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14. ABSTRACT Even though multiple lessons have been learned and applied to the evolution of Political-Military Interactions at the Strategic and Operational Levels of War, current Combatant Commanders have the appropriate tools available at the Operational-Tactical Level in order to confront, coordinate and compete in Complex Contingency Operations. Despite the progress which has been made to establish Policy Coordination Committees, Annex Victors and Civil-Military Operations Centers, the commander needs the ability to understand, influence and facilitate the Non-Governmental Organizations, Inter-Governmental Organizations and Private Volunteer Organizations in the field. The current Special Operations Civil Affairs Teams provide the ideal model on which to base such a force. Unlike the SOFCA teams, the force required needs to contain a specialized international "police-like" capability, including training in SWAT tactics and non-lethal weapons. This force would specialize in Preventive Intervention, Security Cooperation, and Environmental Stability (PISCES). Due to the "peace-keeping" requirement, PISCES would have to reside within a separate Functional Combatant Command, which would provide regionally-trained forces to the Geographic Combatant Commanders. Armed with PISCES, commanders will gain greater insight into the battlefield from expanded HUMINT assets; will better understand the non-military influences affecting the battle space; and will have the tools available on-ground to have an early effect on the outcome of a situation. PISCES will be a force multiplier with a small footprint; will reduce time delays in the build-up, fires and post-hostilities phases of an operation; and will create an un-equalled awareness of the space factor.					
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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

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PISCES

The Commander's Tool for an Effective Exit Strategy

By

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The Contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____

16 May 2003

ABSTRACT

Even though multiple lessons have been learned and applied to the evolution of Political-Military Interactions at the Strategic and Operational Levels of War, current Combatant Commanders have the appropriate tools available at the Operational-Tactical Level in order to confront, coordinate and compete in Complex Contingency Operations. Despite the progress which has been made to establish Policy Coordination Committees, Annex Victors and Civil-Military Operations Centers, the commander needs the ability to understand, influence and facilitate the Non-Governmental Organizations, Inter-Governmental Organizations and Private Volunteer Organizations in the field. The current Special Operations Civil Affairs Teams provide the ideal model on which to base such a force. Unlike the SOFCA teams, the force required needs to contain a specialized international “police-like” capability, including training in SWAT tactics and non-lethal weapons. This force would specialize in Preventive Intervention, Security Cooperation, and Environmental Stability (PISCES). Due to the “peace-keeping” requirement, PISCES would have to reside within a separate Functional Combatant Command, which would provide regionally-trained forces to the Geographic Combatant Commanders. Armed with PISCES, commanders will gain greater insight into the battlefield from expanded HUMINT assets; will better understand the non-military influences affecting the battle space; and will have the tools available on-ground to have an early effect on the outcome of a situation. PISCES will be a force multiplier with a small footprint; will reduce time delays in the build-up, fires and post-hostilities phases of an operation; and will create an un-equalled awareness of the space factor.

INTRODUCTION

Military Operations Other-Than War (MOOTW) have been prevalent since the end of the Cold War. Some military strategists predict that the frequency of MOOTW will increase over the next twenty-five years due to the increasing number of failing states and “non-state” threats to national security. Historically, the Combatant Commanders (CoComs) have confronted these “special” peacetime operations with an un-prepared, poorly coordinated response plan. Efforts have been made to solve the complex Command and Control (C2) issues created when incorporating Joint U.S. military, international military, multiple-agency, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGO's). However, current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq continue to highlight shortfalls in the system. The United States Department of Defense (DoD) must undergo a paradigm shift away from defining MOOTW as a “collateral” assignment. DoD must accept and understand the role of being one (significant) piece of an interagency puzzle in an international arena of National Security. Even though lessons have been learned and applied to the evolution of Political-Military interactions, current Combatant Commanders must be provided with the appropriate tools for confronting future Complex Contingency Operations (CCOs).

At present, the Special Operations Forces’ (SOF) Civil Affairs Teams provide an ideal model for the “force” which is necessary both to confront the complex situations in the MOOTW setting and to arrange for an acceptable “post-conflict” exit strategy. In order to distinguish the “combatant” SOF assets from the “international police” assets, a separate “Functional Combatant Command” is required. This Functional Command will provide the Geographic Commanders with regionally focused teams which can provide “**P**reventive **I**ntervention, **S**ecurity **C**ooperation and **E**nvironmental **S**tability (**PISCES**).” PISCES will

allow the Geographic CoCom's to assume the lead in Preventive Diplomacy and Cooperative Security at home and abroad. It will also become the tool required to develop an exit strategy. PISCES will provide coordination and guidance in the ten major functional / mission area tasks outlined in PDD-56.¹ PISCES will draw from its roots in the SOF community and will utilize state-of-the-art technology to interact seamlessly, not only with all military and security branches of the United States and her allies, but with the local national assets, the **Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO's)**, **Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGO's)** and nation-states in their specific theater of interest. PISCES will lead the transformation required to meet the primary challenge of our new National Security Strategy: to use our strength to create a balance of power that favors human freedom; protecting the values of people across the globe "to be able to speak freely; choose who will govern them; worship as they please; educate their children – male and female; own property; and enjoy the benefits of their labor."²

HISTORICAL REVIEW

Current doctrine describes MOOTW as:

“Operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during and after war.”³

Actions include Presence, Coercive Diplomacy, Security Assistance, Insurgency/Counterinsurgency, Humanitarian Assistance, Combating Terrorism, Peace Operations, Peacetime Contingencies, Counter-drug Operations and Military Support of Civil Authorities. Since the end of the Cold War, the military C2 process evolved to accommodate the increasing frequency of MOOTW and CCOs. (See Appendix A)

The evolutionary process resulted in a system inherent with irreconcilable conflicts for the Services and for the CoComs. The Service Chiefs equip and train an overwhelmingly superior conventional force that is forced to engage on an “unconventional” battlefield. The CoComs’ ability to prepare to fight the next conventional war is degraded by multiply tasking the same units to fight this “asymmetric war.”⁴ A more recent analysis (June 1999) of Peace Operations by current flag officers found that:

- 1) Engagement in multilateral peace operations is in our national interests and will be a key ingredient in the war against terrorism.
- 2) The U.S. doesn’t have to lead every operation, but it has to be a player, and to be most effective, must be a player on the ground.
- 3) Peace operations are “leadership laboratories” and soldiers are better soldiers for having participated in them.
- 4) Skills gained in peace operations are the very skills needed in the multi-dimensional war against terrorism.
- 5) Problem #1 now facing peace operations is the “rule of law” issue.
- 6) In the early phases of a peace operation, the military must take the lead role in establishing law and order, but that the long-term solution to the problem of law and order is not a military solution.
- 7) There is a serious danger in leaving war criminals at large unapprehended: their influence remains pervasive, and failure to apprehend them sends a sigh of weakness to terrorist leaders and others that peace enforcers are “toothless tigers.”
- 8) The UN is and increasingly important partner in the war against terrorism and its breeding grounds.

The panel’s recommendations to address the increasing frequency of Peace Operations are:

- 1) Engage
- 2) Fix the Rule of Law
- 3) Recognize the UN as an indispensable partner⁵

While these are difficult times for initiating new programs, the DoD should find that a relatively small investment in some MOOTW-specific technologies will pay large dividends by minimizing the number of general-purpose forces involved in CCOs. The military’s understanding of CCO C2 has grown through participation in MOOTW. CCOs involve a

response to a Complex Emergency where the capacity to sustain livelihood and life is threatened primarily by political factors and by high levels of violence. CCOs are characterized by:

1. Politically driven resource wars
2. High levels of violence
3. Cultures, ethnic or minority groups at risk of extinction
4. High levels of armed conflict, usually complicated by natural disasters
5. Represent catastrophic public health emergencies
6. Top five causes of death are infectious disease epidemics
7. Vulnerable Groups at Risk include: Infants; children; pregnant & lactating women; elderly; handicapped; orphans

The Interagency Complex Contingency Operations Handbook (Appendix B) outlines principles which should be applied to all such operations including:

1. deciding to intervene
2. crafting an integrated strategy
3. establishing effective integration mechanisms
4. determining who will lead the operation
5. building a cohesive and effective coalition
6. gaining political support for the operation
7. continually reassessing the operation
8. executing a smooth and seamless transition

Military Lessons (Appendix C) and Humanitarian Lessons (Appendix D) have been learned from each of the recent CCOs in which the U.S. military has been involved.

Military strategists predict that there will be more failing states and more “non-state” threats to security over the next twenty-five years. (Appendix E) Military commanders have become increasingly responsible for managing these situations which fall out of their “comfort zone” (i.e. military-on-military confrontation). Recent history holds numerous incidents of intentional direct and indirect violence against civilians. (Appendix F) Over the past three hundred years, the proportions of deaths in war that are civilians have increased from 5% to 90% (Table 1).⁶

TABLE 1	
Percentage of Total War Casualties That are Civilian	
1700 - 1900	5 - 50%
World War I	5 - 20%
World War II	50 - 66%
Today	75 - 90%

INTERAGENCY PROCESS

Problems exist at all levels of interagency coordination from the strategic to the tactical. Despite significant efforts made to improve the system over the past five years, an understanding of the limitations, restrictions and constrictions imposed by operating in the interagency arena need to be recognized in order to improve the possibility of success in future CCOs. Classic interagency problems confronted by the commander include:

1. Civilian agencies lack authority and accountability when executing humanitarian and nation-assistance tasks. The agencies have the freedom to choose one operation and to discard the next. For example, the U.S. Customs Agency sent officials to participate in sanctions against Bosnia; however the same agency declined a similar role in actions against Iraq and Serbia.
2. Most civilian organizations are not manned or equipped for expeditionary operations. In Somalia, both the Department of State and USAID (United States Agency for International Development) lacked sufficient personnel to manage the situation.
3. Many civilian agencies lack standard operating procedures or operational doctrine, resulting in delayed and inconsistent responses. In Rwanda, U.S. European Command provided strategic airlift for the humanitarian agencies which were attempting to reach the operating area. Unfortunately, Air Force planners' and loadmasters' attempts to efficiently schedule and load the airframes were undermined by the humanitarian agency representatives' indecision and in-efficiency in deciding what to contribute. This resulted in incompletely filled airframes departing into the theater with available humanitarian stores remaining in the warehouses located adjacent to the runway.
4. Combatant Commanders do not have any civilian counterpart. State Department's regional assistant secretaries are not deployed and are not responsible for field matters, and the ambassadors are responsible for only one country in a geographic region, and their authority does not cross national boundaries.

5. Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56 (May, 1997) detailed the process of interagency cooperation among government agencies; unfortunately the current administration cancelled all standing PDDs at the time of inauguration. A replace document has yet to be published.
6. Not all civilian and military leaders have conformed to the intent of PDD 56.
7. The process for managing operational transitional periods remains undefined. The pol-mil plan presents minimal guidance on how to handle transitions, while the PDD neglects to explain managing an operation as it moves from peacekeeping to peace building.
8. No mechanism exists for integrating regional specialists into a developing operation.
9. No doctrine has been established for military involvement in traditionally civilian tasks.
10. PDD 56 fails to provide guidance for crisis recovery (peace building).

The CoCom is left to coordinate efforts across a range of issues including funding, logistics, political will, commitment of time, and understanding host nation customs, laws, and culture. This may include providing food, water, shelter, medical care, housing and utility/infrastructure repairs for civilians, refugees or internally displaced persons. This “lack of doctrine” negatively affected operations in Operation Allied Force (Serbia), Operation Restore Hope (Somalia) and in Haiti (where at the last minute, a planned combat operation rapidly transformed into a peaceful intervention.)⁷

CURRENT RESPONSE

Over the past five years, the U.S. Government and has experimented with “patches” for the Operational C2 and Operational Planning Systems to better interface the components of the interagency system. At the Strategic Level, the National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 1 established

“Six (Policy Coordination Committees (PCC)) . . . for the following regions: Europe and Eurasia, Western Hemisphere, East Asia, South Asia, Near East and North Africa, and Africa. Each of the NSC/PCCs shall be chaired by an official of Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary rank to be designated by the Secretary of State.”⁸

It also established eleven PCCs for the following functional topics:

- a) Democracy, Human Rights, and International
- b) International Development and Humanitarian Assistance
- c) Global Environment
- d) International Finance
- a) Transnational Economic Issues
- b) Counter-Terrorism and National Preparedness
- c) Defense Strategy, Force Structure, and Planning
- d) Arms Control
- e) Proliferation, Counter proliferation, and Homeland Defense
- f) Intelligence and Counterintelligence
- g) Records Access and Information Security

Contingency Planning and Policy Coordination Centers have been established to anticipate, prevent and respond to complex foreign crisis. At the country level, the Ambassador's Country Team has expanded to include an increased number of interagency representatives.

At the Operational Level, the CoCom staffs have gained Political Advisors and representatives from various intelligence agencies. Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG) have been created which seek to establish operational connections between civilian and military departments and agencies that will improve planning and coordination within the government. "The JIACG is as a multi-functional, advisory element that represents the civilian departments and agencies and facilitates information sharing across the interagency community. It provides regular, timely, and collaborative day-to-day working relationships between civilian and military operational planners." ⁹ Proposed JIACG functions include:

- a) Participate in combatant command staff crisis planning and assessment
- b) Advise the combatant command staff on civilian agency campaign planning
- c) Work civilian-military campaign planning issues
- d) Provide civilian agency perspectives during military operational planning activities and exercises
- e) Present unique civilian agency approaches, capabilities & limitations to the military campaign planners
- f) Provide vital links to Washington civilian agency campaign planners
- g) Arrange interfaces for a number of useful agency crisis planning activities
- h) Conduct outreach to key civilian international and regional contacts

In order to improve the C2 process, Joint Forces Command created a Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ). When a contingency requires the establishment of a Joint Task Force (JTF), all or select portions of the SJFHQ element can be embedded in the CoCom's staff. The team pulls specialized knowledge into the planning process through maintaining an extensive data base and coordination network with academic, industry and government centers of excellence. The SJFHQ also maintains important "reach-back" links to U.S. strategic planning groups, intelligence organizations and other non-DoD agencies.¹⁰

Tactically, Presidential Decision Directive National Science and Technology Council (PDD/NSTC) 7 states that

“The mission of DoD will be expanded to include support of global surveillance, training, research, and response to emerging infectious disease threats.”¹¹

This resulted in the development of the Natural Disaster / Epidemic Preparedness and Strategic Contingency Planning¹² System and the DoD Global Emerging Infections Disease Surveillance and Response System.

CURRENT OPERATIONS: AFGHANISTAN

In June 2001, the U.S. Agency for International Development's Disaster Assistance Response Team (USAID/DART) began its emergency coordination work in response to a four-year regional drought in Afghanistan. Many Afghans were forced to leave their homes in search of food and water. Afghanistan had suffered through two decades of war and civil strife, including a decade-long Soviet occupation. A USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) Program Office in Kabul continues to assess the humanitarian needs of vulnerable Afghans, and to monitor the relief programs of its implementing partners.¹³

In response to the 11 September terrorist attacks, CENTCOM initiated Operation Enduring Freedom on 7 October, 2001. A multinational campaign against the al Qaeda network and the Taliban was developed through Crisis Action Planning in a region where no pre-existing OP/CONPLAN existed. To date, 21 nations have deployed more than 16,000 troops to the CENTCOM AOR. No evidence of a preexisting Annex V, Inter-agency plan or Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) plan (Appendix G) could be found by the author.

In May, 2002 JTF Afghanistan was established in Kandahar, commanded by Lt. Gen. Dan McNeill. In addition to ongoing limited military operations, the JTF is primarily focused on Interagency and International Coordination. Inter-factional fighting and criminal activity continue to limit humanitarian operations throughout the country, which has led to the suspension of several UN missions. The International Security Assistance Force (IASF) is the Political-Military organization providing security in Kabul. Germany and the Netherlands recently took over leadership from Turkey. The security situation remains tense in many parts of the country as factional fighting resumed in some areas. Over the past two months, one UN convoy was attacked and another was robbed at gunpoint. There are reports of regrouping on the Taliban in the Ghor Province. Criminal incidents still continue to be on the rise throughout parts of the country, and night travel is not recommended.¹⁴

The current refugee situation requires dealing with the return of almost two million refugees and another million internally displaced persons. Key to establishing the civil infrastructure and providing interagency cooperation and coordination were the SOF CA units, which are designed to prevent civilian interference with tactical operations, to assist commanders in discharging their responsibilities toward the civilian population, and to provide liaison with civilian government agencies. (Appendix H)

The 489th Civil Affairs Battalion deployed to Afghanistan with a mission to rebuild the country's infrastructure. Some of their projects included schools, roads, wells, dams, and clinics. The commander of the unit, Lt. Col. Roland DeMarcellus, stated that

“America’s mission then was to secure ... victory, and to do that (it) turned to one battalion — the 489th Civil Affairs Battalion. No battalion had a greater impact on the history of Afghanistan over this period, or more importantly, the lives of the Afghan people.”¹⁵

TABLE 2

AFGHANSITAN: NUMBERS AT A GLANCE	
Afghanistan	Numbers Affected
Total population (CIA Factbook)	26,813,057
Voluntary Assisted Refugee Returns (UNHCR) 2002	
Pakistan (March 1 – Dec. 31)	1,532,000
Iran (April 9 – Dec. 31)	261,000
Central Asian states (March 1 – Dec. 31)	10,000
Pakistan (Jan. 1 – March 3)	2,705
Iran (Jan. 1 – March 3)	6,072
Old Caseload Refugees as of August 2001 (UNHCR)	
Pakistan and Iran	3,500,000
Internally Displaced (UNHCR)	
Estimated caseload as of October 2002	724,000
...North and west	117,000
...Center and east	194,000
...South and southeast	413,000
Internally Displaced Returns Since January 1, 2002 (IOM)	
Total as of December 2002 (vol. assisted)	250,000
Total since December 2002 (spontaneous)	400,000
TOTAL FY 2001 - 2003 U.S. Government (USG) Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan	\$780,950,886

CURRENT OPERATIONS: IRAQ

Following the 1991 Gulf War, the Iraqi population teetered on the brink of a humanitarian disaster due to the lingering effects of war, sanctions, and drought. Between 1991 and 1996, the U.S. Government provided nearly \$794 million in humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons in northern Iraq. In 1996, Iraq accepted the Oil-for-Food (OFF) Program and humanitarian conditions improved. Revenues from the OFF program were intended to provide food, medicine, and other civilian goods to the Iraqi people through the Public Distribution System (PDS). Widespread corruption (by Iraqi and UN officials) limited the effectiveness of the OFF program. From March 20 to May 1, 2003 Coalition forces conducted military operations in Iraq. Even though the conflict did not result in a large-scale humanitarian crisis, the subsequent disorder exacerbated the population's vulnerable circumstances. (Appendix I)

In March, the United States Government deployed a multi-agency DART to the region to assess and respond to humanitarian needs and to help coordinate the emergency relief effort. The DART reports that the Ministry of Trade (MOT) and has established four offices in Iraq and has deployed teams to Kuwait, Jordan, Cyprus, and Qatar. They have overseen: the first nationwide distribution of the World Food Program's (WFP) Public Distribution System (PDS) in June 2003; the improvement of the Umm Qasr port by the UN Development Program which is presently receiving humanitarian supplies; and re-establishment of passenger rail service between Baghdad, Al Basrah and Mosul. Unfortunately, the World Health Organization (WHO) reports that the lack of security is becoming an acute problem for the health system in Iraq. Hospitals and other health facilities are not protected; water pumping stations are still being looted; warehouses and distribution networks are not secure; doctors and nurses cannot safely carry out their work; and people

cannot get safe access to health care. Surveillance remains the cornerstone of disease outbreak control. Close working relationships have been established with UN agencies, NGOs, and with U.S. Military Civil Affairs personnel.

The 353RD Civil Affairs teams started working in a Western Iraqi city of Ar Rutbah prior to the termination of active hostilities. Their battle was to win the “hearts and minds of the people” in the land. The CA teams worked with NGO’s and IGO’s to get food, medicine, clothes and clean water to the small communities in Western Iraq. The CA officers pre-arranged to meet the NGOs at the border of Jordan and Iraq in order to facilitate a smooth transition into country. One sergeant reported that “It can be a nightmare getting people and vehicles across the border into Iraq, there are a lot of people in cars and trucks wanting to go into Iraq, so we make it our job to make sure Humanitarian Assistance gets through smoothly.” Maintaining positive control over deliveries of humanitarian aid is required because at any time total chaos can break out or the Fedayeen can try to flex their muscles. Saddam’s regime didn’t put money into this town since 1990. The roads are beat up and the services such as electricity and water are very bad. The town’s people had to smuggle food and equipment past Saddam’s police because they would be charged money for bringing in anything.

One local stated that “the future of the town is now good, we were forgotten out here and we had many problems that would not have solved themselves. The Mayor wanted water, and we got water. The Mayor wanted electricity and we got electricity. Mike and Mark are good! America is good, very good!”

ANNEX V

In 1998, ANNEX V (“victor”) was added to OPPLANS and CONPLANS as an “Interagency Coordination Annex.” This annex provides a means to communicate the Commander’s Intent of an OPPLAN through the SECDEF and NSA to the involved governmental agencies in order to facilitate a nationally unified command plan. Reviewing the 2002 version of “ANNEX V TO USCINCENT CONPLAN 1015-98,” it is evident that the Annex is being written at the strategic/operational level, without addressing the specifics of the Operational-Tactical interface. The plan (Unclassified) details the “Transition/Exit Criteria” as:

- (a) Isolate IRAQ and its regime
- (b) Form an International Consensus and Coalition
- (c) Engender and Sustain Domestic Support
- (d) Deter IRAQI use of WMD
- (e) Revitalize a post-conflict IRAQI populace, government and military to support a balanced and stable region.

The paragraph goes on to state that the “Interagency processes will assist in coordinating, defining, and quantifying the involvement of any other nations or international organizations in military operations.”¹⁶

These orders (statements) and an understanding of where they fit into the Phased approach to the operation are necessary to communicate to the non-military agencies. However, other statements in the Annex V (like “Facilitate emergency relief by NGO/PVO’s in wake of combat operations”) remain vague, and require either an inherent understanding of or seamless communications with each NGO in the field.

Coordinating (facilitating) with NON-Governmental organizations require communication with organizations which (by definition) are not a U.S. Governmental agency. The language and format of those communications often do not fit within a “standard format” as defined by any publication, directive or doctrine. The coordinating

language may be any spoken (or unspoken) language and the written format may require scribbled pictures on a napkin rather than a typed memorandum. When interacting at the NGO level, there frequently is no one at a “CinC” level, and in some of these organizations there may be no one in a formal “administrative” position. The Commander needs to understand that these “organizations” are frequently only those who are on the ground, performing the tasks, and communication with those individuals can only be accomplished by a person, on the ground that can speak the language and be trusted by the provider. In order to “facilitate” at this level, the CoCom must provide:

- a) a safe enough environment for the organizations to enter
- b) a secure enough situation for the organization to operate
- c) varying degrees of logistical support, depending on the theatre of operations

This re-iterates that the “rule of law” is, in essence the military’s exit strategy; this may mean that a functioning police, penal and judicial system must be firmly established before the military can depart. In Bosnia, the Dayton agreement did not address the legal system, and former combatants “infiltrated” the Bosnia police force. The necessary international “police force” did not arrive for eight months after hostilities had ceased. In Kosovo paramilitaries and criminals took charge of the cities after the police fled and the court system became dominated by Albanians, who protected their own and repressed the non-Albanians. Eighteen months elapsed before sufficient numbers of police were authorized by the UN Security Council.

PISCES PROPOSAL

Leadership in a CCO is akin to shepherding an ever-evolving flock of continuously developing contingencies in a general direction as opposed to executing a discrete plan focused on specific goals. These contingencies are marked by extraordinary complexity;

there are shifting and contradictory priorities instead of a positional authority providing a centralized direction toward defined goals. Moreover, any attempt to coordinate a centralized effort is frequently resisted by the parties involved. There is no organizational authority to direct the level of involvement of external agencies. All CCO participants arrive with individual interests, missions and goals. CCOs may have a distinct beginning but (unlike a military campaign) rarely have a distinct end-point. Resolving the initiating crisis often results in the presentation of an underlying (more complex) problem which prevents the establishment of a stable, self supporting institutional organization.¹⁷

A PISCES Functional CoCom will be in addition to and will learn lessons from the current SOF structure. The war in Afghanistan has revalidated long-held special operations axioms, according to Brig. Gen. Harrell, who commanded SOF in the CENTCOM AOR:¹⁸

1. Humans are more important than hardware.
2. Quality is better than quantity.
3. Special operations forces cannot be mass produced.
4. Competent Special Operations Forces can't be created after an emergency occurs.¹⁹
5. Intelligence is crucial
6. Soldiers who understand the culture of the country in which they're operating are indispensable.
7. Snipers are important and effective in combat operations.
8. Altitude and cold weather training are important.
9. Mobility is essential.
10. The al-Qaida and Taliban fighters were "very, very good with mortars."
11. It is important to build rapport with the locals.

PISCES' missions reflect the ten major functional / mission areas tasks outlined in PDD-56:

1. Political mediation / reconciliation
2. Military Support
3. Demobilization
4. Humanitarian Assistance
5. Police Reform
6. Basic Public Services
7. Economic Restoration
8. Human Rights Monitoring

9. Social Reconciliation
10. Public Information²⁰.

PISCES will be “human oriented” in its manning, its operations and its function. All members will receive extensive training in regional dialects, traditions, politics and customs. PISCES will be organized into eight geo-politically centered cells which reflect the Geographic Combatant Commands in order to maintain a core of regional experience.

The ideal operational foot print will vary in response to the geo-political environment in which it is operating. Each unit will be responsible to equip itself for optimal geographic and environmental acclimation. All individual service affiliations will be shed, in order to present a unified front, with uniforms and insignia distinctly different from those of the U.S. combatant forces. Adequate PISCES forces will be obtained, trained and maintained for continuous employment (to include immediate re-deployment).

Individual training will extend beyond each member’s specialty area in order to develop a consistent pool of specialists who understand the culture of the country in which they are operating. Each team member will become a valuable and reliable HIMINT source. PISCES will not only provide input to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) but will assist in the analytical interpretation and confirmation of regional intelligence developments.

PISCES FUNCTION

Preventive Intervention. PISCES will reduce the overall volatility of the world-wide geo-political system to “buy down” the risk and uncertainty associated with the unpredictable nature of interpersonal and inter-societal interactions. A goal of this mission is to prevent the need for Coercive Diplomacy. This mission will incorporate the classically

defined MOOTW missions of: 1) Political mediation / reconciliation, 2) Humanitarian Assistance, 3) Human Rights Monitoring and 4) Public Information.

Security Cooperation. PISCES will weave an inter-digitative strategic web of diplomatic treaties, economic contracts and military interdependencies to coordinate international efforts in the creation of an interactive Security Net. This mission will incorporate the PDD 55 missions for: 1) Military Support, 2) Demobilization and 3) Social Reconciliation.

Environmental Security. PISCES will respond to manmade and natural disasters in order to reconstruct a safe, stable and secure environment in which civil, economic and political systems are allowed to flourish. This mission would incorporate the prior MOOTW missions of 1) Basic Public Services and 2) Economic Restoration.

Designating the CSF as a “police” force rather than a “military” force provides greater flexibility to the team. As a law enforcement agency, the CSF will be allowed to search, seize and arrest. The CSF will require special national and international law training and SWAT type training in the urban environment. This designation will also allow North Com to task PISCES to Homeland Security missions. Finally, this designation will benefit PISCES during humanitarian operations, in that it will obviate the foreign perception that the “American Military is invading.”

PISCES will allow the CoComs to assume the lead in Preventive Diplomacy and Cooperative Security at home and abroad. It will become a new military tool to coordinate an exit strategy following conventional warfare. (See Appendix J) It will also bridge the gap between U.S. National-Military-State and Local disaster relief agencies. PISCES can be the most effective means to build upon the valuable lessons learned over a decade of NGO-

military interactions. Alternatively, the CoCom could utilize PISCES to expand his factor of space, multiply his factor of force and reduce his factor of time. Conversely, he can also deploy his core competencies (namely global situational awareness, responsiveness, and long-range, precision-strike capabilities) to support PISCES missions. Either way, friendly and civilian casualties will be minimized.

APPLICATION

One can explore the CoCom's options, had PISCES been an established Functional Combatant Command in 1991. Prior to the September 11th attacks (9-11), Special Operations Command Central Command (SOCCENT) would have limited numbers of fluent forces scattered through out the Middle East in order to conduct ongoing intelligence operations. Following 9-11, SOCCENT would request additional assets from PISCES, and would begin in-depth social and civil evaluations in the proposed Theater of Operations in order to develop a comprehensive picture of the current psycho-social structure, to extrapolate the critical strengths and weaknesses into the post-hostility period and to identify NGOs which have an interest in the area. For Operation Iraqi Freedom, PISCES forces would be phased into the theater through out hostilities and would be in place prior to beginning peacekeeping operations. Each major city would have a PISCES "city-council" structure which would operate "side-by-side" and parallel with their counterpart local national personnel in order to plan, organize and operate basic civil functions. Each PISCES "city team" would interact with local resources and NGO at a city-wide (or smaller if necessary) Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) and would forward requests for "tailored packages" of assets to CENTC OM through the chain-of-command. Each PISCES community would turn-over

control to its local counterpart on a time-line established at the local level, depending on the specific requirements and resources available.

CONCLUSION

PISCES will allow today's Service Chiefs to train, equip and fund troops to dominate all Complex Contingency Operations. The Combatant Commanders will utilize PISCES to assume the lead in Preventive Diplomacy and Cooperative Security, at home and abroad. PISCES will not only lead the transformation required in our new National Security Strategy, but it will be the transformer which allows today's multitude of political operating systems to communicate. Even though lessons have been learned and applied to the strategic and operational evolution of Political-Military Interactions, current Combatant Commanders need the ability to interact with, influence and facilitate the "ground assets" of NGOs, IGO's and PVO's. PISCES is the requisite tools for confronting future Complex Contingency Operations.

APPENDIX A

U.S. MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN MOOTW

The USAF reports involvement in over eight-hundred MOOTW over the past 80 years. Since 1983 the United States Military has learned lessons from multiple such operations including:

- 1983 Lebanon, Marine Barracks
- 1983 Grenada intervention
- 1987 Berlin: bombing / Lybia: Eldorado Canyon
- 1989 Panama: Blue Spoon / Just Cause
- 1989 JTF - Alaska Oil Spill
- 1990 Desert Shield / Storm
- 1991 Operation Provide Comfort: Turkey and Northern Iraq
- 1991 Sea Angel: Bangladesh
- 1991 Fiery Vigil: Philippines
- 1991 Guantanamo Haitian Refugees
- 1992 Operation Provide Hope: Former Soviet Union
- 1992 Operation Provide Relief: Kenya-Somalia
- 1992 Hurricane Andrew: Florida/Louisiana
- 1992 Typhoon Omar: Guam
- 1992 Typhoon Iniki: Hawaii
- 1992 Operation Restore Hope: Somalia
- 1993 Operation Provide Promise: Former Rep of Yugoslavia / Bosnia
- 1995 Operation Allied Force, Kosovo

The constraints imposed on the CoCom by the current system are illustrated through the MOOTW involvement of the USAF over the past eighty years and through more than 800 operations. The Air Force's first major MOOTW success was the Berlin Airlift. Since the end of the Cold War however, multiple types of small conflicts and non-combat operations placed exceptional demands on the USAF. "Peace operations" accounted for 90% of all sorties flown between the end of the Cold War and 2002. They placed unusually high demands on specialized assets (i.e. the Airborne Warning and Control System [AWACS], intelligence platforms, and Special Operations Forces [SOF] aircraft) as well as on the fighter

force. The amount of time the USAF devoted to such operations exploded from almost zero during the last few years of the Cold War to a level that consumed ten percent of USAF flight hours in the 1990's.

This steep increase in airframe demand was due to "peace operations" requiring the USAF to enforce no-fly zones. The current concept of operation for such missions requires fighters and AWACS to fly long sorties patrolling the controlled airspace. In turn, these patrolling aircraft must be supported by tankers, electronic warfare, and other assets.

Difficult enough to maintain over a short period, this level of commitment has continued for years, with USAF squadrons flying sorties over Iraq since 1991, over Bosnia since 1993 and even over the United States following 9-11.

"The consequences of these continuing sorties are reduced combat readiness and lower morale for the commands--and the particular assets--that bear most of the burden."²¹

In the short term, this high level of involvement disrupted the routine training and exercises needed to prepare for major conflicts. In the long term, excessive TDY assignments could lead to lower retention rates and less-experienced and less-capable units.

APPENDIX B

INTERAGENCY COMPLEX CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS HANDBOOK

<http://c21.maxwell.af.mil/responseplans>

Lessons for the Interagency from Past Complex Contingency Operations

Summary:

- deciding to intervene
- crafting an integrated strategy
- establishing effective integration mechanisms
- determining who will lead the operation
- building a cohesive and effective coalition
- gaining political support for the operation
- continually reassessing the operation
- executing a smooth and seamless transition

Lessons in Detail

1. **Deciding to intervene.** Any decision to conduct or participate in a complex contingency operation should be based on the following factors:
 - a realistic assessment of the situation
 - an assessment of U. S. interests at stake
 - an assessment of options and an evaluation of the costs/risks compared to U.S. interests
 - likely participation/contributions of other governments and organizations
 - identification of clear objectives, an exit criteria and strategy for the U.S.
 - acceptability of command, control, communication and intelligence arrangements
 - prospects for gaining adequate political and financial support for the operation
2. **Crafting an integrated strategy.** Complex contingency operations involve far more than simply military operations. Any strategy for achieving U.S. objectives must integrate political, military, humanitarian and other dimensions.

3. **Establishing effective integration mechanisms.** The interagency must ensure that mechanisms for integration exist at all levels -strategic, operational and tactical -- and that these mechanisms coordinate with one another.
 - At the strategic level (Washington), the interagency will establish an EXCOM.
 - At the operational level (regional combatant command), the CINC should establish an interagency cell to provide advice and assistance.
 - At the tactical level (host nation), the Ambassador should augment the Country Team with interagency representatives as appropriate. In the absence of U.S. diplomatic representation in country, the CJTF Commander should establish an interagency cell to provide advice and assistance.
4. **Determining who will lead the operation.** For the foreseeable future, the UN is not capable of undertaking complex contingency operations that involve the potential for combat without a strong member or alliance taking the lead.
 - When the United States commits significant numbers of troops to such an operation, it must be prepared to play more than a supporting role and to be held accountable for the results.
 - If U.S. interests do not support such a leadership role, then forms of participation other than committing large numbers of troops should be considered.
5. **Building a cohesive and effective coalition.** When forming a coalition, the lead nation or organization should:
 - assess the political will and military capability of possible participants
 - obtain advance agreement from coalition on:
 - mandate, objectives and strategy
 - command and control arrangements
 - rules of engagement
 - resource contributions of each participant
 - establish mechanisms for regular consultation and coordination among coalition partners, both on the ground and at higher political levels
6. **Gaining political support for the operation.** Winning and sustaining the support of Congress and the American people is critical to success. Congressional and public affairs strategies are, therefore, critical elements of any integrated strategy. This must be done not only at the outset of an operation, but also whenever significant changes on the ground or in the pol-mil plan occur.
7. **Continually reassessing the operation.** Once the operation is underway, the interagency must continually reassess the operation to ensure that mission execution remains consistent with our overall objectives and strategy.

- Operations on the ground must be transparent to key policy-makers.
 - When conditions on the ground change significantly, the interagency must fully assess the impact of such change on its overall objectives, its strategy and the means needed to carry it out.
 - Shifts in policy guidance must be communicated as clear decisions and coordinated with coalition partners; communication up and down the chain of command must remain unbroken.
 - Whenever U.S. troops are put in harm's way, the USG must ensure that policy issues are surfaced and resolved in a timely manner and that the operation receives sustained policy oversight.
8. **Executing a smooth and seamless transition.** A smooth, seamless transition from a coalition operation to a UN operation requires:
- carefully worded UNSCR transition language
 - early selection of the SRSG and force commander
 - early deployment of an advance team or core headquarters staff
 - commitment of significant time, effort and resources to help the UN plan/prepare for the follow-on operation
 - beginning to recruit for the UN operation while recruiting for the coalition operation
 - realistic evaluation of both the political will and the capabilities of potential contributors
 - tailoring the U. S. contribution to the UN operation

APPENDIX C

MILITARY LESSONS LEARNED FROM RECENT COMPLEX CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

The 1991 Kurdish Refugee Crisis required a rapid response in inhospitable terrain. United Nations agencies were not operational at the time and the U.S. military forces initiated and supported the relief effort. The military effectively supported the NGO community and multiple military technical and humanitarian supporting services were identified. However, the decision-makers were unprepared to make the required “public health” decisions and “mission creep” was a problem. The primary lesson the military identified was that they were not familiar with Relief Community culture or “players” who were involved.

From 1992 to 1993, Somalia was characterized by anarchy and the world’s worst poverty levels. The United Nations was faced with dealing with a situation in which there was no government with which to negotiate. A long-term relief effort came to standstill over escalating security problems, and the military intervened. Not only was this military response perceived as “bypassing” the on-going humanitarian effort, but the assigned military “platform” was ineffective against the warring factions. The absence of cohesive UN guidelines and well trained UN peacekeepers compromised the intervention.

Rwanda presented a Complex post-colonial period conflict from 1994 to 1996. The international UN response was delayed for 6 months and relief efforts occurred amid progressive violence, disease and diversion of aid to the military factions. This contingency demonstrated that the international governmental community is ambivalent about getting involved in “old smoldering” internal conflicts. It highlighted the requirement for initial

public health assessments to “diagnose” problems and coordinate relief efforts prior to establishing definitive procedures. It also established that aid, in the absence of political solutions, solves nothing.

Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo (1992-Present) provided a non-African relief model. UNPROFOR was established without mission statement, Rules-of-Engagement and Measures-of-Effectiveness. The dilemma of “the lesser of two evils” was recognized within a flawed peace accord. In Bosnia, the underlying cause of the conflict was found to be deep ethnic hatred resulting in violations of humanitarian law. In Kosovo, the humanitarian community was not prepared for speed of crisis. NATO was quick to set up refugee camps, however did not coordinate their efforts with the relief agencies.

APPENDIX D

**HUMANITARIAN LESSONS LEARNED
FROM RECENT
COMPLEX CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS**

Each situation created its own set of lessons learned. In July of 1992, the CDC reported that “over the past three decades, the most common emergencies affecting the health of large populations in developing countries have involved famine and forced migrations”²² They also provided evidence that the two most common recent trigger events for population displacements have been famine and war. Disaster-evolution can be described in terms of a "trigger event" leading to "primary effects" with subsequent "secondary effects." In the case of a rapid-onset disasters (like an earthquake), the primary effects (i.e. death, injury and destruction) may be high but there are few secondary effects. In the case of a slow-onset disasters (like drought) or manmade disasters (like war and civil strife), the secondary effects (i.e. decreased food availability, environmental damage, and population displacement) may lead to a higher delayed death toll than that of the initial event. The most severe consequences of population displacement occur during the acute emergency phase, when demand is high, when catastrophic losses remain preventable and when relief efforts are poorly coordinated. The crude mortality rate (CMR) of refugees has risen to sixty times the CMR of comparable non-refugee populations in the country of origin.

During non-emergency situations, the daily CMR in developing countries is 0.5 per 10,000 persons. The death rates in Zaire (34-54 deaths per 10,000 per day) were among the highest to be documented during recent refugee emergencies, while those among refugees in Burundi were similar to those recorded in border camps in Thailand in 1979 (10.6 per 10,000 per day), in Somalia in 1980 (10.1 per 10,000 per day), and in Ethiopia in 1991 (4.7 per

10,000 per day). In Zaire, a high proportion (initially 90%) of deaths occurred outside health-care facilities, indicating either that health-care service was not accessible to a high proportion of severely ill persons or services at clinic sites were exceeded by demands.

Although the quality of international disaster response efforts has steadily improved, the human cost of forced migration remains high. The international community's response to the health needs of these populations has been at times inappropriate, relying on teams of foreign medical personnel with little or no training. Hospitals, clinics, and feeding centers have been set up without assessment of preliminary needs, and essential prevention programs have been neglected. War, food deficits, famine, and population displacement combine to be linked to increased mortality in certain large populations in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East.

Detailed, defined and directed CCO surveillance systems must be initiated during the emergency phase to identify the appropriate need for services. This leads to rapid identification of outbreaks, to implementation of appropriate interventions and to the accurate assessment of their response (i.e. control diarrheal diseases through the provision of clean water, the creation of sanitation systems, the distribution of soap and the training of aggressive community re-hydration programs).²³

APPENDIX E
FUTURE-WAR -
A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS

A consensus of military strategists predicts that there will be “more failing states” and more “non-state threats to security” over the next twenty-five years. Tangredi assumed that “no one source has the ideal solution,” and compiled thirty-six, clean slate, unclassified studies on the future security environment (published between 1996 and 2000) for input to the current QDR. He then listed sixteen consenting (85%) and 9 divergent assessments including that there would neither be an ideological competitor, a rival coalition of states nor a conventional military peer competitor for the United States through the year 2025. He also concluded that there would be more failing states, more non-state threats to security and more use of anti-access and area denial strategies against U.S. forces. Finally, he stated (prior to 9-11) that the U.S. homeland would become increasingly vulnerable to asymmetric attacks and that large-scale combat involving U.S. forces would likely include the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).²⁴

Michael Renner compiled a quantitative summary, finding that “of the 108 armed conflicts during 1989-98...just seven wars during that decade were interstate wars.” He also went on to support an argument that the “health” of societies (economic well being, social justice, equity, natural environments) is ultimately the most important issue; he argued that “no amount of defense spending and military sophistication can repair its loss.”²⁵

Martin van Creveld tracked the development of war from A.D. 1000 to 1945. He reached a similar conclusion that “future wars will be overwhelmingly of the type known... as ‘low intensity’.” He argued that since the advent of nuclear weapons, large-scale interstate war as a phenomenon was slowly but surely being squeezed below the historical horizon and

that the frequency of intrastate war is going up. He used the past 50 years as a guide to say that military actions will need to change their doctrine to become more like police.²⁶ Van Creveld went on to describe Future War as one which will become a “war without fronts” between “states” without borders using weapons “that are prohibited today.” If our soldiers are going to fight this war, if our military is going to win this war, if our nation is going to survive this war, we must prepare for it today.

The frequency of complex emergencies is expected to remain high over the next decade. Humanitarian needs are moving from rural to urban settings, creating humanitarian relief and transition challenges, notably the challenge to the strategic planning process to keep pace with changing environment.

APPENDIX F

VIOLENCE AGAINST CIVILIANS

Recent history holds numerous incidents of intentional direct and indirect violence against civilians. Such acts include the:

- 1) One-million who were killed by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia.
- 2) The one-million killed by the Hutu's in Rwanda
- 3) The Kurds who suffered chemical attacks in Iraq
- 4) The 100,000 who were "cleansed" in Bosnia-Herzegovnia.

Disruption of the basic social infrastructure has also been responsible for countless deaths:

- 1) In Angola and Ethiopia fields were burned and then mined.
- 2) In Lebanon water systems were destroyed and water sources were contaminated.
- 3) In Khmer Rouge (1975-79) all the hospitals were destroyed and only 45 of 450 doctors remained.
- 4) In Mozambique, 45% of all the health care facilities were destroyed
- 5) In Nigeria (1967-70) a medical school was destroyed.
- 6) In Angola 2 of 150 church-sponsored hospitals remained intact.

APPENDIX G

*The CMOC*²⁷

by MAJ Richard Vick, Battle Command Training Program

As a civil affairs subject matter expert (SME) with the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP), Operations Group Bravo, I have observed several corps and divisional warfighters. Each of these warfighters has provided a unique view of civil-military operation centers (CMOCs) in a variety of geographical and urbanized environments. While all, at the end of an exercise, had made great strides toward a smooth and efficient operation, several areas had systemic shortfalls. These shortfalls included: the physical layout of the CMOC, the meeting framework, the lack of situational awareness between the military and the international organizations (IOs) and non-governmental officials (NGOs) and, finally, who should attend the initial meetings. I will address these shortfalls and make recommendations on possible solutions to correct them.

Layout of the CMOC

There is little in the way of doctrine that can assist a unit in managing a CMOC. **FM 41-10, *Civil Affairs Operations***, addresses the set up of a CMOC, but it lacks a checklist of items needed to maintain it. I have proposed a packing list of basic items that I believe are essential:

- Maps of the area (should be 1-50/1-100,000; be prepared to give a map to one or more NGOs).
- Six tables.
- Twenty-four chairs.
- Four tablets of butcher-block paper/easel/pens.
- Several rolls of acetate for overlays.
- Large coffee pot/coffee cups.
- Twenty-four spiral note books.
- Two boxes of pens.
- Thank-you notes (to be used after the initial CMOC meeting).
- Two rolls of acetate.

- DA Form 751, Telephone Log.
- Four packs of 3x5 cards.
- Stapler.
- One box of staples.
- One box of adhesive dots.
- Area study.
- **FM 27-10, *The Law of Land Warfare.***
- **FM 41-10, *Civil Affairs Operations.***
- **FM 101-5, *Staff Organization and Operations.***

The basic layout of the CMOC should project an air of professionalism and aid in the building of rapport between you, the IOs, and the NGOs. The location of radios and faxes should be far enough away from the actual CMOC meeting location so as not to interfere with any coordination that is taking place with IOs or NGOs. Constant interruptions of the meeting will only detract from the purpose of the meeting, which is to facilitate interaction between the military and the IO and NGO communities.

The layout of the meeting site is critical. A large table that has place cards to indicate where everyone sits should be by organization, not by name. This technique will limit how many of a certain group can sit at the table and will prevent one group from monopolizing the meeting. Avoid a lecture-type or briefing-type arrangement with a podium and chairs in a seating arrangement. You are not lecturing or giving a military-style brief; you are the facilitator of a meeting. Ensure you have spare chairs that can be used for overflow if necessary, but be careful because you do not want to have a meeting attended by 100 people unless you are prepared for it. Do not hesitate to move disruptive IOs and NGOs away from the head of the table. This sends a subtle but unmistakable message that open, honest discussion is encouraged, but an abusive, confrontational demeanor will not be tolerated. If movement farther from the head of the table does not work, the disruptive person or persons can be moved to the overflow seats. (See Figure 1.)

CMOC LAYOUT




Figure 1
Conducting a CMOC Meeting

Once you have decided on the layout of the CMOC, you should review the actual conduct of the meeting. An agenda should be posted on a blackboard or butcher-block tablet that has the time and date of the next meeting. The agenda should include the following:

- Opening comments.
- A brief situation report on activities in the AO for the last 24 hours to include enemy activities along MSR (have this brief cleared with the G-2 and PAO).
- Current working issues.
- Issues the IOs/NGOs are working.
- IO/NGO status of food/water deliveries.
- Any new tasks and IO/NGO issues (briefed by the IOs/NGOs).
- A brief summary (allow time for the scribe to read back any issues that were raised to avoid any misunderstanding as to what was said).
- Closing remarks.

Once you have your agenda, rehearse it to see what questions may come up and how to best handle them. This rehearsal will allow you to anticipate and possibly avoid getting trapped into promising something you can't deliver. After the meeting, have a post-CMOC meeting to determine who is responsible to provide an action. This will ensure you are prepared for any possible problems prior to the next meeting.

Allow time before or after the meeting to glean information from the IOs and NGOs. Ask leading questions such as: Are you having trouble traveling the roads in the north (assuming troops will be advancing north at some time in the future) and if so, why (bad roads, blown bridges)? Civil affairs soldiers are not active intelligence collectors, but they can be passive collectors if they know what questions to ask.

Situational Awareness

The lack of common situational awareness between the military and the IOs and NGOs is compounded by the lack of common maps. The CMOC staff generally uses 1:50,000 or 1:100,000 military maps. In most cases, this is not the same as what the IOs or NGOs use. With no common frame of reference, the use of grids to identify a location on the ground will not be easily passed to an organization that has no military maps. A possible solution would be to procure selected map sheets of the areas where the IOs and NGOs are working and provide them to the lead agency in the area. If the maps are in short supply, the use of Rand McNally maps or a map downloaded from the Internet may facilitate the passing of information from the military to the IOs and NGOs. This method, however, has the potential for errors when converting a general location from a non-military map to a military map.

Attendance at CMOC Meetings

Who should attend CMOC meetings? A representative from the G-2 shop is critical. He can give an unclassified situation brief as to activities in the area of operation. This brief helps the IOs and NGOs understand why movement into certain areas is restricted (terrorism, banditry, or special purpose forces activity). The division transportation officer will explain how (if allowed) to move humanitarian supplies on main supply routes. The Judge Advocate General can explain the U.S. position on the Geneva Convention, Hague Convention, and Ottawa Mine Convention, and what our responsibilities are toward these conventions. The Chaplain can discuss any religious concerns of the IOs and NGOs. The medical officer can discuss medical concerns. These are just a few of the military representatives you may want to have at the CMOC meetings.

Conclusion

You have learned a way to set up an efficient, professionally organized CMOC. With this basic guidance, your first CMOC meetings will be more productive, and you will be able to develop the critical rapport that is needed between the IOs and NGOs and the military.

APPENDIX H

Special Operations Official Reference Manual²⁸

CHAPTER 3

US ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

US Army Civil Affairs (CA) Organization

CA units are designed to provide support to both GP and SO forces at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. The vast majority of army CA forces are in the reserve component (RC). The army's active component (AC) CA unit (96th CA BN, Ft. Bragg, NC) is capable of rapidly deploying one of its five regionally aligned CA companies to meet the initial CA support requirement, with transition to RC units beginning as soon as mobilization permits. The RC civil affairs units have functional specialties, with the unit's soldiers being assigned to functional teams. The functional specialties are:

Government Section

Legal

Public administration

Public Education

Public Health

Public Safety

Economic/Commerce Section

Economic Development

Civilian Supply

Food and Agriculture

Public Facilities Section

Public Communications

Transportation

Public Works and Utilities

Special Functions Section

Cultural Relations

Civil Information

Dislocated Civilians

Emergency Services

Environmental Management

Civil Affairs Command

The five reserve component CA commands provide predeployment command and control to their geographically oriented CA brigades and battalions. CA commands provide support to their respective warfighting CINC. They are usually the senior CA unit in theater and aligned to the Theater Army (TA)

The command's mission is to plan, manage and conduct CA operations that support the TA commander. The CA command may also provide staff support to the TA component services and joint theater staff as required. The CA Commands are responsible for the training, equipping, and preparation of their subordinate units for mobilization and deployment both in war and in support of peace operations. When deployed CA units are attached to the supported command. Civil Affairs commands have all the CA functional specialties organized in functional teams.

Civil Affairs Brigades

The Civil Affairs brigades support the corps and the JTF, TA, theater support command, and TA area commands. The CA brigades provide predeployment command and control to their battalions. The CA brigade accomplishes its mission through attachment of its subordinate battalions. The CA brigades are responsible for the training, equipage, and preparation of their subordinate units for mobilization and deployment both in war and support of peace operations. When a CA brigade is designated the senior CA unit in theater, it is aligned to a Theater Army, and assumes the duties of a CA command. It is the lowest level unit that has representation of all of the CA functional specialties

Civil Affairs Battalions

There are three types of Civil Affairs battalions; the General Support (GS), General Purpose(GP)

and Foreign Internal Defense/Unconventional Warfare (FID/UW)

Civil Affairs FID/UW BN Typical

The GS battalion is the army's only active duty CA battalion and it is responsible for planning and conducting CA activities in support of military operations. Composed of CA generalists, it provides immediate operational access to CA assets for the regional CINCs, through the GS battalion's regionally aligned companies.

The CA battalion (GP) mission is to plan and conduct CA activities in support of a division, a corps support command, or an area support group. It supports planning and coordination of CA and foreign nation support operations. The unit provides Civil Affairs functional area specialists in the following areas:

- Public Administration
- Dislocated Civilians
- Civilian Supply
- Public Communications
- Public Health
- Public Work and Utilities

The primary mission of the reserve components' CA battalion FID/UW is to support the theater SOC, the JSOTF, the SF group headquarters. Its secondary mission is providing CA support to conventional forces. The following are examples of possible CA organizations.

APPENDIX I

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Iraq – Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance

Fact Sheet #34, Fiscal Year (FY) 2003 May 15, 2003

Current Situation (Updated Daily)

Sector Updates

Food

The U.S. Government's Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) reports that the Ministry of Trade (MOT) and the World Food Program (WFP) are expecting the first nationwide Public Distribution System (PDS) distribution to begin in June. During June, Iraq will begin with a clean slate and food distributions for the actual month will occur. WFP is using the month of May to provide missing commodities in the food rations already distributed within the nine southern governorates. The commodities to be provided during May include wheat flour, rice, and vegetable oil, but the exact needs vary by location. The DART estimates that there will be shortfalls in powdered milk for the June food rations, an important commodity in the southern Iraqi food basket. _____

The DART reports that the M/V Rise completed its discharge of rice on May 14. In view of the Umm Qasr port's improved performance, WFP is encouraging more ship owners to use the Umm Qasr port. WFP expects to berth another vessel containing rice in Umm Qasr around May 20 and will continue to use the port as conditions permit.

WFP reported to the DART that food distributions in Mosul took place on May 12. WFP provided 40 metric tons (MT) of food commodities to hospitals, an elders' house, and a girls' orphanage. Ministry of Trade (MOT) personnel started the distributions of the general food rations on the same day in order to cover 30 percent of the population who did not receive their September-October food entitlement.

Health

__On May 14, the World Health Organization (WHO) reported that the lack of security is becoming an acute problem for the health system in Iraq. WHO reports that hospitals and other health facilities are not protected; water pumping stations are still being looted; warehouses and distribution networks are not secure; doctors and nurses cannot safely carry out their work; and people cannot get safe access to health care.

__The DART reports that surveillance is the cornerstone of disease outbreak control. Because of the destruction of the Department of Public Health Laboratory in Al Basrah by looting, only a passive surveillance system exists that does not cover all hospitals and clinics. The DART met with the Cholera Task Force to facilitate the funding of laboratory re-agents, culture media, and other essential laboratory supplies that would jump-start the laboratory surveillance. The DART is assisting, through International Medical Corps (IMC), in providing supplies for laboratories in Al Basrah.

Infrastructure

USAID reports that the U.N. Development Program (UNDP) has engaged a dredger to deepen births 1-8 at the Umm Qasr port. This dredging is based on past and current engineering studies at the port and is coordinated with USAID-financed dredging at the port by the Port Authority (British Coalition forces, Stevedoring Services of America (SSA),

Great Lakes (a Bechtel sub-contractor) and the UNDP contractor). The dredging is financed by a \$3 million grant from the Government of Japan to UNDP.

According to the Coalition Joint Task Force, passenger rail service between Baghdad and Al Basrah is operating daily in each direction. Passenger service has also been running on a regular basis between Baghdad and Mosul.

Water and Sanitation

__The DART reports that UNICEF is procuring 50 tons of chlorine to supplement dwindling supplies in Al Basrah and has provided the Al Basrah water utility authority with new chlorinators to replace older malfunctioning devices. In addition, an active health education program is now being launched to improve personal hygiene and promote hand washing.

U.S. Government Response (New information is underlined)

Emergency Relief

__USAID/OFDA is supporting U.N. and NGO emergency assistance activities through quick-impact projects and IDP support. USAID/OFDA supports projects in the sectors of agriculture, food security, health, logistics, nutrition, shelter, and water/sanitation.

The DART has approved an implementation plan under USAID/OFDA's cooperative agreement with the International Medical Corps (IMC) to restore four looted health clinics in Kirkuk to operating condition. IMC

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will supply health kits from OFDA regional stockpiles, including essential drugs and equipment, as well as provide repairs to essential water, sewage, electricity and other basic

needs such as doors and windows. IMC will also provide furniture and medical examination equipment to replace the equipment that was looted.

The DART has approved an implementation plan under USAID/OFDA's cooperative agreement with Save the Children/US (SC/US) to register and track internally displaced person (IDP) concentrations in Al Basrah governorate; assess their basic needs; and provide them with assistance as appropriate including food, emergency shelter, non-food items, and protection. SC/US will also assist in voluntary returns as appropriate. SC/US estimates this implementation plan will benefit 10,000 IDPs.

_____USAID's Office of Food for Peace (USAID/FFP) is providing emergency food commodities through the Emerson Trust and P.L. 480 Title II emergency food assistance to WFP for distribution to food insecure Iraqis. WFP also received a cash contribution from USAID/FFP for the purchase of commodities in the region.

USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID/OTI) is supporting the implementation of the Iraq Transition Initiative (ITI). The ITI program supports the process of political stabilization and community recovery in post-conflict Iraq by providing small grants designed to build confidence among Iraq's diverse ethnic groups, increase citizen participation in decision-making, and rapidly respond to community needs, while establishing and building trust for long term reconstruction efforts. The ITI program is implemented through Development Alternatives Incorporated (DAI) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

USAID/OTI is supporting a month-long community clean-up program in four neighborhoods in the former Saddam City benefiting 16,000 people. The program will create temporary employment (three days employment for each person employed during the one

month program) for workers to clean up and haul away garbage, sewage, and debris from the streets, alleys, and public spaces as well as repair broken sewer pumps and pipes. Total funding for this program is \$280,000.

USAID/OTI is supporting the emergency provision of approximately 3,000 tons of special cement that will reinforce the Mosul dam foundation and interior core for up to two months, as well as obtaining a shipment of turbine oil for the generators and sulfuric acid for the control room batteries. Total support for Mosul dam is approximately \$144,000. Mosul dam, the largest in Iraq, has structural problems that threaten its integrity. Additionally, its generators, which provide power to around 1.7 million people, are in danger of burning out due to a shortage of turbine lubricating oil.

The Department of State's Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration (State/PRM) contributed assistance for the pre-positioning and emergency response activities of UNHCR, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), and the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

Reconstruction

In addition to the emergency relief assistance provided through the DART by USAID and the Department of State, USAID's Asia and Near East Bureau (USAID/ANE) has provided assistance for reconstruction activities in Iraq in a broad range of sectors. USAID supports reconstruction projects in education, governance, health, infrastructure, and logistics.

Infrastructure

USAID private sector partner Bechtel is looking to make repairs to the Kharza bridge, which will be instrumental to the transport of humanitarian food and fuel assistance from Jordan. Bechtel is looking into different engineering designs and work is scheduled to begin immediately after design selection.

The assessment of power plants and substations in Baghdad and the Al Basrah Governorate is ongoing. USAID is working to distribute necessary chemicals to power stations in the southern Iraq and Baghdad. An air assessment of the national power system is scheduled for May 15.

Bechtel is scheduled to meet with the manager of the southern Iraq Railroads to determine inventory and needs for the railroad line that runs from Umm Qasr to Al Basrah.

Umm Qasr Port __

USAID air and sea ports project manager is meeting with the former Iraqi Port Authority Staff and Bechtel to coordinate efforts on the port rehabilitation.

A magnetron, which is used to locate sunken vessels, is due to arrive at the Umm Qasr port on May 17. This piece of equipment will facilitate the task of clearing the channel so larger ships can reach the port with humanitarian supplies.

Local Governance __

USAID local governance partner, Research Triangle Institute (RTI), and education partner, Creative Associates International (CAII), will travel to southern Iraq May 17-20 to make initial USAID local small grants in Al Basrah. These grants will be in sectors such as school renovation and repair and security packages.

Two RTI representatives deployed to Baghdad continue to serve as principal participants in meetings with representatives of Baghdad's municipal districts in their discussions on the concept of neighborhood meetings and advisory groups.

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Health __

USAID health project manager is working on an implementation plan for a national immunization day, possibly to be held at the end of June.

USAID private sector partner for health, Abt Associates, arrived in Kuwait City on May 15 and will meet with the USAID health project manager in Kuwait City on May 16 to coordinate with Abt on creating a list of priorities.

__WHO epidemiologists are developing reporting and recording documents as part of the health information system (HIS) in an effort to detect outbreaks early on. This system will be implemented first in Al Basrah in collaboration with the Iraqi Director of Public Health. WHO now has representatives in Baghdad and Mosul and are reestablishing their national operations.

Background

__Since 1991, the Iraqi population has subsisted on the brink of a humanitarian disaster due to the lingering effects of war, sanctions, and drought. Between 1991 and 1996, the U.S. Government provided nearly \$794 million in humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons in northern Iraq.

__In 1996, the Government of Iraq accepted the U.N. Oil-for-Food Program, after which humanitarian conditions improved. Revenues from the OFF program provided food, medicine, and other civilian goods to assist vulnerable Iraqis through the Public Distribution

System. However, widespread corruption by Iraqi officials limited the effectiveness of the OFF program.

__On March 20, 2003, Coalition forces began military operations in Iraq. On May 1, 2003, 42 days after the conflict began, U.S. President George W. Bush announced that combat operations in Iraq have ended. Although the recent conflict did not result in the large-scale humanitarian crisis and widespread displacement many had envisioned, the conflict and subsequent disorder has exacerbated the Iraqi population's vulnerable circumstances.

__In March 2003, the United States Government deployed a multi-agency Disaster Assistance Response Team to the region to assess and respond to humanitarian needs and to help coordinate the emergency relief effort. In Iraq, the DART has established offices in Al Basrah, Arbil, Baghdad, and Al Hillah. In addition, DART members are located in Kuwait, Jordan, Cyprus, and Qatar and are working closely with U.N. agencies, Non-Governmental Organizations, and in coordination with U.S. Military Civil Affairs personnel.

Other Donor and International Organization Assistance*

DONOR	US \$ (MILLIONS)	DATE (2003)	ASSISTANCE SNAPSHOT
Australia	\$64.9	April 29	U.N. agencies, ICRC, and NGOs
Austria	\$1.1	April 1	UNICEF
Bangladesh	\$2	April 4	Food Assistance
Belgium	\$4.4	April 29	ICRC, UNICEF
Canada	\$74.6	March 26	WFP, UNICEF, UNHCR, OCHA, ICRC, NGOs
China		March 27	Tents
Croatia	\$2.8	May 2	Blankets, sleeping bags, flour, sugar, water purification disinfectants
European Commission	\$117.7	April 22	U.N. agencies, IOs, and NGOs
Finland	\$5.13	March 25	ICRC, UN OCHA, WFP
France	\$10.7		UNICEF, WFP, NGOs
Germany	\$50	May 5	UNHCR, WFP, ICRC
Greece	\$4.6	May 5	UNHCR, ICRC, NGOs
Iceland	\$3.75	April 8	ICRC, NGOs, UNCHR, WFP
India	\$20	April 4	WFP and U.N. Consolidated Appeal
Ireland	\$5.1	March 31	U.N. agencies and NGOs for humanitarian assistance
Japan	\$212	May 1	U.N. Agencies, NGOs, Bilateral Assistance
Korea	\$10	April 3	U.N. agencies and Korean NGOs
Kuwait	\$30	March 14	UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF, ICRC
Netherlands	\$20.5	April 2	U.N. Consolidated Appeal and ICRC
New Zealand	\$2.3	April 22	U.N. agencies including WFP, IOs, and NGOs
Spain	\$56.7	April 22	U.N. agencies, bilateral refugee assistance, and NGOs
Sweden	\$38	April 11	OCHA, UNICEF, ICRC, IFRC
Switzerland	\$21.9	April 16	ICRC, UNCHR, IOM, IFRC, OCHA
Taiwan	\$4.3	March 27	Refugee assistance – food, medicine, nonfood items
United Kingdom	\$382	April 29	U.N. agencies including WFP, IOs, and NGOs – food, health kits, water units, winter supply kits, primary health, IDP assistance
OTHER DONOR CONTRIBUTIONS TO DATE**			\$1,144 MILLION

*This compilation was drawn from the Department of State tracking of donor government pledged or committed funding. The list may not be comprehensive.

** This total is approximate as the value of donated commodities is not available in some cases.

Public Donation Information

__The most effective way people can assist relief efforts is by making cash donations to humanitarian organizations that are conducting relief operations. A list of humanitarian organizations that are accepting cash donations for their activities in the Gulf can be found in the “How Can I Help” section at [www.usaid.gov/iraq].

__USAID encourages cash donations because they: allow aid professionals to procure the exact items needed (often in the affected region); reduce the burden on scarce resources (such as staff time, warehouse space, etc); can be transferred very quickly and without transportation costs; support the economy of the disaster-stricken region; ensure culturally, dietary, and environmentally appropriate assistance.

__General information on making donations and volunteering can be found at:

o **USAID:** www.usaid.gov/iraq -> “How Can I Help?”

o **The Center for International Disaster Information:** www.cidi.org or 703-276-1914

o **InterAction:** www.interaction.org -> “Guide to Appropriate Giving”

o **Information on relief activities of the humanitarian community can be found at www.reliefweb.org.**

*Fact Sheets can be obtained from the USAID web site at <http://www.usaid.gov/iraq>

U.S. Government Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance to Iraq

<i>Agency</i>	<i>Implementing Partner</i>	<i>Sector</i>	<i>Regions</i>	<i>Amount</i>
FY 2003				
EMERGENCY RELIEF				
USAID/OFDA				\$51,232,905
	Administrative	Administrative Costs	Countrywide	\$3,406,209
	AirServ	Logistics	Countrywide	\$2,151,585
	The Cuny Center	Research studies	Countrywide	\$40,260
	International Dispensary Association	Health	Countrywide	\$711,850
	InterAction	Coordination	Kuwait City	\$92,860
	IOM	IDP programs	Countrywide	\$5,000,000
	IMC	Capacity building	Countrywide	\$202,900
	Logistics	Commodities and DART support	Countrywide	\$8,044,110
	SCF/US	NGO Consortium	Countrywide	\$883,131
	UNICEF	Health, nutrition, water/sanitation	Countrywide	\$4,000,000
	UN OCHA	Coordination and Information	Countrywide	\$1,200,000
	WFP	Logistics and pre-positioning of food	Countrywide	\$5,000,000
Cooperative Agreements				
	IMC	Quick-impact projects: Food Security, Health, Nutrition, Water/Sanitation	Countrywide	\$4,000,000
		Health	Al Basrah, Maysan, Wasit, Kirkuk	
		Health, Water/Sanitation	An Nasiriyah	
	IRC	Quick-impact projects: Health, Water/Sanitation	Countrywide	\$3,000,000
	Mercy Corps	Quick-impact projects: Health, Non-Food Items, Shelter, Water/Sanitation	Countrywide	\$3,000,000
		Water/Sanitation	Kirkuk	
		Water/Sanitation	Diyala	
	SCF/US	Quick-impact projects: Food Security, Health, Shelter, Nutrition, Non-Food Items, Water/Sanitation	Countrywide	\$4,000,000
		Nutrition	Mosul	
		Health, Transportation	Mosul	
		Non-Food items, Shelter, Water/Sanitation	Al Basrah	
	World Vision	Quick-impact projects: Health, Logistics, Non-Food Items	Countrywide	\$2,500,000
		Water/Sanitation	Al Anbar	
		Hospital Rehabilitation	Al Anbar	
	CARE	Quick-impact projects	Countrywide	\$4,000,000
		Water System Rehabilitation	Al Anbar	
		Blankets, Hygiene Kits	Baghdad	
USAID/FFP				\$430,000,000
	WFP	Pre-positioning funding	Countrywide	\$55,000,000
	WFP	Emerson Trust – 161,000 MT	Countrywide	\$84,000,000
	WFP	P.L. 480 Title II emergency food commodities – 105,000 MT	Countrywide	\$91,000,000
	WFP	Regional Purchase	Countrywide	\$200,000,000

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<i>Agency</i>	<i>Implementing Partner</i>	<i>Sector</i>	<i>Regions</i>	<i>Amount</i>
FY 2003				
EMERGENCY RELIEF (cont.)				
USAID/OTI				\$5,042,344
	Administrative	Administrative Costs	Countrywide	\$708,732
	IOM	Iraq Transition Initiative	Countrywide, Umm Qasr	\$1,700,000
	DAI	Iraq Transition Initiative	Countrywide, Baghdad, Mosul, Umm Qasr	\$2,473,253
	Internews	Media	Countrywide	\$160,359
STATE/PRM				\$36,630,000
	UNHCR	Emergency assistance	Countrywide	\$21,000,000
	ICRC	Emergency assistance	Countrywide	\$10,000,000
	IFRC	Emergency assistance	Countrywide	\$3,000,000
	IOM	TCN – transportation assistance	Countrywide	\$2,630,000
RECONSTRUCTION				
USAID/ANE				\$95,700,000
	ABT	Health	Countrywide	\$10,000,000
	AFCAP	Logistics	Countrywide	\$8,000,000
	Bechtel	Capital Construction	Countrywide, Mosul, Arbil, Umm Qasr, Baghdad, Al Basrah	\$34,600,000
	IRG	Reconstruction Support	Countrywide	\$9,800,000
	RTI	Local Governance	Countrywide, Al Basrah, Baghdad	\$7,900,000
	CAII	Education	Countrywide, Al Basrah	\$1,000,000
	UNICEF	Health	Countrywide	\$8,000,000
	UNICEF	Education	Countrywide	\$1,000,000
	WHO	Health	Countrywide, Mosul, Baghdad	\$10,000,000
	SSA	Port Management	Umm Qasr	\$2,900,000
	SkyLink	Logistics	Baghdad	\$2,500,000
TOTAL USAID ASSISTANCE TO IRAQ IN FY 2003				\$581,975,249
TOTAL STATE ASSISTANCE TO IRAQ IN FY 2003				\$36,630,000
TOTAL STATE/USAID ASSISTANCE TO IRAQ IN FY 2003				\$618,605,249

APPENDIX J

PISCES IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS

PISCES will lead the transformation required to meet the primary challenge of our new National Security Strategy: to use our strength to create a balance of power that favors human freedom; protecting the values of people across the globe “to be able to speak freely; choose who will govern them; worship as they please; educate their children – male and female; own property; and enjoy the benefits of their labor.”²⁹ PISCES will allow the CoCom to assume the lead in Preventive Diplomacy and Cooperative Security at home and abroad; it will create a new military tool to help coordinate a regional “conventional force exit strategy”; and it will bridge the gap between U.S. National-Military-State and Local disaster relief agencies. PISCES will become Northern Command’s primary tool for Homeland Defense and it will by definition; become the “model” agency for “joint” operations in the broadest sense. Eventually, PISCES has the potential not only to replace the current DoD Geographic CoCom structure, but to incorporate the entire DoD, State Department and Homeland Security Department into one unified national asset.

While these are difficult times for initiating new programs, a relatively small investment today will pay large dividends by minimizing the number of general-purpose forces involved in CCOs. PISCES will not only lead the transformation required meeting the primary challenge of our new National Security Strategy, but it will be the transformer which allows today’s multitude of political operating systems to communicate. In the same way that a simple electrical transformer is applied in order to utilize a 110V/60A appliance in a 220V/50A environment, PISCES must become the system transformer which will create linkages and interpretations between multiple different political operating systems. PISCES

must seamlessly interact and fluently converse not only with all military and security branches of the United States and her allies, but with the known Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGOs), Multi-National Corporations (MNCs), religions, sects, cultures and geographically defined nations, geopolitically defined states, and nation-states. This will be accomplished through her three missions.

ASSESSMENT

MISSION

1. Preventive Intervention. PISCES will reduce the overall volatility of the world-wide geo-political system to “buy down” the risk and uncertainty associated with the unpredictable nature of interpersonal and inter-societal interactions. A goal of this mission is to prevent the need for Coercive Diplomacy. This mission will incorporate the classically defined MOOTW missions of: 1) Presence and 2) Humanitarian Assistance.

The lead PISCES agents will be the Foreign Service representative who will begin to develop international, IGO and NGO support and involvement. PISCES engineering and medical units will then be free to focus on creating suitable infrastructure utility and sanitation systems and on developing a Public Health and Preventative Medicine base.

Secondary agents for this mission will be: the Educational Superintendent charged with developing a rudimentary primary and secondary educational system structure; the Governmental-Political advisors, charged with coordinating the establishment of a governing body which is acceptable to the people; and the Logistical and Civil Security Force would participate as needed.

2. Security Cooperation. PISCES will weave an inter-digitative strategic web of diplomatic treaties, economic contracts and military interdependencies to coordinate international efforts in the creation of an interactive Security Net. This mission will incorporate the classic MOOTW missions to: 1) Combat Terrorism, and 2) Perform Peace Operations.

The lead components involved in this mission would be the Foreign Service, the Governmental-Political and the Educational Superintendent agents. They would focus on stabilizing political systems; encouraging international treaty involvement and compliance; and promoting intellectual thoughts and discussions to promote greater communication, coordination and cooperation.

3. Environmental Security. PISCES will respond to manmade and natural disasters in order to reconstruct a safe, stable and secure environment in which civil, economic and political systems are allowed to flourish. This mission would incorporate the prior MOOTW missions of 1) Security Assistance; 2) Counter Insurgency; 3) Combat Terrorism; 4) Peace Contingencies; 5) Supporting Civil Authorities; and 6) Counter-drug Operations.

This mission would require close cooperation between PISCES Logistical, Engineering, and Environmental Health agents with the Civil Security Force (CSF). It is important that the CSF is clearly defined as a PISCES asset and is not confused with operational combatant forces. Again, uniforms must be noticeably different, especially to the foreign eye.

Designating the CSF as a “police” force rather than a “military” force provides greater flexibility to the team. As a law enforcement agency, the CSF will be allowed to search, seize and arrest. The CSF will require special national and international law training

and SWAT type training in the urban environment. This designation will also allow North Com to task PISCES to Homeland Security missions, without breaking the military-notional boundary. Finally, this designation will benefit PISCES during humanitarian operations, in that it will obviate the foreign perception that the “American Military is invading.”

CORE COMPETENCIES

PISCES will be focused on the first five of Secretary Rumsfeld’s Six Transformational Goals:

- 1. Protecting Critical Bases of Operations and Defeating Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons.** PISCES is uniquely structured to do much more than to protect U.S. bases at home and abroad. It is focused on creating a world wide environment in which the need to protect U.S. bases is markedly diminished. Utilizing PISCES missions of Preventative Intervention and Security Cooperation, the resulting political environment will be considerably less threatening.
- 2. Projecting and Sustaining Forces in Anti-Access Environments.** PISCES is the spearhead of U.S. forces overseas. Similar to current SOF force placement, the pre-positioning of a world-wide network of broad based capabilities will be able to evaluate the current security threat to conventional operating forces, direct a safe or secured approach for combat vessels and mitigate and respond to situations involving weapons of mass destruction. PISCES is unique in that its operational footprint can be uniquely tailored to fit within the current geo-political state of operations.
- 3. Denying Enemy Sanctuary.** PISCES will develop and provide the robust capability to conduct persistent surveillance of vast geographic areas. Their inherent HIMINT resources will hold the greatest resistance to the enemy’s determined denial and

deception efforts. PISCES presence will facilitate the ability to insert and network with special operations and other maneuver forces into denied areas.

4. Leveraging Information Technology. PISCES is the transformer which will enable not only U.S., but multi-national forces to communicate with each other and to share information about their location and the enemy's position. PISCES will be able to transform the superior U.S. information technology assets to be effectively utilized in a third world, field environment.

5. Assuring Information Systems and Conducting Information Operations. Each PISCES member will receive extensive intelligence training and become a unique HUMINT source, stemming from the individual's own area of expertise. PISCES will be networked with DIA, CIA and AFMIC not only to provide unique quantitative and qualitative input, but to give detailed in depth analysis from an "in theater" perspective.

Internal/External Strengths and Weaknesses

PISCES strengths include:

1. Human-centric mission valuing quality over quantity.
2. Preventative nature, limiting costly expansion of a problem.
3. World-wide presence.
4. Unique geo-political understanding.
5. Multifaceted, flexible approach capable of reacting to the unknown, unseen and unexpected.
6. Fluid footprint, capable of shaping itself to the situational environment.
7. Un-equalled HUMINT capability.

PISCES weaknesses include:

1. The force can not be “mass produced.”
2. The force can not be developed AFTER an emergency occurs.
3. The absence of established SOP’s, policies and procedures.

External Threats and Opportunities

Threats to PISCES include:

1. The bureaucracy of the present establishment / resistance to change.
2. Perceived threat from the individual services.
3. International perception of American Imperialism.
4. Established terror cells and networks.
5. Future potential peer competitors to the U.S.
6. Individual NGOs and IGOs who perceive autonomy losses.

Opportunities for PISCES include:

1. Overwhelming administrative support (President, Sec Def) for transformational systems.
2. Overwhelming U.S. public support for the military and coordinated efforts to minimize the terrorist threat.
3. National and International environment of prevention rather than reaction.
4. Current UN and NATO support for Cooperative Security.

SET FUTURE DIRECTION

VISION PISCES will be the transformer which allows a multitude of unique Political Operating Systems to communicate, coordinate and cooperate.

GAPS:

Present Gaps in achieving PISCES vision and missions include:

INTERNAL:

1. Lack of a PISCES structure and organizational definition.
2. Lack of Standard Operating Procedures and Rules of Engagement.
3. Established DoD resistance to “purple force” structures.

INTRAGOVERNMENTAL:

4. Lack of established Congressional Support and Political Lobbyists.
5. Inherent competition and distrust between DoD, DoS and intelligence assets.

INTERNATIONAL:

6. Inherent competition and distrust between Government and NGOs.
7. IGOs desire to control / direct international operations.

RESISTORS

1. Services
2. Congress (budgetary requirements).
3. NGOs / IGOs
4. International Community

ALLIES

1. Services
2. President, SecDef
3. NGO's / IGOs
4. UN / NATO
5. Public Opinion
6. International Community

GAME PLAN

The Game Plan for the organization and implementation of PISCES will be the process of transformation. This process will be founded on Rumsfield's Transformational Pillars, and then will begin to build, expand and transform them.

1. Strengthen Joint Operations and Organizations. PISCES is the quintessential Joint Force. Lessons abound from prior attempts to integrate and operate the three U.S. services with International Forces and within Humanitarian Assistance operations. These lessons need to be compiled, analyzed and utilized to minimize conflict and maximize synergy between military, national and international organizations.

2. Joint and Multinational Command and Control. The concept of Multinational Command and Control of U.S. forces is disconcerting and destabilizing to today CC's. PISCES will implement the concept of "Leadership from Within" to assure U.S. interests are promoted through out world-wide, multinational activities.

3. Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters and Standing Joint Task Forces. Again, PISCES will exponentially expand the present concept of Jointness. PISCES will eventually supplant these requirements.

4. Experimentation and New Concepts of Operation Experimentation. PISCES concepts of Preventive Intervention, Security Cooperation and Environmental Stability are already transformational. It will continue this process through its ability to implement detailed, defined and directed CCO surveillance systems during the initial phase of every operation. This will quantify the appropriate need for services and will integrate ongoing feedback on the effectiveness of it efforts.

IMPLEMENTAION

PISCES implementation will require the delineation, realization and optimization of well defined goals.

1. PISCES will allow the CC's to assume the lead in Preventive Diplomacy and Cooperative Security at home and abroad. This goal alone will be the primary selling point to the State Department and to a multitude of NGO's. The U.S. DoS prides itself in the ability to perform preventive diplomacy. PISCES focus of "preventive intervention" is a natural evolution of preventive diplomacy and wonderfully integrates with the "interventive" nature of relief focused NGO's such as the American and International Red Cross, Doctors Without Borders. Selling Cooperative Security to the U.N. and NATO is not a problem; they are built on these same fundamental principles.

2. PISCES will create a new military tool to help coordinate a regional "conventional force exit strategy. Promising Combatant Commanders additional assets, information and capabilities guarantees their support. With their support, as well as the support of the DoD (SecDef) and President, the services bureaucratic momentum can be overcome. With CoComs' and SecDef's input, the Annual Report, QDR and annual budgets will drive the PPBS system to fund and maintain PISCES. Popular public opinion based on the "withdrawal" of conventional forces and will support PISCES and will provide necessary pressure on the internal political system to create a majority of support in congress.

3. PISCES will bridge the gap between U.S. National-Military-State-Local disaster relief agencies. This goal directly supports PISCES' "Environmental Stability" mission and will promote cooperation and commitment form the local and state governments, as well as national relief NGOs

4. PISCES will become Northern Commands primary asset to offer to its Homeland Security Mission. . It will also provide Commander Northern Command and the Department of Homeland Security with a well structured tool with which to combat surprise attacks in unexpected ways. This too, will generate support from the communities, services, CC's and Congress.

5. PISCES will become the international model for 'joint' operations. Promoting this goal will create international and NATO support and respect for American leadership.

ASSURE PERFORMANCE

The following approaches to assessing the performance of PISCES and to assure the optimal performance of its components.

DIAGNOSTIC

Diagnostic measurements of the individual units' abilities will continue to be utilized, including the licensing, certification and continuing education process for the medical, educational, engineering and security professionals. The overall performance of PISCES will be monitored by quantifying and following the number of rogue and failed states, the morbidity rates of refugee populations and the number and quality of security informants.

BELIEF SYSTEM

The belief system will be monitored by the quantifying the number of inter-service rivalries, complaints and incidents among the team members. The belief system will also be monitored through a subjective evaluation of unit cohesiveness, turnover, awards and promotion rates.

BOUNDRIES

Multiple boundaries will be monitored, including PISCES interactions with:

1. Conventional SOF
2. Conventional Forces
3. CCs
4. International Forces
5. NGOs
6. IGOs
7. State and Local Authorities

INTERACTIVE

PISCES defines itself on its ability to conduct positive interactions between multiple components of multiple geo-political systems. This is the KEY INDICATOR of PISCES success. These communicative efforts require close, standardized and routine monitoring of the wide array of PISCES customers. The feedback loop will require incorporation of identification, training and education methods specifically designed to eliminate these barriers.

BALANCED SCORE CARD

In order to monitor the vision to “be the transformer which allows a multitude of unique political operating systems to communicate, coordinate and cooperate, PISCES success will be scored from four aspects:

FINANCIAL: The amount of the congressional budget will directly reflect the “buy in” from the country, public and congress. The proportion of the Department’s budget will provide a “relative” measure which will reflect the perceived value of Service Chiefs and the CC’s.

INTERNAL BUSINESS PROCESSES: Will be monitored by unit cohesiveness, longevity and incidents. It will also be monitored by the number of truly innovative measures incorporated into the field operations.

CUSTOMERS: The individual geopolitical regions will be polled when available. Questioner tools will be utilized to obtain feedback from the CoComs, the services, NGOs, IGOs and the DoS.

LEARNING AND GROWTH: PISCES will have continuous learning and growth opportunities across all spectrums of interface. This will begin at the lowest “field operations” level, and will continue through the military leadership structure, the International Political Structure and the National University System.

CONCLUSION

PISCES will allow today’s Service Chiefs to adequately train, equip and fund troops to dominate all Complex Contingency Operations. The Combatant Commanders will utilize PISCES to assume the lead in Preventive Diplomacy and Cooperative Security, at home and abroad. PISCES will not only lead the transformation required meeting the primary challenge of our new National Security Strategy, but it will be the transformer which allows today’s multitude of political operating systems to communicate. Extending America’s hand in Preventive Intervention, Security Cooperation and Environmental Stability is the only means available to protect the values of people across the globe and across the ages.³⁰

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