USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

THE TOTAL FORCE POLICY AND EFFECTIVE FORCE

by

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This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the
Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student
academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the
official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of
Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
1. REPORT DATE
03 MAY 2004

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
The Total Force Policy and Effective Force

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7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5050

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

15. SUBJECT TERMS

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Unclassified</th>
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<tr>
<td>a. REPORT</td>
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<td>b. ABSTRACT</td>
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17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT

18. NUMBER OF PAGES
29

19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON

See attached file.
This strategy research project concludes that current Department of Defense guidance for rebalancing will reverse the Total Force Policy in terms of its essential contributions to the effectiveness of US armed forces. An inductive analysis grounded in historical precedent indicates that the Total Force Policy supports the overall readiness and decisive use of military force. The Total Force Policy is not a Cold War or post-Vietnam anachronism, but an essential ingredient to the successful application of military force. The goal of conducting rapid response operations without any reserve call-up or mobilization prior to commencement of operations will obviate the use of reserve forces within the construct of the typical joint campaign. This will cause a departure from the Total Force Policy’s outcome of complementary active and reserve forces, and reinstate the vision of redundant roles for reserves forces that predated intervention in Vietnam. Perceived shortfalls in the Total Force Policy come from failure to invest adequately in the readiness of reserve forces, not from any intrinsic inability of reserves to support military operations. Instead of altering component roles, the Army should focus on achieving a reserve component readiness posture that is on par with active component forces.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to gratefully acknowledge the help of my project advisor, Colonel Randy Pullen, and my faculty advisor, Dr. Doug Borer. Colonel Pullen directed me to the principal resources and lines of inquiry that focus on the Total Force Policy; he was very helpful in sharing his own resources and expertise, as well as reviewing and commenting on the draft document. My faculty advisor, Dr. Doug Borer, first set me on the path, through our classroom and private discussions, to explore the Total Force Policy as a major defense policy issue. I also benefited much from the classroom discussions within my Army War College seminar group (8), and particularly in discussions with Mr. Felix Hernandez, US Department of State, who introduced me to the topic of civic militarism. The reference librarians at the Army War College library were essential in locating and procuring resources. The reasoning and conclusions in this paper reflect my own thoughts and opinions on the subject of Total Force Policy, in consultation with those works noted in the endnotes and bibliography.
THE TOTAL FORCE POLICY AND EFFECTIVE FORCE

Challenging times are calling the Army to: restructure its divisions, re-organize the Army staff, re-examine the roles of functional commands, expand its special warfare capabilities, and test new air mobility concepts. All of this is happening while the Army’s worldwide commitments continue to increase, “…and the feeling in the Office of the Secretary of Defense [is] that in the past it [has] not been all that well handled.”

That passage might have been taken from any of several transformational documents that have mushroomed since October 1999. Instead it is paraphrased from Lewis Sorley’s description of the Army circa 1964, when General Creighton Abrams became the Army Vice Chief of Staff. From that time, until 1974, when he died in office as Chief of Staff, the Army faced an imminent super-power threat from the USSR, fought a war in Vietnam, and saw rising domestic unrest, all while it competed with the Great Society and the space program for resources. Today the United States has no immediate peer nation competitor and the US enjoys relative domestic calm. Other government sectors compete for public money, but the September 11, 2001, attacks on the US moved Defense to the top of the queue.

From advanced information architecture to “born joint” doctrine and materiel, almost every avenue of defense management is seeking solutions to this altered security environment. One of these avenues has led to the perceived need to rebalance capabilities between reserve and active component forces. The simple question addressed here is whether significant mobilization of reserves should remain requisite to any national decision to deploy and employ general purpose forces. This was the result, if not the intent, of the Total Force Policy that came from General Abrams’ plan for post-Vietnam rebuilding of the Army. This paper posits that the current, primarily deductive approach to rebalancing will undo the salient effectiveness of the Total Force Policy, and thereby set the conditions for a less effective future force.

This argument against the present trends and assumptions in rebalancing is not a plea for the status quo ante Operation Iraqi Freedom. There is no question about the need to modernize and reorganize all component forces in order to fight information-age war. There is a need to rebalance within the reserve components to ensure that the work of the reserves is equitably distributed across the available force. That aspect of rebalancing is beyond the scope of this paper. This paper seeks specifically to counter the perception that requisite, early reserve component mobilization is a symptom of some archaic institutional inertia. On the contrary, significant reserve participation in all phases of a joint campaign is the best means of reinforcing the American military with the quality of durable effectiveness.
SYNOPSIS OF THE PRESENT REBALANCING EFFORT

The Total Force Policy is the Department of Defense policy of using reserve component forces as the primary and essential augmentation for the active component force in any medium to large deployment of forces. The Total Force Policy emerged during difficult times in 1973 as the precursor to an aggressive plan to field sixteen Army divisions. It may have been a compromise as the most feasible path to the future force. The reserves that General Abrams inherited when he became Army Chief of Staff in October 1972 were not the ideal complement for an active Army anticipating World War III. Reserves had come to be viewed as a dooms day force-of-last-resort, only to be called up when the Soviets charged the Fulda Gap. As a result, they were an unused, unready, and dispirited force. The Johnson administration had by-passed the reserves for service in Vietnam in favor of expanding the active Army through the draft. It appeared then that the reserves’ call to war might be as likely as the next nuclear salvo, an event which would make their existence finally and completely superfluous. The post-Vietnam leaders assumed considerable short term risk and cast their vision well beyond their time by staking national defense on the reserves at a time when conflict with the Soviets appeared imminent and US capabilities waned. Subsequent history has not betrayed their vision, because the reserve components have fulfilled their trust.

The Secretary of Defense memorandum that directs rebalancing forces between active and reserve components does not stipulate departure from the Total Force Policy. Even so, its provision for avoiding having reserve units as early deploying elements in war plans has raised concern among reserve component advocates that the end result might be the dilution of the Total Force Policy by significantly diminishing the role of reserve forces. This voice of concern comes from a sound and rational appreciation of history, culture, and warfighting effectiveness projected into the current and future operating environment.

The present effort to rebalance the force envisions an end-state wherein alert for mobilization of reserves is not required before commencement of “rapid response” operations, and reservists have predictability for their deployment commitments. The first goal implies changes to joint doctrine for campaign planning at the operational level. The second goal touches the strategic level in the personnel management and motivation of reserve component soldiers through offering predictable deployment cycles. The success of such a rebalanced force should be seen first in a more responsive active component force for initial entry of forces and secondly in a more durable form of reserve component augmentation to the overall campaign, particularly in the later phases. It all resonates with simple and appealing logic, founded on over a decade of post-Cold War experience. In other words, it will render a force
well designed to “fight the last war.” But there is no intention here to hamstring rebalancing with an overwrought, usually meaningless, truism—just a suggestion that the goals receive a closer look to see whether they derive from either too narrow a band of history, or too abstract a future vision.

This critique agrees with pursing rebalancing primarily as an effort to employ all reserve structure more efficiently instead of overusing small segments. It also agrees with the motivation behind rebalancing to achieve the most effective warfighting structure. Some may insist that early reserve mobilization be concomitant to the warfight in order to moderate the potential or scope of war through political debate. This sounds good hypothetically, but the first case has yet to be seen in which submitting the decision to go to war through the Constitutional process reduces the overall chances of war happening. Under the Total Force Policy, the US has decisively waged offensive war in Desert Storm, preventative war in the Balkans, and preemptive war in Iraq. It is also unproven and unlikely that calling up the reserves would have stymied the Vietnam escalation: it would, however, have added a sense of urgency and finality to the operation at the strategic level. Instead of moderating or preventing war, early commitment of the reserves best ensures the most vigorous, decisive, and discreet use of military force. The present path toward rebalancing risks setting the stage for situations of piecemeal commitment and distended violence.

PRIMACY OF THE EPOCHAL AND INDUCTIVE APPROACH

There are two ways to analyze rebalancing requirements, which, if they are hitched in tandem, would carry the effort efficiently forward. If they are uncoupled, or if one is discarded, the whole enterprise drags and will abandon on the road the goods necessary at the destination. One way is the deductive approach. It begins with an abstract set of general capabilities sought and concludes with specific measures that fulfill those perceived requirements. The other way is the inductive approach. It begins with specific observations from epochal precedents and arrives at general principles that should guide the overall process. Ideally, the deductive effort should proceed from the inductive effort. The inductive work provides a sound theoretical and existential basis from which the deductive process derives goals and metrics for achieving the most effective and economical capabilities possible.

Such an ideal approach answers the rational (or “why”) questions before moving toward the desired endstate. This methodical approach is particularly relevant to rebalancing US forces because any number of deduced solution sets could yield a more or less effective force against the known and foreseeable competition. A broad US overmatch in raw power has remained
constant in all wars fought since World War II. Yet winning any way is not necessarily winning the best way. The best way leaves intact a potent force not only for the next contingency, but for the next generation as well.

Within the nearly sixty-year span since WWII, the US has won all but one major conflict. The aggregate span of years it took to win decisively twice in Iraq and once in Afghanistan would add up to a minor fraction of the years it took the US to lose the Vietnam War. In fact, the total span of years from Gulf War I to the fall of Baghdad would not significantly exceed the total time taken in indecisive muddling in Vietnam. The chief military difference between the two approaches to war was the heavy reliance on the reserve components in all conflicts except Vietnam. War demands a sense of urgency at all levels, but without a sense of national urgency at the strategic level, war too easily becomes a self-fulfilling enterprise among elites.

Rebalancing as currently written affirms the value of urgency in its effort to improve responsiveness of US forces. This is a thoroughly reasonable goal from a sheer capabilities point of view; but the method of achieving it through rebalancing component warfighting roles introduces risk by enervating that national sense of urgency that reserve mobilization brings. The notion that reserve mobilization should not be required for any “rapid response operation” indicates that the rebalancing process is being pursued in a logical, deductive manner without reference to sufficient inductive analysis—something like a reaction without an action.

Similar thinking pervades our latter day combat developments process. The combat developments process has shifted from a threat based approach to a capabilities based approach. An open-ended capabilities based approach is somewhat coy in that it appears to focus institutional professional energy narrowly on how to fight. But it is really quite open-ended in that it leaves the strategic purpose flank hanging and exposed. In such a purpose-less environment, any capability will do; then there comes the danger that the capability developed will drive the purpose for which it is used. A capability is not a purpose unto itself; it must be tied to a strategic end.

One may criticize the epochal and inductive approach as being tied to the past in a world where all the rules have changed. But have they changed that much? Might we reflect here on whether the requirement to mobilize reserves impeded a sufficiently swift and successful invasion of Afghanistan in October and November 2001, or delayed the start of operations in Iraq, or whether launching a brigade in ninety-six hours would have prevented the attacks of September 11? On the other hand, would the capability to do all this without reserves tempt piecemeal commitment of US forces into gray wars instead of seeking decisive victory through discreet, broadly accepted war aims? How did it work in Mogadishu? One might also criticize
the epochal and inductive approach as somewhat linear in an era that loves “spiral development.” Others might say that spiral development is simply a cipher for an undisciplined process of spiraling requirements.11

All military capabilities develop from either praxis or myth. An epochal and inductive approach roots capabilities in praxis; and harmonizes the myths according to their utility instead of their superstitious effects. A purely capabilities based approach is a blank check backed only by the quixotic power of the pen.

COMPROMISE OF THE TOTAL FORCE POLICY

The Secretary of Defense memorandum of 9 July 2003 directs that reserve and active component capabilities be rebalanced so that alert for mobilization does not occur prior to initiating a “rapid response operation”12. The phrase “rapid response operation” is sufficiently broad to include almost any operation undertaken by US forces. Its closest approximation in joint doctrine appears in JP 3-0: “Force projection usually begins as a rapid response to a crisis by forward deployed or forward-based forces, where available.”13 Under this guidance, any mobilization would begin not earlier than phase II, seize initiative, of the joint campaign model.14 For an operation such as Desert Storm, phase II began either at the opening of the air campaign, or perhaps the ground campaign, depending on the combatant commander’s perspective of the whole operation. So for a Desert Storm-like event, reserves would have had to been alerted, mobilized, deployed, and integrated into the force within either thirty days or one hundred hours in order to support the fight. Phases II and III for operation Iraqi Freedom appear to have lasted about three weeks all together from first combat to the fall of Baghdad. Constraints on strategic lift and throughput at world-class ports prevent even conventional active forces from deploying and employing that quickly. Moreover, no force, whether active or reserve, just arriving during the transition to post hostilities would be in a position to provide seamless support to phase IV operations.

Following this delayed mobilization construct indicates that phase I tasks in setting the theater are done by active forces. Much transformation literature posits the end or near elimination of the reception, staging, and integration task in the future. The will and capability to do so have not been demonstrated beyond the level of “PowerPoint” charts. If, however, initial deployment, employment, and sustainment were to become near simultaneous events, considerable transportation and support capabilities would still have to reside in the active component if mobilization is disallowed in phase I. This can be done in one of two ways. Active component support forces such as we have now at division and corps level can be diverted to
theater tasks. This removes support capability from forces preparing for imminent combat operations and introduces higher operational-level risk.

The other way to provide this capability is to rebalance Army structure so that there are sufficient active component forces available to set the theater and establish the necessary strategic links. This would minimally require the conversion of a division or more of active maneuver arms to maneuver support and sustainment structure. There would then be an aggregate reduction of ten or more percent of ground combat power available for phase III and phase IV operations, and any other near simultaneous contingency operations. At this writing, the Army is dedicating its temporary increase in manpower to building more maneuver brigades, or units of action. Therefore, there is little evidence of institutional desire to truly enable such capability.

At the political level, non-mobilization would enable the President to commit perhaps a divisional, or greater, equivalent force to a theater of operations before much if any impact was felt at street level in America. A few Congressmen would have to be notified under the War Powers Resolution, of course, but the constituents could choose to remain somnolent toward the event while only the professional soldiers were killed. This would effectively eliminate the salient effects of the Total Force Policy. Therefore, the real issue at hand in the rebalancing quest is in determining where risk can be accepted, and where it cannot. Do we engender more strategic risk by decreasing reliance on reserves, or by not being able to deploy large forces by a virtual executive fiat?

This really hangs not so much on a view of the threat, but on the appropriate means to defeat it. The US has latched on to “terrorism” as the threat buzzword de jour, which seems to mean that we face sundry counter-democratic forces. But is this primarily a conventional military threat, or a societal threat? In other words, is it best countered by conventional military forces configured to enable imperial prerogatives, or by ensuring that the US remains soundly within its republican principles?

The second proviso to rebalancing shows yet a more disturbing trend in the direction of imperial configuration in the call for more predictability for reserve forces mobilization. It is difficult to envision how regularity could be achieved given the inherently unpredictable nature of war and international conflict unless there is intent to be regularly launching “rapid response operations” and then occupying foreign soil where reserves are needed to deploy for cyclical phase IV operations. In other words, are present operations in Iraq just the first iteration in an indefinite pattern of deployments?
This goal of rebalancing follows the first as a collateral effect of the pattern of extensive reserve participation in post-hostility and peace keeping operations during the 1990s. It looks like the right thing to do for the soldier, but as a strategic policy phenomenon in and of itself it is either a Trojan horse or the canary-in-a-coalmine; pick which ever metaphor seems best. It appears to offer the security of predictability both in terms of frequency and length of deployment. As with the shift in mobilization, it has some force of logic given the late usage and operational tempo of the reserves in the Balkans and now in Iraq. But juxtaposing the concepts of predictability and war bears ominous tidings of the priorities and culture of a military institution. The Army in Vietnam craved such predictability at the operational-level with one-year tours in country and six-month command tours. The current Army Chief of Staff appears determined not to repeat this mistake with the force now in the field. Offering predictability to the reserves, then, is either the same mistake repeated on the strategic level, or the portent of another degree of separation in the total force. It signals a need to structure reserves not as complementary force structure within the same operational model, but as an alternate purpose force for different types of operations.

A force based on the exercise of imperial prerogatives over warfighting imperatives can lose its military edge. For the reserves it would mean graduating from being weekend warriors to itinerant journeymen, and dispensing with the image of the Minuteman altogether. Wanting peace, predictability, and stability is a reasonable and exceptionally moral quest for humanity; war is none of the above. Therefore, should war, and the commitment of coercive force, ever be a routine event for the citizens of a republic? This may sound hyperbolic, but the drift is palpable, especially if cleaning up near simultaneous contingencies would become the new purpose for reserve forces. These forces would then field redundant capability to that of the active component, or become the de facto constabulary force of choice. This was similar to the pre-Vietnam vision for reserve employment.

In summary, the first requirement of rebalancing would obviate reserve component participation in war as we have seen it since 1990. The second requirement would reshape US forces toward a purpose not native to the Constitutional vision for the role of the military and the nature of the republic. This may appear necessary for the sake of immediate operational expediency. But is it a trap laid in superstitions over an ethereal and fearful vision of the threat?

Efficacy of American Civic Militarism

Western military supremacy has been sustained by its willingness to acknowledge and exploit its myths, rather than be trapped within them. At the crossroads of rebalancing, two
kinds of myth threaten our forces. One is the myth of the past: that the Total Force Policy under the banner of the Abrams Doctrine is the everlasting gobstopper within the political process. The other is the myth of the future: that some new threat presents us with a Gordian knot that must be untied in order to prove relevance as a military force. Of course, we know the end of these ancient and modern stories. Charlie gave up the gobstopper and inherited to whole factory. Alexander summarily cut the Gordian knot without bowing to its vanity and probable PSYOP intent. Both stories teach that decision makers succeed by imposing their will, through their constant values, on the object at hand rather than vice versa.

Rebalancing presents a similar test today. It would be easy to dispense with the Total Force Policy as so much drag on warfighting if one considered only the microcosm of a single operation and the incidental frustration of the staffs managing it. But stepping back, even a cursory review of the broad scope of US wars demonstrates that consistently positive military outcomes have been rendered faster under the Total Force Policy than apart from it. This is because the Total Force Policy mines a deep American civic militarism in a way that generates decisive strategic force through a lethal blend of political urgency and military capability.

Victor Davis Hanson points out that western societies have surpassed other cultures in military prowess throughout millennia-long traditions of “freedom [as in free land owners], decisive battle, civic militarism, rationalism, vibrant markets, discipline, dissent, and free critique.” This was true of the ancient Greeks, and it is true of Americans today. One American statesman expressed it as follows at the turn of the last century as America stepped into the league of international powers with the Spanish-American War.

Our Government derives its just powers from the consent of the governed, and its strength from the people themselves. We cannot afford to weaken the Government's reliance upon the people by cultivating the idea that all the work of war must be done by professional soldiers. The citizen is a safer lawmaker when he may be called upon to assist in the enforcement of the laws, and legislation is more likely to be just when the Government relies largely upon volunteers, because the support is surest when the Government is so beneficent that each citizen is willing to die to preserve its blessings to posterity. The readiness with which the American people have always responded to their country's call is a guarantee as to the future.

As William Jennings Bryan explains, reliance on the citizen soldier is how the US as a nation chooses to actuate these most potent traditions. Individual members of the active as well as reserve forces innately possess such traditions. Drafted citizens also may serve just as well at the individual level by the same inculcated societal traditions. But within the larger body politic, the professional is a member of an essential but separate subculture and the apparition
of the draftee represents an anomaly if not an outright breach in the system. The reservist still presents the essential archetype of a free citizen volunteering to leave hometown, family, and career to join a fight worth having. Total Force Policy engages the nation and the Congress in ways that a purely regular and conscript force cannot.

Though this civic militarism may sound like so much primitive machismo, it actually demonstrates the opposite cultural ethos. A society that relies on citizen soldiers as central to war making believes that the normal state of existence should be peace and freedom for private civilian life. War is the last resort—an aberration that disrupts the preferred order of peaceable commerce. This is the very antithesis of a warmongering state.

A priori reserve mobilization complements this posture by bounding, but not limiting, the scope of military intervention. It bounds military intervention by compelling decisive action with the forces and time available with the commitment of citizen soldiers. Yet it does not limit military options in the application of decisive force because it provides a trained and ready force when called, so long as resources have been forecast and allocated in peacetime.

TOTAL FORCE POLICY—INTENT AND ACCIDENCE

Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird initiated the Total Force concept in a memorandum to the Service Secretaries and the Joint Chiefs of Staff dated August 21, 1970. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger reaffirmed the concept and gave it the expressed status of policy in a memorandum dated 23 August 1973. In March 1974, General Creighton Abrams, Army Chief of Staff, published a plan to field sixteen Army divisions (an expansion by three additional divisions) that included “…a reliance on the reserves such that the force could not function without them, and hence could not be deployed without calling them up.” General Abrams’ far-reaching implementation gave the Total Force Policy a statelier moniker in later literature, “the Abrams Doctrine.”

The Total Force Policy itself merits candid de-mythologizing. There is no direct evidence that it came about as a specific remedy for the political failings in prosecuting the Vietnam War. There has been some debate about General Abrams’ original intent because of the way he implemented the Total Force Policy within the Army. In all likelihood, the immediate intent was to accommodate an extremely resource-constrained environment in the drawdown after Vietnam. Secretaries of Defense Laird and Schlesinger promoted the Total Force Policy primarily with the justification of repairing the readiness of the reserves. There is also credible oral history attesting to a subliminal political purpose, as well. But the fact that the authors themselves were not without second thoughts indicates that the Total Force Policy was not first
and foremost a restraint on defense options. Secretary Schlesinger testified to Congress in 1975 that Guard and Reserve divisions should not be relied on too heavily for initial defense missions.\textsuperscript{40}

The Total Force Policy need not be vouchsafed as a political crowbar. To do so presents more danger to the interests of the reserve components themselves by implying that their innate value derives from being a political tool, rather than an effective military force. This vision of the reserves will always make them a suspicious commodity in the eyes of both the professional military establishment, which must take them to war, and in the Congress, which must pay for such a luxury. The nation that would write such cynicism into policy is doomed.

General Abrams and Secretaries Schlesinger and Laird had all these dynamics well in hand. Within this strategic environment, key Defense Department leaders of the early seventies inaugurated the improbable Total Force Policy with the plain purpose of rehabilitating the reserve components and enhancing their readiness.\textsuperscript{41} The Total Force Policy appeared awkward at its inception because the Abrams implementation introduced the concept of complementary capabilities between components rather that redundant capabilities within each component. Redundant capabilities had been the vision of reserve employment through the early nineteen sixties and the prevailing view of the Kennedy administration.\textsuperscript{42} Bringing reserves into the equation as a complementary force gave General Abrams the space he needed to field sixteen divisions when most government budgeters thought ten or at most thirteen divisions were all that could be fielded.\textsuperscript{43}

The Total Force Policy might not have been the most obvious or desirable short-term solution to readiness problems in 1970-1973. Yet, it may have been the only politically acceptable solution, and the only feasible solution in terms of means, given the US economic situation following Vietnam, the Great Society, and the 1973 OPEC oil embargo. The Total Force Policy had to appear a dubious measure for quickly resolving a bad readiness posture. The repair of the reserves would take years, and even decades given the institutional friction it encountered. A Brookings Institution report, as late as 1989, cites a litany of difficulties in maintaining the Total Force Policy and the readiness of the reserves.\textsuperscript{44} The rehabilitation of the reserve components was not a quick fix. It consumed an entire generation in the career life-cycle of the US military from the withdrawal of combat forces from Vietnam in 1973 to Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003.

The vision and steady hand of the Defense leadership in early seventies is even more remarkable when considering that the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the OPEC oil embargo intervened between Secretary Schlesinger’s policy statement in August 1973 and
General Abrams’ sixteen division plan in March 1974. The shock of the lessons learned in this war, and its aftershock in the OPEC oil embargo, might have justifiably distracted the Department of Defense (DOD) and Army leadership from pursuing reserve integration, and caused them to press hard for other near term remedies to the readiness problem, such as a continuation of the draft, and additional weapons system procurements for a credible expansion of the active force. But they held firm to the Total Force Policy.

CONCLUSION
The tenets of rebalancing have the worthy intent of achieving a more efficient warfighting capability and more generous treatment of the reserve component soldier. But the broad outline of rebalancing now being fostered bodes troubling subsequent and tertiary effects. Rebalancing in accordance with current DOD guidance likely leads to parallel, or redundant, reserve structure rather than complementary, or covalent, reserve structure. This leads in turn to atrophy in the reserves, then to reduction in the capabilities that US forces have demonstrated in all wars since Vietnam—that being the capability both within the political realm and within the military to define objectives and execute decisive operations.

More importantly, the Total Force Policy is not a throwback to the Cold War era; and the Constitutional bias for militia, or reserve, forces is not an anachronism. These are mechanisms for perpetuating the values that have made America the power that it is. Rebalancing should go forward grounded in the principle that a reserve call-up remains essential to the initial deployment of conventional US ground forces. Consistent with this, the reserves should receive priority for resources to ensure a high level of readiness when called. Building more ready reserve components is more vital to our enduring military effectiveness than temporary, and perhaps ephemeral, up ticks in manning given over to additional maneuver formations.
ENDNOTES


2 For purposes of this paper, the term “mobilization” will encompass the whole range of options in activating reserve soldiers for contingency operations from Presidential Reserve Call-up (PRC) to partial or full mobilization. A distinction is not made between statutory scale because the DOD documents directing rebalancing are somewhat generic in their application of the term, and because the general principle at issue is the requirement for a reserve activation trigger prior to operations.

3 Donald H. Rumsfeld, “New Model Army,” *Wall Street Journal*, (3 February 2004); available from <https://www.us.army.mil/portal/jhtml/earlyBird/Feb2004/e20040203254301.html>; Internet; accessed 3 February 2004. Also see: Thomas F. Hall, “Sometimes Rebalancing is Just Rebalancing,” *The Officer*, (October 2003): 16. Assistant Secretary of Defense Hall notes that of 1.2 million reservists, 20,000 have been mobilized twice in the past 13 years. The burden of mobilization is falling on a relatively small slice of even the whole reserve structure. The need for rebalancing, at least within components should not be in doubt.


5 Ibid., chapter 3. “Another sinister reality of that period was a growing consensus among the Army leadership, Congress, and the President, that the Warsaw Pact possessed technology equal to or superior to that of the United States and far outnumbered the NATO forces available. In defending Europe against such a threat, the United States in the 1970s could no longer use the weight of men and material available in earlier decades. The next war would be “come as you are” without the traditional preparation time afforded the United States in the two previous world wars.”


8 Rumsfeld, “New Model Army.”

9 The term “epochal” is used instead of simply “historical” to evoke those martial events which are not only historical, but also momentous. War and training exercises both qualify as historical events for purposes of a unit history. However, wars carry epic significance because they usually mark the phases in the life of a nation if not a civilization.

The consideration that "spiral development can lead to spiral requirements" was suggested during a lecture given in Bliss Hall by a distinguished visitor.

Rumsfeld, "Rebalancing Forces."


Ibid., III-19.


"Until now, the Army has insisted on enforcing the two-year command tours, with no accommodation made for the fact that a unit might be in combat. Thus, a battalion commander might leave his unit halfway through its one-year tour in Iraq because his two-year command is up…. "Schoomaker…has told the units preparing to deploy to Iraq and Afghanistan that he does not want midtour changes of command."


J.D. Khalil and Carl Rehberg, “W(h)ither the Abrams Doctrine: Good or Bad Policy?” The Officer, (December 2003), 21-2. Khalil and Rehberg discuss the Founders’ bias for militia as expressed in Constitution and other early American documents.

in 584 B.C., Gabriel observes that, “Free from mythological explanations for events, the Greeks erected the great edifice of natural law based on rational observation and analysis.”


24 Allusion to Alexander the Great at the opening of his campaign in Asia Minor.


26 Ibid., 168.


28 Congressional Record, House of Representatives, *Hon. Ron Paul of Texas In the House of Representatives, Abolish Selective Service*, January 30, 2003. “The Department of Defense, in response to recent calls to reinstate the draft, has confirmed that conscription serves no military need. This is only the most recent confirmation that the draft, and thus the Selective Service system, serves no military purpose. In 1999, then-Secretary of the Army Louis Caldera, in a speech before the National Press Club, admitted that ‘Today, with our smaller, post-Cold War armed forces, our stronger volunteer tradition and our need for longer terms of service to get a good return on the high, up-front training costs, it would be even harder to fashion a fair draft.’”

29 Congressional Record, Senate, *Reliance on National Guard and Reserve Forces to meet the Requirements of Active Military Forces for Additional Personnel*, 2 September 1970, p. 30968. Even though Senator Allen Ellender introduced Laird’s original memorandum into the Congressional Record by stating that failure to use National Guard and Reserve forces in Southeast Asia had “…added to the many inequities in the Selective Service System.”

30 John O’Shea, “America’s Citizen Warriors,” *The Officer*, October 2003, p. 24. COL (R) O’Shea recounts his duties after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 while in the Army Operations Center at the Pentagon where he had to recommend reserve component units for Presidential call-up. “…the most compelling one was a map of the United States showing the location of the units to be mobilized. …every major community in America would be affected by the action.”


36 Ibid.

37 Currie and Crossland, 213. “While the move toward an All-Volunteer Force was a political decision stimulated by the civil unrest of the late 1960’s, the Total Force Policy developed more in response to fiscal realities.”

38 Laird, ibid.

39 Sorley, 364-5. Sorley notes that General John Vessey affirmed General Abrams’ intent to integrate the reserves for precisely the reason of making them indispensable to future deployments. Sorley also cites James Schlesinger as saying that it wouldn’t be like “Abe” to do that as forcing function. But it was as clear to Schlesinger as to Abrams that the sixteen division force, without an increase in end-strength, would require significant reserve augmentation.

40 Binkin and Kaufman, 26.

41 Congressional Record, Senate, Reliance on National Guard and Reserve Forces to meet the Requirements of Active Military Forces for Additional Personnel, 2 September 1970, p. 30968.

42 Currie, 149-153.

43 Sorley, 362-3.

44 Binkin and Kaufman, 59-62.

45 Morris, Lackey, Mordica II, and Hughes, chapter 3. “A dramatic event that injected an [sic] urgency into the TRADOC organization and training plan and created a sense on [sic] purpose for the U.S. Army leadership was the Arab-Israeli War in October 1973. This war, though short in duration, demonstrated to all the “new lethality” of mid to high intensity modern warfare. The combined armored losses alone in the October War exceeded the entire U.S. inventory of armor and artillery platforms available in Europe. (28) Arab capabilities shocked the West. Training techniques, advanced weapons (in particular long-range antitank guided missiles
[ATGMs]), and integrated air defense systems, passed to the Third World by the Soviets, and the perceived Soviet capability to fight on the chemical and nuclear contaminated battlefield, all represented new challenges to the U.S. Army. The October War indicated that future conventional wars would be different, if not revolutionary, from all the previous American experiences."
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