Pushing Out the Borders – Integrating Homeland Security

Objectives in Theater Security Cooperation Plans

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Homeland security objectives should be included in Combatant Commander Theater Security Cooperation Plans. This will ensure full integration of strategic national objectives and optimize the use of all forms of national power to combat the modern terrorist threat.

PUSHING OUT THE BORDERS - INTEGRATING HOMELAND SECURITY
OBJECTIVES IN THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION PLANS

by

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily
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Signature: ______________________

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Introduction

Background: The 11 September 2001 terror attacks on the United States and the ensuing Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) were watershed events in the arena of homeland security and national defense. The possibility of terrorist attacks against the homeland had long been discussed in security circles, and had been publicly highlighted by the 1999 Hart-Rudman Commission on National Security in the 21st Century.¹ However, most people failed to comprehend the potential magnitude and ramifications of such attacks and assumed the threat could be dealt with through existing law enforcement and security mechanisms. Unfortunately, the method of attack, scale of destruction and far reaching economic impacts were worse than anyone had feared, proving that the United States homeland was no longer protected by its geographic separation from the trouble spots of the world. As details on the attacks became clear, it was evident that not only was the United States homeland vulnerable to terrorism, but that Al Qaeda had actually used the very openness of America's society and economy to enable the attacks.²

It quickly became evident that new structures and strategies would be required to integrate all forms of national power to eliminate seams in the nation's defenses and effectively combat the terrorist threat. To this end, the Office of Homeland Security was established within the White House in October 2001, followed by the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in January 2003. Additionally, the first

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National Strategy for Homeland Security was published in July 2002, identifying the critical mission areas and strategic foundations for ensuring homeland security\(^3\).

While the National Strategy for Homeland Security provides a sound and valid starting point for defending against the terrorist threat, it almost entirely focuses on domestic security issues internal to the United States. There is no question that we must improve our internal defenses as a key component of homeland security, but the national homeland security strategy must go further. In support of a preemptive national security policy it must also look outward, ensuring full integration of domestic and international efforts in order to close gaps in our homeland defense, thereby engaging and defeating terrorist threats before they arrive on our shores. In adopting such an integrated defense-in-depth concept, the homeland security strategy must make optimal use of all elements of national power, including diplomacy, information, military and economic tools, to thwart the terrorist threat to the United States.

While many avenues should be explored to achieve this integrated defense-in-depth for homeland security, one of the most effective approaches would be to employ a tool that already exists - the Combatant Commander's Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP).\(^4\) The TSCP provides an existing structure that seeks to shape the international environment through active engagement in the key regions of the world, leveraging all

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\(^4\) The term Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP) was previously known as the Theater Engagement Plan (TEP). This shift in terminology occurred over the past three years, concurrent with the change in Presidential administrations. Many of the documents cited in this work were published prior to the change and still use the old terms. This paper will use the new terminology to the maximum extent possible, but quotes and other citations to previous works may include the old terms, which should be considered synonymous.
elements of national power to improve relations with foreign governments and defeat emerging threats at the earliest opportunity.

*Thesis:* In order to realize a seamless homeland security strategy, it is imperative that the Department of Homeland Security and regional Combatant Commanders work together to integrate homeland security objectives into each Theater Security Cooperation plan. Only the full integration of domestic and international security objectives will guarantee that TSCPs address emerging GWOT priorities and ensure the optimal application of all forms of national power to engage and defeat security threats before they reach the United States.

*Theater-Strategic Relevance:* The integration of homeland security objectives into TSCPs is a major consideration for both the homeland security community and Combatant Commanders due to force employment and resource prioritization concerns. The inclusion of a wide variety of homeland security initiatives into TSCPs might continue to stretch an already thin force available to the Combatant Commanders, and would have to be carefully managed to avoid degrading other war-fighting missions. While additional TSCP activity comes with a price tag, it might also offer new avenues of funding for Combatant Commanders and potential remedies to long-standing TSCP funding problems, while raising national visibility and support for the mission overall. Given the national interests involved in winning the GWOT, a fundamental re-ordering of both TSCP priorities and national resource allocation to support homeland security initiatives must be considered.

This paper will demonstrate why homeland security objectives should be integrated into TSCPs by examining the underlying premises of the homeland security,
national security, counter terrorism and military strategies, with an emphasis on why they should all be mutually reinforcing in the face of daunting new security challenges. It will examine resource implications, and how full integration of homeland security objectives into TSCPs might improve the budget environment for Combatant Commander's security cooperation initiatives. Finally, the paper will review existing and potential areas of cooperation and recommend additional measures to improve integration efforts.

Analysis

The National Strategy for Homeland Security: The National Strategy for Homeland Security establishes priorities for the diverse set of agencies that comprise the government's newest department. It identifies six critical mission areas that include: Intelligence and warning, border and transportation security, domestic counter-terrorism, protecting critical infrastructures and key assets, defending against catastrophic threats, and emergency preparedness and response.5 This massive effort to reorganize existing branches of the federal government aims to better coordinate homeland security functions by consolidating forces to address these critical mission areas while leveraging four "foundations" for building a successful homeland defense.6 These include: Law, science and technology, information sharing and systems, and international cooperation.7 While the strategy recognizes the ubiquitous nature of the global economy and even calls for improved international cooperation, the overall focus of the strategy revolves around improving security systems, organizations and processes internal to the United States.

6 Ibid., x.
7 Ibid.
Re-capitalization of the Coast Guard, re-organizing the Federal Bureau of Investigation, implementing a threat warning system, reforming immigration services and increasing security at the borders are all laudable goals, but they are primarily defensive elements that cede the initiative to the terrorist enemy. In order to achieve effective homeland security the United States must continue to actively engage its enemies far away from American shores. This construct proved its worth during previous global conflicts when the United States sought to engage security threats overseas, rather than depend on insular geography to keep the threat at bay.

This need to push out our borders is even more compelling today, given the global reach of both states and transnational organizations, like Al Qaeda, pursuing asymmetric means to attack American interests. As the U.S. Department of State Coordinator for Counter-terrorism, Ambassador Michael Sheehan, puts it, "With the rapid changes occurring in the domestic and international environment, we must develop an 'active defense' outside the United States to guard against threats emanating from overseas and to protect American citizens...Without this expansion in scope, even the best domestic homeland defense...leaves the United States and its citizens vulnerable."8

While the National Strategy for Homeland Security provides a sound plan for domestic security issues, it does not take full advantage of opportunities to engage threats before they reach the United States. In order to rectify this shortcoming, the next iteration of the homeland security strategy must comport fully with the preemptive philosophy contained in other key national security policy documents, such as the


The National Security Strategy: The National Security Strategy recognizes the importance of applying all facets of national power in a concerted effort to disrupt the terrorist threat before it reaches the United States. The overarching premise of this strategy is vigorous and continuous action that seizes the initiative by, "...defending the United States, the American people, and our interests at home and abroad by identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches our borders."9 As the keystone document for developing national security plans, it clearly establishes the need for a proactive course of action. It is only logical that the National Strategy for Homeland Security should directly support the same preemptive concept and provide provisions for engaging the terrorist threat before it reaches the United States.

The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism: The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism further supports the need to fully integrate domestic and foreign actions to defeat the terrorist threat. It strongly emphasizes the global and transnational nature of modern terrorist organizations, and highlights the mechanisms that such organizations use to organize, fund and direct global operations. One key tenet of this strategy is the need for U.S. leadership and international cooperation to defeat the threat. "We will work with regional partners to implement a coordinated effort to squeeze, tighten, and isolate the terrorists. Once the regional campaign has localized the threat, we will help states develop the military, law enforcement, political, and financial tools...

necessary to finish the task."\textsuperscript{10} Again, since the National Strategy for Homeland Security and the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism are closely related; they should both provide complementary domestic and international plans to deal with the terrorist threat.

\textbf{The National Military Strategy:} While the National Security Strategy and the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism provide broad, high-level guidance for countering the terrorist threat, the National Military strategy provides more specific means for achieving U.S. security goals through military action. Additionally, it identifies shaping the international environment by military engagement as a key means of meeting national security goals. Peacetime military engagement includes a wide variety of military activities involving other nations and is intended to, "...demonstrate our commitment; improve interoperability, reassure allies, friends and coalition partners; promote transparency; convey democratic ideas; deter aggression; and help relieve sources of instability before they can become military crises."\textsuperscript{11}

In addition to its military utility, the engagement mission cuts across all other elements of national power and can be useful in developing and implementing the diplomatic, informational and economic elements of national strategy. This is particularly true for the security assistance and humanitarian assistance categories of TSCP, that focus on training internal security forces and building infrastructure. A good example is the State Partnership Program that coordinates interaction between U.S. Country Teams, various U.S. National Guard components, and foreign military establishments; seeking to promote social, economic and military exchanges between the


participants and facilitate the growth of democratic institutions and market economies.\textsuperscript{12} Focusing this type of program on the nexus of economic and security concerns by improving transportation infrastructure, training security forces and developing more robust immigration control programs, helps to improve local economies and ultimately reduce the appeal of terrorist organizations that feed on poverty and hopelessness.

In addition to building these very tangible aspects of national power, the effective use of TSCPs can help the United States to better understand the cultural differences that present challenges to American power overseas. The military-to-military contacts, education of foreign students and other cultural exchanges that are directly related to the TSCP can provide new insights into foreign perspectives and enhance U.S. capabilities to effectively meet the terrorist threat.

Although the National Military Strategy was last published in 1997 and antedates the GWOT, the concept of international shaping through engagement continues to provide a relevant strategy, as indicated in the most recent Quadrennial Defense Review and press releases discussing the upcoming revision of the National Military Strategy.\textsuperscript{13} Even though the threat has changed dramatically since 2001, engagement is an extremely flexible tool, one that been a keystone of peacetime military activity and national security for at least the last fifty years.\textsuperscript{14}

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Theater Security Cooperation Planning Guidance: In an effort to codify and standardize ongoing engagement activities, and reconcile these activities with the larger defense strategy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff promulgated the Theater Engagement Planning Manual (CJCSM 3113.1A) to provide direction and guidance to the Combatant Commanders responsible for engagement activities. This manual identifies the various types of engagement activities, including: Operations, combined exercises, security assistance, combined training, combined education, military contacts, and humanitarian assistance.¹⁵ It also outlines the policy, planning cycle and required reports that support engagement planning, and specifically provides for input from other government agencies that have a vested interest in the region, with the overall goal of supporting the full range of national security objectives, both inside and outside the Department of Defense.¹⁶ The specific guidance contained in this document provides an avenue for the Department of Homeland Security to integrate its objectives with the other elements of national power at the theater-strategic level.

Toward Full Integration: By examining these key strategy and planning documents it is clear that a full integration of domestic homeland security initiatives with international efforts to combat terrorism is both desirable and consistent with other elements of national policy. It also demonstrates that TSCPs can provide a mechanism to exercise all elements of national power and ensure that domestic and international efforts to improve homeland security are coordinated and complementary.


By including input from the Department of Homeland Security, the United States will ensure that the TSCP process continues to address the full range of national strategic security goals and eliminate seams and resource wasting overlaps between domestic and international homeland security objectives.

Moreover, integrating homeland security objectives into TSCPs also contributes to operational efficiency and effectiveness by making optimal use of time, space and force factors. Given the destructive potential of the modern terrorist threat it only makes sense to deal with the threat before it reaches the United States. A Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) hidden in a shipping container could do untold damage if it isn't intercepted until it enters a U.S. port or city. The high speed of global transportation mandates that we stop these threats before they depart their point of origin. Additionally, training foreign forces to deal with these threats acts as a force multiplier, alleviating some of the pressure on already over-worked military and security forces here in the United States.

*Counter-arguments:* Some would argue that the TSCP process already includes other government agencies concerned with homeland security, and that adding yet another source of input would only complicate matters and slow the process. While it is true that many government agencies are already involved in the TSCP process (including at least one element of DHS), there is no real integration between DHS components and DoD to ensure that critical homeland security objectives are being addressed in the most effective and efficient manner.17

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17 CAPT Stephen D. Austin, USCG <stephen.austin@js.pentagon.mil> "DHS Involvement in TSCP," [E-mail to CDR Sean Burke <sean.burke@nwc.navy.mil>] 22 Jan 2004.
Each organization that participates in the TSCP process is likely to consider only its own narrow perspective and not include the full range of activities that support a seamless homeland security strategy. For example, the Coast Guard might work with various Combatant Commanders to provide training to foreign navies regarding migrant interdiction operations at sea, but without input from the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration the TSCP might overlook efforts to improve host-nation border control measures that stem migration at the source. This could result in a seam in our defenses that allows improperly documented terrorists to reach the United States. An integrated approach would provide a broader spectrum of support and might prove more attractive to foreign governments with limited resources available for international security initiatives. This in turn could bolster coalition building and GWOT cooperation, in addition to enhancing U.S. homeland security. As one proponent of increased integration states, "For Theater Engagement Plans to be more effective, true coordination and integration is needed among all departments and agencies that are pursuing foreign policy in a given region."  

Another potential counter-argument against including homeland security objectives in the TSCP process is that it would stretch already overtaxed resources and degrade the warfighting mission of the armed forces. However, this argument fails to recognize the need to re-prioritize national resources to meet GWOT imperatives and ignores potential funding that DHS and Department of State (DOS) initiatives could provide to the Combatant Commander. One of the primary shortcomings that has been

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identified in the TSCP process is the lack of resources available to Combatant Commanders through the normal DoD resource planning mechanisms. Because the TSCP process was initially envisioned as a peacetime mission that made use of existing force assignments, there was no strong link to planning and resource decision making and no additional funding was provided for the engagement mission.\textsuperscript{19} Additionally, many elements of the engagement mission are funded by other government agencies that operate on disparate budget cycles, resulting in disrupted planning and uncertain funding streams for the TSCP.\textsuperscript{20}

Including homeland security objectives in the TSCP process could provide additional resources to the Combatant Commander by tapping into new funding streams made available for homeland security initiatives. For instance, in 2003 the Department of Homeland Security provided $1.28 Billion for port security programs.\textsuperscript{21} A portion of this funding could be re-directed to TSCP projects that enhance homeland security. In a broader sense, TSCP resources could also benefit from an enhanced visibility due to increased involvement in the homeland security mission. Some of the TSCP activities that may have been difficult to justify in the past would certainly take on a new importance if they could be linked more directly to protecting American lives and property at home.

The National Security Strategy closely links international stability and homeland security, and identifies special funding such as USAID’s $5 Billion Millennium


\textsuperscript{20} Ibid, 17-18.

Challenge Account to improve stability by enhancing economic growth. TSCPs could benefit from this or similarly unique funding sources by linking the TSCP mission to foreign development and improved global security. The Department of State has enjoyed good success working with regional Combatant Commanders in this realm by establishing a separate foreign operations line item in its budget that is specifically identified for engagement activity, thereby providing a stable source of funding for TSCP related projects. The Department of Homeland Security, and other government agencies that have a vested interest in the TSCP program, could pursue a similar budget strategy to help identify additional funding for engagement activities.

Success and Room to Grow: There are numerous examples of effective coordination and integration of homeland security objectives in TSCPs, but there are also areas where further integration could improve homeland security.

The counter-drug mission is one prime example where some integration has already occurred, with beneficial results for homeland security, particularly in the U.S. Southern Command and U.S. Pacific Command areas of responsibility. It is widely recognized that the profits from drug trafficking supports terrorist organizations, from the cocaine funded FARC in Columbia, to more recent heroin poppy production in Afghanistan that supports radical Islamist groups, including Al Qaeda. U.S. military and other government agencies working under the Joint Interagency Task Forces South and West (JIATF-S and JIATF-W) have demonstrated the positive results that can be

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achieved when military and other government security / law enforcement agencies work together under the direction of a regional Combatant Commander. TSCP related events such as training exercises between the U.S. Coast Guard and Caribbean nation's navies, patrol boat sales to Panama, and combined operations with U.S. Special Forces and the Colombian Army to destroy cocaine production facilities, have proven highly successful in stemming illegal narcotics trafficking. In the maritime component alone, one drug smuggling vessel is seized on the average of every five days, and in 2003 approximately 112,000 pounds of cocaine worth $3.5 Billion was seized.\textsuperscript{24} This directly translates into funds that are not available to narco-terrorists and subsequently improves the homeland security of the United States.

This same model could easily be transferred to other regions of the world where narcotics production fuels terrorist activity. Such efforts might include combined military operations with the forces of other countries to eradicate drug crops, providing training for naval forces on at-sea interdiction of drug trafficking vessels, coordination with international and local intelligence gathering organizations to better understand drug production, distribution and funding patterns, and military training of K9 teams to help locate drugs secreted in legitimate commercial cargoes. All of these security cooperation missions could be performed and funded under the auspices of the homeland security strategy.

WMD counter-proliferation provides another opportunity for improved integration of homeland security objectives in TSCPs. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) announced by President Bush in May, 2003 seeks to forge an international

\textsuperscript{24} Coast Guard, FY 2003 Report, Fiscal Year 2002 Performance Report, 2004 Budget in Brief, Washington, DC, undated, ii.
coalition to preemptively interdict land, air and sea shipments of WMD using both civilian and military assets of the coalition nations. Concurrently, the Department of Homeland Security is implementing the Container Security Initiative, Offshore Strategic Boarding, and High Interest Vessel programs, all designed to detect, track and intercept potentially dangerous cargoes before they arrive in the United States. With coalition training exercises already envisioned to support the PSI, regional TSCPs should be designed to integrate the entire range of these programs from intelligence gathering, to foreign port security, to en route interdiction efforts. This integration of homeland security objectives, along with other U.S. national security and coalition partner concerns into TSCPs provides the best means for engaging the terrorist threat at the earliest opportunity and closing gaps in America's defenses.

**Recommendations**

Integration of homeland security objectives into Theater Security Cooperation Plans should be conducted immediately at both the operational and strategic levels. This approach would ensure that homeland security objectives fit regional realities that are unique to each geographic area, while connecting them to overarching goals at the national level.

*Integration at the Regional Level:* CJCSM 3113.01A provides a timeline for the TSCP planning process that includes gathering information from service components,

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27 Weiner, 2.
supporting Combatant Commanders, host nations and other government agencies to develop plans at the regional level. The Department of Homeland Security should establish staff elements aligned with each of the geographic Combatant Commanders to provide direct liaison to their staffs and provide input on engagement activities that support homeland security. Several regional Combatant Commanders have established Regional Working Groups (RWG's) that are designed to, "Provide critical feedback that assesses past shaping efforts, prioritizes regions within the AOR and any subsequent shaping activities, apportions shaping activities based on a collaborative effort, and develops shaping guidance that optimizes the use of Combatant Commander's resources." The homeland security staff should directly participate in the appropriate RWG's or the equivalent mechanism for gathering requirements and planning TSCPs.

**Integration at the Strategic Level:** Homeland security objectives should also be considered at the strategic level. There is an opportunity to provide specific guidance to the Combatant Commanders relating to homeland security needs when the Joint Chiefs of Staff promulgate the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). Homeland Security Council and DHS input into this process would ensure that the strategic objectives are updated and provided to the operational level planners at least every two years, or sooner if the security environment changes. When the final TSCPs are forwarded to the Joint

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Staff for review and approval, the Homeland Security Department should work with the J5 interagency coordinator for TSCPs to review the overall Global Family of Engagement Plans to ensure coherence with strategic homeland security objectives and provide advance budget requirements for subsequent planning efforts.\textsuperscript{31}

\textit{Homeland Security Funding:} To ensure effective integration of homeland security objectives into the regional TSCPs, DHS must establish a funding source that can be used by the Combatant Commanders specifically for security cooperation initiatives. National leadership must ensure that funding streams are identified to bring TSCP resources into alignment with the high priority accorded homeland security and GWOT requirements. Funding previously allocated for the Millennium Challenge Account or other foreign aid should be considered for re-programming to TSCP homeland security initiatives. In any event, a relatively predictable line item like the DOS foreign operations budget should be sought to ensure adequate funding on a consistent basis. Similar to long-term procurement accounts, these funds should be established several years in advance to provide stable TSCP planning and execution.

\textit{Additional Interagency Coordination:} In addition to participating directly in the TSCP process, the Department of Homeland Security should also increase cooperation with the Department of State and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. DHS should establish liaison officer positions at both DOS and DSC, as well as participation in key country teams. When combined with direct interaction with the Combatant Commander's staff, these efforts will help to develop and prioritize future TSCP initiatives. Direct liaison will also facilitate the transfer of security technologies and

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid, A-3. CDR Steven A. Banks, USCG <steven.banks@js.pentagon.mil> "Interagency and TSC," [E-mail to CDR Sean Burke <sean.burke@nwc.navy.mil> 22 Jan 2004.
training to our partners overseas and will improve interoperability and enhance future working relationships during TSCP exercises and real-world contingencies.

Measures Drive Continued Success: Finally, the Department of Homeland Security must work with the Department of Defense, Department of State and the Combatant Commanders to develop realistic measures of effectiveness that will support ongoing budgetary investment in future TSCP activities. The new department will need to demonstrate how these initiatives are contributing to homeland security in order to maintain funding in a highly competitive budget environment that normally gives precedence to highly visible domestic spending projects. In order to accomplish this, the program should focus on effects-based measures that provide tangible evidence of improvements to homeland security.

Conclusion

The existing National Homeland Security Strategy provides a sound starting point for improving America's defenses against terrorist attacks. However, in order to be fully effective it needs to expand its focus beyond internal security measures and look for means of stopping terrorist threats before they reach the United States. At first glance it might make sense to have a homeland strategy that focuses strictly on internal security while others, such as the National Security Strategy and the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, focus on the external threat. Unfortunately, this type of built-in stovepipe only serves to reinforce narrow institutional perspectives and results in security gaps that terrorists can exploit to attack the United States. A more inclusive approach that integrates all elements of national power should be implemented. In order to ensure the security of the United States, homeland security objectives must be fully integrated
into the regional Combatant Commanders Theater Security Cooperation Plans. The
TSCPs provide a powerful tool to take the initiative in the fight against terrorism while
making the most effective use of scarce national resources. Including homeland security
objectives in the existing TSCP process can provide a source of funding for the
Combatant Commanders and help to integrate all elements of national power in the fight
against terrorism. This integrated strategy will help to close the seams in our defensive
posture and directly improve the homeland security of the United States.
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