USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

SERVICE LONGEVITY FOR ARMY RESERVE
ACTIVE GUARD RESERVE (AGR) OFFICERS

by

Lieutenant Colonel Kevin G. Mangan
United States Army Reserve

Colonel Ruth B. Collins
Project Adviser

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
### Service Longevity for Army Reserve Active Guard Reserve (AGR) Officers

#### Report Details

- **Report Date:** 03 May 2004
- **Report Type:** 
- **Dates Covered:** 
- **Title and Subtitle:** Service Longevity for Army Reserve Active Guard Reserve (AGR) Officers
- **Author(s):** Kevin Mangan
- **Performing Organization:** U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5050
- **Distribution/Availability Statement:** Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
- **Security Classification:**
  - Report: Unclassified
  - Abstract: Unclassified
  - This Page: Unclassified
- **Number of Pages:** 24

### Abstract
See attached file.
Current policy dictates that reserve officers in the Active Guard Reserve (AGR) program are released from active duty after 20 years of active federal service (AFS). This is often many years prior to their Mandatory Retirement Date (MRD). The Secretary of Defense views the forced retirement of officers at MRD as a waste of resources. The Assistant Secretary of the Army, Manpower & Reserve Affairs, ASA(M&RA) has approved interim policy changes for retaining officers beyond 20 years through a board process. However, there is a need to develop a predictable, systematic process for life cycle management of AGR officers up to their MRD. The purpose of this paper is to propose policies to effectively retain AGR officers up to their MRD.
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SERVICE LONGEVITY FOR ARMY RESERVE AGR OFFICERS

We encourage and often force servicemen and women to retire after 20 years in uniform – after we have spent millions to train them and when, in their 40’s, they are at the peak of their talent and skills.

—Donald Rumsfeld

Weeks after Secretary Donald Rumsfeld took over the Department of Defense, he announced as a top priority, the need to take a fresh look at longevity within the military. He views officers being forced out through mandatory retirement as a loss of personnel at their intellectual prime. Active Army officers were exiting at the average age of 51, having served 28 to 30 years of service depending on their current grade. The Active Guard Reserve (AGR) Program in the Army Reserve requires officers to separate at 20 years of active federal service (AFS), typically six to eight years prior to the statutorily required mandatory removal date (MRD). The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) has approved interim changes to the policy for AGR longevity extensions. However, there remains a need to establish a predictable systematic process for the management of AGR officer longevity to MRD to support unit readiness and career development in the Army Reserve.

The issue of AGR longevity is particularly critical during this period when the nation is at war. The House Armed Services Committee has expressed concern about the reliance on the reserve components. The committee “articulated the inextricable link between reserve component readiness levels and its full-time support force.” In order to maintain the best readiness of units possible, there is a need to develop the bench of future full-time AGR officers in the Army Reserve. Separating officers well ahead of their MRD contradicts effective human resource management practices, significantly increases turnover in the senior grade officer ranks, and adversely impacts the military at war.

EVOLUTION OF AGR OFFICER LONGEVITY POLICY

The Active Guard Reserve (AGR) program in the Army Reserve has evolved since 1960 into the current career program. Beginning in 1960, AR 135-18, Assignment of ARNGUS [Army National Guard, United States] and USAR [U.S. Army Reserve] Officers to Headquarters and Agencies for Reserve Affairs, established initial policies and procedures for administering the AGR program. The first introduction of the term Active Guard Reserve was in 1982 with AR 135-2, Full-Time Manning. This regulation governed the establishment of AGR requirements. The revision in 1985 of AR 135-18, The Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) Program, changed the
title and more significantly, established that AGR officers are released from active duty when they have attained 20 years of active federal service (AFS). In 1996, the establishment of the Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act (ROPMA) brought significant changes to the promotion, separation and retirement system in the active and reserve components. For AGR officers, the promotion system directly ties to the issue of AFS longevity.

The original intent of the 20 year AFS policy was to provide a means to grant retirements instead of limiting service. There was a small group of officers in the full-time support program currently known as AGR and the intention was for an officer to serve a single tour and return to drilling reserve status. The AGR program has evolved well beyond the original intent.

Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 1205.18, **Full-Time Support (FTS) to the Reserve Components**, specifically directs that the AGR program be administered as a career program. With current regulations and policies, it has become evident that officers do consider the AGR program a career. Few officers voluntarily separate after their initial tour and now there are over 3200 officers serving worldwide. Assignments are made using the life cycle management model to make officers competitive for future promotions.

**NAVY TRAINING AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE RESERVES (TAR) PROGRAM**

Despite the DoD “umbrella,” a brief review of the program in other services revealed that there is not a comparable “20 year AFS rule” in any of the other services. The Navy full-time management program for reserve units is the Training and Administration of the Reserves (TAR) program. The officer population in the TAR program is similar to the Army Reserve AGR program, with an end strength of about 4,000 officers. However, promotion selection rates are somewhat lower in the TAR program than in the Army Reserve AGR program. The promotion system is managed by year group, with Navy TAR officers competing for promotion simultaneously with the active component Navy officers in the same year groups. There is a control point with a centralized selection for continuation at 24 and 26 years of active federal service. Lieutenant Commanders not selected for promotion are protected by the system because they reach 18 year “lock in” sanctuary for retirement before being considered a second time for promotion selection.

A key component of the Navy TAR program is that TAR officers are tracked with the same year group as their active counterparts. By Navy policy, promotion rates must be within 5% of the active component Navy selection rates. The management of the population is through selections that are based on projected requirements. This is in contrast to the Army Reserve
AGR program that does not tie promotions to requirements and where AGR promotion rates are 25 to 30% higher than active Army selection rates.

OPMS XXI EFFECT ON AGR CAREER LONGEVITY

The Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act (ROPMA) directed new management programs for the Army Reserve. Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) XXI followed and was implemented for the Army Reserve AGR officer program in May 2003, but only for those career fields applicable to the AGR program. The significance for the AGR program is the use of a “single track” career field for future life cycle management. With 25% of all positions in senior grades coded 01A branch immaterial, the defining of position requirements is important for establishing future needs for the Army Reserve. This establishes promotion policies and longevity requirements but allows requirements to drive life cycle management instead of the current longevity policies. Officers only have assignment options within their designated career fields. Longevity is important when OPMS narrows officer control specialties to small populations.

The AGR program is already a small population of officers. Further divided by specific career field management under OPMS, it is critical to smooth out the peaks and valleys of the present promotion and management system. The current system relies completely on AFS extension boards for the shaping of the AGR officer force. This changes the current culture of AGR program by moving officers from generalists to single track specialists. The impact is the need for more depth of experience in an officer’s assigned specialty instead of a broad background. Once this experience is acquired, longevity policies need to support maintaining this expertise in the force as long as possible for the best qualified officers. Without a systemic plan for the development of officers for extended periods, separations are dictated by current policies and the experience gained over a decade of assignments is lost well before officers’ mandatory removal dates.

FULL-TIME SUPPORT AND ARMY READINESS

The AGR program has a significant impact on readiness for units in the Army Reserve. Because unit readiness has been directly linked to the full-time force in the reserve, the Secretary of the Army was authorized to increase the AGR force from 1997-2000 in an effort to increase reserve force readiness. Continued Congressional interest in the full-time force resulted in the Secretary of the Army authorizing additional incremental increases in the AGR force in FY 2003. These increases in AGR end strength are in direct support of the increased reliance on reserve units to perform missions world wide.
Deliberate and responsible management of the AGR forces is critical to the overall readiness of reserve units. All personnel management initiatives must carefully consider the impact on unit readiness. Turnover from frequent rotations of full-time support personnel degrades unit readiness. Regular rotation is a key distinction between drilling reserve and full-time support personnel. Active component (AC) personnel, U. S. Navy Reserve (USNR) Training and Administration of the Reserves (TARs), U. S. Army Reserve (USAR) Active Guard Reserves (AGRs), Marine Corps Reserve (MCR) Active Guard Reserves (AGRs), and Air Force Reserve (AFR) officer Military Technicians (MTs) regularly rotate officers among assignments for effective career development. Effective longevity policies to stay beyond 20 years AFS is present in all the above services except the Army Reserve AGR program. You can see the importance of effective management when you consider the overall percentage of full-time forces in reserve units.

The following table shows the FY03 end strengths of reserves by component and the proportion that full-time unit manning represents for that component:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected Reserve</th>
<th>Total Strength</th>
<th>AGR/TARS</th>
<th>Technicians</th>
<th>% Full time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army Reserve</td>
<td>205,000</td>
<td>14,374</td>
<td>7,594</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy Reserve</td>
<td>85,900</td>
<td>14,384</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps Reserve</td>
<td>39,600</td>
<td>2,261</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force Reserve</td>
<td>75,800</td>
<td>1,660</td>
<td>10,081</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army National Guard</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>25,595</td>
<td>26,189</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air National Guard</td>
<td>107,000</td>
<td>12,193</td>
<td>23,156</td>
<td>33.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>863,300</td>
<td>70,469</td>
<td>67,020</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 1. TOTAL STRENGTH AND FULL TIME SUPPORT BY COMPONENT

A significant part of Army Reserve full-time support includes military technicians who typically stay in the same position and location for extended periods of time. Of the 14,374 Army Reserve AGR positions, only 3,249 are officers. Army Reserve AGR officers represent less than 2% of the force, yet this small group of AGR officers fills key positions throughout the Army. Personnel turnover based on the current 20 year AFS policy significantly affects this small, but key category of AGR personnel. AFS date is treated like a MRD policy for officers. Unless selected for AFS extension, an officer must retire or return to a troop unit and choose not to receive retirement.
A CASE FOR CHANGE

The development of a “bench” in the senior leadership of the AGR program directly impacts the Army Reserves’ ability to effectively manage the force. Transformation to the Army Reserve of the future requires solid, well developed leaders. Excessive turnover in the senior leadership of the officer corps degrades effective management and impacts unit readiness.

The Chief of Staff of the Army has established 17 immediate focus areas for increasing relevance and readiness of the Army. The following two of these focus areas are relevant to the topic of AGR officer longevity:

**The Bench** – Prepare future generations of senior leaders. Identify and prepare select Army leaders for key positions within joint interagency, multinational and Service organizations.

**Leader Development and Education** – Train and educate Army members of the Joint Team.

These two focus areas are interdependent and require a planned program of assignments and training to make the best use of officers. The current 20-year AFS policy is not consistent with the intent of these initiatives. A recent staff study of education showed an alarming trend for continued service of AGR Senior Service College (SSC) graduates. The SSC graduates represent the top five percent of AGR officers based on resident school selection rates. In the past ten years of graduates, the average years of service after SSC graduation has dropped from 6.8 years to 2.4 years. The conclusion is that some of the best and brightest officers are serving very little time after graduation.

The 20 year AFS policy creates a ceiling for service that forces many officers out of the AGR program. When selected for AFS extension, last year’s Colonels were given only an additional year to serve. A one year extension does not serve the organization or the officer well. The officer must plan for retirement “year to year” with an annual AFS extension board. The organization is not able to reassign the officer via a permanent change of station (PCS) to a new position with limited time available for assignment. The officer continues to plan for possible retirement in the near term which degrades effectiveness in serving the unit.

As more officers receive AFS extensions, the added career longevity increases the number of officers able to compete for promotion to Colonel. With high promotion selection rates not connected to requirements, the result is over selection to Colonel and minimal time available to serve at the next higher grade. Promoting more officers than required can also contribute to increased movement and turmoil with a top-heavy AGR program.
The current AGR force is depicted in the following table by grade for the AGR officer force effective 10 July 2003:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Positions</th>
<th>Fill</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LT</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>734</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>1431</td>
<td>1351</td>
<td>-80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>963</td>
<td>708</td>
<td>-255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COL</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3249</td>
<td>3171</td>
<td>-78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 2. TOTAL AGR OFFICER POSITIONS AND STRENGTH BY GRADE**

First glance shows personnel shortages for majors and lieutenant colonels and an overall shortage for colonels by 28 officers. Typically, AGR officers will fill the next higher grade position up to three years in advance of promotion in order to balance position requirements.

**LONGEVITY POLICY IMPACT**

Current policies for longevity work adversely with AGR promotions. AGR officer promotions are exceeding requirements at senior grades and many officers must retire within one year of pin-on dates as a result. AGR personnel management processes adjust longevity to the promotion results that are not based on requirements. The active Army uses its promotion system, in effect, to manage longevity in the officer corps. Officers are selected for promotion based on projected requirements. Using historical trends for retirements and separations, the selection objectives for promotion are established for a board. If selected for promotion, the statutory limitations for longevity apply to the selected officers, currently 28 years commissioned service for Lieutenant Colonel and 30 years for Colonel. For retirement pay purposes, the officer must hold the current grade for three years. This encourages officers selected for promotion to serve a minimum of three years in the current grade prior to submitting for a voluntary retirement, unless properly waived. This is in contrast to the current Army Reserve AGR program that can have its officers face an AFS “involuntary” retirement after serving a minimum of six months in grade for retirement pay purposes. When a large group of AGR officers are considered for promotion to colonel, high selection rates exceed requirements and force excessive separations. For example, of the 708 Lieutenant Colonel population in Table 2 above, 235 are eligible for promotion consideration to Colonel in FY 2004. Using historical selection rates of 60%, approximately 141 officers are projected for selection to Colonel. The end result is a significant over selection to the grade of Colonel. The primary
method of reducing the Colonel population is then to deny AFS extensions to the most senior officers. This method dramatically increases turnover of senior officers. The high turnover produced by the current practice of limiting officer extensions (to prevent bottleneck in promotions of next year’s officers) is detrimental to retaining the best senior officers in the Army.

The current 20-year AFS policies in some cases limit an AGR officer from reaching promotion eligibility far into the future. A captain entering the AGR program with 8 years AFS requires 12 years of mandatory consideration and promotion selection to get to the Lieutenant Colonel promotion board. Under the current process, there is no chance to be promoted to Lieutenant Colonel without an AFS extension. For other officers selected by AFS extension boards, they receive short one and two year incremental extensions that inhibit the officer and the organization from planning for future utilization. These AFS extension boards have begun to drive the promotion and assignment process in the Army Reserve AGR program. Key assignments, professional development education, and command eligibility all center on longevity. Regardless of MRD, without longevity remaining to 20 years AFS, officers are ineligible for selection.

Currently, the average AFS of the Colonel population is 19.6 years. 160 (52%) of the Colonels are beyond 20 years AFS. Also, 50% of the officers have been extended past 20 years AFS at least once. The significance of this is the turmoil that the current process presents. The Colonel and Lieutenant Colonel population past 20 years AFS are not valued in this model as experienced resources. Instead, senior grade officers in the AGR program are retained if they are not blocking promotions for future officers. Senior officers are often forced to retire and move aside to facilitate future promotions. Any further extensions of this population may prevent promotion for a Major or Lieutenant Colonel for other officers coming up through the ranks. This practice supports promotions which are currently averaging 98% to Lieutenant Colonel and 60% to Colonel for AGR officers. High promotion rates, combined with more officers selected for AFS extension, will create promotion congestion for AGR officers. Obviously, selecting Colonels for extension will directly contribute to this promotion congestion.

For the Colonels competing for extension, the Army Reserve uses a board process. Established and used the past three years, this is a Department of the Army centralized board administered through the Army G-1. When an active component officer is selected for promotion to Colonel, his or her longevity is based on statutory provisions for service for 30 years unless a voluntary request for retirement is submitted. For the AGR Colonel, the extension boards will incrementally grant extensions to those officers selected. Typically a two-year extension is granted through the board process for all officer grades. For the FY04 board,
however, Colonels were granted a one year extension. So, after going through the board process, one additional year is granted followed by another board process in less than a year. Neither the officer nor the service can plan on utilization based on these short incremental extensions. This directly impacts turbulence and guarantees uncertainty in the management process. Further, based on these short incremental extensions, over 200 Colonels are scheduled losses by the end of CY 2004. That is 65% of the existing population that is uncertain of future service. By the end of CY 2006, over 90% of the Colonel population is projected as losses. No organization can function in today’s environment with that much uncertainty in its senior leader population.

High promotion selection rates not based on AGR requirements should not dictate AFS extension models. A robust model will select officers for promotion at all ranks based on available and projected requirements. Those unfilled requirements may then drive AFS extension requirements in the interim. The steady state goal would be a pull system that selects based on needs of the service. Those officers selected would then automatically have longevity based on statutory MRD. Increasing the increment of extensions will reduce the turbulence in the AGR force and maintain the best officers to MRD. Currently, the issue is that all life cycle management processes in the Army Reserve AGR program are driven by the 20 year rule for AFS.

Culturally, officers see a challenge to staying past 20 years AFS in the AGR program under the current process. Selection rates for AFS extension have continued to drop from 90% to 48% over the past three Army Reserve AFS extension boards. Trends indicate that promotion rates will remain high and AFS selection rates will continue to drop in the future.

The reserve component chiefs have continually sought delegation of authority to manage the longevity of their AGR officers. Current policy delegated by the ASA(M&RA) dictates a board process for selection for AFS extension. The delegation authority granted allows extensions up to three years with eligibility and select objectives determined by each reserve component service chief. This delegation also requires a Department of the Army board process managed through HQDA, G-1. The Director, Army National Guard does not see this as the best use of resources. Because a centralized board is directed, the Army National Guard (ARNG) executes a formal board for every state and territory, 54 total, regardless of the number of officers considered for AFS extension. In some states, three officers are being boarded for three selection requirements. One could suggest that when the number of fully qualified officers being considered equals the number of requirements, a board could be waived.
The Chief, Army Reserve (CAR) has concurred with Pentagon working groups and studies that have recommended delegation of authority or elimination of the 20 year AFS policy limitation contained in AR 135-18, *The Active Guard Reserve Program.* The longevity policy still remains after numerous studies and groups have shown the AGR program has evolved past an individual short tour program to support units with one-time fills to a career program.

**BOOZ, ALLEN AND HAMILTON STUDY**

In January 2001, ASA(M&RA) commissioned Booz, Allen and Hamilton, Inc (BAH) to conduct an AGR program review to assess a variety of issues in both the Army Reserve and Army National Guard programs. One primary element of the BAH study addressed the policies in AR 140-30, specifically the 20-year AFS rule. The policy then authorized the Chief, Army Reserve (CAR) to grant AFS extensions, subject to Secretary of the Army (SA) approval, when officers request extension in increments of two years or less beyond 20 years AFS. These extensions were to be based on needs of the service for the particular experience and qualifications of the officer.

The results of the BAH study recommended formalization of AGR career planning processes and establishment of written guidelines. The report stated such conclusions as, “It is believed that the 20-year AFS policy is outdated,” and “Any policy change should minimize the administrative burden on the reserve component chiefs to include the conduct of additional boards to assess extension requests.” Feedback to this study from service members in the AGR program also identified the 20-year AFS policy as one of the top three concerns for the force. This study was presented to ASA(M&RA) and another working group was convened to make recommendations for policy revisions. With the BAH study as a basis, the working group recommended revisions to the 20-year AFS policy that included an interim delegation of authority for reserve component chiefs to conduct boards and recommend extensions in increments up to three years AFS to MRD based on the needs of the service. This interim incremental board process is what the reserve component service chiefs are currently using. The established method for implementing AFS extension policies is still in the early stages of development.

**MODELS FOR LONGEVITY**

There are several models currently in use that warrant consideration for future use. Each of these models is considered with the focus of providing a process for longevity for Army Reserve AGR officers to statutory MRD.
STATUS QUO MODEL

This is the current model used for the first three AFS extension boards conducted by the Army Reserve. The model defines requirements for longevity AFS selection boards by promotion eligibility and back logs. In simple terms, if officers are projected for promotion in a grade and specialty, then the model does not provide extension select objectives for the officers at the next higher grade. This model uses the assumption that extensions of officers at the current grade cannot block promotions of officers projected at junior grades. An example of this philosophy is that if majors are projected to be promoted in transportation to Lieutenant Colonel, then this directly reduces the number of Lieutenant Colonel transportation officers that can be extended. Under this model, priority is upward mobility to eliminate promotion bottle necks. Promotions are currently based on total reserve requirements (TPU, AGR, Army National Guard) instead of separate Army Reserve AGR requirements. This typically results in high promotion selection rates for AGR officers of 98% to Major and Lieutenant Colonel. The weakness in this model is forcing potentially much better qualified officers out at a higher grade to make room for promotions.

Additionally, the model compares all officers in the same grade and specialty as equals for evaluation purposes. Since comparison of officers is primarily by grade without use of year groups, junior time-in-grade officers must compete equally against officers with four or more years in the same grade. Continuing the same example above, a transportation major with six months time-in-grade is considered and evaluated equally with a major having six years time-in-grade, not exactly a level playing field for the officer and it may also miss the needs of the Army Reserve. An officer senior in grade may be extended to fill a major transportation requirement, then be promoted to Lieutenant Colonel the next year. Equity to the officer and the service requirements seemed to be missed with this model.

YEAR GROUP MANAGEMENT MODEL

This model is derived from the current active component methods of managing longevity. Managing officers by specialty, grade and year group is conducive to predicting needs of the service in a predictable manner. This would allow for more precise shaping of the force through specific allocation of requirements for AFS extensions by year group and specialty. The desired end state would be to manage the requirements toward a promotion board system where selection for promotion resulted in AFS extension to an increment toward MRD. For example, with selection to Lieutenant Colonel, an officer is also extended to 24 years AFS.
The advantage of this model is a detailed comparison of officers regardless of AFS. Year groups are based on date of rank. The current extension model does not take year group into account, therefore resulting in granting AFS extensions to officers in an already large year group who will all compete for promotion at the same time. Worse, the current model can result in non-selection for AFS extension in under-manned year groups that will result in minimal promotions to meet the needs of AGR officers in the future.

This model also contributes to the analysis of the entire life cycle management of AGR officers. Through the year group analysis, it can be determined in advance of accessions into the AGR program which year groups are short or over. Targeted accessions can now be used to shape the force at the beginning of life cycle management. This reduces personnel turbulence later in life cycle management when officers are at senior grades.

**RAND DEMAND PULL MODEL**

In 2000, Rand Corporation proposed the “Demand Pull” model to address the issue of longevity for personnel management. The model begins with the senior grades and works backward, for instance with Colonels. You would determine the inventory and the number entering and leaving from promotions followed by establishing years of service (YOS). Finally, you would subtract the retirements to determine the required promotions into the grade for the future year. This is applied over a five-year period to reduce the peaks and valleys that may occur with a significantly small or larger year group. This is similar to the current five-year plan used for promotion boards.

This model correlates well to the Army Reserve AGR program because of the ability to run the model on specific populations. The shaping tool or dependent variable would temporarily remain the current 20-year AFS policy. When this model reached steady state, officers selected for promotion to the next higher grade could voluntarily serve to MRD.

In the AGR program, there are some requirements that dictate a specific specialty or experience to fill the position and others that are coded branch immaterial. As stated earlier, currently over 25% of the AGR officer requirements are coded as branch immaterial. The CAR has recently directed branch immaterial positions be reduced to no more than five percent. This pull model has the advantage of using promotion requirements for shaping the force. It also maintains the AFS extension board for meeting needs in low density specialties by forecasting those needs by year group analysis.
THE WAY AHEAD

Changing longevity policies will create change that is not without resistance. Resistance will center primarily around two arguments. The first argument is that increasing longevity will slow promotions. Any reduction to the current high promotion rates is viewed as negative. In response, little competition for promotions can contribute to a culture of mediocrity in the officer corps. Rewarding strong and weak performers equally is detrimental to developing a quality group of senior leaders.

The second argument is that if a model is adopted that mirrors the current active Army, the Army Reserve risks looking too much like the active Army, and this could lead to eliminating the Army Reserve. Already we have combined staffs at the Department of the Army level and within the Human Resources Command, and the need for reserve component expertise will remain after the efficiencies of combining the staffs are accomplished. Needed policy changes for longevity of the Army Reserve AGR officer corps should not be disregarded for fear of possible future organization changes. The officer expertise that results from longevity policy changes will produce officers who will work the future transformation changes for the Army Reserve. Longevity policy changes are needed and neither of these two arguments warrants retention of the current process.

Revision of the policies for AGR longevity is required to build the bench of experienced AGR officers in the Army Reserve. Determining the future requirements for AGR reserve officers is the most important step in an effective process. When AGR officers are selected for promotion based on requirements, the current statutory MRD will effectively manage the population and provide for longer terms of service for the officer corps. Although promotion selection rates will decline somewhat, the reduction in turnover for senior leaders in the AGR program is a significant benefit to developing future leaders. Those officers selected for promotion will have increased longevity and provide an effective bench to serve as senior leaders in the Army Reserve. This process allows the active service extension process to shape the force to meet future requirements in the interim and reduces the practice of forcing out quality officers just to increase promotion opportunities. In the interim, until a separate competitive category is established for AGR officer promotions, the leadership of the Army Reserve should not promote officers in excess of requirements. Solving the issue of longevity will provide the much needed program for “building the bench” of the future Army Reserve AGR program.

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ENDNOTES


8 Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act (ROPMA), enacted with the FY 1995 Defense Authorization Act, effective 1 Oct 1996.


12 Active Guard Reserve Management Information System (AGRMIS), (Saint Louis, M.O.: Human Resources Command – Saint Louis, effective 10 July 2003).


15 Active Guard Reserve Management Information System (AGRMIS), (Saint Louis, M.O.: Human Resources Command – Saint Louis, effective 10 July 2003).
16 Assistant Secretary (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) Reginald J. Brown, “Retention of Active Guard Reserve (AGR) Officers Beyond 20 Years of Active Federal Service (AFS),” memorandum for Chief, Army Reserve, Washington, D.C., 11 Feb 2003.


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