defend as far out as possible. Therefore we need the support of Canada and Mexico to be able to defend our interests.” He clearly demonstrated the level of understanding on the part of the United States military about the importance of strong relations with neighbouring states towards collective security. General Eberhart was charged with developing plans for the defence of all approaches to the North American continent - air, land and sea, including security cooperation and coordination with United States adjacent neighbours, Canada and Mexico. The co-location of NORAD and NORTHCOM, and the creation of the Bi-National Planning Group in Colorado Springs on 5 December 2003 have once again provided a framework for defence cooperation between the two nations. The planning groups mandate is to prepare contingency plans to respond to threats and attacks, and other major emergencies in Canada or the United States, enhancing bi-national military planning and support to civil authorities. If you plan together, you can present your governments with viable options to deal with contingencies.

INTEROPERABILITY AND COALITION OPERATIONS

Look into the matter of his alliances and cause them to be severed and dissolved. If an enemy has alliances the problem is grave and the enemy’s position strong; if he has no alliances the problem is minor and the enemy’s position weak.

—Sun Tzu on “Waging War”

Taken in this context, it is hard to argue against the hypothesis that a group of nations acting together in an alliance or coalition that are interoperable, are likely to be more effective than those same nations acting unilaterally. The reasons for participating in a multi-national operation, as part of a coalition force, are numerous and varied. A country with a less capable military force may seek a coalition response to a regional threat or situation that they are incapable of facing alone. This is often the case facing Canada as they are a small nation with a military that is not capable of acting unilaterally. By seeking a coalition response, Canada is able to optimize its military assets and capabilities in meeting its operational imperatives while minimizing risks and expenditures. Countries that are more self reliant like the United States,
may seek a coalition response due to common national objectives of the potential coalition partners. A multi-national approach to resolve a regional crisis is often better tolerated in the court of world public opinion more than a unilateral operation by a superpower like the United States.\textsuperscript{39}

Although it is difficult to predict coalition partners in advance, with an understanding of national interests and an appreciation of regional issues, combatant commanders should be able to determine with some degree of accuracy, future potential partners. A concerted effort must then be made by all parties to address and rectify issues associated with political, operational and technical interoperability to ensure transparency of operations.\textsuperscript{40} The scope of this paper will not allow an in depth look at all the interoperability issues. In the arena of operational interoperability issues, there are six key areas that require comment: common weapon systems, communications, intelligence, logistics, training and exercises.\textsuperscript{41} The subject of common weapon systems speaks for itself as all parties understand the capabilities and limitations of their respective weapon systems. The ability to communicate securely and exercise command and control is imperative to successful coalition operations. Intelligence will always be a sensitive issue due to release restrictions associated with certain nations. A policy of the need to share versus the need to know is an approach that needs to be followed in coalition operations or the whole issue of shared intelligence can be a real stumbling block. Likewise, logistics are a key element of any successful operation. Commonality of equipment and weapons systems eliminates a lot of logistics issues as sustainment and maintenance problems are easier to solve when you use the same equipment. Standard operating procedures and planning guidelines like those developed through ABCA remove a lot of the hurdles to effective multi-national logistics. Nothing replaces training and exercises when it comes to identifying issues and working out the necessary solutions. Having a system of liaison officers and instructor exchanges at training institutions like Canada and the United States share is an enabler to interoperability.

Canada and the United States have had an ongoing successful small unit exchange program for years. The successes achieved there need to be built upon and more opportunities for formation level exercises need to be sought out. During the Cold War period the Reforger Exercises in Europe provided the necessary venue. Since 1990 there have been a number of multi-national exercises conducted in both Canada and the United States, but not enough. This is the way of the future, as it is only through training together that understanding and trust is built. In multi-national operations, it is trust the binds the coalition together.\textsuperscript{42}
Over the past fifty years, Canada and the United States have had an extensive and formalized defence industry relationship. It is one of the most comprehensive and unique defence industry relationships in the world. Presently, Canada and the United States have several defence industrial, testing and evaluation, and research and development agreements. The three key agreements are as follows:

- **Defence Production and Defence Development Sharing Arrangements.** First signed in 1956 and amended on a number of occasions, it calls for the greater integration of United States and Canadian military development and production; greater standardization of military equipment; removal of obstacles to the flow of defence supplies and equipment between the two countries; the development of channels for the exchange of information between appropriate United States and Canadian Government agencies on defence economic matters; and finally, the provision to accord equal consideration to the business communities of both countries. These arrangements have served to benefit both countries and have facilitated greater standardization in the design and production of military equipment.

- **North American Technology and Industrial Base Organization (NATIBO).** The Organization, chartered in March 1987 by the United States DoD and Canada’s Department of National Defense (DND), coordinates the technology and industrial base activities of defense organizations supporting the North American Technology and Industrial Base. NATIBO’s mission is to promote a cost effective, healthy technology and industrial base that is responsive to the national and economical security needs of the United States and Canada.

- **Canada-United States Test and Evaluation Program (CANUSTEP).** The program provides the DND and the DoD with reciprocal lower cost access to each other’s facilities and ranges for testing and evaluating military equipment and technologies. The CANUSTEP agreement has served to reduce DND and DoD costs for tests previously conducted under other mechanisms.

Canada is an extremely significant market for the United States defence industry and is one of the largest buyers of American defence equipment among all of the United States major allies. In 2001, for example, Canadian defence purchases in the United States amounted to approximately 20 percent of the acquisition budget. The United States has also benefited from access to a broader and stronger defence industrial technology base, greater standardization
and interoperability with a close military ally and cost effective and reliable alternative sources of supply. In the event of a national emergency, Canadian firms are positioned to augment the American industrial base to produce items critical to sustaining the United States forces. United States defence contractors have a major presence in Canada, and, over the last 50 years, have developed Canadian operations that support both DND and DoD. Canada’s privileged access to the American market also affords Canada the ability to have many more sources of supply, critical to national security, than could not be economically maintained through DND acquisitions alone.44

**DEFENCE PROCUREMENT AND SUSTAINMENT**

The Canadian military has in the past unfortunately been used by the federal government as a tool for regional development ahead of military efficiency and effectiveness when it comes to major equipment purchases. To date, attempts by DND officials to control these types of imposed and costly national acquisition practices have proven futile because they originate outside the Department’s authority. “Examples of procurement programs that continue to plague the CF are not hard to find. During the 1980s, the CF acquired most of its transport vehicles through politically directed regional development initiatives. For instance, the Iltis jeep, designed by Audi and VW of Germany and Belgium, was made under license in Quebec by Bombardier. The Light Support Vehicle Wheeled (LSVW) designed by Iveco, a subsidiary of Fiat, was made in Kelowna B.C. by Western Star. The Medium Logistics Vehicle Wheeled (MLVW), a modified United States Army M35/M36, was made by Bombardier, and the Heavy Logistics Vehicle Wheeled (HLVW), designed by Steyr of Austria, was made in Kingston, Ontario by the company UTDC.”45

“DND paid an exorbitant premium for these regionally manufactured trucks, a premium estimated at 250% of the original manufacturers’ retail price. In other words, DND should have obtained twice the number of vehicles for the same price, or paid half as much for what it got. But this was only the start of the negative effects of this costly venture. When the Canadian plants closed, the military had no recourse but to return to the original manufacturer for spare parts. As you can see, owning a limited production, foreign designed truck is a very expensive proposition.”46

Canada cannot afford to develop defence technologies from first principles with the size of her defence budget. The framework of defence industrial agreements outlined above provides the structure for Canada to purchase proven off the shelf capabilities that have been developed and are in use by the United States military. Buying North American not only makes good fiscal
sense, it also ensures that equipment purchased can be maintained and sustained. A nation’s military should not be used in support of regional development initiatives.

**UNITED STATES ARMY TRANSFORMATION PLAN**

The United States Army Transformation Planning Guidance states, "It is in our interest to make arrangements for international military cooperation to ensure that rapidly transforming United States capabilities can be applied effectively with allied and coalition capabilities." A component of the Army’s interoperability goal is to ensure that these select military forces keep pace with United States Army Transformation and avoid unnecessary degradation in multinational force compatibility. The Army International Activities Plan (AIAP) focuses on crafting mutually beneficial army-to-army relationships with those countries that are contributing to United States Army missions or are most likely to do so in the future. AIAP uses senior leader and bilateral staff talks; ABCA Standardization Program and NATO standardization activities; and other venues to influence foreign planning and programming decisions, exchange information, leverage advanced technology, and share lessons learned.

At the AUSA in October 2003 in his first media roundtable, Army Chief of Staff General Peter Schoomaker stated that, “Although he plans to continue much of the transformation initiated by his predecessor, retired General Eric Shinseki, he will not be using terms like legacy, interim and objective to describe the force.” The terms being used are the Current Force and the Future Force. He noted that the focus is on the present and ensuring that more Army funding goes toward the equipment that is already in the hands of soldiers, instead of future combat systems. Of his top fifteen focus areas, the Soldier is at the top of the list.

In November 2003 General Peter Schoomaker issued his *Way Ahead* and an updated *Army Transformation Roadmap*. These two documents provide the necessary refocus and guidance for how he intends to take the United States Army through its transformation in support of the National Security and Defense Strategies. He states in the *Way Ahead* that the goal of army transformation is to provide relevant and ready Current Forces and Future Forces organized, trained, and equipped for joint, interagency, and multi-national full spectrum operations.

In November 2002 the United States Army responded to a capabilities gap between its lethal, survivable, but slow-to-deploy heavy forces and its rapidly deployable light forces that lack the protection, lethality, and tactical mobility by fielding its first Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCT) into its Current Force. With the SBCT the Army has fielded its first truly medium weight network-centric force. The SBCT is a combined arms force in both design and manner
of deployment and employment. The SBCTs are able to deploy rapidly, execute early entry, and conduct effective combat operations upon arrival. The first SBCT, 3 Brigade/2 Infantry Division, has deployed in support of OIF. The second and third SBCTs are currently organizing and training. The Army will field a total of six SBCTs by 2007 and the Reserve Component will achieve operational capability of its SBCT in 2010. The SBCTs will increase rapid strategic response from power projection platforms, and will help shape the development of the Future Force. The Army has fully funded the Stryker program to field six SBCTs. The Stryker family of vehicles has two variants: the Mobile Gun System (MGS) and the Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV). To date the US Army has only fielded the ICV variant.  

The United States Army intends to learn from the deployment of the SBCT on operations and apply those lessons to the development of the Future force. With the country at war, General Schoomaker is focused on ensuring he provides the tools to the Current Force so that they are successful as they fight the war on terrorism. Transforming the nations' military capabilities while at war requires a careful balance between sustaining and enhancing the capabilities of current forces to fight wars and win the peace while investing in the capabilities of future forces.  

CANADIAN ARMY TRANSFORMATION PLAN

When Lieutenant General Rick Hillier took over the Canadian Army in June 2003, he stated in his change of command remarks that it was his job to implement the Army Vision and the Army Strategy developed by his predecessor Lieutenant General Mike Jeffery. Since that time he has continued to reinforce that theme. In a press conference on 29 October 2003, he spoke about his views on army transformation and he announced the purchase of the General Dynamics Mobile Gun System for the army.

This transformation will allow us to implement the Army Vision and the Army Strategy resulting in an immensely capable land force component of the CF... This transformed army will be credible with friends and allies ... The mobile direct fire system that we are talking about here today will give us the capability we can deploy and which would fit well with our Light Armoured Vehicle fleet, and the Coyote reconnaissance and surveillance fleets. It is important to stress that a mobile direct fire system is just one component of the weapons systems on vehicles we are introducing in our plan over the next several years. These war-winning systems are in turn just one component of Army Transformation... We are also introducing radical changes in the way we train, the way we generate our forces for missions, and the way in which we manage our equipment ... Our ability to act in our transformed land force is built around the best weapons system that we have and one that at the end of the day is not propelled by itself on tracks or on wheels but one that moves on combat boots - our soldiers.
The weapons systems that Lieutenant General Hillier was referring to are: the Tow Under Armour (TUA) system, a vehicle mounted heavy Mortar, and the Oerlikon Air Defence Anti-Tank System (ADATS). The Canadian Army already have these systems in their inventory and intend to mount them on a Light Armoured Vehicle (LAV) chassis continuing the trend of a common platform that is air portable in a C-130. The Army intends to retire the Leopard tank and replace the M-109 fleet. Canada is transforming her Army into a medium weight force based on the LAV family of vehicles, the same as the Stryker family of vehicles built by General Dynamics. The new force is designed to be strategically deployable and is optimized for employment in complex terrain, but will be adaptable to any environment. It will not be a force able to go head to head with any opponent, but will be a combat capable force similar to the SBCTs being fielded in the United States Army. It will allow Canada to continue to provide a credible and relevant deployable force for security operations at home and for international coalition operations abroad.

THE RIGHT FORCE STRUCTURE FOR CANADA (THE STRYKER BRIGADE)

As shown earlier, Canada cannot afford to maintain the full spectrum of military capability. The decision has been made to transform into a medium weight force and that process is now well underway. The fact is Canada’s three mechanized brigade groups are very similar to the SBCTs. Not only are they similar in equipment and size, but they are strategically deployable by air the same as the SBCTs. Through ABCA and NATO standardization efforts, both armies have a similar operating doctrine. Recent experiences in Somalia, Haiti and Afghanistan have demonstrated the interoperability of the two forces. An opportunity has presented itself with the United States Army transformation for Canada to offer something credible and relevant to the United States for coalition operations, three more medium weight brigades. The United States has just deployed an SBCT to Iraq. Both countries will learn from that deployment.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The author feels that the Canadian government must conduct the much debated and discussed defence review in 2004. The outcome of that review must be a new White Paper on Defence that clearly outlines what the Canadian government wants from the military. More importantly, the White Paper must be backed up with sufficient funds to pay for the tasks and priorities contained in the White Paper. Secondly, a fundamental change in defence procurement policy must be initiated. There has to be an acknowledgement that the Canadian military is too small to go it alone for large scale capital projects. The Canada/United States
defence agreements and our intertwined industrial base have provided opportunities that Canada has not yet taken full advantage of. If the two countries are going to continue to work together both at home and internationally, it just makes sense that Canada must increase its buy North American program. Thirdly, the Canadian government must continue to work closely with the United States government on the issue of North American security through the Bi-National Planning Group located with NORTHCOM and NORAD Headquarters in Colorado Springs. Lastly, bruised relations with the United States over Iraq must be repaired. This can only be accomplished by a shift in attitude and personal intervention on the part of the new Prime Minister.

Internally, the Canadian military also have a role to play in controlling their own destiny. The framework for defence cooperation is proven and already in place for the Canadian and United States military to work together, yet full advantage of that cooperation has not been realized. Canada and the United States need to seize on the opportunities to train more together at the National Training Centre in California, the Joint Readiness Training Center in Louisiana and the new Canadian National Maneuver Training Center in Wainwright, Alberta. It is only through training together that forces will gain the confidence and trust that is so necessary in coalition operations. As the Canadian army continues to move down the transformation road it must continue to work with the United States Army through ABCA and our wide LO network to ensure that interoperability barriers are identified and eliminated. Lastly, the Canadian Army must continue its drive to re-equip the balance of it brigades with all the variants of the LAV family of vehicles to complete the shift to a medium weight force.

CONCLUSION – INDEPENDENT, CREDIBLE AND RELEVANT

Increasing global unrest and the broad threat to national security will ensure that the Canadian government will want to remain engaged internationally and will demand a capable Canadian Forces that is strategically relevant and credible in a multi-lateral coalition scenario. Canada has repeatedly demonstrated that she is willing to commit to such ventures. Within the next twelve months a comprehensive defence review and a new White Paper on Defence is expected. There is optimism that an increase to defence spending will occur. The United States can assist in this regard by being specific to the Canadian government and telling them what is militarily important as our countries work together to deal with the threat of international terrorism. Having a military that is more closely aligned, similarly equipped and trained removes interoperability barriers to future coalition operations. Doing so does not prejudice Canada’s sovereignty and right to decide what path to take internationally. If the recommendations above
are taken, then Canada will be ready to face the challenges of the future with a combat capable and sustainable army force structure that is both credible and relevant to the United States and her allies.

WORD COUNT = 7073
ENDNOTES

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45 Douglas Bland, 94 -95.

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50 Ibid.


52 Schoomaker and Brownlee, 8-12 to 8-13.

53 Ibid, i and ix.

54 The author was present at the change of command ceremony in Ottawa on June 15th 2003 and listened to the remarks of Lieutenant General Hillier on that occasion.


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