WAGING PEACE: OPERATIONS ECLIPSE I AND II—
SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS

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### Waging Peace: Operations ECLIPSE I and II Some Implications for Future Operations

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ABSTRACT

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In May 1943, Allied planners in London began working on a complex plan that arguably would have as significant impact on the postwar world as its more famous companion, Operation OVERLORD. The plan became Operation ECLIPSE, the order that would govern the occupation of Germany by the western Allies. Sixty years later, the Combined Forces Land Component would title its plan for postwar operations in Iraq ECLIPSE II. As this mission unfolds today, ECLIPSE offers a lens through which to examine its successor.

This study argues that postwar operations are complex civil-military endeavors that require clear lines of authority and astute, politically attuned leadership. It concludes that waging peace requires an overwhelming force on the ground, especially in its early phases, information dominance, and application of economic and political means from other government agencies. This latter point emerges as perhaps the most significant lesson. The decision to go to war involves a calculus that the application of force will set the conditions that will allow the state to achieve its policy aims. The first step, going to war, must be linked to the last step, ordering the resulting peace to ensure the achievement of policy objectives. This necessarily requires statesmen to wield all instruments of national power in a coordinated campaign on a battlefield where force is not the primary determinant of success. Yet the national security structure as currently configured is inherently inefficient for waging peace. Wholesale changes must be made in the culture of government to inculcate an interagency spirit that transcends departmental parochialism. Interagency training, a common doctrine for planning and management, and removal of barriers to information and communication are essential to build mechanisms for interagency cooperation and truly joint planning and operations. The time is ripe for a revision of the National Security Act of 1947 to create an organizational structure and culture able to seamlessly and simultaneously bring all instruments of power to bear effectively at strategic, operational, and tactical levels.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT................................................................................................................................................III

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................................ VII

WAGING PEACE: OPERATIONS ECLIPSE I AND II—SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS .................................................................1

OPERATION ECLIPSE...................................................................................................................2

OPERATION ECLIPSE II................................................................................................................6

IMPLICATIONS FOR WAGING PEACE.....................................................................................10

ENDNOTES .............................................................................................................................................. 15

BIBLIOGRAPHY .......................................................................................................................................35
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WAGING PEACE: OPERATIONS ECLIPSE I AND II—SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS

The decision for war usually rests on rational calculations that conflict will create the conditions that achieve strategic objectives. The scale of the objective, Clausewitz suggests, defines the character of the war. The character of the war, in turn, inevitably dictates the peace that follows. As war drives toward fulfilling its terrifying logic, Clausewitz argues, passions overthrow reason, violence spirals, and stakes grow. Statesmen must assemble the ways and means to achieve the desired ends. So great is the effort required to wage war, so high the costs, that it can consume political and military leaders who thus often fail to look beyond the fighting. Yet such vision is the most significant requirement of strategists: it is not enough to win the war—they must also win the peace to secure broader policy objectives, without which the sacrifices of war have no meaning. This effort demands the same application of appropriate ways and allocation of means as waging war. Waging peace requires a level of planning, commitment, and exertion consistent with the ends pursued in the war. Failure in waging war can have disastrous results, more often than not the price of a flawed ends-ways-means assessment. Similarly, failure in waging peace will undermine the sacrifices of war and wrest defeat from victory by undermining the achievement of broader policy aims for which military forces have waged (or should have) the conflict.

In May 1943, Allied staff officers in London began working on a complex plan that arguably had as significant impact on the postwar world as its more famous companion, Operation OVERLORD. The plan became ECLIPSE, the operation that governed the occupation of Germany by the western Allies. Sixty years later, the Combined Forces Land Component titled its plan for postwar operations in Iraq ECLIPSE II. As present day operations unfold, ECLIPSE offers a lens through which to examine its successor. It brings into sharp focus the extent to which planners and policy-makers anticipated the requirements for successful post-conflict operations, the assumptions underlying their plans, and the way the United States postured itself to conduct postwar operations. Despite distinct differences in the circumstances of both ECLIPSE and ECLIPSE II there exist fundamental commonalities in defining and balancing ends, ways, and means in such a manner as to advance national interests. ECLIPSE I and II thus offer useful case studies to examine how to think about, plan, and conduct future postwar operations.
OPERATION ECLIPSE

On 12 February 1944, General Dwight Eisenhower received the celebrated directive to “enter the continent of Europe and...undertake operations aimed at the heart of GERMANY and the destruction of her armed forces.” What historians understandably tend to ignore is a less ringing passage entitled: “Relationships with Allied Governments—the Re-establishment of Civil Governments and Liberated Allied Territories with the Administration of Enemy Territories.” Allied staffs planning postwar operations must have eagerly looked here for long-awaited policy guidance, only to find that “Further instructions will be issued to you on these subjects at a later date.”² In fact, policymakers were unable to define the desired end state beyond the immediate objective of defeating and occupying Nazi Germany. Not unusually for a politician, President Franklin Roosevelt preferred to keep his options open, and not surprisingly, he vacillated between competing visions of a retributive and realist peace. More importantly, he had to consider the demands of maintaining a wartime coalition: so long as the decision hung in the balance it was folly to raise troublesome issues arising from competing visions of the postwar order.³

Responsibility for conducting the war resided with the War and Navy Departments. Left undefined was which government agency would bear responsibility for planning and administering the peace. Roosevelt’s ideological preference for civil administration over military government suggested that he would turn to the Department of State to meet this requirement. However, events in North Africa after TORCH underlined the practical fact that State lacked the capacity for planning and conducting such a complex task.⁴ Immediately after Pearl Harbor, Secretary of State Cordell Hull established an advisory committee to consider postwar foreign policy. Most important was the work of a number of subcommittees that met periodically to address economic reconstruction, postwar European structures, and security issues. The last sub-committee included representatives from the War and Navy Departments, the first interagency-body to consider postwar policy.⁵ The work of these committees abruptly ended in June 1943 when the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS), wrestling with how to deal with liberated territories in the wake of Operation TORCH, brought postwar policy into the War Department by establishing the Combined Civil Affairs Committee (CCAD) under Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy. The State Department had representation on this committee, but there is no evidence that it used this venue to shape policy.⁶

The most significant product of CCAD was CCS/551, the “Directive for Military Government in Germany Prior to Defeat or Surrender,” issued to Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) on 28 April 1944. This order vested in the Supreme
Commander the authority and responsibility for governing occupied Germany and established basic principles for him to follow. Because the directive applied only to the pre-surrender period, however, significant questions as to the policy the United States intended to pursue and the military’s role in postwar occupation remained unanswered. In the absence of political decisions, commanders and staffs remained in limbo about the ends the president was pursuing and the instruments of national power he intended to apply. Eisenhower’s Chief of Staff, Bedell Smith, sought guidance by posing a series of questions to the CCS about postwar German government, economy, and partition. He emphasized: “On the answers to these, and to many other kindred questions, long-term planning depends.” He reminded the chiefs that “the problem is not one that can be handled piecemeal or a solution extemporized hurriedly in the last stage of the operation.” Events sixty years later proved him correct.

Within months of D-Day, SHAEF had to grapple with the practical problems of conducting postwar operations before a policy existed to govern such operations. On 18 September 1944, following the Allied capture of the first German town, Eisenhower issued a proclamation announcing that “Allied Military Government is established in the theater under my command to exercise in occupied German territory the supreme…authority vested in me as Supreme Commander…” Small military government detachments would travel immediately behind the lead elements of advancing forces and begin the process of political and physical reconstruction under the direction of division, corps, and army commanders executing SHAEF directives.

Although many saw victory in Europe as imminent by December 1944 (at least prior to the German’s Ardennes offensive), the U.S. government still did not have a coherent postwar policy, nor had it worked out the ways or means that it would require in the postwar period. At the initiative of new Secretary of State Edward Stettinius, the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy formed the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) to consider postwar policy. This committee’s deliberations and policy recommendations were instrumental in preparing Roosevelt for Yalta in January 1945, where the Soviets, British, and Americans proclaimed their “inflexible purpose to destroy German militarism and Nazism and to ensure that Germany will never again be able to disturb the peace of the world.” To do so, they intended to oversee the complete disarmament, demilitarization, and denazification of Germany.

In May 1945 the Joint Chiefs of Staff finally issued JCS 1067, the first formal national guidance for the conduct of postwar operations, to Eisenhower in his capacity as Commander, U.S. Forces European Theater. By its provisions, the United States Army would occupy Germany and treat the Germans as a defeated enemy. Occupation forces would exercise limited control over the economy and limit the distribution of goods and foodstuffs to levels
necessary to prevent disease and unrest. Orders strictly forbade fraternization between soldiers and Germans, while the troops oversaw the thorough extirpation of Nazism and militarism. As General Lucius Clay, later military governor, observed, “there was no doubt that JCS 1067 contemplated the Carthaginian peace which dominated our operations in Germany during the early months of occupation.”

With the ends that the government aimed to pursue finally articulated, the ways available to achieve those ends had received little or no assessment. After North Africa, the U.S. Army had explicitly received primary responsibility for planning and conducting postwar operations. There was little interaction with other potential players such as State and Treasury: there assuredly was no interagency process beyond general policy discussions at SWNCC to coordinate the application of various approaches to accomplishing strategic ends. The one-dimensional nature of postwar planning was clear in the case of General Clay. In early 1945, Eisenhower had selected Clay to oversee military government operations as his deputy.

Before departing for Europe, Clay met with the president, Secretary of War Henry Stimson, and General George C. Marshall, army chief of staff, to receive instructions. He did not meet with anyone from the State Department. He later recalled: “As I look back I find it amazing that I did not visit the State Department or talk with any of its officials….No one at that time advised me of the role of the State Department in occupation matters or of its relationship to military government, and I am inclined to believe that no one had thought it out.”

Despite its instrumental role, the army remained uncomfortable with postwar operations as a long-term mission. After V-E Day the War Department immediately began pressing for an early transition from military to civil government in occupied Germany. According to Clay, Eisenhower sought to create an “organization which could be transferred to civilian control on twenty-four hours notice.”

Eisenhower sent a memorandum to Stimson setting a target date for the transition to civil control by 1 June 1946. The new president, Harry Truman, approved this objective without consulting Secretary of State James Byrnes. Byrnes, believing adamantly that his Department was a policy-making organization, not an operational entity, deftly maneuvered behind the scenes to forestall any assumption of primary responsibility by his department for the occupation. As a result, the 1 June 1946 date for transition came and went without remark, while the War Department retained responsibility for governing Germany until 1949.

With the ends settled and the ways defined as residing solely with the military instrument of power, it remained for the military to plan, coordinate, and execute the application of means to achieve strategic and political objectives. This effort had begun in March 1943, despite the
policy void, as prudent military planning when the CCS directed the Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC) to draft contingency plans for a sudden German collapse or surrender. The result was Operation RANKIN.\textsuperscript{19} RANKIN assumed an unopposed occupation of Germany and avoided discussing administration of the occupied territory by either civil or military authorities.\textsuperscript{20} After completion of RANKIN, a postwar planning cell continued to develop staff studies and papers that served to advance thinking about post-hostilities operations and raise relevant questions and issues to policy-makers.\textsuperscript{21}

As D-Day approached, planning shifted from preparations for a sudden Nazi collapse to considerations for the period after a military campaign that resulted in the occupation of Germany. In this environment, there was an explosion of postwar planning by the SHAEF staff that resulted in a new plan in October 1944, TALISMAN. TALISMAN addressed disarmament, disposal of war material, control of German prisoners of war, care of Allied prisoners of war, and denazification as the major postwar tasks.\textsuperscript{22} Conspicuously missing was specific guidance on how the Allies would administer occupied Germany, by whom, and what fate awaited the defeated state. Soon after completion of the plan, SHAEF, believing its codeword had been compromised, renamed it ECLIPSE.\textsuperscript{23}

The ECLIPSE Plan consisted of two phases. The primary phase focused on physical occupation and would occur simultaneously with the terminal combat operations of OVERLORD. In the second phase, ECLIPSE would stand alone as the Allies solidified their control of occupied areas, disarmed the \textit{Wehrmacht}, enforced surrender terms, established law and order, and redeployed Allied forces into defined national zones of responsibility. ECLIPSE also directed commanders to “complete establishment of Military Government throughout the sector.”\textsuperscript{24} Attached memoranda provided detailed guidance on surrender procedures, labor policies, procedures for handling Allied prisoners of war and displaced civilians, mechanisms for disarming the German armed forces, and guidance for establishing military government.\textsuperscript{25}

To execute these tasks, the military possessed ample means. On V-E Day, sixty-one U.S. Army divisions were in Germany and available to execute ECLIPSE. This made the security mission relatively simple: units dispersed and assumed responsibility for assigned areas.\textsuperscript{26} The troops also implemented ECLIPSE plans to demobilize the German Army and dispose of war materiel,\textsuperscript{27} care for and assist millions of displaced persons to return home,\textsuperscript{28} and organize reconstruction efforts to restore basic services and prevent a humanitarian disaster resulting from famine, epidemic, or exposure.\textsuperscript{29} Specialized military government detachments were also available and responsible for establishing political authority, implementing denazification, and directing reconstruction.\textsuperscript{30} By April 1945, the area of occupied territory
exceeded the capability of the existing 150 military government detachments, and army
commanders formed provisional detachments using antiaircraft, field artillery, and signal
troops. These detachments remained under the tactical chain of command until 1 August
1945, when U.S. Forces European Theater established districts under military governors. As
a result, according to the occupation’s official historian, in the transition from war to peace
“tactical commanders had more military government authority than any military government
detachment.”

OPERATION ECLIPSE II

Sixty years later, American political and military leaders again confronted the requirement
to define ends, identify ways, and assemble the means to advance national objectives beyond
the short-term one of “regime change.” American soldiers again found themselves responsible
for the practical problems arising from their position as the most available means for waging
peace and maintaining order in the wake of combat.

On 19 March 2003, after months of military preparations, political maneuvering in
Congress and the Security Council, and alternating Iraqi acts of defiance and compliance, the
American-led coalition launched Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. When announcing the beginning
of hostilities, President George W. Bush defined the coalition’s objectives in the following terms:
“to disarm Iraq, to free its people and to defend the world from grave danger.” With diplomacy
exhausted, the president settled on the military “to apply decisive force” as the way to achieve
those ends. Significantly, the president also had articulated a postwar vision for Iraq; in a
speech on 26 February 2003 he declared America’s objective to be a “free and peaceful Iraq.”
He noted that achieving this would not be easy and pledged the “sustained commitment” of the
United States to the effort. Hearkening back to 1945, the president recalled that “After defeating
enemies, we did not leave behind occupying armies, we left constitutions and parliaments. We
established an atmosphere of safety, in which responsible, reform-minded local leaders could
build lasting institutions of freedom. In societies that once bred fascism and militarism, liberty
found a permanent home.” Not burdened by the requirement to hold together a disparate
wartime alliance that Roosevelt had confronted, Bush went to war with clearly articulated ends.

Before the war, the president also designated the instrument he would employ to secure
his policy objective of a secure, prosperous, reconstructed, and democratic Iraq. On 20 January
2003, he issued National Security Presidential Directive 24 and explicitly assigned responsibility
for conduct of postwar operations to the Defense Department. Although postwar efforts
ostensibly were to be interagency in approach, under Pentagon leadership, in fact the military
instrument of power became the chosen way through which the president proposed to achieve
his strategic ends, just as it had for Roosevelt. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld quickly
established the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) under the
leadership of retired Lieutenant General Jay Garner. Garner put together a team of 200 former
military, Foreign Service, academic, and corporate personnel and began developing plans.\(^{37}\)
Despite requirements to reestablish a political system, provide aid and assistance, create a
sound banking system, and a multitude of other tasks that touched expertise across the
expanse of the United States government, Rumsfeld refused to allow the effort to reach out from
the Pentagon.\(^{38}\) As a result, ORHA did not integrate work done by the State Department in its
“Future of Iraq” project that began in March 2002, nor did it pay any attention to war games
conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency the summer before.\(^{39}\) Garner’s organization was
where the various instruments of national power were supposed to come together and function
in a coordinated fashion in the few short weeks before combat operations began. It did not
happen. Its work on humanitarian assistance was extensive, reflecting concerns aroused by
United Nations’ predictions of thousands of refugees and widespread shortages of food and
water in the wake of serious fighting.\(^{40}\) Planning for civil administration and reconstruction,
however, remained vague. In late February, ORHA conducted a rehearsal at Fort McNair.
One observer reported “I got the sense that the humanitarian stuff was pretty well in place, but
the rest of it was flying blind.”\(^{41}\)

In the absence of a coherent interagency approach, the military made its own
preparations based on a doctrinal appreciation that planning must address postwar
requirements, just as the Army had done in 1942.\(^{42}\) Military planning for what became IRAQI
FREEDOM reportedly began in earnest in summer 2002 at the president’s direction. General
Tommy Franks, the Commander of CENTCOM, tasked the Combined Forces Land Component
Commander (CFLCC), Lieutenant General David McKiernan, and his staff to prepare plans for
ground operations, including conflict termination operations. CFLCC planning initially focused
on the tough questions of assembling the military force to topple the regime, building the
support structure to sustain operations, and synchronizing the effects of joint fires and
maneuver to achieve a rapid, decisive victory. Phase IV, postwar stability and support
operations, received less attention, as it depended more on national policy decisions, was less
critical for decisive combat operations, and remained outside the “comfort zone” of most military
decision-makers.\(^{43}\) Policy guidance to shape Phase IV emerged only gradually from the office
of Under Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith. According to an after action review by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff that was leaked, this guidance failed to reflect any interagency planning between
the Defense and State Departments.\textsuperscript{44} Indeed, Feith’s efforts remained tightly contained within a small circle in the Pentagon, because of the political sensitivity of planning for the war against Iraq and, perhaps, because of a widely reported rift between Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Colin Powell over Iraq policy.\textsuperscript{45}

With the military instrument of power established as the means of achieving the Administration’s ends, the Defense Department began assembling forces for implementation. Central to this process were several assumptions that soon became unquestionable within the Pentagon. Principal among these was the belief within the Office of the Secretary of Defense that the Iraqis would view the coalition as a liberating force. They would then rise up to hasten the collapse of the regime and assume responsibility for sustaining public safety, administration, and basic services. According to the dismissed Army Secretary Thomas E. White, Feith “‘had the mind-set that this would be a relatively straightforward, manageable task, because this would be a war of liberation and therefore the reconstruction would be short-lived.’”\textsuperscript{46} Similarly, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Collins stated in late February 2003: “We’re not coming in to punish or to occupy Iraq. We’re coming in to liberate the country and create the conditions where the Iraqis can create a highly functioning democracy on their own.”\textsuperscript{47} The Pentagon thus based force planning and deployments on assumptions that military operations could accomplish this aim rapidly once Saddam and Baathist party apparatchiks were gone by building on existing Iraqi governmental and security structures.

Initial responsibility for postwar operations would necessarily fall to the military, which would need to begin addressing postwar tasks from the moment U.S. forces crossed into Iraq. However, significant military power was not immediately available to conduct stability and support operations designed to avert humanitarian disaster, restore critical infrastructure, and provide the environment for creation of a free, democratic Iraq. Admittedly a major effort did occur at the outset to preserve the Iraqi oil fields. Only after combat operations were complete could the efforts of the four coalition divisions and three combat brigades, together with large numbers of theater and corps support units, focus on postwar tasks. The Department of Defense had shaped this force to achieve success in bringing down Saddam’s regime, not for postwar efforts. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz dismissed estimates that the army would need more troops for postwar operations than combat operations as “outlandish.”\textsuperscript{48} Yet, when confronted by the anarchy that occurred in the wake of Saddam’s collapse, American troops were stretched too thinly to respond in a timely manner to contain the violence and destruction.
The military means for implementing the president’s vision of a democratic and stable Iraq thus assembled under two principal headquarters: ORHA and CFLCC (until it transitioned to a Combined Joint Task Force as planned in June). However, according to participants in the planning effort at CFLCC, there was virtually no contact between military planners and ORHA, despite the latter organization’s supposed subordination to CENTCOM. Matters did not improve when Garner and his staff deployed to Kuwait on 16 March, three days before the war began. Rather than accepting facilities on the same installation as CFLCC, Garner leased a hotel in Kuwait City, which given travel restrictions might have been in another country. The divide continued to widen. CFLCC saw ORHA’s contributions as coming too late to be helpful in shaping plans, while they viewed its headquarters and staff as isolated from the realities of combat operations. ORHA, for its part, felt marginalized by the military and without necessary resources. There was neither unity of effort nor unity of command in implementing a postwar strategy. Unlike Eisenhower, Franks does not appear to have involved himself directly in planning or executing postwar operations.

The arrival of Garner and his team in Iraq weeks after coalition forces had occupied Baghdad further exacerbated problems in transition to postwar operations. ORHA was then glacially slow in getting organized. There were no military government detachments following combat troops into Iraq as they had in Germany. Garner appeared increasingly hapless in the face of mounting reconstruction tasks. In his defense, the damage to the infrastructure was much greater than anticipated, in part due to widespread looting and the wholesale collapse of Iraqi civil institutions, including the ministries that ORHA was counting on to accomplish day-to-day administration. The Bush Administration therefore accelerated the timeline to replace Garner, and in May the president appointed Ambassador Paul Bremer to head ORHA’s successor, the Coalition Provisional Authority, to “oversee Coalition reconstruction efforts and the process by which the Iraqi people build the institutions and governing structures that will guide their futures.” With looting, blackouts, and insurgent activity, Iraqis were uncertain whether the Coalition had a plan, much less was executing one. The result was a loss of momentum, the appearance of flawed planning and preparation, and the frittering away of the psychological impact gained in victorious combat by indecisive, disorganized, and unsure postwar operations. The effects that the speed and precision which had destroyed the regime might have inspired instead were dissipated by what many observers, Iraqi, American, and international viewed as a bungled transition to peace operations. Iraqis soon were suspicious that such ineptitude could only be deliberate, an excuse to lengthen the occupation.
With the complete collapse of domestic Iraqi institutions, the first priority for postwar reconstruction was creation of an “atmosphere of safety.” This has proved problematic for coalition forces and has had a significant impact on the pace, costs, and perceptions of progress. Flawed assumptions that overestimated the coalition’s ability to destroy pro-regime forces quickly came into play, as potential sources of resistance melted into the population in the face of the speed and firepower of the coalition offensive. Equally troubling was the impression of widespread anarchy in the streets of Baghdad created by widespread looting in the wake of the regime’s disintegration. Exacerbating security problems was the fact that the coalition served as a lightning rod attracting radical Islamic fighters from throughout the region. The porous borders with Syria and Iran readily allowed Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups to join the fight. According to Lieutenant General Richard Sanchez, commander of ground forces in Iraq, “We did not expect instability before we arrived here. We did not expect the old Iraqi army to disappear and the political and economic structures to shut down. That was clearly a surprise.”

All continue to consume many more resources—time, manpower, and financial—than initially estimated, largely due to the decrepit state of the infrastructure and the stultifying effects of three decades of fear, brutality, statism, and inefficiency on the Iraqi people, factors undermining their initiative and sense of individual power.

IMPLICATIONS FOR WAGING PEACE

The ECLIPSE experiences indicate that the United States is very capable of waging war, but postwar operations have an ad hoc nature that is fundamentally inefficient, costly, and open-ended. The challenge for policy makers is not only to articulate strategic ends, identify appropriate ways, and allocate sufficient means, but also to link ends, ways, and means to produce a coherent strategy. If the policy objectives (the ends) are unclear or undefined, the strategy may well define the policy—for better or worse. Conversely, if the strategy is flawed, the attainment of policy goals will be threatened. Clausewitz argued “The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose.” He also urged statesmen not to take the first step toward war without considering the last to ensure that they had a coherent strategy to link ends and means. Operation ECLIPSE and the planning for the occupation of Germany present the case of a military strategy seeking policy. Allied military leaders planned for and resourced postwar operations in the absence of a policy defining what such operations would be asked to accomplish. In Iraq, the situation was reversed. The policy was established in some detail before initiation of hostilities. The president publicly laid out his postwar objectives on several occasions. However, the
strategy to achieve the policy was hampered severely by flawed planning assumptions, the failure of the United States government to apply sufficient resources to the task to ensure decisive results, the limited time for integrated planning, and a lack of interagency coordination. The latter deficit points out a common failing in both ECLIPSE operations, a failure to identify and apply appropriate ways to achieve the desired ends.

For American military officers, the centrality of planning in this process seems self-evident. Military officers learn carefully defined decisionmaking processes; daily operations and exercises then reinforce that instruction. It is axiomatic to military personnel that these planning techniques are universally relevant to all situations. It often comes as a professional shock for them to learn that policy makers do not necessarily share the same confidence in planning as a means of preparing for the future. Winston Churchill wrote his Foreign Secretary in 1942: “As you know, I am very doubtful about the utility of attempts to plan the peace before we have won the war.” Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld apparently shares Churchill’s reservations about the limits of planning. According to Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith, Rumsfeld’s “big strategic theme is uncertainty….The inability to predict the future. The limits on our knowledge and the limits on our intelligence.” Feith related that as a result if someone told Rumsfeld “‘Let me tell you what something’s going to look like in the future,’ you wouldn’t get to your next sentence!”

This reluctance to predict the future conflicts with the imperative for careful planning that undergirds highly complex military operations. As General Bedell Smith warned during the ECLIPSE planning, “the problem is not one that can be handled piecemeal or a solution extemporized hurriedly in the last stage of the operation.” Yet this is precisely the approach policy makers, who want maximum flexibility to react to changing domestic and international considerations, often prefer. By 1943, with the United States well in the war, Churchill overcame his doubts about planning the peace, as he astutely initiated operations in the Mediterranean and elsewhere with a clear eye on the future and the need to posture the British Empire to deal with threats that might emerge in the wake of the defeat of the Third Reich. The magnitude of the task of winning the war and the necessity of holding together the coalition, however, limited the public enunciation of postwar goals by the Big Three until 1945, creating opportunities for military leaders to prepare plans and build organizations that could then implement policy decisions. Sufficient ways and means were present in the context of total war to achieve postwar objectives as they emerged.

In general terms the Bush Administration also recognized what it wanted to accomplish in undertaking to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s regime. It marshaled sufficient ways and means
to gain an overwhelming military victory in a limited war, but in trying to minimize forces committed to the operation, it failed to provide adequate ways and means to wage peace successfully. Political considerations limited the scope of postwar planning, shaped assumptions that downplayed resources required to achieve stated objectives, and failed to establish either unity of command or unity of effort to link military operations with political, economic, and informational operations to achieve a rapid decision in the wake of fighting.

The experiences of ECLIPSE I and II also suggest that postwar operations are complex civil-military endeavors that require clear lines of authority. In postwar Germany, Eisenhower received undisputed command of the U.S. occupation. He exercised this authority through Clay, who he purposefully endowed with the title “Deputy Commander” to connote the level of responsibility he was giving him. While Eisenhower reported through the army chief of staff and the Secretary of War, he had sole responsibility for the conduct of postwar operations. This is in stark contrast to the confused state of affairs that exists in ECLIPSE II. The Department of Defense separated responsibility for postwar operations just weeks before the initiation of combat operations in a way seemingly calculated to sow confusion and cause a lack of unity of effort. Secretary Rumsfeld quickly formed ORHA to oversee reconstruction, humanitarian assistance, and the transition of Iraq to a representative form of government under the rule of law. Garner did not have the power or stature to pull things together quickly; and Franks failed to exercise powers as a theater commander to impose order on disjointed postwar efforts.61

At a tactical level, the ECLIPSE experiences indicate that the military means necessary to achieve decisive postwar results may not be equivalent to the means required to prevail on the battlefield. In Germany, as in Iraq, the force that began executing postwar operations was largely the same as that which conducted the war. In World War II, the presence of sixty-one divisions, augmented by specialized military government detachments, meant that sufficient means were available in Europe to dominate both the combat and postwar battlefields, but the Pentagon, in conducting the war in Iraq, made a conscious decision to move away from an overwhelming force model.62 Given advances in technology, the forces needed to gain decisive results in the combat phase may be inadequate to wage peace decisively. Smaller maneuver forces can fight and win with precision fires and timely, accurate intelligence. However, this lethal combination is vulnerable when the mission shifts to peace operations with their demand for presence, human intelligence, civil affairs, and information operations. Waging peace requires an overwhelming force on the ground, especially in its early phases.63 Numbers matter, because it takes soldiers conducting patrols in neighborhoods and responding rapidly to unrest to achieve security and stability; precision fires cannot substitute for troop presence. In
addition to taking and holding terrain, information dominance becomes critical in the postwar period, not just for its military utility in providing information to support force protection and security, but for its ability to shape public opinion, disseminate information to the populace, counter enemy propaganda, and build cultural and political awareness in the occupying force to gauge effects of actions. Finally, economic and political means from other government agencies necessarily become more critical given the objectives of most postwar operations—economic sufficiency and political stability.  

This is perhaps the most important lesson of ECLIPSE: postwar operations do not fall just within the purview of the Defense Department. The decision to go to war involves a calculus that the application of force will set the conditions that allow the nation to achieve its policy aims. Statesmen must link the first step, going to war, to the last step, ordering the resulting peace to ensure the achievement of policy objectives. This requires the wielding of all instruments of national power in a coordinated campaign on a battlefield where force is not the primary determinant of success. Such an integrated effort did not occur in either ECLIPSE operation. After ECLIPSE, policymakers sought to institutionalize the informal consultations that had developed in various subcommittees and in the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee through the National Security Act of 1947 that created the National Security Council. ECLIPSE II exposed an interagency planning process that continues fundamentally to be flawed. NSPD 24 made the Defense Department the lead agency for postwar operations, but that seems to have translated into a perception by other agencies that Iraq is the Pentagon’s show; actions by various members of the Office of the Secretary of Defense appear to have reinforced that belief. As a result, other than the Central Intelligence Agency’s active involvement in all aspects of the war (especially the search for weapons of mass destruction) and the U.S. Agency for International Development’s actions to posture American and international aid efforts to forestall a potential humanitarian disaster in the wake of fighting, other key agencies in the government were conspicuously absent from planning and execution of postwar missions. The National Security Council system failed to act forcefully as an effective vehicle for interagency cooperation, and when the National Security Advisor attempted to carve out such a role for herself and the NSC staff, a strong Secretary of Defense quickly quashed her.  

The state of the current national security structure is reminiscent of the Department of Defense prior to Goldwater-Nichols. It is time for wholesale changes in the culture of government to inculcate an interagency spirit that transcends departmental parochialism. Interagency training, a common doctrine for planning and management, and removal of barriers to information and communication are essential to build mechanisms for interagency
cooperation and truly joint planning and operations. The time is ripe for a revision of the National Security Act of 1947, itself a product of the realization of the need for interagency coordination exposed by World War II, to create an organizational structure and culture able to seamlessly and simultaneously bring all instruments of power to bear at strategic, operational, and tactical levels. In order to do so, the means must be adequate to the task. Only in this way can policy and strategy be linked to ensure that the nation wages peace with the same focused intensity as it wages war.

WORD COUNT = 5,902
This paper draws on two monographs (“Winning the Peace: Postconflict Operations” and “Planning the Peace: Operation ECLIPSE and the Occupation of Germany”) written by the author in 1994-1995 at the School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The latter monograph was edited to form the basis for an article published by the author in *The Journal of Military History*, July 2001 entitled “Planning the Peace: Operation ECLIPSE and the Occupation of Germany.” Parts of this Strategic Research Project are adapted from these previous works and some portions are used without alteration.

1 A perfect correlation does not exist between the two events. ECLIPSE occurred amid both the total destruction of the Nazi regime and the utter devastation and prostration of Germany. There was no fight left after nearly six years of virtually total war—and any inclination to resist was extinguished quickly by the presence of millions of Allied soldiers on the soil of Germany (and for those in the western zones of occupation the specter of Soviet occupation always held out a worse fate). No insurgency emerged under these conditions. Germany, unlike Iraq, comprised a homogeneous population and the occupation did not have to deal with different ethnic and religious factions vying for power. Moreover, Germany had a familiarity with the processes of democracy that preceded the Nazis; democratization did not represent a cultural leap. Critically for comparison, however, each operation occurred within a broader context, both emerging as defining battles in wider struggles: Germany in the Cold War and Iraq in the Global War on Terrorism.


3 The Allies established the European Advisory Commission (EAC) in December 1943 as a result of an understanding reached at the Moscow Conference. The EAC was directed to look at postwar issues and make “recommendations to the three governments upon European questions connected with the termination of hostilities.” Despite its charter, the group did not prove useful as a policy-forming body; however, its discussions provided a forum for the Allies to probe each other’s objectives and draft language for such matters as the surrender document, occupation zone protocol, and coalition control machinery. The American representative, Ambassador John Winant, was disturbed by what he viewed as the group’s impotence in defining larger policy matters. United States Army, *Planning for the Occupation* (Frankfurt, Germany: Office of the Chief Historian, European Command, Occupation Forces in Europe Series, 1945-1946; reprinted as Special Text 41-10-62, U.S. Army Civil Affairs School, Fort Gordon, Georgia, n.d.), 33-35; and Earl F. Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946*, United States Army in World War II, Special Studies (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1975), 131.

4 The New Dealers who surrounded Roosevelt reflexively viewed the military with suspicion and were sensitive to any hint of imperialism or militarism in American policy. From April to December 1943, a debate raged within the Roosevelt administration over the propriety of military government. The Army’s Provost Marshal General reported that at a cabinet meeting in early 1943, Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes “had denounced our military government plans as ‘imperialistic’ and the president told the Secretary of War by memorandum that he thought the government of occupied territories was a civilian rather than a military matter.” Gullion to Jenkins, 6 February 1943, quoted in Harry A. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, *Civil Affairs:*


7. Letter to CCS from Chief of Staff, SHAEF, 10 February 1944, Civil Affairs Division Decimal File 380.7 – Germany; quoted in Cochran, 42.


10. Historians have argued that SWNCC was the forerunner of the National Security Council. Its formation was a tangible indication that key cabinet secretaries recognized that formulation of postwar policies was inherently an interagency problem. According to Alexander Cochran, SWNCC “represented the first formal acknowledgement by the military and civilian departments that the planning for the treatment of postwar Germany was a joint problem which had to be conducted in a coordinated manner with agreed upon responsibilities.” Cochran, Planning, 100. Interestingly, for the National Security Council parallel, SWNCC had a joint secretariat, affording it a mechanism to coordinate actions with the JCS and other governmental departments. The working group was formed by departmental deputies like James C. Dunn of the State Department’s Post War Programs Committee and Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy, and included General John Hilldring, Chief of the Civil Affairs Division of the General Staff—veterans of the ad hoc planning groups that had come before. Cochran, Planning, 102.

11. The Big Three also announced their intent to extract reparations. See the Tripartite Agreements of the Yalta Conference, in Diane Shaver Clemons, Yalta, Appendix A, 295-296. At Potsdam, following V-E Day, the Allies got more specific in the “Protocol on Proceedings,”
agreeing that the goals of occupation were “The complete disarming and demilitarization of Germany and the destruction of the Nazi party, in order to convince the German people of its total defeat and prepare for the eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis. The Protocol also called for decentralization of German economic power, with emphasis on fostering agriculture and “peaceful domestic industries.” Cochrane, Planning, 129.

12 Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1950), 19. The history of JCS 1067 [“Directive to the Commander in Chief of U.S. Forces of Occupation Regarding the Military Government of Germany in the Period Immediately Following the Cessation of Organized Resistance (Post Defeat)”] is long and complex. The first version was sent to Eisenhower on 24 September 1944. It was presented to the European Advisory Committee in January 1945 as the American proposal for a policy for occupied Germany. Following Yalta, the directive underwent a number of revisions and was ultimately issued to Eisenhower in his capacity as Commander, U.S. Forces Europe on 14 May 1945 as JCS 1067/8. Ziemke, Occupation, 101-102; 208-214. The text of JCS 1067/8 is printed in Holborn, American Military Government, 157-172.

13 In North Africa, the State Department was given responsibility for civil administration of occupied territories. State established the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations and the Office of Foreign Territories to conduct the operation. Political questions and disputes over priority of shipping and supplies created numerous points of friction between civil administrators and General Eisenhower. Lieutenant General Brehon Somervell, Commander of Army Service Forces observed in April 1943 that “we have had the opportunity to learn a real lesson from North Africa which lesson to me is that you cannot separate the handling of civil affairs from military operations in areas in which military operations are under way, and that an attempt to do so in a hostile country would be disastrous.” Somervell to McCloy, 3 April 1943, quoted in Cole and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 65. As a result, at the urging of Secretary of War Stimson, President Roosevelt directed that the Army become the lead agency in civil administration of liberated and occupied territories. General George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, told a subordinate that the State Department and other civilian agencies “were very unhappy about the fact that the Army, and not they, were going to have this problem in the wake of battle….” He also stated that only the bad experience Eisenhower had in North Africa in the wake of TORCH with all the civilian agencies that had flowed in and competed for scarce resources had convinced Roosevelt that military government would be necessary. “The President himself,” General Hilldring [the Army Chief of Civil Affairs] remembered Marshall saying, “had come to this conclusion without any pressures at all by the War Department…but that nobody else in the cabinet, except perhaps Mr. Stimson and Mr. Knox, had any sympathy with the President’s decision, and that some cabinet members…had great doubts about the wisdom of giving to soldiers the amount of political power and influence to be exerted by [the Civil Affairs Division of the Army General Staff] in the years ahead.” Hilldring interview, 30 March 1959, quoted in Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Organizer of Victory, 1943-1945 (New York: Viking Press, 1973), 457-458. See also Ziemke, Occupation, 10-13; and Holborn, American Military Government, 12-13. Despite this decision, the Army continued to attempt to place limits on the mission. General Hilldring assured Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson in late 1943 that “The Army is not a welfare organization. It is a military machine whose mission is to defeat the enemy on the field of battle. Its interest and activities in military government and civil affairs administration are incidental to the accomplishment of the military mission. Nevertheless, these activities are of paramount importance, as any lack of a condition of social stability in an occupied area would be prejudicial to the success of the military effort.” Hilldring to Acheson, 9 November 1943, quoted in Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 153.
John McCloy had written to Eisenhower in late 1944 telling him that the War Department was recommending “that the government of Germany should be instituted on a military basis…[with] single, undivided responsibility in the military commander.” McCloy made it clear that the commander would be Eisenhower. He went on to state that he intended to suggest the appointment of Robert Patterson, the Under Secretary of War, to act as a civilian advisor to assist Eisenhower in administering the peace. Secretary of War Stimson convinced Roosevelt, however, that Patterson was too important to the War Department to lose at this time. Stephen E. Ambrose, *Supreme Commander: the War Years of General Dwight D. Eisenhower* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1970), 602. In March 1945, with no one yet appointed to supervise the day-to-day operations of the occupation government, Eisenhower wrote the Army’s G-1 telling him that he had “heard a rumor that Lucius Clay may become available for assignment to a theater. If it should develop that this is so, I have a very urgent need for him….My idea is that he would be the Herbert Hoover of this war and would have the job of handling civil affairs in Germany.” Eisenhower to Somervell, 14 March 1945, in Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., ed., *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, the War Years*, volume IV (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), 2528. Clay, an Army engineer, had been detailed early in the war to serve as the War Department’s representative to the War Production Board and Office of Lend Lease. Ultimately, he had become the deputy to the Director of War Mobilization, James F. Byrnes. Clay was thus admirably positioned to be selected for assignment as the Deputy Military Governor of Germany. As he later recalled, “I was considered in the War Department to have had perhaps as much experience dealing with civilian agencies of the government as anybody in the military establishment.” The later ascension of Byrnes to Secretary of State made the choice especially fortuitous for smoothing coordination between State and War. Cochran, “Planning for the Treatment of Postwar Germany,” 122.


Ibid., 56. Forrest Pogue, Marshall’s biographer, concluded: “Letters between Marshall and Eisenhower and memoranda between Stimson and Marshall about the approaching postwar situation reflected the fact that they thought in terms of 1919—that American public opinion would demand a recall of troops from abroad, that a demand would be made for a sharp cutback in the armed forces, that a resurgence of isolationism would bring a revulsion against stationing American troops abroad to be caught up in Europe’s quarrels, and that final arrangements would be made at a peace conference.” Pogue, *Organizer of Victory*, 574.

James Dunn, voiced State’s position at the time: “The Department of State is a policy organism of the Government and is therefore not equipped to carry out operations certainly not on such large scale as would be required in dealing with the German problem.” Cochran, “Planning for the Treatment of Postwar Germany,” 141.

Byrnes accomplished this by co-opting the military by appointing the chief of the Civil Affairs Division of the General Staff as Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas to develop occupation policy, and leveraging his own strong personal relationship with Truman. Cochran, *Planning*, 141. See also John Gimbel, *The Origins of the Marshall Plan* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), 26; and Gimbel, “Governing the American Zone of Germany,” in Robert Wolfe, ed., *Americans as Proconsuls*, 92-93. Byrnes’ relationship with General Clay from the days when Clay was his deputy in the War Mobilization Office also afforded him valuable entree into the Office of Military Government. Cochran, “Planning for the Treatment of Postwar Germany,” 122.
Planning for the Occupation, 22. See also Cochran, “Planning for the Treatment of Postwar Germany,” 34. A structure for postwar planning was created in the Army staff and in combined headquarters. The War Department had formed a Civil Affairs Division in the Army in 1942 and established a school for military government in Charlottesville, Virginia. Then in March 1943, General Marshall directed the formation of the Civil Affairs Division (CAD) of the General Staff, an initiative stemming largely from his own experiences with occupation duty in the Philippines in 1902 and in Europe after World War I. See Pogue, Organizer of Victory, 455-457. In Europe, General Morgan, Chief of Staff of COSSAC, created the European Civil Affairs Division. With the establishment of SHAEF in February 1944, ECAD became the G-5 Division. Within the Operations Section of the G-5, separate civil affairs sections for each country in the area of operations prepared plans for occupation or liberation, as appropriate. The German Country Unit (GCU), formed in March 1944, was the principal postwar planning organization in G-5. The GCU was manned by 150 British and American officers, bringing a combined perspective to their postwar deliberations, something that was missing at the national level. The GCU drafted plans to assume responsibility for governing Germany at national, regional, and local levels. This served as a mechanism for training military government detachments for the specific tasks that they would have to perform. According to Harold Zink, the official historian for the United States High Commissioner of Germany, the GCU “actually succeeded in drafting a series of plans which had a considerable bearing on the actual occupation of Germany.” Harold Zink, The United States in Germany, 1944-1955 (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1957), 20. Zink apparently was a member of the German Country Unit at one time (his book, American Military Government in Germany, is dedicated to “Brother Officers on the Board of Editors, German Country Unit, SHAEF”).

Planners addressed three “cases” under which RANKIN might be executed: a rapid collapse of resistance; a sudden German decision to retreat to pre-war borders; and unconditional surrender. The latter, labeled RANKIN-C, was viewed as the most likely scenario and was finalized at the end of October 1943. Planning for the Occupation, 21-24. On 30 October 1943, the RANKIN-C draft was issued as a planning directive to the U.S. First Army Group and the British Twenty-First Army Group. Oliver J. Frederiksen, The American Military Occupation of Germany, 1945-1953 (Headquarters, United States Army, Europe, Historical Division, 1953), 189.

Most importantly, the RANKIN planning began to build the staff organizations capable of undertaking the work of planning the peace. For example, Major General C.A. West, Deputy G-3 of COSSAC, told his staff “We cannot wait for policy to be laid down by the United Nations. It is essential that we should prepare now, as a matter of urgency, papers on all these problems,” listing armistice terms, disarmament, displaced persons, prisoners of war, martial law, disposal of captured war material, and coordination of movement and transportation. Major General C.A. West, Memorandum, 14 January 1944, subject: “Operation RANKIN-C,” quoted in Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, 36.

TALISMAN also went into much greater detail than RANKIN in assigning specific missions to various commands and detailing force movement and positioning. See note 24 below. Planning for the Occupation, 60-61.

RANKIN-C called for twenty-five divisions; TALISMAN increased the requirement to over thirty-nine. Ibid., 64-67 and 69.
Once resistance ended, plans called for the Twenty-First Army Group (UK) to assume responsibility for the designated British zone of occupation in the north, and the Twelfth and Sixth Army Groups (U.S.) for the American zone of occupation in the south. The army groups were to establish four military districts in each zone to set the conditions for transition to Tripartite Control. The Supreme Commander would preside over Berlin as a separate district. The plan also anticipated a requirement for redeployment of “surplus US and British forces not required for occupational duties in GERMANY” from ports in France. Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces, Operation ECLIPSE: Appreciation and Outline Plan, Section I, paragraphs 67-70, 10 November 1944. See also ECLIPSE Appreciation and Outline Plan, Section VI, Task 6.

Eight of these accompanied the ECLIPSE Outline Plan; SHAEF published the rest as they were completed and approved. The first memorandum contained the “Instrument of Surrender” or instructions to surrendering German forces to implement the terms agreed to by the Allies. These were general in nature, directing disarmament of all German armed forces, authorized activities of German military personnel, and procedures for safeguarding materiel, records, equipment, and facilities. It also mandated German cooperation and assistance in removing obstacles to land, sea, and air movement. Appendices to the memorandum contained special orders to German military commanders requiring them to furnish the Allies specific information and admonishing them to cooperate and protect facilities and equipment pending disposition instructions. Appendix H provided for sanctions against violators of the terms of surrender. These included military measures, judicial and police measures, and “repressive” measures such as destruction of property and hostages. Only the Supreme Commander could authorize “repressive” measures, with the exception that Allied forces could force “civilian or military persons to accompany military parties into buildings or areas suspected of being mined or booby trapped, or on trains and other forms of transportation liable to be damaged by sabotage…” Memorandum Number 1, Instrument of Surrender; Orders to German Military Authorities to Supplement Instrument; Sanctions in Event of Delinquency, 25 November 1944, in ECLIPSE Appreciation and Outline Plan.

Memorandum 5 established rules governing labor in the postwar period and instructed army group commanders to use German labor as available, including disarmed German military and paramilitary personnel. Memorandum Number 5, “Labor,” 2 March 1945 (revised 28 April 1945), in ECLIPSE Appreciation and Outline Plan.

Memorandum 8 assigned army group commanders “responsibility for the safety, recovery, care, maintenance, administration, and evacuation of all United Nations Prisoners of War…in their respective zones of operation. The SHAEF G1 was designated as the Supreme Commander’s executive agent on prisoner of war matters and the memorandum directed him to attach personnel to the army groups to assist them in executing this task. The memorandum also established policies and procedures for the army groups to follow to deal with these liberated prisoners. Memorandum Number 8, “The Care and Evacuation of Prisoners of War in Greater Germany under ‘ECLIPSE’ Conditions,” 25 March 1945, in ECLIPSE Appreciation and Outline Plan. Memorandum 14 addressed control of displaced persons (DPs). It estimated that there would be 3,685,000 DPs in the American and British zones, with another 3,405,000 in the Russian zone. The memorandum reminded commanders that “The care of these people and their ultimate disposition is an international problem of the first magnitude, affecting in varying degrees the governments of nineteen countries.” It instructed them to employ “All available resources at the disposal” of the Allies forces to ensure the DPs were cared for properly. The memorandum further directed commanders to establish assembly centers to control movement
of displaced persons and establish border controls. It further instructed them to insure separation of German refugees from Allied displaced persons. Memorandum Number 14, “Control of Displaced Persons,” ECLIPSE Appreciation and outline Plan. The estimates of DPs in the plan were fairly accurate. By October 1945, 2.3 million DPs had been repatriated from the American zone. Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, 75.

Memoranda 9 through 11 addressed disarmament of German ground, air, and naval forces respectively. The local Allied commander was tasked to safeguard and control German war materiel. Annexes to the memoranda delineated specific materials that the Allies would confiscate and identified those materials that the Germans could retain, including ambulances, trucks (one per 100 soldiers for supply), and horse-drawn vehicles, draft animals, and their harnesses. Memorandum Number 9, “Primary Disarmament of the German Land Forces and Short Term Disposal of Surrendered War Material,” 25 November 1944; Memorandum Number 10, “Primary Disarmament of German Air Forces Opposing Us and Short Term Disposal of Surrendered War Material,” and Memorandum Number 11, “Primary Disarmament of German Naval Forces, Short Term Disposal of Surrendered Naval War Material and Naval Demolitions,” 5 January 1945, in ECLIPSE Appreciation and Outline Plan.

Memoranda 12 and 13 provided instructions on civil affairs operations in liberated countries and military government operations in Germany respectively. Civil affairs guidance was provided on each country. Military government was designated as the responsibility of the Supreme Commander, with the army group commanders acting as his agents in their zones of responsibility. He would exercise “supreme legislative, executive and judicial rights of an occupying power, subject to the rules of International Law.” The tasks identified for military government were substantial. They were to enforce the terms of surrender, establish and maintain law and order, and apprehend war criminals. Additionally, it had the mission to “care, control, and repatriate” displaced citizens of the United Nations while providing “minimum care necessary to effect control of enemy refugees and displaced persons.” Military government was also charged with elimination of Nazism, fascism, and militarism. Military government detachments were empowered to retain “and establish suitable civil administration to the extent required to accomplish the above objectives.” Specific procedures for military government were contained in the Military Government Handbook published by the SHAEF G-5. Significantly, units were reminded “Military government of Germany is a command responsibility. In the initial stages of the advance into Germany military government will be carried out on an ad hoc basis in accordance with the tactical areas of command. As the situation stabilizes it will be possible to establish Military Districts, which will correspond in general with German administrative boundaries.” Memorandum Number 12, “Digest of Civil Affairs Considerations in Liberated Countries,” 28 December 1944; and Memorandum Number 13, “Digest for Military Government and Occupation of Germany,” 28 December 1944, in ECLIPSE Appreciation and Outline Plan.

The area that a division might be tasked to cover could be extensive. The 78th Infantry Division was assigned an area of 3,600 square miles, the 70th Infantry Division one of 2,500 square miles. Ziemke, Occupation, 320. Commanders usually decentralized command and control down to companies and assigned them to guard frontiers, key installations, bridges, banks, and utilities, and provide reaction forces to respond to disturbances, looting, or criminal activity. U.S. forces performed various other special security functions. The 26th Infantry Regiment of the 1st Infantry Division guarded the prisoners and proceedings at the Nuremburg Trials for a year. Third Army, Mission Accomplished: Third United States Army Occupation of Germany (Engineer Reproduction Plant, 1947), 25. A tank battalion and infantry regiment were detailed to guard the huge treasure trove of Nazi-looted items found in a mine near Merkers.
According to Ziemke, “the company was widely viewed as the ideal unit for independent deployment because billets were easy to find and the hauls from the billets to guard posts and checkpoints would not be excessively long.” Ziemke, Occupation, 229.

By 15 April, 30,000 German soldiers were surrendering daily to the western Allies; by early May, they held five million German prisoners of war. Because plans had anticipated only 900,000 PWs by the end of June, there were significant shortfalls in logistics, facilities, and guards. As an example of what this could mean at the tactical level, a first lieutenant commanding 300 troops, found himself charged with guarding 37,000 Germans at Bad Kreuznach. Ziemke, Occupation, 241-243. SHAEF addressed the shortfall in guards by assigning thirteen antiaircraft battalions to provide security. Gunter Bischof and Stephen E. Ambrose, eds., Eisenhower and the German POWs: Facts Against Falsehood (Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1992), 9. More daunting were the logistics challenges of dealing with this many prisoners, especially providing them rations. Seven million rations were required daily in Germany to feed U.S. soldiers and PWs: this rate of consumption could not be supported. SHAEF cut rations for Allied personnel by ten percent. It also authorized a distinction between “prisoners of war” who had surrendered prior to V-E Day and “disarmed” German military forces who had surrendered after 9 May. This allowed circumvention of the Geneva Convention requirement that PWs receive the same rations as their captors; disarmed Germans were given less than Allied soldiers. Ziemke, Occupation, 293; Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, 89. To deal with the problem and provide manpower to assist in restoring essential services, SHAEF ordered the discharge of German PWs who were coal miners, transportation and utility workers, police, and farmers on the condition that they had no S.S. connections and posed no security risk. Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, 89. The units charged with running the PW compounds seized on this order “to discharge as many as possible as fast as possible without a great deal of attention to categories,” according to one G-1 inspection report. To aid this process, local commanders established and manned discharge centers and reception points at railheads and transported PWs to the areas from which they had been inducted. Ziemke, Occupation, 293-294; Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, 90. Remaining prisoners were organized into labor companies and assigned to American commands to assist in reconstruction efforts ranging from clearing rubble to burying the dead to removing wire obstacles and minefields. This was done under the “labor reparation policy” whereby the Allies determined to use German labor to assist in rebuilding devastated areas of Europe. See Brian Loring Villa, “The Diplomatic and Political Context of the POW Camps Tragedy,” in Bischof and Ambrose, eds. Eisenhower and the German POWs, 69; Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, 53; Ziemke, Occupation, 294.

The other significant task involved in disbanding the German armed forces was disposing of the equipment and munitions that littered battlefields, collected at depots, and filled bunkers and production facilities throughout Europe. Little attention had been paid to captured enemy equipment before V-E Day except by souvenir hunters. After the German surrender, Army quartermasters at all levels were charged with recovering and disposing of German war materiel. They initially gave priority to destruction of enemy chemical and munitions stocks. Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, 86. According to the Third Army history of the occupation, “Large quantities of explosives were crated and dispatched to the port of Bremerhaven where they were disposed of by being dumped into the sea while other shipments of ammunition were distributed among Allied Nations as a form of reparation.” Third Army, Mission Accomplished, 61. For captured weapons and equipment, they applied the model used by the U.S. Army for disposal of surplus war materiel. Ordnance units established huge depots to receive the collected materiel: one near Wurzburg contained up to 17,000 vehicles. Each
piece of equipment required inspection, cleaning, maintenance, and processing before it could be sold, shipped, or destroyed. The total effort to dispose of materiel and munitions placed further stress on increasingly scarce resources of personnel as demobilization gathered pace. Julian Bach, Jr., *America’s Germany: An Account of the Occupation* (New York: Random House, 1946), 41; Third Army, *Mission Accomplished*, 61-62.

Agreements reached at the Yalta conference required military commanders “to employ all practicable means to transport United Nations displaced persons to agreed locations where they could be transferred to national authorities.” Frederiksen, *American Military Occupation*, 73-75. U.S. forces were overwhelmed by the sheer numbers of DPs they faced: there were an estimated 2.3 million in American occupied areas on V-E Day. This represented but a portion of the “unprecedented mass migration of civilians and soldiers” that was taking place in Europe. In addition to seven million DPs throughout Germany, there were twelve to fourteen million refugees and hundreds of thousands of German soldiers from eastern Germany fleeing the Soviets. See Bischof and Ambrose, *Eisenhower and the German POW*, 2-6, for an excellent discussion of this situation. Units encountered large and small groups of refugees daily as they advanced into Germany. Commanders initially emphasized caring for the almost universally malnourished and ill people they found. They arranged housing for them in former German barracks, prisoner of war camps, schools, and private residences (unsympathetic American troops forced out the German owners if necessary), and they issued them food from captured stores, supplemented by U.S. military rations. Army medical teams conducted an intense public health campaign among the DPs to contain feared outbreaks of typhus and other communicable diseases. General Hobart Gay, Third Army Chief of Staff, captured this concern in his journal on 10 April 1945, writing: “The situation reference displaced persons continues to be aggravated….Most of them are like animals, or worse, and unless force can be used on them to insure reasonable sanitary measures, it would appear that disease, perhaps something bordering on a plague, is in the offing.” Martin Blumenson, *The Patton Papers, 1940-1945* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1974), 682. Among other actions, the 12th Army Group established a “cordon sanitaire on the Rhine” to dust DPs with DDT before they left Germany. Ziemke, *Occupation*, 195, 286. U.S. forces slowly sorted DPs by nationality and moved them into camps to facilitate the process of repatriation. Tactical units provided logistical and security support to the United Nations Refugee Relief Administration (UNRRA) which administered these facilities. These DPs represented a serious threat to order. Accounts of the occupation are replete with reports of drunkenness, looting, arson, rape and murder by displaced persons celebrating their freedom and seeking to exact revenge on the Germans. In Marburg, “Displaced persons continued to loot after military government arrived, because German police lacked jurisdiction over them and because some local unit commanders apparently sanctioned it. Military authorities stepped in only after the displaced persons began to threaten the security of the local area by robberies and murders. They stopped looting by putting the displaced persons into camps where they could be observed, controlled, and then processed for repatriation.” Ziemke, *Occupation*, 61, 205; Gimbel, *Marburg*, 37, 61. The Ninth Army eventually dedicated an entire corps to assisting DPs. Ziemke, *Occupation*, 236-237, 252; Frederiksen, *American Military Occupation*, 11. By October 1945, over two million displaced persons had been repatriated out of the American zone. It was a monumental task performed well. Although planning for repatriation occurred at the strategic and operational levels of command, tactical commanders effectively carried out the demanding mission. Frederiksen, *American Military Occupation*, 75.

Engineer units rebuilt and repaired roads, bridges, electric plants, sewage treatment facilities, and waterworks. When Bonn was captured, for instance, virtually all public services
were nonfunctional. Within days, gas, water, and electric service had been restored to parts of the city, and within months, street cars were again operating. Eugene Davidson, *The Death and Life of Germany: an Account of the American Occupation* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1959), 50. Elsewhere, water purification units provided safe drinking water. Engineers also demolished German fortifications, gun emplacements, bunkers, and minefields. Construction units worked to improve living conditions of occupation forces by winterizing billets and building recreational facilities. Third Army, *Mission Accomplished*, 52-53.

30 At the strategic level, denazification had perhaps the greatest long-term interest. The Allies were determined to stamp out any vestige of the Nazi Party in Germany. General Eisenhower signaled the importance attached to this effort in a speech in the fall of 1945, when he stated: “The success or failure of this occupation will be judged by the character of the Germans fifty years from now. Proof will come when they begin to run a democracy of their own and we are going to give the Germans a chance to do that, in time.” Stephen E. Ambrose, “Eisenhower and the Germans,” in Bischof and Ambrose, eds, *Eisenhower and the German POWs*, 35. The primary military instruments for executing this policy were the military government detachments charged with finding acceptable non-Nazi public officials and the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) soldiers whose mission it was to find and arrest Nazis. An immediate problem the occupation faced was how to define “Nazi.” Was it related to length of membership, rank, or did it apply to every party member regardless of activity? Guidance was unclear initially. The CIC, according to one special agent, was “given orders to arrest all Nazis from *Ortsgruppenleiter* on up, all *Gestapo*, all SS from *Geretler* up.” Ian Sayer and Douglas Botting, *America’s Secret Army: the Untold Story of the Counter Intelligence Corps* (New York: Franklin Watts, 1989), 225. Military government detachments, desperate to find qualified personnel to assume responsibility for running German cities, counties, and states tended to be more forgiving. Historian Earl Ziemke, who observed the occupation firsthand, observed: “Competent non-Nazis were among the rarest commodities everywhere in Germany…; in the managerial and professional groups they were practically nonexistent.” Ziemke, *Occupation*, 182. It was difficult enough to find someone with requisite skills to undertake administrative responsibility for a town; the problem was infinitely complicated by the need to identify a politically untainted qualified applicant. This fundamental difference in orientation could lead to conflict. The daily report from one military government detachment read: “Having trouble with CIC. Do not believe security threatened so have concentrated on assuring food, proper administration, and property protection on the assumption these will prevent unrest. Have done these at the expense of looking into past activities of present civil servants.” Ziemke, *Occupation*, 151. Candidates were vetted against black-white-gray lists prepared by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and investigated by CIC agents. See also Zink, *Military Government*, 170, and William B. Dallas, “The Role of Counterintelligence in the European Theater of Operations during World War II,” Master of Military Arts Thesis (Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas: Command and General Staff College, 1993), 75. When the glare of media attention was turned on the occupation, it became politically intolerable to be perceived as “coddling” Nazis, and policy hardened. At the direction of General Eisenhower, military government personnel made an intense effort to screen all Germans seeking employment or assistance from the occupation forces. Military government detachments administered a questionnaire (the *Fragebogen*) to all Germans seeking employment or assistance from the occupation forces. Effectively, this amounted to the entire adult population of the American zone, or some thirteen million Germans, creating an immense administrative burden. The chief historian of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany observed: “the assignment of going over the thirteen million completed forms, investigating the validity of the data furnished, and deciding on the action to be taken in each individual case was positively overwhelming.” Zink, *Military
Government, 159. Soldiers were transferred from other duties and assigned to assist the military government detachments. Even with these augmentees, little headway could be made in reducing the backlog. Ultimately, 1.65 million Fragebogen were screened before General Clay succeeded in passing responsibility for this task to newly constituted German courts. Of the 1.65 million questionnaires screened, U.S. officials had judged 300,000 to be Nazis, eligible only for employment as common labor. Clay, Decision, 69. Eisenhower was willing to accept diminished administrative efficiency in return for thorough denazification. Military Government Law Number 8, effective in September 1945, “made it mandatory to dismiss anyone who had ever been a member of the Nazi party for whatever reason from any position save one of ordinary labor.” Davidson, Death and Life, 130. Patton’s well-documented clashes with Eisenhower on this issue resulted in his removal from command of Third Army in October 1945. Patton recorded in his diary on 29 September 1945 the result of a meeting with Eisenhower in which they discussed the presence of Nazis in the government of Bavaria: “So I called Harkins at 6.30 and told him to remove Schaeffer, Lange, and Rattenhuber and all members of their ministries in any way tainted with Nazism regardless of the setback it would give to the administration of Bavaria and the resultant cold and hunger it would produce—not only for the Germans but also for the DP’s. This seemed to make everyone happy except myself.” Quoted in Blumenson, Patton Papers, 785.

Ziemke, Occupation, 194, 236. In the absence of military government troops, responsibility for military government often rested in the hands of tactical commanders such as a lieutenant who, after his tanks occupied a town, reported that he “selected me a mayor who lived in that big house yonder—and he’s doing all right.” Davidson, Death and Life, 49. Tactical troops posted the occupation ordinances and the SHAEF proclamation, established population control measures such as roadblocks and curfews, and conducted security patrols. When Leipzig fell on 19 April 1945, V Corps designated the commander of the 190th Field Artillery Group to take control of the city of one million inhabitants and gave him three field artillery battalions, four security guard detachments, and a provisional military government detachment (sixteen officers, twenty-four enlisted men) to administer the city and provide security. Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, 10.

Ibid., 31.

Ziemke, Occupation, 273.

Nadia Schadlow argues persuasively that “Civilian leaders supported the Army’s leadership over governance operations largely because of a lack of alternatives. Political leaders realized that the Army was the only agency capable of accomplishing reconstruction in the midst of and aftermath of combat.” Nadia Schadlow, “War and the Art of Governance,” Parameters, Autumn 2003, 88


President George W. Bush, Speech to American Enterprise Institute, 26 February 2003; available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/iraq/20030226-11.html, Internet; accessed 10-17-03. After the war, in his speech on the USS Lincoln, the President sounded the same themes: “We have difficult work to do in Iraq. We're bringing order to parts of that country that remain dangerous. We're pursuing and finding leaders of the old regime, who will be held to
account for their crimes. We’ve begun the search for hidden chemical and biological weapons….We’re helping to rebuild Iraq, …And we will stand with the new leaders of Iraq as they establish a government of, by, and for the Iraqi people. The transition from dictatorship to democracy will take time, but it is worth every effort.” Bush, “Address on USS Lincoln,” 1 May 2003; available at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/iraq/ 20030501-15.html>, Internet; accessed 15 September 2003.

37 As the New York Times put it, Garner was “in charge of everything the American military is not: feeding the country, fixing the infrastructure and creating…a democratic government.” Jane Perlez, “Nucleus of a Postwar Government Forms in Kuwait,” New York Times, 4 April 2003, reprinted in International Herald Tribune; available at <http://www.iht.com/articles/92109.html>, Internet; accessed 11 September 2003. The composition of the leadership team at ORHA represented various backgrounds. Tim Carney, former ambassador to the Sudan was named to head the Ministry of Interior, Kenneth Keith, former ambassador to Qatar, would lead the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Robin Raphel, former ambassador to Tunisia, would direct the Ministry of Trade. In addition, regional supervisors were named to direct regional humanitarian assistance and reconstruction efforts. These were directed by General (ret.) Bruce Moore in the North, General (Ret.) Buck Walters in the South, and Barbara Bodine, former ambassador to Yemen in the central part of Iraq, including Baghdad. James Fallows, “Blind into Baghdad,” The Atlantic, January/February 2004, 65.

38 Journalist George Packer noted the enormous political sensitivity of negotiations in the United Nations in January-February 2003, and quotes one ORHA official, Drew Erdmann: “How much diplomacy would there have been at the U.N. if people had said, ‘The President is pulling people out of the Departments of Agriculture and Commerce to take over the whole Iraqi state?’ That’s the political logic that works against advance planning.” George Packer, “Letter From Baghdad: War After the War—What Washington doesn’t see in Iraq,” The New Yorker, November 24, 2003, 64.

39 Many have argued that Secretary Rumsfeld and Under Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith systematically blocked dissenting voices from ORHA, whatever their level of expertise. For example, Packer states that contact with Thomas Warrick, the director of the “Future of Iraq” project, was specifically forbidden by Secretary Rumsfeld, who intimated that he was acting at the request of the Vice President. Packer, “War After the War,” 62. James Fallows has an extensive account of the detailed planning that was done in the Future of Iraq project beginning in March 2002, a year before ORHA was formed. In addition he describes a CIA-sponsored war game in May 2002 to consider post-Saddam scenarios. The exercises reportedly highlighted the risk of disorder in the wake of the collapse of the regime, the complexity of the WMD hunt, and the difficulty of creating a workable Iraqi government given “that rivalries in Iraq were so deep, and the political culture so shallow.” Fallows reports that “Representatives from the Defense Department were among those who participated in the first of these CIA war-game sessions. When their Pentagon superiors at the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) found out about this, in early summer, the representatives were reprimanded and told not to participate further.” Fallows, “Blind into Baghdad,” 56-58. In another case, a meeting between a retired Air Force colonel who had conducted an extensive study of Iraq’s infrastructure and Deputy Assistant Undersecretary of Defense Joseph Collins was abruptly and unexplainably cancelled. The officer concluded: “It became clear that what I was really arguing was that we had to delay the war… I was saying ‘We aren’t ready, and in just six or eight weeks there is no way to get ready for everything we need to do.’” Ibid., 70.
ORHA administrator Jay Garner was selected principally because of his experience in humanitarian operations. In the aftermath of Operation DESERT STORM, then Lieutenant General Garner commanded Operation PROVIDE COMFORT to resettle Kurdish refugees in northern Iraq and provide them humanitarian assistance. In this task “he combined vision with a practical ability to get things done.” Adam Curtis, “Iraq’s interim administrator,” BBC News Online; available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/Americas/2924201.stm, Internet; accessed 22 September 2003. MSNBC reported on 24 April 2003 that “Garner is expected to repeat what he pulled off for the Kurds, namely restoring law and order to a region where chaos reigns.” Rachel Elbaum, “Iraq meets the new boss,” MSNBC; available at <http://www.msnbc.com/news/900794.asp?cp1=1>, Internet; accessed 22 September 2003.


Packer, “War after the War,” 62.

Joint doctrine states that “military plans and operations must focus both on achieving the political objectives and on establishing the military conditions necessary to sustain the objectives following cessation of military operations. This calls for planning based on the desired end state, ensuring that the longer-term postconflict environment called for by US political objectives is preserved following conclusion of military involvement. Military plans at all levels should therefore include consideration of conditions under which conflict termination and termination of military involvement can be executed.” Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States,” Joint Publication 1, 13 April 1995, II-5. Current joint doctrine also directs its readers to “View conflict termination not just as the end of hostilities, but as the transition to a new posthostilities phase characterized by both civil and military problems.” Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning,” Joint Publication 5-00.1, 25 January 2002, II-5.

This focus on combat operations is not unique to OIF. General Maxwell Thurman related that when he became commander of U.S. SOUTHCOM a few months before Operation JUST CAUSE: “I did not even spend five minutes on Blind Logic [the post-conflict plan].” As he reflected back on the events leading up to JUST CAUSE he concluded, “the least of my problems at the time was Blind Logic….We put together the campaign for Just Cause and probably did not spend enough time on the restoration.” Quoted in William Flavin, “Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success,” Parameters, Autumn 2003, 108.

Rowan Scarborough, “U.S. Rushed Post-Saddam Planning,” Washington Times, 3 September 2003, 1. Feith established a highly compartmented Office of Special Plans to prepare postwar plans and policy. According to one Air Force officer who worked in the Near East/South Asia Bureau of Feith’s Policy office in OSD, “She and her colleagues were allowed little contact with the Office of Special Plans and often were told by the officials who ran it to ignore the State Department’s concerns and views.” Jonathan S. Landay and Warren P. Strobel, “Lack of Planning Contributed to Chaos in Iraq,” Knight Ridder Newspapers; available at http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/6285256.htm.; Internet; accessed 11 September 2003.

Packer, “War after the War,” 62.
Ibid.

Quoted by Bob Kemper, “Bush Sees Wide Post-War Peace: Iraq Defeat Would Open Door to Democracy in Region, He Says,” *Chicago Tribune*, 27 February 2003; available from www.voy.com/134586/9.html, Internet; accessed 11 September 2003. Vice-President Cheney echoed the same view in an interview with Tim Russert just before the war: “...I really do believe that we will be greeted as liberators...The read we get on the people of Iraq is there is no question but what they want to get rid of Saddam Hussein and they will welcome as liberators the United States when we come to do that.” Quoted in Fallows, “Blind into Baghdad,” 65.

Wolfowitz went on to say that “It’s hard to conceive that it would take more forces to provide stability in post-Saddam Iraq than it would take to conduct the war itself and to secure the surrender of Saddam’s security forces and his army. Hard to imagine...” Packer, “War after the War,” 63; Fallows, “Blind into Baghdad,” 72-73. Meanwhile, former CENTCOM commander Marine General Anthony Zinni expressed concern before the war that the new plans called for two fewer divisions than plans he had developed: “The reason we had those two extra divisions was the security situation. Revenge killings, crime, chaos—this was all foreseeable.” Quoted in Ibid., 65. Zinni’s testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 11 February 2003 is a masterful review of the complexity of postwar operations and a strong pitch for an integrated interagency approach. He noted that he had directed a planning effort to address postwar considerations when he was in command: “Not only to identify the problems or what had to be done, but I didn’t want the military to be stuck with this problem, as is always the case. We did that. I must say with mixed results. I can’t say I had enthusiastic support from all agencies, but I did from some and it helped us identify some of the problems.” Anthony Zinni, “Statement of Gen. Anthony Zinni,” Transcript of Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 11 February 2003; available at <http://www.iraqwatch.org/government/US/HearingsPreparedstatements/sfrc-021103.htm#AZ>, Internet; accessed 24 October 2003.

ORHA officials reportedly drafted a list of key sites in Baghdad that would require security when the city fell. Although they submitted this list to CFLCC, it was lost in the press of managing combat operations; and in the absence of personal relationships among planners, there was no follow-up by ORHA. Packer, “War after the War,” 64.

In fairness, the conditions they faced were daunting. The convention center in which ORHA established operations was covered in dust and debris; the small ORHA staff had to clean it themselves and set-up operations from the ground-up with little assistance from military forces. Discussion with Colonel George Oliver, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, 27 February 2004.

A retired Air Force colonel, Sam Gardiner, presented results of his study of the Iraqi infrastructure to a Rand Corporation forum in January 2003. He concluded that despite precision bombing, the fragile water, sewage, electrical, and public health systems would collapse as a result of any war or its aftermath. Fallows, “Blind into Baghdad,” 70.


One Iraqi asserted “Americans are withholding gas and electricity on purpose. They want to break us, so we’ll accept any government. But we will not let that happen. Iraq is not
Afghanistan. Our patience is running out.” Robert Stefanicki, a Polish journalist, reported: “Three months after the end of the war, Iraqis express a growing sense of disappointment in the new American order—or, to be more precise, the lack of order. There is no dictatorship, but there is also no electricity, work, safety, or government.” He quoted one Iraqi as saying: “Americans took over Iraq in three weeks but they have not been able to restore the electricity in three months. What kind of power is that? They promised us democracy, but where is the government...After the war with Kuwait, Saddam rebuilt Iraq in four months.” Robert Stefanicki, “Iraq, Three Months After the War,” Gazeta Wyborcza, Warsaw, Poland, 10 July 2003; available at World Press Review, <http://www.worldpress.org/Europe/1361.cfm>, Internet; accessed 11 September 2003. For an Administration view, see Paul Wolfowitz, “Building a Free and Democratic Iraq is Going to be a Huge Victory in the War on Terror,” Jerusalem Post, 26 September 2003; available at <http://www.us.army.mil/portal/jhtml/earlyBird/Sep2003/e20030930220472.html>, Internet; accessed 30 September 2003. Wolfowitz, when asked by the interviewer if there was anything he would have done differently in the pre-war planning for the post-war, responded: “You mean all this terrible planning that prevented oil fields from being destroyed, that prevented humanitarian crises, that prevented fortress Baghdad, that prevented weapons from being used against Israel...I get a little tired of all these things we didn’t plan for when there was so much good planning that prevented all these things that these critics predicted.” Historian John Gaddis, who argued that the Bush Administration is pursuing another “Agincourt” in its war on terror, captures another view. He warned, “The trouble with Agincourts...is the arrogance they can encourage, along with the illusion that victory itself is enough and that no follow-up is required.” The Bush strategy, Gaddis asserted, relied “on getting cheered, not shot at.” John Lewis Gaddis, “A Grand Strategy of Transformation,” Foreign Policy, No. 133, November/December 2002; reprinted in Volume I, Readings, Course 2: “War, National Security Policy and Strategy,” 27 August-24 October 2003, U.S. Army War College, 373.

54 Time reported: “To cope with the mounting lawlessness—which threatens to turn into a free-for-all for armed gangs, and an orgy of retributive violence against those associated with the regime..., the U.S. has called for the Iraqi bureaucrats who previously policed the city and ran its basic services to come forward and help restore order. Soldiers have been ordered to stop looting where possible, but their primary focus remains securing the city from hostile combatants.” Tony Karon, “Anarchy in Baghdad,” Time, 11 April 2003; available at <http://www.time.com/time/world/printout/0,8816,442987,00.html>, Internet; accessed 15 September 2003.


56 Perhaps most emblematic of the problems the coalition faced in Iraq was that of reconstruction. As part of its postwar preparations, the administration let a $680 million contract with Bechtel for reconstruction projects, $230 million of which was earmarked for restoration of
the electric grid. The plan assumed that precision bombing would limit damage and allow relatively rapid restoration of essential services. Planners failed to take into account the depths to which Iraq's infrastructure had fallen after years of mismanagement, underinvestment, and a decade of international sanctions. Bomb damage, although relatively slight, proved difficult to repair; and looting in the wake of the fall of Baghdad decimated an already fragile infrastructure. The collapse of the power grid serving Baghdad and much of the rest of Iraq became a symbol of the failure of the reconstruction effort. Despite concerted coalition efforts to restore power, pre-war levels of electrical production were not reached until October. The blackout apparently was caused by a massive power surge when American forces accidentally severed high-voltage lines near Baghdad International airport. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, "Crossed Wires Kept Power Off in Iraq: Prewar Planning Failed to Assess State of Infrastructure," Washington Post, September 25, 2003, 1. The Bush administration’s request to Congress for funds to rebuild Iraq recognized the magnitude of the problem by asking for over $12 billion for reconstruction projects alone. $5.7 billion was requested "to rehabilitate and upgrade Iraq's electric power infrastructure." In addition, it requested $3.7 billion for water and sewer system projects, $2.1 billion to modernize the oil industry, and over $700 million for projects to rebuild and improve transportation networks. Vernon Loeb, "U.S. Tells How Billions of Dollars Would Rebuild Iraq," Washington Post, 25 September 2003, 25

57 Clausewitz, On War, Book I, Chapter I, 99. It is important to note, as Michael Howard has, that Clausewitz' principle is "honored more often in the breach than in the observance. Normally the priorities are reversed. In spite of himself the strategist finds that his plans are being shaped by immediate military and political necessities, which cumulatively shape the object of the war." Michael Howard, “British Grand Strategy in World War I,” in Paul Kennedy, ed., Grand Strategies in War and Peace (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 31.


59 Fallows, “Blind into Baghdad,” 53.

60 Letter to CCS from Chief of Staff, SHAEF, 10 February 1944. Civil Affairs Division Decimal File 380.7 – Germany; quoted in Cochran, “Planning for the Treatment of Postwar Germany,” 42.

61 The naming of Ambassador Paul Bremer to head the Coalition Provisional Authority with the rank of Presidential Envoy reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense did little to unify the effort. The CENTCOM Commander, General Abizaid, now directs stability and security operations in Iraq through a Combined Joint Task Force organized around V Corps headquarters; Ambassador Bremer has no direct authority over these forces, and there is not an effective mechanism for coordinating the activities of the CPA and the CJTF.

62 The regime would be toppled by about 130,000 coalition troops in total. This was accomplished not by seizing and holding territory—at least until the Third Infantry Division reached Baghdad—but by decisive maneuver, information superiority, and precision strike throughout the battlefield. In effect, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM brought to life Joint Vision 2020 which calls for "full spectrum dominance—achieved through the interdependent application of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics and full dimensional protection." No one can deny that the force assembled for the fight met the requirements for achieving decisive combat effects, but this force proved incapable of achieving "full spectrum
"dominance" once major combat operations had ended. The debate that occurred between Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki and senior leaders of the Defense Department, most stridently, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, underscored the conflict over planning assumptions and force-sizing for postwar operations. Clearly Wolfowitz, speaking for Secretary Rumsfeld, prevailed in asserting a view that U.S. and coalition forces could shift responsibility for security quickly to extant Iraqi police and elements of the Iraqi army that would reject Saddam Hussein and refuse to resist coalition military operations. These assumptions proved invalid when, rather than standing and fighting, elements of the Iraqi Army most loyal to the regime, notably the Special Republican Guard and the Saddam Fedayeen, melted into the population and constituted the basis for insurgent operations. "I suppose on reflection the thing that probably surprised me the most is the ability that the so-called Fedayeen Saddam people had to terrorize and frighten the rest of the Iraqi people and cause them to not come over to the other side," Rumsfeld said in answer to a question from the audience. Associated Press, "Rumsfeld Surprised by Saddam Loyalists.\textquotedblright, 10 October 2003; available at <http://start.earthlink.net/newsarticle?cat=9&aid=D7U3KUF02_story>, Internet; accessed 10 October 2003. In part their ability to do so may have been a result of the refusal of Turkey to grant transit rights to the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), forestalling rapid occupation of northern Iraq, especially the area around Tikrit. The assumptions about postwar manpower requirements also proved invalid when Iraq fell into anarchy in the wake of the sudden collapse of authority and in the absence of a countervailing authority. And they proved invalid when the infrastructure, carefully preserved by precision engagements, proved so decrepit and fragile that it collapsed under the strain of looting, stress, and lack of maintenance. As Anthony Cordesman observed, "The same strategy designed to deliver a carefully focused attack on the regime did not provide enough manpower to simultaneously occupy and secure the areas that the Coalition liberated and fell short of the manpower necessary to occupy the country." Anthony Cordesman, "Iraq and Conflict Termination: the Road to Guerrilla War?" (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 28 July 2003), 8; available at <http://www.csis.org/features/ Iraq_ConflictTerm.pdf>, Internet; accessed 24 October 2003.

63 A comparison of the two ECLIPSE operations indicates that there is a window of opportunity in the wake of major combat operations to establish security and control quickly. After total war, when an enemy state has been so thoroughly defeated that there is no fight left in its army or people this window is broad. It is relatively narrow after a limited war pursued for limited ends, when a regime collapse may leave an undestroyed will to resist in the population as a whole or in significant parts of the society. Con Crane of the Army War College faculty, told a reporter that "insights from successful occupations suggest that it is best to go in real heavy and then draw down fast." Fallows, Blind into Baghdad," 65. Crane and Andrew Terrill presciently observed in their pre-war study on postwar Iraq that "Initial Iraqi gratitude for the destruction of the Saddam dictatorship is likely under most circumstances, but many Iraqis will nevertheless assume that the U.S. intervened for its own purposes and not primarily to help them. U.S. forces therefore need to complete occupation tasks as quickly as possible and must also help improve the daily life of ordinary Iraqis before popular goodwill dissipates. Even the most benevolent occupation will confront increasing Arab nationalist and religious concerns as time passes." Conrad C. Crane and W. Andrew Terrill, "Reconstructing Iraq: Challenges and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario," Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 29 January 2003, 2. IRAQI FREEDOM demonstrates that an inadequately resourced, poorly planned and executed conflict termination operation can threaten to undermine a decisive military victory. A Carnegie Endowment for International Peace study of nation building concluded that "Few national undertakings are as complex, costly, and time consuming as reconstructing the governing institutions of foreign societies. Even a combination
of unsurpassed military power and abundant wealth does not guarantee success, let alone quick results.” Minxin Pei and Sara Kasper, “Lessons from the Past: The American Record on Nation Building,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 2003; available at <http://www.ceip.org/files/pdf/P.PDF>, Internet; accessed 22 September 2003. The Army must reexamine force structure, training, and doctrine in light of the need to not only fight and win wars, but also to wage decisive peace operations to secure the policy objectives for which the war was undertaken.


65 Clausewitz emphasized that “the first step” in war not be taken “without considering the last.” Clausewitz, On War, Book 8, Chapter 3A, 706.


67 In 1997, President Clinton, responding to similar shortcomings in Bosnia and Kosovo, had signed Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56, directing that State, Defense, CIA, Treasury, and other agencies take tangible steps to improve “the planning and management of complex contingency operations.” Among other things, PDD-56 mandated establishment of a training regime, a mechanism for capturing lessons learned, interagency rehearsals, and implementation of interagency planning procedures. Specifically, it directed “that a political-military implementation plan…be developed as an integrated planning tool for coordinating U.S. government actions in a complex contingency operation.” “The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations: Presidential Decision Directive, May 1997,” White Paper; available at <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd56.htm>, Internet, accessed 22 September 2003. PDD-56 failed to live up to its promise, however. A Rand Corporation study concluded “only the military is likely to hold up its end.” The study also noted that “Civilian departments have often confused plans with schedules and think plans are not worth the effort. Moreover, some officers in the State Department have an aversion to plans, which they see as impediments to the ambiguity and flexibility required for successful negotiations.” Daniel Byman, Ian Lesser, Bruce Pirnie, Cheryl Barnard, and Matthew Waxman, Strengthening the Partnership: Improving Military Coordination with Relief Agencies and Allies in Humanitarian Operations, Rand Corporation, 2000, Chapter 8, 3; available at <http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1185.ch8.pdf>, Internet; accessed 22 September 2003. See also William P. Hamblet and Jerry G. Kline, “Interagency Cooperation: PDD 56 and Complex Contingency Operations,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Spring 2000, 96. See also Rowan Scarborough; “Study Hits White House on Peacekeeping Missions,” Washington Times, 6 December 1999; available at <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pddd/991206-pdd.htm>, Internet; accessed 22 September 2003. Other governmental agencies lacked the structure, resources and culture that the military brings to planning. PDD 56 was widely ignored and then quietly scrapped by President Bush when he took office.
The Bush Administration announcement in October 2003 of plans to create the Iraq Stabilization Group in the National Security Council to provide improved post-war interagency planning and coordination died in the wake of opposition from Secretary Rumsfeld, but it represented an appreciation at the highest levels of the lack of interagency coordination. The Washington Post reported that “The new group…is intended to remove a bottleneck in decision-making by identifying and resolving problems faced by the U.S.-led occupation…. ‘It is to facilitate Bremer and to get him what he needs, whether it’s policy guidance, whether it is to fix a problem in Washington between . . . two agencies that are not in sync and he can’t fix it from the field,’ a senior administration official said.” Peter Slevin and Mike Allen, “New Group to Intended to Speed Iraq Efforts,” Washington Post, 7 October 2003, 1. See also, William R. Hawkins, “Cheap Hawks and Weak Brigades,” Washington Times, 8 October 2003, 17; Joseph L. Galloway, “A Tough Assignment for Rice,” Miami Herald, 9 October 2003; David Ignatius, “…and the Infighting,” Washington Post, 10 October 2003, 27. Anthony Cordesman concluded in July 2003 that among the reasons that conflict termination failed was the lack of “a coordinated interagency approach to planning and executing peacemaking and nation-building before and during the war: as “The National Security Council failed to perform its mission.” The NSC, he observed, “acted largely in an advisory role and did not force effective interagency coordination.” Cordesman, “Iraq and Conflict Termination,” 11.

The author recognizes the many problems inherent in this proposal. The Constitution of the United States was designed to safeguard liberties first and provide for good governance second. It established a tension between the legislative and executive branches. A reorganization such as that proposed in this paper would threaten equities at several levels. First, the legislative branch would be intruding on the prerogatives of the president to organize and direct the activities of the executive branch, and ultimately his ability to exercise leadership consistent with his style of decisionmaking. Any move to make the National Security Advisor directly responsive to congressional oversight would undermine the ability of that person to advise the president frankly and confidentially. An action to create a super National Security Department on the model of the Department of Homeland Security would require not only legislation, but amendment of the Constitution, and concentrate tremendous amounts of power under a single cabinet official (or, as the Scowcroft commission proposed, a Vice President for National Security). A revision of the National Security Act of 1947, moreover, would threaten equities within the Congress itself. Multiple committees now exercise oversight of various components of the national security structure, including defense, foreign relations, and intelligence. An integrated national security budget would alter radically the current power arrangements within the Congress. With that being said, it is interesting to note that there are rumblings on Capital Hill in support of actions to strengthen the interagency process. Senators Lugar and Biden recently introduced legislation in the Senate to mandate improved interagency mechanisms and training within the State Department.
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ECLIPSE II


