HOW CAN THE UNITED STATES ARMY IMPROVE HUMAN INTELLIGENCE IN PEACE OPERATIONS?

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the US Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

David N. Wright, MAJ, USA
B.A., Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan, 1990

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2003

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Name of Candidate: MAJ David N. Wright

Thesis Title: How Can the United States Army Improve Human Intelligence in Peace Operations?

Approved by:

LTC William L. Greenberg, M.M.A.S, Thesis Committee Chairman

LTC Edward C. Stepanchuk II, M.A., Member

Scott W. Lackey, Ph.D., Member

Accepted this 6th day of June 2003 by:

Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D., Director, Graduate Degree Programs

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HOW CAN THE UNITED STATES ARMY IMPROVE HUMAN INTELLIGENCE IN PEACE OPERATIONS? By David N. Wright, 82 pages

In military operations every soldier is a human intelligence (HUMINT) collector. The new doctrine and current peace operations regarding the G2X position fails to incorporate all HUMINT collectors under the G2X. Additionally, the new doctrine also fails to incorporate nonintelligence HUMINT collectors involved in peace operations. Current doctrine calls on the many “secondary” HUMINT collectors to collect information or intelligence as part of their mission. These secondary collectors, such as the Military Police, Psychological Operations, Civil Affairs and Line Units conduct liaison with international and local police forces, host-government official, nongovernment organizations, and local leaders. These are same individuals with whom the primary HUMINT collectors liaison. But the secondary HUMINT collectors do not fall under the G2X’s ability to deconflict. The lack of deconfliction and coordination leads to redundant coverage of sources and circular reporting. If the efforts of the secondary and primary collectors could be deconflicted, it would reduce circular reporting and redundancy. The eliminated redundancy would free primary HUMINT collectors to concentrate on sources that require street craft and resources not available to secondary collectors.
PREFACE

The author is currently completing this study while assigned to the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Major Wright is an Army Intelligence Officer with almost twelve years of experience working at the tactical level. She has served in tactical assignments with 3rd Battalion 64 Armor Regiment in Schweinfurt, Germany, the 103rd Military Intelligence Battalion in Wurzburg Germany, the 110th Military Intelligence Battalion at Fort Drum, New York and the Naples Detachment of the 655th Military Intelligence Group, Naples, Italy.

Major Wright has held positions as battalion and Brigade S2, Platoon leader, Company Executive Officer, Company commander, Counterintelligence Detachment commander, Divisional Operations officer, and Chief of Counterintelligence Operations.

Major Wright attended the counterintelligence officer school at Fort Huachuca in 1995. He has deployed to Bosnia-Herzegovina with the 10th Mountain Division during SFOR5 and SFOR6 as the Chief of Counterintelligence Operations for the 110th Military Intelligence Battalion. Following reassignment to Naples Italy, Major Wright deployed to command the 655th Military Intelligence Group’s Kosovo Detachment in 2002.

Major Wright is a graduate of the Military Intelligence Basic, Advanced, and Counterintelligence courses. He holds a Bachelor of Arts degree from Michigan State University and is currently completing his master’s degree in military art and science from CGSC.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>THESIS APPROVAL PAGE</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREFACE</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACRONYMS</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION TO HUMAN INTELLIGENCE AND PEACE OPERATIONS</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Intelligence</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Operations</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary HUMINT collectors</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limitations</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delimitations</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assumptions</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctrine</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Documents</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Papers</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Books</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Methodology</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 3. THE DOCTRINAL ORGANIZATIONS IN DIVISIONS AND JOINT TASK FORCES</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 4. US OPERATIONS IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 5. BRITISH OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN IRELAND</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX A. NORTHERN IRELAND COMMITTEES</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX B. LIST OF INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLOSSARY</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REFERENCE LIST</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERTIFICATION FOR MMAS DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AADC</th>
<th>Area Air Defense Commander</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACE</td>
<td>Analysis and Control Element</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACT</td>
<td>Analytical Control Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>Area of Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOI</td>
<td>Area of Interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AS</td>
<td>Area Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASUs</td>
<td>Active Service Units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPSEs</td>
<td>Brigade Psychological Support Elements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Civil Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHOPS</td>
<td>CI/HUMINT operations section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CICA</td>
<td>Counterintelligence Coordinating Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CID</td>
<td>Criminal Investigation Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMO</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>COAs</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>COP</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSS</td>
<td>Combat Service Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Divisional Area Committees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>Defense HUMINT Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPSE</td>
<td>Division Psychological Support Element</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM</td>
<td>Field Manual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPTs</td>
<td>Force Protection Teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOC NI</td>
<td>General Officer Commanding Northern Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HARC</td>
<td>HUMINT Analysis and Requirements Cell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAT</td>
<td>HUMINT Analysis Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Host Nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUMINT</td>
<td>Human Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUMINT</td>
<td>Coordinating Authority (HCA),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I/R</td>
<td>Internment and Resettlement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFOR</td>
<td>Implementations Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Imagery intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Intelligence-Surveillance-Reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Joint Commissioned Observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>Joint Task Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L&amp;O</td>
<td>Law and Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASINT</td>
<td>Measurement and Signature Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDMP</td>
<td>Military Decision-Making Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MI</td>
<td>Military intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMS</td>
<td>Maneuver and Mobility Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MND (N)</td>
<td>Multi-National Division, North</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Military Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSC</td>
<td>Major Subordinate Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTW</td>
<td>Major Theater of War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NI</td>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCEs</td>
<td>Operational Control Elements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMT</td>
<td>Operational Management Teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OOTW</td>
<td>Operations Other Than War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPCON</td>
<td>Operational control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPORD</td>
<td>Operation order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSI</td>
<td>Office of Special Investigation, Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIO</td>
<td>Police Intelligence Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIRs</td>
<td>Primary Intelligence Requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PO</td>
<td>Peace Operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSYOPs</td>
<td>Psychological Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;S</td>
<td>Reconnaissance and Surveillance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Regional Area Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RFI</td>
<td>Requests For Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUC</td>
<td>Royal Ulster Constabulary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S2</td>
<td>Intelligence officer, Battalion or Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAS</td>
<td>Special Air Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFOR</td>
<td>Stabilization Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGINT</td>
<td>Signals intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCG</td>
<td>Tasking and Coordination Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFCICA</td>
<td>Task Force Counterintelligence Coordinating Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFE</td>
<td>Task Force Eagle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPT's</td>
<td>Tactical PSYOP Teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDR</td>
<td>Ulster Defense Regiment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION TO HUMAN INTELLIGENCE
AND PEACE OPERATIONS

This thesis is focused on the human intelligence (HUMINT) discipline of military intelligence (MI) and its ability to support the commander in peace operations (POs) by maximizing the HUMINT collection capability in the task forces. In military operations every soldier is a HUMINT collector. But modern operations fail to incorporate these collectors. The G2X concept is new in Army doctrine. It fist appeared in FM 2, Intelligence (DRAG) in 2003. The G2X position was a step forward in the coordination and de-confliction of redundant intelligence HUMINT collectors and counterintelligence (CI) collectors. But the new doctrine and current PO, the G2X position fails to incorporate all HUMINT collectors under the G2X. Additionally HUMINT and CI are divided under the G2X position and the G2X’s de-confliction authority lacks the authority to de-conflict the counterintelligence database with the HUMINT database. The new doctrine also fails to incorporate other nonintelligence HUMINT collectors involved in POs. Current doctrine calls on the many “secondary” HUMINT collectors to collect information or intelligence as part of their mission. These secondary collectors, such as the Military Police, Psychological Operations, Civil Affairs, Line Units, and collectors from a higher headquarters, like the joint commissioned observers in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), conduct liaison with international and local police forces, host-government official and nongovernment organizations and local leaders. These are the very same individuals that the primary HUMINT collectors meet with. But the secondary HUMINT collectors do not fall under the G2X ability to de-conflict their activities with each other and the
“primary” HUMINT collectors. This lack or coordination leads to redundant coverage of sources and circular reporting. If the efforts of the secondary collectors could augment the primary HUMINT efforts, the reduction in efforts would reduce circular reporting and redundancy. The eliminated redundancy would free primary HUMINT collectors to concentrate on sources that require street craft and resources not available to secondary collectors. This thesis will attempt to answer the question, How can the US Army improve Human Intelligence in Peace Operations?

Background

The US Army has played a crucial role in the increasing amount of POs around the world. As with all military operations, intelligence is key to mission accomplishment. Military intelligence has many disciplines. The major Army intelligence disciplines are Signals intelligence (SIGINT), Imagery intelligence (IMINT), Measurement and Signature intelligence (MASINT), Technical intelligence (TECHINT), Counterintelligence (CI), and HUMINT. These all play key roles in providing intelligence on the battlefield. Varying degrees of these disciplines are utilized in POs. Usually, due to the lack of technology or surviving infrastructure and the diversity of belligerents in the area of operations (AOs), some disciplines cannot provide the same level of intelligence as they would in a major theater of war (MTW). Because of this, HUMINT, which only needs the human element present to produce intelligence, plays a larger role in POs. The US Army has been involved in a number of POs to include Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and East Timor. Although these operating environments were similar, the forces used a different structure for its HUMINT and received different degrees of effectiveness. The correct structure is essential to
HUMINT’s effectiveness. In some cases the structure did lend itself to incorporating all
the primary HUMINT assets, but few, if any successfully incorporated secondary
HUMINT collectors, those of the civil military operations (CMO), psychological
operations (PSYOPs), Military Police, or the combat commanders. All of these secondary
HUMINT collectors are conducting liaison or similar HUMINT tasks. To understand the
challenges posed, a clear understanding of HUMINT and POs is needed.

Human Intelligence

With the growing commitment to POs, the Army has looked at new ways to
leverage its intelligence disciplines. Of all the intelligence disciplines, the Army
recognizes HUMINT as playing the major role in PO. Field Manual (FM) 34-1 states,
“HUMINT is the most important discipline in many Operations Other Than War
(OOTW) activities for collecting information and understanding the Area of Operation
(AO).” In supporting the commander with counterintelligence support and answering
priority intelligence requirements, HUMINT is critical. FM 34-7 goes on to say, “In
combating terrorism, HUMINT is the first line of defense,” and “HUMINT is potentially
the most important and productive intelligence discipline in support to Peacetime
Contingency Operations.” FM 100-7 recognizes US doctrine in that, “Most activities in
MOOTW are HUMINT intensive.”

But what actually is HUMINT? It is not always clear. There are several factors
that lead to the confusing definition of HUMINT. First, is the fact that HUMINT is both a
discipline and a source. JCS Pub 1-02 defines it as, “A category of intelligence derived
from information collected and provided by human sources.” The US Army looks at
HUMINT slightly differently. Its discipline of HUMINT consists of the
Counterintelligence function, that is identification of, and capture of human informants and spies and of interrogators of enemy prisoners of war (EPW). Its Military Occupation Specialty (MOS) web page 1-1.b defines HUMINT as,

The collection of foreign information by a trained HUMINT Collector from people and multimedia to identify elements, intentions, composition, strength, dispositions, tactics, equipment, personnel and capabilities. It uses human sources as a tool, and a variety of collection methods, both passively and actively, to gather information to satisfy the commander's intelligence requirements and cross cue other intelligence disciplines.

This definition delineates between an untrained MOS that conducts HUMINT tasks and those MOSs that are specifically trained to conduct them. Both counterintelligence agents and interrogators deal directly with human-to-human contact to gain intelligence. But, HUMINT is also a source of information. Any information that is gained from a human or that uses a human as a source of the information is HUMINT. An example is a counterintelligence agent meeting with a trusted, returning source, continually judging the validity of the information and that of the source. On the other end of the spectrum is the scout sitting in an observation post that radios in enemy movement on a road. Both are considered HUMINT, but with little in common.

Another issue that confuses HUMINT is its placement in the AO may not reflect the echelon it supports. A strategic level HUMINT asset can work along side a tactical element but only gather intelligence of strategic value. The easiest way to determine the level at which HUMINT is operating is to look at the echelon whose primary intelligence requirements (PIRs) it is attempting to answer. FM 34-1 states, “The levels of intelligence are not tied to specific echelons but rather to the intended outcome to the operation which they support” (1994, 2-1). A tactical HUMINT source will often gain information of strategic value and subsequently, a strategic source may have information
with tactical significance. This crossover between HUMINT assets and the source’s information often leads to additional confusion and frustration of commanders. An issue that arises when the intelligence collected by a higher echelon HUMINT collector is not shared with the commander that is responsible for that AO, but stove-piped to a higher headquarters.

This thesis will adapt one definition of HUMINT to establish a common understanding. HUMINT as a discipline, humans collecting information for the purposes of generating intelligence from humans, either by a primary HUMINT asset as Military Intelligence HUMINT or a secondary HUMINT asset as combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units, specifically Civil Affairs (CA), PSYOPs, MPs, or combat commanders. Secondary HUMINT assets produce intelligence as a by-product of their primary mission.

Peace Operations

The end of the cold war brought about increasing regional instability. This instability takes on many forms that may exist individually or consecutively. FM 100-20 identifies the categories of regional instability as cross-border aggression, internal conflict, transnational threats, proliferation of dangerous military technologies, and humanitarian disasters. These factors have led to an increased involvement from the international community and its militaries. The US president issued Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25 and the Department of Defense issued Joint Pub 3-07.3 to guide US involvement in POs. The object of PO is to establish and maintain an environment of peace. This type of operation requires the use of military force because the military is self-sustaining, has the ability to protect itself, and can impose its will on belligerents by
use of force or the treat of force. POs are composed of three types of activities: support to
diplomacy (peacemaking, peace building, and preventive diplomacy), peacekeeping, and
peace enforcement. Although there is nothing new about performing POs, the US Army
has seen an increase in the number, rate, pace, and intricacy of operations. The main
challenge of the intricacy of a PO is the political social environment, the relationship of
the PO forces and belligerents. There may be an uncertain and fluid relationship between
each of the belligerents, and the relationship between the belligerents and the PO force.
The belligerents may not be identified or loosely organized. The controlling powers
involved in the conflict may not be a stable government. It could take the form of
multiple governments, a shadow government, armed faction, or a criminal element. The
extreme may be lack of any government or dominate controlling faction.

The first type of activity in PO, support to diplomacy, consists of peacemaking,
peace building and preventive diplomacy. Support to diplomacy is conducted to prevent a
conflict and is often conducted in conjunction with political diplomacy. Peacemaking
involves engagement of the potential belligerent in peaceful military to military activities.
It may include security assistance operations, exercises, and peacetime deployments to
enhance US relations and demonstrate US resolve. Peace building comprises postconflict
activities that rebuild a country’s institutions and infrastructures to prevent a return to
hostilities. Peace building might include the restoration or establishment of a legitimate
government, building of schools, medical facilities, law enforcement facilities, and
housing. Preventive diplomacy is an action to limit or prevent an act of aggression. It is a
deterrent. It may include an increase of readiness or a deployment as a show of force.
The second type of PO activity is the most well-known peacekeeping. This activity is conducted with the consent of all belligerents. It consists of observation and monitoring of truces, cease-fires, and supervision of truces. It is an effort to stabilize the region to facilitate diplomatic efforts to reach long-term political settlements.

The third type of PO activity is peace enforcement. An international authority directs this activity. It is conducted with force or the threat of force to enforce resolutions and sanctions, and it establishes and maintains a stable environment to facilitate a long-term political settlement. Peace enforcement may include the forceful separations of belligerents.

In all PO there exists the possible escalation of hostilities that may be directed toward PO forces that will breakdown or delay the peace process. It is critical in PO to identify and detect indications and warnings leading to an escalation of hostilities. HUMINT plays a significant role in collecting and reporting on indications and warnings.

Secondary HUMINT collectors.

Although military intelligence has the primary mission of conducting HUMINT operations, there are other assets that conduct similar HUMINT tasks. Liaison is a good example of this. It is a common task that primary HUMINT collectors perform. But, many secondary collectors conduct liaison in the conduct of their mission. This brings secondary HUMINT collectors in contact with key personalities and gain valuable information that can be incorporated into the HUMIT system. Civil Affairs (CA), Military Police (MP), Psychological Operations, and Combat Commanders are four types of units that fit this role. They have a mission that brings them into contact with individuals that are important or significant information. Populace and resources control...
(PRC) missions are another examples. Examples of individuals that they come into contact with are mayors who have access to important information due to their position, the media who themselves seek important information like demonstrations or labor strikes or the local police that might be investigating groups that pose a threat to US forces. Often times these are the same individuals the primary HUMINT collectors are meeting or would like to meet. It is logical then to incorporate other functions into the HUMINT system to de-conflict sources, reduce redundancy of effort, and take advantage of positive relations that are built by the secondary HUMINT collectors. It is important to note as each secondary HUMINT asset is examined that some have a secondary mission to collect intelligence. Other do not have a the mission to actively collect, but critical information and intelligence is a by-product of there normal activities, that is to say they are passive collectors.

The primary responsibility of CA is conducting civil military operations (CMO) for the commander. These operations include foreign national support, populace and resource control, humanitarian assistance, military civic action, emergency services and support to civil administration. FM 41-10, *Civil Affairs Operations*, defines CMO.

Civil-military operations are the activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, government and nongovernment civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations in order to facilitate military operations and consolidate and achieve US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur before, during, or after other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated Civil Affairs forces, by other military forces, or by a combination of Civil Affairs forces and other forces.

FM 41-10, 1-6 gives an example of a CMO in Haiti.
Operation UPHOLD AND MAINTAIN DEMOCRACY in Haiti included humanitarian relief, public safety, and election assistance. When the legally elected government was reestablished, Ministerial Advisory Teams (MATs) deployed to Haiti to advise and assist various ministries (Health, Justice, and Public Works) in establishing functional programs. CA planners also assisted in coordinating more than $1 billion in funding for public works projects from private sources. Democratic elections were successfully held for the first time following years of military rule.

These types of operations not only put CA soldiers in direct contact with public figures, but also establish a positive relationship by the nature of the activities. This positive relationship lends itself to CA secondary mission of HUMINT. The majority of CA contact with the populace is with liaison and PRC, where they screen and provide services to thousands of individuals. FM 41-10, 1-23 states, CA operations support security by providing a conduit for information of intelligence value from the local populace and government human intelligence (HUMINT). Screening local populace groups, separating potential terrorists or enemy special operations forces (SOF) from the civilian populace and larger groups, such as Displaced Civilians (DCs). Identifying potential cultural, religious, ethnic, racial, political, or economic attitudes that could jeopardize the military mission.

During POs, the Joint Task Forces (JTFs) are normally task organized with a CA unit, a brigade, or battalion depending on the JTF size. Within the CA unit is an intelligence officer, the S2. At the brigade level, one of the S2’s primary capabilities is to “provide information to the intelligence system” (FM 41-10, 3-36). This task is not stated at the battalion level, but implied. Again FM 41-10 defines the S2’s responsibilities. “The intelligence officer (S2) is the principal staff officer for all aspects of intelligence, counterintelligence, and security support in garrison. He plans, coordinates, approves, and directs all battalion-level intelligence analysis, production, and dissemination. He identifies the need for, and assists in the planning and coordination of intelligence support.” Although the S2 does not have tasking authority, and can not de-conflict, the S2
is the commander’s intelligence representative and must work closely with the battalion operations officer. As the intelligence officer, the S2 is the link between the unit, the division intelligence officer (G2) and the HUMINT system.

PSYOPs works closely with CA because of the similarity of information both need to conduct their missions. PSYOPs units have the mission to “convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals” (JP 1-02, 2001, 350). To accomplish this, PSYOPS conducts a large amount of intelligence collection on the target population. To task both CA and PSYOPS to “collect information is doctrinally supported and a sound employment of assets.” (B/H CAAT 2, 1996, p 77) PSYOPs units conduct Foreign National Support, Populace and Resource Control, Humanitarian Assistance, Military Civic Action, Emergency Services and Support to Civil Administration missions. Not only do these types of missions grant the PSYOPs units good access to the populations and their leadership but do so in a manner that fosters a close relationship. This close relationship further allows the PSYOP units to collect additional information to help the host country.

Military Police (MP) conduct similar functions as CA in CMO making them a key secondary HUMINT collector. The functions of the MP are maneuver and mobility support (MMS), area security (AS), police intelligence operations (PIO), law and order (L&O), and internment and resettlement (I/R). The MMS function is essentially the activities MP take to keep road or routes open and clear. It might involve traffic control points, patrols, or moving displaced civilians (DCs) to keep a road clear. The AS function protects a force and provides freedom of movement, as a patrol that will identify, delay,
or engage belligerents or crowds of civilians. The PIO function is the analysis and dissemination of intelligence gained during the other MP functions. The L&O function is the enforcement of laws, directives, and punitive regulations. And during the course of a patrol or in conducting a multinational investigation, MPs have the potential to collect criminal or threat intelligence. The I/R function is the movement and confinement of EPWs, detainees, and civilian internees (CI), this might also include measurements taken to control the local population or resources such as; curfews, movement restrictions, resettling dislocated civilians, licensing, ration control, regulation enforcement, amnesty programs, inspecting facilities, and guarding humanitarian-assistance distributions.

MPs collect information during all these functions either by direct observation, proximity of local nationals or through liaison with other police or security forces. FM 3-19.1 recognizes this and identifies the necessity to infuse the information into intelligence channels.

During the performance of MMS, AS, I/R, and L&O functions, the MP develops and exchanges information with other organizations in the AO. The MP obtains information through contact with civilians, NGOs, IHOs, local and HN police, multinational police, and other security forces. If the MP receive, observe, or encounter information (police, criminal, or combat) while performing these functions, they will immediately submit a report to relay information up the chain of command. (2001, 4-72)

An example of how the MP can collect intelligence came from Operation Uphold Democracy and is given in FM 3-19.1.

During Operation Uphold Democracy, and MP team was conducting a Traffic Control Point as part of a cordon and search operation in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. While performing the task, two civilians approached the MP team informing them of criminal activity in the neighborhood. During the interview, the MP team prepared a sketch of a house and surrounding areas. The team also obtained information describing the criminals and their weapons. Recognizing that the criminal activity was in fact the actions of a political/mercenary group named FRAP, the MP team radioed the platoon leader and forwarded the field
Two days later, a unit from the 10th Mountain Division raided the house, capturing weapons, ammunition and equipment. (2001, 4-68.)

MP units are organized like the majority of military units. An intelligence officer, the S2, is on the staff. The S2’s primary function is to facilitate the collection and flow of intelligence from their unit to a higher headquarters and down from the higher headquarters’ S2 or G2 to their commander and unit. MPs are recognized as a collector more than any other non-Intelligence-Surveillance-Reconnaissance (ISR) unit. However, as secondary HUMINT collectors, they are not incorporated into the HUMIT system.

The last secondary HUMINT collectors to be addressed are the PO forces themselves, specifically the commanders. In efforts to support CMO or Public Affairs, brigade, battalion, and company commander conduct liaison with civil authorities and security forces. Often commanders have primary HUMINT collectors in their units that will conduct debriefings and sensitize them to intelligence requirements. Because some commanders are not directly linked into the HUMINT system, the intelligence inadvertently gather may not make it into intelligence channel. Additionally, they do not receive critical information on situations that affect or directly deal with their liaison counterparts.

**Purpose**

The purpose of this thesis is to answer the question: How can the US Army improve HUMINT in POs? To effectively and efficiently maximize the use of HUMINT to increase the intelligence capability of a division and lesson the operational tempo of HUMINT service members.
Scope

The scope of this thesis will be the tactical HUMINT during POs, primarily the military intelligence structure and how it might incorporate or cooperate with secondary HUMINT collectors as civil affair in civil military operation, psychological operations units, military police and the combat arms units conducting PO. This thesis will also consider the structures of multinational units and sister services, as the Allied Military Intelligence Battalion, Office of Security Investigation, or the Naval Criminal Investigation Service and the role they play in the tactical HUMINT structure.

Limitations

The topic of HUMINT crosses the spectrum of classification. This thesis will address issues and solutions found only in unclassified sources. Although there is an abundance of unclassified material on US Army Peace Operation, sources on foreign Peace Operations are limited, consisting of secondary sources and interviews of individuals who anonymously provided information.

Delimitations

The topic of HUMINT intelligence crosses every echelon and discipline. This thesis will concentrate at the echelons of division and below. It will address strictly US Army operations and suggestions regarding those operations and will not discuss collectors that are not in support of divisions. Many of the solutions enter the area of automation and cost associated with them. This thesis will not address them. Manpower is another issue that will not be discussed. This thesis will not address the new Army
HUMIN Military Occupation Specialties and the blending of counterintelligence and HUMINT.

**Assumptions**

The major assumption for this thesis is that the structure of tactical HUMINT plays a role in its effectiveness. Another assumption is that HUMINT will continue to be the major intelligence discipline and important in POs.

**Importance**

With the war on terrorism and with the current environment and the possibility for simultaneously conducting four major peace operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, it is more important than ever that the US Army is able to maximize full control over HUMINT operations. Today, HUMINT has become more important than ever. Army HUMINT must evolve as the Army evolves. As PO forces are reduced in size and capability, the ability to see and predict actions in the environment become more important. Commanders of a reduced force in PO need a better picture of the environment and more time to react. The commanders need the ability to be proactive to shape the environment. This research will show some disparities from what commanders want in the way of HUMINT support and what the Army is currently giving them. Commanders will be better served if the intelligence from all HUMINT sources are collected, processed, produced, and disseminated. This thesis will show the imperative linkage with all HUMINT assets and how the HUMINT structure supports or fails to support it. The Army must quickly move to fix deficiencies and capitalize on successes.
At the end of this research, The Author will recommend changes to the HUMINT structure that will better support commanders.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY

There is a multitude of literature that had an impact on this thesis research. These include; books, periodicals, operational documents (operation orders, after-action reviews), doctrinal publication, field manuals (FMs), and research papers from other educational institutions (School for Advanced Military Studies monographs, other Master of Military Art and Science theses, and War College papers). Some identified problems and others suggested solutions. The literature ran the spectrum of HUMINT, PO, MP operations, CA operations, and intelligence. This thesis research used doctrine to determine the doctrinal definition and use of HUMINT, then after-action reviews and operation orders and books written on the operations to determine how the US Army is currently conducting operations and how other armies conduct HUMINT operations in PO. Finally the author used books and interviews in an attempt to discover what HUMINT should be doing. Research was not limited to US sources. Allied POs have additional lessons learned and similar research material.

Doctrine

The research relied on a number of doctrinal publications to define terminology and identify current doctrine for tactical HUMINT. FM 34-7, *Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Support to Low-Intensity Conflict Operations* and FM 3-07 (100-20), *Stability Operations And Support Operations*, give the general doctrine for using HUMINT in an environment short of a major theater war. They identify types of missions HUMINT should conduct, as well as, placing HUMINT into the intelligence cycle. FM 100-5,
Operations, and FM 3-0 provide an overview of operations in a PO environment. FM 100-23, Peace Operations, provides a summary of all the operations other than war, from support to diplomacy to peace enforcement, and the intelligence requirements for each. Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, provides the joint perspective of PO and further defines PO missions from FM 100-23. FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations, and FM 2-0 (DRAG) explain how HUMINT supports the spectrum of military operation. FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogations, and FM 34-60, Counterintelligence, lay out the missions for each discipline of Army HUMINT and how they function at each level, tactical to strategic, and how they support POs.

Operational Documents

After-action reports from the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) has a plethora of after-action reviews (AARs). The AARs ranged from tactical Military Intelligence, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, and Military Police units returning from BiH and other POs, to observer-controller observations from the National Training Centers. They were very focused and detailed with observations and tactics, techniques, and Procedures that work in real world environments. These were incredibly valuable in determining trends and patterns of success and failure for the HUMINT soldiers in the environment of POs. Several good resources can be accessed on-line. Lessons From Bosnia: The IFOR Experience discusses intelligence operations and the HUMINT architecture, discussing new and non-doctrinal uses and structures for the HUMINT assets in a PO environment. Jennings and Gaddis’ Intelligence Support to Law Enforcement in Peacekeeping Operations coins the term CRIMINT for law enforcement’s relationship
with intelligence in PO. Several articles from Stars and Stripes to the Task Force Eagle newspaper the Talon describe the mission and effectiveness of different units.

Educational Papers

In the area of educational papers, several papers had relevance to the research. Among them were Master of Military Art and Science theses, several School of Advanced Military Studies monographs and a research project from the Army War College. They all address HUMINT in one regard or another.


Books

Michael Dewar’s British in Northern Ireland gave very good detail on day-to-day operations and the intelligence staff. Franks Kitson’s Low Intensity Operations gives a British perspective and outlines the committee system. Desmond Hamill’s book, Pig in the Middle, gives an accounting of the British failures in Northern Ireland. Mark Urban’s
*Big Boy’s Rules* explains the relationship and missions of the clandestine units operating in Northern Ireland and the formation of the Tasking and Coordination Groups. These books cover the strategic to the tactical level over several operations.

**Research Methodology**

The author used a holistic comparative method in a four-step process to answer the thesis question. The first step composed of research into doctrine to determine how the Army defines HUMINT, PO, and the roles and mission of secondary collectors. The author then compared this to the doctrinal example of BiH and how the Army employs the HUMINT system at the divisional level and how it interfaces with secondary HUMINT collectors. Thirdly, the author then analyzed the operations of the British in Northern Ireland, attempting to identify improvements to the deficiencies identified in US operations. In the last step the author concluded the thesis by taking US deficiencies and incorporating the successes of the British in Northern Ireland and made recommendations that the Army could implement to improve its HUMINT operations.
CHAPTER 3
THE DOCTRINAL ORGANIZATIONS IN DIVISIONS
AND JOINT TASK FORCES

When a division deploys, it is a Joint Task Force (JTF) or a subordinate division of a JTF depending on the size of the operation. Regardless of how it deploys, it does so with its staff and is augmented as needed. Whether a JTF or a division, its core organization is the same, for the purpose of discussion the term of division is synonymous with like equivalent size JTF.

A division’s staff comprises of several sections. The primary staff sections are the G1, Personnel; G2, Intelligence; G3, Operations; G4, Logistics; G5, Civil Military Operations; and G6, Signal. The G3 has tasking authority of all assets subordinate to the division, while concurrently the G2 has the primary responsibility for de-confliction and control of HUMINT. The G2 can be a large and complex staff section unto itself.

The G2 comprises of several subcomponents; the G2, the senior intelligence officer and the G2 administration section, Operations, Plans, Staff Weather Office (SWO), and Terrain sections, and the Analysis and Control Element (ACE). Each of these sections plays a role in supporting the division with intelligence.

The Operations section of the G2 is responsible for the current enemy situation, development, and presentation in support of the division’s current operation. It focuses on the enemy, civilian activity, and environment within the unit’s area of interest (AOI) that affects the current operation. It also assists the G2 in tracking enemy course of actions (COAs) and alerting the commander to changes in predicted enemy COAs, capabilities, or intentions. The operations section has the responsibility to manage intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations within the unit’s AOI and maintain the intelligence portion of the unit’s common operational picture (COP) (FM 2.0 2003, 5-2). The Operations section communicates directly with subordinate or major subordinate command’s (MSC) intelligence officers (S2s).

The G2 Plans Section is responsible for developing the enemy COA for future operations, working with the G3 planner and other staff elements to plan for future operations using the military decision-making process (MDMP). The G2 Plans Section uses, revises, and often helps construct the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) products to analyze and predict future enemy and environmental conditions within the unit’s AOI. G2 Plans writes the intelligence estimate and the intelligence portions of the unit operation order (OPORD). It also refines and updates the IPB products throughout the planning, preparation, and execution of the unit’s operations (FM 2.0 2003, 5-3).

The Analysis and Control Element (ACE) is the division’s center of analytical effort. The ACE is part of the MI Battalion and under Operational Control of the G2. The ACE supports the commander in executing battle command and planning future missions across a full spectrum of operations. The mission of the ACE is to perform ISR tasking and reporting, production of all-source intelligence, providing operations technical control of intelligence assets, and disseminating intelligence and targeting data. All intelligence flows though the ACE (FM 2.0 2003, 6-4).

The new doctrine of FM 2.0 includes the G2X. The G2X is the primary advisor to the G2 and division commander on HUMINT and counterintelligence (CI) activities. The G2X is the coordination authority for all HUMINT and CI activities within the
organization’s AO and provides technical control of all HUMINT and CI assets. The G2X is responsible for coordinating its two subordinate sections, the Counterintelligence Coordinating Authority (CICA) and the HUMINT Operations Cell (HOC) for all HUMINT and CI activities to support intelligence collection. The G2X manages reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) mission tasking for HUMINT and CI. Although the G2X does not exercise operational control over the HUMINT and CI assets, it is empowered by the commander to supervise a cohesive HUMINT and CI effort. The G2X is also the release authority for CI/HUMINT reporting (FM 2.0 2003, 5-4).

The HOC follows all HUMINT activities in the AOR. The G2X uses this information to advise the G2 on all HUMINT activities conducted within the AO. The HOC exercises technical control of all HUMINT assets, coordinates and de-conflicts HUMINT activities in the deployed AO, and maintains a HUMINT source database. The HOC is responsible for coordination, supervision, and intelligence oversight of HUMINT force protection source operations conducted by all services and components in the AO. The HOC also performs liaison with host nation (HN), partners of a multinational JTF, and US national HUMINT organizations. The HOC makes recommendations to the G2X and G2 for release of intelligence to partner nations and HN (FM 2.0 2003, 5-4).

The CICA does the same for the counterintelligence assets as the HOC does for the HUMINT assets. The CICA will have the authority to coordinate the activities of all CI agencies involved in an operation to include sister services and all partner nations. The CICA’s staff will include CI professionals from every major CI element represented on the battlefield since each CI element is constrained by its own regulations and policies. This ensures that all CI activities are adequately coordinated and de-conflicted and all
sources are properly registered. The CICA establishes and maintains a CI source database in direct coordination with the HOC and the HUMINT database. The CICA also coordinates with the HUMINT and CI operations sections located at the MI battalion, component J/G2X elements, and other service CI agencies. The CICA develops and manages collection requirements for CI in coordination with the requirements manager and HOC. It performs liaisons with the HN, partnership nations, and US national-level CI organizations. Like the HOC, the CICA makes recommendations to the G2X and G2 for release of intelligence to partner nations and the HN (FM 2.0 2003, 12-8).

Within the ACE is the HUMINT Analysis Team (HAT). The HAT is the “fusion point” for all-HUMINT reporting and operational analysis in the ACE. It determines gaps in reporting and coordinates with the collection manager to cross-cue other intelligence sensor systems. As the HUMINT analytical cell in the ACE, the HAT produces and disseminates HUMINT products and provides input to intelligence summaries, it also analyses HUMINT reporting for trends and patterns. The HAT has responsibility to determine source reliability and credibility as reflected in reporting and reports its analysis back to the collectors. The HAT will also maintain databases specific to HUMINT collection activities that directly support the collection efforts of HUMINT teams and are directly accessible by HUMINT teams. This database does not include source information found in the CICA and HOC source databases. Additionally, the HAT provides collection requirements input to the HOC and answers HUMINT-related requests for information (RFI) (FM 2.0 2003, 7-9, 7-41).

During a deployment, all the organizations that run sources, the Division (Under the G2X), the Military Intelligence Battalion or Special Forces have the ability to
establish a CI/HUMINT operation section (CHOPS). The CHOPS acts as an interface between the Operational Management Teams, the MI Group/Battalion, and the G2X. The CI/HUMINT has Operational Control over General Support teams and Technical Control over Direct Support teams within the AOR. The CI/HUMINT Operations section is responsible for tracking teams, managing collected intelligence and tasking.

The Operational Management Teams (OMTs) are established at the supported maneuver units, or in the GS MI Company for GS teams, to manage two or more HUMINT teams. The OMT provides vital technical control to deployed HUMINT teams. The OMT is the interface between CHOPS and the HUMINT teams. The OMT provides the collection focus for HUMINT teams as well as providing quality control and dissemination of reports of subordinate HUMINT teams. It conducts single-discipline HUMINT analysis, CI analysis, and mission analysis for the supported commander and the S2 (FM 2.0 2003, 7-9).

A standard CI/HUMINT team consist of two to four CI or HUMINT soldiers that are augmented as necessary. Primary augmentation is military and or civilian linguists (with appropriate security clearances) and security, as MPs or infantry soldiers. A team will usually incorporate one CI soldier in case a Counterintelligence matter occurs. When a Counterintelligence issue surfaces, the CHOPS will establish a team of exclusively CI soldiers to conduct an investigation or operation.

As discussed in chapter 1, the subordinate battalions of the division have a staff that is organized very similar to the division staff. The S3 Operations officer and the S2 Intelligence officer play the primary role in operations. The S2, being the commander’s representative for intelligence, has the responsibly to see that all intelligence the unit
selects is analyzed and disseminated to subordinates, lateral units and higher headquarters. Because the Division collection manager resides in the ACE under the G2, the S2 often has better visibility on the Division’s PIR and collection requirements tasked to the subordinate units. But it is the S3’s responsibility to ensure the division’s requirements are tasked to subordinate units for collection.

Analyzing the current doctrine, several issues arise. First of is the separation between the HOC and the CICA and their databases under the G2X. Second is the lack of creating any delineation of sources between collectors. The third issue is the Collection Manager’s, the G2, and the G2X’s lack of visibility on the activities of the secondary collection units. These issues in the US Army doctrine create several coordination problems when implemented in operations.

The G2X has the responsibility to de-conflict between the HUMINT and Counterintelligence collectors. Although they have different missions and focus, there is often overlap when counterintelligence collectors collect force protection information. Having two separate databases multiplies any confusion between the collectors. In addition, the doctrine dictates separate database management. This leaves all the de-confliction to the G2X, who during an operation will not have the time to manage two separate databases.

The second issue in US doctrine is lack of delineation of sources. Although not a large problem into itself, it exasperates the problems that lack of coordination and de-confliction create between primary and secondary collectors.

Lastly, the G2X’s lack of visibility on secondary collectors and the lack of doctrine to tie them or their sources into the G2X causes a large amount of redundancy of
sources and circular reporting. The following is an example of a common problem when Primary and secondary HUMINT collectors are not de-conflicted. It is a generalization and not all inclusive of all the factors involved in the intelligence cycle.

Based on the primary intelligence requirements, the division collection manager develops intelligence requirements that the G3 will task to the division’s subordinate assets. The requirements are than tasked to the G2X, the Civil Affairs unit, the Military Police unit, the Psychological Operations unit, and the Infantry Battalion responsible for the area. The G2X then tasks a HUMINT team. The taskings are the same for each of the subordinates. The collections manager will task some assets with more requirements if that asset has the ability and history of reporting that type of information. But the collections manager will not always task all of the assets in order to prevent an over usage of a unit. All the subordinate units conduct liaison with the mayor of Greentown in support of their missions and decide that he has that information.

On Monday the HUMINT team meets with the town mayor and gathers their information. On Tuesday, the CA team meets with him and collects the same information. On Wednesday, it is the MP team and Thursday the Infantry Company Commander. On Friday, all the teams are lined up outside the mayor’s office to verify the information for another requirement. This information goes to division and confirms itself because only the HUMINT team has registered the mayor as a source. The other reports do not have source information and appear to becoming from different people. The G2X has no visibility where the other teams received their information. The G2 now has several reports from what appears to be several sources. The information is now confirmed. This example although simplified happens often in US Army POs. It could be
avoided if the doctrine were more developed on several points. These trends can be seen
to repeat when analysis is conducted of US operations in BiH.
CHAPTER 4

US OPERATIONS IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

As discussed in the last chapter the US Army has new doctrine for POs. Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) is an example of the implementation of that doctrine. Although the US Army has had many successes and has developed new doctrine from its BiH experience, this chapter will focus on five areas of its HUMINT structure and methods. Again, primary collectors are defined as servicemen with HUMINT collection MOS as 97E and 97Bs and secondary collectors as servicemen who conduct liaison missions and have a secondary mission of collecting intelligence, like Civil Affairs, Military Police, PSYOPS and Line Units. The first issue in this chapter regards the G2X’s redundant HUMINT databases. Second, is the fact that the G2X’s lacks visibility on secondary HUMINT collectors operations and sources and is unable to de-conflict these with primary collectors. Third, the lack of HUMINT coordination below the Task Force (Division), at brigade and battalion levels. Forth, the lack of any delineation in types of sources from primary and secondary HUMINT collectors, company commanders meeting with all the mayors for example, and lastly the lack of focus secondary HUMINT collectors place on collection, production, and dissemination of HUMINT intelligence.

Before discussing these issues, this chapter will first cover a brief history of Implementation Force (IFOR) and the Stabilization Force (SFOR), then discuss the organizations involved and the issues, and finish with some conclusions. Since IFOR and SFOR are similar in their mission, structure and lessons learned in regards to HUMINT, the issues in this chapter pertain to both.
On 14 December 1995, the Bosnia, Serbs, and Croat factions ended four years of warfare by signing the General Framework Agreement for Peace, known as the Dayton Accord. The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1031 mandated NATO to deploy an Implementations Force (IFOR) to BiH to ensure compliance of the military provisions, establishment and enforcement of a zone of separation (ZOS) and the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL), control the airspace, assist international organizations in their humanitarian missions, observe and prevent interference with the movement of civilian populations, prevent acts of violence, and monitor the clearing of obstacles to include minefields (Siegel 1997).

NATO forces of IFOR entered BiH on 16 December expecting to remain for one year as Operation Joint Endeavor. A year later on 12 December 1996, NATO extended the mission for an additional 18 months and it became Operations Joint Guard. The new troops of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) replaced those of IFOR. NATO later extended SFOR indefinitely and renamed the operations Joint Forge. As part of IFOR and SFOR the US Army established Task Force Eagle (TFE) as the Multi-National Division North in BiH. SFOR has seen significant reductions of forces and force reorganizations. This chapter is meant to cover the history of IFOR and SFOR. For brevity and due to the multitude of changes between SFOR rotations, the TFE organization will remain general. The discussion in this chapter is not effected by the change in organization, command relationships of collectors or number of teams, nor by the relationship between primary and secondary HUMINT collectors.

The IFOR and later SFOR troops were comprised of three multinational divisions under a joint multinational headquarters in Sarajevo, BiH. The United Kingdom’s
division became Multi-National Division (MND) Southwest, known as MND (SW),
France established MND Southeast (SE) and the US division establish Task Force Eagle
in the North as MND (N). TFE is a US Division that is comprised of a Turk Regiment, a
Russian Brigade, a NORDIC Brigade, and a US Brigade. Additionally, TFE’s
headquarters was a multinational organization of over seven countries, some of which are
non-NATO. Established with IFOR, TFE is still operating in BiH today.

TFE has a standard staff in support of Operation Joint Forge, The G2 And G2X
function within that staff as discussed in chapter 3. Subordinate to the G2X are several
positions or cells; the Task Force Counterintelligence Coordinating Authority (TFCICA)
can be a position or a cell of several individuals, a HUMINT Operations Cell (HOC) and
a HUMINT Analysis and Requirements Cell (HARC), referred to as the HAT in chapter
3. The TFCICA is responsible for the CI HUMINT database. The TIFCICA manages the
database and de-conflicts the US Military Intelligence battalion’s FPTs and the teams of
the Allied Military Intelligence Battalion, a multinational battalion. The HOC is a loosely
defined organization that works out of the G2X’s office. The HOC is comprised of
Defense HUMINT Service (DHS) agents, Joint Force Intelligence Teams (FIT), Air
Force Office of Special Investigation (OSI) Agents, and other national organizations. The
DHS representative manages the HOC HUMINT database. Both the HOC and the CI
FPTs conduct source operation to collect intelligence and force protection information.
Since both the CI FPT, a primary HUMINT collector, and HOC HUMINT collectors may
be targeting the same information the chance of source overlap can be significant.

The HUMINT Analysis and Requirements Cell (HARC) is the HUMINT
analytical cell from the G2 Analysis Control Element (ACE). The HARC is responsible
for conducting analysis and evaluation of all HUMINT reporting in MND(N). It provides this analysis to the ACE for fusion with the other intelligence methods like signals intelligence and imagery intelligence. The HARC is also responsible for developing the TFE commander’s intelligence requirements into HUMINT collection requirements and developing taskings for the HUMINT collectors. Although the HARC conducts evaluations of information and sources, it does so with source numbers and is not given access to source information other than ethnicity.

Because of the sensitivity of the HOC HUMINT sources, the HOC HUMINT database is kept separate from the CI HUMINT database. Additionally, the TFCICA and G2X may not have access to the HOC HUMINT database that is comprised of both a sister agency’s and national sources because they are US Army. This can hamper the deconfliction of HOC HUMINT and CI teams and sources. Moreover, when a CI source needs to be de-conflicted with a HOC source, the TFCICA must give the name to the HOC for clearance. This method allows the HOC to deny a source to the CI section of the G2X. This is an issue as the FPTs may have a different agenda than the HOC. The G2X is the commander representative on all source and HUMINT operations and is responsible for all sources within MND(N) and should have access to the entire database.

The US Military Intelligence Battalion supports TFE with Force Protection Teams (FPTs). Significantly augmented with up to a CORPS worth of HUMINT soldiers, the MI Battalion deploys as many as 15 FPTs. The battalion has a standard staff of S1, S2, S3 and S4 and four companies; three Direct Support and one General Support. The new doctrine of FM 2-0 was developed during the BiH mission, hence the US Army Military
Intelligence battalion is organized similar to FM 2-0, but with different names that FM 2-0 did not adopt.

For Operation Joint Forge, a HUMINT Operations Section is established with the same responsibilities discussed in chapter three. The HUMINT Operation section conducts coordination and de-confliction with the G2X. The HUMINT Operations section has Technical control over five Operational Control Elements (OCEs) and the OCE’s FPTs. The OCEs perform the same functions as Operational Management Teams (OMTs) from chapter three. There are three direct support OCEs, one under each direct support company at each US Battalion in MND(N). Each Direct Support company and its OCE is linked into the supported battalion’s S2 section by the Analytical Control Team (ACT). The General Support Company’s has the same link with its ACT in the US Brigade. The ACT is the Military Intelligence Company’s analysis cell that collocates with the Battalion S2 section. There are two General support OCEs, the first located with the NORDIC Brigade and a second located at TFE headquarters whose teams support Eagle Base, the immediately surrounding area and the Russian Brigade.

Although the Joint Commissioned Observers (JCOs) left BiH in May of 2000, their contributions to the collection efforts were substantial. Initially, information was sent directly to the JCO’s higher headquarters, later an additional command and control element was established on Eagle Base to assist liaison between the JCO and TFE. The MND (N)’s JCOs were a US Army Special Forces team of 10 men. The JCOs operated in two man teams augmented by a local interpreter. (Anderson, 2001) The JCO differed from any other intelligence collection organization in the Task Force. The JCO did not wear equipment associated with combat, with the exception of Battlefield Dress Uniforms with
only name and US Army tapes. They were meant to be the eyes and ears imbedded in the communities. MAJ. Sater accurately portrays the JCOs method of employment. “The JCOs lived on the economy in the Bosnian Federation and the Republic of Srpska in rented houses, away from the conventional SFOR bases and camps. As a result, team members could move freely through the communities to gather information and facilitate communication” (Sater 2001). The Special Operations Command and Control Element at Eagle Base commanded the JCO teams. The Special Operations Command and Control Element coordinated and provided information to the TFE staff. Intelligence reports were sent to the G2 and operational movements were given to the G3. But, its headquarters was a Forward Operation Base of the Special Operations Command-Europe in Sarajevo, and often reports were sent directly to Sarajevo, by passing the Divisional Headquarters on Eagle Base. Since the JCO did not fall under the direct control of the MND (N) Commander, the JCOs were not regularly managed by the G2X, nor did the G2X have visibility on JCO sources.

TFE’s Military Police (MP) support has fluctuated greatly from a MP brigade, to less than a company. The common point behind all the rotations was the contact with the International Police Task Force and the local police forces of BiH. The International Police Task Force is a Multinational organization of police officers. They have the mission of establishing a functioning multiethnic BiH police force and judicial system and watching over it to ensure it is in compliance with the peace agreement. The Criminal Investigation Command (CID) conducts liaisons with both the International Police Task Force and the local police forces during joint investigations involving local nationals and US troops. As discussed in chapter 3, the MPs collect intelligence on the criminals and
criminal activity, “CRIMINT” as referred to by MAJ Jennings and CPT Gaddis.

Although the MP collected significant CRIMINT and conduct liaisons with both the IPTF and local police forces, the G2X does not have visibility with whom or when they meet. Additionally because the MPs are not seen as collectors, there is not an established relationship between HUMINT and the MPs, the CRIMINT does not enter into the HUMINT database and the MPs do pass on potential leads to the G2X. The S2 section of the MPs often consists of a junior officer and one enlisted. The S2 section primary provides weather and threat briefings for MP teams.

In US doctrine Psychological Operations (PSYOPs) units and their mission are Special Forces. This distinction and the specificity of the PYSOPs mission, like the Civil Affairs mission, CA create a shadow Chain of command that causes some difficulties. SFOR has a Combined Joint Information Task Force that directs the Division Psychological Support Element (DPSE) at TFE. The DPSE directs the three Brigade Psychological Support Elements (BPSEs), one element supports each brigade in MND(N). Each BPSE with three subordinate Tactical PSYOP Teams (TPTs) that are in direct support to each battalion of MND(N).

PSYOPs is “both a consumer and a producer of intelligence” (Jacobson 1998). And it became a major contributor to HUMINT collection. The Maneuver battalion’s S-2s often direct and de-conflict the TPTs in their collection efforts. But this coordination is not consistent throughout MND(N) or across individual SFOR rotations and “depended mainly on the personalities in the FPT and PSYOP cells.” (Jacobson 1998) Due to locations of the teams in the Russian and NORDIC Brigade, coordination is dependent on the DPSE and the G2X. The G2X has no visibility on TPTs and PSYOP activities and
provided no de-confliction. Often times the intelligence gathered by the TPT at the battalion level is not time critical and is held with the TPT until a final product is finished. That TPT product is too large for the battalion S2s to incorporated into their intelligence summaries, so it is often left out or submitted to the G2 as a separated product. Due to the PSYOP command structure, the intelligence it does collect is often stove-piped to its PSYOP headquarters on Eagle Base or in Sarajevo without the supported battalion or brigade command receiving any information. Additionally, the vast amounts of information PSYOPs did collect remains in a PSYOP database with only final product being furnished to the line units.

TFE has a Civil Affairs (CA) unit to conduct Civil Military Affairs (CMA). Activities included the rebuilding of schools and water purification systems. The CA units have Direct Support teams at the Brigade and Battalions and attempt to support the commanders with their CMA needs. However, even though the CA Unit is in Direct Support to TFE, due to the nature of its mission, it has a second CA chain of command that it follows as well. Like PSYOPS teams, the CA teams report to a higher echelon in Sarajevo and receive supplies through that same channel. These two chains of command often conflict (411 CA AAR). Although CA teams conduct a significant amount of liaison with local, international, and nongovernmental organizations, little of the information is infused into HUMINT channels, nor does CA recommend contacts that they make to primary HUMINT collectors for further development.

The line units are the largest organizations and conduct the majority of the operations in TFE. Made up of maneuver units like Infantry, Armor and Cavalry, their efforts consists of presence patrols, weapon storage site inspections, and liaison with

35
local officials and military leaders of the ethnic factions. A typical SFOR rotation consists of a Maneuver brigade with its three battalions located on separate base camps throughout the US Brigade’s Area Of Responsibility. Each battalion has its full compliment of line companies and augmentation units, such as the Direct Support Military Intelligence Company, Civil Affairs Team and PSYOP Team.

The line companies have an area of responsibility to conduct mounted and dismounted patrols. The main emphasis on patrol is provided a presence as a deterrent to violence. Although some information is collected, it is primarily significant activity as weapons fire or explosions. After a patrol, the patrol leader will fill out a debriefing sheet that the S2 section reviews. If any information warrants further debriefing, a member of the Battalion S2 section will conduct a debriefing of that patrol. There is no attempt to conduct analysis or build any database at the company level. Many of the small details and attitudes of the population are not recorded.

The battalion has its standard staff as covered in chapter 3. The S2 section comprises of an officer and four to six soldiers and is augmented with a two-soldier Analytical Control Team (ACT). The eight soldiers of the battalion S2 section conduct the intelligence analysis for the entire battalion on a 24-hour schedule. There are no soldiers performing analysis below the battalion level and except from the standard augmentation from the ACE, no additional augmentation is given the S2 section.

The US Brigade located at Eagle Base has the standard staff. In particular the S2 Section has an Officer and six soldiers augmented by an ACT of two soldiers from the General Support Company. Like the line battalions, no additional augmentation is given to the S2 section in support of the mission and is responsible for running operations 24
hours a day. Additional personnel would not only help in the analysis of the abundance in information but also in coordinating primary and secondary collectors.

Operations Joint Endeavor, Joint Guard, and Joint Forge are considered successful and have led to the reduction of forces and the removal of the JCOs, the US Army remains deficient in several areas concerning HUMINT. First is the G2X’s lack of visibility of the entire source database. Secondly, there is a lack of coordination at each level, battalion through Task Force (Division) of primary and secondary collectors. Thirdly, the division of types of sources given to primary and secondary HUMINT collectors is not delineated. Lastly, secondary HUMINT collectors lack focus on intelligence analysis and dissemination. Some of these issues overlap and affect each other.

Current doctrine and the execution of that doctrine leave a rift between the CI source database and the HOC source database. This leads to confusion and redundant use of sources by multiple HUMINT collectors. The G2X is the Commander’s representative on all HUMINT operations in the units area of responsibility, the TFCICA is the method the G2X uses to deconflict the primary HUMINT collectors. It would stand to reason that there should only be one HUMINT source database and TFCICA should manage it. This issue affects not only primary but also secondary HUMINT collectors from the divisional level down to the battalions.

The lack of coordination and deconfliction issue is a vicious circle stemming from lack of visibility of other assets. The G2X and sometimes the brigade and battalions do not have visibility on secondary HUMINT collectors and are unable to deconflict these with primary collectors at any level. The secondary collectors do not always coordinate
with lower level units when operating in their area (SFOR 6 AAR 2000). Again, coordination at every level will prevent the redundant use of sources and aid in maximizing the primary HUMINT collectors. Secondary collectors have the potential to pass sources over to primary collectors if they believe the source warrants the primary collectors’ attention. This would save time of the primary collectors who normally develop all their own sources. Additionally if S2s and S3s can coordinate the operations of primary and secondary collectors, the primary collectors can benefit from the positive relationship the secondary collectors develop. 10th Mountain Division inadvertently discovered this when forcing the collectors to convoy together. “FPTs were able to capitalize on the information and contacts made by the CA and PSYOPS teams” (SFOR 6 AAR 2000).

A clear delineation and understanding of the sources available would assist significantly in deconflicting collectors and free the primary HUMINT collectors to concentrate their efforts on sources that need their skills. Surface sources and contacts, such as public and political figures, should be given to the secondary collectors. It is not an effective use of a primary HUMINT collector’s time to gather information that does not make use of their unique training, skill sets, and resources (SFOR 6 AAR 2000). SFOR 1 discussed in its AAR that an improved collection focus and delineation of sources was a contributor in doubling the volume of information reports (CALL IIR 1998).

The line units lack the infrastructure and focus to conduct intelligence collection and analysis in any amount of detail. The intelligence sections at division and below are understaffed to conduct peace operations (B/H CAAT 2 1996). The daily patrols are
conducted as deterrents and not to develop relationships and collect information from the populace. This attitude is reflected in the force protection levels and personal combat equipment and weapons soldier carry on patrols. The intelligence infrastructure the US Army uses in PO in inadequate (TFE AAR 1996). The debriefing methods are inadequate due to the lack of intelligence personnel in the battalions and the brigade.

The success of the overall mission in BiH and the predominant roll HUMINT has played leads many to believe that the US army needs more HUMINT collectors rather than improving on methods of employment what it does have. HUMINT does play a greater roll in PO, but lack of numbers is not the only issue. To address the issues that face HUMINT in PO, better management is needed in the deconfliction of primary and secondary HUMINT collectors. The collectors under the G2X must coordinate with each other and the secondary collectors. The G2X’s visibility of the contacts the secondary collectors maintain is critical. This will become increasingly important as the potential of secondary collectors is realized and action is taken to assume sources from primary collectors. This will maintain coverage of the original contacts and free primary HUMINT to concentrate on sources that are more difficult. Intelligence capabilities will continue to increase if the line units augment their intelligence analysis and production capability with additional intelligence soldiers or combat arms soldier in an intelligence position. As the line units are successful in increasing the collection potential, more intelligence analysts are needed to manage and analyze the large databases. If the US Army can coordinate the secondary and primary collectors, it will create a synergistic effect and improve HUMINT exponentially.
CHAPTER 5
BRITISH OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN IRELAND

Unity of effort can be achieved by a single commander as the French advocate. Unity of effort can be achieved by a committee under civilian leadership as the British advocate. (1966, 73)

John McCuen

The British have struggled with its PO in Northern Ireland (NI) for over 30 years. During this lengthy operation they have develop many tactics, techniques and procedures that have lead to their recent success. The purpose of this chapter is to show the successful developments in Northern Ireland that the US Army should consider for current and future PO. The US Army has the opportunity to learn from British operations or learn the same lessons on its own in the Balkans over the next ten years.

This chapter will give a brief history of NI to aid in the understanding of the operational environment. It will then provide a description of the committee system, then describe the organizations working in NI, the Army, Special Forces, and the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) police, and the lessons learned associated with them. The chapter will then describe the committee that governs the Special Forces and covert units. There are four main lessons covered in this chapter. The first lesson is the synchronization of primary and secondary HUMINT collectors and the delineation of the sources. Secondly is the effort of Maneuver Forces (Line units) toward intelligence collection and the robust intelligence architecture within the line units as secondary HUMINT collectors to support its increased role of collection. Thirdly, it will cover the covert intelligence community in NI that is now organized to de-conflict and synchronize the special organizations from the military and RUC as an example of coordination and de-confliction of primary
HUMINT collectors. Lastly the coordination and de-confliction between primary and secondary HUMINT collectors with example of the coordination of intelligence and operations with the line units, army intelligence and Special Forces units and how the British de-conflict, synchronize and share intelligence. The current organizations were long in coming, but are now very effective in the PO of NI.

Although the NI conflict has existed for hundreds of years, the modern doctrine of current operations started to develop in 1969 with the introduction of British troops onto the streets of NI to quell the most destructive sectarian violence since the partition of Ireland in 1921 (Bowlin, 1998, 1). It is important to note that the British Army came into NI at the behest of the Catholic community that now adamantly opposes its presence. NI’s troubles are a complicated conglomeration of religious and political issues. The Catholic and Protestant are engaged in a social movement that has incorporated large-scale violence as a course of action. Although unrest continues, current operations have diminished the level of violence and the belligerents are now closer than ever to settling their disputes.

When the British Army entered NI in 1969, they came prepared to apply a military solution. The people of NI expected the Army to evenhandedly apply the law. Unfortunately, the mistakes of mass illegal searches, illegal internment and Bloody Sunday led to the loss of credibility and the perception that the Army favored the Protestants and were not capable of protecting either the Catholic or Protestant populations. Poor intelligence exasperated the situation because the majority of individuals targeted had no connection to the current violence.
The poor intelligence of the RUC was blamed for the disastrous outcome of the searches and internments. The British Army took great strides to increase its intelligence capabilities so it would not have to rely on the RUC intelligence structure again. The RUC also increased its intelligence capabilities having discovered its inadequacies.

The British quickly recovered from their early mistakes of the late 1960s and early 1970s. The late 1970s and 1980s brought some significant changes to the British method of operations, not just in additional training, increased capabilities and reorganization, but how they controlled and coordinated their intelligence and operations. Today’s organizations do not look like the originals of 1969. They have evolved over 30 years of activity and are coordinated by the committees to produce an effective tool against the violence and instability of NI.

The British have developed a committee system where all members of the operations have representation. The committee synchronizes, de-conflicts and ensures the sharing of critical intelligence. The British established a chain of command with the committees in NI. Each committee is chaired by the senior RUC police officer and has representation from an Army commander, Army intelligence, and RUC intelligence and on an ad hoc basis national intelligence and Special Forces. Each committee is responsible to a higher committee. All members make decisions jointly and execute operations using the organic units belonging to the members. Members of a committee vote and provide resources. Officials, like an intelligence officer, are present to provide information and have no vote in decisions. Operations and performance are based on the committee as a whole and on their cooperation. The committee system establishes the
chain of command from the Secretary of State for NI down to the Army Company commanders (Appendix A).

Directly under the British Secretary of State for NI is the Security Coordination Committee. The Chief Constable of the RUC chairs the Security Coordination Committee, with representation from the General Officer Commanding NI (GOC NI), a division level task force commander that is also the senior military commander in NI. Under the Security Coordination Committee are three Brigade level organizations called the Regional Area Committee (RAC). The Regional Commander for the RUC chairs the RAC with an Army Brigade commander as a member and intelligence offices from the Army and RUC as officials. Subordinate to the RAC are Battalion level Committees called the Divisional Area Committees (DAC). The RUC Divisional Commanders chairs the DAC, with Army Battalion commanders as members and intelligence officers from Army and RUC as officials. Below DACs are Sub-DACs. The local inspector for the RUC chairs the Sub-DAC with participation from company commanders and intelligence representation from the Army and RUC (Dewar, 1985, p148).

The British have organized their Special Forces in NI into three regionally based committees called Tasking and Coordination Groups (TCG). The TCGs comprise of members from the Special Air Service (SAS), the 14th Intelligence Company, the Force Reconnaissance Unit and the RUC’s intelligence unit the Special Branch. The Special Forces and Special Branch provide a covert capability to NI, and because of the sensitivity of their activities, they change their names often. Regardless of the name, the capabilities and need for coordination remain constant. The TCG coordinates and provides intelligence to the SCC and when necessary, the RACs and DACs. “The TCG
concept...dramatically improve[d] intelligence coordination throughout NI” (Bowlin 1998, 11).

Each committee whether the SCC, RAC, DAC, Sub-DAC or TCG, is responsible to synchronize, de-conflict and share information of its own collectors and units with its committee and to subordinate committees. The committee system has developed over the 33 years of operations and is a major lesson learned in NI. It is an effective method of synchronizing two or more units with separate chains of command. The committees link the organizations together into a single effort and a single chain of command while preserving the original single service chain of command and support.

Decisions of the committee are made jointly and then executed by the members using their units to fill the requirements. Each member of the committee has a superior in his organization that sits on a higher committee. This allows any member who disagrees with a decision of the committee to raise it to the next level. “His single service superior could even take up the cudgels on his behalf at the next superior committee if he considered it desirable” (Kitson 1974, 54). Boundaries or internal command structures not matching the organization of the rest of the committee can complicate the committee system. Like civilian agencies, the committee system works very well with allied nations or services that are in competition with each other. The committee system gives fair representation of the agencies involved in the operation and in developing a solution to issues.

The ally can feed in military, police or civil aid or advice of any sort as required without having it misapplied, wasted, or used in a way which is not relevant to the successful prosecution of the struggle.” (Kitson 1974, p59)
Because each member has a vested interest in mission accomplishment, and the establishment of goals for their region, they are more apt to share intelligence and cue the correct organization to act on that intelligence. It also allows for sources and operations to be de-conflicted, allowing the conservation of resources and faster reaction time on actionable intelligence.

Another of the advantages of the committee system is the allowance of the committee to select different organizations that could better accomplish the mission, something a single agency cannot do.

The SAS are used in any situation where we believe that there’s going to be a level of firepower which could transcend that which the RUC are capable of dealing with and that the army are trained to respond to. That’s why they are in NI, available to the RUC and available to the military. That’s the best instrument you’ve got and you use it. (Taylor 1980, 318.)

With committees, the British have successfully tied together its conventional forces and their intelligence efforts. Additionally, the British repeated this with the Special Forces, enabling them to synchronize them with each other and with conventional forces committees.

For the regular army, the Army’s intelligence structure is enhanced in number for the NI mission. The NI line units are restructured as well. In the line companies, the three platoons of 26 soldiers are divided into two “multiples” of 12 soldiers, six multiples in a company. The platoon leader and platoon sergeant command one of the multiples. The multiple may patrol independently. When a multiple patrols it breaks down into three mutually supporting teams of four soldiers called a “Brick.” The multiple leaders are responsible for the debriefing after every patrol. Every detail is recorded and kept at the company and battalion level. Soldiers from the battalion intelligence section debrief 50
percent of the patrols everyday to establish a base pattern. This is something the US Army S2 sections in Bosnia are not able to manage due to the shortfall in soldiers. The soldiers, having become intimately familiar with the environment will be able to detect when something out of the ordinary occurs. “Thus, it was really through the intelligence gathered by the Regular Army that the IRA organization became known to British intelligence. . . . Over time, extensive files were developed by the British Army on the Catholic population as a whole and the profile of the IRA was refined even further” (Hamill 1985, 123).

Two soldiers or noncommissioned officers (NCOs) are allocated to intelligence functions in each line company. If the company has platoon base camps, an additional line soldier is dedicated as an intelligence analyst at the platoon level. They are responsible for collecting information from the patrols and forwarding pertinent information on to the battalion intelligence section. The company intelligence representatives are also responsible for requesting intelligence from higher, to include imagery and other intelligence products.

The battalion intelligence section consists of the battalion intelligence officer, a warrant officer, two senior NCOs and a six junior NCOs and riflemen. They process the reports from the companies and pass information and intelligence to the brigade and request intelligence from brigade for the battalion staff and companies. It also maintains close liaison with the RUC and Special Branch to insure the sharing of intelligence in the committees. The battalion intelligence section also maintains contact and establishes sources within the population in the battalion area of responsibility. The battalion intelligence officer will de-conflict these sources with the line company liaisons and with
the RUC intelligence representative at the committee. The battalion intelligence section is echoed at the brigade level, but the number of personnel in the brigade’s intelligence section can number into the thirties. The mission of the intelligence sections at every level is to pinpoint weapons and explosive caches, provide the RUC with any relevant information that will produce the evidence necessary for an arrest and to collect any useful information that will enhance the battalion’s operational capability (Dewar 1985, 186).

In the Army, responsibility of sources is delineated between the line companies, the intelligence sections, and Army’s HUMINT units. Overt contacts, like local politicians, are given to company or battalion commanders. With the line units conducting liaison with preliminary or surface contacts, the primary HUMINT collectors are able to establish sources that provide richer intelligence and that need the additional protection of street craft that primary collectors provide. Additionally, the line units understand that if they come across a potential source, either through a normal contact or if they are approached, to obtain re-contact information to pass to a primary HUMINT collector.

The following is an example of the emphasis in collection and synchronization of British primary and secondary HUMINT collectors. A soldier manning a checkpoint stops a car for a routine inspection, the driver of the vehicle tells the soldier during their conversation that he would like to provide some information about a suspected terrorist. The soldier does not call attention to the potential source by detaining the man nor calling his supervisor over. He discretely records information to recontact him and sends the man on his way telling him that someone will contact him. After his patrol, the soldier will
take the information straight to the battalion intelligence section. In the battalion intelligence section, one soldier has the responsibility of passing that contact information to the appropriate primary HUMINT collector.

The same will happen for exploitable intelligence. If a soldier recognizes what he thinks is a weapons cache, he will hold the information until the end of the patrol, when he will provide it to the battalion intelligence section. The information in both cases is not shared with fellow soldiers, or the chain of command, this minimizes the sphere of knowledge and enables the information to be exploited. Both these examples demonstrate the part line units play in gathering and controlling exploitable intelligence. It also demonstrates how secondary HUMINT collectors increase the source base by assuming sole responsibility for surface contacts, freeing the primary HUMINT collectors to concentrate their efforts elsewhere without losing intelligence. Additionally, the secondary HUMINT collectors are able to identify individuals that warrant the attention of primary sources, and assist in handing the source off to the primary collectors. All the secondary collectors that conduct liaison or have contact with the populace as a whole echo this same method and dramatically increase preliminary contacts with potential sources.

The success of the army can be contributed to the British understanding that every patrol collects intelligence and conducts liaison with the populace. Another contributing factor is its designated role in conducting liaison with surface contacts and identifying potential sources and exploitable intelligence for primary HUMINT collectors. The robust intelligence structure at every level has enabled the absorption and analysis of the
vast amounts of information. This information created a baseline picture of the activity in the community. If some action breaks the mold of normalcy, it can be identified.

Intelligence reorganization was not limited to the British Army. Both the Special Forces and the RUC have taken measures to increase their efficiency and the coordination with each other and the army. The creation of the TCGs brought the covert units together and assisted in the coordination with the conventional committees and their units.

The premier British army intelligence service in NI is the 14th Intelligence Company. Created in 1974, the 14th Intelligence Company recruits from all services. The British army granted it Special Forces status in 1987. The 14th Intelligence Company has the mission to identify and track Loyalist and Republican terrorists. It cues the RUC or the Special Air Service (SAS) to make an arrest or conduct ambushes depending on the circumstances (Bowlin 1998, 25). The 14th Intelligence Company’s capabilities cross the spectrum, but it primarily conducts surveillance and Human Intelligence (HUMINT) operations. The TCG primarily tasks a Detachment from the 14th Intelligence Company for surveillance operations and continues to task and coordinate it along with the other services.

Being responsible to the TCG meant a broad range of tasking that might originate from beyond the Army chain of command. For example, it would not be unusual for the 14th Intelligence Company Detachment to be tasked to conduct surveillance in a mission that originated with the SPECIAL Branch. The advantage of the TCG centralization was that it allowed tasking across the intelligence community according to the preferences of the commanders and the requirements of the mission.” (Bowlin 1996, 25)

The TCG assisted in intelligence sharing between the RUC’s Special Branch (The RUC’s intelligence service), the 14th Intelligence Company and the SAS.
Although the SAS had the initial responsibility to train both the 14th Intelligence Company and the Special Branch, they were not officially committed to NI until 1976. British Special Air Service is a British Special Forces unit and is similar to the US Special Forces. They typically conduct reconnaissance, surveillance, and direct actions. Traditionally the SAS develops its own intelligence and sources. Since the establishment of 14th Intelligence Company and their merger with the SAS into the Intelligence and Surveillance Group (ISG), the 14th Intelligence Company handles all the sources. The SAS’s role is now more operationally focused, cued by the 14th Intelligence Company to conduct arrests and ambushes.

The SAS and 14th Intelligence Company and other covert units are merged into the Intelligence and Surveillance Group, a joint special operation command subordinate to the GOC NI. This single command enables the British to maximize their special operations and reduce the number of SAS in country. The SAS in NI are currently centrally located, while the 14th Intelligence Company’s operators remained dispersed in three detachments across NI. The ISG is commanded by a lieutenant colonel and is available for operations to the TCGs (Urban 1992, 139).

The issues that arose during the initial years of the Army’s operations also caused the Royal Ulster Constabulary, the civilian police force, to establish a robust intelligence service. The establishment of the RUC Special Branch gave a covert capability to the RUC to collect intelligence on the tightly organized criminal organizations to include terrorist cells. Most of the RUC efforts are against common criminal activity and the RUC has an overt collection capability with the criminal informants. The RUC’s intelligence service, the Special Branch, has grown since 1969, and with it, its network of
informers (HUMINT sources). Special Branch has the mission to develop high-level police informers and conduct surveillance (Bowlin 1998, 16).

Special Branch was modeled on the Army’s 14th Intelligence Company. Special Branch has two intelligence collection divisions, Echo Three (E3) and Echo Four (E4). Echo Three is responsible for HUMINT sources. Echo Four is responsible for surveillance (Holland 1996, 78). Special Branch also has operational sections for riot control and a special operation section (similar to a Special Weapons And Tactics teams (SWAT) in the United States), which is trained by the SAS. Like the 14th Intelligence Company and the SAS, the Special Branch falls under the TCG as part of the RUC. The TCG coordinates and de-conflicts Special Branch with other intelligence activities with in the TCG and with the SCC or DAC when needed.

Following the implementation of the regional TCG plan in 1979, the RUC Special Branch began to work in greater cooperation with its counterparts in national intelligence and the Army. Beginning in the early 1980s, liaison positions were established between the RUC and MI5 to assist in deconflicting operations and facilitate the reciprocal flow of intelligence between the two organizations. (Bowlin 1998, 20)

The critical element of the TCG is the coordination and de-confliction of activities and the sources of its members. Special Branch targets the higher echelons of criminal organizations. The Army and the Special Forces target terrorists and their activities. However, there is a conflict due to the criminal nature of terrorist and their extensive use of criminal activities such as cigarette smuggling, prostitution, and drugs, to fund their terrorist activities. The British used the TCG to bring together several organizations with redundant capabilities and overlapping efforts with separate distinct chains of command and keep them operationally focused. The British Government commissioned three TCGs; one in Castlereagh to coordinate the Belfast operations, a second in Armagh to
coordinate intelligence activities in south Ulster, and a third in Londonderry for the northern portion of the province (Urban 1992, 95). The TCGs have the authority to task any of the surveillance or undercover units to execute any specific operation, while simultaneously monitoring daily operations and providing intelligence oversight. Covert units can no longer conduct operations independently supporting their own agendas. All covert units are now accountable to the TCGs. Additionally, the TCG can pick the best assets from all the organizations according to its capability for an operation. The TCG ensures the sharing of intelligence and the deconfliction of sources. Moreover, because it monitors the actions of all the units, it minimizes the chance of a fratricide incident (Holland and Phoenix 1996, 90).

Furthermore, as the TCGs were utilized, the concept was perfected to the point that some units became interchangeable for certain missions. For example, 14th Intelligence Company and Special Branch’s E4A adopted similar methodologies, and in most surveillance operations, one could be used in lieu of the other. (Urban 1992, 48)

A special Branch officer directs each TCG. Each TCG also had representatives from Army intelligence (ISG), on an ad hoc basis, national level intelligence officers (Urban 1992, 95). The TCG dramatically improves intelligence coordination throughout NI (Bowlin 1998, 11).

Since the establishment of the TCG and the emphasis on intelligence in 1979, the British have increased their capability to share intelligence and coordinate operations, which has led them to be increasingly successful in NI. It has allowed them to de-conflict their sources and operations. This is especially impressive considering the overlap of potential sources and activities due to the fact the terrorist and their activity crosses the spectrum from petty crime, smuggling to assassination. The TCGs ability to coordinate
and deconflict with the regular forces and their committees allows the British to focus all
the organizations on the challenges in NI. Operation Judy at Loughgall is an example of
the committees working successfully.

Operation Judy, the SAS ambush at Loughgall in 1987, demonstrates the
successful coordination and intelligence sharing that the committee system has brought to
NI. By the mid 1980s the East Tyrone brigade of the IRA, a loose organization of
mutually supporting Active Service Units (ASUs) whose members numbered into the
thirties, was number two on the level of activity in NI. Capable of complex operations
and armed with sophisticated weapons and equipment, they were capable of mortar
attacks, bombings, and direct assaults. Their operations included diversionary attack
teams that utilized spotters, hijacking, bombers, and gunmen. The Tyrone Brigade
enjoyed many successes in 1985 and 1986 that peaked with the destruction of the Birches
police station and the later assassination of the contractor that was to rebuild it. The
British government began placing pressure on the RUC for results (Bowlin 1985, 107-
109).

A HUMINT source provided intelligence that indicated that the Tyrone Brigade
was planning an attack on the Loughgall police station in North Armagh. This
intelligence was given to the SCC. The SCC in turn tasked the Armagh TCG to conduct
an arrest or ambush operation. The TCG named the operation Judy. The TCG decided to
ambush and not arrest the IRA because of the complexity of the Tyrone Brigade’s tactics,
their advanced armament and training, and the lack of adequate intelligence to safeguard
the security forces in an arrest. Both the ISG and the Special Branch gathered this
intelligence. The TCG tasked both the 14th Intelligence Company and Special Branch to
place the two leaders of the Active Service Units (ASUs) and the possible weapons

cache, under close surveillance (Bowlin 1985, 116).

In preparation for the ambush, the SAS brought in 15 additions members from G

Squadron in Hereford to supplement the existing 24-man squadron in Ulser (Urban 1992,

228). An additional special branch unit was called in to backup the SAS and seal off the

avenues of escape after the ASUs entered the village (Holland and Phoenix 1996, 141-

142). Additionally, the TSG coordinated with the DAC to ensure that on the day of the

suspected attack, no patrols were conducted in close vicinity of the police station and that

the RUC was quietly evacuated out of the police station. The TSG also coordinated with

the DAC for several companies of Regular Army and UDR soldiers would isolate the

area from outside of Loughgall. The plan called for the use of hundreds of soldiers and

police (Urban 1992, 228). The IRA plan was similar to the last bombing of the Birches

police station.

During the afternoon of 8 May, members of Lynagh and Kelly’s ASUs

hijacked a van and a digger. The digger was to be used to carry a two-man team

with a bomb in its front-loader as in the Birches attack, and the van would carry

the remainder of the team. At 1900 hours, the surveillance teams dug in

throughout Loughgal noted the van driving slowly past the police station. The van

left the village and returned twenty minutes later followed by the digger with a

300-pound bomb concealed by rubble in its bucket. (Holland and Phoenix 1996,

143)

The van drove past the police station and stopped; several gunmen got out,

including Patrick Kelly, and opened fire on the police station with their assault

rifles. From this point, events began to move very swiftly. As the two SAS groups

opened up on the IRA team in and around the Van killing Kelly and two others

immediately, the two terrorists on the tractor lit the fuse on the bomb, pointed the

tractor towards the station and jumped off. Both were shot dead. . . . As the tractor

hit the building’s wall, the bomb detonated nearly flattening the police station.

Several SAS troopers inside the police station were wounded although no one was

killed. Meanwhile the gun battle continued as the SAS destroyed the van with

7.62mm machine gun fire killing the occupants . . . as the battle ended, all eight

gunmen from the Tyrone IRA had been killed by the SAS. (Urban 1992, 230-232)
In Operation Judy the TCG coordinated with a DAC to conduct an operation involving two covert intelligence organizations, to track the terrorist and trigger the ambush, one direct action organization to conduct the ambush, while utilizing two of the DAC’s forces, the Army Regulars and the regular RUC, to isolate and secure the area. The two committees were able to coordinate and direct a divergence of organizations into a highly successful, synchronized operation.

Although many advocate the single commander technique for conducting operations, the British have shown the committee system can be more effective in synchronizing deconflicting and sharing intelligence. The British operations in NI also show how the increased involvement of secondary collectors in HUMINT activities can increase intelligence collection. By the secondary collectors assuming responsibility for conducting liaison with casual contacts, the primary HUMINT collectors are free to concentrate on sources that are of greater intelligence value and need the source handling skills the primary HUMINT collector’s possess. Additionally the British recognize the potential the secondary HUMINT collectors have to pass off potential sources to primary HUMINT collectors and preserving the information allowing the primary collectors to exploit the information. The British TCG allow the covert units to synchronize their activities with each other and with regular forces. Although the British receive criticism that the development and implementation of the current systems has taken some time, they nevertheless have developed new and innovative solutions to a complex problem.
The US Army has operated in BiH for eight years. It is still faces many of the challenges it originally encountered when it first entered BiH. Some of the answers to these challenges can be found by looking at the lessons the British have learned in their 30 years in NI. This chapter will finish this thesis with some conclusions and the following recommendations: First, US Army doctrine concerning the G2X and the relationship between the HUMINT Operations Cell (HOC) and counterintelligence Coordination Authority (CICA) needs to change to reflect a common coordination authority for both. Second, the US Army needs to establish a delineation of sources between primary and secondary collectors. Third, the S2X position needs to be created at the battalion and brigade levels. Forth, primary and secondary HUMINT collectors need to coordinate their activities at every level and adopting the committee system can do this. Fifth, secondary collectors require augmentation to effectively handle the increase in intelligence gathered. Lastly, an Operations Management Team or HUMINT Team should augment secondary collection units. With these changes the HUMINT effort of the US Army in Peace Operations will dramatically improve.

The first conclusion and recommendation concerns the G2X. The G2X needs a common coordination authority for the CICA and HOC. Currently, the G2X cannot fully de-conflict between the CI collectors and the HUMINT collectors as it does not have a centralized hold over its collection assets from which it can execute de-confliction. The new US Army intelligence manual FM 2.0 and the intelligence community established
the CICA to de-conflict counterintelligence sources, but doctrine does not allow for it to de-conflict between the HOC and the CICA. The coordination authority should de-conflict sources from both the counterintelligence collectors and the HOC. The CICA should be the one position working with the G2X that has visibility on all the sources within the unit’s area of responsibility. The new structure should give the G2X supervision of all HUMINT activity with the CICA renamed the HUMINT coordinating authority (HCA), directly subordinate to the G2X and coordinating both the counterintelligence collectors and the HOC collectors. If a non-Army collector, such as the Defense HUMINT Service, takes issue with giving the G2X or HCA visibility of their sources, then that agency should fill the HCA position. With a HCA, the primary collectors will be synchronized and all their sources de-conflicted, giving priority of a new source to the organization that can best utilize them.

Secondly, having no clear delineation between collectors leads to wasted resources and redundant use of sources. The US Army needs to delineate sources for primary and secondary HUMINT collectors. This recommendation follows the lead of the British in NI. Surface contacts such as political figures or individuals who do not require the training of the primary HUMINT collectors are given to the secondary collectors. This frees the primary collectors to concentrate their efforts on sources of higher importance and that need the protection, street craft, and resources the primary collectors offer. This enables the unit to expand their source base while maintaining the original sources.

The third conclusion and recommendation focuses on the creation of the S2X. The US Army recognized the need for a brigade S2X in the new Striker Brigade Combat
Team (TFE AAR 1996; and ST 2-19.402 2002, 3-4). This idea should be carried over to the HUMINT intensive environment of US Army PO. The creation of a S2X at Brigade and Battalion level is the first step in de-conflicting sources at every level. The S2X has the same responsibilities as their G2X counterpart. Additionally, the S2X acts as the source de-confliction authority and coordinates with the HCA at division. The S2X would also assist in the committee concept by managing sources of committee members.

Fourthly, to coordinate, synchronize, and de-conflict the many units, the US Army should adopt the Committee system at every level. The US Army attempts to coordination and de-conflict at Division, Brigade and Battalion levels. But, issues arise with organizations, like Joint Commission Observers, Civil Affairs, and PSYOPS, that may have a different chain of command or a second chain of command operating in a Line Unit’s area of responsibility. The British committee system would alleviate that conflict. At the battalion level the Operations officer, the S-3, would chair the committee with representation from appropriate staff members, like the S2 and S2X, as well as the JCOs, CAs, PSYOPS, and the Operations Management Team. The committee will discuss upcoming operations and schedules of the teams. Each team will provide the source information to the S2X before the meeting. The S2X’s source database will include sources from primary and secondary collectors. The S2X will address any conflicting sources, and the committee will decide which team will meet with the source. This de-confliction will prevent circular reporting and a line outside a source’s office of primary and secondary collectors. The team that meets with the source has the responsibility for collecting information that other committee members need. If any combined missions are possible, they will be identified in the meeting and organized
afterwards. This enables the primary collectors to have visibility on sources that the secondary collectors are meeting and possibly take advantage of a previous relationship. Additionally, with a consolidated source database, source information is not lost if an organization, like the JCO in BiH leave with no follow on unit to whom they can hand off the source.

Additionally, the committees will increase contact and visibility between primary and secondary collectors that will give the secondary collectors an appreciation on the types of sources the primary collectors are interested in. With a little training, the secondary collectors will have the capability to identify and hand sources over to primary collectors. This relationship is reciprocal, working for both the primary and secondary collectors. For example, if a primary collector is going to terminate a source, a secondary collector may want to continue the relationship develop by the primary collector. This does not waste the relationship the primary collectors have built. It also allows the secondary collector to monitor the source to determine if the source later warrants the attention of the primary collectors. A primary or secondary collector may only want to meet with another team’s source a few times. Tight coordination would allow a new team and the original team to meet with a source simultaneously. This helps the new team build rapport with the source and assist in building a trusting relationship.

The committee should exist at the division, brigade, and battalion levels. This allows for de-confliction at each level and creates a committee representatives with whom a member can coordinate with higher, lower, and laterally. The battalion or brigade S2X can pass source information higher to de-conflict with the G2X’s HCA to ensure division level teams are de-conflicted with brigade- and battalion-level teams.
There are many benefits for adopting the committee system, not only does the committee coordinate and de-conflict, it gives every involved organization visibility on what each are doing laterally and higher and lower. This allows an organization at each level not only to de-conflict its activity but also to take advantage of preexisting relationships, it can also leverage the potential strengths and mitigate potential weaknesses of various types of collectors.

Fifthly, some secondary collectors require some HUMINT augmentations. Line Units have an attached OMT. Some secondary collectors are not trained to collect intelligence, actively or passively. To assist them in their collection, the division should assign a HUMINT team or OMT to the unit. The Military Intelligence battalion should provide the team or built one from the deployment augmenters. Having a resident HUMINT team in a secondary collector’s unit has many benefits. The HUMINT team can: conduct debriefings of teams after a meeting, train the teams on report formats and questioning techniques, ensure their reporting is entered into the HUMINT database via the HUMINT team’s automation systems, ensure sources are entered into the G2X HUMINT source database, provide source biographies to the secondary collection teams, accompany teams occasionally to evaluate sources, aid in handing off a source, from or to, a primary collector and assist the unit S2 in analysis of the HUMINT collected or passed from the division. Having an OMT or HUMINT team attached to a secondary collection unit not only assists the HUMINT community by providing intelligence that does not make it into the HUMINT system, but also the secondary unit by providing intelligence from the HUMINT database to the unit.
Lastly, secondary collectors need to augment their organic intelligence sections. Many of the AARs of the US Army have found the intelligence sections under staffed (B/H CAAT 2 1997, 71). The US Army should adopt the British Army model in NI, and augment its intelligence sections with line soldiers. In addition to attaching a HUMINT team to a secondary collection unit, the units should dramatically increase the intelligence analysis capability by augmenting the S2 sections at every level. Each company should have at least two soldiers to assist in debriefing, recording information and maintaining a database. They should be the experts of activity at the company level. Likewise, additional soldiers should augment the Battalion and Brigade S2 sections. Augmentation does not have to come in the form of an intelligence soldier, but as in the British model, a smart rifleman trained to do the intelligence job. A Mobile Training Team from the Army Military Intelligence School at Fort Huachuca can train the riflemen in their new intelligence jobs. The division can conduct this training internally as well. During predeployment training, the unit presently conducting the PO can provide on-the-job training if riflemen deploy a week before their units. This augmentation is needed to handle the increased flow of information and intelligence, the delineation of sources and the committees created when they synchronize, coordinate, and de-conflict the primary and secondary collectors.

The US Army can save time and resources by adopting some of the lessons the British learned in their 30 years in NI, instead of expending the time and resources to learn the same lessons. If the G2X is able to create a common coordination authority over its counterintelligence collectors and HOC collectors, it will be able to de-conflict its sources internally. If the US Army determines a clear delineation of sources for its
primary and secondary collectors, it will significantly aid in the de-confliction of their activities. Additionally if the US Army adopts the British Committee system, it will be able to gain visibility, and coordinate and de-conflict the activities of the multitude of HUMINT elements operating in a Line Units area of responsibility. The creation of an S2X at the battalion and brigade levels will assist the units in de-conflicting their sources with each other and the G2X. Additionally, the collectors will dramatically increase their collection if augmented by a primary HUMINT team. This augmentation will also increase the flow of intelligence both to and from secondary collection units. Neither the arguments nor the solutions presented here are new. But if these changes are made, the HUMINT efforts in POs will dramatically improve.
APPENDIX A

NORTHERN IRELAND COMMITTEES
APPENDIX B

LIST OF INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS


3. Anonymous One. First hand knowledge of British Operations is NI.

4. Anonymous Two. Firsthand knowledge of British Operations is NI.
GLOSSARY

CA Civil Affairs. Designated Active and Reserve Component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct Civil Affairs activities and to support civil-military operations (JP 3-57 2001).


Civil administration. An administration established by a foreign government in (1) friendly territory, under an agreement with the government of the area concerned, to exercise certain authority normally the function of the local government, or (2) hostile territory, occupied by United States forces, where a foreign government exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority until an indigenous civil government can be established (JP 1-02 2001).

CMO: civil-military operations. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, government and non-government civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations in order to facilitate military operations and consolidate and achieve US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur before, during, or after other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated Civil Affairs forces, by other military forces, or by a combination of Civil Affairs forces and other forces. Also called CMO (JP 3-57 2001).

Counterintelligence (DOD, NATO): Those activities which are concerned with identifying and counteracting the threat to security posed by hostile intelligence services or organizations, or by individuals engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion, or terrorism (JP 1-02 2001).

Counterintelligence Liaisons: The establishment and maintenance of personal contacts between CI liaison officers and personnel of organizations which have missions, responsibilities, information resources, or capabilities similar to those of US Army intelligence. It is conducted to promote cooperation, unity of purpose, and mutual understanding; coordinate actions and activities; and to exchange information and viewpoints. OCONUS CI liaison also includes overt collection of foreign intelligence and CI; acquisition from foreign sources of material and assistance not otherwise available; and the procedures used to gain access to individuals whose cooperation, assistance, or knowledge is desired.
DC dislocated civilian - A broad term that includes a displaced person, an evacuee, an expellee, or a refugee (JP 1-02 2001).

Human Intelligence: A category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources. Also called HUMINT (JCS Pub 1-02 2001).

Intelligence: The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas (JCS Pub 1-O2 2001).

Liaison: That contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action.

Liaison Contact: The act of visiting or otherwise contacting a liaison source.

Liaison Source: An individual with whom liaison is conducted. This term applies regardless of whether the individual furnishes assistance or is contacted on a protocol basis.

Peace Building: Postconflict actions, predominately diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.

Peace Enforcement: Application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order.

Peacekeeping: Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease-fire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.

Peacemaking: The process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlements that arranges an end to a dispute and resolves issues that led to it.

Peace Operations: A broad term that encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace.

Primary HUMINT collector: An individual, team or unit that has the primary mission to and is designated by a Military Occupations Specialty, to collect intelligence by directly interacting with humans.
Secondary HUMINT collector: an individual, team or unit that has a primary mission to interact with humans and has a secondary mission to collect information or intelligence actively or passively.

Source: Any person who furnishes intelligence information either with or without the knowledge that the information is being used for intelligence purposes. In this context, a controlled source is in the employment or under the control of the intelligence activity and knows that the information is to be used for intelligence purposes.
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