

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**WINNING THE PEACE? AN EXAMINATION INTO BUILDING AN
AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY (ANA) AND NEW IRAQI ARMY (NIA)**

by

Lieutenant Colonel Mary A. Baker
United States Army

Dr. Larry Goodson
Project Advisor

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

Report Documentation Page

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

1. REPORT DATE 03 MAY 2004		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED -	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Winning the Peace? An Examination into Building an Afgan National Army (ANA) and a New Iraqi Army (NIA)				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Mary Baker				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5050				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT See attached file.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 29	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Lieutenant Colonel Mary A. Baker
TITLE: WINNING THE PEACE? AN EXAMINATION INTO BUILDING AN AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY (ANA) AND NEW IRAQI ARMY (NIA)
FORMAT: Strategy Research Project
DATE: 19 March 2004 PAGES: 29 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The purpose of this paper is to examine the development and growth of new military institutions in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Many see the building of national armies in both Afghanistan and Iraq as critical institutions that embrace the national identity of their people within their nation state. Therefore the paper will first address the ANA and NIA in relation to their histories and national characters. Secondly, the paper will look at challenges in the formation of the new armies as well as attempt to characterize the individual ethos and value changes required to be successful. Thirdly, the paper will examine the two very different Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) processes and their success and failures. Lastly, the paper will provide a brief analysis of the means applied towards these armies.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT..... iii

WINNING THE PEACE? AN EXAMINATION INTO BUILDING AN AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY (ANA)
AND NEW IRAQI ARMY (NIA)..... 1

 THE ANA AND NIA IN RELATION TO HISTORY AND NATIONAL CHARACTER.....4

 TOWARD NEW NATIONAL ARMIES 6

 DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, AND REINTEGRATION (DDR)10

 APPLICATION OF MEANS13

 CONCLUSION14

ENDNOTES 17

BIBLIOGRAPHY21

WINNING THE PEACE? AN EXAMINATION INTO BUILDING AN AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY (ANA) AND NEW IRAQI ARMY (NIA)

Our strategy in Iraq has three objectives – destroying the terrorists – enlisting the support of other nations for a free Iraq – and helping Iraqis assume responsibility for their own defense and their own future.

—President George Bush

Our shared goal is to help the Afghan people rebuild a politically stable, economically viable, secure Afghanistan.

—Colin Powell

Since 2001, the United States has placed the global war on terrorism and removal of threats of weapons of mass destruction against the U.S. at the forefront of our National Security Strategy (NSS). During the past two years the military element of power has been the most prominent element of national power being used to achieve our NSS. In October 2001 the U.S. initiated Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and in March 2003 began Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in Iraq in pursuit of these NSS objectives. With overwhelming military victories in each of these campaigns the United States remains engaged in both theaters in order to achieve national strategic victories. In order to achieve strategic victories the U.S. and its coalition partners must establish and maintain secure and stable environments to create the conditions necessary for the emergence of democratic governments. In both theaters our ability to create secure and stable conditions for the interim governments of Afghanistan and Iraq is more difficult than anticipated. As Americans are exposed to daily news reports of American and coalition force casualties, the pressure builds on the Bush administration to expedite stability operations and post-conflict reconstruction efforts in order to transfer responsibility to the Afghan and Iraqi governments, thereby eliminating the requirement for continued long-term presence of U.S. and coalition forces in both theaters.

There are several writings on post-conflict reconstruction based on recent U.S. experiences that identify essential tasks towards post-conflict reconstruction. John Hamre and Gordon Sullivan identify four distinct and interrelated categories of post-reconstruction tasks, or “pillars”: security, justice and reconciliation, social and economic well being, and governance and participation.¹ Of the four, Hamre and Sullivan state that security is most critical because ...“security encompasses collective as well as individual security and is the precondition for achieving successful outcomes of the other pillars.”² This is reinforced by Lakhdar Brahimi, formerly a Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations in Afghanistan

and now working in a similar role in Iraq, when he said “a number of parallel efforts must come together, including the creation of a new Afghan army and police along with the demobilization of existing forces, constitutional reform, initial preparations for elections, and the implementation of large-scale reconstruction and local development projects.”³ Likewise, Conrad Crane and Andrew Terrill list security, in their “Mission Matrix”, for Iraqi reconstruction as not only the essential first task but as a task that will remain essential throughout the entire period of reconstruction of Iraq. Since the end of major combat operations in both theaters the task of creating secure and stable environments for other post-reconstruction efforts remains the essential task. Until emerging security gaps are eliminated, U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan and Iraq will remain for years to come. These forces are necessary not only to counter security threats but to fulfill the role of national defense forces that are virtually nonexistent in both countries.

The United States is fully engaged in the major chore of nation-building in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Success of the nation-building process hinges on the U.S. ability to diminish and eliminate security gaps in both countries. This is a task of considerable significance and difficulty when one considers the current security threats that include armed warlord forces in Afghanistan and insurgents in Iraq. In both cases the U.S. has put reconstruction efforts and long-term stability of these two countries at risk by failing to address the gap between security needs and security resources. In Afghanistan, reconstruction efforts are in daily jeopardy due to the absence of sufficient security forces outside of Kabul to address the existence of the warlords, production and exportation of drugs, and the influx of returning Afghan refugees. Not to mention the Taliban and Al Qaida remnants. In Iraq, members of the Interim Governing Council are at risk, as well as Coalition soldiers and many Iraqis, as insurgents continuously hamper progress. History shows that in modern state-building an army is a necessary part of the security solution. Therefore, the development of new credible defense forces is a necessary and appropriate step that the U.S. has failed to comprehend. While the goal in both cases is to create professional security institutions that will provide for the individual and collective security of Afghans and Iraqis alike, the magnitude of the challenges to accomplish this goal was underestimated. The challenges are many and include ethnic and tribal diversity; recruitment and retention issues; Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR); the presence of spoilers; and acceptance by the people as legitimate armed forces. The focus of this paper is on these challenges in the development of new national military forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. Until these forces achieve operational capability both the Afghani and Iraqi the interim governments are entirely dependent upon U.S.-led coalitions and

their limited and hastily trained indigenous police forces to provided the required level of security to mitigate the existing security gap.

In Afghanistan, the development of a national defense force includes the building of an Afghan National Army (ANA) to shape both the current and future environment. The debate on how to form a new national army began as soon as the interim government leader Hamid Karzai took office.⁴ By April 2002, at a meeting in Geneva, detailed plans were drawn up/for and accepted by the Karzai government to set the size of the future ANA at 70,000.⁵ The ANA is to be a voluntary, non-partisan army dependent on a civil command structure.⁶ By January 2003 the U.S. had trained only 4000 forces. By September 2003 the force was at 6000 strong and had participated in its first major combat, Operation Warrior Sweep, alongside U.S.-led coalition troops. The pace of recruitment is far less than what is needed to reach the goal of 70,000 and that is primarily due to lack of cooperation from regional warlords, which will be discussed later in this paper. The shortage of trained ANA soldiers and a larger but poorly trained Afghan police force presents Afghanistan with a large security gap .

Meanwhile, Iraqi law enforcement forces are the focus of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) efforts to stabilize the current environment in Iraq, while the development of a national Iraqi military, the New Iraqi Army (NIA), is envisioned as the force that will preserve future Iraqi sovereignty (although it appears the NIA will possess limited capabilities). Post-conflict plans for Iraq always included retaining selective elements of the old army in order to preserve the Army as a nationally recognized symbol for Iraqis. The plan quickly came to an end and took a new approach on 23 May 2003, when the new head of the CPA, L. Paul Bremer, abolished the Iraqi defense and information ministries, the Iraqi military and security courts, and the Ba'ath party. He said, "the new interim authority planned to create a new Iraqi corps, which would be the first step in forming a national self-defense capability for a free Iraq. Under civilian control, that corps will be professional, non-political, militarily effective, and representative of all Iraqis."⁷ Unfortunately it appears that there is an imbalance of investment to the detriment of the armed forces. Currently, NIA manning is only approximately 2% (1,738 soldiers) of the hastily trained manning numbers for the various Iraqi security forces (112,622). These numbers suggest that there is a lack of urgency to properly recruit, retain, and equip both the ANA and NIA as formidable forces to conduct their internal defense roles.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the development and growth of new military institutions in both Afghanistan and Iraq, and to offer some insights into the challenges of building new armies in two very complex cultural and competing internal political environments. This paper is comprised of three parts. First, the paper will provide an historical perspective and

understanding of the internal operating environments of the Afghan and Iraqi armies prior to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and how these perspectives challenge the development and acceptance of the ANA and the NIA. Afghanistan and Iraq both have long histories of militaries that oppressed their people, either directed from a central authority, as in Iraq, or many competing authorities, as in the case of Afghanistan. The roles and mission of their militaries in the past have become part of their cultural norms within their diverse populations (ethnic, religious, and tribal) that will not be easy to change but must result in changing the military cultures in order to achieve stable and peaceful governments. Given an appreciation of past military norms it will take more than a well-developed plan to ensure the dramatic changes needed to develop professional armies. The second part of this paper addresses the complexity of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) as it applies in both situations. The last part of the paper will look at the ability of the Bush administration to apply the appropriate means to the timely development of credible defense forces. Having established the objective of building new legitimate military forces is one thing, having the means to achieve the desired end-state is another.

THE ANA AND NIA IN RELATION TO HISTORY AND NATIONAL CHARACTER

Afghanistan and Iraq offer two very distinct histories that should not be overlooked as the U.S. and coalition forces define the ANA's and NIA's mission, roles, structure, and civil-military relationship. It appears that a good deal of thought has gone into ensuring that the history and culture of these two nations are influencing factors on how the new militaries are constructed.

Since the 1890s, Afghanistan had established regular armed forces that were employed as a mechanism of state-building. The army, which started out at 15,000, went through several modernization efforts that were limited during Afghanistan's civil war. After the civil war modernization efforts included the opening of a military academy, schools for cavalry, artillery and infantry. By 1936 the army numbered 60,000 and played an important role in internal security. After World War II the army was 90,000 strong but still deficient of good equipment. During 1950-1978, the Afghan government utilized Soviet assistance to professionalize its army. A by-product of Soviet influence in Afghanistan was U.S. efforts to undermine the Soviets by providing military aid to the *mujahidin*. The Afghan-Soviet war and ensuing civil war led to support and growth of numerous warlords and their militias and the demise of a central or singular Afghan military force. Hence the country was carved up among numerous armed factions with many *mujahidin* commanders establishing themselves as local warlords and creating regional forces loyal only to the regional warlord, thereby establishing a society of

armed actors. It is this brief history lesson that illustrates the complexity of the ANA's role in placating the natural tensions in Afghanistan between the competing power bases throughout Afghanistan. As one author noted "Afghanistan's tumultuous political history has resulted in a recurring lack of consistent, legitimate central authorities able to create or sustain a reasonably disciplined, loyal armed force. The fluid nature of alliances, the loose bands of fighters prone to hate crimes when a battle is looming or not going their way, and the tendency to desert and then re-join when the bounty or weather is favorable are difficult obstacles to creating an effective regular fighting force."⁸ The desired outcome is to develop the ANA as a non-partisan army that recognizes only the authority of the legitimate government and a non-partisan army that the people recognize as legitimate institution of the Afghan government. This may sound logical but it does force one to ask the question--is it a realistic option when considering the realities of Afghanistan's past and present culture, which is best characterized by internal strife? This is just one of the questions that the Karzai government must answer if it really envisions the ANA "as a connecting body — uniting Afghans in a cause larger than tribal concerns or linguistic associations."⁹

Iraqis also need convincing that the NIA is a very different military from Saddam's forces. Joseph McMillan states that "Saddam Hussein and his predecessors, going back to the creation of the state, have left Iraq a legacy of endemic domestic political violence, dysfunctional civil-military relations, and, in recent decades, an ideology of unremitting hostility to virtually every one of Iraq's neighbors."¹⁰ The armed forces of Iraq were most notable for their suppression of their people during the Hussein regime, when in fact, executions of combatants and non-combatants and destruction of villages actually date back to the early 1930s.¹¹ In the past eighty years the Iraqi people have come to know their military as a draconian tool of their leader that will do anything to maintain internal control of the country, however that leader deemed fit. A recent commentary by Pierre Sarkis asserts, "the Iraqi army, like all Arab armies, was trained to control its citizens rather than fight other countries."¹² This point is well made but fails to account for the patriotic and military role of the army during the Iran-Iraq war from 1980-1989. In addition, one cannot overlook the fact that by the end of the Iran-Iraq war, Iraq had become one of the largest armies in the world and earned a sense of entitlement vis-à-vis Arab states in the Gulf region. It was not until after the Gulf War in 1990 that the sanctions and isolation imposed on Iraq weakened the Iraqi military. This decade of deterioration helps to account for the miserable display of military performance during OIF. The most recent adjustment to the Iraqi military occurred in May 2003 when the CPA enforced a complete and comprehensive dismissal of the Iraqi military. The history of the Iraqi military has left most Iraqis with a poor opinion and

suspicion of the military and shedding this image is important to the success of the NIA. Here is where U.S. military planners are challenged with the enormous task of developing the NIA (as cited earlier) into a professional, non-political, military based on strong civil-military relations.

The ANA and NIA have inherited tainted and draconian legacies they will have to struggle with for some time to come. Arguably more significant is the threat of instability sustained by the militias in Afghanistan and insurgents in Iraq continue to threaten the existence of the new armies. It is paramount that, in both efforts, the differences between their old and new militaries are clearly delineated, understood, and demonstrated openly to the people of Afghanistan and it is even more apparent that these new armies must be developed with a greater sense of urgency to offset the security gaps.

TOWARD NEW NATIONAL ARMIES

The formation of the ANA and NIA evolved along two very similar paths although both emerged from two entirely different sets of circumstances. In Afghanistan there is a wide security gap among the regions (between Kabul and the regions, and between Kabul and bordering states) while in Iraq the security gap is primarily a result of an insurgency. The ANA has been given an essentially non-military, law enforcement-style mission in the short-term plan, while functioning as a fully-fledged military force is its long-term stated objective.¹³ The NIA's mission in the short-term is to assist Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7) in stability operations and in the long-term possess a full professional defense capability.¹⁴ Inherent in either approach is the desire for each military to achieve three specific goals:

- To serve as an unifying symbol of nationalism
- To possess professional soldiers expected of modern militaries
- To establish good relationships with the people

The most difficult and sought after goal is the emergence of the two militaries as symbols of nationalism. President Karzai chose the Afghan National Army name for he said "it will be a national army, and the term "national" signifies the need to establish an army that is representative of all Afghan people."¹⁵ The ANA is envisioned by the Karzai government and others to serve as a unifying influence that will assist in overcoming significant internal centrifugal forces such as "deep ethnic, linguistic, secretarian, tribal, racial and regional cleavages and *Qawm* identity, emphasizing the local over higher-order formations."¹⁶ The latter is especially important, as Goodson emphasizes the point that Afghanistan today is defined by resurgent localism. It is localism that must be recognized and overcome in the development of the ANA, just as in any other Afghan institution.¹⁷ If not, the Karzai government will fail in

achieving any degree of support from the local warlords and militias. Having recognized the significance of localism in December 2002, President Karzai outlawed all Afghan military forces other than the ANA. This has yet to be implemented, as the warlords maintain their private armies including Minister of Defense (MOD) Mohamed Fahim.¹⁸ In order to gain cooperation of the warlords for the creation of the ANA, the Karzai government and U.S. hosted a two-day conference in April 2003 called “Shaping the future of Afghanistan – the military dimension.”¹⁹ The end result was full agreement by all the participants, including 50 militia leaders and warlords, that they would “work closely with the Ministry of Defense in taking direction from the central government to the common defense of the nation and in building the New National Army.”²⁰ This is a good example of why the ANA is viewed as an institution that can assist the interim government’s influence throughout Afghanistan.²¹ Although the expectation for complete compliance with this announcement is not expected in the short term, it does reinforce the goal of having the ANA serve as an enabler, either symbolically or physically, towards unity and stability in Afghanistan.

In Iraq’s case, the Coalition Military Assistance and Training Team (CMATT), formed to build the NIA, also envisioned the NIA emerging as a national symbol. The CMATT’s strategic vision for NIA includes “achieving greatness of national will in mission to defend Iraqi culture and way of life by ensuring popular support, soldierly morale, good border relations, proper support and resources, and high mission readiness while guided by the rule of law.”²² Conrad Crane and Andrew Terrill support this approach as they stated “the military can also serve as a unifying force under certain conditions. In a highly diverse and fragmented society like Iraq, the military proved to be one of the few national institutions that stressed national unity as an important principle. Conscripts were at least publicly encouraged to rise above parochial loyalties and stationed in parts of the country far from their ethnic kinsman.”²³ With the military disbanded in May 2003, the CMATT faced the larger challenge of building a NIA that mirrors the many dividing lines within in Iraq. As noted by Richard Perle, “there are distinctions between Kurdish, Sunni and Shiite Iraq. Other groups have tribal distinctions; still others have political ones. These differences are not trivial ...there are deep and serious divisions that have, over the centuries, deepened into profound distrust. Referring to them as the Iraqi people creates a fiction. Their loyalty does not go to the nation state so much as to other institutions – religious, tribal and ethnic.”²⁴

Planners in both theaters recognized the enormous challenge in developing “nationalistic” armies and therefore established recruiting policies that would recruit soldiers to reflect the truest representation of each country’s ethnic, religious and tribal groups within their new forces.

It becomes obvious when you map out the strategic placement of recruiting stations/centers in both Afghanistan and Iraq. In Afghanistan the first two recruiting stations, known as Volunteer Centers, were established in Jalalabad and Gardez. Four additional centers were opened in Bamian, Kandahar, Konduz, and Kabul. All of these centers cater to different ethnic and tribal groups. The long term plan calls for centers in each of Afghanistan's 32 provinces. While these centers attempt to recruit a multi-ethnic national force, some challenges, such as high illiteracy rates and allegiances to local commanders, undermine their efforts. The most destabilizing force is the perception of ethnic favoritism by the current MOD, Mohamad Fahim, who is a Tajik and senior commander of *Shura-yi Nazar* (Council of the North), and who has been accused of trying to create a Tajik-dominated military.²⁵ Indeed, failure to achieve quasi-proportional ethnic representation within the ANA will only serve to weaken the nationalization of the army. Another equally daunting challenge unique to the recruitment of the ANA is President Karzai's inability to initially co-opt local warlords to support this new national army. Failure to do so will result in Afghanistan having a regular, western trained army that will be forced to de facto coexist with the warlord armies.²⁶ Karzai's success in binding Afghanistan together hinges on bringing the local influences to the center both politically and militarily.

Recruiting efforts for the NIA have been aggressive since the decision was made to accelerate the creation of the NIA in August 2003. The NIA was put on a course to expand from a nine (12,000 soldier) battalion Army to a 27 (35,000 soldier) battalion army by July 2004. Here the overarching goal is to recruit men from all ethnic, regional and religious groups. The first three recruiting centers were established in the major ethnic regions of Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul. Among the initial recruits, Shiites made up 60%, Sunnis 25%, and Kurds 10%. One unique challenge to recruiting in Iraq is the screening that must be done in order to prevent Ba'ath party officials, intelligence service officers, and members of the Special Republican Guard from service in the NIA. There is an even larger challenge according to Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He believes that "one of the great problems here is that they are creating an Iraqi Army that is seen by most Iraqis as not an Iraqi army, but a paramilitary force that looks more like a tool of the occupation than a national defense force."²⁷

Both Afghanistan's and Iraq's interim governments face incredible challenges towards developing professional national armies that are legitimate and credible to their own populations. Possessing professional soldiers expected of modern militaries is crucial to both efforts. In order to achieve the ethos and values of a modern army each military must establish education systems for their enlisted personnel, noncommissioned officers, and officers. This effort is being accomplished within both militaries now as coalition forces are providing soldiers and civilians to train and educate these groups. The figure below illustrates the implications of Afghanistan and Iraq's internal strife and pre-existing military ethos and values against a list of

	Kabul's Army and Local Militias	Hussein's Military Complex
Existing Internal Strife	Kabul vs. Warlords Warlords vs. Warlords	Sunni vs. Shia Kurd vs. Arab Rival Kurdish Groups
Existing Ethos and Values	Cooperation with terrorists Internal Oppression Self Serving	Internal Oppression Violation of human rights Pursuit of WMD Aggression against neighbors Cooperation with terrorists




FIGURE 1

required changes that the ANA and NIA must make from the onset to become the professional military force desired.²⁸ Each of the required changes is significant and will require constant attention and resolve in order to take hold over time.

Equally daunting is the need to build good relationships with the people. Recruiting stations are a great start but the relationship must be built on the basis of mutual respect and trust. It is imperative that both armies are given numerous opportunities early on to outwardly assist the people in missions other than war and fighting. This could be accomplished by supporting humanitarian activities throughout the country. The size and type of military organizations interacting with the people is not important. What is important is the symbolic display of how ethnic and tribal diversity are not impediments, but enablers. Frequent public

displays of professional, well disciplined and compassionate forces may help win the people's hearts and minds.

DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, AND REINTEGRATION

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) deals with transforming “combatants, whether they are organized in formal national security forces, paramilitary units, or private militias, into noncombatants.”²⁹ According to Scott Fiel, the DDR process has three steps. First, create a viable and seamless strategy that dismantles command and control structure and co-locates soldiers to communities. Second, limit the circulation and individual possession of weapons and small arms. Third, provide employment, educational opportunities, and community reintegration programs.³⁰ Accomplishment of these steps in Afghanistan and Iraq vary significantly. In Afghanistan, even as U.S. forces defeated the Taliban, there remained numerous dominant and competing warlord commanders. In fact, the U.S. Afghan strategy helped empower the warlords. Success in achieving DDR hinges on acceptance and compliance of the DDR process by all militia leaders, although removing warlord militias without anything to replace them creates an opportunity for someone that may be more antagonistic than the present warlords towards the Karzai government. In Iraq command and control was dismantled completely with the decree that abolished the Iraqi military in May 2003. This left the CPA and Iraqi Governing Council with the daunting challenge of achieving steps two and three of the DDR process.

Afghanistan remains immersed in provincial and tribal rivalry and it will affect DDR in several ways. Larry Goodson points to the warlords as the “tallest hurdle in Afghanistan’s path” and suggest that demobilization of local militias can only work if applied evenly across all local rivalries.³¹ President Karzai’s first goal towards peace and stability is the demobilization of former warring factions and integrating them within a unified military.³² Without this step President Karzai will remain ineffective. Towards this end, in December 2002, President Karzai signed a decree that not only established the basis for the ANA but addressed the DDR of all other forces. Three months later President Karzai attended the Tokyo Conference on “Consolidation of Peace (DDR) in Afghanistan – Change of Order from “Guns to Plows.” It was at this conference he established the following policy:

- DDR shall be impartial, paying due consideration to the diversity of Afghan society
- A phased approach will be adopted
- Disarmament should be completed within one year

- The Afghanistan's New Beginnings Program (ANBP) will be established to implement demobilization and reintegration

It is believed by some that the "guns to plow" program will only succeed if there is active involvement of an international armed force, significant economic incentive, and an understanding of the current Afghan militia structures.³³ Expansion of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has been a consistent request of President Karzai and has finally begun but will take some time to develop. Until then the emphasis needs to be on the development and maturity of the ANA. Unfortunately at the time of phased implementation of ANBP in the fall of 2003, ISAF was still limited and the ANA was not ready in terms of size to take on this mission. Some have been bolstered by the ANA's successful deployments alongside U.S. soldiers in order to provide security in the absence of trained local police forces.³⁴ More problematic is the fact that the military is still perceived as an instrument of Fahim and his regional forces (*Shura-yi Nazar*) in spite of reforms that were taken prior to ANBP (phased) implementation. This perception could destabilize efforts to ensure equal application of demobilization among the warlords. The optimistic assessment is that the ANA coupled with trained local police forces are enough to ensure the success of DDR only if economic incentives are sufficient and equal as to not cause a conflict among the militias.

The Karzai government has established economic incentives through the ANBP. The program establishes a payment of \$200 in Afghan currency, food staples (130 kilograms) and counseling and training for a new career in exchange for a weapon (it has been said that many combatants possess more than one weapon).³⁵ The new employment areas include reintegration of the ex-combatant into rural life, vocational training, assistance in establishing small businesses, de-mining employment, assistance in establishing agribusinesses, and wage laborers.³⁶ These economic incentives have to be followed through carefully or the process will collapse as soldiers return to their former activities. One activity of concern is the Afghan warlords', and their soldiers, involvement in heroin production and trade. Afghanistan is expected to yield 75% of the world's heroin in 2004, achieving an income equal to half of its GDP. The alarming statistic presented by a Western anti-narcotics expert in Kabul is the estimation that approximately 60% of the regional warlords are profiting from drug trafficking and using the profit to support their regional armies.³⁷ William Durch emphasizes this point by stating "This is a significant challenge to the DDR process because opium supports not only organized crime but local faction leaders' resistance to the development of legitimate central authority."³⁸

Understanding the current militia structures and how to dismantle existing power pyramids appears well thought out and cautiously approached as the DDR was initiated using small pilot projects and then expanded into larger regions.³⁹ The pilot projects began in Konduz and then moved to Bamiyan and Gardez. These areas were selected first based on their political climate. ANBP implementation will then carry through Mazar-i Sharif and Parwan.⁴⁰ Parwan includes the Panjshir Valley, which is considered “decisive in convincing other commanders outside the *Shura-yi Nazar* network to participate. According to Afghanistan’s senior advisor on DDR, this phase of the program will target troops from Parwan who are stationed in Kabul and account for the bulk of the *Shura-yi Nazar* forces in the capital.”⁴¹

While a sound DDR process is beginning in Afghanistan, a thoroughly different process is emerging in Iraq. The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs (ORHA) planners fully envisioned that certain elements of the former Iraqi military would be retained through a selective retention process as the campaign transitioned to stability operations. The prevailing thought was, “long-term security challenges and requirements for defense self-sufficiency were too great in Iraq to justify completely demobilizing the military.”⁴² It appears that L. Paul Bremer’s decision to reverse the plan for selective retention and completely demobilize all Iraqi military forces along with the Ministry of Defense was driven by his belief that it was critical to begin stability operations by first sending a clear signal to the Iraqi people that one of Saddam’s most important institutions during his reign was gone and that he would never return.⁴³ The unintended consequences of this decision resulted in protest by thousands of former Iraqi soldiers. In order to quell these protests, it was announced in June 2003 that the CPA would pay former soldiers stipends on an indefinite basis and they would be eligible to join the NIA. Discontent remains high among former Iraqi military personnel, resulting in a second protest in January 2004.

Disarmament began with the CPA issuing a decree in late May 2003 banning automatic and heavy weapons. Iraqi response to a “turn-in arms” campaign was poor and the CPA issued new regulations allowing Iraqis to keep guns up to 7.2mm (caliber of an AK-47) in their home without a license as long as they did not take the weapon outside.⁴⁴ It is estimated over 50 major weapons depots in Iraq contain over 650,000 tons of weapons such as rifles, missiles, and ammunition.⁴⁵ Security is already a large concern in Iraq and the presence of the lightly secured depots makes them vulnerable, but nowhere does there appear to be urgency for the cache of weapons to be destroyed.⁴⁶

The current program to disarm combatants and noncombatants requires reevaluation. Iraqis, like Afghans, have a long history of gun ownership and are not likely to hand over these

weapons unless there is adequate incentive. As in the Afghan DDR process, the CPA needs to appreciate what is important to the Iraqis and concede to some of their desires. As one analyst recently offered, "instead of buy back programs, Iraqis would benefit from community based weapons collection programs. Rather than turning in weapons for cash, a neighborhood could receive increased security patrols; provision of electricity; or assistance with rebuilding schools, roads, and shops, for a target number of weapons turned in."⁴⁷

The process of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration is moving too slow in both countries. It has taken Afghanistan almost one year to begin its formal phased implementation of ANBP. The process was initially stalled due to the slow response of the MOD to put in place required reforms. Transferring military power from the locals to the ANA is going to remain a tough mission. In Iraq the CPA needs to ensure the current lawlessness does not result into formation of tribal warlords in rural areas, creating an Afghan effect. The primary difference between Afghanistan's and Iraq's DDR programs is that the Karzai government has some degree of legitimacy as it works ANBP because of the backing of the United Nations, Japan, and a myriad of Non-governmental agencies. In Iraq, neither the CPA nor Iraqi Governing Council appears to have attained any level of legitimacy in this process, nor have they produced any formal plan to conduct DDR.

APPLICATION OF MEANS

Building new militaries comes at considerable cost. Resources in terms of the application of dollars towards manning, training, equipping, and sustaining must be available for the ANA and NIA to mature into credible forces. In both cases the current governments and economies are not in a position to provide the necessary means to build their armies. In both cases the reliance is on resources from international coalitions. In this regard it appears that the U.S. and coalition forces are putting forth considerable resources to shape the conditions for the acceptance and legitimacy of both emerging governments and military institutions. In terms of providing weapons, equipment, and ammunition the U.S. Congress supported President Bush's plan to spend \$170 million to support the ANA and \$2 billion to support the NIA. Reports indicate that it is not an absence of money and support that presents a challenge to the building of the armies but recruiting procedures themselves. The challenge for Afghanistan is to improve recruiting capabilities to overcome their primitive transportation and communication conditions, reduce desertion rates that in most cases are encouraged by warlords, and mitigate the tribal divisiveness of the MOD.⁴⁸ The challenge for Iraq is also high desertion rates. As the NIA prepared its first battalion to begin working with U.S. military units, more than one-third of its

soldiers deserted.⁴⁹ The reason for these sudden desertions was a realization by the Iraqi soldiers that they received a salary of \$70 per month while other Iraqi security forces salaries averaged \$10 to \$40 more per month.⁵⁰ Initial indication from the CMATT is that changes will be made in the pay scale to ensure soldier retention.

All of these indicators are outward demonstrations of the U.S. government and coalition partners commitment of resources to the ends of establishing new armies. Nonetheless, this commitment is not enough, and time is against both Afghanistan and Iraq. As William Durch points out, in Afghanistan current efforts focus on the long-term solutions while the immediate need is an acceleration of the ANA to assist during the next year of transition otherwise the U.S. and others are wasting valuable resources.⁵¹ The solution, according to Durch, is to accelerate the building of the ANA and deploy it into the major towns now while simultaneously expanding the International Security Assistance Force. These are both essential steps identified in 2002 that have yet to take place.

In Iraq, the U.S. learned that it did not have enough soldiers on the ground to secure the cities and suspected "hot spots" at the end of major combat operations. It was this miscalculation that facilitated the emergence and growth of an insurgency in Iraq. Currently, U.S. forces remain challenged in eliminating the insurgency. The administration exacerbated security gaps in Iraq by eliminating the pre-existing military forces in their entirety, introducing a policy that has resulted in the unemployment of over 700,000 Iraqis and created additional tension towards the CPA and any governmental or nongovernmental agency that supports U.S. reconstruction efforts in Iraq (to include Iraqis). The dollar commitment is currently there to support the NIA and Iraqi police forces, but the NIA remains years away from initial operational capability.

Beyond 2004, it is critical that the financial support and international security presence remains to ensure the continued maturation of these armies and their economies to sustain them. So the greater question is, can the U.S. sustain its commitment to providing the resources needed towards the development of both of these armies, in terms of manpower, equipment, and dollars, as the current administration faces a presidential election year? The answer has to be yes, or both Afghanistan and Iraq will never achieve the security necessary to ensure that they do not become failed states.

CONCLUSION

Afghanistan and Iraq will continue to occupy a great deal of America's energy, soldiers, and money for some time. Only when true peace and stability is achieved will U.S. and coalition

presence diminish. Until then, the Afghan and Iraqi interim governments need to aggressively pursue the growth and development of their new defense forces. Afghanistan and Iraq's new emerging governments have an incredible amount of work to do towards establishing their governing institutions. Among these is the very crucial establishment of formal civil-military relations. Joseph McMillan points to four priority tasks that he believes are "interrelated issues that lie at the political-military nexus between any constitutional government and the armed forces that serve it:

- How national security policy is determined through the political process?
- How the legitimate government exercises control over armed forces?
- How national resources – both human and financial – are allocated to military purposes?
- How the military force reflects and interacts with society at large?"⁵²

The first three tasks require the emergence of legitimate governments. Once that is accomplished, McMillan states that "a legitimate civilian government can control and monitor the development, funding, and employment of the military and ensure the development within the new military of attitudes and patterns of behavior that reinforce new constitutional political order at home and peace and stability abroad."⁵³ The development of accountable civil-military organization rests with the emergence of legitimate new governments. An absence of checks and balances between the leaders, the governing body of the people, and the military will certainly lead to inappropriate use of the militaries. So what should the interim governments do in the meantime? Accomplish McMillan's fourth task. Employment of the newly graduated army battalions is an important and critical step towards establishing their relationship with the people they are there to support. The public credibility of these new armies will be on the line as they begin executing missions at the lowest end of the spectrum, but it is a necessary risk. The U.S. and coalition must make every effort to allow the ANA and NIA to demonstrate that their existence is to promote and preserve the quality of life that Afghan's and Iraqis desire.

It would also be prudent to appoint a civilian defense minister as a demonstration of civilian authority over the military. While some may question why President Karzai has retained Fahim as the Minister of Defense, others see the prudence in his retention. This double edge sword serves to first keep Fahim engaged and working with President Karzai while at the same time providing continued concern about Tajik favoritism. For the interim President Karzai may be able to sustain this course with Fahim and continue to bargain for a multi-ethnic ANA. Inevitably the Afghans need to establish civilian control over their military. Fortunately, in Iraq

the CPA indicated that they were working with the Iraqi Governing Council to find the right civilian leader for the NIA.

In Afghanistan and Iraq, over time, the militaries can emerge as symbols of nationalism, modernization, and professionalism. The challenges highlighted in this paper are complex, and the product of long histories but not impossible given the time, commitment, and resources of the U.S. and its coalition partners. The conquering of the challenges presented by ethnic and tribal diversity, recruitment and retention issues, the DDR process (or lack thereof in Iraq), coupled with the presence of spoilers all hinge on several factors coming together. First U.S. and coalition partners must stay the course and see through what has been started in both countries. Second is the accomplishment of the DDR process. Third, each of the militaries must address ethnic imbalances, alter values of the senior leadership to represent the values of their society, understand their subordination to civil authority, come to appreciate their service as a matter of patriotism, and finally win the respect of the people. Fourth and last, and foremost is the adoption of an Afghan/Iraqi democratic government that is committed to developing proper civil-military relations.

WORD COUNT=6778

ENDNOTES

¹ John J. Hamre and Gordon R. Sullivan, "Toward Postconflict Reconstruction," *The Washington Quarterly* (Autumn 2002): 85-92.

² Ibid.

³ Lakhdar Brahimi, "Afghanistan: Prospects for the Future," *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs* (Summer/Fall 2003): 75-81.

⁴ Internal Affairs: Army Afghanistan. In *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment— South Asia*; [database online]; available from Jane's Geopolitical Library; accessed 18 November 2003.

⁵ Ibid., 4.

⁶ Antonio Giustozzi, *The Problems of Creating a New Afghan Army and the Critical Dangers of Failure!* International Industrial Information LTD., 2002.

⁷ Internal Affairs; Iraq, In *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment-The Gulf States*, [database on-line]; available from Jane's Geopolitical Library; accessed 23 August 2003.

⁸ Emily Clark, "Afghanistan's Army: The Ambiguities of National Defense," 4 February 2002; available from <<http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/afghan-army.cfm.html>>; Internet; accessed 2 September 2003.

⁹ Ibid., 2.

¹⁰ Joseph McMillan, "Building an Iraqi Defense Force," *Strategic Forum* 198 (June 2003): 3

¹¹ Ibid., 1.

¹² Pierre Sarkis, "Iraqi Army's Lesson for Arab Regimes," *The Lebanese Daily Star*, 25 October 2003.

¹³ Internal Affairs: Army Afghanistan. In *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment— South Asia*, 3.

¹⁴ Thomas J. O'Donnell odoneellt@orha.centcom.mil, "I have an idea" electronic mail message to Mary Baker <pabakerpa@comcast.net>, 7 August 2003.

¹⁵ U.S. Department of State: "Rumsfeld Sees Progress Toward Afghan National Army. 30 April 2002. Available from <<http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/sasia/afghan/text/0430rmfd.htm>>; Internet, accessed 9 December 2003.

¹⁶ Larry Goodson, "Picking Up the Pieces," *Hoover Digest* 1 (Winter 2002); 57-6. Quam refers to the group to which the individual considers himself to belong, whether a sub tribe, village, valley, or neighborhood.

¹⁷ Ibid., 59.

¹⁸ Internal Affairs: Army Afghanistan. In *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment* – South Asia; 3.

¹⁹ Internal Affairs: Army Afghanistan. In *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment* – South Asia; 3.

²⁰ Internal Affairs: Army Afghanistan. In *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment* – South Asia; 3.

²¹ Agency Group 09; "Afghan National Army Key to Afghan Nationalism;" FDCH Regulatory Intelligence Database; 7 September 2003. [database on-line], available from Ebscohost; accessed 24 September 2003.

²² Thomas J. O'Donnell <odoneellt@orha.centcom.mil>, 4.

²³ Conrad C. Crane and W. Andrew Terrill, "Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario", Carlisle, PA; U.S. Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute, February 2003.

²⁴ Thomas J. O'Donnell <odoneellt@orha.centcom.mil>, "Geopolitical Diary: Richard Perle on Iraq," electronic mail message to Mary Baker <pabakerpa@comcast.net>, 29 August 2003.

²⁵ Internal Affairs: Army Afghanistan. In *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment* – South Asia; 3.

²⁶ Thomas J. O'Donnell <odoneellt@orha.centcom.mil>, "Geopolitical Diary: Richard Perle on Iraq," electronic mail message to Mary Baker <pabakerpa@comcast.net>, 29 August 2003.

²⁷ Alex Berenson, "Iraqis New Army Gets Slow Start," *New York Times*, 21 September 2003; available from <<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/21/international/middleeast/21TRAI.html>>; Internet; accessed 22 September 2003.

²⁸ Source of this idea was obtained from a conversation with COL Anthony Puckett. Sep 03.

²⁹ Scott Feil, "Building Better Foundations: Security in Postconflict Reconstruction," *The Washington Quarterly* (Autumn 2002); 97-109.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 104.

³¹ Goodson, 91.

³² Ania Manuel and P.W. Singer, "A New Afghan Army." *Foreign Affairs* 81 (July/August 2003); 44-59. General James L. Jones, SACEUR, with Lieutenant General Gotz Gliemeroth CIC ISAF in Kabul, "Exclusive News from Kabul; LTGeneral Gliermeroth, CIC ISAF," Interview by Dieter Farwick, World securitynetwork.com, 24 October 2003. 1-10.

³³ International Crisis Group; "Disarmament and Reintegration in Afghanistan," ICG Asia Report N 65, 30 September 2003.

³⁴ FDCH Regulatory Intelligence Database, "Afghan Army Units Doing Well in Field," 4 February 2003; available from <http://web14.epnet.com/deliveryPrintSave.asp?tb=1&_ug+dbs+0+In+en-us+sid.html>; Internet; accessed 24 August 2003.

³⁵ Ilene R. Prusher; "UN Aims to Disarm Afghan Fighters," *Christian Science Monitor*, 2 December 2003; available from <<http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/1202/p06s01-wosc.html>>; Internet, accessed 8 December 2003.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 7.

³⁷ McCirk, Tim, et al, "Remember Afghanistan?" *Time*, March 2004, pg. 59.

³⁸ William J. Durch, "Afghanistan: Keeping the Peace Without hardly trying," 23 October 2002; available from <<http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?RQT=512&querySyntax=PQ&searchInterface=1&TS-1075390667&m.html>>; Internet; accessed 29 January 2004.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁴² Frederick Barton and Bathsheba Crocker, "A Wiser Peace: An Action Strategy for a Post-Conflict Iraq." Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2003.

⁴³ Internal Affairs; Iraq," *In Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment-The Gulf States*, [database on-line]; available from Jane's Geopolitical Library: accessed 23 August 2003.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 14.

⁴⁵ Rachel Stohl; "Iraq Small Arms are a Big Threat", *Christian Science Monitor* 5 November 2003 [journal on-line]; available from <<http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/smallarms/articles/1105threat.htm>>; Internet; accessed 9 December 2003.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ Dodge Billingsley; "New Afghan Military Completes First Mission," *Salt Lake Tribune*, 22 December 2002; available from http://www.sltribune.com/2002/dec/12222002/nation_w/13540.asp; Internet; accessed 27 October 2003.

⁴⁹ Christine Spolar; "Iraqi Soldiers Deserting New Army," *Chicago Tribune* 9 December 2003, available from <http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20031210239955.html>; Internet; accessed 10 December 2003.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁵¹ Durch, "A Realistic Plan to Save Afghanistan," A12.

⁵² Joseph McMillan, "Building an Iraqi Defense Force," *Strategic Forum* 198 (June 2003): 3.

⁵³ Ibid., 1.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Agency Group 09. "Afghan National Army Key to Afghan Nationalism." FDCH Regulatory Intelligence Database. 7 September 2003. Database on-line. Available from Ebscohost. Accessed 24 September 2003.
- Baram, Amaitzai. "Victory in Iraq, One Tribe at a Time." *New York Times*, 28 October 2003, A25.
- Barton, Frederick, and Bathsheba Crocker. *A Wiser Peace: An Action Strategy for a Post-Conflict Iraq*. Washington, D.C. Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2003.
- Berenson, Alex. "Iraqis New Army Gets Slow Start." *New York Times*. 21 September 2003. Available from <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/21/international/middleeast/21TRAI.html>. Internet. Accessed 22 September 2003.
- Billingsley, Dodge. "New Afghan Military Completes First Mission," *Salt Lake Tribune*, 22 December 2002. Available from http://www.sltribune.com/2002/dec/12222002/nation_w/13540.asp. Internet> Accessed 27 October 2003.
- Brahimi, Lakhdar. "Afghanistan: Prospects for the Future." *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs* (Summer/Fall 2003): 75-81.
- Bush, George. "Text of President Bush's speech on Iraq." 9 September 2003. Available from <http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2003-09-07-bush-speech-text_x.htm>. Internet. Accessed 8 September 2003.
- Clark, Emily. "Afghanistan's Army: The Ambiguities of National Defense." 4 February 2002. Available from <<http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/afghan-army.cfm.html>>. Internet. Accessed 2 September 2003.
- Crane, Conrad C., and W. Andrew Terrill. *Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario*. Carlisle, PA.: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, February 2003.
- Dobbins, James, et al. *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany To Iraq*. Santa Monica, CA. RAND, 2003.
- Durch William J., "A Realistic Plan to Save Afghanistan." *Washington Post*. 30 July 2002. A17. Available from Proquest. Accessed 29 January 2004.
- Durch William J. "Afghanistan: Keeping the Peace Without Hardly Trying." 23 October 2002: Available from <http://www.stimson.org/fopo/pdf/Afghan_KeepingPeaceWithoutTryingrev12602.pdf>. Internet. Accessed 29 January 2004.
- Edens, Timothy J. *Nation Building in Afghanistan – A Disconnect Between Security Means and Political Ends?* Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 7 April 2003.

- FDCH Regulatory Intelligence Database, *Afghan Army Units Doing Well in Field*. 4 February 2003. Available from http://web14.epnet.com/deliveryPrintSave.asp?tb=1&_ug+dbs+0+In+en-us+sid.html. Internet. Accessed 24 August 2003.
- Feil, Scott. "Building Better Foundations: Security in Postconflict Reconstruction." *The Washington Quarterly* (Autumn 2002): 97-109.
- Giustozzi, Antonio. *The Problems of Creating a New Afghan Army and the Critical Dangers of Failure!* Monmouth, UK: International Industrial Information LTD, 2002.
- Goodson, Larry. "Afghanistan's Road to Reconstruction." *Journal of Democracy* 14 (January 2003): 82-99.
- Goodson, Larry. "Picking Up the Pieces." *Hoover Digest* 1 (Winter 2002): 57-67.
- Grymes, Robert D. *Establishing Security and Stability in Afghanistan*. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 7 April 2003.
- Hamre, John J, and Gordon R. Sullivan. "Toward Postconflict Reconstruction." *The Washington Quarterly* (Autumn 2002): 85-92.
- Internal Affairs: Army Afghanistan. In *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment – South Asia*. database online. Available from Jane's Geopolitical Library. Accessed 18 November 2003.
- Internal Affairs: Iraq." In *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment-The Gulf States*: August 2003. database on-line. Available from Jane's Geopolitical Library. Accessed 23 August 2003.
- International Crisis Group. "Disarmament and Reintegration in Afghanistan". *ICG Asia Report N 65*. 30 September 2003.
- Manuel, Anja, and P.W. Singer. "A New Afghan Army." *Foreign Affairs* 81 (July/August 2003): 44-59. General James L. Jones, SACEUR, with Lieutenant General Gotz Gliemerth CIC ISAF in Kabul. "Exclusive News from Kabul: LTGeneral Gliemerth, CIC ISAF." Interview by Dieter Farwick. World securitynetwork.com, 24 October 2003. 1-10.
- McCirk, Tim, et al. "Remember Afghanistan?" *Time*. March 2004, pg. 59.
- McMillan, Joseph. "Building an Iraqi Defense Force." *Strategic Forum* 198 (June 2003): 3.
- Olivia M. Synnott. "Civil-Military Relations in Iraq: The Success of the Saddam Hussein Regime." 1 March 2000: Available from <http://www.intellnet.org/documents/500/010/519.htm>. Internet. Accessed 10 October 2003.
- O'Donnell, Thomas J. <odoneelt@orha.centcom.mil>. "I have an Idea." Electronic mail message to Mary Baker pabakerpa@comcast.net. 7 August 2003.
- _____. "Geopolitical Diary: Richard Perle on Iraq," electronic mail message to Mary Baker pabakerpa@comcast.net. 29 August 2003.
- _____. "Bremer Speech." electronic mail message to Mary Baker pabakerpa@comcast.net. 5 September 2003.

- Open Society Institute and the United Nations Foundation. *Reconstructing Iraq: A Guide to the Issues*. Washington, D.C. Open Society Institute and the United Nations Foundation, 2003.
- Prusher, Ilene R. "UN Aims to Disarm Afghan Fighters." *Christian Science Monitor*. 2 December 2003. Available from <http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/1202/p06s01-wosc.html>. Internet. Accessed 8 December 2003.
- Sarkis, Pierre. "Iraqi Army's Lesson for Arab Regimes." *The Lebanese Daily Star*, 25 October 2003.
- Spolar, Christine. "Iraqi Soldiers Deserting New Army." *Chicago Tribune* 9 December 2003: Available from <<http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20031210239955.html>>. Internet: Accessed 10 December 2003.
- Steven Metz. "Iraq Stabilization." Lecture. Carlisle Barracks, PA, U.S. Army War College, 14 October 2003. Cited with permission of Dr Metz.
- Stohl, Rachel. "Iraq Small Arms Are a Big Threat." *Christian Science Monitor* 5 November 2003. Journal on-line. Available from <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/smallarms/articles/1105threat.htm>. Internet: Accessed 9 December 2003.
- U.S. Department of State. "Rumsfeld Sees Progress Toward Afghan National Army. 30 April 2002. Available from <<http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/sasia/afghan/text/0430rmfd.htm>>; Internet. Accessed 9 December 2003.
- Wisner, Frank G., II, and Nicholas Platt, and Marshall M. Bouton. *Afghanistan: Are We Losing the Peace?* New York: Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., 2003.

