### Transatlantic Armaments Cooperation Is it Worth the Effort?

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**DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT**
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

**ABSTRACT**
See attached file.

**Subject Terms:**
[The subject terms are not provided.]

**Security Classification of:**
- Report: Unclassified
- Abstract: Unclassified
- This Page: Unclassified

**Limitation of Abstract:**
Unclassified

**Number of Pages:** 34
ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Colonel Steven M. Brouse
TITLE: Transatlantic Armaments Cooperation: Is It Worth The Effort?
FORMAT: Strategy Research Project
DATE: 19 March 2004 PAGES: 34 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The European continent has undergone tremendous change since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) shortly thereafter in 1991. With such monumental changes taking place, some would argue Europe should assume more of its own security responsibilities within the NATO alliance. Taking a closer look, however, one discovers that the countries of Europe are essentially struggling to find some middle ground in their attempts to consolidate their defense armaments efforts towards a meaningful end state. On the other side of the Atlantic, the United States continues to prod and encourage the Europeans to spend more on their own defense, while at the same time imposing technology transfer controls. Why is greater armaments cooperation between the United States and Europe so important? Why is it necessary that we put so much effort into improving our transatlantic ties in matters such as arms procurement? This paper will attempt to sort through the various frameworks for transatlantic armaments cooperation with the ultimate objective of proposing several beneficial solutions that may help to continue strengthening our transatlantic ties.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT................................................................................................................................................ iii

**TRANSATLANTIC ARMAMENTS COOPERATION: IS IT WORTH THE EFFORT?** .................................1

  - A CHANGING EUROPE.................................................................................................................. 2
  - A NEW UNION............................................................................................................................. 3
  - A NEW THREAT .......................................................................................................................... 4

**TRANSATLANTIC ARMAMENTS COOPERATION: A BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW**........... 4

**ARMAMENTS COOPERATION: THE EUROPEAN CONSTRUCT**.............................................. 5

**EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY**................................................................. 6

**EUROPEAN EFFORTS TO IMPROVE COOPERATION**........................................................... 7

**ARMAMENTS COOPERATION: THE UNITED STATES PERSPECTIVE**............................... 8

**RECENT U.S. EFFORTS TO IMPROVE COOPERATION**........................................................ 8

**WHAT ABOUT NATO?** .............................................................................................................. 9

**NATO’S TRANSFORMATION** ..................................................................................................... 10

**ARMAMENTS COOPERATION: THE ROAD AHEAD**............................................................ 12

**RECOMMENDATIONS**.............................................................................................................. 13

**EUROPEAN UNION**................................................................................................................... 13

**UNITED STATES**........................................................................................................................ 13

**NATO**........................................................................................................................................... 14

**CONCLUSIONS**.......................................................................................................................... 14

**ENDNOTES** ............................................................................................................................... 17

**GLOSSARY**................................................................................................................................. 23

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**.......................................................................................................................... 25
Transatlantic defense cooperation is a little like the weather: everybody talks about it, but nothing much seems to happen.¹

—“Saving NATO’s Foundation,” Foreign Affairs, 1999

The European continent has experienced tremendous change since the fall of the “Iron Curtain” in 1989 and the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) shortly thereafter in 1991. In fact, the newly established European Union (EU), with its “capital” in Brussels, is now in the process of accepting as new member states those countries formally aligned with the old Warsaw Pact.² In its effort to become a more complete union, the EU has established its own currency, the Euro, and is now in the midst of ratifying its own constitution.³ But, as is often the case, these rapid changes invoke many questions and concerns about the future and stability of the European continent. For instance, how will the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) affect the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the one organization that provided stability and security during the 46-year Cold War following World War II? When you add in current tensions and squabbles between the United States and several European countries over the U.S. decision to go to war with Iraq in March of 2003, the state of affairs between the continents remains cordial at best. Many have gone so far to characterize relations as a “Fortress Europe” verses “Fortress America.”⁴ This may be extreme, but there is certainly some truth to the assertion.

One area in particular that has been affected by this stand-off, and one very often overlooked, is in the arena of transatlantic armaments cooperation. For years, both sides of the Atlantic have struggled to improve the situation by promoting efficiencies through worthwhile cooperative armaments initiatives. Yet after further investigation, it appears that Europe and the United States are on separate paths regarding armaments cooperation. “In spite of many good reasons for better transatlantic cooperation and numerous initiatives to achieve that objective, the record is rather poor.”⁵ However, two things are certain. First, the gap between the United States and European military capabilities continues to grow, undermining both NATO and the European allies’ ability to undertake multinational and “out-of-area” joint operations outside of the NATO construct.⁶ These capability gaps are primarily focused in the areas of logistics, force protection, air/sea transport, combat search and rescue, precision weapons, command and control, surveillance, intelligence, and reconnaissance.⁷ Secondly, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 resulted in a much more proactive - some would say unilateralist - approach by the United States to defend itself. U.S. President George W. Bush’s “coalitions of
the willing” speech following 9/11 did not bode well for the future of an alliance devoid of the capability required to counter threats that emanate outside of Europe.\(^5\) What is needed is a better understanding between NATO allies on the direction the alliance, as well as transatlantic armaments cooperation, should head in the future.

So where do we go from here? More specifically, why is greater armaments cooperation between the United States and Europe more or less important? Is it really worth the effort? This paper will attempt to answer these and other questions by sorting through the various frameworks established by the allies regarding transatlantic armaments cooperation. It will do so by first examining the current European perspective regarding armaments cooperation, followed by the view from the United States. Finally, it will focus on the effects that the current state of armaments cooperation is having on NATO and European security as a whole. Ultimately, this paper will propose several beneficial solutions to help strengthen transatlantic ties in future armaments cooperation.

**A CHANGING EUROPE**

Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus: They agree on little and understand one another less and less.\(^6\)

---Robert Kagan
Of Power and Paradise 2003

Throughout its history, the continent of Europe has consistently experienced periods of crisis and upheaval. Wars have dotted the European landscape like trees in a forest. World Wars I and II wreaked tremendous devastation in terms of lives and property.\(^10\) Recent European history, specifically the period from 1945 to the present, has had its share of challenges, mostly resulting from efforts to counter the “expansionist policies and methods of the USSR.”\(^11\) The U.S.-sponsored Marshall Plan (1948-51) provided recovery aid for all countries of Europe, however, the USSR and those Eastern European countries under the hand of Soviet domination, “refused to take part.”\(^12\) In 1949, an alliance of Western European nations was established, along with the United States, Canada and Iceland, to counter the growing communist threat posed by the USSR and its “Warsaw Pact” satellite nations. During the nearly five decades of the Cold War, NATO served as the “rock of stability” for the free and democratic states of Western Europe. The Europeans, in turn, formed the Western European Union (WEU) consisting of France, Germany, Spain, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Portugal, and the United Kingdom as a further expression of Europe’s intention to provide for its own defense.\(^13\) However, NATO’s further usefulness was questioned when the
Iron Curtain dividing Western and Eastern Europe, was torn down in 1989. Soon after these momentous events, the European Union was established. It is without doubt that the security and stability fostered by NATO during the previous decades set the conditions for this integration.

A NEW UNION

The European Union officially became reality following the signing of the “Treaty on European Union,” also known as the Maastricht Treaty, in 1992. Its intent was to “unite” the countries of Europe into one entity with a central government, yet allowing its nation-states to retain their own identities and traditions. The EU faces many challenges, including ratification of a constitution, acceptance and approval of new members, the establishment of an economic policy and one common currency, confronting differences in language and culture, and perhaps most importantly, the defining of its own foreign and security policies. The EU’s foundation rests upon three “pillars.” The first is a single market based upon the passage of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1985 which integrated the European commercial market. The second pillar is cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs, while a final pillar is a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) which is the most applicable to the topic and will be discussed later in this paper.

The challenges facing the EU are certainly daunting, however, “there is a tendency to overlook and underestimate the scale of the almost revolutionary changes which the old continent has undergone since the end of the Cold War.” The world is certainly watching how the EU confronts these challenges, none more so than the United States, which has a definite stake in Europe’s security. Not only is the EU America’s largest trading partner, but “the defense of North America remains inextricably tied to the defense of Europe.” There are, and have been for quite some time, glaring deficiencies between the defense budgets of the United States and of our European allies, which may justify why Americans have always perceived that Europeans were not pulling their weight when it came to the defense of their continent. This fact may not appear significant, except when you consider that NATO has now assumed missions outside of its territory, and is now deliberating whether to send NATO troops to support ongoing efforts in Iraq. Beside valid concerns of outdated equipment and capabilities, a more important concern is the inability of European forces to be integrated and interoperable with United States and other coalition forces. Taken as a whole, this situation could present serious challenges to future multilateral efforts. A focused and robust armaments cooperation effort must remain an important priority for both sides of the Atlantic.
A NEW THREAT

The threat that NATO spent decades preparing to confront no longer exists. The new threat, religious in nature and global in its reach, has the potential to affect all of mankind. "A new totalitarianism, Islamic terrorism and its inhumane Jihad ideology, pose a threat to peace and stability, both regionally and globally."20 The horrific events of September 11, 2001 in the United States brought to the forefront the unpredictable and destructive realities of transnational terrorism, prosecuted by, who many are now calling, "clandestine transnational actors."21 Terrorists offer a new challenge “because they are willing to sacrifice themselves and their own civilian populations, as well as hostile civilian populations, to achieve their objectives.”22 We can only “successfully counter these new threats if the U.S., Canada and the EU draw up a long-term plan to tackle this strategic task together, on the basis of their common values, interests and the successful transatlantic tradition of the last few decades.”23 Transnational terrorism is recognized by allies on both sides of the Atlantic as a threat that can be defeated only if nations work together.24 Therefore, NATO allies can no longer be content with just talking about greater cooperation. Efforts must be made towards immediately achieving tangible results.

TRANSATLANTIC ARMAMENTS COOPERATION: A BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Since the beginning of the Cold War and NATO’s inception, the United States and Europe have cooperated in varying degrees regarding armaments. Cooperation has ranged from "simple licensing agreements of U.S. systems to Western Europe in the 1950’s and 1960’s to co-production arrangements in the 1970’s, followed by government-to-government joint development programs in the 1980’s and 1990’s."25 However, from the very beginning, the United States has dominated the flow of armaments across the Atlantic, and profited greatly “from selling sophisticated equipment to NATO countries without sharing much work or technology.”26 This one-way flow of arms can initially be attributed to the fact that European countries were focused on re-establishing their sovereignty, and their defense industries, following World War II. In the 1950’s, “Western European countries attempted to establish numerous organizations to centralize procurement and correct the one-way flow of arms from the United States to Europe.”27 During the decades prior to the EU’s establishment, Europeans further attempted to stand up various organizations to centralize armaments development and procurement, but nearly all failed in their stated purpose because they lacked the authority to transcend national armaments policies and industries.28 This, in part, led to Europe’s armament sector remaining “fragmented into national markets, with costly duplication in all armaments-related areas.”29 Frustratingly, Europe still has yet to move beyond the status quo with respect
to its armaments policies. If the allies are to continue improving their relationship regarding armaments cooperation, Europe must move away from its nationalistic tendencies.

**ARMAMENTS COOPERATION: THE EUROPEAN CONSTRUCT**

Our vision is clear. Europe must prepare to do more – to pull its weight. And it must develop capabilities in ways that support action in NATO as well as under European Union leadership. There is an expectation on both sides of the Atlantic that we will make real progress...we cannot afford to fail.³⁰

—Geoffery Hoon, British Prime Minister, April 2000

Before attempting to begin understanding the current armaments cooperation situation between the United States and Europe, one must first dissect the intricate web of national politics, treaties, and various frameworks which the Europeans have constructed for themselves in this area. The idea of creating an agency to deal solely with armaments has been around for quite some time. However, too many organizations and too little power apparently plagued the armaments organizations established under the old WEU and now the EU.³¹ The Maastricht Treat of 1992 establishing the EU includes annexes for the provisions of just such an agency. Even more recently, special provisions for a common armaments agency have been spelled “out in full in the draft constitutional treaty.”³² One major impediment, however, has been that armaments have “traditionally been a national domain” which has made it extremely difficult to harmonize European efforts to consolidate.³³ What permits national market fragmentation is an article from the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) in 1957. Article 296 states the following:

1. The provisions of this Treaty shall not preclude the application of the following rules:

   (a) no Member State shall be obliged to supply information the disclosure of which it considers contrary to the essential interests of its security;

   (b) any Member State may take such measures as it considers necessary for the protection of essential interests of its security which are connected with the production of or the trade in arms, munitions and war material; such measures shall not adversely affect the conditions of competition in the common market regarding products which are not intended for specifically military purposes.

2. The Council may, acting unanimously on the proposal from the Commission, make changes to the list, which it drew up on April 1958, of the products to which the provisions of paragraph 1 b) apply.³⁴
It is apparent that some countries of Europe continue to reference this article as justification for maintaining their own separate armaments industries and procurement policies.\textsuperscript{35} In yet another attempt to consolidate its efforts, the Western European Armaments Organisation (WEAO) was established in 1996 to “increase joint research and cooperation in defense armaments,” but with limited power to award contracts, the WEAO was considered institutionally weak.\textsuperscript{36} Despite the formation of the WEAO, there still emerged a need to have an empowered organization to deal with the ever-increasing number of joint projects and transnational companies.\textsuperscript{37} As a result, France and Germany took it upon themselves to create the Organisation Conjointe de Cooperation en Matiere d’Armement (OCCAR) in 1996 as “a totally separate agency to manage joint contracts.”\textsuperscript{38} OCCAR’s selling point was that it “did not threaten any country’s sovereignty over military issues, but it could pressure member states to harmonize policy and procurement procedures in order to rationalize project management.”\textsuperscript{39} Additionally, the so-called Letter of Intent (LOI) was signed in 1998 by France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom to address “areas crucial for mergers and transnational defense cooperation, including security of supply, exports, research and development, security of information, harmonization of military requirements, and intellectual property.”\textsuperscript{40} What made the LOI attractive was that now European companies “would not have to apply for licenses to transfer technical data and defense items among the participating countries, and there would be predefined export destinations for each program.”\textsuperscript{41} The LOI was soon replaced by the new “Framework Agreement” in July of 2000 which further built upon the tenets of the LOI.\textsuperscript{42}

**EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY**

As the EU continues to expand and mature, it is logical that it would want to protect and defend its interests. The EU Treaty provided for a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) to do just that. The defense element of the CFSP is the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and was further defined at the EU’s Cologne Summit in June of 1999. The European Council declaration stated:

In pursuit of our Common Foreign and Security Policy Objectives and the progressive framing of a common defense policy, we are convinced that the Council should have the ability to take decisions on the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks defined in the Treaty on the European Union, the “Petersberg Tasks.” To this end the Union must have capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO.\textsuperscript{43}
The ESDP was different from any previous EU defense policy in that it was now “both separable and independent of NATO forces.” This was truly a bold step for the EU in exerting its presence on the world stage. The ESDP enhances the effectiveness of the CFSP by enabling the EU to independently perform such missions as humanitarian relief, peacekeeping tasks, as well as employment of combat forces in crisis management situations. The EU’s Helsinki Summit, held in December of 1999, established a “Headline goal” for EU member states in terms of their military capabilities for crisis management operations by laying the groundwork for a rapid reaction force (RRF) made up of a 50,000-60,000-strong army. As a step toward putting a “backbone” in the ESDP, the creation of this RRF was not, however, to imply the creation of European army to duplicate the structure of NATO.

The rapid reaction force was once again the focus of discussion at an EU non-sanctioned “mini-summit” held in Brussels on April 30, 2003. Hosted by French President Jacques Chirac, the summit also included Chancellor Gerhard Schroder of Germany, Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt of Belgium, and Premier Jean-Claude Juncker of Luxembourg. Their purpose was to discuss efforts toward establishing a European defense force apart from NATO. The timing of the conference, however, was questionable as the United States was one month into a war with Iraq to enforce UN resolutions and destroy WMD. The group proposed that this force should have its own headquarters, located in Brussels, with an operational planning capability separate and distinct from NATO. Under pressure from the UK, “headquarters” was clarified later to mean the creation of a “planning cell” within NATO’s military headquarters.

EUROPEAN EFFORTS TO IMPROVE COOPERATION

Despite nationalistic tendencies toward armaments procurement and production, Europe is continuing to make progress in light of past failures to consolidate efforts. In addition to harmonization efforts by the EU, European industry continues to make strides in developing various arrangements and partnerships to reduce duplication of effort. “Some European defense companies are initiating cross-border mergers that are not tied to government cooperative programs.” Examples of such mergers include: the Franco-German-Spanish company, European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS) and its very successful AIRBUS Consortium; the French company THALES and its acquisition of the UK Company RASCAL; and British Aerospace (BAE) and its acquisition of the Italian company, GEC Marconi. These three constitute Europe’s “big three” defense companies. Some companies, such as BAE and its North American division, have even crossed the Atlantic to further their chances of breaking into the American defense market. While the “British see
American partnership as the answer, the French and Germans inevitably are inclined to consolidate and build a fortress Europe to match fortress America. Access to the United States has become a major strategic goal for all big industrial players in Europe. By the proactive nature of its defense industry, Europe appears to be moving in the right direction toward improving its armaments procurement strategies. Still, more can be done.

ARMAMENTS COOPERATION: THE UNITED STATES PERSPECTIVE

Perhaps at no other time in its 228-year existence has the United States of America possessed so much power - - diplomatic, economic, informational, and military. Since the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, America, arguably has become the sole hegemon on the planet. Still, in the wake of 9/11, the United States has boldly taken the lead in prosecuting a global war on terrorism (GWOT) and has encouraged the rest of the world to do the same. As a result of its assumed leadership role, the United States continues to allocate a large portion of its annual budget towards defense. The United States has encouraged its NATO allies for decades to increase their defense budgets and improve their military capabilities, but to no avail. That said, what is tremendously worrisome is that the growing gap between U.S. and European military capabilities continues to get worse. In fact, the United States spends nearly two times more on defense (%GDP) than all EU members combined. To the contrary, and thanks to America’s robust and continuing contribution to NATO, Allied governments are under no pressure to increase defense spending to the NATO agreed standard of 2% of GDP, despite continued coaxing by America.

RECENT U.S. EFFORTS TO IMPROVE COOPERATION

From its perspective, the United States feels comfortable that it has made tremendous strides in its efforts to improve its transatlantic relationship regarding armaments cooperation. To its credit, the U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO) in its October 1997 report entitled Defense Trade: European Initiatives to Integrate the Defense Market supports American armaments progress. The report stated:

The U.S. Government has taken several steps over the past few years to improve defense trade and transatlantic cooperation, but some observers point to practical and cultural impediments that affect U.S.-European cooperation on major weapon programs.

U.S. policy towards armaments is influenced by the fact that because of “its enormous financial resources, defense-industrial assets and military capabilities,” America is not dependent upon armaments cooperation with Europe, or with anyone else for that matter.
Despite this observation, America realizes the importance of maintaining a robust armaments cooperation policy. Thus, it has established many national-level agencies and organizations empowered to improve and nurture armaments dialogue between the Atlantic partners. One such organization is the International Cooperation Directorate located in the Office of the U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. Within this office is the Directorate of Armaments Cooperation Atlantic whose stated purpose is:

To advance U.S. National Security Objectives - military, economic, technical and political, through promotion of technical and industrial cooperation in the development and production of defense armaments.\(^{59}\)

The United States has hosted many formal and informal meetings over the years to foster armaments dialogue. These include European and Transatlantic Armaments Cooperation Symposia, as well as various NATO workshops devoted to the subject.\(^{60}\) Despite the current missteps on the European side of the Atlantic, all indications are that America is fully committed to supporting transatlantic armaments cooperation.

**WHAT ABOUT NATO?**

NATO is the key institution of the transatlantic alliance.\(^{61}\)

—Review of International Affairs, 2003

As previously mentioned, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was established as a direct counter to the threat posed by the USSR and its Warsaw Pact. The North Atlantic Treaty was officially signed on February 1, 1949 by twelve countries. This grouping included those democratic nations of Western Europe, as well as the United States, Canada, and Iceland.\(^{62}\) The Alliance’s essential purpose was to provide protection, a collective defense, against an attack on Western Europe by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. NATO established its military headquarters, known as Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), in Mons, Belgium. The position of Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) has always been an American general officer.\(^{63}\) This is mainly in recognition that the United States is the major contributor to NATO’s welfare in terms of financial and military support. However, NATO’s Deputy SACEUR is a European flag officer who in the event of a major crisis, is the primary choice to serve as either the “Operation Commander or “Strategic Coordinator” for an EU-led operation.\(^{64}\)

NATO’s greatest accomplishment, of course, has been its effectiveness as a deterrent against communist aggression in Western Europe. In the age of nuclear weapons, this was no small task. As this threat waned, the alliance was presented with new security challenges.
During the last ten years, NATO has provided military forces outside its borders, to include Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1996 and Kosovo in 1999. The reality, as seen with the recent missions to Bosnia and Kosovo, is that the multinational forces of the alliance will increasingly be deployed outside of NATO territory, perhaps for years at a time. Despite its Cold War successes and recent deployments to the Balkans, NATO remains at a crossroads concerning its utility in the modern world.

NATO'S TRANSFORMATION

[NATO]...must understand the likely threats to the security of its members, decide on the capabilities needed to address those threats, and develop and field those capabilities through a combination of national and Alliance-wide efforts.66

—Strengthening Transatlantic Security, December 2000

Aside from the extraordinary measures taken by the EU, no other organization in the transatlantic relationship has worked harder to adapt itself to the new security environment than NATO. To expand its sphere of influence, it has taken gallant steps to intensify its cooperation within Europe through organizations such as the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative, the NATO-Russian Permanent Joint Council, the NATO-Ukraine Commission, and the Mediterranean Dialogue, all established with the intent of “facilitating transparency and creating greater confidence between NATO and its partners.”67

NATO continues to enlarge itself by offering membership to those countries that can meet NATO’s expectations. The Membership Action Plan (MAP) was launched in April of 1999 “to assist those countries which wish to join the alliance in their preparations by providing advice, assistance and practical support on all aspects of NATO membership.”68

NATO is also adapting itself in other ways. Since the early 1990’s, NATO has worked diligently to transform itself into an alliance equipped to handle the security challenges expected in the 21st century, despite reductions in its available forces since the end of the Cold War.69

Motivated by the realities of the post-9/11 world, NATO acknowledged that it must change internally to meet the needs of this new security environment by streamlining its command structures. The recent establishment of Joint Task Force (JTF) headquarters, with their embedded Combined and Joint Task Force Headquarters (CJTF HQ) command and control capability, will provide NATO a flexible means to respond quickly to new challenges out of area. NATO response forces will be apportioned based on a graduated readiness system from the Very High Readiness Force (VHRF) deployable within days, to High Readiness Forces (HRF) available within 90 days, and eventually to the Forces at Lower Readiness (FLR) available
Additionally, NATO has established a new command, Allied Command Transformation (ACT), to focus on the longer-term vision of the force. ACT, formerly Supreme Allied Command, Atlantic, (SACLANT) is “NATO’s means of synchronizing efforts across national programs and forces to create a more effective alliance fighting team.” Ensuring greater transparency with the EU is another area of extreme importance to NATO. This includes providing the EU with access to NATO’s operational planning capabilities and C2 for potential EU-led operations should the alliance, as a whole, choose not to participate in a specific mission.

Perhaps NATO’s crowning transformation achievement has been the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC). It resulted from discussions during NATO’s Prague Summit in November of 2002. The PCC is NATO’s program to concentrate member spending on near-term capability improvements. The overall goal of this program is to encourage allies, old and new, to “focus their defense spending on the most critical combat shortfalls identified by NATO military authorities.” Member heads of state made firm commitments to improve targeted capabilities in eight fields. The eight focused fields are: Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense; Intelligence, Surveillance and Target Acquisition; Air-to-Ground Surveillance; Command, Control and Communications; Combat Effectiveness, including Precision-Guided Munitions and Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses; Strategic Air and Lift, Air-to-Air Refueling; and Deployable Combat Support and Combat Service Support Units.

A secondary goal of the program is to allow all members to provide their specialized “niche” capabilities. The PCC’s overall objective is to avoid costly and unnecessary duplication of effort by NATO members regarding acquisition of armaments.

NATO also has an organization in its structure specifically dedicated to armaments-related matters. The Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) meets regularly to consider all aspects of the development and procurement of equipment for NATO forces. In 1993, NATO’s North Atlantic Council (NAC) directed the work of the CNAD towards the following key areas:

- Harmonization of military requirements on an Alliance-wide basis;
- Promotion of essential battlefield interoperability;
- Pursuit of cooperative opportunities identified by the CNAD and the promotion of improved transatlantic cooperation;
- The development of critical defense technologies, including expanded technology sharing.
The CNAD also has component sub-groups specifically devoted to addressing issues relating to land, sea, and air armaments. NATO’s Research and Technology Board, as well as the NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG), provide the CNAD with advice and assistance regarding matters of research and technology and industry. Additionally, CNAD Partnership Groups are “active in fields such as defense procurement policy and acquisition practices, codification, quality assurance, test, and safety criteria for ammunition, and material standardization.” Overall, it would appear that the NATO framework is a tried and true mechanism for improving armaments dialogue and cooperation.

ARMAMENTS COOPERATION: THE ROAD AHEAD

Perspective comes also comes from acknowledging that a spectrum of views exists on both sides of the Atlantic. Our attention is drawn to extreme positions. We often fail to notice the overlaps, the middle ground.77

—Javier Solano, EU High Commissioner for Common Foreign and Security Policy

Evidence suggests the modest trend in the defense spending habits of European nations will not end anytime soon, therefore, the United States must continue to strengthen the systems and processes already in place to ensure better armaments cooperation between the allies. As the defense capabilities gap continues to grow, the battlefield performance potential of NATO forces will continue to degrade, as well. Mismatched defense capabilities, but more importantly, the problems associated with the inability to operate effectively with other member nation forces, will create dangerous and untenable conditions for coalition warfare. NATO’s recent deployments and out-of-area operations during the latter half of the1990’s highlighted problems that will continue to exist if immediate steps are not taken to halt this dangerous downward trend in NATO defense capabilities. It is therefore imperative that the United States, specifically the Department of Defense, continue to dialogue with European militaries and defense industries to avoid the “Fortress Europe” and “Fortress America” mentality.

The Europeans have a poor track record regarding armaments cooperation when done on a national or bilateral basis, as opposed to when accomplished within a multilateral context. They appear to have a much better track record when cooperation occurs when NATO is involved. Therefore, NATO appears to be the logical choice to serve as a central “clearing house” for matters relating to armaments cooperation between the allies. NATO’s organizational structure provides for deliberate and crisis action planning for the alliance, along with a well-established capabilities and requirements generation process. The CNAD and other
armaments-related organizations provide a “skeleton” apparatus within the NATO structure capable of supporting such a “clearing house.”

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are intended to improve the current state of affairs regarding transatlantic armaments cooperation:

EUROPEAN UNION

- Implement Common Foreign and Security Policy in its entirety.
- Consider the establishment of an EU-sanctioned Armaments, Research, and Capabilities Agency (ARCA) and European Defense Equipment Market (EDEM) as suggested by Burkard Schmitt of the EU’s Institute for Security Studies.78
- European industries should continue to seek U.S. defense contracts, perhaps “through teaming arrangements with U.S. companies.”79
- Continue armaments-related dialogue with all concerned parties, especially the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), NATO, and European Industry.
- Remain actively engaged in NATO’s military planning processes.

UNITED STATES

- Establish permanent and formal relations between the DoD and the EU, perhaps through the office of International Cooperation within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.
- Reform/ease restrictions on current export control processes regarding technology transfer across the Atlantic.
- Set favorable conditions for increased participation by European industry in the DoD acquisition process (i.e. bidding for government contracts, etc.).
- Encourage mergers between American and European defense industries.
- Continue to encourage transatlantic armaments dialogue through frequent armaments-related workshops and symposia.
- Under the auspices of the Director, International Cooperation (USD, ATL), form a “Blue Ribbon” panel of our nation’s, as well as Europe’s, top defense, academic, and industry professionals in order to explore renewed options towards a better transatlantic armaments cooperation policy.
NATO

- Continue armaments-related dialogue with all concerned parties, especially the EU and the U.S. DoD.
- Continue transformation efforts to meet the challenges of the evolving security environment.
- Continue to encourage members to contribute niche capabilities to the overall alliance force structure.
- Continue to encourage the initiatives of the EU’s ESDP.
- Continue to support the spirit and specifics of the “Berlin Plus” Agreement.\textsuperscript{80}

CONCLUSIONS

I seem to recall that it was only in the arms of Venus that Mars found peace. And was their beautiful daughter not the Goddess Harmonia?\textsuperscript{81}

—Javier Solana, EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy

Since the fall of the Iron Curtain and the end of the Cold War, Europe has experienced a breathtaking period of change. The establishment of the European Union and the challenges that face this newly formed confederation will most certainly keep the EU Council of Ministers and Parliament busy, none more so than in the arena of defense and security of the European continent. The EU, in conjunction with the NATO, must strive for even greater coordination to improve and modernize European forces capable of meeting the full range of military tasks. To accomplish this, the EU must improve its capabilities regarding defense of the European continent and transatlantic armaments cooperation. NATO’s Berlin Plus and PCC Initiatives stemming from the 2002 Prague Summit signal Allied willingness to work with the EU to coordinate forces requirements within established procedures. However, while past treaty and summit agreements are truly laudable, it often appears that these statements are nothing more than political pronouncements. What is lacking is a modernized and sustainable force, expeditionary in nature, capable of carrying out tasks and missions that Europe, unilaterally or multilaterally, will be asked to execute. Political statements must be backed up by action in terms of greater, and wiser, defense spending by the Europeans. It is obvious that this will not occur until the Europeans admit to the fact that their security, nearly fifteen years after the end of the Cold War, still remains in the hands of the United States. Immediate steps to rectify the situation are needed. Furthermore, they cannot consider themselves a “union” until they act and function as such. Right now, that doesn’t appear to be happening. Continued problems
with ratification of the EU Constitution, along with lingering nationalistic tendencies toward defense, prevent them from taking advantage of this tremendous opportunity which stands before them. The EU desires to be a dominant actor on the world stage, however, this will not occur until their individual national defense policies are unified towards a common purpose that is fully coordinated with NATO.

The United States is also not without its faults in the transatlantic relationship. It does not need Europe to maintain a world-class military. America can certainly procure and maintain its own state-of-the-art weaponry within its own borders. But, it is not in its best interest to do so. The United States needs Europe just as much as Europe needs the United States. For that reason alone, America must continue playing the “big brother” role as it has in the past while its European partners sort out their many issues. It must continue the dialogue, backed with meaningful and visible actions toward improvement. Actions such as greater relations with the EU, the easing of export control restrictions, and the setting up favorable conditions for greater participation of the European defense industry in DoD acquisition processes will go a long way in encouraging greater armaments cooperation.

Despite the recent rhetoric that has passed across the Atlantic, the relationship between the United States and its European allies is worth salvaging. They have shared too much history together to let it all go by the wayside. There must be room for disagreements every now and again, and disagreement does not equal disrespect. Likewise, efforts to improve the current situation in the area of armaments cooperation can only help bolster this relationship, while at the same time improving NATO’s military capabilities. However, it will require constant nurturing by key government leaders on both sides of the Atlantic. “America and Europe can master the challenges of the 21st Century, but only if they act together.” The “Fortress Europe” and “Fortress America” mentality cannot, and must not, continue to perpetuate.
ENDNOTES


4 The “fortress” connotations have become very popular with authors and journalists when characterizing tensions caused by a perceived stand-off between the United States and Europe following the U.S. unilateral decision to go to war with Iraq in March of 2003. Many European countries, including some NATO allies, did not support this decision and were very vocal in their opposition to United States policy.


6 Deutch, Kanter, and Scowcroft, 55.


8 Speech delivered by U.S. President George W. Bush to a Joint Session of Congress following the devastating terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States.


Sir Winston Churchill, former British Prime Minister, was the first to use the phrase “Iron Curtain” to describe the Soviet domination that was taking place in eastern Europe following the Second World War. He used the phrase in a speech as leader of the Opposition Party in the House of Commons following the Potsdam Conference in 1945. He used the phrase again several months later in 1946 during his speech in Fulton, Missouri. See Geoffrey Grigson and Charles Harvard Gibbs-Smith, eds., Ideas: A Volume of Ideas, Notions, and Emotions, Clear and Confused, Which Have Moved the Minds of Men (New York: Hawthorn Books, Inc., 1957), 212-213.


Ibid., 21.


Fischer, 20.


Fischer, 21.


Deutch, 55.
27 Zakheim, 4.
28 Ibid., 15.
33 Ibid., 9.
35 Zakheim, 18
36 Ibid., 15.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid. OCCAR was a positive step in European armaments policy since it established an authority to manage procurements. It also provided needed management structure to international programs.
39 Ibid., 16.
41 Ibid.
43 Ibid., 22.
44 Ibid.
45 Erich Reiter, “The Strategic Role of the EU,” *Review of International Affairs* 54 (July-September 2003): 42. These tasks are collectively known as the “Petersburg Tasks” and were drafted in the EU’s Amsterdam Treaty of 1997.
47Ibid.


55Deutch, 55.


57General Accounting Office, 3.


61Fischer, 23.


64As the EU solidifies exerts its influence in the region and the world, there will certainly be times when the Europeans may want to employ military force outside the construct of NATO. It is with this scenario that the Deputy SACEUR, the highest ranking European in NATO, is given the additional responsibility for such EU-led operations.

65Leon Fuerth, “Alliances for the Next Generation,” The Washington Post (23 August 2002): 27 [database on-line]; available from ProQuest; accessed 7 September 2003. See also NATO Handbook, 48, for a discussion of NATO’s recent participation in operations outside its territory. These include the implementation of the multinational Implementation force (IFOR) and the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia-Hercegovina in 1995 and 1996, respectively. NATO also contributed to the Kosovo Force (KFOR). In 1999.


67NATO Handbook, 47.

68Ibid., 65.

69Ibid., 50. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO forces have been reduced substantially. For example, ground forces have been cut by 35%, naval vessels have been reduced by 30%, and air force combat squadrons have been reduced by 40%.


75Ibid., 181-182.
The “Berlin Plus” Agreement, developed during a joint meeting of the EU and NATO in Madrid, Spain in June of 2003, provides for access, by the EU, of NATO’s collective capabilities and assets for operations led by the EU. It was further understood by all parties that the EU would then return the assets to NATO upon completion of said operation. See Department of State, “Joint Press Statement by the NATO Secretary General and the EU Presidency,” NATO Press Release, 4 December 2003; available from http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/prsrl/2003/26890.htm; Internet; accessed 18 March 2003.


Fischer, 24.
### GLOSSARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACT</td>
<td>Allied Command Transformation (NATO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARCA</td>
<td>Armaments, Research, and Capabilities Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAE</td>
<td>British Aerospace</td>
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<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>Command and Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJTF</td>
<td>Combined Joint Task Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNAD</td>
<td>Committee of National Armaments Directors (NATO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSFP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy (EU)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSIS</td>
<td>Center for Strategic and International Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSMC</td>
<td>Defense Systems Management College</td>
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<tr>
<td>EADS</td>
<td>European Aeronautic, Defense and Space Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAPC</td>
<td>Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
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<td>EDEM</td>
<td>European Defense Equipment Market</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and defense Policy (EU)</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FLR</td>
<td>Forces at Lower Readiness (NATO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAO</td>
<td>Government Accounting Office (US)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GWOT</td>
<td>Global War on Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRF</td>
<td>High Readiness Forces (NATO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFOR</td>
<td>Implementation Force (Bosnia-Herzegovina)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF HQ</td>
<td>Joint Task Force Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOI</td>
<td>Letter of Intent</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAP</td>
<td>Membership Action Plan (NATO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Council (NATO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIAG</td>
<td>NATO Industrial Advisory Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCCAR</td>
<td>Organisation Conjointe de Cooperation en Matiere d’Arment (Organization for Joint Armaments Cooperation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCC</td>
<td>Prague Capabilities Commitment</td>
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<tr>
<td>PIP</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace (NATO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander, Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACLANT</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEA</td>
<td>Single European Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>SFOR</td>
<td>Stabilization Force (Bosnia-Herzegovina)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHAPE</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>TDC</td>
<td>Transnational Defense Companies</td>
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<tr>
<td>TEC</td>
<td>Treaty European Community</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>USD, ALT</td>
<td>Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<tr>
<td>VHRF</td>
<td>Very High Readiness Forces (NATO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>WEAO</td>
<td>Western European Armaments Organization</td>
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<td>WEU</td>
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BIBLIOGRAPHY


