THE INCREASED ROLE OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN PEACEKEEPING
AND EFFECTS ON THE UNITED NATIONS PREEMINENCE
IN FUTURE PEACE OPERATIONS

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by

BIRENDER S. DHANOA, LT COL, INDIA
M.Sc., University of Madras, Tamil Nadu, India, 1995

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Name of Candidate: Lt Col Birender S. Dhanoa

Thesis Title: The Increased Role of Regional Organizations in Peacekeeping and Effects on the United Nations Preeminence in Future Peace Operations

Approved by:

Mr. William M. Connor, M.A.

LTC Colin Magee, B.M.A.Sc.

LTC Steven G. Meddaugh, M.S.

COL Robert M. Smith, D.V.M., Ph.D.

Accepted this 6th day of June 2003 by:

Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

THE INCREASED ROLE OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN PEACEKEEPING AND EFFECTS ON UN’S PREEMINENCE IN FUTURE PEACE OPERATIONS, by LT COL Birender S. Dhanoa, 76 Pages.

Regional Organizations have played an increasing role of late in resolving intrastate conflicts. The UN, drawn into a plethora of peacekeeping operations in the 1990s, has relied increasingly on regional organizations and alliances to take the lead in conflict resolution, especially for peace enforcement. In view of this, the primary research question is: Has the increased role of regional organizations and alliances in recent UN mandated peace operations, such as East Timor, Sierra Leone, and Kosovo, defined the path for the future conduct of such operations? A follow on question is: Will it lead to a decline in UN preeminence in future peace operations? The thesis first describes the new ground rules in international affairs since the end of the Cold War. They have changed the way the UN undertook peacekeeping operations in the past decade with regional organizations. Second, it undertakes an analysis of the military component of three UN peace operations involving regional forces, in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and Kosovo. Finally, it derives conclusions from the analysis of these operations. While the degree of involvement of regional organizations in current peace operations is shaped by the nature of the conflict, the UN remains a key player and its role, as the primary arbiter of international peace and security does not seem under threat in the near future.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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<td>ADF</td>
<td>Australian Defence Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRC</td>
<td>Armed Forces Revolution Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMOC</td>
<td>Civil Military Operations Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peace-keeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>Military Observer Group (of ECOWAS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFOR</td>
<td>Implementation Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERFET</td>
<td>International Force East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KLA</td>
<td>Kosovo Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOOTW</td>
<td>Military Operations Other Than War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUF</td>
<td>Revolutionary United Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>SFOR</td>
<td>Stabilization Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>TACON</td>
<td>Tactical Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
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<td>UNAMET</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in East Timor</td>
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<td>UNAMSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Kosovo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOMSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>United Nations Protection Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>United Nations Transition Authority in East Timor</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Peacekeeping is a useful and highly visible element of the efforts of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security. . . . Peacekeeping, properly conceived, directed, and financed, could become an important and effective symbol of a new determination to relieve the peoples of the world of unnecessary conflict, excessive armaments and the constant threat of war.

-Sir Brian Urquhart

Is the increased role of regional organizations and alliances in peace operations during the last decade of the 20th Century, as envisioned under Chapter VIII of the United Nations (UN) Charter, a harbinger of future conduct of such operations? Is it likely to lead to a decline in UN preeminence in peace operations in the 21st Century? This study shall attempt to provide the answers to these very valid questions, as the world faces a multitude of challenges to international peace and security in the opening decade of the 21st Century.

Peacekeeping in the Cold War Era

Peacekeeping is a mission the UN derived for itself in the maintenance of international peace and security in the 1950s, even as the world grappled with the consequences of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. Never a simple exercise, peacekeeping has always depended for its success on the creativity and improvisational skills of its practitioners. In the early days, it was a technique of conflict control that assumed the consent and the cooperation of the hostile parties. Traditional operations, normally deployed in situations of interstate conflict, were designed to monitor a truce, troop withdrawal and/or buffer zone while the political negotiations were
allowed to go forward (Gordon and Toase 2001, 3). Though the polarizing effect of the superpower confrontation hampered the UN’s ability to act on security issues, between 1956 and 1988, it did conduct 13 peacekeeping operations of which 12 could be characterized as traditional peacekeeping, while the mission in the Congo represented a peace enforcement operation (Clark Jr. 1997).

Post Cold War Peace Operations

The end of the Cold War presented both opportunities and challenges for the international community: opportunities in the sense that the UN found itself freer to act than at anytime in its history; challenges in the sense that the Cold War and communism had suppressed many long simmering economic and ethnic conflicts that were now unleashed (Clark Jr. 1997, 1). The UN responded with a flurry of new peacekeeping operations. On 31 January 1988, the UN was engaged in only five peacekeeping missions, all but one of them involving interstate conflicts. By 16 December 1994, the number of UN peace operations (these are purposely referred as peace operations because of their multi-dimensional scope) had increased to 26. Of the 21 new operations established in the intervening six years, only eight (38 percent) addressed interstate conflicts, while 13 peace operations (62 percent) attempted to resolve the complex issues of intrastate conflict (Ghali 1995).

These intrastate conflicts tended to be messy affairs, with the main protagonists being not only regular armies but also bands of militias and armed civilians with ill defined chains of command. There were no clearly delineated frontlines. Civilians and government officials were often the primary targets of the armed groups causing massive outflows of refugees and internally displaced persons. Ethnic and religious fault lines
stood exposed, often with horrific consequences. A collapse of most government and
civic institutions, characteristics of a stable society, resulted in a total breakdown of law
and order. The UN intervened in such situations using an outdated template and soon
learned that the complexity of planning, executing, and coordinating such operations
called for resources and expertise far in excess of what it had available.

Failures to prevent genocide in Rwanda in April-May 1994 and the massacre in
Srebrenica, a UN protected enclave, in July 1995, only served to emphasize apparent UN
incompetence when faced with a complex military-humanitarian crisis. It appeared that
the UN was ill equipped to handle multiple crises in different parts of the globe. In 1995
the Secretary General of the United Nations, Mr. Boutros Boutros Ghali, reached out to
regional organizations in an attempt to energize more active cooperation between them
and the UN under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Arguing that the UN resources were,
and would likely remain, inadequate to meet all needs, he called on regional
organizations to merge their efforts.

In fact, two years earlier in 1992, in his *An Agenda for Peace* (UN: New York,
1992), he had underscored the productive roles that regional organizations could play in
the areas of preventive diplomacy, peace operations, and post conflict building (Lewis
and Marks 1998, 4). The participation of regional organizations in resolving disputes,
albeit in a limited way, is not a new phenomenon. It is their increasing role in dispute
settlement since the UN Secretary General’s appeal in 1995 and related effects on
conduct of peace operations that forms the focus of this study.
Regional Organizations and Peace Operations

For the past nine years the UN and a number of regional organizations and alliances, both security and economic, have participated in a multitude of peace operations. Some of the regions and countries where the regional organizations have played a significant role are given in Table 1 below:

### TABLE 1. PARTICIPATION OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN RECENT PEACE OPERATIONS


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>AREA OF ACTIVITIES</th>
<th>Recent Activities</th>
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<tr>
<td>Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)</td>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>PEACE-MAKING; PEACEKEEPING</td>
<td>Deployment of peacekeeping forces to Liberia and Sierra Leone.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South African Development Community (SADC)</td>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>PEACE-MAKING; PEACEKEEPING</td>
<td>Diplomatic initiative for the peaceful settlement of the Congo conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN)</td>
<td>Asia and the Pacific</td>
<td>PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY; PEACE-MAKING; PEACEKEEPING</td>
<td>Diplomatic initiative for the peaceful settlement of the Cambodian conflict. Deployment of peacekeeping troops in conjunction with Australia and New Zealand in East Timor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization for Peace and Security in Europe (OSCE)</td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>PEACE-MAKING; HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE; ELECTORAL MONITORING</td>
<td>Observer Missions in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Estonia, Latvia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Electoral supervision and human rights monitoring in Bosnia and...</td>
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These missions have had varied levels of success. However, the world community has come to recognize the advantages of such regional cooperation. Regional players bring to the operation more intimate knowledge of the political complexities of a conflict, and their staff may be less likely to encounter language and cultural barriers in their work (Fortna 1993). Regional organizations can exploit the solidarity that derives from shared histories and provide a regional forum for debate. On the flip side, the closeness to the region of such organizations and players may prevent true impartiality in resolving a dispute, and national interests may cloud objectivity in analyzing the path to peace and tranquility.

21st Century Peace Operations

Events of the first two years of the 21st Century have proven that the world continues to be plagued by insecurity. The need for maintaining international peace and security will continue to bedevil the world community. In the new world order, it is not the threat of a major conflagration between traditional antagonists but messy internecine wars, driven by ethno-religious and/or economic fault lines within states, that will occupy the attention of world leaders. The UN, unlikely to return to its “traditional
peacekeeping” of the Cold War era, would continue to be the principal arbiter in international disputes. However, interested nations are likely to approach conflict resolution within the broad “fig leaf” legitimacy provided by the UN Security Council but unencumbered by the consensus decision making so characteristic of the UN, and its elephantine response time to any crisis. This can be best achieved by going the regional route under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Thus, it seems evident that regional organizations and alliances are going to have a greater say in future peace operations especially as the trend in conducting these operations focuses more on peace enforcement (Chapter VII) rather than peacekeeping (Chapter VI).

The UN, strapped for physical resources and military muscle, may also prefer mandating such peace operations under Chapter VIII of its Charter as long as it keeps the regional organizations and alliances from pursuing independent agendas. Is this going to mark a significant shift in the whole process of peacekeeping; from mandate formulation, force generation, logistics and financial planning to coordination of humanitarian aid?

Nations that have been traditional troop contributors to UN peacekeeping may now be unwilling to provide similar effort to a regional peace mission while those countries that were hesitant to contribute troops and finances to a UN led force may be willing contributors to regional efforts. The type of military force and other agencies coming together under the UN or a regional organization may well dictate the success of a mission, as its coercive and financial staying power would vary under both agencies. Will the shift in the high visibility role peacekeepers, from the traditional Blue Helmets to regional military organizations and alliances, lead to a lowering of the UN image in the eyes of the millions who have come to identify the Blue Helmet with succor and security
Research Questions

In light of the background described above, it is intended to focus this study on the respective roles of the UN and regional organizations/alliances in the conduct of future peace operations. The primary question this thesis shall address is “Has the increased role of regional organizations and alliances in recent UN mandated peace operations, such as East Timor, Sierra Leone, and the Balkans, defined the path for the future conduct of such operations?”

If indeed there is an established trend for future peace operations going the regional route, the subordinate questions that the study shall answer are:

1. What are the various facets that comprise a modern day peace operation?
2. What factors govern a nation’s decision to contribute men, materiel and finances to a UN or regional peace effort and what impact does it have on the end-state(s) sought to be achieved?
3. Of these facets, which are best tackled by a regional organization and what (if any) should be left to the UN to handle, in order to synergize efforts and ensure that the peace operation has a reasonable chance of success?
4. Will an increased regional participation in peace operations influence the preeminence the UN has enjoyed thus far in peacekeeping? If so, how?

Assumptions

A few assumptions that are relevant to the research conducted are mentioned here in order to place in perspective the thrust of the study. These are
1. Peace operations by regional organizations and alliances in the future would resort to a mandate under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and not function outside it.

2. The UN is unlikely to establish its own standing force in the foreseeable future.

3. Most regional organizations and alliances are capable of force generation, in terms of troops and military assets, needed to conduct peace operations.

Definitions

It is necessary to define a few of the terms being used in the study. The definitions are the author’s understanding of the term and have not been taken from any existing glossary.

1. Regional Organizations. Collective bodies of nations that have come together through formal alliances for military and/or economic reasons and are recognized as such by the United Nations.

2. Regional Alliances. A group of nations that have shared interests in a given region and have formed an alliance, formal or informal, to resolve an inter/intrastate dispute in the region.

3. Peace Operations. The complete range of political, diplomatic, military, economic and humanitarian operations undertaken by nations and international/regional agencies in resolving any inter or intrastate emergency that is beyond the capabilities of the host nation(s) to resolve.

Limitations and Delimitations

The limitations and delimitations of the study are given below:

1. Some written material, on recently conducted and ongoing peace operations which the study has analyzed, cannot be made available due to their security
classification or sensitivity of the information, by the UN and countries involved. This factor has been a limitation on the research.

2. The study of peace operations has been restricted from the year 1992 to the present. 1992 has been chosen as the cutoff year since it coincides with the publication of the former UN Secretary General’s, Mr. Boutros Boutros Ghali, *Agenda for Peace* that defined the future role of the UN and regional organizations in conducting peace operations.

3. Most data in the study has been collected before 15 February 2003.

4. The study has confined its research to analyzing only three peace operations, i.e. in East Timor, Sierra Leone and Kosovo, which involve the UN and regional organizations and alliances.

**Significance of the Study**

Peace operations form a significant block of what has come to be described as military operations other than war (MOOTW). In fact for many professional armies, which exist in relatively stable and economically prosperous regions, the study and training for peace operations forms a major component of their doctrine. Military planners are well aware of the importance of joint and multinational operational planning which forms the backbone of sound peace operations. Thus a study focusing on the future conduct of peace operations and the roles of different players in such operations becomes topical. A lively debate on the future direction the UN will take in the 21st Century is already on in various international forums and strategic think tanks. It is hoped that this study would be able to shed light on the road ahead for the most visible UN role in the past fifty years i.e. Peacekeeping.
CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The celebration of the United Nation's fiftieth anniversary has hardly obscured the profound crisis facing the organization itself and its role as world peacemaker. . . . Taking the heat on both the actual and political battlefields are the overburdened and logistically challenged forces of U.N. peacekeeping.

-Michael Renner

A logical start point for the literature review is a brief analysis of the UN documents An Agenda for Peace (UN, New York 1992) and Supplement to an Agenda for Peace (UN, New York 1995) by the former UN Secretary General Mr. Boutros Boutros Ghali. In order to understand the context of these documents it is necessary to reiterate the salient aspects of the UN Charter, Chapter VIII Articles 52 to 54, as pertaining to regional arrangements:

ARTICLE 52

“Nothing in the present (UN) Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.”

ARTICLE 53

“The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council. . . .”

ARTICLE 54

“The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.”
The UN Charter and Regional Arrangements

It is abundantly clear from these three Articles, under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, that the founding fathers of the United Nations clearly envisioned a role for regional arrangements and agencies in the pacific settlement of disputes wherever possible. However, as succinctly brought out by Ghali in *An Agenda for Peace*, the reasons for inadequate involvement of regional bodies in maintaining international peace and security was the ideological schism that existed due to the Cold War, and found expression in the vetoing of Security Council resolutions dealing with international peace and security (a total of 279 such vetoes were cast between 1945 and 1990). Ghali then goes on to say that with the collapse of the ideological barrier at the start of the final decade of the 20th Century “the world is witnessing a time of transition marked by uniquely contradictory trends in that, while regional and continental associations of states are evolving ways to deepen cooperation and ease some of the contentious characteristics of sovereign and nationalistic rivalries, at the same time, fierce new assertions of nationality and sovereignty are springing up, threatening the cohesion of states by brutal ethnic, religious, social, cultural or linguistic strife” (Ghali 1992).

The former UN Secretary General was perceptive in his vision in 1992 when he stated that demands on the UN for preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peace making, and peace building activities in the coming years would continue to challenge the capacity, the political and financial will, and the creativity of the UN Secretariat as well as the Member States. To overcome this challenge he identified the increased role of regional organizations in preventive diplomacy and peace building efforts. He felt that the moment was ripe for regional arrangements and agencies to step in and resolve
disputes in the manner foreseen in the UN Charter. The UN Charter deliberately provides no precise definition of regional arrangements and agencies, thus allowing useful flexibility for undertakings by a group of states to deal with a matter appropriate for regional action, which could also contribute, to the maintenance of international peace and security (Ghali 1992).

Lastly, in the 1992 UN Document, Ghali opined that in the past, regional arrangements often were created because of the absence of a universal system for collective security; thus their activities could on occasion work at cross purposes with the sense of solidarity required for the effectiveness of the UN. “But, in this new era of opportunity, regional arrangements or agencies can render great service. . .if their relationship with the UN, and particularly the Security Council, is governed by Chapter VIII. . . Regional organizations participating in complementary efforts with the UN in joint undertakings would encourage states outside the region to act supportively. And should the Security Council choose specifically to authorize a regional arrangement or organization to take the lead in addressing a crisis within its region, it could lend the weight of the UN to the validity of the effort” (Ghali 1992). The former Secretary General was clearly asking regional organizations to step up and shoulder some of the responsibility in the maintenance of international peace and security in the new world order but with the caveat that such actions be within the purview of the Security Council as stated in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.

The UN Framework for Regional Cooperation

On the eve of the 50th Anniversary of the UN in 1995, the then Secretary General, Mr. Ghali released the second document that is in focus for this literature
review, i.e. Supplement to an Agenda for Peace. In the intervening period (1992-1994), between the publication of these two documents, the UN had been through a series of complex peace enforcement/humanitarian operations that had not only been inconclusive but were perceived to be (and to an extent the perceptions were justified) operational disasters. The UN was over extended in its operations in Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda to cite some of the less successful missions. Ghali identified UN shortfalls in unambiguous terms hoping to create further debate and spur reform in the way the UN conducted peace operations. In his report he identified five ways in which the UN and regional organizations could cooperate in the maintenance of international peace and security. These were:

1. **Consultations.** Formal and informal; the purpose being to exchange views on conflicts that both the UN and the regional organization(s) may be trying to solve.

2. **Diplomatic Support.** The regional organization would participate in the peacemaking activities of the UN and support them by diplomatic initiatives and/or by providing technical input where necessary.

3. **Operational Support.** Such as the provision of air support by NATO to the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia. For its part, the UN could provide technical advice to regional organizations that undertook peacekeeping operations of their own.

4. **Codeployment:** of UN field missions in conjunction with peacekeeping troops from regional organizations wherein the regional organization carried the main burden but co-opted a small UN operation for technical support and verification that the operation functioned in a manner consistent with positions adopted by the Security
Council. However, the political, operational and financial aspects of such an arrangement would require great attention prior to deployment.

5. **Joint Operations**: This was the last of the ways the UN and regional organizations could cooperate. A good example mentioned in the document was the United Nations Mission in Haiti, the staffing, direction and financing of which were shared between the United Nations and the Organization of American States (OAS).

The report pointed out “the capacity of regional organizations for peacemaking and peacekeeping varies considerably. None of them has yet developed a capacity, which matches that of the UN, though some have accumulated important experience in the field and others are developing rapidly” (Ghali 1995). The report further stated that while a universal model for the relationship of regional organizations and agencies with the UN was impracticable, certain principles could nevertheless be identified on which such cooperation should be based. These included:

1. Establishment of agreed formal/informal mechanisms for consultation.

2. Respect of the primacy of the UN, as set out in the Charter.

3. A clear definition of the division of labor in order to avoid overlap and institutional rivalry where both the United Nations and a regional organization may be working to settle a dispute.

4. Consistency in dealing with a common problem of interest to both organizations, for example, standards for peacekeeping operations.

**Previous Research on Regional Organizations and Peacekeeping**

While the UN itself was in the process of defining the role of regional organizations and alliances in the conduct of peace operations, academic circles and
strategic think tanks across the globe were involved in a holistic review of the conduct of complex and diverse peace operations that challenged the collective security concerns of the developed world. A few well-researched and cogently written papers address the issue of regional organizations and peacekeeping. One of them, published as early as 1993, and titled, *Regional Organizations and Peacekeeping: Experiences in Latin America and Africa* (Virginia Page Fortna Washington D.C., June 1993), was a study of the efforts of the OAS, Organization of African Unity (OAU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Commonwealth to undertake peacekeeping operations in Latin America and Africa. In summary, the paper suggested, “. . .the UN could not expect to rely on such organizations--at least in the short term--to relieve it of a growing burden of regional peacekeeping. Regional security organizations such as the OAS and OAU first must improve their decision-making capabilities, strengthen their financial bases, and address key issues of command and control before they will be capable of shouldering more of the burden on their own” (Fortna 1993, iv). However the paper went on to suggest that regional organizations had the potential to operate in partnership with the UN in certain circumstances such as monitoring elections or the human rights record of governments. In addition, regional organizations could provide troops, under UN auspices, for a peace operation in the region for effective resolution of a dispute (Fortna 1993, iv).

A more recent study that specifically addressed the issue of regional organizations and peacekeeping is a thesis presented to the faculty of The School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama by Major John S. Clark Jr., USAF in 1996. Titled, *Keeping the Peace: Regional Organizations and Peacekeeping* (John S.
Clark Jr., Major 1997, Alabama), this study too examined the intervention by OAS in the Dominican Republic in 1965, the OAS role in the Central American peace process in the late 1980s, and the intervention by ECOWAS into Liberia in 1990 since these operations illustrate several salient features of regional organizations conducting peacekeeping (Clark 1997, v). The study concluded that in order for peacekeepers to achieve their mandate, it is critical to possess strong political will and a minimum of operational support. The performance of regional organizations “indicates that when their national interests are at stake, the regionals demonstrate the required political will to persevere in a mission. Furthermore, they indicate an increasingly strong determination to participate in peacekeeping missions. They understand that a positive correlation exists between regional political stability and economic growth, and they appear ready to build an environment that fosters such growth. However, a gap exists between their political will and operational capability” (Clark 1997, v). The study went on to recommend that the United States should work towards improving the capabilities of regional organizations to conduct peacekeeping operations. This would require the active support of the US Department of Defense and other US agencies working in concert to ultimately ensure a reduced US commitment to peacekeeping as regional organizations took on this role, either independently or in partnership with the UN.

A third study, by the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington, D.C. bears the title, *Searching for Partners: Regional Organizations and Peace Operations* (William H. Lewis and Edward Marks 1998, Washington, D.C.). It is a comprehensive paper, which has as its start point the changing global security environment in the post cold war era, and the UN’s efforts in the early
1990s to draw in the regional organizations into peacekeeping under Chapter VIII of its Charter. In the introductory chapters the authors are of the opinion that some of the proposals set forth by Ghali in his *An Agenda for Peace*, in so far as they concerned the competence of regional organizations to conduct some of the activities identified earlier in this chapter, were not well received by many UN veterans. The reasons were that “regional organizations do not cover some conflict areas in any sensible way. . .and it frequently happens that regional organizations are regarded as less objective and less impartial than the UN” (Lewis and Marks 1998, 8). They then go on to state that on the other end of the spectrum “is a regionalist bloc of member states, who since the UN’s founding at San Francisco in 1945, have argued for recourse to regional bodies as a means to counter perceived UN ‘dominance’. . .involving weakening Security Council ‘Perm Five’ hegemony in matters of peace and stability” (Lewis and Marks 1998, 9). The authors go on to discuss US approach to the problems of peacekeeping that involves a triangular crisis management approach involving the UN, regional organizations, and ad hoc coalitions. According to them “each leg in this strategic tripod has certain strengths and weaknesses, and the decision as to which one or combination to use in a given situation is high policy indeed” (Lewis and Marks 1998, 9).

The paper is exhaustive in its examination of regional possibilities/a combination of UN and regional agencies for conflict resolution in all major geographic regions of the world beset by war and dispute. It considers the geopolitical and economic nature of the conflicts in each region, viz. Europe, Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Africa and Asia. It provides the authors insight on how they see progress of regional organizations in different parts of the world.
Important Articles and Research Papers

In addition to the above papers, there are a number of articles published in professional magazines that discuss the advantages and disadvantages of having regional organizations involved in peacekeeping operations. The first is an article by Paul F. Diehl titled *Institutional Alternatives to Traditional UN peacekeeping: An Assessment of Regional and Multinational Options* (Armed Forces & Society, 1993). Mr. Diehl, in reviewing two institutional alternatives to *ad hoc* UN peacekeeping operations i.e. peacekeeping by regional organizations and by multinational forces, was of the view that overall, despite its faults, the UN mode of operations as it stood in 1993 held up rather well in comparison to the alternatives (Diehl 1993, 227). Mr. Walter Dorn expresses a similar but more forceful view in an article published by the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, Canada, in 1998 wherein he believes that in general, regional peacekeeping, is a bad idea, however regional forces can exist when working closely with the UN.

Two articles, published by the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies in 1996, offer a more positive outlook on the role of regional organizations in peace operations. The first, by Mr. Davidson Black, is optimistic that regional organizations are better suited (than the UN) to play an active role at the low end of the peacekeeping scale. In his conclusion he remarks, “The future roles of regional organizations in peace operations may grow as the regional structures themselves develop. Currently, there is a strong desire on the part of the UN, as well as among certain regional organizations, to expand the depth and breadth of regional peacekeeping missions” (Black 1996). The second article, by Maurice Manirka, while presenting the pros and cons of pursuing peace using regional organizations is sanguine that despite limited success by regional efforts, “they
nonetheless have great potential in playing a constructive role to strengthen international peacekeeping,” which should not be overlooked (Manirka 1996).

The last of the articles reviewed is a paper presented by Mr. David Quayat, Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary, Canada, at the Conference of Defence Associations Institute Second Annual Graduate Symposium 12-13 November 1999. It is titled The United Nations and Regional Organizations: A New Paradigm for Peace? As aptly stated in the paper’s opening remarks “very little consensus exists on the role of regional organizations in peacekeeping” (Quayat 1999). The paper’s purpose is to examine the relationship between the UN and regional organizations in the sphere of international peace and security. Mr. Quayat does so by first exploring the origins and basis for regional peacekeeping by examining relevant sections of the UN Charter as well as the political dynamics providing the impetus for regional peacekeeping. He then proceeds to survey the operational experience of regional organizations in UN peace deployment focusing on Africa and Europe. The key finding of his paper is that the increasing primacy of regional organizations, being asserted by different professional think tanks and institutes, is based on an exclusively European experience that has not been shared by African states (Quayat 1999). Mr. Quayat does not, however, completely discount the future involvement of regional organizations.

The extensive documentation available on this topic highlights the intense debate generated in different professional and academic forums on the future role of regional organizations in peace operations. This is precisely the reason why the primary question of this thesis is structured around the conduct of peace operations by regional organizations and whether the very nature of future conflict would force the world
community and its collective conscience, the UN, to adopt a regional approach in conflict resolution. In answering the primary question, if the research does indeed provide pointers to a greater regional involvement, a natural follow on question to be asked is; Does it have any effect on the way the UN is perceived by member states, especially in regions where the world body has been keeping the peace for over fifty years? The answer to which should be provided by the findings of the secondary questions of this thesis.

While recent studies, such as the paper by Mr. Quayat and Messrs Lewis and Marks are comprehensive in their own right and a natural follow up of the way peace operations have unfolded in the 1990s, world events have moved on and regional organizations continue to be called upon to share the increased burden of peace operations. The literature, which is listed and briefly discussed in this chapter, helps focus on the primary issues facing increased participation by regional organizations in peace operations. It is hoped that this thesis will help bridge the knowledge gap between the existing literature and shared experiences of the UN and regional organizations in peace operations in Africa, Asia, and Europe. Lessons learned from recent and ongoing regional and UN peace operations in Kosovo, East Timor and Sierra Leone are relevant in analyzing the future trends in peacekeeping and answering the primary and secondary research questions of this thesis.

**Documents Specific to Current Research**

A number of well-researched articles on the Australian regional experience in East Timor have been published over the past three years. Dr. Alan Ryan, a research fellow at the Australian Defence Forces (ADF) Land Warfare Studies Centre (LWSC,
Duntroon, Australian Capital Territory), has written two of them in which he opines that the Australian experience in East Timor is a model for the future conduct of regional and coalition operations and that nations would have to increasingly rely on regional cooperation to enforce and maintain peace. This thought process has been studied in detail while answering the primary and secondary questions of the thesis.

The databases available with the Center for Army Lessons Learned, Leavenworth, on Kosovo, the UN Lessons Learned Unit under the Department of UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO, New York) for Sierra Leone and the Australian Defence Forces Land Warfare Studies Centre (LWSC, Duntroon, ACT) for East Timor form the primary sources for the research. Documents reviewed in this chapter are some of the secondary sources for analysis and comment in chapter 4 of the thesis.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

All truths are easy to understand once they are discovered; the point is to discover them.  
-Galileo Galilei (1564-1642)

As would be evident to those involved in the field of historical research, this thesis is an attempt to predict future trends in the maintenance of international peace and security by the UN and regional organizations using events of the immediate past as a tool for research and analysis. The author is cognizant of the fact that while conflicts have a tendency of resembling one another at a superficial level, no two disputes (inter or intrastate) are ever the same and hence lessons derived from one cannot be templated for resolving another.

However, a thinking and adaptive body of peacekeepers needs to develop and evolve tactics, techniques, and procedures in order to train effectively for future conflict management. Thus, lessons learned in earlier peace operations are a major source of material to be studied and synthesized in order to prepare for the future. It is in similar vein that this thesis approaches its research, i.e. a comparative analysis of three recent peace operations, in which the military component for the operations has come from a regional organization, a coalition of regional nations, and a regional military alliance, and establishing their effectiveness in light of a defined set of success criteria, thereby attempting to predict future trends in conflict management.

The thesis goes about doing so by first laying out the changed ground rules in international affairs since the end of the Cold War that dictate the nature of current
conflict. These in turn have radically altered the way the UN undertook peacekeeping operations through the last decade of the 20th Century. Some of the conflicts were handled by adopting a regional approach and these are highlighted briefly to understand why a change from the “traditional form” of peacekeeping (i.e. observing cease-fires, interposing forces along a buffer zone, providing early warning, as well as monitoring and verifying truce arrangements) became necessary.

It is not within the scope of this thesis to prescribe success criteria across the spectrum of diplomatic, informational, military and economic aspects of the peace operations under discussion in this paper. It must be pointed out that UN led peace operations are currently underway in the regions discussed, and the ongoing dynamics of these operations make it difficult to draw firm conclusions as to the degree of success achieved at the political level. However, a common set of factors that are essential in the achievement of initial success at the military level, which in turn allow a political process to be initiated, are listed here so that the reader understands the thrust of this research and the boundaries within which it has been circumscribed.

First and foremost among the criteria is the laying down of a clear, unambiguous, and achievable mandate by the UN Security Council for the given peace operation being conducted by a regional organization. Second is the issue of providing adequate resources in terms of military personnel, equipment, logistics support and finances to the peace operation. The next major criterion is defining the command and control relationship between the forces undertaking the peace operation and the nomination of a lead nation for unity of command at the operational level. Fourth on the list of criteria is the issue of rapid deployment to the region and a time bound establishment of a secure, violence free
environment in the given area of operations. Fifth is the ability to assess requirements and effectively coordinate activities of all players involved in the peace operation. Sixth is the ability to bring the parties to the dispute to the negotiating table through the creation of a secure environment and using military or other means as necessary to ensure that they do not renege their commitment to a political dialogue. The last criteria considered is having a viable exit strategy for either transition to a UN led operation, or handing over the lead to a different authority, maintaining the requisite peacekeeping force as required, once the military objectives have been achieved.

Having laid down the essential criteria for conducting a successful peace operation by regional organizations, or the UN for that matter, it is necessary to first provide succinct answers to three of the secondary questions addressed by this thesis. These are:

1. What are the various facets that comprise a modern day peace operation?

2. Of these facets, which might be best tackled by a regional organization and what (if any) should be left to the UN to handle, in order to synergize efforts and ensure that the peace operation has a reasonable chance of success?

3. What factors govern a nation’s decision to contribute men, material and finances to a UN or regional peace effort and what impact does it have on the end-state(s) sought to be achieved?

The initial portions of chapter 4 of the thesis provide the answers to the three secondary questions listed above before proceeding to analyze the military aspects of the recently concluded peace operations in East Timor, i.e. International Force East Timor (INTERFET)/ United Nations Transition Authority in East Timor (UNTAET), the
ongoing UN Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). While the INTERFET mission in East Timor represents an informal coalition between a regional organization (ASEAN) and non-ASEAN members i.e. Australia and New Zealand (the two nations being the leading troops contributors), and led by a non-ASEAN member (Australia) that soon transitioned to a UN peace operation, the Sierra Leone peace operation is an example of a long drawn out regional effort (ECOWAS) that became a mixed UN/regional effort before finally transforming into an entirely UN operation. On the other hand, the Kosovo peace operation remains a co-deployment of regional military forces, i.e. NATO, and UN police and civilian personnel. By highlighting the success and/or failure of these peace operations in light of the established criteria, the study provides the answers to the primary and remaining secondary question of the thesis.

It is essential to understand why the three peace operations that this study analyzes have been selected. Firstly, they represent a heavy regional military involvement in the establishment of a secure environment for the peace process to be initiated and progress to the next level, and more importantly; they represent conflict in three continents, Europe, Asia, and Africa. The research would be lopsided if a trend were to be established by studying the resolution of conflict using the regional route in Europe or Africa alone. Lastly, the type of conflict in each region spans part of the spectrum of conflict future peacekeepers may be called in to quell. It provides the reader a perspective of the problems unique to each region and the pitfalls for peacekeepers in applying standard procedures across the globe to achieve the military objectives of a peace operation.
The study concentrates on the first hand reports of military and political personnel involved in the three peace operations mentioned above and derives from each pertinent lessons that either prove or disprove the primary as well as the last of the secondary research questions. Analytical articles by researchers of peace operations, which have been listed in the literature review, have also been referred to in order to draw upon conclusions that are self evident and relevant to the research. The comparative methodology adopted, though not without its weakness of analyzing only the military aspects of regionally undertaken peace operations, is still relevant to arriving at an answer to the primary research question.
CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

The Chinese use two brush strokes to write the word crisis. One brush stroke stands for danger; the other for opportunity. In a crisis, be aware of the danger but recognize the opportunity.

-Richard M. Nixon (1913-1994)

Introduction

The UN developed the term *peacekeeping* to help manage conflicts during the cold war era. Despite limitations imposed on it by superpower rivalry, the UN established and ran fourteen peacekeeping operations during the period 1948-1988, of which thirteen were mandated under Chapter VI (peacekeeping) of the UN Charter and just one, in Congo, was changed to a Chapter VII (peace enforcement) mission. These fourteen peace operations, authorized by the UN Security Council over a period of four-plus decades, fell under seven distinct types of peace operations: interposition of forces between two belligerents; observation and monitoring of ceasefires and truces; provision of humanitarian support; monitoring of elections; containment of armed forces/groups to given areas; the voluntary disarmament of forces; and peace enforcement. In each case, apart from the single peace enforcement action against the Katangese rebels in Congo in the 1960s, the success of these operations was contingent upon the consent of the contending parties to the dispute.

Peacekeeping missions mandated under Chapter VI of the UN Charter during the cold war came to be called “traditional peacekeeping” missions, and they evolved a set of principles that were enunciated by the UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold as early as 1958. These included the following: first, the peacekeepers must have the consent of
the parties involved. Second, the forces must not come from the great powers. Third, the forces must maintain a strict impartiality. Fourth, the forces must retain the capability to defend themselves (Clark, Jr. 1999, 8). Constrained as the UN was under the realities of the cold war, it conducted peace operations following a well defined set of principles and in most cases succeeded in maintaining peace, bringing succor to millions of lives, and justifying the faith of its founding members in laying down the UN Charter.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and its satellite communist states in the late 1980s caused upheavals in the existing world order, bringing to the fore conflicts no longer suppressed by communist ideology or superpower rivalry in different parts of the globe. As the UN rushed in to manage the rash of conflicts erupting across the world, it found itself conducting peace operations that encompassed much more than traditional peacekeeping, employing a set of principles that needed change, and under mandates lacking both the political will or the military muscle to be successful. The UN was forced to recognize, through painful experiences in the field, its inadequacies in handling the complex situations it faced when tackling conflicts that were mostly intrastate in nature. The Security Council ‘permanent five’ members and the UN Secretariat realized that it took a multi-pronged approach at the diplomatic, informational, and economic levels—not just a purely limited military effort, as had been the experience earlier—to have any effective chance of managing and resolving such conflicts.

While the UN went in for reform and an improvement in its capabilities to conduct peace operations, it also reached out to the regional organizations to merge their efforts with those of the UN in maintaining international peace and security. This desire was articulated in the UN documents *An Agenda for Peace* (UN: New York, 1992) and
Supplement to An Agenda for Peace (UN: New York, 1995), which recognized the role regional organizations could play in helping the UN to conduct the expanded or “wider” forms of peace operations that present conflicts and humanitarian emergencies demanded.

Modern Day Peace Operations

These “wider” forms of peace operations reflected some of the factors that have constituted modern day peace operations (in the 1990s) mostly under Chapter VII, i.e. peace enforcement, of the UN Charter. The UN experience in “wider” forms of peace operations ranged from Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, Cambodia, Kosovo, East Timor, and Sierra Leone, to name just a few missions. Without taking recourse to a particular example, some of the major activities that peacekeepers have been called upon to do, some of them near simultaneously, are:

1. Separating belligerents or warring factions through direct military action/intervention.

2. Disarming and controlling weapons of belligerents.

3. Securing and protecting supply routes, including mine clearance.

4. Protecting humanitarian convoys.

5. Provide security to refugee camps or safe havens.

6. Assist in provision of basic humanitarian relief.


8. Establish and train new armed and police forces.


10. Establish and run those institutions that are necessary for ‘the rule of law’.
11. Observe, monitor and verify elections.

As would be evident, the scope of a modern day peace operation far exceeds what traditional peacekeeping operations were expected to achieve. It also becomes clear that not all activities listed above are within the capability of the military to execute or perform. They require, in addition to a military force, trained civilians and specialist organizations that have the capacity to execute and oversee the expected range of functions. It would be fair to assume that future conflicts requiring the attention of the UN or regional organizations would in all likelihood have some, if not all, of the facets mentioned above.

**Working Together: Regional Organizations and the UN**

Having established what could be the possible facets of a modern day peace operation it is but logical to ask: of the facets just described, which are best tackled by a regional organization and what (if any) should be left to the UN to handle, in order to synergize efforts and ensure that the peace operation has a reasonable chance of success? To look at it from a different perspective, it may be asked, what are the different mechanisms under which the UN and/or regional organizations could address these facets while conducting peace operations.

The UN has looked into this issue in a study titled *Cooperation Between the United Nations and Regional Organizations/Arrangements in a Peacekeeping Environment: Suggested Principles and Mechanisms* (UN: New York, March 1999). The document, compiled by the Lessons Learned Unit of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, after an in-depth case study on six cases of cooperation between the UN and regional organizations mostly in the 1990s, recommends areas of expertise that different
organizations should concentrate on when involved in peace operations.

Of the eleven major subcategories of peace operations activities (and this list is by no means exhaustive) described earlier in this chapter, the UN report, acknowledging the expertise and support different regional organizations provide in each of them, broadly groups the cooperation between the UN and regional organizations while undertaking such tasks under the following categories (1) operational support, (2) codeployment, and (3) joint operations.

The UN report (Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Lessons Learned Unit 1999, 8) cites examples for these three forms of cooperation that include, the operational support provided by the NATO-led multinational Implementation Force/Stabilization Force (IFOR/SFOR) to the United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) in establishing a safe and secure environment in that region of Croatia. The operational support provided by the Commonwealth of Independent States forces to the UN observer mission in Tajikistan, co-deployment of regional forces and UN military observers in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and joint operations in Haiti. Interestingly, in each case the main role of regional organizations, by the UN’s own admission, centered around providing a safe and secure environment in the area of operations by deploying ground forces, air assets, and naval task forces when necessary, to undertake tasks that were military in nature and which have been listed at serial 1 to 5 on page 29 of this chapter.

Evidently, for a peace operation to fulfill its mandate, the provision of a safe and secure environment is an objective that must be secured early on in an operation’s time schedule. The military muscle needed to achieve it can apparently be provided by a
regional organization, while the UN deploys its personnel for observation and monitoring
tasks and securing the politico-economic objectives set out in the mission’s mandate.
Cooperation between the regional organization and the UN could be through either one of
the suggested three mechanisms, depending upon the particular needs and sensitivities of
the region. In the case of Europe especially, “NATO will almost certainly prove the
primary organization in shaping the future of Europe in terms of peacekeeping roles and
missions” (Lewis and Marks 1998, 54).

The March 1999 UN Report also acknowledges some of the advantages of using
regional organizations in resolving disputes such as their better knowledge about the root
causes of a conflict in their particular region as well as the parties and personalities
involved in the conflict. They may be more flexible than the UN in the allocation of
resources and, therefore, are able to deploy assets, including troops faster than the UN
within their own regions. Further, the UN Report goes on to say, rich regional
organizations/arrangements are able to provide adequate resources to support their own
operations (Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Lessons Learned Unit 1999, 12).

Support for a UN or Regional Approach to Conflict Resolution

Having established that one of the primary advantages that many regional
organizations bring to the conduct of peace operations is in the rapid deployment of
forces to their regions (relative to deployment time under the aegis of the UN) and in the
robust execution of military operations for creating a safe and secure environment, it is
necessary to answer the next secondary research question i.e. what prompts some nations
to contribute troops to a UN led peace operation and not a regional effort and vice versa?

There is no clear-cut answer to this question, though broad indicators of a nation’s
willingness to contribute and support a UN or a regional peace operation can be identified through an understanding of the geo-political factors that drive such decisions.

An important factor is the degree of control a nation wishes to exercise over the conduct of operations, and as a subset to this is the issue of command and control over its forces committed to a given operation. In many cases, players involved in a regional effort may wish to control the direction and tempo of operations without “interference” from the permanent five members of the Security Council or the UN Secretariat, especially when the outcome of the peace operation impacts, directly or indirectly, their own security or national interests. In such situations nations would be willing to help set up and run a peace operation using an existing regional organization or even an informal alliance/coalition of regional states. NATO members’ hesitation to provide full operational control over their forces in former Yugoslavia to UNPROFOR, as well as the UN’s inability to take effective decisions for the use of force, led to the collapse of the mission. The subsequent Dayton Peace Accord could only be implemented when NATO provided its own Implementation Force (IFOR), under NATO command, to direct and control the operation (Lewis and Marks 1998, 47).

Then there are countries, which have a jaundiced view of any peacekeeping effort, especially if it involves the US or a former regional power (e.g. Russia in peace operations in the CIS), operating outside the direct control of the UN, i.e. a mandate given by the Security Council under Chapter VIII. They view such peace operations as a disguised attempt by the lead nation to exert control over its former spheres of influence or satellite states. Such nations are willing to support the UN but find it an anathema to provide material or personnel support to a regional effort (Lewis and Marks 1998).
Another issue to be considered is the position of nonaligned states that have been large contributors to “traditional peacekeeping” UN missions under a Chapter VI mandate. Their government policies remain firmly rooted in the principles of non-interference in another nation’s affairs, consent of parties to the dispute, strict impartiality in the conduct of operations and restrictive Rules of Engagement (ROE) that are essentially defensive in nature. Current peace operations, as already brought out, need a more flexible and robust approach to tackle intrastate conflict and an ability to employ force as necessary. The nonaligned nations find themselves unwilling to cooperate with nations that prefer the regional route, as inflexible government policies and the dangers of participating in a peace enforcement mission, in a nebulous security environment, are inhibiting factors for them.

An indirect factor that influences the decision to contribute is the relationship between the parties to the dispute (whether they are state or non-state actors) vis-à-vis the contributing nations, and involvement of the UN in running the operation. This factor strongly influences decisions by either the UN Security Council or a regional organization with respect to the actual composition of a peacekeeping force.

**Analysis of Case Studies**

Hereinafter, the focus of the analysis shall be on the three peace operations that have been selected for study in which the military component for the operations has come from a regional organization (Sierra Leone), a coalition of regional nations (East Timor), and a regional military alliance (Kosovo). This analysis would be restricted to the success criteria mentioned in Chapter 3 i.e.:

1. A clear, unambiguous and achievable mandate for the peace operation.
2. Matching resources to the mandate.

3. Lead nation concept and command and control of forces.

4. Rapid deployment to the area of operations and creating a secure environment.

5. Assessing requirements and coordinating efforts of all organizations/bodies involved in the peace process.

6. Setting the conditions for parties to the dispute to stay the course for negotiations and working towards a political/power sharing agreement.

7. A viable exit strategy once security objectives are met and maintained.

Sierra Leone

The first peace operation to be analyzed is the ongoing effort in Sierra Leone. It started in the mid 1990s as a regional peace operation before transitioning to a co-deployment of regional peacekeepers and UN military observers. In its current form it is the largest UN-led peace operation in Africa since Congo in the 1960s.

Peacekeeping in Africa

In order to grasp the essentials of the problems in Sierra Leone, it becomes necessary to first understand the complexity and challenges of peacekeeping in Africa. Given the host of unsuccessful peace operations in Africa through the 1990s, many realistic and influential thinkers in the US and Europe were vocal in their efforts to convince the politicians that Africa was not worth taking care of. “The continent is plagued by complex emergencies representing the greatest challenges of recent years. Therefore the international community should let bloody African wars follow their course until fighters are exhausted and willing to agree on a peace deal” (Patel 2001,1). One of the outcomes of such thought was the Clinton Administration’s Presidential Decision
Directive 25 (PDD 25) in 1994, which established the parameters for future US participation in peace operations, to avoid the mistakes of Somalia and Rwanda. In effect PDD 25 made it extremely difficult for US participation in any operation in Africa.

This Directive influenced other European nations as well and resulted in a drying up of “Western” troop contributions to peace operations in sub-Saharan Africa post 1994. On the other hand, it was becoming evident that “the types of conflicts that cause collapse in Africa require a longer and more expensive commitment than was initially proposed in the early 1990s” (Patel 2001,1). The dichotomy caused by these diverging views made the sub-Saharan African states realize the need to develop a regional peacekeeping capability.

However, as pointed out by Chris Landersberg, of the Center for Policy Studies in Johannesburg, the notion of African solutions for African problems is easier stated than realized in practice. The collapse of African states is in large part due to bloody intrastate feuds driven by ethnic and tribal rivalries and further fuelled by the desire of global corporations to exploit the wealth of natural resources in Africa, ranging from oil and diamonds to rare minerals, at a fraction of the cost by satisfying warlords in the region through cash and weapons (Patel 2001). “Warlords enjoy a situation of anarchy in which they can threaten the local population and engage in illegal business. They often use a condition of illegality to exploit, as in the case of Sierra Leone, the country’s economic resources. As a consequence they have no interest in participating in a serious peace process” (Patel 2001, 2).

Background to the Conflict in Sierra Leone

The conflict in Sierra Leone dates from March 1991 when fighters of the
Revolutionary United Front (RUF), headed by a former army corporal Foday Sankoh, launched a war from the east of the country near the Liberian border, to overthrow the government. Actively supported by President Charles Taylor of Liberia and using the country as a base for their operations, they soon succeeded in seizing diamond-mining properties, the main source of hard currency for the government. The Sierra Leone army, with the support of the Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a regional economic organization in West Africa, tried at first to defend the government. However, the following year, the army itself overthrew the government while the RUF continued its attacks consolidating its control over large parts of eastern Sierra Leone.

In 1995, the UN Secretary General appointed a special envoy, Mr. Berhanu Dinka (Ethiopia), to the region who, working in close cooperation with Organization of African Unity (OAU) and ECOWAS, was able to get the army to relinquish power and allow elections to be held in February 1996. Dr. Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, of the Sierra Leone’s Peoples Party (SLPP), was elected president but the RUF refused to participate in the elections and did not recognize President Kabbah, perpetuating the civil war further. A failed peace accord in November 1996 was followed by a coup d'état in May 1997 in which the army threw in its lot with the RUF and a new junta assumed power. President Kabbah and his government went into exile in neighboring Guinea. Failing to persuade the junta to step down, the UN Security Council imposed an oil and arms embargo in October 1997 and authorized ECOWAS to ensure its implementation using ECOMOG troops.
On 23 October 1997, the ECOWAS Committee of Five on Sierra Leone and a delegation representing the chairman of the junta held talks at Conakry, Guinea Bissau, and signed a peace plan which, among other things, called for a ceasefire to be monitored by ECOMOG and, if approved by the UN Security Council, assisted by UN military observers. While President Kabbah pledged his support for the plan, it too never got implemented as the junta criticized key elements and raised issues with the implementers.

The Arrival of ECOMOG Peacekeepers

By now, ECOMOG forces had begun arriving in the Sierra Leone capital Freetown, having extended their deployment from Liberia to Sierra Leone. By January 1998 they numbered some 9000 peacekeepers drawn mostly from Nigeria, with a sprinkling of troops from Ghana, Guinea and Mali. In February 1998, in response to an attack from junta forces, ECOMOG peacekeepers launched an assault that collapsed the junta’s control over Freetown, forcing its fighters to flee to the bush. The Government of President Kabbah was reinstated in March 1998. With armed groups still roaming the interior, ECOMOG attempted to extend its control over other parts of the country, especially the diamond properties, with very limited success.

A semblance of security in and around Freetown prompted the UN Security Council in July 1998 to establish a military observer mission, the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), for an initial period of six months. The mission was intended to promote national reconciliation and provide help with the demobilization of former soldiers, in collaboration with ECOMOG. Some of the key points in its mandate included the monitoring of the disarmament of various armed
groups as well as monitoring the role of ECOMOG in the provision of security and the
collection and destruction of arms in secure areas (SC Resolution 1181 1998).

Little progress had been made towards the achievement of this mandate when, on
6 January 1999, rebel fighters belonging to the deposed Armed Forces Revolutionary
Council (AFRC) and the RUF overwhelmed the ECOMOG defenses and swept into
Freetown (Malan, Rakate, and McIntyre 2001). They set off an orgy of violence that
grabbed the world’s attention. This orgy exposed weaknesses in the ECOMOG forces’
capability to defend themselves or the UN military observers. The latter were evacuated
together with the hundreds of UN civilian staff and humanitarian aid workers in
Freetown. A belated ECOMOG response together with the help of a local militia, the
Kamajors, loyal to President Kabbah, eventually restored peace and order to Freetown
but not before 5000 people, including scores of Nigerian troops, had been killed, and
150,000 people left homeless (Malan, Rakate, and McIntyre 2001).

The Lomé Peace Accord

The sacking of Freetown had been narrowly preceded by a change of government
in Nigeria (from a military dictatorship to civilian presidential rule). The new government
announced that it could no longer afford to pay US $ 1 million per day to maintain its
troops in Sierra Leone (UN and Conflict Monitor Autumn 1999, online) and was pulling
out its forces from ECOMOG. In the words of Mark Malan:

The impending Nigerian withdrawal prompted a frantic scramble
among West African states, as well as Britain and the US, to broker a
peace agreement. The UN Special Representative initiated a series of
diplomatic efforts aimed at opening up dialogue with the rebels.
Negotiations between the Government and the rebels began in May 1999.
With coaxing from the UK and US, a controversial peace agreement was
signed by President Kabbah and Corporal Sankoh in Lomé, Togo, on 7
July 1999. The Lomé accord granted total amnesty to Foday Sankoh and members of the RUF, promised reintegration of the RUF into the Sierra Leonean army, assured the RUF several cabinet seats in the transitional government, left the RUF in control of the diamond mines and invited Sankoh to participate in UN-sponsored elections.

The ECOMOG mandate was revised to cover four areas: (1) peacekeeping; (2) state security; (3) protecting UNOMSIL; and (4) protecting demilitarization personnel. Meanwhile, a timetable was to be drawn up for ECOMOG's phased withdrawal linked to restructuring national armed forces. There was further reference to a neutral peacekeeping force comprising UNOMSIL and ECOMOG. A wide variety of monitoring, observation and coordinating tasks were given to UNOMSIL with a temporary increase in military observers from 70 to 210. Eventually in October 1999 the Security Council announced the mandate for a UN led peacekeeping force, United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), which formally ended the co-deployment of ECOMOG and UN personnel in Sierra Leone.

Transition to UN Peacekeeping

A few more narrative facts need to be highlighted before an objective analysis of the peace operations in Sierra Leone, in light of the established success criteria, is done. Firstly, UNAMSIL re-hatted a large contingent of Nigerian and Ghanaian troops from ECOMOG to UN peacekeepers. The attendant problems caused by such a move shall be brought out subsequently.

Secondly, UNAMSIL underwent a drastic change in its mandate and concept of operations in less than seven months, from peacekeeping to a peace enforcement mission, owing to a series of crises created in part by the piecemeal arrival of UN forces, ambiguity in command and control structures, and poor equipment and training of some
national contingents. Encouraged by the lack of UN response to an attacks on peacekeepers in the interior, the RUF took over 500 UN troops hostage and threatened Freetown once again prompting an intervention by British troops in May 2000, ostensibly to evacuate British citizens, but as acknowledged by the UN Secretary General, Mr. Kofi Annan, it was the presence of a viable deterrent in the form of a UK Task Force off the coast of Sierra Leone that allowed UNAMSIL to continue operating after the crisis of May 2000 (Fawcett 2002, online).

Lastly, it has been acknowledged by those who have followed the progress of peace in Sierra Leone that till such time the capabilities of UNAMSIL were not strengthened by a brigade-sized professional contingent from Pakistan and an air component from Russia, together with the presence of a sizeable UK army training team of 200 plus personnel, no reasonable progress towards achieving the given mandate was feasible (Malan, Rakate and McIntyre 2001).

Analysis

Various 'lessons learned' seminars conducted in the wake of the peace operations of the 1990s reflect consensus on one absolutely key prerequisite for mission success; the need for a realistic and well-defined mandate, supported by the necessary means or resources for its accomplishment (Malan, Rakate, and McIntyre 2001). The UN ordered a comprehensive study of the way it conducted peace operations in August 2000 resulting in the presentation of the Brahimi Report, prepared by an expert panel chaired by Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, the UN Secretary General’s current Special Representative to Afghanistan. It too includes in its key recommendations these two crucial prerequisites for mission success.
A look at the mandates of ECOMOG and UNOMSIL, and even UNAMSIL, in comparison to the complexity of issues, players, and events involved in Sierra Leone brings out the simple fact; the mandates were ambiguous and difficult to achieve given the commitment of resources. As noted by the ECOWAS Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Committee of Five on Sierra Leone in December 1997:

...the ECOWAS Peace Plan for Sierra Leone provided for the deployment of a UN Observer Mission along with ECOMOG in Sierra Leone to implement the disarmament process. In this connection, they urged the United Nations Security Council to accelerate efforts towards the deployment of a United Nations Military Observer Mission in Sierra Leone. They also called on Member States to urgently contribute more troops to enhance ECOMOG's operational capability in Sierra Leone.

While this statement is an obvious pointer to the lack of resources, there were, “Major inconsistencies in terms of tasks to be performed for the voluntary disarmament of RUF cadres and their encampment/demobilization” (UN DPKO Lessons Learned Unit 1999). RUF fighters were unwilling to hand in their weapons to ECOMOG, whom they looked upon as their enemy since 1991, due to their links and support from Charles Taylor of Liberia against whom ECOMOG had operated in 1990-91, when the civil war first started in Sierra Leone.

ECOMOG was a Nigerian led show from the very beginning. However, whether they achieved unity of effort through the ‘lead nation concept’ and acceptability among the population and parties to the dispute remains open to question. There have been enough insinuations in the press and even confidential reports of the UN that pointed to complicity between Nigerian peacekeepers and the RUF over control of the diamond properties (Wurst 2000).

ECOMOG forces and the UN peacekeepers were deployed in a piecemeal
fashion, both organizations showing no desire to speed up deployment even as events overtook their forces on the ground forcing constant changes to the concept of operations. Their ability to secure the entire territory of Sierra Leone, at least as envisaged by planners in ECOWAS and DPKO, was never within their capabilities from the outset.

The relative ease with which the RUF and AFRC guerillas were able to attack Freetown and spread terror in the countryside, without relinquishing their hold over the diamond mines, only serves to highlight the inadequacy of the perceived threat of force these guerillas faced from ECOMOG peacekeepers for not adhering to the various peace accords they signed between 1996 to 1999. So puny was this threat, that not only did the RUF renege on their commitments to negotiate, they felt confident of attacking ECOMOG defenses in 1998 and actually overrunning them in 1999. Similar inadequacies in the UN peacekeepers intent and deployment in 2000 once again encouraged RUF to do what it did best; probe the perimeters of Freetown, intimidate the UN troops and show utter disrespect for the Lomé peace accord. It required a strong British showing to get them back on track to negotiating and allowing UN troops to fulfill the mandate (BBC News Online June 2000).

The word coordination finds mention in every mandate, regional or UN, from 1996 to the present. And yet, this issue seems to have been given little thought by the forces actually on the ground when the UN and ECOMOG were co-deployed in 1998-99. How else would they be able to explain the lack of coordination between UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Committee of the Red Cross, and ECOMOG in the handling the refugees and displaced persons, provision of humanitarian support and medical assistance that is mentioned in the UNHCR monthly
reports to the UN Secretariat. To quote just one example “the UNHCR and World Food Program (WFP) warned today that more than 42,000 Sierra Leoneans . . . will face serious shortages of food and other vital supplies within six weeks unless the two agencies can mobilize more trucks urgently to move people and relief supplies” (WFP and UNHCR Press Release 1998). Such shortages were the norm and not an exception through the period 1998-2000 till the UN established a Civil Military Coordination Center (CMOC) in Freetown for overseeing all humanitarian and peace building activities in Sierra Leone.

Lastly, an exit strategy for ECOMOG or the UN military observers was never clearly defined or thought out. It was the pendulum of events as it swung in the favor of the rebels or the peacekeepers that dictated either mass evacuation or a hasty pullout by Nigeria, whose forces were the backbone of the mission, at a time when such a move was ill suited for the peace operations.

East Timor

Before the study moves on to look at the peace operation in East Timor in South East Asia, it would be pertinent to understand how countries here have evolved their outlook towards a regional approach to peace operations. Some observers have remarked that regionalization in peacekeeping could also be seen as a result and reaction to globalization (Coutts 2002). The overemphasis of globalization on a common approach to solving problems in different corners of the world may serve to provoke a reaction in regions to preserve what they perceive to be their unique outlook, or approach.

For the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) the answer may lie in its origins in 1967 when it helped promote regional reconciliation among the non-communist states of South East Asia at a tense time in their relations, basing its approach
on the bedrock foundations of respect for sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs (Coutts 2002, 3). ASEAN evolved its ‘unique’ way of quiet diplomacy, dialogue, non-confrontation and behind the scenes efforts, which its members are hesitant to change. Yet, when ASEAN was forced to confront an increased level of violence in its backyard and behind the scenes diplomacy did not yield desired results, it led to a coordinated regional peace operation, led by a non-ASEAN member, to resolve the crisis.

Background to the Crisis in East Timor

The deployment of the UN mandated International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) came about as a consequence of a sequence of events extending back to the Indonesian invasion of East Timor on 07 December 1975. Since that date East Timorese resistance to Indonesian occupation had continued and was characterized by a drawn out guerilla war. While the UN adopted a number of resolutions between 1976-1982 and initiated talks between Indonesia and East Timor’s former colonial master, Portugal, to resolve the status of the territory, the issue never registered very high on the international agenda, and most nations turned a blind eye to Indonesian occupation.

The Indonesian occupation was oppressive and brutal. It is estimated that during the period 1976-1980, deaths from military action, famine or disease ranged between 100,000 to 225,000 for the East Timorese, out of a total population of just over 600,000 (Ryan 2000). In the 1980s the issue of East Timor seemed to be put on the backburner for most of the world, however it refused to disappear, much to the chagrin of the Indonesian military dictatorship.

The fact that the East Timorese had not accepted Indonesian sovereignty and that the Indonesians were still behaving as colonial masters was tragically demonstrated by
the Dili massacre on 12 November 1991. Indonesian forces opened fire on a funeral procession of a pro-independence Timorese, killed earlier by the security forces, and by their own official account killed over 50 mourners and wounded another 91 (unofficial estimates placed the toll much higher) (Ryan 2000, 10). The event brought world focus back to the intractable nature of the Indonesian-East Timor problem and from 1995 onwards talks involving representatives from East Timor, Indonesia, and Portugal (the former colonial power in East Timor) were held on an annual basis in Austria under UN auspices.

The Referendum in East Timor

It was only in 1999 that President Habibie of Indonesia offered the people of East Timor a referendum to enable them to determine their future, i.e. autonomy within Indonesia or independence. The task of conducting the referendum was entrusted to the UN while the Indonesian government was charged with maintaining peace and security in East Timor to ensure a peaceful vote. However, interested parties within the Indonesian government and some East Timorese businessmen set about organizing small militia groups to intimidate the population into voting in favor of Indonesia. Violence against the people of East Timor intensified as the referendum date of 30 August 1999 drew closer and while the UN Security Council set up the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) to oversee the ballot, militia bands roamed the countryside orchestrating a campaign of terror. Despite the efforts of the militia, often aided and abetted by the Indonesian military (Ryan 2000, 14), the East Timorese population voted overwhelmingly in favor of independence. The results of the ballot unleashed an orgy of violence on the island and forced the UN to withdraw most of the UNAMET staff by 08
September 1999. Over 500,000 East Timorese fled their homes while scores remained unaccounted for, presumed killed by pro-integration militias.

Establishment of INTERFET under Australia’s Lead

The scale and ferocity of the violence shocked the UN, as did the tacit compliance of the Indonesian authorities who were responsible for peace and security. The Secretary General, Kofi Annan, gave an ultimatum to Indonesia to restore law and order or accept multinational intervention. Reluctantly, the Indonesian government accepted a UN authorized multinational force (comprising mostly troops from the ASEAN and the Asia Pacific Rim), vested with Chapter VII powers, to be led by Australia with the mandate of restoring peace and security in the territory; protecting and supporting UNAMET in carrying out its tasks; and, within force capabilities, facilitating humanitarian-assistance operations (UN SC Resolution 1264 1999).

In the words of Ryan:

Australia came to assume the leadership of a regionally based coalition as a consequence of a policy vacuum among other states in the region and due to the hardening of Australian domestic resolve. As the crisis in Timor escalated after the ballot of 30 August 1999, no other regional state or organization proved to be capable of establishing the most basic consensus on the issue. . . . Australia proved to be the only country in the immediate region that was capable of building a ‘coalition with strong regional representation’ for both peace enforcement and peacekeeping missions.

When the Security Council gave its seal of approval to Resolution 1264 on 15 September 1999, it authorized the setting up of an International Force East Timor (INTERFET) as an interim measure that was capable of immediate deployment under Australian unified command to help bring the tripartite process for eventual independence of East Timor back on track until such time as a UN peacekeeping
operation could be deployed (UN Press Release 1999).

**Deployment of INTERFET and Transition to UNTAET**

INTERFET forces began arriving in Dili East Timor on 20 September 1999 (Lamb, LA Times 20 Sep 1999); just five days after the UN Security Council had authorized the deployment. The first contingent of troops, from Australia, New Zealand, and a detachment of British Special Forces, did not face any opposition as they landed at Dili’s Komoro airport. Initially, the forces concentrated on establishing a firm base in Dili. This was necessary to establish conditions of security and adequate logistic support to sustain operations in the not-so-readily accessible interior of the territory.

On 22 September 1999, troops began to spread out to the outlying parts of East Timor. By the end of October 1999, in a period of approximately forty-five days, INTERFET had brought the entire mainland East Timorese territory under its operational control. The last part of East Timor brought under INTERFET control was Atauro Island on 21 November (Ryan 2000, 74).

The pro-integration militia failed to demonstrate the resolve to continue the conflict that their leaders had promised before the Indonesian withdrawal. In large part this failure was due to the speed with which INTERFET established control over the border region. The rapid and successful deployment of over 9,000 troops, coupled with a robust mandate, backed by adequate political will and military firepower, enabled INTERFET to draw down its deployment beginning January 2000. The transition to a UN led peace operation, the United Nations Transition Authority in East Timor (UNTAET), was formally completed on 23 February 2000. In effect, over 80 percent of the INTERFET forces came under UN control, donning ‘Blue Berets’ and switching to the
operational tasks the Security Council had mandated for UNTAET in its resolution 1272 of 25 October 1999.

Analysis

“INTERFET had the benefit of one of the most strongly worded mandates given by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations since Resolution 678 authorized the expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait” (Ryan 2000, 24). The UN Security Council gave INTERFET a carte blanche in the use of force by stating “. . .to take all necessary measures to fulfill this mandate” (UNSC Resolution 1264 1999, Article 3). Thus a key component of the success criteria (as determined in the research methodology for the case studies), i.e. a clear and unambiguous mandate, was established early on for East Timor.

Backing a clear mandate was the strong presence of a multinational coalition, with a heavy regional bias, and adequately augmented and supported by the lift and logistical capability of the United States Pacific Command. Also lurking in the background was the undeniable presence of the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) aboard the USS Belleau Wood to support INTERFET. The message could not have been lost on the prointegration militias or their backers, the Indonesian Armed Forces, that should they hinder INTERFET forces in establishing peace and security in East Timor, a capable quick reaction force in the shape of the 31st MEU was on hand to intervene.

The Security Council was clear in its authorization of establishing a multinational force under a ‘unified command structure’ for East Timor (UNSC Resolution 1264). The resolution, while never specifically mentioning Australia as the lead nation, left adequate
scope for the nation so designated to discharge the mandate without undue interference from outsiders (Ryan 2000, 27).

The Australian Defence Forces (ADF) settled for a command structure that followed the US model for Haiti in 1994, i.e. an operational command responding to a lead-nation headquarters. While the Australian component of INTERFET was under Headquarters Australian Theatre, all national contingents were placed under operational control of Major General Peter Cosgrove from Australia, the Force Commander INTERFET. He in turn worked directly for the Australian Chief of Defence Forces (CDF). The national contingents also had a direct link to their own national command authorities who in turn could communicate freely with the CDF. The arrangements worked well and ensured that orders were executed with undue reference back to national command authorities. In the words of Brigadier Steve Ayling, the Director General of INTERFET Branch at the ADF Headquarters (Ryan 2000), one of the lessons to be derived from the Australian experience of coalition command in INTERFET is that:

Coalition participants will only join a coalition if they respect and have confidence in command structure. Command and control can be based on the widely accepted UN model that has proven successful, but it requires the appointment of a capable and credible coalition commander agreeable to all. Potential coalition participants need to be convinced that the most direct and efficient chain of command has been established, and most importantly that it will be responsive to their national requirements.

In so far as rapid deployment to the affected region, it has been highlighted that within five days of the SC resolution authorizing the establishment of INTERFET, the lead combat troops were arriving at Dili airport and within 45 days had completed deployment in their projected area of operations. The speed of deployment has been quoted as a key factor in keeping the pro Indonesian militias on the defensive. The
Australians were quick to point out that their ability to deploy was dependent significantly on three factors: (1) preplanning; (2) availability of trained and ready forces; and (3) the proximity of East Timor to the northern Australian port of Darwin, which became the main logistical base for INTERFET. It is interesting to note that Australia committed its troops while still actively engaged in building a coalition in the region and cajoling nations to contribute troops and material for the peace operation.

While INTERFET concentrated on creating a secure environment, the main purpose of UNAMET was not lost sight of, i.e. overseeing a transition to a popular form of government as desired by the majority of the East Timorese people in their referendum vote of 30 August 1999. Talks with the East Timorese leaders, Xanana Gusmao and Jose Ramos Horta, were held to sort out issues related to disarming the Falantil (East Timorese proindependence guerillas) and setting up the transitional government. There were some tensions when the Falantil leadership resisted disarming of its cadres by INTERFET, claiming this was outside the mandate of the forces. However, consultations and close liaison with leaders on the ground ensured an amicable settlement with Falantil guerillas being allowed to keep their weapons.

Humanitarian relief operations were at the bottom of the agenda for INTERFET as mentioned in its mandate. Yet, within the constraints of its limited resources for humanitarian operations, Headquarters INTERFET was able to coordinate the efforts of over 65 relief organizations [of which 23 were UN agencies and the rest Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs)] through the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC). INTERFET leadership did however acknowledge that a better relationship with
the NGOs and understanding of each other’s capabilities prior to deployment would have helped in more efficient relief operations (Ryan 2000, 125).

INTERFET completed its transition to a UN led peace operation on 23 February 2000, five months after the first troops arrived in Dili. The Australian national command authorities were aware that the goodwill garnered by their forces in the initial phases of the operation would quickly fade as the political climate heated up for a transition to an interim government under UN auspices. They worked in close coordination with the UN to ensure an early exit for INTERFET once the main security objectives had been met.

Kosovo

The final case study involves the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the UN, and the ethnic conflict in Kosovo, a province in the former Republic of Yugoslavia. The period covered by the case study, June 1999 to April 2000, is only a small segment of the timeline spanning the multitude of conflicts that plagued the Balkans through the 1990s. It is not feasible to provide a detailed chronology of all the events that led to the disintegration of Yugoslavia and NATO’s intervention in Kosovo. However, the nature of the problem in Kosovo together with the circumstances that led to the establishment of a NATO security force and a UN mission in Kosovo, are described briefly before analyzing the military effectiveness of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) in light of already established success criteria.

Background to the Conflict in Kosovo

Kosovo lies in southern Serbia and has a mixed population of which the majority are ethnic Albanians. Both Serb and Albanian nationalists claim Kosovo on grounds of history, demography and military conquest. Kosovo came under the Ottoman Empire at
the end of the 14th Century and remained a part of it until 1912 when war in the Balkans drove the Turks out of Kosovo. By now it had become a predominantly Albanian province. This was due to a steady migration, over the past two centuries, of its Serbian population to Bosnia in the North, coupled with an influx of mostly Muslim Albanians from the mountains of Albania in the southwest. However in 1914 the province was conquered by Serbia and, with the exception of the two world wars, formed a part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia through most of the 20th Century.

Marshall Joseph Broz Tito, the strongman of Yugoslavia, wisely started a process of emancipation for the Albanian Kosovars in the 1960s culminating in the grant of full autonomy in 1974. This enabled the province, which by now comprised almost 90 percent ethnic Albanians, to have almost the same rights as the six republics of Yugoslavia. The minority Serbs in Kosovo however, complained of constant harassment and persecution by Albanian officials. Slobodan Milosevic, as the head of the Serbian Communist Party, came to power in 1989 riding a wave of anti-Albanian sentiment and his first act was to strip Kosovo of its autonomy. In retrospect, this action of Milosevic was the thread that unraveled the Yugoslav Republic. Over the next five years, a groundswell of nationalism became an unstoppable wave that destroyed the federation so carefully preserved by Tito for nearly four decades.

The Serbian Crackdown in Kosovo

In 1998, nine years after the abolition of Kosovo’s autonomy, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)—supported by the majority ethnic Albanians—came out in open rebellion against Serbian rule. The international community, while supporting greater autonomy, opposed the Kosovar Albanians’ demand for independence. But international
pressure grew on the Serbian president, Slobodan Milosevic, to bring an end to the escalating violence in the province. By October 1998, the violence had claimed the lives of over 1500 Kosovar Albanians and forced over 390,000 people from their homes. Milosevic seemed to be in no mood to listen to the international community. A series of diplomatic initiatives and UN Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs 1199 and 1203) through October 1998 to January 1999 backed by the threat of NATO air strikes made Milosevic pause in his efforts to quell Kosovar Albanian popular sentiment. However, in mid January 1999, with the discovery of a mass grave of Kosovar Albanians in Racak, Kosovo, by OSCE observers (whom Milosevic had allowed in earlier in Nov 1998), it became evident that the Serbs had never stopped their violent campaign against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.

The NATO Air Campaign

On 20 March 1999, the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission was withdrawn from the region, having faced obstruction from Serbian forces to the extent that they could no longer continue to fulfill their task. When Milosevic refused to comply with renewed UN and NATO demands to stop the violence and withdraw his forces from Kosovo, the order was given on 23 March 1999 to commence NATO air strikes against Serbian forces. The air campaign (Operation Allied Force) was halted on 10 June 99 when it was confirmed that a full withdrawal of the Serbian forces had begun from Kosovo in accordance with the Military Technical Agreement that Milosevic and his generals had signed just a day prior, caving in to the spiraling economic and political costs of facing up to NATO air strikes.
Deployment of NATO Ground Forces as Peacekeepers

On 10 June 1999 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1244, welcoming the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles on a political solution to the Kosovo crisis, including an immediate end to violence and a rapid withdrawal of its military, police, and paramilitary forces. The Resolution announced the Security Council’s decision to deploy international civil and security presences in Kosovo, under United Nations auspices. The security presence, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, was to be headed by NATO, which would also provide the majority of the forces. The operation would be established and run under a unified command and control mechanism and its responsibilities would include deterring renewed hostilities (between Serbs and the KLA), demilitarizing the KLA and establishing a secure environment for the return of refugees and in which the international civil presence could operate.

NATO was not entirely unprepared for the task of establishing a strong security presence in Kosovo. In fact, preparations for an intervention by ground forces had been ongoing since 23 April 1999, when NATO Secretary General, Javier Solana, had authorized NATO to do an ‘assessment’ of its ground intervention plans (Clark 2001, 268). Also, owing to the influx of refugees into northern Albania since October 1998, substantial NATO ground forces were present in the north and northeast of Albania to secure the border against any Serb cross border incursion and force protection of NATO air assets deployed close to the Serb Albanian border. NATO troops were also present in Macedonia as a part of a preventive deployment strategy for the region.
Planning for Operation Joint Guardian (the NATO designation for the deployment of ground forces in Kosovo) had commenced well before the air campaign ended. By the first week of May 1999, diplomatic parleys between the US and Russia had prompted NATO to start considering a post “Operation Allied Force” deployment in Kosovo. On 04 May 1999, the Joint Staff at the Pentagon conveyed to General Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), their thinking on deployment of ground forces. In the words of General Clark:

The Joint Staff thinking was not to intermix NATO and Serb forces, so we would direct the removal of air defense weapons first, then verify by air a Serb ground force withdrawal over a period of about seven days. Then the NATO force would enter to stabilize the situation and assist the civil implementation organization in its early operations. After about six months, the NATO force could be drawn down substantially.

The first elements of KFOR entered Kosovo on 12 June 1999. As agreed in the Military Technical Agreement, the deployment of the security force, KFOR, was synchronized with the departure of Serb security forces from Kosovo. By 20 June 1999, the Serb withdrawal was complete and KFOR was well established in Kosovo. However, the KFOR deployment was not without drama and tensions as NATO troops faced off against a column of Russian mechanized troops that had beaten them to Pristina airport on 10 June 1999. According to a research paper funded by the Rand Corporation in 2002, titled, Disjointed War: Military Operations in Kosovo, 1999:

The surprise movement of Russian forces from Bosnia into the Pristina airport on June 10 caught NATO by surprise. General Clark requested that Lieutenant General (U.K.) Sir Michael Jackson, the KFOR commander, order the Russians to withdraw from the airport, but Jackson refused to act, instead informing his home government, which agreed that KFOR should not confront the Russians. The issue was later resolved without incident, but it illustrated the difference between a national chain of command, in which subordinates are normally expected
to obey orders, and an alliance chain of command, in which senior commanders may appeal to their national command authorities.

At the peak of its deployment by January 2000, KFOR had 45,000 troops in Kosovo; spread over five multinational brigade sectors, performing a wide variety of peacekeeping, policing, and humanitarian tasks. The Russian contingent (approximately 3600 troops) had been integrated into KFOR through a separate chain of command, with Russia retaining control over its forces, while the other national contingents functioned directly under the NATO chain of command.

With the induction of KFOR, the steady flow of Kosovar refugees into Albania and Macedonia was reversed and by September 1999 over 775,000 refugees and displaced persons had returned home (www.afsouth.nato.int.htm).

KFOR also assumed responsibility for protection of minority communities, in particular the Serbs who had stayed back, and protection of cultural sites. It also undertook the disarmament of the KLA. Both these tasks were potentially sensitive and subject to accusations of partiality by the Serbs and the Kosovars. Almost immediately, KFOR was embroiled in controversy when KLA commanders refused to disarm (Christian Science Monitor 28 June 1999) and the Serbs accused KFOR for the deaths of their community members at the hands of armed Kosovars who had refused to handover their weapons to KFOR troops. The vulnerability of Serbs to renegade armed groups of ethnic Albanians was highlighted in the massacre of 14 Serbs in the small village of Gracko, in south central Kosovo on 23 July 1999. An Associated Press report of 24 July 1999 published in USA Today described the incident thus:

GRACKO, Yugoslavia (AP): The massacre of 14 Serbs harvesting wheat threatened to set back efforts to end Kosovo's cycle of endless violence,
and NATO officials acknowledged Saturday that such acts of vengeance are beyond their control. Villagers blamed ethnic Albanians for the attack, the worst since NATO peacekeepers entered Kosovo six weeks ago. Peacekeepers have been hard-pressed to curb daily killings, abductions and harassment of Serbs across the province by ethnic Albanians avenging widespread atrocities committed earlier by Serb forces.

Eventually, backroom diplomacy and a promise for a greater role in policing Kosovo (to the dismay of the Serbs still remaining in Kosovo) led the KLA leader, Hashim Thaçi, to announce on 20 September 1999 that his forces had disarmed fully, and this was confirmed by KFOR Commander Lieutenant General Sir. Michael Jackson (www.afsouth.nato/int.htm).

The UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was fully operative by November 1999 and KFOR was committed to provide UN and international staff the requisite security environment for their effort towards political rapprochement and peaceful coexistence of all communities as envisioned in UN Security Council Resolution 1244. Four years later this task of KFOR has not changed substantially even as it has scaled down deployment to about 30,000 troops. In a recent interview to Jane’s Defence Weekly the present KFOR Commander, Italian Army Lt Gen. Fabio Mini, indicated that KFOR could reduce to 15-17000 troops by the end of 2003 (Felstead 2003).

The KFOR mandate for ensuring peace and security was quite broad in its scope and an improvement over the restrictive features of the Dayton Peace Accord for Bosnia (Rand Corporation 2002). However there has been criticism within the United States that the KFOR mandate is an open ended costly commitment of US forces for peace operations (Phillips and Anderson 1999). There can be no doubt though about KFOR’s ability to achieve most of military objectives by April 2000 despite allegations of
hesitancy (at times even refusal) on the part of some contingents to confront the KLA or Serbs involved in committing atrocities against each other. In a paper titled “Kosovo One Year On: Achievement and Challenge,” published in 2000, the Secretary General of NATO, Lord Robertson says, “The most daunting current challenge for KFOR is to maintain a safe and secure environment within Kosovo. . . . Improving the security of minorities is one of KFOR’s chief priorities and a major cause for concern”.

Given the wide scope of the mandate, NATO planners did their best to equip the KFOR troops adequately to deter any fresh Serb aggression and gain operational control of key towns and villages. It was in the performance of policing tasks however, such as maintenance of law and order and protection of minorities, that many contingents felt the lack of expertise initially. The troops were quick to learn by augmentation of their capabilities using Special Forces and Civil Affairs teams before the arrival of UNMIK civilian police forces.

NATO had a clearly defined chain of command and operational control for the five multinational brigades as well as the Russian contingent that is under Russian National Command Authorities but TACON to NATO multinational brigades in three sectors. This relationship can be better understood with the help of the following table:
### TABLE 2: RUSSIAN PARTICIPATION IN KFOR

**SOURCE:** HTTP://WWW.NATO.INT/KOSOVO/DOCU/A990618C.HTM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAC</th>
<th>SHAPE</th>
<th>AFSOUTH</th>
<th>KFOR Commander</th>
<th>KFOR Staff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MOD Representative</td>
<td>MOD Representative</td>
<td>MOD Representative (Deputy)</td>
<td>MOD C2 Representatives</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A = Allied, Partner, or other non-Russian Contingent

Even with a clearly delineated chain of command, with the North Atlantic Council (NAC) occupying the lead-nation spot at the apex, contingents have a strong connection with their own national governments that have a say in what a contingent may or may not do in a given situation. For example, while the KFOR rules of engagement specifically mentioned that Commander KFOR had the authority to use troops from one multinational brigade in another brigade’s sector, such freedom was denied in early 2000 when some governments, which were members of the NAC, withdrew their consent to employ their contingents outside the boundaries of the specified brigade sector (Rand Corporation 2002).
As brought out earlier, NATO was well poised to deploy forces in Kosovo. On receiving the go ahead from the UN Security Council, it was able to deploy 20,000 combat troops within two weeks to Kosovo. Geographical proximity, preplanning and a willingness on the part of NATO members to commit their forces ensured such a quick deployment. It is safe to presume that had this not been the case, Serb forces may well have continued to hold on to Kosovar territory contiguous to Serbia or that the KLA may have exacted grim revenge on the minority Serbs in Kosovo.

In the field of coordination and assistance to civil presences in Kosovo, KFOR, by its own admittance, has been only partially successful. In the words of Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Anderson, US Army, Commander of 2nd Battalion 505th PIR Task Force in Kosovo “Although 335 aid agencies operate in Kosovo, military ties to NGOs in PKO are poorly structured” (Anderson 2001). This inadequacy has been addressed by establishing a Civil Military Operation Center (CMOC), which “serves as a command and control center for the battalion CA teams to help establish an interim regional government, restore the industrial and agricultural economic base, and manage resources and assets” (Anderson 2001). As for cooperation between KFOR and UNMIK, there has been good understanding and close cooperation between KFOR and UNMIK’s first pillar for humanitarian assistance, i.e. UNHCR, to build a humanitarian assistance program for Kosovo (Robertson 2001).

It is in the field of political settlement and dialogue between the Kosovars and minority communities (Serb, Roma, Muslim, Turk and Slav) in Kosovo that KFOR and the UN have encountered an intractable problem. UNMIK’s inability to effectively monitor law and order, coupled with a deep hatred and mistrust between Kosovar
Albanians and the minorities, has forced UN and NATO to change their long-term goal from multi ethnicity of society to peaceful coexistence of the different communities in distinct areas within Kosovo.

Whereas NATO planners, US policy makers and politicians have from the commencement of Operation Joint Guardian insisted on a time bound reduction of the military presence in Kosovo, the political nature of the problem and hesitancy to grant independence to Kosovo has allowed only a partial draw down of forces. Having an exit strategy and actually being able to execute it in a time bound fashion are issues that will continue to bedevil military planners of peace operations just as they have caused NATO to keep a near open ended commitment in Kosovo thus far.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

You can’t separate peace from freedom because no one can be at peace unless he has his freedom.

-Malcolm X (1925-1965), Malcolm X speaks, 1965

This thesis originated with the questions: Is the increased role of regional organizations and alliances in peace operations during the last decade of the 20th Century, as envisioned under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, a harbinger of future conduct of such operations? Is it likely to lead to a decline in UN preeminence in peace operations in the 21st Century? This chapter is a summation of the findings and provides an answer to these two questions.

Peace operations today are a determined manifestation of humankind to bring an end to conflict and suffering in different parts of the globe. It seems unlikely that the need to conduct such operations is going to diminish in the 21st Century. In the previous chapter this study has analyzed three recently launched (and ongoing) peace operations, in which the military component for the operations has come from a regional organization, a coalition of regional nations, and a regional military alliance. In each case, the arrangements for provision of peace and security to the war torn country have differed substantially from the UN’s traditional approach of providing peacekeepers under UN command and control, working directly under the UN Secretariat. The analysis has focused on the military component of the three peace operations in order to gauge the success (or lack thereof) for achieving objectives set out in the mandate and ultimately provide an answer to the primary and secondary question posed above.

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It is evident from the three case studies that regional organizations and alliances have to work in close cooperation with the UN and coordinate their activities with various international and nongovernmental organizations that are essential for any long term political and economic resolution of an ongoing conflict. While regional organizations and alliances may have the required military muscle to impose a degree of peace and security in the short term, they lack the experience and, in most cases, the expertise to conduct long term activities needed for peace building and peace consolidation initiatives. The analyses of the peace operations in East Timor and Kosovo reveal this fact quite succinctly.

It is also clear that not all regional organizations and alliances have similar military capacity, organization, doctrine, interoperability, and response mechanisms in place to be effective peacekeepers or peace enforcers in their respective regions. In that sense, it would be wrong to draw common conclusions about military effectiveness of regional organizations and alliances as a whole vis-à-vis the UN in peace operations. Of the three peace operations analyzed in chapter 4, NATO clearly had the most formidable military capability, while Australia’s resolve to cobble together a cohesive coalition, with the firm backing of the UN and the United States, carried the day for INTERFET in East Timor. However, it is the trends in setting up and running peace operations in the contemporary environment that is the focus of analysis in this thesis.

In each of the case studies, the UN Security Council approved a mandate for peace enforcement, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which was then executed by a military coalition, and in the case of Kosovo an existing military alliance (NATO), from the region. It would not be off the mark to suggest that given the changed nature of
present day conflict, which is mostly intrastate, peace enforcement operations can be mounted with greater ease and rapidity by a regional military alliance than a UN peacekeeping force. This factor has not been lost on the UN Security Council and it remains a major consideration in the way the UN has conducted the business of peacekeeping in the recent past and will continue to influence future peace operations requirements.

Another trend that becomes evident from the analysis is the need for political will in mounting and enforcing a regional peace operation. Regions that had the firm backing of governments, which were the lead players in a regional initiative, such as Australia in the case of East Timor and the US, France, Germany, and UK in Kosovo, were able to provide sufficient combat capability to separate the belligerents and achieve most provisions of the military mandate in an acceptable time frame. Lack of such political will was evident in the case of ECOWAS in Sierra Leone. Once Nigeria, the lead nation for ECOMOG, decided it could no longer afford to support its troops in the field, the UN was forced to step in and provide UN peacekeeping forces to achieve what was left unfinished by ECOMOG. Thus the UN cannot always rely on regional initiatives for rapid response and robust military capability in future conflicts. This is especially true for Africa, which continues to be plagued by the kind of intrastate conflicts requiring outside intervention. While US, French, and British initiatives to build regional peacekeeping capabilities in Africa are laudable, they do not absolve the UN from ignoring the region for future peace operations using UN peacekeepers.

Associated with political will is the economic burden sharing of fielding and sustaining a regional peacekeeping force that falls on all members states of a regional
organization or alliance. This factor, while not explicitly mentioned in the analysis of the three case studies, plays a significant role in determining eventual success of the peace operation. For East Timor and Kosovo, most of the countries forming the regional military coalition/alliance also happened to be members of existing regional economic forums (such as EU in Europe and ASEAN/Asia Pacific Rim in South East Asia). The combined wealth of the regions impacted directly on the type of military capability, in terms of quality of training and equipment, that was available for the peace operation initially and the contributing states capability to sustain them in the field for a given duration. In addition, some of the nations though not providing a direct military capability, pledged substantial financial aid (such as Japan for INTERFET in East Timor) for the funding of the operation that alleviated the economic burden on the troop contributing nations and ensured viability of the peace operation. In the case of Sierra Leone, a major factor for Nigeria’s withdrawal from the operation was its inability to bear the daily cost of one million US dollars to sustain its forces that formed 90 percent of ECOMOG’s strength in the field. Thus for future peace operations, the likelihood of regional organizations and alliances being capable of sustained operations would depend on the economic burden sharing capacity in that region. If this capacity was weak or non-existent in a region torn by conflict, then the UN would have to rely on the traditional troop contributing nations for peacekeeping troops and its annual budget for providing the funds for any peace operations, as it has being doing for the past so many years.

Connected with the aspect mentioned above is the role of the United States, as the world’s sole superpower, in determining the outcome of regional and UN peace operations. In the case of East Timor and Kosovo, there was firm US political,
diplomatic, and military support for a regional approach to the military component of the peace operation, and this ensured their success to a great degree. In the case of Sierra Leone, such keenness on the part of the US was not evident. It was left to the British to intervene, when things seemed to be outside the UN’s control, to step in militarily and restore the peace process but with a vastly changed mandate and the largest UN peace operation currently in Africa. In the current geo-strategic context, what the US desires the US gets, and not many nations would oppose or hinder an agenda for peace operations laid down by the United States. It is an open secret that many US policy makers find the UN a tower of Babel and ineffectual in its decision making process (author’s personal observation through exposure to the US print and electronic media over the last one year). They feel that since the US contributes nearly 25 percent of the UN annual budget, they should have a greater say in the way it conducts business. If they cannot do so, they would prefer to organize and run peace operations outside the UN chain of command. In fact, US peace operations doctrine envisages that US troops will invariably be the “lead nation” in peace enforcement operations as specified in PDD 25 (Joint Publication 3-07.3 1999). Thus it seems likely that in future peace operations, in regions where the US national interests are affected, it would prefer to back a regional approach (under a UN Security Council mandate) to peace operations, while nations that prefer a wider consensual decision making process may seek a purely UN approach.

Some of the trends identified in this chapter may lead to the conclusion that there is indeed a move towards regionalizing peace operations and this is the way ahead for future conduct of peace operations. However, such a conclusion would be premature. In each of the three case studies analyzed, there was a substantial UN presence in the field
cooperating closely with the regional peacekeeping force and without which, the secure environment created by the military would not have resulted in the peace process moving ahead as envisioned in the mandate. The UN has greater field experience than regional organizations in peace operations despite the setbacks and failures of the past decade. Regional organizations and alliances are relative newcomers to the game and as such they will have to rely on UN expertise and advice even when they maybe taking the military lead in future peace operations.

The UN itself is in the process of reform and strengthening its capabilities for conduct of peace operations. The desire for reform is evident from the way the Department of Peacekeeping Operations under the UN Secretary General has been restructured to resemble an efficient military headquarters since the year 2000 when the Brahimi Report on UN reform was submitted to the UN Security Council. Clearly the members of the UN Security Council do not see the UN backing off from conduct of peace operations in the 21st Century. However the UN is cognizant of its strengths and weaknesses, and it acknowledges the role regional organizations play in the maintenance of peace and security. This is especially true in the case of messy intrastate wars where the UN would be hampered in responding quickly, while a regional military coalition or alliance would be better suited to respond in strength due to geographic and political reasons.

In short, the answer to the primary research question is that the increased role of regional organizations and alliances in peace operations in the last decade of the 20th Century, under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, has been due to the changed nature of the conflict and humanitarian disasters erupting in different regions since the end of the Cold
War. This calls for a more interventionist approach rather than an agreement between all parties to the conflict to enable the induction of peacekeepers. Peacekeeping forces in modern day peace operations have, more often than not, got to protect civilians and even uphold the legitimacy of a weak but constitutional government against forces that may not be willing to recognize such rule of law or have respect for fundamental human rights. In such situations, a UN Charter Chapter VII, i.e. peace enforcement mission, is better executed (in most cases) by a regional coalition or alliance rather than UN peacekeepers. However, the UN does need to be co-opted into such a mission at the planning stage itself because of the expertise it brings to the field and the need for a near simultaneous establishment of the political, economic and civilian police component of the mission without which the main component of any mandate i.e. lasting peace and security cannot be fulfilled. The UN remains capable of conducting Chapter VI, i.e. peacekeeping, missions quite effectively and would continue to do so in the future.

Will the increased role of regional organizations in peace operations lead to a decline in the UN’s preeminence in this field in the 21st Century? By now the answer should be clear that it would not. The two have a symbiotic relationship. They need each other in order to mount and run a peace operation. Both have their strengths and weaknesses and it is only close cooperation between them in the future that would ensure success of any peace operation. The UN was established by its founding fathers for the maintenance of international peace and security and it will continue to remain the only international forum in the 21st Century that allows all nations big and small to contribute towards the achievement of this noble purpose.
This thesis is not intended to be an all encompassing, exhaustive study on the increased future role and involvement of regional organizations, alliances, and coalitions in peace operations. Recently concluded events in the Middle East and the current stand off between the Permanent Five members of the Security Council on the future role of the UN in Iraq is a logical follow up topic to this thesis. Future studies, in similar vein as this one, may prove invaluable in revalidating some of the conclusions of this thesis or refuting trends established in the analysis of the three case studies. Whatever be the conclusions of follow up studies, the topic shall continue to generate lively debate in the foreseeable future.


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