THE SMALL WAR MANUAL AND MARINE CORPS MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR DOCTRINE

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Military History

by

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2003

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On 28 March 2001, the United States Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory’s embedded “think tank,” the Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities, announced its intentions for developing a follow-on volume of the Small Wars Manual. This Small Wars Volume II intends to serve as a reference publication despite that the original manual was authoritative doctrine and that current Military Operations Other Than War guidance is either in a “Concept in Development” or “Awaiting Development” status. Thus this thesis answers: Does the Small Wars Manual series present a relevant baseline for the United States Marine Corps (USMC) to further develop its future MOOTW doctrine? The following supporting questions require examination: (1) Why did the original SWM erode from serving as USMC MOOTW authoritative doctrine to that of general reference and historical material? (2) What does the SWM offer Twenty-first Century Marine Corps MOOTW doctrine? (3) What does the SWM Volume II intend to offer Twenty-first Century Marine Corps MOOTW doctrine? The thesis concludes, among other things, that indeed the SWM series deserves significant consideration for serving as Navy and Marine Corps authoritative MOOTW doctrine with the Small Wars Manual retaining its Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) designation and its follow-on volume serving as a Navy and Marine Corps authoritative doctrinal.

**Subject Terms:**
Small Wars Manual; Doctrine; Military operations other than war (MOOTW); Marine Corps; Warfighting Laboratory; Navy

### ABSTRACT

On 28 March 2001, the United States Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory’s embedded “think tank,” the Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities, announced its intentions for developing a follow-on volume of the Small Wars Manual. This Small Wars Volume II intends to serve as a reference publication despite that the original manual was authoritative doctrine and that current Military Operations Other Than War guidance is either in a “Concept in Development” or “Awaiting Development” status. Thus this thesis answers: Does the Small Wars Manual series present a relevant baseline for the United States Marine Corps (USMC) to further develop its future MOOTW doctrine? The following supporting questions require examination: (1) Why did the original SWM erode from serving as USMC MOOTW authoritative doctrine to that of general reference and historical material? (2) What does the SWM offer Twenty-first Century Marine Corps MOOTW doctrine? (3) What does the SWM Volume II intend to offer Twenty-first Century Marine Corps MOOTW doctrine? The thesis concludes, among other things, that indeed the SWM series deserves significant consideration for serving as Navy and Marine Corps authoritative MOOTW doctrine with the Small Wars Manual retaining its Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) designation and its follow-on volume serving as a Navy and Marine Corps authoritative doctrinal.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT


On 28 March 2001, the United States Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory’s embedded “think tank,” the Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities, announced its intentions for developing a follow-on volume of the Small Wars Manual. This Small Wars Volume II intends to serve as a reference publication despite that the original manual was authoritative doctrine and that current Military Operations Other Than War guidance is either in a “Concept in Development” or “Awaiting Development” status. Thus this thesis answers: Does the Small Wars Manual series present a relevant baseline for the United States Marine Corps (USMC) to further develop its future MOOTW doctrine? The following supporting questions require examination: (1) Why did the original SWM erode from serving as USMC MOOTW authoritative doctrine to that of general reference and historical material? (2) What does the SWM offer Twenty-first Century Marine Corps MOOTW doctrine? (3) What does the SWM Volume II intend to offer Twenty-first Century Marine Corps MOOTW doctrine? The thesis concludes, among other things, that indeed the SWM series deserves significant consideration for serving as Navy and Marine Corps authoritative MOOTW doctrine with the Small Wars Manual retaining its Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) designation and its follow-on volume serving as a Navy and Marine Corps authoritative doctrinal.
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<td>CAP</td>
<td>Combined Action Platoon</td>
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<td>CCO</td>
<td>Complex Contingency Operations</td>
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<td>CETO</td>
<td>Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities</td>
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<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>COE</td>
<td>Contemporary Operating Environment</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>DoS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
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<td>EFDS</td>
<td>Expeditionary Force Development System</td>
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<td>EMW</td>
<td>Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare</td>
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<td>FMFM</td>
<td>Fleet Marine Force Manual</td>
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<td>4th MEB (AT)</td>
<td>4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (Anti-Terrorism)</td>
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<td>HQMC</td>
<td>Headquarters Marine Corps</td>
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<td>JFC</td>
<td>Joint Force Commander</td>
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<td>JWC</td>
<td>Joint Warfighting Center</td>
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<td>MAGTF</td>
<td>Marine Air Ground Task Force</td>
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<td>MARCORSOCDET</td>
<td>Marine Corps Special Operations Command Detachment</td>
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<td>MOOTW</td>
<td>Military Operations Other Than War</td>
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<td>NA/COIN</td>
<td>National Assistance/Counterinsurgency</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>OEF</td>
<td>Operation Enduring Freedom</td>
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<td>SWM</td>
<td><em>Small Wars Manual</em></td>
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<td>Tactics, Techniques, Procedures</td>
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<td>United States Government Printing Office</td>
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<td>United States Marine Corps</td>
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<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

On 28 March 2001, the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab and the Potomac Institute partnership “think tank,” the CETO, announced their intention to conduct a contemporary examination of the *Small Wars Manual (SWM)* to produce a “practical educational guide . . . [that] seeks to complement Joint Publication 3-07 (JP 3-07), *Joint Doctrine for MOOTW* and Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1-0, *Marine Corps Operations* . . . [and] the new *Small Wars Manual* is not intended to be a doctrinal publication.”¹ CETO crafted its statement carefully to ensure that it did not intend for its *SWM Volume II* to serve as Marine Corps service doctrine. This is in spite of the fact that the *SWM* enjoyed authoritative doctrinal stature following its 1940 publishing, and the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) has yet to develop either a future vision or completed its type operations doctrine with respect to the Marine Corps and MOOTW. Both MCCDC’s Future Warfighting and Doctrine Divisions list their Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare’s (EMW) Other Expeditionary Operations (OEO) as “Concepts in Development” and their Marine Corps Warfighting Publication, MCWP 3-33, *Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)* as “Awaiting Development” respectively.² In short, CETO is in the process of updating the *SWM* with a limited endstate and absent Marine Corps of top down planning guidance.

This thesis addresses the question and answers: Does the *Small Wars Manual* series present a relevant baseline for the USMC to further develop its future MOOTW doctrine? The problem question requires answers to the following:
1. Why did the status of the original **SWM** erode from serving as USMC MOOTW authoritative doctrine to that of ‘general reference and historical material’?\(^3\)

2. What does the **SWM** offer to Twenty-first Century Marine Corps MOOTW doctrine?

3. What does the **SWM Volume II** intend to offer Twenty-first Century Marine Corps MOOTW doctrine?

**Context of the Problem**

The **SWM** is a USMC “pre-World War II booklet that provide[s] guidelines for the conduct of Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW).” It has been celebrated as “an unparalleled exposition of the theory of small wars.”\(^4\) The **SWM** authors, veterans of the Caribbean and Central American “Banana Wars” (1901 to 1934), based their Manual upon “experiences in the early years of the twentieth century, and on a handbook that grew out of Britain’s colonial experience.”\(^5\) The handbook referenced is Colonel Charles Calwell’s *Small Wars*, a warfighting classic that captures British MOOTW experiences accumulated over an entire era of colonial expansion. In 1987, the USMC reprinted the **SWM**, claiming it to be “... one of the best books on military operations in peacekeeping and counterinsurgency operations published before World War II.”\(^6\) This claim is perhaps an understatement given the generic nature of currently available MOOTW doctrine. CETO’s current **SWM Volume II** confronts the daunting task of modernizing Callwell’s and the Banana War’s doctrinal legacies.

Despite recent service in the Great War and with another global conflict looming on the horizon (World War II), the 1940 **SWM** authors declared that “Small Wars” represented “the normal and frequent operations of the Marine Corps.” Similarly, at the
turn of the Twenty-first Century, despite the I Marine Expeditionary Force’s sustained operations ashore during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm (1990 to 1991) and in Operations Iraqi Freedom (2003 to present), MCDP 3, Expeditionary Operations (1998) reminds Marines that small-scale contingencies remain “the most likely and most frequent crises into which the United States will find itself drawn.” Given this emphasis, it is puzzling that Marines enter the Twenty-first Century without either an EMWOEO supporting concept for the future or service-specific MOOTW doctrine. Even more puzzling is CETO’s intent for the SWM Volume II’s, a doctrinal work of enduring value, to serve as nothing more than a complementary reference publication and its development without benefit of the normal Marine Corps Planning Process tenant of ‘top down planning guidance.’ This paradox provides impetus for an examination of the SWM’s history, its operational relevance, and the intended “value added” of SWM Volume II may have for the Twenty-first Century Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) MOOTW doctrine.8

Congruency prevails in at least one aspect of this topic—all pertinent SWM related scholarship agrees that the SWM remains relevant and merits an updated version. Endorsements range from the Council of Foreign Relation’s Olin senior fellow, Max Boot, whose recent Savage Wars of Peace (2002) dedicated two chapters to the manual’s insights, to Dr. Keith Bickel, whose published dissertation, Mars Learning (2001), captured the Manual’s unique “bottom-up development.” In addition to this academic commentary, numerous other theses, monographs, as well as current Marine Corps doctrine have endorsed the Manual’s relevance. Most notably, MCDP 1-0, Marine Corps Operations refers to the work as “seminal” and explicitly states the Manual remains “...
relevant to Marines today as they face complex and sensitive situations in a variety of operations.”

The Marine Corps relationship with CETO, an organization tailored to MOOTW study, is fortuitous. Dr. Bickel noted the challenges that the original SWM authors overcame in juggling the project with respect to time, resources, and institutional resistance during the inter-war years. Marine Corps School’s Commandant Brigadier General James Breckenridge threatened to emulate Major General Russell’s technique for producing the Tentative Manual for Landing Operations by threatening to suspend Small Wars curriculum in order to ensure that the SWM came to fruition. These manpower and expertise challenges have remained constant across time. A cursory review of the MCCDC Doctrine Division “Points of Contact,” reveals that the Marines retain only a limited stable of doctrine writers who fight an uphill battle to match relevance with the current changing operational environment. CETO appears to be the right organization and at the right time for the SWM Volume II mission, but is their ultimate intent for one of the Marine Corps most celebrated doctrines to serve as reference appropriate?

Assumptions

This thesis assumes its completion prior to CETO publishing the SWM Volume II coordinating draft. Initially, CETO estimated completion of its coordinating draft by September 2001; however, MCWL reported that the SWM Volume II’s progress was continuing as late as March 2003. Thus, this Academic Year 2003-2004 thesis promises potential insight for CETO’s ongoing coordinating draft.
Definitions

Academic discussion requires a common terminology so definitions are essential. The MOOTW taxonomy itself varies with the United Nations, Department of State (DoS), Department of Defense (DoD), and Non-Governmental Organizations. Definitions proliferate throughout these respective communities and create confusion. Consequently, this thesis limits its operational terminology review to MOOTW, Peace Operations, Complex Contingency Operations (CCO) and Small Wars. These are terms directly related to the problem question. Content notes clarify references to benefit both researchers and casual readers.

Military Operations Other Than War. The cumbersome term corrals at least sixteen military operations under its umbrella. JP 3-07 succinctly defines this term as that which:

encompasses the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power [diplomatic, information, economic] and occur before, during, and after war. Figure 1 provides a framework for comparing the sixteen different MOOTW-type operations across the spectrum of conflict.

JP 3-07 describes MOOTW’s underlying characteristics as being “sensitive to political considerations;” as following “restrictive rules of engagement;” and as focusing upon a “hierarchy of national objectives” that inherently creates complex military problems. Thus MOOTW, albeit in many respects similar to combat, requires principles distinct from those normally associated with conventional operations against a nation-state’s armed forces. MOOTW arguably requires applying more military art than
science either for achieving a political objective or for changing a population’s behavior. Limited force or threat of its use requires finesse quite different from straightforward, conventional “seize the objective” combat missions. Granted, controlling maneuver forces and firepower remains a complex and difficult blend of military art and science; however, the variables are usually more limited, when compared with manipulating human behaviors that often conceal friendly or hostile intentions. MOOTW promotes diplomatic, information, military, and economic “combined arms” to achieve often ambiguous political end states. Finally, MOOTW mission success often resembles
shades of gray rather than the boldly contrasted black and white of victory or defeat.

Success or failure in MOOTW’s case often reveals itself years later, unlike conventional warfare more conflict ending outcomes.

Small Wars. Sixty-three years ago (1940) and sometimes currently, Marines have described MOOTW as Small Wars and defined them as:

operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by the foreign policy of our Nation.\textsuperscript{16}

Despite a fifty-five year gap between the SWM and JP 3-07, \textit{Joint Military Operations Other Than War} (1995), the Small Wars and MOOTW definitions remain similar with the following exceptions:

JP 3-07’s MOOTW recognizes the strategic instruments of power (diplomatic, information, military, economic) whereas the SWM acknowledged only the diplomatic and military instruments.

JP 3-07’s MOOTW remained ambiguous on where to apply military power (domestic or foreign), whereas the SWM specifically limits Small Wars action to foreign countries.

Thus, the similar pre-World War II Small Wars and the JP 3-07 definition permits its use as generally interchangeable terms with the exceptions noted above. In fact this thesis later make a case that Small Wars is more appropriate for the Marine Corps vernacular. Furthermore, with remarkable prescience, \textit{Expeditionary Operations} retains the SWM’s Small Wars sub-classifications that are used in this thesis.
Military Intervention—the deliberate act of a nation or group of nations to introduce its military forces into the course of an existing controversy to influence events.

Military Interposition—the deliberate act of a nation to introduce military forces into a foreign country during a crisis to protect its citizens from harm without otherwise becoming involved in the course of the crisis.17

A subordinate MOOTW mission, Peace Operations, embraces “a broad term that encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace.”48 These operations, such as the Dayton Accords’ Bosnian Implementation and Standing Forces and UN Resolution 1244’s Kosovo Forces, reflect protracted MOOTW campaigns that normally do not call for MAGTF employment outside a forward deployed contingency response force.

Marine Forces component commanders neither seek nor cherish protracted Peace Operations campaigns for their MAGTF given their “limited objective, limited duration” expeditionary nature and mentality. MAGTF participation in UN Peacekeeping Forces during the Beirut Peace Operations (1982 to 1984) and Operations Restore Hope (1991 to 1992) stand as lone examples of the Marine Corps participation protracted peace operations other than the unilateral Banana Wars (1901 to 1934).

Although the Marine Corps does not normally deploy MAGTFs in support of a protracted Peace Operations campaign, it does support joint force commanders with staff augmentation and forces to fulfill specific functional requirements. Nevertheless, participation in protracted peace operations may be difficult for the Marine Corps to avoid in the near future. As the USMC’s thirty-third Commandant, General Michael
Hagee, noted with respect to Marines currently participating in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF):

What I would suggest is that we are there for a shorter period of time. In my opinion, we need to back load, we need to reconstitute our maritime preposition force and we need to recock the Marine Corps to ensure that it is prepared to go anywhere else that it needs to go. We are an expeditionary force. Our job is not there in southern Iraq when it is all over. Having said that, we’ve done that before. We’ll just have to see how it pans out.¹⁹

Recent MOOTW missions, such as Operation Restore Hope (Somalia) and Provide Comfort (Northern Iraq and Kurdistan), evolved into what the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief community consider complex humanitarian emergencies or complex humanitarian operations. In fact, the *JTF Handbook for Peace Operations*, an outstanding non-doctrinal publication, claims that, “the majority of future peace operations will be part of complex contingencies.”²⁰ These terms, not specifically recognized by DoD, resemble what JP 1-02 defines as CCO. They are:

Large-scale peace operations (or elements thereof) conducted by a combination of military forces and nonmilitary organizations that combine one or more of the elements of peace operations which include one or more elements of other types of operations such as foreign humanitarian assistance, nation assistance, support to insurgency, or support to counterinsurgency.²¹

The key term complex reflects the reality, regardless of whether the environment is permissive or hostile, that executing CCO requires balancing both security and humanitarian assistance capabilities for success. In short, a protracted CCO could represent the most operationally challenging MOOTW scenario that a MAGTF may be called upon to perform--the humanitarian aspect being one of the few circumstantial differences between the CCO and the Banana War Marine’s counterinsurgency
operations. CCOs best reflect a Marine Corps warfighting doctrine that addresses what
the USMC’s thirty-first Commandant, General C. C. Krulak, termed as “3-Block War”:

One moment they will be feeding refugees and providing other humanitarian
relief. A few hours later conducting peace keeping operations, Marines will be
separating fighting warlords and their followers. . . . Later that day, they may well
be engaged in mid-intensity, highly lethal conflict--and this will take place within
three city blocks.22

Executing a CCO requires full-spectrum military capabilities which the Marine
Corps claims as their niche, but qualify their expeditionary capability with a limitation
that they are best deployed as “an immediate response while serving as the foundation for
follow-on forces or resources.” Marines normally respond to a CCO either with their
contingency response or forward deployed Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special
Operations Capable), with their larger “middle weight” crisis response force, the Marine
Expeditionary Brigade, or with their tailored Special Purpose MAGTF.

Limitations

The United States Army Command and General Staff College Master of Military
Art and Science program constrains the thesis’ scope given the following: Fort
Leavenworth’s location and course requirements for the Command and General Staff
College Officer Course preclude visits to archives and other research centers located
within the Washington, DC metropolitan area. Thus, this thesis rests on sources available
through Command and General Staff College, the Combined Arms Research Library, and
on-line, retrievable documentation. Furthermore, time is a significant limitation given
that the program requires completion during the academic year.
Delimitations

This thesis scope limits itself to identifying the 1940 SWM relevance for today’s contemporary operating environment (COE). However, the thesis scope implies the following:

1. Given the United States Army and United States Special Operations Command’s (SOCOM) role in protracted MOOTW campaigns, a consideration of SWM from their perspective.

2. Given the importance of MOOTW to a broader community, a consideration of the SWM’s specific impact in professional military education schools, civilian peacekeeping institutes, and International organization’s MOOTW training and education curriculum.

3. Given the SWM’s general relevance, an application of its operational principles and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to a Twenty-first Century MOOTW campaign such as Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) (Afghanistan), or OIF (Post-Conflict phase) similar to other SWM monographs and theses addressing counter drug operations, Haiti, and Somalia.

4. Given common denominators suggested by the SWM, a comparison of Lieutenant General Victor’s Krulak’s Vietnam War era “spreading inkblot strategy” versus French Colonial General Joseph Gallieni’s “progressive occupation” seventy-five years earlier in what was then considered “Tonkin.”

Significance of the Study

As Expeditionary Operations points out, the nature of the post-Cold War and 9/11 world suggests that small-scale contingencies are likely to figure prominently in the
mission requirements for the MAGTF. Additionally, the COE reflects that these contingencies appear to require protracted campaign requirements versus a limited time period in which the Marine Corps are most familiar. Smaller-scale operations in the Philippines, Columbia, Afghanistan, and Horn-of-Africa while simultaneously liberating Iraq and defending the Republic of South Korea prove this point.

Whether these contingencies are tabbed Small Wars or MOOTW, their nature presents complexities and peculiarities that rival--and perhaps exceed--the demands of more conventional operations. The challenge is such that all available wisdom should be brought to bear in preparation for engagement in operations that appear less than conventional. If appropriate, this wisdom should include “best thought” and “best practices” from the past. The requirement is to discern what has changed and what remains universal for contemporary application. The intent is to determine the value and relevance of the small wars legacy for today’s world.

CETO SWM Volume II’s timing cannot be overlooked given its content potentially reflects valuable TTP relevant to the ongoing protracted campaigns. The aforementioned small scale contingencies have prompted the Marine Corps to not only form new commands and lead Joint Task Forces, but also return to protracted MOOTW campaigns. Since 11 September, the Marines established both the Marine Corps Special Operations Command Detachment (MARCORSOCDET) and 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (Anti-Terrorism) (4th MEB (AT)); lead both the Commander Joint Task Force Horn of Africa and Military Coordination and Liaison Command (Northern Iraq) missions; and currently responsible for OIF post-conflict duties in southern Iraq.\(^{25}\) Given General Hagee’s OIF perspective, the COE may require Marines to return to the
protracted Banana Wars-type operations that the United States SOCOM and United States Army normally fulfill, thus potentially making the SWM Volume II more valuable to Marine Corps operating forces.

Research Methodology and Thesis Organization

The primary research question, Does the SWM series present a relevant baseline for the USMC to further develop its future MOOTW doctrine? serves as this study’s focus and point of departure. In order to prove or disprove the continuing validity of the SMW, it is necessary to understand the situation that spawned it, together with the circumstances that seemingly altered its relevance. If these circumstances suggest that concerns other than direct SMW pertinence eroded its fundamental value, then an examination of these circumstances warrants investigation within the larger study. If, at the same time, there are aspects of SWM that appear timeless, these aspects must be identified and emphasized. At the heart of this task is the assumption that military engagement in small wars generally conforms to certain underlying principles, just as engagement in “large wars” generally conforms to what United States commentators call “the principles of war.”

Determination of enduring or “universal” relevance rests on a comparison of operating environments. If these environments are similar, then so will be the associated operational challenges. To be sure, the means used to address these challenges have changed appreciably since 1940, but many of the questions should remain the same. For example, one of the salient features of modern OOTW is the way that political considerations permeate virtually all activities in pursuit of mission accomplishment. In contrast, political considerations associated with conventional operations normally
assume overriding significance only for the higher-ranking political-military leadership. This distinction and others should be evident in an examination of operating environments.

Determination of enduring relevance also rests on a comparison of the SWM with contemporary Joint Force and emerging Marine Corps MOOTW doctrine. Neither of these conceptual constructs builds on empty ground. If, in fact, both contemporary doctrine and SMW are based on common distilled experience and sound theory, a general examination of both should reveal a high degree of congruity.

Finally, this investigation does not occur in an intellectual vacuum. The very fact that CETO is presently engaged in production of a SWM Volume II is indicative that other personnel and organizations perceive an affinity between present preoccupations with MOOTW and the intellectual legacy of the original SWM. Just as in the case of the above comparisons, the CETO’s effort promises to reveal a high degree of congruity between past and present small-war-like concerns. This study builds in part on an analysis of the CETO’s effort and what that effort demonstrates with respect to the enduring relevance of SWM.

In accordance with these and related considerations, this thesis builds its organizational framework around answers to the three supporting questions that examine the SWM’s journey and assess its current relevance. Additional insight flows from an assessment of SWM Volume II’s potential impact. Chapter 2, “The Operational History of the Small Wars Manual,” attempts to answer the question, Why did the SWM’s status erode from authoritative Marine Corps MOOTW doctrine to that of general reference and history? This chapter traces the manual’s relevance with respect to national security and
Marine Corps institutional strategies since 1940. In addition to surveying the SWM’s administrative and operational history, this chapter describes the evolving role of Special Operations Forces (SOF) in the conduct of MOOTW. Background comes from Callwell’s Small Wars for a general understanding of SWM’s intellectual baseline and from Dr. Keith Bickel’s published dissertation, Mars Learning. Dr. Bickel’s work, together with Moskin’s The Marine Corps History, Boot’s Savage Wars of Peace, and Peterson’s Combined Action Platoons, afford perspective on Marine Corps institutional context and doctrinal development. Other pertinent materials come from selected theses and monographs.

Chapter 3, “The Small War Manual; Twenty-first Century Relevance Check,” addresses the supporting question, What does the SWM offer to Twenty-first Century Marine Corps MOOTW Doctrine? As point of departure, Marine Corps Operations claims that SWM continues to be relevant to Marines today as they face complex and sensitive situations in a variety of operations. This chapter seeks to identify what characteristics and content remain specifically relevant. The examination extends to SWM’s framework (title, organization, style, and focus) and continues further to compare SWM’s content with that of JP 3-07’s.

The fourth chapter answers the question; what does the SWM Volume II intend to offer Marine Corps MOOTW doctrine? Although a coordinating draft has not yet been distributed, the intentions governing the effort are a matter of public record. They can be subjected to examination for congruency with the original SWM’s intent, with Marine Corps Operations, with current doctrine, and with the COE.
The conclusion chapter provides the results of analysis, with specific answers to the research question and subsidiary questions. This chapter also provides recommendations with respect to the SWM series and evolving Marine Corps doctrine.


“CETO was established at the direction of the Senate Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities . . . to solve the problems of lessons learned from non-traditional military operations conducted since the end of the Cold War.” Marine Corps Association, “Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities Established,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, February 2001, 6.


General J. L. Jones, 32nd Commandant of the Marine Corps, states in his forward to MCDP 1-0 that the publication “is the transition-the-bridge-between the Marine Corps’ warfighting philosophy of maneuver warfare to the TTP [tactics, techniques, procedures] used by Marines. . . . It addresses how the Marine Corps conducts operations to support the national military strategy across the broad range of naval, joint, and multinational

2Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare is the Marine Corps new Capstone Concept and Other Expeditionary Operations is one of its supporting concepts. United States Marine Corps, “Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare” (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Combat Development Command’s Doctrine Division, Official Home Page, 10 November 2001; abstract on-line; available from https://www.doctrine.quantico.usmc.mil/emw.htm; Internet; accessed on 16 May 2003).


4Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities, CETO Media Advisory.


Boot, 283.

6Department of the Navy, *Small Wars Manual*, Foreword.


8“MAGTF [derived from a longstanding naval expeditionary tradition and state of mind]; Marine Air-Ground Task Force. 1: a combination of four military arms—command, ground, air and support—whose whole is exponentially stronger than its parts. 2: a self-contained and self-sustained combined arms striking force, capable of operating from land or on a mobile and protected sea base. 3: a scalable, modular building-block organization that ensures the most appropriate and cost-effective capabilities are applied to the task at hand. 4: an enabler for Joint Task Force operations. 5: a rheostat of equally expandable or retractable crisis response options that can be tailored to meet any crisis. 6: a unique form of naval expeditionary operations practiced by the United States.” United States Marine Corps, “Send in the Marines . . . the Art of MAGTF Operations” (Washington, DC: United States Marine Corps Official Home Page, 1996; available on line from http://www.usmc.mil/download/send.nsf/page1; Internet; last accessed on 15 April 2003).


10Bickel, 214.


14Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, *Joint Doctrine for MOOTW*, I-1

15Ibid., vii.

16The Marine Reading Program designated a section in its Professional Reading List titled “Small Wars” which reflects a number of books dealing with counterinsurgency and terrorism. United States Marine Corps, “US Marine Reading Program,” ALMAR 026/00; available on line from http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/mcu/Reading/CompleteListBySubject.htm; Internet; last accessed on 15 April 2003.

_Warfighting_, the Marine Corps’ capstone publication, utilizes the term “Small Wars” interchangeably: “Military operations other than war and small wars are more probable than a major regional conflict or general war.” Department of the Navy, *Warfighting* (Washington, DC: USGPO, 27 June 1997), 27.


Department of the Navy, *Small Wars Manual*, 1-14(a), 1-20(b), and 1-15(j).

18 Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: USGPO, 12 April 2001), 323.


21 International and Non-Governmental Organizations such as the UN, Agency for International Development and United States Pacific Command’s Center of Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance normally utilize the term Complex Humanitarian Disasters or Complex Emergencies; a non-DoD recognized term, versus CCO. Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: USGPO) 87.


23 The contemporary operational environment (COE) is the overall operational environment that exists today and in the near future (out to the year 2020). The range of threats during this period extends from smaller, lower-technology opponents using more adaptive, asymmetric methods to larger, modernized forces able to engage deployed U.S. forces in more conventional, symmetrical ways. In some possible conflicts (or in multiple, concurrent conflicts), a combination of these types of threats could be especially problematic. United States Army, *The Contemporary Operating Environment Handbook 03-3* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 9 May 2003, chapter 1; available from http://call.army.mil/Products/Ctc/COE-handbook/coe-ch1.htm; Internet; last accessed on 1 June 2003).


CHAPTER 2

THE OPERATIONAL HISTORY OF THE SMALL WARS MANUAL

Why did the SWM suffer erosion in status from USMC MOOTW authoritative doctrine to that of general reference and historical material? Perhaps more appropriately: How did the SWM, the Marine’s original MOOTW doctrine, a volume that is still available, studied widely, applied operationally, and sold commercially vanish at the outset of World War II and reappear forty-seven years later with perhaps more relevance to the COE than in 1940? A discussion of SWM’s contemporary relevance begins with the SWM’s origin and development in light of various MOOTW conflicts, changes in national security strategies, shifting Marine Corps focus, and joint force evolution.

The Banana Wars

Early Twentieth Century Marines (1901 to 1934), often referred to as State Department Troops for their role in United States Caribbean interventions, executed a number of majority MOOTW-style operations in the Caribbean and Central America (see Appendix). Marines consistently executed MOOTW-style campaigns “with fuzzy objectives--not to annihilate a hostile army but ‘to establish and maintain law and order by supporting or replacing the civil government in countries or areas in which the interests of the United States [had] been placed in jeopardy.’” Eventually, the Marines became the Secretary of War, Henry Stimson’s (1911 to 1913), force-of-choice to support the State Departments so-called “Dollar Diplomacy.” Marines achieved the ascendancy because “dispatching the army would be tantamount to a declaration of war, whereas the Marines, with their long history of landing abroad, could be sent with few international repercussions.” As a result “no longer would United States sailors and Marines land for
a few days at a time to quell a riot; now they would stay longer to manage the internal politics of the nation.” Eventually World War I drew United States attention to Europe, leaving Marines and State Department officials in the Central American and Caribbean Banana Republics to achieve the Small Wars’ complex political objectives. These actions evolved into what were referred to as Banana Wars, in which Marines executed protracted counterinsurgency campaigns against insurgent guerilla forces, while simultaneously addressing civil administration duties. These activities were uncommon to both early and late Twentieth Century Marines, given the formers’ sea and barracks duty roles and the latter’s self-proclaimed limited objective, limited duration emphasis on interventions.

However, in 1922 the Marine Corps announced its intention to downplay former sea and barracks duty in favor of providing Fleet commanders a forcible entry capability for seizing Advance Naval Bases. This role marked a radical departure from the Corps’ Banana War’s constabulary operations and Great War service alongside the United States Army in linear conventional land warfare. The thirteenth Commandant of the Marine Corps, General John A. Lejeune (1920 to 1929), intended that his Marines “supply a mobile force to accompany the Fleet for operations on shore, when the active naval operations reach such a stage as to permit its temporary detachment from the Navy.”

The Banana War Marines, confident that Small Wars provided the Corps a distinguishing niche and perhaps uncomfortable with the Advance Naval Base concept, took umbrage with Lejeune’s initiative, which initiated a long-standing “. . . simmering tension between two cultures--the small wars specialists and the Advanced Base adherents.” Dr. Bickel notes that years later Major General John H. Russell, sixteenth
Commandant of the Marine Corps (1934 to 1936) and the overseer of amphibious warfare doctrine overseer, perpetuated General Lejeune’s Advance Naval Base agenda when he wrote that “expeditionary forces in ‘small wars’ were not in the Corps’ nor the nation’s interests.” Later in his post-World War II memoirs, Russell specifically stated, “Marines should not be used for the suppression of revolutions in small countries.” Not surprisingly, pre-World War II Commandants passively suppressed the Small Wars arguments that later resurfaced in the mid-1970s, during the “Haynes Board” roles and mission review.  

Competition among respective advocates produced a healthy dialogue and differences persisted. Neither camp rested during the inter-war years. Advocates from both camps pursued their respective doctrinal agendas while the Marine Corps’ role evolved from sea and barracks duties to projecting combat power ashore in support of maritime campaigns. The institutionally-backed Advance Naval Base advocates won the doctrine contest with their *Tentative Manual for Landing Operations* (Bible of Amphibious Warfare). The Banana War Marines quickly followed with the *SWM*. During this time the Marine Corps enjoyed a prolific period of doctrinal flowering with respect to “type operations” (for example amphibious operations, riverine operations, Small Wars, and others). This period was perhaps matched only by the efforts of recent (1989 to 1998) Commandants A. M. Gray and C. C. Krulak to advance Marine Corps operational thought. They moved the Marine Corps from a focus on type operations to one of conceptual warfighting theory. For Gray and Krulak overarching principles guided and informed doctrine and TTP.
The Small Wars Manual and World War II

The scale and scope of Marine Corps operations in World War II overcame the small war specialist attempts to further their agenda. Dr. Bickel has observed that just when the final published SWM emerged in 1940, “it became the most irrelevant because of the onset of World War II.” Marines embraced World War II’s opportunities for amphibious warfare opportunities. These proved the validity of the Tentative Manual for Landing Operations during the Pacific Theater of Operation’s “island-hopping campaigns,” while United States Army forces simultaneously validated the doctrine within the European Theater of Operations. Despite the numerous MOOTW-type operations that also occurred during the high-intensity conventional warfare of World War II, the SWM’s legacy faded. Author Max Boot laments that:

The final edition of the Small Wars Manual was published at the most inopportune of times, 1940. It seemed to have little application to WW II, though what is often forgotten is that along with the clash of big armies the 1939-1945 conflict saw plenty of guerilla operations by forces as disparate as the Yugoslav partisans and the French maquis—not to mention America’s own Office of Strategic Services (OSS), forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

Fortunately, both amphibious and Small Wars doctrines survived World War II within the next decade. The 82nd Congress (1952) legislated the Marine Corps strategic concept and tasked it with responsibility for: “A balanced force for a Naval Campaign and a ground and air striking force [as well as provide a necessary force]. . . Ready to suppress or contain international disturbances short of war.” Ultimately, both the Advance Naval Bases and Banana Wars advocates’ respective inter-war years’ doctrines required by combat operations and legislated by Congress. However, only the Tentative Manual for Landing Operations survived further evolution into what is now titled JP 3-
In contrast the SWM, remains the same SWM as written in 1940. Despite the SWM 1990’s renaissance, its doctrinal contribution both historically and operationally remains muted. Both MCDP 1-0, Marine Corps Operations, and Headquarters Marine Corps’ Concepts and Programs 2002 (The Marine Corps Congressional Budget Manual) passively snub the SWM as inter-war years and “Continuous Transformation” examples (see figure 2). Operationally, the Marine’s new EMW capstone concept recognizes OEO as one of its supporting concepts; however, the Department of Navy’s “Naval Transformation Roadmap” fails to acknowledge OEO as an EMW supporting concept.

Doctrinal Distribution and the *Small Wars Manual*.

In addition to the fact that the amphibious operations of World War II pushed the Small Wars advocates’ agenda to the background, the SWM’s classification also contributed to its erosion in status. Physical access to the manual as well as its distribution became difficult. The Marines classified the SWM as “Restricted,” thus immediately creating physical access and distribution friction. Even more telling, the SWM earlier version, the 1935 *Small Wars Operations*, a Marine Corps Schools student text, “was marked ‘Restricted’ and contained the warning on the title page: ‘Not to pass out of the custody of the U.S. Naval or Military Service.’”

Granted, post-1940 technology allowed for mass document reproduction, and the Navy-Marine Corps possessed an internal publication distribution system; however, access to classified materials was just as cumbersome and restrictive in the 1940s as in 2003. Consequently, the SWM most likely languished unused and unread in a unit’s security vault, inside a three-drawer safe, with access strictly controlled. Physical handling was limited to Publications Clerks and Security Managers.


The SWM was a doctrinal treasure buried in a labyrinth of classified access procedures, and it remained restricted (thus available only in controlled spaces) and virtually forgotten from World War II to its 1987 reprint. Clearly, the Marine Corps’ publication, distribution, and classification system contributed to the SWM’s doctrinal erosion. A forty-seven year
period that included both the Vietnam War which Dr. Ronald Shaffer characterizes as the United States’ “. . . longest and most searchingly-reported ‘small war’” and the Marine’s Beirut Peacekeeping Operation tragedy.

**Containment Doctrine and the Small Wars Manual**

The Korean War and President Truman’s “Containment Doctrine” further served to erode the SWM’s relevance to contemporary operations. Korea’s limited war provided the Marines another amphibious warfare opportunity while Truman’s Containment Doctrine satisfied both Cold War requirements and a war-weary nation by moving Small Wars operations from the overt Banana Wars to the realm covert operations. Boot explains:

> after 1945 the emphasis switched to covert operations, with Washington supplying arms and expertise to friendly governments battling communist insurgencies. This approach failed spectacularly in China, which was taken over by the communists in 1949, but it worked elsewhere. A small sample of the victories: Between 1945 and 1949, Greece defeated the communist Democratic Army with U.S. help provided under the Truman Doctrine. Between 1946 and 1954, the Philippine government, advised by the “Quiet American,” Edward Lansdale, put down the Hukbalahap rebellion. And between 1980 and 1992, El Salvador, with U.S. aid provided under the Reagan Doctrine, defeated the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front. In all these instances, the U.S. strategy called for carrots and sticks – aggressive military operations against the rebels combined with liberalizing reforms to win over the uncommitted populace. And in all these cases, the U.S. and its allies won. The glaring exception is Vietnam.\(^{18}\)

Thus, the CIA covertly fought Small Wars and the Marine Corps concentrated on high intensity conflict warfare that highlighted amphibious operations and sustained operations ashore alongside the United States Army. The Korean War and the Truman Doctrine was incongruent with the SWM, so the Manual’s downward spiral continued
despite content applicable to MOOTW activities often inherent in these police actions and low intensity conflicts.

**Massive Retaliation and the *Small Wars Manual***

Shortly after the Korean War, the Eisenhower Administration (1953 to 1961) elevated modern warfare’s stakes with “Massive Retaliation,” a military strategy that relied upon nuclear superiority and continued emphasis on covert action to deal with problems earlier associated with Small Wars. Thus Cold War approaches, and not Small Wars, dominated military theory and operational thought. The nation’s primary security tool lay with the deterrent inherent in and emphasis on nuclear weaponry.

**Flexible Response and the *Small Wars Manual***

In contrast with the Eisenhower Administration, the Kennedy and Johnson era (1961 to 1969) elicited a “flexible response” strategy “to confront the Soviets with conventional and counterinsurgency forces as well as with nuclear arms . . . requiring forces capable of deterring and, if necessary, fighting the Soviets at all levels of conflict.” What once had been purely covert CIA Small Wars began to include an overt element--military advisors performing what are now considered National Assistance/Counterinsurgency (NA/COIN) and Support to Insurgency missions.

John F. Kennedy had been a great enthusiast for low-intensity conflict. He changed the nation’s official military strategy from Massive Retaliation to Flexible Response, pledging to meet aggression at any level without instantly hauling out nuclear weapons. As part of this policy (and over the objections of the brass), he bestowed the green beret on the special forces and expanded their budget. The army was happy to have more funding, but it adamantly resisted attempts to move its focus away from preparing for a forces’ approach to future small wars.
The 1960s emerged as a strategic environment ripe for SWM application. However, given the limited awareness of the manual, it was largely ignored. Boot’s Savage Wars of Peace concludes, “. . . that the American armed forces paid a high price in Vietnam for neglecting to study the Small Wars Manual.”22 He asserts that “America’s defeat there stemmed from many factors, including a ham-handed military campaign that ignored successful counterinsurgency techniques of the past.”23

Boot’s assertions are true with respect to Vietnam in a macro-perspective. It is also logical to agree with Michael E. Peterson’s The Combined Action Platoon, which concludes that failure to study the Manual resulted in both the United States Army Special Forces (Green Berets) advocating and the Marine Corps accepted an unsophisticated and flawed counterinsurgency doctrine.

The Small Wars Manual was replaced in 1962 by [Fleet] Marine Force Manual 8-2, Operations Against Guerrilla Forces, an agglomeration of old experience, technological updating, and borrowings from U.S. Army doctrine. That doctrine was derived from a different set of experiences than the Marines’. . . . The Army’s doctrine contained a dangerous conceptual pitfall in that it overlooked a vital distinction between two types of guerrilla warfare: partisan and insurgent.”24

Despite Boot and Peterson’s well-documented perspectives, it remains unclear to what degree Vietnam War era Marines were ignorant of the SWM. In the quote above Peterson claims Fleet Marine Force Manual 8-2 was the Manual’s successor, thus implying that the Marines acknowledged the SWM and deliberately revised and updated it. However, the Marine Corps Association claims Fleet Marine Force Manual 21, Operations Against Guerilla Forces replaced the SWM.25 Dr. Shaffer’s foreword to the Small Wars Manual (commercial version), contradicts both Peterson and the Marine Corps Association. He claims the manual’s successor was a 1949 “ten-page pamphlet,”
but fails to reference the source and further notes that a Marine officer contributing to the 1960’s training manual, *Anti-Guerilla Warfare*, “was unaware that the 1940 *Small Wars Manual* existed.”  

In contrast, Moskin claims the *SWM* was “used for its [the Marine Corps] pacification program in Vietnam 25 years later,” but fails to elaborate. However, his view concurs with that of Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak (Fleet Marine Force, Pacific 1964 to 1968). In his book *First to Fight*, Krulak acknowledges both the contributions of Banana War Marines and the *SWM*. In view of conflicting evidence over a deliberate *SWM* successor and the degree of ignorance about the Manual, it is fair to say that the *SWM* was not widely distributed. Perhaps even more unfortunate, the Marine Corps has yet to update either its *SWM* or counterinsurgency doctrine in 2003. Fortunately, during the Vietnam War, the Banana Wars mindset and knowledge of previous service often prevailed.

At the Strategic and Operational Level of War, where Lieutenant General Victor “Brute” Krulak served as Commanding General of what is now designated Marine Forces Pacific, it is highly unlikely that Krulak lacked knowledge of both the Banana War Marines’ experiences and the *SWM*. As mentioned in *First to Fight*, he graduated from the Marine Schools “Junior Course” the same year that the Manual was published. However, it is difficult to determine whether he borrowed directly from the *SWM* in drafting the Marines’ spreading inkblot strategy. This involved “. . . expanding American control slowly from the seacoast by pacifying one hamlet after another.” This approach was similar to Joseph Gallieni’s “progressive occupation,” which French colonial forces utilized as early as 1890 in what was then called Tonkin. Furthermore, Boot and
Pulitzer Prize winning author Neil Sheehan buttress Krulak’s appreciation for both the Banana Wars era and SWM. Boot attributed Krulak’s perspective to the “the Corps’ small wars tradition, learning from, and serving alongside, many of the veterans of Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua. The plan Krulak developed for winning in Vietnam drew on those experiences.”

Sheehan’s *A Bright Shining Lie* agrees, but goes further and directly credits the SWM’s influence on Krulak’s strategic aim:

> that there was a school of pacification strategist within the upper ranks of the Marine Corps because of its institutional history. The decades of pre-World War II pacifying in Central America and the Caribbean, codified in the Corps’ *Small Wars Manual*, were a strategic precedent which ruled that wars like Vietnam were wars of pacification. The Marines had adopted an approach that emphasized pacification over big-unit battles almost from the outset of their buildup in I Corps. While Krulak had been the guiding intellect, taking account of the special conditions of the Vietnamese wars and grafting social and economic reform onto the strategy the Marines had followed in those earlier decades of pacifying, Greene and other senior Marine officers believed just as firmly in the concept.

At the Operational Level, Lieutenant General Lewis Walt serving in a “One Commander and One Staff” role as both Military Assistance Command Vietnam’s Marine Corps component and Marine Amphibious Force Commander, was subject to similar experiences as Krulak; however, none are directly attributable to the SWW. Rather Walt’s acceptance and enthusiasm for the Combined Action Program (CAP) perhaps was attributable to the legendary Lieutenant General “Chesty” Puller’s Banana Wars legacy. As Peterson demonstrates, Puller was a former Banana Wars Company Commander who returned from Nicaragua to become:

> the chief instructor at the Marines’ Basic School in Quantico, Virginia. One of his first students was 2nd Lt. Lewis Walt . . . [who] would also figure largely in the formation of the Combined Action Program. Viewed from this perspective, the Combined Action Platoon may be seen to be a direct descendant of Company M.
Finally, at the tactical level both Marine Corps Operations and Peterson credit the Corps for the CAP that ultimately utilized SWM-type techniques without direct access to the Manual itself. Marine Corps Operations claims the III Marine Amphibious Force, “building on the counterinsurgency experiences of Marines in Haiti and Nicaragua . . . created the combined action platoon program in South Vietnam in 1965.”

Peterson agrees, claiming that:

The Combined Action Program did not spring forth like some Athena from Zeus’ forehead, mature and full conscious. The Program grew and was nourished by the Marines’ historical traditions and strategic orientation . . . [and that] what is particularly noteworthy here is three major characteristics that distinguished the CAPs throughout the war were so early established: 1) the interspersed USMC squad/PF platoon; 2) the specialized training for the Marines prior to duty with the CAPS; and 3) the volunteer nature of the program.

Thus, with respect to the SWM and Vietnam War-era Marines, Andrew J. Birtle best explains the indirect SWM-Vietnam phenomenon by what he terms as “informal doctrine.” Informal doctrine involved “. . . custom, tradition, and accumulated experience that was transmitted from one generation of soldiers to the next through a combination of official and unofficial writings, curricular materials, conversation, and individual materials.” Unfortunately, given restrictions on circulation, the SWM remained largely inaccessible when it was most relevant to what Boot considers, similar to Dr. Shaeffer, America’s biggest Small War. One has to wonder what impact the SWM might have had during the Vietnam War if the Manual had been distributed and studied as aggressively at the time as in the late twentieth century and the early twenty first century.
Nixon Doctrine and the *Small Wars Manual*

President Kennedy’s emphasis on “Green Berets” did not diminish Marine Corps MOOTW-style requirements during the Vietnam War. However, the United States Army Special Forces subsequently relieved the Marines of many post-Vietnam long-term NA/COIN operations. These closely resembled the ‘ready to suppress or contain international disturbances short of war,” especially while executing President Nixon’s “bilateral and multilateral alliances to contain Soviet expansion.” Special Forces dominated “counterinsurgency” and “support to insurgency” campaigns, while Marines remained true to their ambiguous Small Wars “force in readiness” role. Consequently, the Marines were estranged from their roots as “the first military service to view counterinsurgency and other forms of small war fighting as an integral part of its mission.”

The Carter and Reagan Doctrines and the *Small Wars Manual*

The 1975 Senate Armed Services Committee tasked the Marines with reevaluating their roles and missions resulting in the Haynes Board. This Board permitted the Small Wars ghosts to creep back into the fight, this time against Cold War amphibious advocates who formed a modern version of the Advance Naval Bases camp.

Some planners believed the Corps should strengthen its firepower and help defend Europe. They said that a prepositioned conventional deterrent remains credible only if it can be reinforced and that the Marine Corps’ ready force serves this purpose. Others saw the Corps’ future value not in supplementing U.S. Army forces in Europe but in intervening against nonsuperpowers, where American interests and citizens are endangered or where the superpowers’ interests clash.

The Small Wars advocates lost again in 1976, when the Haynes Board recommended a “mid and high intensity wars” focus. The Marines subsequently
concentrated on “more heavily armed and armored [forces]” capable of “dispersal and rapid mobility that could destroy attacking tanks, aircraft and the enemy’s new weapons at greater distances.”\textsuperscript{44} Over a decade later, this focus proved worthwhile in light of the Marine Gulf War performance in 1990 to 1991. But the same focus had done little to prepare the Marines for missions such as the tragic Beirut Peace Operations (1982 to 1984).

Between these actions, General P. X. Kelley, twenty-eighth Commandant of the Marine Corps (1983 to 1987), appeased the Small Wars advocates by charging his Marines to prepare for both missions. His assertion was that, “The Marine Corps is what you want it to be. Amphibious operations are our primary mission, and we have to be ready to cope with every level of conflict.”\textsuperscript{45} The door remained open for the Banana War Marine ghosts to enter. Kelley’s license meant, “in a strange and rational way--and without abrogating the possibility of massing power in the future--the Corps was going back to a reborn version of what it had been before the massive actions of World War II.”\textsuperscript{46} Despite the lessons of the Vietnam War’s CAP, the CIA and Special Forces protracted Central American counterinsurgency campaigns, and Beirut Peace Operations, the Marine’s doctrinal focus still remained amphibious. Mastering what was then termed Low Intensity Conflict during the Cold War could not compete on equal terms with General Kelley’s challenge to match the MAGTF global tactical mobility against the Soviet “evil empire.”

Still, all was not lost with respect to Small Wars. Perhaps in response to both General Kelly’s “full operational spectrum” challenge and the numerous Cold War, Low Intensity Conflict situations, Headquarters Marine Corps in 1987 reprinted the venerable
As a result, in 2003 the *SWM* remains in print and relevant to many. It is studied in Marine Corps officer professional military education institutions (The Basic School, Expeditionary Warfare School, Command and Staff College), sister-service institutions, and civilian universities (Yale, Rice). Furthermore, the *SWM* is referenced in both the Marine’s current MCWP 3-35.3 *Military Operations in Urban Terrain* doctrine and Marine Corps Order 1510.99 “Competencies for the Marine Officer, Volume 2--Captains.” Moreover, numerous academic monographs, thesis, dissertations and popular history books address the *SWM*’s content.\(^48\)

**Nunn-Cohen Amendment and the *Small Wars Manual***

The same year, as the *SWM*’s reprint, the Nunn-Cohen Amendment to Congress’ 1987 National Defense Authorization Act established United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM) as a supporting combatant command, and provided the command with its own budget.\(^49\) Because low intensity conflict OOTW-type operations were becoming synonymous with special operations, SOCOM retained operational control of an array of forces ranging from the United States Air Force’s Special Operations Wing’s gunships, United States Army’s 75th Ranger Regiment and United States Navy Seal’s Team 6 primarily conducting strikes and raids to United States Army’s Psychological battalion’s supporting Information Operations, Civil Affairs battalions fulfilling Nation Assistance and the Green Berets engaged in counterinsurgency respectively.\(^50\)

The difference between SOCOM special operations and the Marines suppress or contain international disturbances requirement continued to blur, particularly following the Marine Corps’ pre-emptive response in 1986 to the emerging strength of the Special Operations community by standing up its Marine Expeditionary Unit Special Operations
Capable program. This initiative provided very specific special operations capabilities to the regional combatant commanders. Marines provided theater commanders an alternative force in a forward-deployed posture that provided both a contingency response and a deliberate Theater Security Cooperation Plan shaping force. Marines retained their semi-permanent contingency and crisis response “boots on the ground” commitment, while SOCOM featured a long-term NA/COIN presence, and a direct action surgical strike package. In light of the ongoing OEF and OIF 2003, SOF proliferation is said to be “… more in evidence in the world’s developing nations than Peace Corps volunteers and USAID food experts.”

**Engagement and Enlargement and the Small Wars Manual**

Dr. Bickel’s comments perhaps best reflect the Clinton Administration Engagement and Enlargement response to the post-Cold War era:

the history of single hegemonic states--for example, Rome, Spain, France, and England--suggests that the policing of a lesser powers becomes a preoccupation during relatively stable or peaceful period. In the wake of the Cold War the United States has already engaged in Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, and Bosnia.

The aforementioned operations were similar in many ways to the Marines’ Banana War experiences, and therefore, appropriate for SWM application. However, in contrast with the situation during the Vietnam War, the SWM is now readily available, thanks to the Marine Corps 1987 reprint and Sunflower Press’ commercial printing (August 1996).

The doctrine of the post-Vietnam era, Low Intensity Conflict, had evolved into a joint operational doctrine termed operations other than war by 1993. Later in 1995, the CJCS formally discarded the OOTW terminology and recognized MOOTW in its JP 3-0, *Joint Doctrine for Operations* and a month later released its JP 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for*
Despite JP 3-07’s purpose as a joint forces conceptual guidepost, soldiers headed to Somalia and Bosnia having received instruction on the key tenants of the *Small Wars Manual*. As MOOTW doctrine has matured in the 1990s, an emerging operational Order of Battle evolved. SOF and MEU (SOC)’s provided contingency response and deliberate Theater Cooperation Security Plan support, while the larger Marine Expeditionary Brigades (Amphibious or Maritime Prepositioning Forces) and or United States Army light infantry divisions fulfilled the more robust, follow-on crisis response missions. As conflicts subsided, United States Army and SOF remained in theater to conduct what Army doctrine refers to as stability and or support operations, while Marines reconstituted and prepared for the combatant commander’s next mission.

**Small Wars Manual and Preemptive Strike**

In response to the 11th of September 2002 terrorist attacks, the Bush Administration announced a preemptive strike strategy against nations that harbor terrorists and proliferates weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This strategy aggressively reinforces legitimate governments in their conduct of counterterrorism missions, both covertly and overtly. As a carryover from the Clinton Administration, a variety of Banana War imperialism returned in the guise of protective or preemptive interventions. The difference this time is that the driver is the war on terrorism, not the Banana Wars interests such as protecting the Dole Food Companies Nicaragua-based plantations or checking Axis powers proliferation.

The Preemptive Strike strategy shed both the remaining vestiges of the Containment Doctrine and the Vietnam Syndrome that inspired the Powell Doctrine. The
fight against terrorism may require executing a protracted, expeditionary MOOTW campaign. The situation becomes ripe for the SWM theory and TTP application. In addition, United States SOCOM has evolved from Nunn-Cohen’s supporting command to become a supported command, with a particular focus on counterterrorism.\textsuperscript{58} Some Pentagon advocates have even called for establishing Special Operating Forces as a fifth branch of service. One administration official said: “Harry Truman saw the value of air power and made the Air Force a separate branch in 1947. If Truman were president today, he’d do the same for special operations forces.”\textsuperscript{59} However, SOF has limitations. Assistant Secretary for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, Marshall Billingsea, has noted that since SOF “. . . cannot be mass produced, nor can their equipment . . . conventional forces are going to have to step in and pick up certain missions.” These missions include combat search-and-rescue, DoD support to counterdrug operations, Noncombatant evacuations operations, and Nation Assistance.\textsuperscript{60}

A month after Secretary Billingsea’s comments, the 2nd Marine Division formed the nucleus of United States Central Command’s Commander Joint Task Force--Horn of Africa in an open-ended counterterrorism and NA/COIN mission to support OEF and in the European Command Area of Responsibility Marine forces replaced Green Berets training indigenous forces (Foreign Internal Defense) in the landlocked Republic of Georgia.\textsuperscript{61} SOCOM’s role has continued to expand demonstrating agility for OIF as its forces executed:

one of the biggest Special Operations missions ever, with a thousand Delta Force members and Rangers in the west and another thousand Special Forces troops in the north and south. In almost every aspect, the missions broke new ground: Some units ‘staged’ into Iraq through former Soviet bloc member Bulgaria. In northern Iraq, conventional Army paratroopers and tank units were put under the
command of a Special Operations general. In the south, meanwhile, some Special Operations troops were put under the command of regular Army generals.\textsuperscript{62}

Mindful of SOCOM’s limited personnel depth, it is not difficult to surmise that the Marine Corps and both the United States Army’s light infantry and emerging Brigade Combat Teams will assume more of SOCOM’s non-counterterrorism missions. Thus the year 2003 finds Marines potentially returning to Banana Wars operations instead of temporary limited objective, limited duration missions. The following table provides a snapshot for perspective on these two periods:

Table 1. Banana Wars versus 2003 Operating Environment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Banana Wars (1901-1934)</th>
<th>2003 COE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monroe Doctrine</td>
<td>Pre-Emptive Strike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protracted Interventions</td>
<td>Protracted Liberations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Wars</td>
<td>MOOTW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterinsurgency</td>
<td>Counter Terrorism/CCO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Revolutions</td>
<td>Religious Revolutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European/Axis Influence</td>
<td>Islamic Extremism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jungle/Mountain Operations</td>
<td>Urban/Littoral Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy Department/Single Svc Dominant</td>
<td>Joint Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine Guns</td>
<td>WMD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As indicated, the differences are subtle and the congruence enlightening despite the intervening lapsed time. WMD and terrorism represent the only notable exceptions. Even more congruent are the \textit{SWM} and \textit{Expeditionary Operations} threat perspectives which share a common respect for the unconventional warrior’s capabilities.
Table 2. Small Wars Manual Versus Expeditionary Operations: “The Threat”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Small Wars Manual</th>
<th>Expeditionary Operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The future opponent may be as well armed as they are [regular army]; he will be</td>
<td>Conversely, smaller-scale contingencies frequently also involve clashes with unconventional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>able to concentrate a numerical superiority against isolated detachments at the</td>
<td>military or paramilitary organizations – criminal and drug rings, vandals and looters,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>time and place he chooses; as in the past he will have thorough knowledge of the</td>
<td>militias, guerillas, terrorist organizations, urban gangs – that blur the distinction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>trails, the country, and the inhabitants; and he will have the inherent ability to</td>
<td>between war and widespread criminal violence. These organizations are likely to employ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>withstand all the natural obstacles, such as climate and disease, to a greater</td>
<td>unconventional weapons and techniques – even relatively simple and cheap weapons of mass</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>extent than a white man. All these natural advantages, combining primitive</td>
<td>destruction – that provide a challenging asymmetrical response to a superior conventional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cunning and modern armament, will weigh heavily in the balance against the</td>
<td>capability.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>advantage of the marine forces in organization, equipment, intelligence and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>discipline, if a careless audacity is permitted to warp good judgment.63</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The reemerging series of realities require the Marines to review their MOOTW or Small Wars role and current doctrine. These include the willingness to conduct preemptive strikes, the intra-state versus inter-state wars and conflicts; the increase in protracted MOOTW operations; the SOCOM focus on counterterrorism; and conventional forces assumption of special operations missions. Can the Marine Corps dismiss the possibility of a protracted MOOTW campaign or Small Wars intervention in light of the current strategic environment? Both the COE and the nature of this question underscore the SWM’s relevance and highlight CETO’s pending SWM update. If the SWM Volume II addresses a twenty-first century protracted MOOTW campaign as did the original Manual with reference to early twentieth century circumstances, the new Manual’s impact may prove similar to that of the 1987 reprint. Dr. Bickel noted that the “Corps resurrect[ing] the Small Wars Manual and reprint[ing] it in its entirety, without
edits” was at the time “prescient in returning to a doctrine with applicability to a future of messy internal wars.”

In conclusion, it was the SWM’s doctrinal influence not its relevance that eroded over the years. A number of variables accounted for erosion: the primacy of amphibious operations and large scale conventional operations during World War II and the Korean War; security classification and limited physical distribution; the Cold War MAGTF operational focus; the emergence of SOCOM; the changing national security strategies; and ultimately, the Marines’ self-declared limited objective, limited duration doctrine. In 2003, the SWM accords with General Krulak’s Chaos in the Littorals and Three Block War depictions of the twenty-first century operating environment. CETO’s SWM Volume II provides an opportunity to revisit MOOTW as a Type Operation similar to those the Banana War Marines confronted during the inter-war years. This development responds to General Krulak’s charge that “military doctrine cannot be allowed to stagnate . . . [It] must continue to evolve based on growing experience, advancements in theory, and the changing face of war itself.”


4Ibid., 129.
5 Moskin, 222.

6 Bickel, Keith B., Ph.D., Mars Learning (Boulder: Westview Press, 2001), 205.


Ibid., As quoted from John Russell, The Birth of the FMF, n.d., John Russell Papers, box 3, folder 3, Marine Corps Historical Center, Personal Papers Section, Washington, DC.

Moskin, 699.

8 Moskin, 223.

9 Bickel, xi.

10 Boot, Savage Wars of Peace, 284-285.


20 Ibid., 52-53.

21 Boot, Savage Wars of Peace, 293.

22 Ibid., 316.

23 Boot, “Forget Vietnam.”


26 Shaffer, v.

27 Moskin, 224; and Victor H. Krulak, First to Fight (Annapolis: United State Naval Institute, 1984), 200.


Krulak, 189-216.

Boot, 295.

“In Indochina, Gallieni was given the tasks of pacifying the extreme north of the country, which was infested by the Black Flags, Chinese “pirates” whom the French had driven from their coastal strongholds. Abandoning concepts of large-scale operations or “front lines,” Gallieni put into practice a method he called “progressive occupation.” Posts were established around which patrols would circulate, progressively extending the area of control until they touched upon that of an adjacent post. At the same time, the post would become a market that attracted the natives, often by purchasing their goods at prices above the market level. The arrival of the indigenous population allowed the French to make contacts and gather intelligence but, above all, to demonstrate that prosperity would follow cooperation with the French. The natives, grateful for the economic reconstruction of their land via the roads, markets, wells, and other public works projects sponsored by the French, recognized the advantages of colonialism and rallied to the occupying power.” Peter Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton NJ: Princeton Press, 1986) as quoted in Douglas Porch’s, ‘Bugeaud, Gallieni, Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial Warfare,” 388.

Boot, 295.


Peterson, 16.

Moskin, 224; and Department of the Navy, Marine Corps Operations, 1-5.


40 Department of the Navy, *Strategy*, 53.

41 Boot, *Savage Wars of Peace*, 283.

42 Moskin, 699.

43 Ibid., 704.

44 Ibid., 710,708,

45 Ibid., 760.

46 Ibid., 761.

47 Department of the Navy, *Small Wars Manual*, Foreword.

48 Bickel, xii,


The Nunn-Cohen Amendment created USSOCOM and consolidated all SOF under one command. Forces making up SOF include Army Special Operations Aviation, Special Forces, Rangers, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations forces; Air Force special operations aviators and special tactics teams; and Navy Sea, Air, and Land (SEAL) Teams and Special Boat Units. The Nunn-Cohen Amendment also provides USSOCOM with its own Major Force Program 11 (MFP-11) funding. This legislation provides USSOCOM with the authority, direction and control of funds that allows it to develop and acquire Special Operations peculiar equipment to prepare SOF to carry out our assigned missions. *Nunn-Cohen Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1987, Title 10, Section 167, U.S. Code* (1987).
Other Operations Than War succeeded Low Intensity Conflict as the doctrinal term to describe current MOOTW actions. Chairman Joints Chief of Staff, JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1 February 1995), V-2.

“Special Operations--Operations conducted by specially organized, trained and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or psychological objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. These operations are conducted during peacetime competition, conflict and war, independently or in coordination with operations of conventional, nonspecial operations forces. Political-military considerations frequently shape special operations, requiring clandestine, covert, or low visibility techniques and oversight at the national level. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps Reference Publication 5-12A, Operational Terms and Graphics (Washington, DC: USGPO PCN 211000008000, 30 September 1997), 1-142.

General P. X. Kelly established the permanent MAGTF concept in 1986 which replaced the temporary Marine Amphibious Units which had first begun to deploy in 1985, Moskin, 761.


“The MEU (SOC) program and certification process to Marine Forces in order to meet the National Command Authority and Geographic Combatant Commanders requirements for a certified, versatile MAGTF that provides a sea-based, forward presence with inherent operational flexibility to respond rapidly to multiple mission.” United States Marine Corps, “Marine Corp Order 3120.9B: Policy for Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU(SOC)).” Headquarters Marine Corps Plans, Policy and Operations Department (POE-30 Expeditionary Branch Official Home Page, 25 September 2001) 1, available on line from http://hqinet001.hqmc.usmc.mil/pp&o/POE/MAGTF%20Special%20Ops/MCO%203120.9B.pdf; Internet; accessed on 17 May 2003.

Theater Security Cooperation Plans are defined explained by MCO 5710.6 reads as follows: “The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) tasks the Combatant Commanders, through the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), to develop Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) strategies. The Combatant Commanders, in turn, rely on their service component commanders to contribute to the Combatant Commander’s strategy and, ultimately, to carry it out. The Joint Staff and the services will review the Combatant Commanders’ TSC. In the past several years, CJCS and the Combatant Commanders have focused their efforts to ensure that security cooperation activities are


54 Bickel, xii.

55 Joint Doctrine for Operations, V-2.

56 Bickel, xii, quoting Colonel Gary Anderson, USMC Instructor, Marine Corps University. Interview by Dr. Keith A. Bickel, August 1994, MCB Quantico, VA.


60 Andrew Koch, “USA Expands Special Operations’ Role in ‘War on Terrorism,’” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 6 November 2002, 36.


63 Department of the Navy, SWM, 1-6(b).


65 Bickel, xi-xii.

66 Department of the Navy, Expeditionary Operations, 3.
CHAPTER 3
THE SMALL WARS MANUAL: TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY RELEVANCE CHECK

Given the SWM’s late twentieth century renaissance, this chapter answers the supporting question, “What does the SWM offer to Twenty-first Century Marine Corps MOOTW doctrine?” Since much has already been said about the SWM’s current relevance, what specifically can be leveraged in the SWM’s framework and content for future Marine Corps doctrine. The chapter examines the SWM’s specific relevance by first reviewing its general framework and then analyzing its content by comparing it to the “Principles of MOOTW” outlined in JP 3-07, Joint Doctrine for MOOTW’s “Principles of MOOTW.”

SWM Framework

Determining whether the SWM’s framework provides a relevant baseline for future doctrine requires examining its title, literary style, focus and organization.

SWM Title. A discussion of whether the SWM reflects a relevant title or term for future Marine Corps MOOTW doctrine essentially evolves into an argument of whether the term MOOTW or the term Small Wars better and more accurately reflect expeditionary operations that MAGTF normally execute. JP 3-07’s MOOTW reflects an appropriate term for the challenging feat of capturing the essence of sixteen different operations in a single doctrinal phrase. However, as reflected in Expeditionary Operations, normally combatant commanders call upon a MAGTF to execute only those MOOTW-style activities that require combat and conflict resolution capabilities such as CCO, non-combatant evacuation operations, and more recently counterterrorism versus
those activities that reflect the remaining MOOTW operations that concentrate on promoting peace or supporting civil authorities.1 Given these differences, the term Small Wars appears more applicable to MAGTF operations than the term MOOTW for it more appropriately reflects the operational environment in which MAGTF operate: military interventions and interposition operations.

Furthermore, aside from the Small Wars term reflecting the normal environment in which MAGTF operate, the term reflects a combat style developed from the Banana Wars era and the recent 3-Block War concept from its land component counterpart. In contrast, the United States Army considers its MOOTW combat style as either a “stability” or “support” operation respectively.2 Its recently published FM 3-07 implies that both operations are distinct and one is either performing one form of the operation or the other which conflicts with the CCO for one is called upon to perform both simultaneously. To be certain, neither the terms Small Wars, Stability Operations, or Support Operations dismiss the doctrinal precedence inherent to joint terminology. They simply attempt to operationalize the joint type operation MOOTW from a service perspective. In the end, the differences between the two services Small Wars versus Stability or Support Operations terminology has been reflected operationally since the Vietnam War.

During the Vietnam War (1965 to 1972) General Lewis Walt organized his CAP to fight the Viet Cong by using a “painstaking campaign to rid the hamlets of the guerrillas and the political cadres, and not merely by killing or capturing them.” That approach was similar to the Banana War era tactics outlined in the SWM’s “Military Territory Organizations” section.3 The United States Army dismissed these tactics in
favor of a firepower and attrition warfare strategy and criticized the Marines for “. . . behaving timidly and letting the Army carry the burden of combat.” Ultimately, the Marine Corps’ Warfighting now highlights Generals Krulak and Walt’s pacification strategy as an example of its maneuver warfare philosophy as opposed to either a stability or support operation.

Twenty years later during Operation Restore Hope (Somalia 1991), I Marine Expeditionary Force’s Small Wars approached differed significantly from the United States Army’s 10th Mountain Division. Boot notes that:

By and large they [Marines] have been far better at small wars than the army. The contrast was on vivid display in Somalia. The Marines took an aggressive attitude. They patrolled actively and always bristled with firepower, letting Somalis know they were not to be messed with. Paradoxically the Marines wound up killing far fewer Somalis—some 500—than the army, which tried a more diplomatic approach but ended up killing 5,000 . . . the Marines read their Small Wars Manual, which counsels that ‘the morale effect of tanks and armored cars is probably greater in small wars operations than it is in a major war.’ They brought in armored vehicles to surround warlord compounds and did not suffer any disasters.

Three years later during Operation Uphold Democracy (Haiti 1994), Adam Siegel’s Center for Naval Analyses study demonstrated that II Marine Expeditionary Force’s Special Purpose MAGTF Caribbean remained true to their Small Wars approach versus that of the same 10th Mountain Division forces. Siegel captured these differences in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marines: SPMAGTF CARIB</th>
<th>Army Forces (principally 10th MTN)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minimal change in operations with the change from forcible to permissive</td>
<td>Shift in plan meant an almost total change in the approach and the Army force list.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimal ROE confusion; stopped FAd’h violence from the start.</td>
<td>Some ROE confusion; late ROE cards; watched Haitian-Haitian violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confrontation with FAd’H violence from the start</td>
<td>Cooperated with FAd’H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggressive civil-military operations; “this is the mission”</td>
<td>Little civil-military activity; avoid “mission creep” as orders call for restoration to D-1 conditions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Again nine years later during Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003), the I Marine Expeditionary Force Marines retained the Small Wars operational approach in contrast to the United States Army’s 3d Infantry Division (ID). During OIF transition phase between combat and post-conflict operations, veteran journalists reported similar differences in operational approaches between the MAGTF and 3d ID operating side-by-side in Baghdad.

The departure of the marines came as something of a shock in this shattered capital. The roughly 20,000 troops of the First Marine Division had been a highly visible and forceful presence, mounting foot patrols through the streets, working with neighborhood committees to stop looting and arson, and running a civil affairs effort to help get the police, hospitals, electrical and water service up and running. They are now being redeployed to southern Iraq.

The soldiers of the Army’s Third Infantry Division, who have now spread out to cover the city, have struck a lower profile. They are largely in tanks or Bradley fighting vehicles at banks, a few major intersections and Mr. Hussein’s many palaces, and at the National Museum of Iraq, which has been looted.

Other soldiers are behind the walls of the palace compounds, other government buildings and stationed at the airport. The 101st Airborne Division has troops at the southern edge of the city, including some at the electric power plant in Dawra.
The Army’s patrols are conducted largely in small groups of two or three Humvees. Today, one was seen traveling with a white Nissan pickup truck filled with armed militia fighters from the Free Iraqi Forces associated with Mr. Chalabi.

The marines had maintained a presence in and around the Palestine Hotel, where they set up a civil and military operations center, which interviewed job candidates among former government workers and tried to get city services operating.

Although the Army has a more elaborate civil affairs organization, composed largely of reservists with specialized experience, none of their civil affairs officers were visible around the hotel today. They were said to be establishing a base inside one of the former palaces.

Later, while assuming the Baghdad Area of Operations from the 3d ID, the 1st Armored Division’s Commanding General’s assessment supported the journalist remarks when he described the current mission posture as “a ‘finger in the dike’ approach.”

Finally with respect to the term SWM’s title, the SWM title merits consideration over the proposed MCWP 3-33, MOOTW because it reflects both a “brand name” within the MOOTW community and appropriately recognizes the Marine Corps Banana War heritage. Moreover, not only would this title change more accurately reflect MAGTF operations, but also generates enthusiasm from both Marine’s and other MOOTW practitioners to study an updated version an enduring Marine Corps legacy doctrine.

**SWM Literary Style.** In addition to retaining the **SWM**’s title, the future MCWP 3-33 doctrine would do well to adopt the SWM’s aggressive literary style versus the rigid, technical writing style resident in most doctrinal publications. Straight forward, no-nonsense observations such as the highlighted passage below undoubtedly caused Dr. Bickel to appropriately describe the SWM’s style as one where, “readers could deviate
from only at their own peril and other sections providing guidance but calling for
individual initiative in application.8

One must ever be on guard to prevent his views becoming fixed as to procedures
or methods. Small Wars demand the highest type of leadership directed by
intelligence, resourcefulness and ingenuity. Small Wars are conceived in
uncertainty, are conducted often with precarious responsibility and doubtful
authority, under indeterminate orders lacking specific instructions.9

In short, the SWM literary prose keeps the reader engaged in the text as opposed to the
technical jargon, list of lists, and stifled prose of the current doctrinal manuals.

SWM Focus. Along with its title and literary style, the SWM authors focused their
work on the dominant, worst-case Small Wars operation of the Banana War era:
counterinsurgency operations in the jungle and mountain environment. By focusing upon
the dominate operational challenge, the SWM authors avoided the temptation to address
each Small Wars operation in detail such as from Freedom of Navigation Operations
(How to protect a strait?) to Maritime Intercept Operations TTP (Visit, Board, Search and
Seizure) and concentrated their efforts on a crisis response force deploying into a hostile
expeditionary environment. An all encompassing Small Wars focus would undoubtedly
resulted in a cumbersome and intimidating encyclopedia versus tailored doctrine. The
SWM addresses general Small Wars theory and the Marine Corps role up front then
quickly moves into describing a counterinsurgency campaign before finally focusing
upon the necessary TTP for operating in the jungle and mountain environment.

Given the multitude of operations that JP 3-07 currently lists under their MOOTW
umbrella, the SWM demonstrates a relevant method for the Marine Corps to address its
current Small Wars doctrinal deficiencies: specifically, a doctrinal expeditionary model
for a crisis response force to execute a CCO within a large, urban in the littoral region.
**SWM Organization.** The SWM’s logical start-to-finish operational approach toward a intervention provides insight on and reinforces an understanding of the compressed levels of warfare inherent to Small Wars and provides a relevant method for problem solving versus the dominant “Collection of Considerations” reflected in many doctrinal publications.

Similarly, although falling short of providing methodology as did the SWM, the Joint Warfighting Center’s non-doctrinal *JTF Commander’s Handbook for Peace Operations* (1997) provides the closest example of a modern SWM particularly with respect to its organization. The *JTF Commander’s Handbook* generally follows the SWM’s construct until it approaches the campaign planning aspect where the two publications diverge. The *JTF Handbook* does not address the SWM’s operational phases and methods of employment other than transition planning. Nevertheless, the *JTF Handbook for Peace Operations* validates the SWM’s organization as a relevant model for modern future MOOTW doctrine give their given its similarity and recent publishing.

**SWM Content**

Having established that the SWM provides a credible framework for future doctrine to build upon, the remainder of this chapter briefly surveys its content against JP 3-07’s “Principles of MOOTW” to determine its relevance in light of the COE. The content examined predominately reflects the SWM’s initial chapters, those that Bickel refers to as the Theoretical chapters and what Boot promotes as an “. . . unparalleled exposition of the theory of small wars,” subsequently titled, “Introduction,” “Organization,” “Logistics,” and “Training.”

57
Objective. JP 3-07 advises Joint Force Commanders (JFC) to “direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective” and acknowledges that political considerations dominate throughout a MOOTW. Likewise, MCDP 1, *Warfighting*, emphasizes the same by reemphasizing Clausewitz’s maxim that “war is an extension of both policy and politics with the addition of military force.”

The *SWM* remains congruent with both the aforementioned doctrines; in fact Dr. Wray R. Johnson points out that the Banana War authors established doctrinal precedence with respect to the political endstate driving the military operations ways and means:

> its treatment of revolutionary guerrilla warfare was groundbreaking and remarkable prescient regarding the nature of emerging revolutionary warfare: ‘After a study has been made of the people who will oppose the intervention, the strategical plan is evolved. . . . Strategy should attempt to gain psychological ascendancy over the outlaw or insurgent element prior to hostilities. [The ] political mission . . . dictates thee military strategy of small wars.’ This statement is quite remarkable in that this was the first time that US military doctrine placed the political mission ahead of military requirements.

The *SWM* consistently nests political and strategic objectives throughout its text and issues a stern charge for Marine officers to expand their professional military education with international relations and intervention history. Its authors emphasized that Marine officers required a keen awareness of the respective Small War political objective for even the early twentieth century expeditionary forces understood that tactical gaffes often result in negative strategic consequences. Thus the *SWM*’s content with respect to the “Principle of Objective” continues to remain relevant from both a doctrinal and COE perspective. Marines cannot continue to ignore political objectives and make tactical mistakes. A recent example was OIF “Strategic Corporal” who created a negative, strategic “CNN effect” by hoisting the American flag over Saddam Hussein’s
statue in Baghdad. Consequently striking a strategic blow against the United States for the action “touched a sensitive chord among Arabs and revived concerns of U.S. military leaders who want their forces to be seen as liberators, not occupiers.”

Unity of Effort. JP 3-07 advises the JFC to “seek unity of effort in every operation” as opposed to the “Principle of War’s” unity of command since MOOTW “is often complicated by a variety of international, foreign and domestic military and non-military participants.” The Banana Wars era did not reflect the often massive and intrusive non-governmental and international organization participation in military interventions as compared to the current COE. However, the SWM did appreciate JP 3-07’s further unity of effort amplification that, “commanders must establish procedures for liaison and coordination . . . because MOOTW will often be conducted at the small unit level.” Appropriately, the SWM also notes that:

the matter of working in cooperation with the State Department officials is not restricted entirely to higher officials. In many cases very junior subordinates of the State Department and the Marine Corps may have to solve problems that might involve the United States in serious difficulties.

Furthermore, the SWM indirectly encouraged Unity of Effort by addressing constabulary operations where Marines served amongst the intervened nations military forces similar to the Vietnam War’s CAP which embedded squads within the South Vietnamese Popular Forces militias. Moreover, the recently published MCWP 3-33.1, MAGTF Civil-Military Operations (April 2003) formally designated this Unity of Effort technique as “combined action” which attempts to ‘embrace people and their institutions . . . for cooperative inclusion of local organizations and authorities can strengthen the MAGTF. For example, MPs are more effective when teamed with Host Nation civil
police . . . the MAGTF should always operate from a basis of partnership and mutual respect." The SWM did not explicitly cite Unity of Effort within its text. However, it remains congruent with the JP 3-07 principle given its emphasis on both State Department liaison and combined action with the target nation’s population.

Security. The “Principle of Security” not only reflect a military perspective, but includes the other national instruments of power as well when it warns JFCs to “never permit hostile factions to acquire a military, political, or informational advantage.” Additionally, JP 3-07 amplifies the necessity for providing security for non-combatants and maintaining strict operational security as well. The SWM addresses the principle of security strictly from a military perspective for it describes the principle simply as “freedom of action” that requires an “occupying force . . . strong enough to hold all the strategical points of the country, protect its communications, and at the same time furnish an operating force sufficient to overcome the opposition wherever it appears.”

The SWM goes further by mandating that the expeditionary force be organized for “mobility and flexibility, and that the troops be highly trained in the use of special weapons as well as proper utilization of terrain.” Operational security is addressed in the “Stratagems and ruses” section within the chapter on “Infantry Patrols.” Finally, with respect to the principle of Security, the SWM describes JP 3-07’s Exclusion Zone operations as “Neutral Zones” whose purpose is “to suppress disorder, provide a guard for our nationals, and their property in the port, including our legation or consular buildings, and, in addition, certain local government buildings, such as custom houses.”

Restraint. JP 3-07 mandates that the JFC “apply appropriate military capability prudently,” and further cautions the JFC that emphasizing restraint is useless unless
“commanders at all levels . . . take proactive steps,” and to expect rules of engagement to change often. Reflecting both JP 3-07’s “Principle of Restraint” as well as then Major General Anthony Zinni’s (USMC) top concerns that a police force and judiciary system could be established soonest during Operation Restore Hope, the SWM states:

The forces of occupation have four weapons to which to act: (a) Moral effects of the presence of troops; (b) intelligence service; (c) provost service (including Exceptional Military Courts); and finally (4) offensive action. In the past, scant attention has been given to these services in the preparation of operation plans for small wars operations. As a rule, they have been established only when the necessities of the operation forced it upon the higher command.

Ultimately, the SWM demanded that, “caution must be exercised, and instead of striving to generate the maximum power with forces available, the goal is to gain decisive results with the least application of force and consequent minimum loss of life.” Furthermore, the SWM counsels its commanders that “a feeling of mutual respect and cooperation between members of the military forces and civil officials on a basis of mutual independence of each other should be cultivated” and demands they accomplish their missions, “. . . with a minimum loss of life and property and by methods that leave no aftermath or taste of bitterness or render the return to peace unnecessarily difficult.”

The SWM also calls for “a knowledge of the laws relating to the psychology of crowds is indispensable to the interpretation of the elements of revolutionary movements;” encourages non-lethal weapons: for if “properly employed, chemical agents should be of considerable value . . . the most effective weapons to quell civil disorders;” and its Aviation chapter dictates that towns and cities are not legitimate targets since they risk “endangering the lives of noncombatants.
Finally, the *SWM* echoes similar JP 3-07 cautions concerning the changing rules of engagement (ROE) for it warns:

Even after landing, instructions probably will be received not to exert any physical force unless it becomes absolutely necessary, and then only to the minimum necessary to accomplish the purpose. Thus orders may be received not to fire on irregulars unless fired upon; instructions may be issued not to fire upon irregular groups if women are present with them even though it is known that armed women accompany the irregulars. . . . the underlying reason for this condition is the desire to keep the war small, to confine it within a strictly limited scope, and to deprive it, insofar as may be possible, of the more outstanding aspects of war.\(^{28}\)

In an overwhelming manner, both JP 3-07 and the *SWM* offer future Marine Corps doctrine similar perspectives on the “Principle of Restraint” from both a theory and a TTP perspective.

Perseverance. JP 3-07 warns JFC to “prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims. Some MOOTW may require years to achieve desired results.”\(^{29}\) Given the Marine Corps’ current limited objective, limited duration MOOTW perspective, this principle may appear least applicable. However, the *SWM* implied perseverance within its campaign design. The “Phases of Small Wars” does not reflect executing enabling operations for follow-on forces and resources to execute decisive operations as does the current Marine Corps doctrine. Instead, the *SWM*’s campaign design reflects a protracted intervention as indicated below.

Phase 1: Initial demonstration or landing and action of vanguard.

Phase 2: The arrival of reinforcements and general military operations in the field.

Phase 3: Assumption of control of executive agencies, and cooperation with the legislative and judicial agencies.
Phase 4: Routine police functions.

Phase 5: Withdrawal from the Theater of Operations.

The SWM remains congruent with JP 3-07’s “Principle of Perseverance.” It takes a campaign perspective versus that of a tactical operation.

Legitimacy. The “Principle of Legitimacy” states “committed forces must sustain the legitimacy of the operation and of the host government where applicable.”\(^{30}\) The SWM makes for similar provisions for it not only requires its officers to sustain a keen understanding of both the current international situation and previous interventions (see principle of Objective), but also requires them to execute deliberate actions that enhanced the “perception . . . of the legality, morality, or righteousness” of the intervention.\(^{31}\)

For example, similar to the COE, the SWM highly regarded engineers and medical services as key capabilities to convince the intervened nation that its intentions were noble.

Experience has demonstrated that the construction, improvement, and maintenance of routes of communication, including railroads, one of the most important factors in a successful small-wars campaign.

The medical personnel with the force is one of the strongest elements for gaining the confidence and friendship of the native inhabitants in the theater of operations. So long as it can be done without depleting the stock of medical supplies required for the intervening troops, they should not hesitate to care for sick and wounded civilians who have no other source of medical attention.\(^{32}\)

Additionally, the SWM internalized the “Principle of Legitimacy” with its staff procedures for it demanded fierce resolve in accountability with the local populace. The SWM considered “Investigations--[as] one of the most important duties of the inspector in small wars is to investigate matters which involve controversies between individuals of the force and local inhabitants.”\(^{33}\) Claims required prompt attention and efficient record
keeping because the SWM’s Withdrawal chapter repeatedly concentrates its efforts on meticulous reconciliation between its executive staff and the host nation. Granted, one may assume these exhortations are nothing more than standard accountability, but in military-civilian government transitions the departing impression remains lasting for both parties.

In conclusion, both the SWM’s framework and content remain relevant for the COE and worthy for emulation in many respects. Specifically, future Marine Corps doctrine should adopt the Small Wars term to both describe its normal participation in joint MOOTW operations as well as honor its heritage. Next to reviving the more accurate Small Wars terminology, the SWMs framework reflects the most relevant aspect for future Marine Corps doctrine development. Its construct allows for the Marine Corps doctrine writers to discuss the Marine Corps’ relationship with MOOTW (or Small Wars) and then similar to the SWM--provide a contemporary model of an intervention crisis response force. The content of both SWM and JP 3-07’s reflect similar concerns applicable to the COE, in some cases but not irrelevant. However, in regards to the COE, the SWM is understandably deficient in the missions that have evolved since its publishing as indicated in the following:

1. Its TTP focuses upon the Banana Wars dominate jungle and mountain operational environment versus that of today’s urban and littoral region.

2. It does not provide for guidance on humanitarian assistance, counterterrorism, and the emerging “Consequence Management” mission in support of both domestic and expeditionary requirements.
Given these arguments and despite its few deficiencies with respect to the COE, the SWM most certainly provides a relevant baseline for future Marine Corps doctrine. Perhaps the better questions is not whether to leverage the SWM to build future Marine Corps doctrine, but careful analysis if future Marine Corps MOOTW doctrine strays from its proven tracks.

1Department of the Navy, MCDP 3, Expeditionary Operations (Washington, DC: USGPO, 16 April 1998), 110.


5Department of the Navy, Warfighting (Washington, DC: USGPO, 27 June 1997), 39; and Sheehan, 636.


7“Major General Ricardo Sanchez, Commanding General of the 1st Armored Division, indicated at a meeting today in downtown Baghdad with some of his subordinate commanders that he understands that the new stance increases the risks taken by U.S. troops in a country where attacks on them still occur daily. He said he wanted to protect his troops,” but added, “We must not let force protection become our overriding concern, so that we go to ground and build fortresses around ourselves and don't do the mission we came to do.” That represents a marked departure from the guarded approach that the Army took in other recent peacekeeping missions, most notably in the Balkans.

In some ways, the changes parallel the revamping of the civilian side of the U.S. occupation effort underway since Bremer arrived this month. In both cases, there is a surprising amount of improvisation going on as occupation officials seek to restore order and re-start civil institutions. “We’re making it up with both hands,” said one U.S.
military official here. “This isn’t the operational climate we expected. We never expected such widespread looting, or such a general collapse of authority.”

Underlying the revision of the peacekeeping posture is a feeling that U.S. troops occupying the city have been too reactive. The 3rd Division, which attacked the city in early April, had a “finger in the dike” approach, Sanchez said at the meeting. A reporter was permitted to attend that session and other military meetings on the changes.

Sanchez’s suggestion that the 3rd Division never made the transition from combat to peacekeeping is widely held in the 1st Armored. “The 3rd I.D. guys are basically in place where they were when they were told to stop fighting,” said Lt. Col. James Boisselle, commander of an infantry battalion that is moving into a part of west Baghdad that is laden with ministries, parade grounds and expensive homes--the Iraqi equivalent of Federal Triangle, the Mall and Georgetown. “Now we’re trying to reconfigure that footprint.”

In the interest of preserving peace within the Army, no one quite says that the 3rd Division's reactive stance helped contribute to the lawlessness that has plagued postwar Baghdad for the last six weeks. Looting has been extensive, hitting most of the government ministries and other major state buildings, and continuing long after the United States established a major troop presence in the city. Gangs of thieves have terrorized shopkeepers, and carjackings have become a major problem. The widespread absence of electricity and police protection has exacerbated the security problem.

But officers from the new division make it clear that they have studied the situation and intend to take a radically different approach. They say, for example, that 3rd Division patrols were limited in scope, generally restricted to major roads, and almost always conducted “mounted” on vehicles.” Thomas Ricks, “US Alters Tactics in Baghdad Operation,” Washington Post, 25 May 2003, A01.

8 Bickel, Keith B., Ph.D., Mars Learning (Boulder: Westview Press, 2001), 4.

9 Department of the Navy, Small Wars Manual, 1-6(e).

10 Boot, 284.


14Department of the Navy, *SWM*, 1-6(d).


16Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine for MOOTW*, II-3.

17Department of the Navy, *SWM*, 1-20(c).


19Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine for MOOTW*, II-3.

20Department of the Navy, *SWM*, 1-9(d).

21Ibid, 1-9(e).

22Ibid., 5-1.

23Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine for MOOTW*, II-4.


25Department of the Navy, *SWM*, 2-13(e).

26Ibid., 1-17(9)c.

27Ibid., 2-2 and 1-29 (g).

28Ibid., 1-5(b)1, 1-18(b).

29Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine for MOOTW*, 2-5.
30 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine for MOOTW*, II-5.

31 Ibid.

32 Department of the Navy, *SWM*, 2-43(a), 2-48(d).

33 Ibid., 2-20(c).
CHAPTER 4
THE SMALL WARS MANUAL VOLUME II

This thesis has discussed the SWM’s journey from authoritative doctrine to a reference publication and its current relevance for serving as a baseline for future Marine Corps Small Wars doctrine. Specifically, this chapter answers the final supporting question: What does the SWM Volume II offer the Twenty-first Century Marine Corps MOOTW doctrine? The following quotes from the CETO formal announcement for the SWM Volume II serve as the basis for answering this question.

The new Small Wars Manual is not intended to be a doctrinal publication.1

The project aims to capture lessons learned from non-traditional operations conducted by the Marine Corps since the original manual was published. The emphasis will be on post-Cold War events. The new manual will provide techniques for dealing with operations ranging from humanitarian assistance to peacekeeping/peace enforcement operations.2

As previously discussed in the first chapter, CETO ultimately intends for the SWM Volume II to complement Joint Publication 3-07, Joint Doctrine for MOOTW and MCDP 1-0, Marine Corps Operations. Furthermore, with the exception of counterterrorism operations, CETO accurately addresses the SWM’s deficiencies with respect to the COE. Thus, a short answer to the supporting question appears simple and straightforward: CETO’s SWM Volume II contributes to Marine Corps twenty-first century Small Wars doctrine by updating the SWM’s TTP relevant to the dominant operations in the COE.

However, further examination demonstrates certain flaws that potentially impact the SWM Volume II’s impact such as the misinterpretation of the SWM’s original status in Marine Corps doctrine; the potential impact of updating the SWM without fully
leveraging the Expeditionary Force Development System (EFDS); and dismissive perceptions that may prejudice the updates content with respect to the Marine Corps’ perspective on Small Wars’ role and the value of thoroughly examining certain Cold War operations.³

**Not Intended to be a Doctrinal Publication**

A non-doctrinal *SWM Volume II*, as CETO intends, reflects a flawed historical interpretation of the *SWM’s* original status for it indeed served as the Marine Corps Small Wars doctrine. *Marine Corps Operations* perpetuates the same interpretation when they praise the *SWM* as a seminal reference publication as opposed to its authoritative doctrine status.⁴ The original *SWM* authors clearly demonstrate their intentions for the manual to serve as authoritative doctrine for they express previous frustration that “there is a sad lack of authoritative texts on the methods employed in small wars” which infers that their manual intended to fulfill this void.⁵

One may then counter that despite the authors’ comments, manuals cannot serve as doctrine for they represent two different ideas: prescriptive action (reference) versus conceptual guidance (doctrine). However, this argument falls short for two reasons. First of all, *Warfighting* defines doctrine as “a teaching of the fundamental beliefs of the Marine Corps on the subject of war, from its nature and theory to its preparation and conduct”⁶ which the *SWM* clearly addresses. Dr. Bickel notes in his description of the manuals contents that:

> It now began with theoretical chapters on strategy, organization, and the like that officers would need to consider before entering the theater of operations. The middle was devoted to the practical operational and tactical considerations of waging small wars once in-theater. The last quarter focused on conditions necessary for withdrawal, including supervising elections in the host country.⁷
Secondly, the circumstances of inter-war years doctrinal development play a significant role. Type operations dominated operational thought compared to current Marine Corps doctrine that now provides conceptual warfighting guidance (MCDPs) that drives the manner in which operations are conducted. To classify an inter-war years manual as merely a reference publication is equivalent to stating that the Tentative Manual for Landing Operations, which drove World War II’s Pacific and European Theater amphibious operations and later the Marine Corps primary mission, was not considered Marine Corps authoritative doctrine. General Alexander A. Vandegrift, the eighteenth Commandant of the Marine Corps (1944 to 1947), certainly did not look to the inter-war years manuals as non-doctrinal. After World War II, Vandegrift noted that:

> despite its outstanding record as a combat force in the past war, the Marine Corps’ far greater contribution to victory was doctrinal: that is, the fact that the basic amphibious doctrines which carried Allied troops over every beachhead of World War II had been largely shaped--often in the face of uninterested and doubting military orthodoxy--by United States Marines, and mainly between 1922 and 1935.  

If one accepts that the SWM previously served as authoritative doctrine, then several questions emerge.

What precludes the Marine Corps from designating CETO’s SWM Volume II’s effort as authoritative doctrine to fulfill an identified deficiency (MCWP 3-33, MOOTW)? Since the original SWM, is currently designated as a MCRP, would not MCCDC’s Doctrine Division dictate its follow-on development? Will CETO’s SWM Volume II serve as a MCRP or will its efforts be completely divorced from the Marine Corps formal doctrine infrastructure?
The answers to these questions could easily be answered if the SWM Volume II’s development nested within the normal processes of the EFDS proper rather than as a “special case” handed over to MCWL’s CETO division.

**Expeditionary Force Development System**

The Marine Corps EFDS nests the supporting establishment’s various efforts to sustain and improve expeditionary force readiness. These efforts vary from doctrine development and material solutions to maintaining training areas. CETO serves as a division of the MCWL, which is a key supporting establishment institution within the EFDS. Among its many other tasks, MCWL produces “X-Files” following their experimentation exercises that provide relevant TTP solutions to operational problems currently challenging the Fleet Marine Force. MCWL describes these “X-Files” as “useful information packaged for rapid reading and easy transport in the cargo pocket of the utility uniform [but] . . . do not contain official doctrine, nor are they policy or standing operating procedures.” The MCWL CETO Division appears to be taking the same “X-Files” approach with the SWM Volume II as opposed to normal EFDS doctrine development procedures (see figure 3). Thus CETO, taking action on a Marine Forces Europe request versus a formal mandate, is free to develop the SWM Volume II as an “X-File” type equivalent with no obligation to sustain its content as is the requirement for normal doctrine development.

If the SWM Volume II had been developed under the EDFS auspices proper, it would have been assigned a doctrinal proponent that both develops and maintains the publication. For example, in the case of MOOTW, HQMC assigned MCCDC
proponency responsibilities which ultimately found its way to Doctrine Division. Thus, MOOTW staff cognizance rest with Doctrine Division, and they are responsible for the future MCWP 3-33, MOOTW “. . . preparation, review, and periodic maintenance” because they have been deemed the organization “most closely connected to the daily application of tactics, techniques, and procedures.”

MCCDC Doctrine Division’s assignment as the Small Wars doctrinal proponent is puzzling in that it possesses no internal MOOTW Branch as it does with Amphibious Operations and the fact that MCWL established a “Small Wars Center of Excellence.” Nevertheless, to this point, little is actually required for MCWP 3-33, MOOTW since the Marine Corps’ annual doctrinal publication status has yet to even schedule the start date for its development.

The temptation is great to dismiss this doctrine development analysis process as trivial detail and magnanimously declaring that what is most important is that the SWM Volume II is being updated. However, one must compare which process provides for the great opportunity for the SWM Volume II’s sustained success?
1. EFDS’ doctrinal proponency method where HQMC annually assigns formal responsibility for developing and maintaining its doctrinal publications. A system designed to mitigate against the doctrinal atrophy that the SWM experienced; or

2. CETO’s “X-File” style where the SWM Volume II does not serve as authoritative doctrine, fulfill a validated formal requirement, or reside within the EFDS. Therefore, no organization is accountable to maintain the publication’s content. It is difficult to counter that Option number 1 is the logical choice. Certainly, there is merit in that the short-term gain potentially outweighs the advantages of dealing with the cumbersome bureaucracy of doctrine development. However, at the same time, the Marine Corps has now been without Small Wars doctrine for more than sixty-three years thus it is difficult to imagine that the additional time required to achieve authoritative doctrinal status will make a significant difference.

CETO’s intent for the SWM Volume II as a non-doctrinal reference publication is not without precedence for this tactic is similar to the Joint Warfighting Center’s (JWC) development of the previously discussed JTF Handbook for Peace Operations (see chapter 3). The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) J-7 maintains cognizance (doctrinal proponency) of its JP 3-07, Joint Doctrine for MOOTW on behalf of DoD. The United States JFC, one of the unified combatant commands, is tasked with producing a ancillary Handbook to complement the Chairman’s conceptual MOOTW doctrine which the chairman in turn delegates to JWC. This process potentially parallels that of the EFDS if MCCDC MCWL Division tasks its CETO Division to produce the SWM Volume II in support of Doctrine Division’s MCWP 3-33 (see figure 4). Likewise, the JWC may have taken the initiative and used a bottom-up approach following JP 3-07’s publishing.
Regardless whether the approach was top down or bottom-up it worked for the JTF Peace Operation Handbook which is a widely read quality product. However, there are both differences and drawbacks to this process. The difference is that CETO has no equivalent Marine Corps service doctrine for guidance as did the JWC with the JP 3-07 and the United States Army FM 100-23, Peace Operations to nest concepts and TTP. The vulnerability that both the JTF Handbook and SWM Volume II share is that they both are non-doctrinal publications.

![Diagram](image-url)

Figure 4. CJCS J-7 and MCCDC Reference Publications Development
Therefore neither publication is reflected in the respective joint and service doctrinal taxonomy--JP, MCRP, MCWP, MCDP--which leave both efforts vulnerable to the following secondary effects.

1. Quality Control Point 1: Both Joint and Marine Corps doctrine require periodic, formal review to mitigate doctrinal stagnation.\(^{13}\) Thus a formal process exists versus depending upon an arbitrary request from the Fleet Marine Force or due diligence by the JWC or CETO staffs in the face of numerous other formal taskings. Thus a manual or handbook not classified within the formal doctrinal taxonomy experiences accountability issues that contribute towards its potential atrophy.

2. Quality Control Point 2: Joint and Marine Corps doctrinal distribution results in either a hardcopy via the United States Government Printing Office or electronic file format via the J-7’s Joint Electronic Library or MCCDC Doctrine Division’s official home page respectively.\(^{14}\) However, non-doctrinal publication distribution is often at the developer’s discretion and not centrally advertised with the formal doctrine it supports. For example, the CJCS Joint Electronic Library list the *JTF Commander’s Handbook for Peace Operations* under its Research Papers section and the *SWM* is only available on the Marine Corps History and Museum Division’s CD that can be ordered only via the USGPO or cumbersome Marine Corps Publication Distribution System. As a result, operational planners and commanders ignorant of the respective publication’s existence could easily overlook their location. Just as the *SWM* was lost within the Classified Material Control Center’s three-drawer safe, so too can valuable doctrine and reference become lost in the twenty-first century digital libraries.
On the whole, the *SWM Volume II* deserves to be a part of the formal EFDS process in the same manner to sustain both CETO’s efforts and the manual’s utility to the Marine Corps’ expeditionary forces. Now that the *SWM Volume II*’s process has been addressed, it is necessary to focus on its potential content in light of CETO’s dismissive tone in describing Small Wars operations as “non-traditional” and deemphasizing Cold War campaigns.

**Small Wars Perceptions**

CETO’s commitment to examining Small Wars lessons learned since the *SWM’s* 1940 publishing, which took into account the Banana Wars Campaigns from the turn of the century, will ultimately result in the *SWM series* being based upon more than one hundred years of military intervention experiences. Further demonstrating their commitment to the Small Wars project, CETO hosted a series of “Common Ground Workshops.” These meetings provide a forum where “insights, observations, and attitudes gleaned from people who have lived, worked, and fought in the small wars environment” that will certainly enrich their *SWM Volume II.* These efforts reflect the same commitment that the original *SWM authors* demonstrated. CETO wants lessons learned that are synthesized into an operational approach and subject matter experts directly involved in the writing process. CETO’s efforts in matching the *SWM process* appear inconsistent with their dismissive description of Small Wars as a non-traditional operations. Perhaps more troubling is their stated objective to discount the Cold War Small Wars campaigns. This casts doubt for the *SWM Volume II*’s content.

**Non-Traditional Operations.** CETO’s perspective that Small Wars represents a non-traditional operation for the Marine Corps reflects a decided bias toward both current
Marine Corps doctrine and its institutions dedicated to its traditional Small Wars operations. From a doctrinal perspective, although the Marine Corps has yet to develop MCWP 3-33, *MOOTW*, the capstone MCDP (see figure 5) provides guidance that explicitly codifies Small Wars as a traditional operation.

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**Figure 5. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications**

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The evidence is overwhelming as MCDP 3, *Expeditionary Operations*, recognizes MOOTW-style activities or missions as both a traditional and frequent operation; MCDP 1-0, *Marine Corps Operations* states that with respect to Small Wars, Marines “provide the means for an immediate response while serving as the foundation for follow-on forces or resources.” The most compelling doctrinal mandate is the capstone publication--*Warfighting*--which authoritatively states, “Military operations other than war and small wars are not simply lesser forms of general war.” Thus from a doctrinal perspective, Small Wars is anything but non-traditional and proves congruent with General James L. Jones mindset, where the Marine’s thirty-second Commandant (2000 to 2003) urged Marines “. . . to shed a 20th-century mentality . . . the word ‘amphibious,’ which is a legacy term--and really understand the power of expeditionary warfare in support of the joint warfighter.” In short, the Commandant reinforces General Kelly’s previous exhortation that Marines perform full combat spectrum operations: Small Wars being one of these.

From an institutional perspective, Marines are far from casting Small Wars aside as a non-traditional mission. MCWL Wargaming Division established a Small Wars Center of Excellence that along with CETO, explores doctrine, TTP, and identifies future enemy threats. Furthermore, Marines serve as DoD Executive Agent for Non-Lethal Weapons which is a notable fact given the SWM’s enthusiasm for riot control agents and other crowd control TTP.

Furthermore, during 2001 and 2002 the Marines instituted changes that allow for more responsive capabilities to its traditional operations--Small Wars--by establishing a MARCORSOCDET for potential service with United States Special Operations
Command and reestablishing its 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade and designating it specifically for Anti-Terrorism missions: 4th MEB (AT). Both MARCORSOCDET and 4th MEB (AT) provide combatant commanders an additional counterterrorism, anti-terrorism, and consequence management capabilities. The MARCORSOCDET is, currently training alongside the United States Navy Special Warfare Group in a proof of concept demonstration to validate “a viable capability [that] . . . demonstrates that the Marine Corps in fact is making an institutional commitment to improving its relationship with SOCOM and making a long-term commitment towards assisting SOCOM in its responsibilities.”

Meanwhile the mission of the 4th MEB (AT), reactivated six weeks following “9/11”, is “. . . to provide designated supported commanders with rapidly deployable, specially trained, and sustainable forces that are capable of detecting terrorist activity, taking the steps needed to deter terrorism, defending designated facilities against terrorism, and conducting initial incidence response in the event of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear terrorist attacks worldwide.”

These force structure actions are a departure from the Marine Corps MAGTF full-spectrum operations focus to standing organizations charged with executing specific Small Wars operations. This recent change in direction has proved popular with Congress for it endorsed the Marine’s actions by increasing its force structure (2,400) in the 2003 National Defense Authorization Act. However, these non-MAGTF forces require more than a mission statement, Tables of Organization and Equipment, and the obligatory mission statement for its proper employment. These organizations, somewhat detached from a specific MEF, require supporting doctrine to address their relationships with both forward deployed and crisis response MAGTF. Again, such requirements
provide an opportunity for the *SWM Volume II* to increase its potential enduring value by nesting these forces similar to the *SWM* resolving the DoS, Navy Department, HQMC, and expeditionary forces responsibilities in its initial chapters.

Additionally, besides MAGTF integration, the following additional issues not only demonstrate areas where the *SWM Volume II* can increase its contents enduring value, but also why the Marine Corps requires an authoritative Small Wars doctrine tie to these disparate elements with roles in this type of operation. What capability does a naval expeditionary force gain from having a MARCORSOCDET as a SOCOM operational force? Is MARCORSOCDET limited to SOCOM control or will it serve in a manner to the United States Navy “Blue” Seals (conventional) as a part of the Navy’s Global Concept of Operations SSGN/SOF Strike Force or dedicated “Purple” Seals (Seal Team 6)?

Why is 4th MEB (AT) limited to the defensive Anti-Terrorism role? Is 4th MEB considered strictly a functional command, or is it also capable of forcible entry MAGTF operations? If 4th MEB (AT)’s mandate is to “deter, detect, defend” then why would it have not formed the Commander Joint Task Force-Horn-of-Africa’s nucleus as opposed to 2nd Marine Division since the mission is to “deter, disrupt, defend, against terrorism in US Central Command’s eastern Africa.” Why did the 4th MEB (AT) not establish the nucleus of the JTF staff given its mission and subordinate Marine Security Guard Detachments resident within the Area of Operations and its Fleet Anti-Terrorism Security Team’s frequent deployments supporting Fifth Fleet versus that of 2d Marine Division? Is 4th MEB (AT) more of a Special Purpose MEB or is it capable of assuming MAGTF duties?
What are 4th MEB (AT)’s roles with respect to Northern Command’s consequence management responsibilities? How does the 4th MEB (AT) act within the legal constraints of posse comitatus stipulations? Is the 4th MEB (AT) simply a MEU (SOC) clone--an alternative force with a new relationship to SOCOM capable of special operations?

Accordingly, CETO’s flawed assertion that Small Wars are not traditional may appear innocent; however, it is a bias that Small Wars advocates since the Banana Wars consistently encountered despite overwhelming evidence on the contrary. These flawed perceptions potentially produce unintended consequences with respect to doctrine, training, logistics, organization, manning, personnel, and facility issues. For one ignorant of MAGTF operations may rationalize that, if MOOTW is not traditional, then why is the Marine Corps deliberately investing resources to improve operational capabilities when more traditional operations require support? There appears to be more questions than answers with respect to Marine Corps Small Wars doctrine. A void which the SWM Volume II could fill as it addresses, doctrinally, a traditional versus non-traditional Marine Corps operation.

Post-Cold War Events. CETO plans to place an “emphasis . . . on post-Cold War events,” but fortunately also states its intent to review “lessons learned since the manual was first published” which would include the Marine Corps only protracted MOOTW campaign since the Banana Wars: the Vietnam War and Beirut Peace Operations. At first, CETO’s concentration on post-Cold War events appears logical given the 1990’s Engagement and Enlargement period’s consecutive Small Wars operations which sparked a parallel Small Wars cottage industry of sorts for now more than “. . . 80 nations have
peacekeeping centers, institutes and organizations dedicated to this emerging field."^{26} As a result, significant operational thought and TTP analyses are readily available and most notably the Center for Naval Analysis’ efforts in the 1990, which have provides a naval operational approach toward executing CCO.^{27}

However, it remains important for CETO to not deemphasize these Cold War MOOTW operations since the COE is arguably a return to these protracted Small Wars. Operation Restore Hope (Somalia: December 1992 to May 1993) provides a recent post-Cold War historical guidepost for examining Marine actions for a significant period. However, in comparison to the Vietnam War and Beirut Peace Operations six months hardly qualifies as a protracted Small Wars campaign. The following provides further insights for not discarding these interventions for examination by the SWM Volume II authors.

**Vietnam War.** Deemphasizing this Cold War operation potentially minimizes the CAP’s NA/COIN efforts--a concept that MCDP 1-0, *Marine Corps Operations* explicitly credits with influencing early 1990’s MOOTW efforts.

Building on the counterinsurgency experiences of Marines in Haiti and Nicaragua, innovative Marines created the combine action platoon (CAP) program in South Vietnam in 1965. This program placed small teams of Marines, led by noncommissioned officers, in the hamlets and villages throughout the Marine’s area of operations (AO). These Marines earned the trust of the villagers by living in the village while protecting the people. Marines led and trained the local people’s defense forces, learned the language and customs of the villagers, and were very successful in denying those areas under their control to the enemy. The CAP program became a model for success in countering insurgencies. Many of the lessons learns from the CAP program were emulated in various peace enforcement and humanitarian assistance operations Marines have performed over the last decade, such as Operation Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq (1991) and Operation Restore Hope in Somalia (1992-1993).^{28}
The Vietnam War’s inherent embedded Small Wars or MOOTW-style activities provide a rich repository of NA/COIN experiences that Marines may be called again to support in the COE. Given SOCOM’s new counterterrorism focus; the United States Army’s challenge to meet its manning of the Special Forces; the Marine Corps involvement in both United States Central Commands open-ended OIF’s CJTF-HOA force protection mission as well as post-conflict operations in southern Iraq. Is the Marine Corps returning to the Banana Wars type missions and Vietnam era’s protracted Small Wars campaigns with the added complexity to counterterrorism? Certainly, NA/COIN missions may not necessarily be the SWM Volume II’s focus given MCDP 3, Expeditionary Operations guidance on typical MAGTF operations in Small Wars, but its inherent TTP certainly deserve consideration for it applies to other Small Wars operations—particularly CCO.

Beirut Peace Operations. These operations demonstrated how rotating Marine Amphibious Units, now termed MEU, could serve within a protracted MOOTW campaign. Furthermore, Beirut also serves as a Force Protection and Consequence Management operational case study given that the Marines Corps experienced one of the first terrorist attacks utilizing WMD which resulted in the deaths of more than 280 Marines, soldiers and sailors in 1983.

Finally, deemphasizing Cold War operations potentially leads the SWM Volume II to repeat the same mistakes that the Anti-Guerilla Warfare and FMFM Counterinsurgency authors made in drafting Marine Corps doctrine, and TTP during the Vietnam War: ignorance of the Banana War experience and the SWM. As a result of this ignorance, the Marines Corps accepted an inferior counterinsurgency doctrine and the
CAP rose from necessity rather than deliberate review. To this end, it is well worth the
*SWM Volume II* author’s efforts to not deemphasize these protracted Small Wars
campaigns in light of the COE.

In conclusion, CETO requires a thorough review of their *SWM Volume II* efforts
to ensure that it is following those tenants which made the *SWM* successful as well as
those that contributed toward its demise. For the most part, early indications suggest that
CETO is repeating the *SWM’s* development and sustainment. In adhering to aspects that
allowed the *SWM* to survive as a work of enduring value, CETO appears to be congruent
with the *SWM’s* development. It has identified Small Wars missions that promise to
challenge MAGTF, ensured that subject-matter experts contribute towards the material,
and committed to thoroughly examine lessons learned since 1940. Unfortunately, CETO
is not taking the necessary steps to ensure their work sustains itself by not nesting it
within the EFDS’ mainstream. This action would mitigate CETO’s *SWM Volume II* from
doctrinal atrophy since its possesses quality control measures that require formal reviews
and appropriate doctrinal distribution techniques. There is also concern that CETO’s
perspectives of MOOTW as a non-traditional operations and a deemphasizing the Marine
Corps Small Wars during the Cold War era may impact the follow-on volumes content.

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5 Department of the Navy, Small Wars Manual (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1940; reprint, 1 April 1987), 1-1(d), 1-6(b).


7 Keith Bickel, Ph.D., Mars Learning (Boulder: Westview Press, 2001), 225.


10 CETO took action on the SWM Volume II based upon a Marine Force Europe request. Center of Emerging Threats and Opportunities CETO Media Advisory.


12 United States Marine Corps “MCBUL 5600,” Enclosure 5; and United States Marine Corps, MCWP 3-33, Military Operations Other Than War, (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Combat Development Command’s Doctrine Division Official Homepage; web page on-line; available from https://www.doctrine.quantico.usmc.mil/mcwp/htm/doc7.htm; Internet; accessed on 3 December 2002).
United States Marine Corps, “MCBul 5600,” 2. The Marine Corps determines the publications requiring review annually with the release of their MCBul 5600 whereas joint publications are reviewed every five years.


Center of Emerging Threats and Opportunities Media Advisory.


The “Small Wars Center of Excellence” “provide[s] a public forum and information resource for the understanding of the history, nature, and challenges presented by the Marine Corps’ involvement in Small Wars; to explore innovative Small Wars concepts, tactics, techniques, and procedures; and to evaluate Small Wars policy, strategy, doctrine, and key programs.” United States Marine Corps, “Small Wars Center of Excellence” (Quantico VA: Marine Corps Warfighting Lab’s Small Wars Center of Excellence, Official Homepage; web page on-line; available from http://www.smallwars.quantico.usmc.mil/; Internet; accessed on 3 January 2003).


Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities CETO Media Advisory


Department of the Navy, Marine Corps Operations, 1-5.

“The global nature of the war, the nature of the enemy and the need for fast, efficient operations in hunting down and rooting out terrorist networks around the world have all contributed to the need for an expanded role for the Special Operations forces,” Mr. Rumsfeld said in January at a Pentagon press conference. “We are transforming that command to meet that need.” Rowan Scarborough, “Special Ops Steal Show as Successes Mount in Iraq,” Washington Times, 7 April 2003, 1,

“Special Operations does not even have on hand soldiers qualified to fill the positions it already has, let alone the new ones it is being given, a Pentagon official said. The Army is supposed to man a total of 270 Special Forces A-teams, with 12 troops each, but currently can fill only 225, he said.” Thomas E. Ricks, “Rumsfeld Stands Tall After Iraq Victory”, Washington Post, 20 April 2003, A01.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The SWM series overwhelmingly presents a relevant baseline for which the Marine Corps can build its future MOOTW doctrine. The original manual sets the example by first bestowing its renowned title to the updated doctrinal publication. The Small Wars title reflects an appreciation for Marine Corps heritage and lends a “brand name” to generate enthusiasm for the updated doctrine. More importantly, the term accurately reflects the type of MOOTW operations that regional combatant commanders currently call upon their Marine Corps components to perform. These operations include complex contingencies, non-combatant evacuations, and counterterrorism which all require an aggressive Small Wars mentality. This warfighting mentality distinguishes the Marine Corps approach within the joint forces and has proved itself time and again since the Banana Wars.

As this thesis demonstrated, framework and content has consistently proved itself to be merely outdated but not irrelevant. This fact allows the SWM Volume II authors the option of simply updating or inserting the necessary text and graphics make the current manual more relevant to today’s COE as opposed to a complete rewrite. As one would expect, time and technology overcame many of the SWM’s discussions on topics such as command and control and TTP--the “means” of Small Wars operations. However, the manual remains strikingly relevant to the COE with respect to the Small Wars “ends” (political objectives) and campaign “ways” (sequence of actions). From the ends and ways perspective, it is difficult to envision major changes to the SWM Volume II.
CETO’s formal announcement of its initial actions to prepare the second volume appear congruent to the methodology adhered to by the SWM authors. For example, their Common Ground Workshops provide a forum for subject-matter experts to directly insert themselves into the doctrinal writing process, and they are examining a significant operational period (1940--current). Both actions prove similar to the SWM authors who were both veterans and students of the Banana Wars era (1910 to 1934). Subject matter expertise analysis of Small Wars over a significant period mitigate against the natural temptation to accept concepts and TTP that prove successful in one specific campaign as a universal principle or concept.

In spite of the similarities between the two efforts, there are notable differences that cause concern. CET0 referring to Small Wars as non-traditional versus a normal type operation reflects an inaccurate grasp of Marine Corps operations. Such comments distort history and perpetuate the myth that Small Wars represents a lesser form or inferior type of warfare. The stark reality is that Small Wars represent the Marine Corps most common operations as this thesis proved historically, legally, doctrinally and as evident in both recent supporting establishment and Fleet Marine Force actions.

Aside from the inaccurate description non-traditional, the most disappointing revelation is CET0’s intent to relegate the SWM Volume II’s status to a reference publication versus authoritative doctrine that the original manual enjoyed. The first argument is that developing a reference publication to complement joint doctrine is the CJCS’ responsibility. The JWC’s JTF Commander’s Peace Operations Handbook that complements JP 3-07, Joint Doctrine for MOOTW serves as a prime example.
Second, normally it is inappropriate for reference publications to directly complement a capstone or keystone publication such as *Marine Corps Operations* that provides guidance. The doctrinal hierarch provides a cascading effect where MCDPs provide philosophies and concepts, MCWPs address operations and TTP, and finally MCRP complement the MCWP or serve as history. There are exceptions, MCRP 5-1A, *Doctrinal Reference for Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare* is a “cargo pocket” version of *Marine Corp Operations*, however, it is based upon the entire MCDP not just one concisely within the chapter on MOOTW as is the case with CETO’s intent.

Finally, it is puzzling why the MCWL committed CETO’s resources in developing a reference publication before MCCDC’s Future Warfighting and Doctrine Division’s provided “top down planning guidance” in the form of Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare’s supporting concept Other than Expeditionary Operations concept or MCWP 3-33, *MOOTW*. Would it not have been prudent for a think tank such as CETO to assist in developing the necessary top down planning guidance before producing a complementing reference publication?

**Recommendations**

MCCDC Doctrine Division should retain the *SWM* as a MCRP, promote the use of the manual’s framework and content for its future MCWP 3-33, and coordinate the development of CETO’s follow-on *SWM Volume II* as dual-Navy and Marine Corps Small Wars authoritative doctrine. This MCWP 3-33/NWP, which should be titled *Small Wars Manual Volume II* to more accurately reflect the naval services operational philosophy, models the original manual. This second volume should initially address Small Wars theory from a maritime perspective, and then subsequently provide a
campaign model for a protracted CCO. The difference between the two volumes is that
the updated work addresses a naval task force (MEB/Amphibious Group) leading a
protracted CCO versus Marine Corps forces exclusively executing protracted
counterinsurgency operations. Aside from the SWM Volume II’s focus, during this
upcoming annual Marine Corps Bulletin 5300 Doctrinal Proponency Assignments review
(June 2003), HQMC should assign the MCWL as the Small Wars doctrinal proponent
since their MCWL established a “Small Wars Center of Excellence.”

These recommendations address both a naval service doctrinal void and provide a
campaign model for executing its most demanding Small Wars operation. Furthermore,
it designated institutional overseer to lead Small Wars type operations development. The
following provides further amplification for the recommended actions of developing the
SWM Volume II as Navy and Marine Corps doctrine, focusing on the protracted CCO and
MCWL assuming doctrinal proponency.

Navy and Marine Corps MOOTW Doctrine. Designating the SWM Volume II as
the naval services’ authoritative Small Wars doctrine promotes the integration that naval
services seek as outlined in the recently published “Naval Operating Concept for Joint
Operations.” This concept calls for the naval services to identify common terms of “...philosophical, conceptual, doctrinal, and organizational actions” for future integration. The naval services tactical air integration and the Navy and Marine Corps internet project provide current examples of this goal.

From a strictly Marine Corps doctrinal perspective, if the SWM Volume II indeed
follows this thesis’ recommendation to focus on the protracted CCO, then its MOOTW
operational doctrine is virtually complete. The SWM Volume II accounts for MCWP 3-
33, *MOOTW* and a CCO (Peace Operations, Humanitarian Assistance) while the Doctrine Division covers non-combatant evacuation operations which is inherent to its role as the CJCS Executive Agent for maintaining JP 3-07.5, *Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations*. These designated Small Wars operations normally require full spectrum operational requirements that require a robust MAGTF versus specific Marine forces fulfilling a JFC functional requirement.

**Complex Contingency Operations.** The inherent mobility of naval forces normally encourages operations of a limited nature and objective with respect to a military campaign. However, given the COE, maritime forces cannot rule out leading a protracted Small Wars campaign while conventional land and special operations forces remain engaged in longstanding global commitments. A *SWM Volume II* with a protracted CCO in a urban, littoral environment focus provides the naval services a point of departure to execute a worst-case Small Wars campaign that is normally dominated by an Army-centric Joint Task Forces and their subordinate land component.

Limiting the *SWM Volume II*’s focus to a protracted CCO in an urban, littoral environment by no means dismisses the other Small Wars missions. Normally MAGTF maintain full-spectrum operational capabilities to fight Krulak’s Three Block War whether the mission is conventional land warfare or Small Wars. However, at some point doctrine must establish a focus or it becomes cumbersome. A *SWM Volume II* that concentrates on a protracted CCO in an urban, littoral environment recognizes the most likely Small Wars operation and retains a focus similar to the original manual. TTP for jungle, mountain, and desert operating environments that may surround this urban setting are available in other MCWPs.

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Doctrinal Proponency. The necessary resources should be shifted to MCWL’s “Small Wars Center of Excellence” to allow it to serve as the Marine Corps Small Wars rally point. The Small Wars charter should dictate that the Center should also take cognizance of the following publications: MCWP 3-33, MOOTW (preferably titled SWM Volume II), MCWP 3-33.1, MAGTF Civil-Military Operations, MCWP 3-33.2, Civil Disturbances, MCWP 3-33.4, Domestic Support Operations, and MCWP 3-33.6, Humanitarian Assistance Operations. Furthermore, MCCDC Doctrine Division should consider delegating its CJCS Executive Agent for non-combatant evacuation operations responsibilities to MCWL’s Small Wars Center for Excellence as well.

Finally, this thesis acknowledges that advocating maritime forces lead protracted Small Wars campaigns reflects a doctrinal heresy of sorts given the “expeditionary force in readiness” and “Marines fight the nations battles!” mantras. Protracted Small Wars campaigns are unpopular with most Marines. Whether the senior OIF MAGTF commander who claimed if he ‘had a vote, I’d say let’s get out of here. Let’s backload the MPS [Maritime Pre-Positioning Ships], get it in shape, and get these kids home because we have regular deployments that need to be met” to a junior Marine who exclaimed “Beautiful Sight!” If the Marine Corps stands ready to conduct protracted, sustained operations ashore in support of a conventional land campaign such as Operations Desert Shield, Desert Storm, and OIF then what precludes it for doing the same in a Small War?

A protracted Small Wars campaign may reflect a far-fetched notion for the Marine Corps, but it appears viable given the COE that requires “boots on the ground” around the globe. Given this fact, the Marine Corps may be called upon to both fight
battles as well as win Banana Wars. CETO’s *SWM Volume II* is the answer for Small Wars authoritative doctrine to provide the necessary point of departure for naval services to fight these type operations.

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1. United States Marine Corps, “Proponency Questions and Answers” (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Combat Development Command, date unknown; available on line from https://www.doctrine.usmc.mil/deepm2e.htm; Internet; accessed on 27 May 2003).

### APPENDIX

#### CURRENT MOOTW OPERATIONS VS PRE-WORLD WAR II ACTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATION/DOCTRINE</th>
<th>Current MOOTW Operations vs. Pre WWII Actions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Arms Control</strong></td>
<td>4th MEB (Anti-Terror)'s Marine Security Force Co. escorting/guarding US Navy nuclear assets. Pre-WWII: Disarmament of factions central to each &quot;Banana Wars&quot; expedition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Counter Terrorism</strong></td>
<td>4th MEB (AT) response to domestic terrorist attack. Pre-WWII: N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTTP for Antiterrorism JP 3-07.6</td>
<td>Reconnaissance or Surveillance support. (physical or electronic) Pre-WWII: Destroyed illegal distilleries (Brooklyn 1867-1871)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DoD Support to Counterdrug Operations</strong></td>
<td>Visit, Board, Search and Seizure (VBSS) duties Pre-WWII: Sea Duty (Marine Detachments)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Enforcement of Sanctions/Maritime Interdiction Operations</strong></td>
<td>&quot;No Fly Zones&quot; - Operation Southern Watch (Iraq) Pre-WWII: Shanghai Intl Settlement Duty (1911-41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Enforcement of Exclusion Zones</strong></td>
<td>Seize &amp; Control SLOC Chokepoints, Combat Air Patrols Pre-WWII: Panama Canal Security Duty 1903-14, Defend Advance Naval Bases (Barracks Duty)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ensuring Freedom of Navigation and Overflight</strong></td>
<td>Operation PROVIDE COMFORT: 24th MEU (SOC) provides shelter, food &amp; water to the Kurds in Northern Iraq (19XX-XX). Operation RESTORE HOPE: I MEF provided humanitarian assistance with limited military action to Somalia. Pre-WWII: Managua, Nicaragua Earthquake Relief Ops (1931)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Humanitarian Assistance</strong></td>
<td>SPMAGTF supporting Hurricane Andrew Relief Efforts (199X), SPMAGTF LA supporting civil efforts quelling Los Angeles Riots (199X) Pre-WWII: Suppress New York City draft riots (1863) Suppress NYC Cuban Filibuster March (1869), Suppress Philadelphia Election Riots (1870)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Military Support to Civil Authorities</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MCWP 3-33.2 Civil Disturbance/MCWP 3-33.4 Domestic Support Ops</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| Nation Assistance/Support to COIN | Mobile Training Teams, Humanitarian Assistance Programs  
Pre-WWII: Nicaragua Interventions 1912-1934, Philippine War (1901-14) |
<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JTTP for Foreign Internal Defense JP 3-07.3</td>
<td>JTTP for Joint Special Operations JP3-05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Pre-WWII: |
| JTTP for NEO/JP 3-07.5 | |
Pre-WWII: 1st Marine Provisional Brigade (Haiti 1915-34)  
Peace Keeping Operations: MAUs (Lebanon 1982-84)  
Pre-WWII: 1st Marines (Cuba 1906-1909), 2d Marine Brigade (Nicaragua 1916-24)  
JTTP for Peace Ops/JP 3-07.3 |
| Protection of Shipping | Naval Forces: Vessel Security, Combat Air Patrols, Hijacked Vessel Recovery  
Sea Duty (Marine Detachments)  
Recovery Operations/JP 3-50.3 |
Pre-WWII: Greely Arctic Expedition Rescue (Greenland)  
Show of Force Operations |
| Show of Force Operations | MEU (SOC) and MPS positioning  
Pre-WWII: Numerous amphibious landings.  
Strikes and Raids |
Pre-WWII: Numerous amphibious landings. |
| Support to Insurgency | Limited to Logistics/Training Support  
Pre-WWII: N/A. During the "Imperialism in the Caribbean" Years (1901-34) the United States simply sent intervention forces to the respective country versus a deliberate subterfuge effort against a sovereign government. |
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