**Report Documentation Page**

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. REPORT DATE</th>
<th>03 MAY 2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. REPORT TYPE</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. DATES COVERED</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</td>
<td>Supporting and Integrating Theater Security Cooperation Plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5a. CONTRACT NUMBER</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5b. GRANT NUMBER</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. AUTHOR(S)</td>
<td>Gregory Hager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5d. PROJECT NUMBER</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5e. TASK NUMBER</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</td>
<td>U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</td>
<td>Approved for public release; distribution unlimited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. ABSTRACT</td>
<td>See attached file.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. SUBJECT TERMS</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. REPORT</td>
<td>unclassified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. ABSTRACT</td>
<td>unclassified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. THIS PAGE</td>
<td>unclassified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. NUMBER OF PAGES</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)  
Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
Almost since its inception, the United States military has interacted with foreign militaries during peacetime. Each of the military services regularly conducted exchanges, formally and informally, to improve military capability or interoperability. Geographic commanders found engagement to be a useful tool to establish security cooperation and continue to conduct military interaction activities to support national security objectives during peacetime. Included in the areas engagement supported were Military Professionalization, Support of Democratic Values, Humanitarian Assistance, Counterdrug and Counter-Terrorism. Following the publication of the 1995 National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, regional commanders and the joint staff developed a formal peacetime engagement planning process. Through the process each Geographic Combatant Commander developed a regional strategic plan, now referred to as the Theater Security Cooperation Plan that described the security environment, identified engagement objectives and listed associated activities that supported those objectives. A criticism of engagement planning was that the plan was developed and executed with scarce resources and little chance to influence the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) for support. This Strategy Research Project examines the planning process and offers areas of improvement to better integrate and support Theater Security Cooperation Plans.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

- ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................. III
- SUPPORTING AND INTEGRATING THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION PLANS .................. 1
  - HISTORY OF THEATER ENGAGEMENT PLANNING ....................................................... 1
  - CURRENT SECURITY COOPERATION PLANNING GUIDANCE ..................................... 5
  - REGIONAL ALIGNMENT ................................................................................................. 6
  - PRIORITIZATION .............................................................................................................. 8
  - RESOURCING ..................................................................................................................... 8
  - PLAN INTEGRATION .......................................................................................................... 10
- CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................ 11
- ENDNOTES .............................................................................................................................. 13
- BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................................................... 17
SUPPORTING AND INTEGRATING THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION PLANS

“I am convinced that the three pillars of the strategy -- shape, respond and prepare -- are well chosen and are the right ones for these turbulent and unpredictable times. The potential of the strategy can best be achieved if we place proper and proportional emphasis and adequately resource each of the pillars.”

- General Charles E. Wilhelm, Commander, United States Southern Command

As long as the United States has had a military, it has conducted activities during peacetime that either prevented crisis from developing or allowed rapid response to areas of conflict around the world. Since 1946, the responsibility for these activities came under the purview of the geographic combatant commands. Although each geographic combatant commander developed a plan to execute these activities, it was not until 1998 that the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and combatant commanders formalized the peacetime engagement planning process in doctrine. After several years, this process has provided focus and discipline to security cooperation planning, but challenges remain that hinder combatant commander execution of adequately resourced, well synchronized security cooperation activities. These challenges include organization for planning, prioritization of engagement objectives and resources among regions, and resourcing. This does not even consider the difficulty caused by continuous changes in the international political environment. The purpose of this paper is to examine these challenges and possible improvements required to better integrate and support Theater Security Cooperation Plans.

HISTORY OF THEATER ENGAGEMENT PLANNING

Originally referred to as the Theater Engagement Plan (TEP), the Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP) is “primarily a strategic planning document intended to link CINC-planned regional engagement activities with national strategic objectives.” Categorized as a deliberate plan, the TSCP is a product of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) and involves all military activities with other nations during peacetime. It is based on guidance from the National Command Authority and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A review of security cooperation planning shows that requirements to conduct interaction with foreign militaries are clearly articulated in national level documents as well as military planning guidance, but provisions for resourcing them is less clear.
Security cooperation started to gain attention in 1995 with the publication of the National Security Strategy (NSS). In it, the President stressed the importance of preventive diplomacy and what would later become theater engagement as a critical element of national strategy. The 1995 NSS stated the following.

“Our leadership must stress preventive diplomacy -- through such means as support for democracy, economic assistance, overseas military presence, interaction between U.S. and foreign militaries and involvement in multilateral negotiations in the Middle East and elsewhere -- in order to help resolve problems, reduce tensions and defuse conflicts before they become crises. These measures are a wise investment in our national security because they offer the prospect of resolving problems with the least human and material cost.”


“Our military forces must perform three sets of tasks to achieve the military objectives of promoting stability and thwarting aggression. These three components of the strategy are peacetime engagement, deterrence and conflict prevention, and fighting and winning our Nation’s wars. Accomplishing the specific tasks of the strategy is facilitated by the two complementary strategic concepts of overseas presence and power projection.”

A specific component of the strategy was peacetime engagement that was further defined as,

“….a broad range of non-combat activities undertaken by our Armed Forces that demonstrate commitment, improve collective military capabilities, promote democratic ideals, relieve suffering, and enhance regional stability. The elements of peacetime engagement include military-to-military contacts, nation assistance, security assistance, humanitarian operations, counterdrug and counterterrorism, and peacekeeping.”

In 1997 the formal requirements of the plan grew when a “National Military Strategy of Shape, Respond, Prepare Now – A Military Strategy for a New Era” was formulated to support the “National Security Strategy for a New Century” and the 1997 “Quadrennial Defense Review” The Quadrennial Defense Review Stated:

“…..the Department of Defense has an essential role to play in shaping the international security environment in ways that promote and protect U.S. national interests. Our defense efforts help to promote regional stability, prevent or reduce conflicts and threats, and deter aggression and coercion on a day-to-day basis in many key regions of the world. To do so, the Department employs a wide variety of means including: forces permanently stationed abroad; forces rotationally deployed overseas; forces deployed temporarily for exercises, combined training, or military-to-military interactions; and programs such as defense cooperation, security assistance, International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs, and international arms cooperation.”
The “National Military Strategy, Shape, Respond, Prepare Now -- A Military Strategy for a New Era” continued to stress peacetime engagement one of three pillars (Shape, Respond, and Prepare) in a strategy for the accomplishment of national objectives.

“Shaping the International Environment. US Armed Forces help shape the international environment primarily through their inherent deterrent qualities and through peacetime military engagement. The shaping element of our strategy helps foster the institutions and international relationships that constitute a peaceful strategic environment by promoting stability; preventing and reducing conflict and threats; and deterring aggression and coercion.”

Continuing to follow the JSPS, combatant commanders received their formal tasking to develop Theater Security Cooperation Plans through the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). The guidance outlined in the JSCP included planning tasks, objectives, and apportioned resources for planning. For the purposes of planning security cooperation within the regional Areas of Responsibility (AORs) as defined by the Unified Command Plan, the JSCP provided each commander with prioritized regional objectives. But contrary to other plans, it apportioned no forces for conducting security cooperation beyond those either assigned within the region or those moving through the AOR. The end result of this statement meant that geographic commands such as United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) and United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) did not have forces readily available with which to conduct planning. All forces for engagement would have to be requested through their respective service component command.

Although the JSCP provided each geographic commander prioritized regional objectives in support of national objectives, it established neither prioritization between the regions nor among the objectives. This provided planning flexibility to commanders but created conflicts during competition for resources. To fulfill the planning requirement of the JSCP, and initially to provide visibility of peacetime military engagement to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, combatant commanders were tasked to develop a two-part plan including a Strategic Plan that outlined the theater strategy and objectives, and the Engagement Activity Annexes that documented each specific engagement activity conducted with foreign militaries in engagement groups identified by the Joint Staff.

Concepts for planning and conducting peacetime engagement did not change; however, the planning and reporting requirements increased with Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3113.01, Theater Engagement Planning published in February 1998.
"Geographic CINC and Executive Agents will develop, as applicable, TEPs for their assigned theaters or designated countries inclusive of the year of execution and the next seven (7) fiscal years. The plan development process is conducted in four phases. The first phase provides planning guidance via the JSCP; the second phase results in a geographic CINC approved TEP Strategic Concept; the third phase includes synchronization of supporting and coordinating plans and results in a geographic CINC-approved TEP; and the fourth phase is the national-level review and integration into the Global Family of Theater Engagement Plans."\(^{13}\)

Under CJCSM 3113.01 all Unified Combatant Commanders were required to submit biennially on 1 April, a Strategic Concept to the Joint Staff for review by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and an Engagement Activity Annex with specific resource and execution data covering the year of execution plus the next seven years. The activity annexes were also submitted to the Joint Staff J5 annually on 1 October. Also included in the 1998 CJCSM 3113.01 was a refined definition of what qualified as an engagement activity and thus required coordination and reporting. The categories of engagement included Operational Activities, Combined Exercises, Security Assistance, Combined Training, Combined Education, Military Contacts, Humanitarian Assistance and Other Activities. Other activities included arms Control Treaties, Negotiations, and Information Sharing\(^{14}\).

These groups of peacetime engagement tasks included a broad range of non-combat activities undertaken by our Armed Forces to demonstrate commitment, improve collective military capabilities, promote democratic ideals, relieve suffering, and in many other ways enhance regional stability. Even with this newly stated peacetime engagement planning requirement, the primary objective of our military strategy remained to be the military’s ability in acting to deter aggression and prevent conflict; and fighting and winning our Nation’s wars when called upon\(^{15}\).

As defined by the 1995 National Military Strategy, Peacetime Engagement included Military to Military Contacts, Nation Assistance, Security Assistance, Humanitarian Operations, Counterdrug and Counterterrorism, and Peacekeeping\(^{16}\). With this narrow definition of engagement, the major fund sources Commanders had at their disposal included CJCS Exercise funds, Security Assistance dollars budgeted by the State Department and executed by the Department of Defense through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Commands were also provided additional funds to conduct operations including counterdrug, disaster assistance and peacekeeping operations. In addition to these budgeted programs, service component commanders could use operational funds to conduct engagement activities with
foreign militaries in conjunction with training opportunities both inside and outside of the United States.

By May of 2000, the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the combatant commanders were well into the formalized process of developing an electronic media to plan, coordinate and track engagement activities. The premise behind the database was that commanders reported engagement activities via the database and the Joint Planning Community could review and track execution of engagement plans. The media that was fielded was the Theater Engagement Planning Management Information System (TEPMIS), later called the Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System (TSCMIS). Shortly after the publication of the May 2000 CJCSM 3113.03, the DOD centralized TSCMIS was eliminated. The result of ending TSCMIS was that there was no longer an electronic tool that could assist in engagement planning and synchronization as well as provide global visibility on engagement activities.

The organization for planning and conduct of the Security Cooperation Plan included the combatant commands, service components, defense agencies, and for those countries with established embassies, the military section of the country team or the security assistance officer. The planning cycle, which began with the geographic combatant commanders’ publication of their Strategic Concept on 1 April that provided the strategic planning guidance for the AOR and subsequent activity annexes on 1 October, was established to coincide with the Department of Defense Planning Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS). The purpose of this process was to allow combatant commanders an opportunity to influence the budget process to gain funding for the conduct of their engagement plans.

CURRENT SECURITY COOPERATION PLANNING GUIDANCE

Although much of the specific reference to peacetime military engagement is absent from the current National Security Strategy, the requirement to engage other countries still exists. The September 2002 NSS identifies the need to “work with others to defuse regional conflicts”. Although there has been no publication of a more recent National Military strategy that outlines the military’s strategy for support of current national objectives, the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review articulates military requirements to conduct security cooperation activities. As with the National Security Strategy, much of the explicit reference to peacetime engagement is omitted from the 2001 QDR and focus is placed primarily on improving capability and interoperability among our allies. The QDR noted:
“A primary objective of U.S. security cooperation will be to help allies and friends create favorable balances of military power in critical areas of the world to deter aggression or coercion. Security cooperation serves as an important means for linking DoD’s strategic direction with those of U.S. allies and friends. The need to strengthen alliances and partnerships has specific military implications. It requires that U.S. forces train and operate with allies and friends in peacetime as they would operate in war. This includes enhancing interoperability and peacetime preparations for coalition operations, as well as increasing allied participation in activities such as joint and combined training and experimentation.”

What is also important is that the QDR also “is built around the concept of shifting to a capabilities-based approach to defense”. This becomes important when planning and resourcing theater security cooperation activities. In order to accomplish the goals outlined in the NMS and objectives articulated in the QDR, in addition to strengthening alliances and promoting democracy through professionalization of foreign militaries, the U.S must increase the capability of our allies to defeat crisis in their own country’s and region whether the threat be terrorism, narcotrafficking, humanitarian crisis or natural disasters. Specific to Security Cooperation Planning is the publication of the Security Cooperation Guidance that provides additional strategic direction for the conduct of DoD interaction with foreign militaries.

DoD further stresses the importance of security cooperation within two of the four Joint Operating Concept categories (Stability Operations and Strategic Deterrence) outlined in the Joint Operations Concepts (JOpsC) which describe how the military will plan, prepare, deploy, employ and sustain a joint force. The JOpsC further identifies Multinational Operations as an enabling concept to describe how tasks are performed and link capabilities to military tasks. Even though specific mention of engagement and shaping is omitted, national policy recognizes the need for the military to conduct military to military activities in support of national interests abroad. The question remains as how to best plan, coordinate, and resource these plans.

REGIONAL ALIGNMENT

The first obstacle to an integrated Theater Security Cooperation plan is the inefficiency caused by a regional organization that does not align the policy making role of the Department of State with the policy implementing roles of agencies to include the Department of Defense. Today, the Department of State responsible for formulating foreign policy is organized with six regional Bureaus (African Affairs, East Asian and Pacific Affairs, European and Eurasian Affairs, Near Eastern Affairs, South Asian Affairs, and Western Hemisphere Affairs). Conversely, the Secretary of Defense who is responsible for national security and defense policy is organized into six slightly different regional bureaus under two Assistant Secretaries of Defense (Africa,
Asia/Pacific, Western Hemisphere, Near East and South Asia, Eurasia, and Europe). Finally the Department of Defense assigns geographic military responsibilities to five geographical combatant commanders (Central Command, European Command, Northern Command, Pacific Command and Southern Command).

Although it has gone through many changes since its formation by the Joint Chiefs following WWII in 1946, the purpose of the Unified Command Plan (UCP) remains to achieve unity of military action within the separate regions of the world. Recognizing a changing threat, the Department of Defense realigned responsibilities effective 1 October 2002 in order to more efficiently respond to homeland security missions and enhance transformation. Since the inception of the UCP, responsibilities of the geographic combatant commanders have grown to include more than just the war fighting aspects of military action and now include all types of activity conducted by the military to include humanitarian assistance and other peacetime military engagement type activities. In order to conduct an effective plan, commanders must coordinate closely with policy-making agencies. The physical organization of these agencies makes efficient coordination difficult. For example PACOM, which is responsible for 43 countries and entities from India throughout the Indian and Pacific Oceans, must coordinate with the Asian/Pacific and Near East/South Asian Affairs Bureaus of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The Near East/South Asian Bureau has responsibility for coordinating Theater Security Cooperation Plans with three different geographic commanders (PACOM, CENTCOM and EUCOM). Similar examples exist when the Department of State bureaus are compared with the regional responsibilities of the geographic commanders.

In the past when the clear threat of the former Soviet Union existed, resources were easily prioritized in support of protecting national survival from Soviet-directed military power. As a result “America’s vital interests were protected even if the Department of State and the Department of Defense planners and actors were not always focused on the same regional issues”. Because of the more complex threat environment and decreased resources that exist in today’s environment it is necessary to more closely integrate national security policy using the elements of national power. In their article “A Blueprint for A Bold Restructuring of the Organization for National Security”, Pasquarette and Kievit provided a structure that retained five revised DoD geographic commands (U.S. Americas Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. African Command, U.S. Near Eastern Command, and the U.S. Far Eastern Command) that would be aligned with five modified DoS regional bureaus (Inter-American Affairs, European Affairs, African Affairs, Near Eastern Affairs, and Far Eastern Affairs). They argued that the revised structure would “integrate U.S. military power with U.S. economic and diplomatic efforts
throughout the world, and would allow U.S. military regional command personnel to focus culturally and linguistically to the same degree as do Department of State operatives.\textsuperscript{33}

The most effective organization for coordinating regional policy with military planning and execution would be to align the regions or areas of responsibility of the Department of Defense, Department of State and the geographic regional commanders.

**PRIORITIZATION**

The second challenge to a well-integrated and resourced plan is prioritization. Though the planning process outlined in CJCSM 3113.01A calls for a “national level review” there is no provision at either the OSD or Joint Staff level to prioritize efforts between regions.\textsuperscript{34} Resources, both money and troops are finite and requirements for support of the geographic commanders’ Theater Security Cooperation Plan in addition to other operational requirements are far greater than resources available. Although the JSCP provides commanders with prioritized regional objectives, nowhere are planners provided with a prioritization among the regions by objective to identify which region would receive priority of a resource in support of a specific objective. In addition to lack of an up front prioritization, there is reluctance at the national level to assign a priority when two commanders are requesting the same asset or resource. In many cases, because there is no national level prioritization, each particular component is left to determine which requirement to support based on availability of resources and readiness requirements.

A solution would involve OSD providing more specific guidance in the formulation of objectives and go beyond identifying vague priorities and guidance.\textsuperscript{35} Additionally a process must be identified that resolves conflicts between combatant commanders when identical resources are required.

**RESOURCING**

A third challenge and perhaps the most visible deficiency with the TSCP process that confronts geographic combatant commanders is the ability to resource their plans. A study conducted by RAND in 2000 identified four areas that contributed to a lack of resources for TSCPs. The first area was that although the TSCP was a deliberate plan it followed a route in JSPS different from other deliberate plans. Because the TSCP followed a separate route through JSPS, the security cooperation activities were inadequately connected to the formal DoD decision making process and received little visibility. Planning of specific activities at combatant commander level was too detailed for OSD to prioritize and make resource
decisions. Finally, many of the resources used by combatant commanders came from agencies other than DoD.\textsuperscript{36}

All U.S. national policy documents including the National Security Strategy, the Quadrennial Defense Review and the recent Security Cooperation Guidance state that military to military relationships are important and support aims to “build allied and friendly military capabilities for self defense and coalition operations.”\textsuperscript{37} The exception is that resource guidance for TSCP planning is not included in the DPG.\textsuperscript{38} A result is that force requirements to conduct these activities are not included in force structure assessments and as such insufficient forces are available to the combatant commanders for plan execution. To be effective, forces required for the effective execution of security cooperation objectives must be considered in force structure development. Additionally combatant commanders must develop programs that focus on creating capabilities consistent with the QDR and the Security Cooperation Guidance whether they address interoperability issues or increase the capability of other militaries to conduct operations. The planning timelines for development and submission of plans are such that adequate time is available to input requirements into PPBS. With the increased emphasis on execution reviews brought about the Management Initiative Decision 913, there is the potential for well-founded engagement programs and activities to be funded from under executing programs during the year of execution. In addition to resources programmed through the service components, combatant commanders must consider and integrate resources budgeted by the Department of State for security assistance. The difficulty with trying to integrate these funds is that DoS does not use identical planning horizons and timelines for programming resources and combatant commanders have little input into where DoS money will be spent.\textsuperscript{39} The security assistance programs that DoS funds are the International Training Program that includes International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Expanded IMET (EIMET), and other training that is funded in conjunction with Foreign Military Financing (FMF). It also includes Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Excess Defense Articles (EDA) in which equipment no longer used by the United States is offered to foreign countries consistent with their particular mission and U.S. interests. Other funds such as Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) has been authorized since 1996 and allows deployment of U.S. military personnel to conduct humanitarian projects. With the exception of security assistance programs much of the interaction is conducted by the service components and resource planning is reduced to a number and type of activities conducted within a country rather than the identification of a required capability.
PLAN INTEGRATION

The fourth area that provides a challenge to the combatant commander is the translation of the theater strategy into bilateral or, multilateral activities conducted within the countries of the region or with foreign security forces within the United States to develop critical capabilities. In order for this to occur an organizational structure must exist that identifies country requirements and translates the combatant commander’s strategy into an executable plan that accomplishes both the foreign country’s needs as well as U.S. interests. The closest organization that exists is the Ambassador’s country team and the Security Assistance Offices within the foreign countries around the world.

While the combatant commander develops the Theater Security Cooperation Plan in which he exercises responsibility for all peacetime military activity in the region, the Department of State simultaneously develops a strategic plan that addresses other elements of national power to meet challenges within foreign countries in support of U.S. interests. Each Ambassador is charged with the development of a Mission Performance Plan that supports accomplishment of objectives outlined in the DoS Strategic Plan. A critical link between the two plans is the Security Assistance Officer (SAO). The Defense Security Cooperation Agency defines his role as follows.

The SAO “overseas activities that are managed and funded by the Security Assistance Program Manager, DSCA Comptroller, that serve to carry out Security Assistance management functions under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Section 515, as amended, regardless of actual title assigned. SAOs include Military Assistance Advisory Groups, military missions, U.S. military groups, offices of defense cooperation, offices of military cooperation, offices of defense representative, and other similar organizations located in foreign countries as part of the U.S. Embassy country team. These organizations are established on a long-term basis to manage international security assistance programs.”

Even though the SAO may be a part of the country team and work for the Ambassador, he is also the combatant commander’s military representative in the country and must be able to coordinate all military activity within the country. The SAO is perhaps in the best position to determine through dialogue with that country’s military its threat and challenges, and what capabilities consistent with the interests of the United States are best served with additional training and equipment. Based on this information, not only could the SAO plan required security cooperation activities best suited for that country but could also include that information in the Ambassador’s Mission Performance Plan for the development of a comprehensive interagency country plan.
Following the identification of a required capability consistent with the combatant commanders’ security cooperation plan and prioritization, the service components could then propose programs in conjunction with the security assistance program to develop that capability as well as resource the program through the budgeting process.

CONCLUSION

“Every TSC activity we undertake enhances our joint/combined capabilities and communicates our intent to assure friends, or dissuade, deter, or defeat potential enemies. Security Cooperation is an engine of change that, along with our Joint Training and Experimentation Plans and our operational focus, solidifies the link between national strategy and focused, enduring regional security.”

- Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command

Regardless of its name, either the Theater Engagement Plan or the Theater Security Cooperation Plan, the articulation of policy in the form of aims and objectives from the National Security Strategy to the geographic combatant commander’s theater strategy make foreign military interaction critical to the accomplishment of national objectives. It is important regardless of whether the interaction enables avoiding or deterring a crisis or facilitates creating access to countries or regions of the world for critical military action. It is equally important in the development of critical capabilities within the militaries of our allies that not only assist the U.S. in its effort to achieve its national objectives, but also to address challenges within that particular country or region. This is true whether it be an allied nations own national security or defense, efforts to address narcotrafficking or terrorism, or its ability to respond to natural or made-made crisis within their own country or region.

Execution of formal TSCP planning has highlighted challenges in prioritizing, resourcing and coordinating security cooperation activities. In order for the plan to become effective, process and organization must be affected that allow for ease of coordination. The coordination must effectively and efficiently link national and regional policy to military strategy through regional alignment across the interagency. In order to effectively manage the scarce resources among the geographic commands, a process must be developed that provides more specific guidance and prioritization of objectives by country and region. To adequately provide resources the plan must be fully incorporated into the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System affecting both force structure and allowing the development of critical capabilities both within the U.S. military and our allies. Finally a planning organization must be developed that begins with a top-down process but also fully establishes and incorporates military representation and planning within the countries favorable to military interaction by pressing a
larger planning role to Security Assistance Organizations within each country. It is not until challenges such as these are addressed that execution of the Security Cooperation Plan can be measured for it's effectiveness at creating capabilities within our allies that make them both more interoperable and able to respond to common crisis both within their own country as well as the region that support the national interests of both countries.

WORD COUNT= 4522
ENDNOTES


5 Ibid., GL-7.

6 Ibid., GL-7.


9 Ibid., ii.


16 Ibid.


20 Ibid., 13.


26 Ibid.


30 Ibid., 12.
31 Ibid., 12.
32 Ibid., 19-20.
33 Ibid., 20.
39 Ibid.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


