ACHIEVING UNITY OF EFFORT: A CALL FOR LEGISLATION TO IMPROVE THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS AND CONTINUE ENHANCING INTERSERVICE INTEROPERABILITY
SO ALL MAY LABOR AS ONE

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Achieving Unity Of Effort: A Call For Legislation To Improve The Interagency Process and Continue Enhancing Interservice Interoperability So All May Labor As One

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See report.
Team Biographies

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Introduction: “Defending our Nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the Federal Government.”

National security has never been so critical or so challenging, given 21st century asymmetric threats and the nation’s demonstrated vulnerabilities following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. The rapidly changing global environment characterized by these unconventional threats requires the United States Government to “use every tool in our arsenal—military power, better homeland defenses, law enforcement, intelligence, and vigorous efforts to cut off terrorist financing” to defeat today’s threat. Interagency and inter-Service integration and interoperability are critical to bring the nation’s full capabilities and resources to bear on the national security challenges of today and tomorrow. However, the existing interagency process presents enduring challenges, much more complex, yet synonymous with the military Service rivalry that brought about Goldwater-Nichols legislation to improve joint operations. Just as Goldwater-Nichols legislation directed improved inter-Service integration for joint operations, similar legislation must mandate interagency unity of effort beyond ad hoc cooperation and collaboration. There is a valid need for legislation (tantamount to Goldwater-Nichols reforms for the military Services) to overcome identified interagency process deficiencies and challenges with the ultimate goal of achieving unity of effort guaranteeing efficient employment of the nation’s full capabilities to assure national security.

The review of recent and pending legislation, Government Accounting Office (GAO) Reports, journal articles, research papers, Internet items, and email interviews with key people working toward improving the interagency process produced several results. Of note, several homeland security organization changes made after 9/11 had been researched and proposed before the 2001 attacks. Similarly, earlier research had challenged civilian authorities to evaluate
the merits of Goldwater-Nichols-like legislation for the interagency process. The nation must progress beyond evaluation and boldly enact legislation now to assure successful integration and interoperability of interagency and joint capabilities before it is forced to react to the next attack.

**What Is The Interagency Process?** “Successful Interagency Coordination enables all concerned to mount coherent, efficient, collective operations.”

Although existing strategic guidance highlights the need to enhance the interagency process, the term has yet to be adequately defined. Even more confusing, the phrase has different meanings to various audiences. The DOD Dictionary defines “interagency coordination” (rather than interagency process) as “the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and engaged US Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and regional and international organizations for the purpose of accomplishing an objective.” Interagency coordination can include a multitude of agencies, many of which are described in the Joint Publications 3-08 and 3-33, as well as the National Response Plan (formerly the Federal Response Plan (FRP)). A wide variety of federal, state, and local agencies are responsible for homeland security and defense. One particular article referred to an organizational chart of federal government agencies containing 151 separate entities involved in responding to terrorism compiled by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies.

in October 2001. HSPD-1 mirrors NSPD-1 creating the Homeland Security Council (HSC) as the interagency forum for homeland security issues. The NSC and HSC are parallel security organizations and each includes a Principals Committee (NSC/PD; HSC/PD), Deputies Committee (NSC/DP; HSC/DP), and Policy Coordination Committees (NSC/PCCs; HSC/PCCs) that are designated either functional or geographic. In addition to the National and Homeland Security Council interagency organizations at the strategic level, formal interagency organizations at the operational level include the Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATFs) and Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs).

Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATFs) were created in 1994 in response to a review of the nation’s command and control and intelligence centers involved in international counternarcotics operations. These commands effectively plan for and successfully integrate multiagency forces committed to the cause of interdicting the flow of illicit drugs. The Northern Command Joint Implementation Planning Team (IPT) considered the JIATF model and debated the possibility of expanding the counterdrug mission to include combating terrorism for the two existing JIATF organizations. The JIATF model continues to be of interest during review of best practices for homeland security organization options and has even been discussed as an option for possible organization of the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

Combatant commands recently began forming Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG) based on experimentation results from Millennium Challenge 02 that identified a staff interagency element as vital to success. JIACGs are intended to be multifunctional, advisory elements that represent the civilian departments and agencies to facilitate information sharing across the interagency community. There is no standard for JIACGs, and informal interviews
indicate diverse membership (ranging from action officer to general/flag officer), focus, and funding across commands.18

Joint Vision 2020 envisions that “the joint force must be prepared to support civilian authorities in a fully integrated effort to meet the needs of US citizens and accomplish the objectives specified by the National Command Authorities.”19 Given this projected necessity for joint/interagency interoperability, military officers, as well as interagency staff “of the future should spend time in a JIATF, as an interagency LNO [liaison officer], and/or working with a JIACG.”20

**Importance of the Interagency Process:** “Defending the U.S. homeland requires a comprehensive strategy beginning with fixing responsibility for integrating all related activities.”21

Complexities of today’s security challenges require full, effective, and efficient employment of U.S. national capabilities. Interagency coordination forges the vital link between the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of power.22 Successful interagency coordination enables agencies, departments, and organizations to mount a coherent and efficient operation to meet U.S. National Security objectives.23 This requires unity of effort, defined as coordination through cooperation and common interests.24 Obtaining interagency interoperability and effective integration of all agency’s expertise, skills, and resources across the spectrum of security requirements (detection, prevention, protection, deterrence, and consequence management), though extremely challenging, is critical to achieving national security.

**Interagency Process Challenges Synonymous With Those Experienced by the Military Services:** “Joint Force Commanders frequently state that interagency coordination is one of their biggest challenges.”25
Joint Publication 3-08, Volume I, on Interagency Cooperation in Joint Operations highlights key challenges of the interagency process:

…[T]here is no overarching interagency doctrine that delineates or dictates the relationships and procedures governing all agencies, departments, and organizations in interagency operations. Nor is there an overseeing organization to ensure that the myriad agencies, departments, and organization have the capability and the tools to work together.\textsuperscript{26}

The interagency process presents complex challenges, many of which are analogous to the problems experienced by the military Services before the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The DOD Reorganization Act of 1986, more commonly referred to as the Goldwater-Nichols Act, was enacted to integrate individually competitive U.S. military Services into an efficient joint team. Major objectives of the Goldwater-Nichols Act included clarifying chain of command/civilian control, improving quality of military advice and enhancing effectiveness of military operations, and improving joint officer management.

In his article “Has It Worked? The Goldwater Nichols Reorganization Act,” James Locher summarized ten fundamental problems in the DOD that led to Goldwater-Nichols legislation.\textsuperscript{27}

A brief discussion follows of five of these challenges, which mirror the current problems plaguing the interagency process.

1. **Imbalance between Service and joint interests.** The different U.S. Government agencies have interests unique to themselves, and in many crises there can be little or no motivation to subordinate those interests to those of an interagency effort, especially if there is a perceived threat to turf that is generally regarded as belonging to the affected agency.

2. **Insufficient qualification (education and/or experience) of military officers assigned to joint duty.** One of the central weaknesses that frequently emerge as a problem in the inter-
agency process is that participating individuals do not understand the capabilities and limitations of the different organizations involved.

3. **Imbalance between the vast responsibilities and weak authority of each unified commander.** There is no recognized leadership in the interagency process, but rather councils that coordinate other committees formed in reaction to a particular issue. Formal interagency interaction at the strategic level (NSC), formal stovepipe interagency organizations (e.g., JIATFs for counternarcotics) for specific functions and informal, nonstandard interagency organizations (e.g., JIACGs) at the operational level do not provide the authority necessary to compel compliance for successful interagency integration to meet requirements across the full spectrum of homeland security requirements: detection, prevention, protection, deterrence, and consequence management.

4. **Confused and cumbersome operational chains of command.** A clearly defined operational chain of command is usually absent in any crisis requiring an interagency response. “The problem of ‘who’s in charge’ still vexes interagency efforts. In the past, the concept of a designated lead agency did not carry with it the operational authority to enjoin cooperation.”

5. **Ineffective strategic planning.** Strategic planning is a challenging, but necessary, endeavor for any organization, small or large. Agencies of the U.S. Government, other than the Defense Department, do not understand “systematic planning procedures.” President Eisenhower said in 1958, “No…task is of greater importance than the development of strategic plans which relate our revolutionary new weapons and force deployments to national security objectives.” The Goldwater-Nichols Act prescribed a hierarchical process for strategic direction, strategic planning, and contingency planning for the U.S. Armed Forces. The interagency process requires standard strategic planning capabilities understood by all participants.
a. The range of challenges discussed above—balance of power, personnel qualification, authority commensurate with responsibilities, chain of command, and strategic planning capability—all contribute to achieving unity of effort necessary for effectiveness and efficiency.\textsuperscript{31} As noted in Joint Vision 2020, “The primary challenge of interagency operations is to achieve unity of effort despite the diverse cultures, competing interests, and differing priorities of the participating organizations, many of whom guard their relative independence, freedom of action, and impartiality.”\textsuperscript{32} Various agencies’ different, and sometimes conflicting goals, policies, procedures, and problem-solving and decision-making techniques make unity of effort a challenge. Authority to compel action (unity of command) is key to achieving unity of effort, but that authority is often absent in an interagency endeavor. Failure to integrate all agencies into planning can complicate unity of effort as well as create unnecessary duplication of effort, gaps in services, and competition among stakeholders. Principles of unity of effort include common understanding, coordinated policy, trust, and confidence.\textsuperscript{33} Unity of effort can be achieved only through close, continuous interagency and interdepartmental coordination and cooperation, which are necessary to overcome confusion over objectives, inadequate structure or procedures, and bureaucratic and personal limitations.\textsuperscript{34}

Another major challenge to the interagency process is that differing perspectives regarding the distinction or lack thereof between foreign and domestic security operations lead to con-
fusion about the interagency process. Homeland Security requirements highlight the need for improved domestic Interagency Coordination, while most articles, including the Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC) curriculum, focus on interagency relationships between DOD, embassies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and private voluntary organizations (PVOs) required for foreign operations. It is difficult, given today’s transnational threats, to define an attack as foreign or domestic when aggressors have no national identity and can effectively strike across international boundaries. While the lines between domestic and foreign interagency efforts are blurred, there are a few distinct differences, such as the effect of *posse comitatus* on military law enforcement authority within the United States. Two security organization structures have separate responsibilities for foreign (NSC) and domestic (HSC) security. The only difference between the National and Homeland Security Councils is the designated membership, which at times can overlap depending on the issue being addressed. Noticeably lacking is a means to formally coordinate between the two councils. It is a good question whether the differences between foreign and domestic security provide enough justification for the parallel NSC and HSC structures because of the duplication of effort and unnecessary seam that could be alleviated by making the Secretary of Homeland Security a formal member of the NSC commensurate with the position of the National Security Adviser, thus eliminating the need for the HSC.

The similarities between past military inter-Service rivalry and current interagency organizational and operational challenges discussed above frame the argument for the necessity to legislatively mandate change to the interagency process just as Goldwater-Nichols mandated integration of the military Services. However, even today, advocates and critics continue to debate the success of Goldwater-Nichols reforms.
**Was Goldwater-Nichols Successful?:** “It was not until the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act that the military was freed, for the first time in the nation’s history, from crippling ideological, political, conceptual, and parochial constraints.”

In evaluating whether Goldwater-Nichols was successful, the question to ask is whether the warfighting capabilities of the military have been enhanced. After the successful campaign of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, former Secretary of Defense William Perry reported, “All commentaries and after-action reports on Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM attribute the success of the operation to the fundamental changes in the chain of command brought about by Goldwater-Nichols.” Finally, Admiral Owens, the former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated, “Goldwater-Nichols was the watershed event for the military… We’ve progressed from a reluctant standing up of the Goldwater-Nichols reforms to a full acceptance by the services that this is the future of warfighting.” In addition, the most recent performances in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM clearly indicate that Goldwater-Nichols met Congressional expectations of improving the warfighting capabilities of the American military.

Just as there were skeptics who questioned the need for legislation to mandate that the Services become more jointly integrated, there are many who believe the interagency process is much too complex to contend with. It is that very resistance that interagency process legislation must overcome.

For the military, the Goldwater-Nichols Act reaffirmed and accelerated organizational changes and relationships already evolving within the Department of Defense. Beginning with the National Security Act of 1947, and through the various subsequent amendments, the defense establishment—civilian and military—was carefully configured and adapted to meet the changing needs of the national leadership. The Goldwater-Nichols Act provided for the next evolutionary step—the strengthening of the Unified Commands. The act provided both a man-
date and a blueprint for continued change—which helped limit bureaucratic re-
sistance to reforms.39

For the reasons discussed above, legislation similar to Goldwater-Nichols can and must
be enacted to mandate and provide a plan for continued improvement in the interagency process.
Even once legislation is enacted, of course, process improvements will take time as they have
with Goldwater-Nichols, thus making the compelling argument that the nation must act now to
ensure future national and homeland security preparedness.

A Call for Interagency Process Legislation: “9/11 will do for the Interagency Process
what 7 December did for the Defense Organization.” – CAPT Jim Pernini, USN Retired

It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide specific details for future legislation re-
garding the interagency process. However, it is abundantly clear that whatever form final legis-
lation takes, Goldwater-Nichols objectives should be used as a model to overcome the inter-
agency process challenges discussed above. While not perfect, that act is a work in progress as
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recently established a working group to recommend
changes to the 17-year-old legislation.40 “Goldwater-Nichols is like the Articles of Confedera-
tion—each is better than what went before; however, each failed to endow the new order it cre-
ated with the authority needed to unify its parts.”41

The proposed solutions for interagency process legislation are organized to follow the
elements of the DOTLMPF (doctrine, organization, training, leadership, materiel, people, facili-
ties) framework directed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for creating innovation.42
These elements encompass the entire context of joint operations:

Doctrine: Does doctrine sufficiently address this task? There is no clear, standardized
doctrine or operating procedure for interagency operations, nor is there a definition for the inter-
agency process. Goldwater-Nichols directed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff publish joint doctrine
standardizing procedures throughout the military Services. Although two joint publications are
dedicated to Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, current guidance is often con-
flicting as the topic is briefly addressed in many other joint publications and is often focused on
foreign rather than homeland interagency efforts.\textsuperscript{43}

The government must define the interagency process and create doctrine standardizing
the way it executes interagency operations to overcome the various agencies’ different, and
sometimes conflicting, goals, policies, procedures, and problem-solving and decision-making
techniques to empower diverse members of the interagency team to operate successfully to-
gether.\textsuperscript{44}

**Organization**: Is the command organized and resourced correctly to accomplish the
task? Current interagency organizations are mostly ad hoc, creating challenges in working rela-
tionships that often lack familiarity, trust, and requisite authority necessary for success. Even
formal organizations like the JIACGs are advisory, information-sharing entities that depend on
coordination and cooperation making their challenge more like herding cats than compelling ac-
tion. Effective organization is vital to achieving unity of effort. The key to unity of effort is
command authority, a requirement many believe is unachievable in the interagency process.
Trust among the varying U.S. Government agencies is essential to effective interagency coop-
eration. The government must create formal strategic, operational, and tactical interagency or-
ganizational structures that can effectively operate throughout the range of security requirements
(detection, prevention, protection, deterrence, and consequence management). These organiza-
tions must have a clear chain of command complete with authority commensurate with assigned
responsibilities. These must be formal, standing organizations enabling day-to-day interaction
that leads to building trust in agency competencies. Proponents of change must verify the neces-
sity of having separate national and homeland security councils and consider making the Secretary of Homeland Security a formal member of the NSC commensurate with the position of the National Security Adviser. Of several models for proposed interagency organizations, whichever interagency organization model is implemented must provide for responsibility, accountability, and authority.45

**Training:** What training is required to gain and maintain proficiency on such a task? Interagency training is varied and incomplete. Each agency has diverse capabilities and competencies not well known by members of other agencies. With the exception of the military, interagency components do not train or educate personnel to conduct interagency operations. A search of the Internet finds many agencies that are willing to conduct interagency training, yet there is no standard.46 There is no universal exercise program leading to many stovepipe exercise efforts within each agency. Whether Goldwater-Nichols was successful in its entirety is a topic for discussion, but what is clear is that Goldwater-Nichols had a profound impact on the development and quality of officers assigned to joint duties within the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Colin Powell stated, as cited by Peter Chiarelli in his article “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols,” “I am confident that without the power of legislation, we would have not seen the progress made over the past six years.”47

It is imperative to increase the knowledge of the civilian and military work force in the skills, resources, capabilities and limitations inherent in each agency.

Ensuring the safety of America’s citizens at home can only be achieved through effective cooperation among the many federal departments and agencies and state and local governments that have homeland security responsibilities. It is clear that roles, missions, and responsibilities of the many organizations and agencies involved in national preparedness must be clearly delineated through an integrated interagency process.48
Training could be one of the most critical, yet relatively easily implemented proposal. The government should create Web-based interagency training readily available to all interagency participants. It must develop a reference document using a standard framework to capture each agency’s organization, missions, location, contact information, references, etc., including any information helpful in effectively planning to incorporate the agency’s capabilities into an interagency effort. It must also implement a standardized, funded, mandatory interagency training program that encompasses the full range of individual and agency training and exercises. The training program would provide for an Interagency Professional Training program modeled after the Joint Professional Military Education program in Goldwater-Nichols. The government must create a national exercise entity to consolidate and coordinate agency exercise efforts for greater realism, charter independent after-action reviews involving participants and experts, and incorporate lessons learned into plans, training, and follow-on exercises.49

Leadership: Do the leaders have the requisite knowledge to perform the task? Each agency has its own culture, hierarchy, biases, misperceptions, and unique perspectives driven by personalities and the inherent penchant of organization’s cultures for self-preservation. While it may seem paradoxical, in a highly decentralized and diffused structure strong leadership is paramount for success. To make the interagency process more robust and productive, the government should develop an interagency leadership model with a tiered system of interagency meetings to develop policy and be capable of making day-to-day binding decisions.50

Materiel: Does the agency have the right equipment to do the task? Agencies compete for scarce resources (funding, competent staff). Each agency (and military Service) has its own individual budget. Although combatant commanders have some budget discretion, there is no overall budget process for the interagency effort. One paper highlights the requirement: “inter-
agency plans supported by multi-year budget commitments are not in place to address critical threats, such as infrastructure protection or homeland defense against weapons of mass destruction.” The government needs to create a multiyear interagency (and joint Service) budget model to fund training, exercise, recruit, and materiel requirements to support the interagency process. The German military has one budget to fund all Services, thus decreasing the competition between Services for funding.

**Personnel:** Is the country able to recruit and retain the right people to perform the task? For interagency coordination to be effective, it is vital that the institutions and individuals participating be familiar with the roles, capacities, limitations, and organizational cultures of all the contributing elements. There is a clear requirement for persons representing all interagency disciplines to have a better understanding of the complex interrelationships that exist in dealing with current and anticipated situations. Thus the government should create a “national security professional” career path for people with a multiagency perspective who understand national security strategy, policy development, interagency planning and operations oversight. This National Security/Interagency Professional Career path will require a new career management system complete with incentives, training, and promotion system. The idea is already being researched by the Goldwater-Nichols reform working groups. Goldwater-Nichols joint officer management would be a starting model for such an interagency career management system.

**Facilities:** Are the facilities capable of supporting task accomplishment? Challenges above are compounded by “low technical and procedural interoperability, and the absence of a common vision,” creating “formidable obstacles” to interagency coordination. Interoperability is key. The nation must find ways to standardize technical and procedural interoperability while sustaining distinct agency capability.
**Conclusion:** “The challenges are best met when the unified actions of the [agencies of the United States Government] elicit the maximum effect from the unique but complementary capabilities of each [Agency] and from the synergy that results from their synchronized and integrated action.”

The United States will continue to face external asymmetric threats that require renewed vigilance and focus on integrated interagency security efforts. The interagency process, though difficult to achieve, is essential to success. There have already been unprecedented organizational changes to enhance the nation’s capability of uniting against future threats in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. However, existing interagency organizations lack the authority necessary to guarantee interagency relationships capable of achieving the unity of effort that is crucial to successfully defending and combatting today’s threats. The nation must establish a common national interagency framework to promote interoperability at all levels of government. Given the challenges facing the interagency process, there needs to be legislation providing a clear blueprint mandating continuous transformation toward integration of interagency capabilities. The moral imperative is even more critical than when Admiral Paul Miller suggested the idea in his National Security Paper in 1993:

Drawing on the central ideas of the Goldwater-Nichols Act—designating responsibility and authority, a focused planning process, and the efficient use of resources—it is time for appropriate civilian authorities to evaluate the merits of similar legislation for the interagency process itself. Such legislation could formalize current interagency approaches, while addressing the unique demands of the multi-agency environment. It would both promote and sanction the consensus needed for new initiatives.

The nation must create an effective, formal interagency process capable of synergistically unifying effort to protect the United States and its citizens while preserving each contributing agency’s unique competencies. Legislation must be enacted to formalize the interagency process
creating **alliances** consisting of stable command structures with empowered leadership and authority, enabling trust and consensus rather than the current ad hoc interagency arrangements that emulate transient **coalitions** hastily formed to meet specific crises.

To resolve the interagency process challenges identified above, proposed legislation must address the following seven of nine objectives of the Goldwater-Nichols Act identified by Lochen:58

1. Place clear responsibilities on the unified commanders (primary agency leaders) for mission accomplishment.
2. Ensure that the unified commanders’ (primary agency leaders’) authority is commensurate with his responsibilities.
3. Increase attention to strategy formulation and contingency planning.59
4. Provide for the more efficient use of resources.
5. Improve joint officer (interagency personnel) management.
6. Enhance the effectiveness of military (interagency) operations.
7. Improve Defense Department (interagency) management and administration.

This legislation must create a **National Interagency Organization** (not a general interagency staff) that integrates interagency capabilities through strategic, operational, and tactical levels across the spectrum of homeland security operations (detection, prevention, protection, deterrence, and consequence management). A legislated interagency structure, though resource intensive, is essential in building trust, interagency familiarity, and integrated capability needed to achieve the unity of effort critical to success. The nation must act so the full capability of its organizational resources can identify, prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from future threats. Just as there was much research stressing the need for a Homeland Security Department before the 9/11 terrorist attacks, ample research documenting interagency process challenges and recommending solutions follow in the bibliography. The nation must **respond** now, enacting interagency process legislation to meet future national security challenges so it doesn’t have to **react** to create new organizations as it did after the 9/11 attacks—when it was too late.

2 Ibid.

3 Secretary of Defense’s Top Priorities for Next 18 Months (7/03-1/05) lists “Strengthen Combined/Joint Warfighting Capabilities” as his second of ten priorities.


6 Interagency Coordination Interactive Courseware available through the Doctrine Networked Education and Training.


8 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publication 1-02 (April 2001), p. 211.

9 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations Vol II*, Joint Pub 3-08 (October 1996) and *Joint Force Capabilities*, Joint Publication 3-33 (October 1999), Chapter V.


11 National Security Presidential Directive–1 (NSPD-1) “Organization of the National Security Council System,” (13 February 2001): Available Online http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-1.htm accessed on 21 July 2003. NSPD-1 reorganized the NSC, abolished the existing system of Interagency Working Groups and assigned responsibilities to NSC Policy Coordination Committees (NSC/PCCs). NSPD-1 reaffirms the NSC Principals Committee (NSC/PC) as the senior interagency forum and the NSC Deputies Committee (NSC/DC) as the senior subcabinet interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security. “Management of the development & implementation of national security policies by multiple agencies of the United States Government shall be accomplished by the NSC Policy Coordination Committees (NSC/PCCs). The NSC/PCCs shall be the main day-to-day fora for interagency coordination of national security policy.”


14 CDR Barndt was a member of the NORTHCOM IPT from February to July 2002.


16 Intended benefits of JIACGs include: collaborate on common operational planning issues; accelerate operational planning for real world contingencies; integrate interagency perspectives into the combatant command/joint task force exercises; provide advice on agency capabilities; represent agency views to combatant command staff. Bottom line results: more effective and timely integrated planning and execution. JIACG questions and concerns include whether this is just a high-priced liaison group; what the appropriate expertise and seniority of those assigned to this function is; who they work for; whether this bypasses agency lines of authority and communication; what the expectations of parent agency and combatant command staff are; how they are educated, trained, and tracked for this role; what the roles of the POLAD and ambassador’s country team are.


18 Ibid.
10 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2020, (June 2000), p. 18.
11 OSD Email dated 11 August 2003.
13 Ibid., p. v.
14 Ibid., p. I-2
15 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Publication 1 (November 2000).
16 JP 3-08, inside cover, letter signed by John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Miller, p. 50.
28 JV 2020, p. 11.
29 Interagency efforts are discussed in JP 0-2; JP 1-0; JP 3-08; JP 3-33.
30 JP 1-0, p. 1.
31 Note—any solution must ensure that integrating, as an interagency partner does not endanger the organizational survival and viability of the agency in question. Rather than mixing the agencies and shaking to achieve an inter-agency shade of grey, the government must integrate them while enhancing each agency’s individual color, preserving the rainbow of capabilities separate and distinct from one another. Potential organization models include the supported and supporting commander model of the regional combatant commanders: “The relationship now established among the Unified CINC’s—the role of a supported and supporting commanders—recommends itself to the interagency process. The supported commander has control and responsibility for operations within a specified area of responsibility. Supported commanders set the parameters, request specific capabilities, task the appropriate agencies, and build a plan for achieving the common goal. To assist the supported commander in accomplishing missions requiring additional resources, supporting commanders provide the requested capabilities as part of the overall team effort. Of course, the determination of which commander is supported, and which is (or are) supporting, depends on the nature of the task at hand.” Refer to Scowcroft paper. In addition to JIATFs, and JIACGs, there is also the National Interagency Fire Center (http://www.nifc.gov/) or the Interagency Global Positioning System (GPS) Executive Board (http://www.igeb.gov/).
32 “The National Defense University is designated as the executive agent in the area of multi-Agency and Department planning and coordination for complex emergencies. In support of US national interests and objectives, the ITEA [Interagency Transformation, Education and After Action Review] program serves as a national focal point for innovation in equation, research, and gaming that addresses the interagency response to such crises.” Most of ITEA’s information including pending legislation is focused on foreign interagency efforts. (Email response from ITEA dated 21 August 2003.) Upon last review of the ITEA website, its interagency training debut was delayed
until late Fall 2003. Point Paper for Interagency Transformation, Education and After-Action Review (ITEA) Curriculum, Available Online http://www.theinteragency.org/storage/365/Curriculum_Point_Paper.doc accessed on 22 August 2003. ITEA provided copies of pending legislation it feels is a first step toward creating a Goldwater-Nichols Act for the interagency community (S.1235 & H.R. 2616). The bills have a foreign focus (“failed states”). Email dated 21 August 2003 from ITEA. The Joint Distributed Learning Center (JDLC), U.S. Joint Forces Command Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) Advanced Learning (ADL) initiative offers Interagency Coordination Interactive Courseware based on Joint Pub 3-08. However, on closer examination, the course is available through Doctrine Networked Education and Training (DOCNET) which requires access from a “.mil” site and is password protected.

47 Chiarelli, p. 77.
48 QDR, pp. 18-19.
50 Ibid, p. 83.
52 Feiler, 2, quoting Michele Flournoy, former Pentagon staffer and senior adviser at Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
53 Feiler, 3, quoting Michele Flournoy
54 Tucker, quoting the report on Army After Next (AAN).
55 JP 1-0.
56 Creation of the Homeland Security Council (HSPD-1); Department of Homeland Security; Northern Command (Unified Command Plan 2002).
57 Miller, p. 50.
58 Locher
59 In February 1999, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the combatant commanders to include Annex V, an Interagency Coordination Annex, to be approved for deliberate war plans.


http://www.fas/org/irp/offdocs/pff56.htm

U.S. Government. Secretary of Defense’s Top Priorities for Next 18 Months (7/03-1/05).


