NATION BUILDING: A BAD IDEA WHO’S TIME HAS COME?

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For over 50 years, the United States military has focused on major wars and the ability to mass adequate land, air and sea power to defeat a global foe. Ironically while preparing for such a war, United States forces have routinely engaged in smaller-scale operations. The military has been required to combat terrorism, fight insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, conduct non-combatant evacuations from war zones, strengthen friendly governments, provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and participate in countless peacekeeping operations and most recently conduct state stabilization and reconstruction. The recent trend, however is that these operations other than war have rapidly moved from the sidelines to the center court, and in the process they have raised valid questions about the force structure, doctrine and use of the United States armed forces specifically in Phase IV Transition operations. The current National Security Strategy of the United States makes it likely that increased numbers of American armed forces will be engaged abroad in coming years carrying out a range of missions from war fighting to nation building. It appears that operations other than war will continue to play an important role in our National Security Strategy and the Army will bear the brunt of these efforts. The challenge is to determine the proper force structure and doctrine required to conduct these operations over the long haul. Done well, the military’s support in these operations will go a long way in ensuring progress toward United States security goals. As we enter the Twenty-first Century it is crucial that we understand the expanded role the Army could potentially play as globalization increases. The purpose of this study is to provide the reader with a better understanding of the current challenges that our Army faces. The paper will examine issues specifically associated with Phase IV Transition and post-conflict operations. The paper will provide a brief survey of United States historical experiences in nation building and their relevance today and for the future. Finally, the paper will look at potential options and make recommendations that could enhance our success in nation building operations in the future.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

- ABSTRACT .......................................................................................................................... iii
- NATION BUILDING: A BAD IDEA WHO’S TIME HAS COME? ............................................. 1
  - AS THE WORLD TURNS ..................................................................................................... 1
  - WE DON’T DO OCCUPATIONS? LESSONS FROM THE PAST ....................................... 2
- THEMES/LESSONS ............................................................................................................. 5
- SUPERPOWERS DON’T DO WINDOWS .............................................................................. 7
  - IF NOT WINDOWS – THEN WHAT? ................................................................................ 7
  - TRAINING READINESS: JUST ENOUGH AND JUST IN TIME .................................... 8
- WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? ...................................................................................... 10
  - IF IT’S NOT BROKE DON’T FIX IT .............................................................................. 11
  - SPECIALIZED PEACEKEEPING UNITS (SPKUS) ......................................................... 11
  - MULTI-PURPOSE UNITS (MPUS) ............................................................................... 13
- CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................... 14
- ENDNOTES ......................................................................................................................... 17
- BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................................. 21
NATION BUILDING: A BAD IDEA WHO'S TIME HAS COME?

Our military requires more than good treatment. It needs the rallying point of a defining mission and that mission is to deter wars – and win wars when deterrence fails. Sending our military on vague, aimless and endless deployments is the swift solvent of morale. We will not be permanent peacekeepers, dividing warring parties. This is not our strength or our calling.¹

- Governor George W. Bush, September 1999

You are requested to form a Defense Science Board Task Force addressing the transition to and from Hostilities…Our military expeditions to Afghanistan and Iraq are unlikely to be the last such excursions in the global war on terrorism.²

AS THE WORLD TURNS

It appears that the United States has once again come full circle in regards to the use of military force in support of national objectives, in this case specifically nation building. During the presidential campaign, then Governor George W. Bush’s line, was “an explicit condemnation of Clinton/Gore foreign policy--specifically that the White House had stretched the military too thin with peacekeeping missions in Haiti, Somalia and the Balkans.”³ Bush argued that President William Clinton had failed to understand that the primary mission of the military was deterrence, combat, and winning the nation’s wars. The “Let me tell you what else I’m worried about line proved to be among the most popular in his stump speech, guaranteed to evoke an eruption of applause from the conservatives who packed Bush’s campaign rallies.”⁴

But, it seems now that the Bush administration has come face-to-face with the challenges presented by the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001. Thus it has adopted a more realistic set of objectives. The 2002 “National Security Strategy” describes this new world, where America is threatened less by conquering states than by failing ones and where conflict is more likely to occur within countries than between them.⁵ The strategy recognizes that threats can suddenly emerge as state weakness rather than strength spreads conflict and chaos. It argues that an environment of failed states, terrorism, weapons proliferation and political chaos may have outgrown Cold War institutions and policies designed to deter, fight and win against a different set of dangers.⁶

For over fifty years, the U. S. military has focused on fighting major wars and the ability to mass the required land, sea and air power to engage a global adversary. But, times have changed and as the National Security Strategy states, “it is time to reaffirm the essential role of American military strength.”⁷ Ironically, while preparing for a conventional war the United States has routinely engaged its forces in smaller-scale operations. The military combated terrorism,
fought insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, conducted non-combatant evacuations from war zones, strengthened friendly governments, provided humanitarian assistance, and executed countless peacekeeping operations. But as retired Marine General Anthony Zinni states, we are “still trying to fight our kind of war – be it World War II or Desert Storm – we ignore the real warfighting requirements of today. My generation has not been well prepared for this future, because we resisted the idea.” President Bush has acknowledged the recent trends as well and points out that “operations other than war” have moved from the sidelines to center court and in the process have raised legitimate questions about the structure and roles of America’s armed forces.

A recent memorandum from the Acting Under Secretary of Defense, Michael W. Wynne, further illustrates that operations other than war have truly left the sidelines. He has directed that a Defense Science Board Task Force form to look at the issue of transitions to and from hostilities. The memorandum states that U.S. armed forces are capable of projecting force and achieving conventional military victory. However, “we Americans will encounter significant challenges following conventional military success as we seek to ensure stability, democracy, human rights and a productive economy.”

The purpose of this study is to address issues associated with a National Security Strategy that has increased the likelihood that the United States will involve its military in post-conflict operations, to include nation building. The paper will examine current policies regarding stability operations, provide a brief survey of America’s historical experiences in nation building and their relevance today, and examine issues specifically associated with the use of conventional forces in nation building. Finally, it will examine options and make recommendations that could enhance the potential for success in such operations in the future.

WE DON’T DO OCCUPATIONS? LESSONS FROM THE PAST

“Every time they do a post-war occupation, they do it like it’s the first time, and they also do it like it’s the last time they’ll ever have to do it. We can’t change the mistakes we made of Iraq, but we can try to avoid them in the future.”

Although nation building is not new to the Army, it has always been a controversial mission for the American military, especially over the past three decades. “The United States military has engaged in these non-traditional operations throughout its history, far more often than it has waged conventional warfare.” The Army has directly supervised the creation of new governments in many beaten states, while performing countless nonviolent and nonmilitary tasks and missions. What is remarkable are the similarities between nation building efforts in
these contingencies. Two of the most familiar success stories are Germany and Japan at the end of WWII. There are, however, other cases that get less attention, such as the Mexican War, reconstruction at the close of the Civil War, the Spanish American War, and World War I. Recent interventions that included governance responsibilities in the post-conflict phase took place during the Cold War as well. They include the Dominican Republic in 1965, Grenada in 1983, Panama in 1989, as well as Somalia in 1993, Haiti in 1994 and the Balkans in 1995. More recent examples that deserve considerable scrutiny include operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. In fact, in over thirteen instances since the 1800s, soldiers under the theater commander’s operational control, have supervised and implemented political and economic reconstitution.\textsuperscript{12}

A short historical review of the relevant operations illustrates the scale and frequency of post-conflict and occupation operations as well as the level of exposure and experience U.S. military has had in such operations. One can easily distinguish recurring themes and lessons – temporary government, population control in general, suppression of residual resistance, resettlement of displaced noncombatants, rejuvenation of supply and distribution systems, infrastructure repair and institutional reform.\textsuperscript{13}

The Spanish American War illustrates several themes that resonate even today. The Army conducted the Spanish American War with little preparation for post-conflict operations. In performing administration duties the Army learned the limitations of its operational doctrine and the requirement for political compromise. In post-hostility operations the military had to deal with the full range of modern politico-military problems: political intelligence, control of guerrilla forces, military government, the arming of indigenous forces, and their terms of political settlement.\textsuperscript{14}

Although the Spanish American War consisted of rather quick and decisive combat operations, the post-conflict operations were long and complex. This early act of nation building has many similarities to the conditions that U.S. military forces are facing in Iraq today. To illustrate the point, the following description of the events in Cuba following the Spanish American War could be used to illustrate post-conflict operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom today.

The close of the war with Spain did not settle the Cuba problem. As a result of years of rule and fighting, conditions in the island were in a deplorable state when the fighting ended...the United States was committed to turning Cuba over to its people. But to have withdrawn before economic and political stability was established would have been both folly and evasion of responsibility. A provisional government supported by an army of occupation therefore was set up. It began at once the many tasks involved in the tremendous job of
rehabilitation and reform: feeding and clothing the starving; care of the sick; cleaning up the accumulated filth of centuries in the cities; restoring agricultural and commercial activity; disbanding the Cuban Army and paying its veterans; organizing municipal governments, local guards, and courts; building roads and other public works; establishing schools; and in general, preparing the people for self-government.\textsuperscript{15}

Additional lessons relevant today include: transition operations occurring simultaneously with combat operations, command decisions required of military leaders, every soldier fulfilling civil affairs responsibilities, the requirement to establish effective relationships with a multitude of ethnic groups and the necessity for a balanced approach between force and restraint in dealing with the populations.\textsuperscript{16}

The constabulary operations in Germany at the end of WWII provides an excellent example of the Army’s ability, in a relatively short period of time, to establish and train a force with specialized skills that can execute post-conflict operations. Planning began early to determine the best way to accomplish the occupation duties in both Europe and Japan. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who understood the importance of the occupation, approved the establishment of a Military District Constabulary in the two Military Districts in Germany.\textsuperscript{17} The Army established a School of Military Government to assist in the preparation of officers and enlisted men to ensure that American soldiers were not falling into operations where they were forced to learn on the fly.\textsuperscript{18}

One can draw many parallels in comparing the experiences of the U.S. military through World War II with what is occurring in Afghanistan and Iraq today. Both involved similar non-combat tasks that required highly trained and disciplined forces, extensive interaction with local officials and civilians, decentralized operations different leader and staff skill sets, relationships with governmental agencies and non-governmental organizations, and restraint through the minimum use of force. It would be beneficial to reexamine the constabulary operations in post war Germany and Japan for applicability in today’s post-conflict operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

Postwar success in both Germany and Japan obviously owed much to the highly developed economies of both nations. However, nation building is not principally about economic reconstruction. It must have a significant aim of political transformation as well, which can be confirmed by the United State’s inability to install viable democracies in Somalia, Haiti and in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{19}
Although one could write volumes about operations in Panama, Somalia, Haiti and in the Balkans, this paper presents only a few observations here. One of the most apparent observations is that each subsequent operation by the United States has been larger in scope and more ambitious than its predecessor, operations in Afghanistan and Iraq confirm the trend. Themes common to these operations include: tactically oriented planners and commanders unprepared for the chaos of Phase IV operations; the campaign plans lack details on Phase IV operations and the plan was distributed after hostilities began; difficulties in balancing humanitarian/peacekeeping roles; difficulties of transitions; mission expansion into nation building; importance of long-term commitment; a “top-down” approach to the reconstruction; and the absolute necessity for interagency planning. 

In Iraq the United States “has taken on a task with a scope comparable to the transformational attempts still under way in Bosnia and Kosovo and a scale comparable only to the United States occupations of Germany and Japan.” A statement made by a former member of the CIA illustrates the challenge the United States forces face in Iraq, “The Messiah could not have organized a sufficient relief, reconstruction or humanitarian effort in that short a time.”

Most observers agree that planning for the reconstruction phase in Operation Iraqi Freedom was not as advanced as the planning undertaken by Central Command for the first three phases of the war. Although one could attribute this to Carl von Clausewitz’s fog or friction, it more likely represents a lack of acceptance or realization of the importance of the political and economic reconstruction of Iraq as an integral part of the war or use of faulty assumptions in the planning phase.

THEMES/LESSONS

If there is any lesson to be learned from our “post-conflict” involvement in Iraq to date, it is that we have failed to adequately learn the lessons from previous such experiences. The American experience with post-conflict and occupation operations is so extensive that one can easily distinguish recurring themes. Listed in this section below are some of the common themes and the salient lessons of the past. Obviously the list is not inclusive, but it emphasizes many of the issues discussed above. A review of after action reports from each operation suggests that these should not be new lessons. For clarity the themes and lessons are broken down into the following categories:

- Planning:
- Limitations of phased planning and a plan predominantly focused on combat operations.
- Faulty planning assumptions.
- Planners avoiding the “Phase IV dilemma”.
- Inadequate planning for Phase IV operations.
- Clearly identifying who is responsible for winning the peace.
- Underestimating post-conflict security requirements.

### Preparation:
- Failure to institutionalize knowledge gained in stability operations.
- We have not integrated salient lessons into our doctrine, our training, and our future planning for future operations.\(^{25}\)
- Lack of clarity on roles and responsibilities resulting in agencies being inhibited and not making the proper investments needed to do these tasks better.
- A failure to regard soldiers with experience in the field of post-conflict operations are not regarded as national assets, to be retained, rewarded for service, trained further, and placed in positions to utilize the skills.\(^{26}\)
- Understanding historical/cultural contexts.

### Execution:
- “Mission creep” - expansion of the mission into nation building.
- Active Component/Reserve Component mismatches.
- Combat Support/Combat Service Support shortages.
- Difficulty with transition to civilian agencies.
- Infrastructure repair and institutional reform.
- Force protection during transition.
- Re-establishing the rule of law.
- Rapid rebuilding of basic infrastructure.

These lessons and many others learned from recent post-conflict reconstruction operations highlight the consistent mistakes that can and must be avoided. A clear lesson is the importance of pre-conflict planning, preparation, communication, and coordination. Anticipating and preparing for the countless tasks required in countries emerging from conflict is onerous, but must be undertaken before the fighting starts if post-conflict reconstruction efforts are to be effective once the hostilities cease. Simply “noting” lessons is not enough; we must “learn” from these lessons. The United States and the international community must commit the resources,
military might, manpower, and time required in Iraq. We face a “Phase IV dilemma,” in Iraq, we can’t stay forever, we can’t leave and we cannot afford to fail! What makes success in these types of operations even more critical is that America’s international credibility is on the line.\textsuperscript{27}

**SUPERPOWERS DON’T DO WINDOWS**

It’s the most difficult leadership experience I have ever had. Nothing quite prepares you for this.\textsuperscript{28}

-- General Eric K. Shinseki

**IF NOT WINDOWS – THEN WHAT?**

Since the attacks on September 11\textsuperscript{th}, many Republicans have come to view stability operations as even more relevant to American national security. In fact, based on the number of soldiers engaged in peacekeeping, it has become the fastest-growing mission for the United States military. “We could take or leave peacekeeping operations in the 1990s as witnesses by our hasty departure from both Haiti and Somalia. The sense was that although pulling out might be regrettable in terms of local conditions it was justifiable because the two countries were now seen as a security threat to the United States.”\textsuperscript{29} It has become obvious now that failed states such as Somalia and Afghanistan are potential havens for terrorists, and even though the United States has significant forces engaged in peacekeeping operations, there may be more in the future.

General Shinseki’s observations about his preparation for a peacekeeping operation, is a common one. Peacekeeping operations in general and post-conflict operations in particular are controversial missions and the Army does little to prepare for them. To make matters worse, the institutional resistance in both the State and Defense Departments has been significant as neither department considers nation building among its core missions. There is significant cultural resistance in the military to any tasks that are not combat related. As the Stability Force commander, General Shinseki felt that he confronted a “cultural bias” in the military and specifically in the Army. Army doctrine-based training prepared him for warfighting and leadership, but “there was not a clear doctrine for post-conflict stability operations.”\textsuperscript{30} This absence of a doctrine for an institution that is doctrine based presents a challenge when you walk into in peacekeeping environment. You are in a kind of “roll-your-own situation.” This is a revealing statement from a senior army general officer. The most remarkable fact, however, is that he is not alone in his opinion; other senior officers who served in Bosnia made similar assessments.\textsuperscript{31}
Although the Army’s performance in Bosnia is generally considered an overwhelming success, many senior officers believe that they were not prepared for the experiences they encountered in Bosnia. Were they trained? The answer is yes, but the training predominately encompassed the art of warfighting and high-intensity conflict. But after the initial deployment in Bosnia and after the prospects of conventional warfare had faded, it became increasingly obvious that the skills acquired by individual soldiers up to general officers were not adequate for the challenges confronted in Bosnia.32

The most significant shortfall in a training strategy that focuses on preparation for major combat operations with little regard for post hostility operations is in the area of readiness. Arguably, the capability of United States armed forces to support and accomplish America’s national security requirements is the ultimate measure of readiness.33

TRAINING READINESS: JUST ENOUGH AND JUST IN TIME

It is undeniable that training is an essential prerequisite for effective military operations. The same is true for post-conflict stability operations. The United States military can no longer afford to “train for war and adapt for peace”. The military must stay prepared to fight and win our nations wars, and retain the “capacity” to execute peace operations when called upon to do so.34 It would not be a stretch to say that our actions in preparing for and executing peacekeeping operations adhere to the following model: “Train for war adapt for peace, with just enough and just in time!”

In reality, like combat operations “the U.S. has learned that the key elements of successful stability operations are well trained and disciplined soldiers under the command of skilled and competent leaders. Although American soldiers are highly trained and possess combat skills that are easily transferable to the needs of post-conflict operations they still require the time to adapt to the nature of the operation, its rules of engagement and its terms of reference.”35

Another factor that impacts on training readiness is the duration of the stability operation. Lengthy involvement in peacekeeping operations degrades combat skills and has a significant impact on combat readiness. As a result, the trend is that combat troops are used for peacekeeping only when necessary and those additional units, with post-conflict related skills, are “cobbled” onto combat divisions as required to meet postwar demands.36 In most cases the armed forces however ill-prepared for the job at hand quickly adapted, figured out what they had to do and did it with great success.37 Although it is admirable that our troops and leaders are agile and can “figure it out” they should be put in that position only by exception.
Morale problems stemming from prolonged deployments, equipment that wears out too quickly, and decreased combat training levels, increase when troops execute non-combat operations. Further exacerbating the military’s declining readiness is the tendency to pull troops with high demand special skills from non-deployed units. A mission may affect non-deployed units as well because they will not be able to train properly due to critical skill shortages. The concept of training readiness is well understood in the United States Army, but as Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated, readiness for what happens after the fighting stops is just as important.

If military training for post hostilities is just enough and just in time, is Army doctrine any better? The United States Army is a doctrine-driven institution but the one area of doctrine it lacks is in post-conflict operations. In Bosnia, Army doctrine was largely inadequate in an environment where American commanders were forced to wrestle with the political, diplomatic, and military demands of stability operations. Almost from the inception of Implementation Force operations, commanders found themselves in uncharted waters. Major General William Nash described the problem as an “inner ear problem.” Having trained for thirty years to read a battlefield, the general officers were now asked to read a “peacefield.” The requirement to train and develop senior leaders to read the “peacefield” and participation in stability operations has largely escaped consideration.

The Army must place greater emphasis on the education of its officer corps. Education must begin at the officer basic course and continue at all levels of the Professional Military Education system. Officers at all grades will benefit from a focus on post-conflict stability operations. Today’s officers are likely to be involved in other than war operations on multiple occasions throughout their service. Geopolitical and cultural training should also be included in the education effort and all officers should maintain proficiency in a foreign language throughout their careers.

General Officers interviewed in a 1999 study conducted by the United States Institute of Peace singled out senior service colleges as the place where leadership training for stability operations should occur and where the most curriculum development is needed. These institutions must place greater emphasis on operations other than war, geopolitical issues and cultural awareness.

Training and Doctrine Command must embrace the entire training effort for stability operations, and the Army must incorporate these skills in its training base for captains, majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels. A doctrinal set of principles for the conduct of post-conflict
operations deserves attention. Along with the doctrine the training must crystallize the fundamentals of this new skill set.

Clearly, there is a need to strike a balance. The United States cannot afford to win the war but lose the peace. To win both the war and the peace will require that the Army must review its institutional training base and build on this foundation without significantly reducing conventional training while at the same time integrating new training aimed at supporting twenty-first century peace operations.\(^{42}\)

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

We have to stop making nation building a political football and recognize that it’s a national competency we need to foster that we’re not going to be able to avoid these kinds of activities.\(^{43}\)

So, how do we handle this political football called nation building? According to Max Boot, the Army must deal with the task of “imperial” policing. He states that though it is not a popular duty, it is vital to safeguarding United States interests in the long run as are the more conventional warfighting skills. “The Army brass should realize that battlefield victories in places like Afghanistan and Iraq can easily be squandered if they do not do enough to win the peace.”\(^{44}\)

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations, Joseph J. Collins, provides another perspective. Collins states that there is a “strong notion that the military exists to deter, fight, and win wars, that’s it, and any other use of the military is some kind of borderline abuse.” He points out that war and recovery are inseparable and occur almost simultaneously. “People in the military have to realize that this is part of the strategic environment. And you do not get to pick your strategic environment. You don’t always have the choice to play the game the way you would like to play it. You have to adapt to the situation.”\(^{45}\)

The United States has yet to discover a workable stabilization strategy for use against large populations that avoids significant troop commitments. Several countries have proposed personnel policies that seek to avoid the painful arithmetic of large deployments. They conduct extended tours of duty using deployed forces built around short-service conscripts or volunteers. This may be a viable option, but so far most Western countries have chosen to rely on their professional armies and the United States is no different.\(^{46}\)

Although there are many possible force structure options to deal with post hostilities operations, this research paper will look at three alternatives that warrant consideration. The
three options are the steady state option, the specialized peacekeeping force, and the adaptable multi-purpose unit options.

IF IT’S NOT BROKE DON’T FIX IT

The steady state option is straightforward and varies little from the Army’s current mode of operation in dealing with post-conflict and peacekeeping operations. In essence the Army would continue to be a “switch hitter”. Many in the Army feel that what the Army is doing now is working, and there is no need for change and that we must continue to train for the high end of the spectrum. Generally those in favor of the status quo realize that operations other than war with their associated challenges will require significant pre-deployment training.

The military has demonstrated that it can adapt to operations other than war while ramping up for deployment. However, the challenges experienced during the deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq have rendered the “just enough training, just in time” option obsolete. There is not ample time prior to deployment to train soldiers and leaders in the skills sets required in for nation building operations. So, if the status quo is not acceptable what are the options available? The remainder of this section will focus on the two options that are getting the most attention by the Department of Defense, specialized peacekeeping forces and multi-purpose units.

SPECIALIZED PEACEKEEPING UNITS (SPKUS)

During speaking engagements in 2003-2004, at the Army War College, three senior level General Officers responded to the following question, is it time for the Army to establish SPKUs or commands to respond to post-hostility challenges? They all felt strongly that this was not a good idea for the following reasons: the Army would lose deterrence value; there would not be enough specialized forces; and those forces that existed would be overworked. All stated that the Army must improve in both its effectiveness and efficiency, but they were not proponents of specialized peacekeeping forces.47

Interestingly, in a Washington Post article titled “Pentagon Considers Creating Postwar Peacekeeping Forces”, Bradley Graham argued that the Pentagon is looking at creating dedicated military forces that could be dispatched to trouble spots around the globe to conduct peacekeeping and reconstruction after conflicts. “The idea is to forge deployable brigades or a whole division out of engineers, military police, civil affairs officers and other specialists critical to postwar operations.”48 The new stabilization and reconstruction force would bridge the gap between the end of decisive combat and the point at which a civilian-led, nation building effort is up and running.
The force would be distinct from a proposed NATO rapid-response force and apart from the U.N. The standing constabulary force would consist of troops from a range of countries - but led and trained by the United States. Secretary Rumsfeld has stated that “it would be good for the United States to provide leadership to train other countries who desire to participate in peacekeeping. The result would be a cadre of people who are trained, equipped, organized and ready to work with each other.”

Defense officials note that Secretary Rumsfeld’s proposal is consistent with the aim of limiting U.S. military overseas deployments. Though it would specialize a small number of American troops in peacekeeping, it would also seek to enlist other countries to contribute the majority of troops, with the promise of training by the United States. Creating a standing international peacekeeping force led and trained by the United States would also allow the Pentagon to exert considerably more control over peacekeeping than in the past. This proposal has attracted significant opposition from senior Army leaders.

Another proponent of permanent constabulary forces is retired Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, the head of the Department of Defense Transformation effort. He argues that a permanent post-conflict stabilization force is needed, but it must be on an equal footing with combat units. Although many of the elements that would make up a post-conflict force such as engineers and military police are already found within the military, their mere existence does not necessarily constitute a post-conflict capability without proper organization and command and control.

During a conference in December 2003, the Fletcher Center for Technology and National Security Policy looked at the issues associated with Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations and addressed the idea of standing peacekeeping forces. The attendees made the following proposals:

- Create two standing joint stabilization and reconstruction commands, one active component and one reserve component division equivalents.
- Stabilization and reconstruction joint command plans, trains, exercises, develops doctrine and deploys to the area of operations.
- Maximize jointness with Army lead.
- Capable of operating in hostile environment.
- Capable of operating under a joint command or as a separate Joint Task Force.
- Modular, scalable, tailorable for mission, embedded interagency.
• Provide link to non-governmental organization contractors to hand off to civilian leadership for nation building.

Although the option of using specialized forces explicitly for post-conflict operations is attractive, it is not the most optimal solution. As Afghanistan and Iraq have shown, troops that are proficient in their warfighting skills are essential in both the decisive operations and stabilization stage. As we are discovering in Iraq without security, peace will not follow and progress will not be made. Based on current trends, it is unlikely that a specialized peacekeeping force could meet the future demands of post-conflict operations. There simply would not be enough of the specialized forces to go around, once again resulting in cobbled forces together at the last minute. Another option which this paper recommends, is the adoption of multi-purpose units.

MULTI-PURPOSE UNITS (MPUs)

Considering the future realities the Army will certainly face, MPUs make sense. The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Schoomaker’s, brigade unit of action initiatives are more relevant to a multi-purpose versus a specialized approach to stability operations. The MPUs would maintain agility by mixing and matching subordinate forces according to the needs of the mission resulting in a modular plug and play, multi-capable outfit. The MPUs appear to be a valid option for the force the Chief of Staff of the Army envisions. This MPU option allows more emphasis on focused training at all levels, including the leadership. The concept requires that a set of key nation building tasks be identified, guidance provided to units, and these essential tasks are added to unit Mission Essential Task Lists (METLs).

Adding non combat focused tasks to unit METLs challenges the conventional wisdom and many feel that it will shift the primary focus of training away from warfighting. Combined with the MPU approach, the ability to plug and play and identify the essential post-conflict tasks would ensure that the United States Army would be postured to meet National Security Strategy demands to provide ready and trained units to execute missions across the full-spectrum of conflict.

Conrad Crane in his study, Landpower and Crises: Army Roles and Missions in Smaller-scale Contingencies during the 1990s, provides an excellent list of recommendations that may assist the Army in better preparing itself to operate in “a future of continuous and cumulative SSCs.”

53
• Create truly multi-capable units structured, trained, and committed to both winning in Major Theaters of War and handling the stability portion of small scale contingencies.

• Increase the ability of units at all levels to train for, plan and execute stabilization phase tasks.

• Ensure adequate focus on the planning and execution of stabilization phase tasks at the Command and General Staff College and the Army War College.

• Conduct a complete review of the Army’s overall combat support/combat service support (CS/CSS) force structure.

• Based on the review realign CS/CSS force structure between active and reserve components to meet demands of SSCs.54

Although the list is certainly not all inclusive, the failure to address any of the issues will have significant implications for the Army. Regardless of the force structure strategy the Army selects the essential task is to improve and sustain the combat proficiency of our Army and its capability to execute critical stability tasks. “One thing is certain the post-conflict mission is too important and too hard to rely on cobbled forces together enroute to the objective.”55

CONCLUSION

Our primary mission is not to fight and win the nation’s wars, though that’s our most important mission. We exist to serve the nation; however, the nation wants us to serve wherever and whenever we are needed.56

General Byrnes sums it up best. Ultimately the armed forces will do what the nation wants and will serve whenever and wherever it is needed. However the objective “is not to ignore post-conflict challenges – shrinking from intervention, ousting regimes without consideration for their replacement or performing only halfhearted reconstruction planning.”57

The challenges of preparing the armed forces to fight in major regional conflicts and other military operations will require flexible and adaptive doctrine and a force structure that can meet the dangers of a post 911 world. The basic tenets of our military policy and force structure focus should remain conventional land warfare. The United States clearly needs the capabilities that come with well-trained and equipped land forces. As long as it is the policy of this Nation to respond to the types of operations we are currently engaged in we should build forces of sufficient size and with the capability to operate across the full spectrum.58
The multi-purpose force approach will provide the flexible, adaptive doctrine and force structure required in the increasingly complex post-conflict environment. As this paper illustrates the specialized force approach to post-conflict and nation building operations is not the most optimal solution. It is unlikely that a specialized force could meet the future demands of stability operations. However, multi-purpose forces that are trained, equipped, with leaders who are committed to both winning in Major Theaters of War and handling the stabilization phase of small scale contingencies will ensure progress towards United States security goals.

Recently the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness told a group of defense correspondents that in order to prevent future wars the United States military is in the nation building business to stay and it seems unlikely that the Army will not continue to play a significant role in the future. Like the Cold War, the global war of terror and its increased requirement for post-conflict intervention is likely to preoccupy the United States for decades and we must be prepared.
ENDNOTES


4 Ibid.


7 Bush, 29.


9 Wynne, 1.


15 Ibid., 50-51.

16 Conrad C. Crane, Landpower and Crises: Army Roles and Missions in Smaller-Scale Contingencies During the 1990s (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, January 2001), 37.


18 Spiller, 8.


21 Dobbins, 23.

22 Mark Fineman, Robin Wright and Doyle McManus, “Preparing for War, Stumbling to Peace – U.S. is Paying the Price for Missteps Made on Iraq,” Los Angeles Times, 24 December 2003, p. 1. Statement made by Judith Yaphe, a former CIA analyst who attended a planning session at the National Defense Univeristy to address how to win the peace in Iraq once the war is over.

23 Schadlow, 6.


25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.


30 Olsen, 2.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid.


35 Ibid., 12.


37 Boot, 341.
38 Spencer, 2.
39 Sorenson, 410.
40 Olsen, 2.
41 Ibid., 10.
42 Ibid.
47 The ideas in this paragraph are based on remarks made by several General Officers participating in the Advanced Strategic Arts Program (ASAP) Lecture Series at the U.S. Army War College, 2003-2004.
48 Graham, 1.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid., 2.
52 Transforming Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, Fletcher Center for Technology and National Security Policy (2 December 2003), 5.
53 Crane, 37.
54 Ibid.


