COMBATING TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Strategy

by

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not
necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or
any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing
statement.)
ABSTRACT

COMBATING TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
by Michael P. Stelzig, U.S. Army, 70 pages.

This Thesis examines the Bush 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) as it applies to combating terrorism in Southeast Asia.

This methodology uses a modified problem solving template to determine the current and evolving nature of the threat in the region. Next it analyzes the application of the Bush 2002 NSS by the four traditional instruments of power: diplomatic, information, military and economic. Further it analyzes the impact of nontraditional instruments of power such as law enforcement, intelligence, financial and education. The results are applied to two case studies.

The conclusion of this study is that the Bush 2002 NSS is effective for combating current and planned transnational terrorist operations in Southeast Asia. The NSS, however, does not go far enough to remove the underlying conditions that will prevent the next generation from becoming transnational terrorists. Recommendations to remove the underlying conditions are proposed. The result is a long-term approach that will defeat transnational terrorism in Southeast Asia.
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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>DIME</td>
<td>Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic. These are the traditional instruments of national power.</td>
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<td>NMS</td>
<td>National Military Strategy</td>
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Possible Scenario

Date: 4 April 2006; Local time: 1300; Location: New York Harbor adjacent to Chelsea Pier; Event: Hydrogen bomb detonated aboard container cargo ship; Initial casualty estimates 2,270,000 dead and 4,000,000 injured. One hour prior to this event: three al-Qaeda operatives hijack the super cargo container ship Lady of Peace as she exits the port of Bayonne. Twenty-one hours prior to this event: the Lady of Peace leaves the port of Philadelphia. Thirty-six hours prior to this event: the Lady of Peace leaves the port of Miami. Three days prior to this event: the Lady of Peace transits the Panama Canal. Ten days prior to this event: the Lady of Peace leaves Pearl Harbor. Seven days prior to this event: the Lady of Peace leaves the port of Kuala Lumpur. Seventeen hours prior to this event, a five-megaton Hydrogen bomb in a twenty-foot container with the serial number SVLU 092039 is loaded on the cargo deck of the Lady of Peace with destinations of St. Johns, Newfoundland, Canada. Fifteen days prior to this event: container SVLU 0920339 leaves the Port of Karachi aboard the container ship Sultan Madurai. The ship’s destination is port of Kuala Lumpur. Eight days prior to this event, al-Qaeda operatives take advantage of the civil war in Pakistan and seize control of an eleven-megaton hydrogen bomb outside of Islamabad and move it overland to the Port of Karachi.

Simultaneously, on the evening of 4 April 2006, from a secret location somewhere in the Middle East, Osama bin Laden’s son and former deputy, Sad bin Laden announces via a live broadcast on Al-Jazeera network that “he is now in charge of al-
Qaeda.” Second, that “this attack is the first of many such attacks in infidel America and in countries with American puppet governments around the world. Today begins the destruction of the anti-Islamic American civilization and of Western hegemony” (this is a fictitious scenario conceived to highlight magnitude of the threat.)

**Nature of the Problem**

In the last 35 years, terrorists around the world committed acts of unimaginable destruction directed against the United States. As demonstrated by the World Trade Center attacks in 1993 and in 2001 the means have become more covert and clever, yet the effects of the attack have become progressively more violent, lethal, and costly. The terrorists have targeted perceived weaknesses, both military and civilian, and have directly avoided the United State’s technology, security, and military advantages. They selected lightly defended “soft targets,” such as the Marine barracks at the Beirut Airport in 1983, the Air Force barracks, Khobar Towers in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, in 1996, or symbolic unprotected civilian targets, such as U.S. flagged civilian commercial aircraft and the World Trade Center, thus avoiding U.S. strengths.

One could argue that terrorism is the most dangerous threat that the U.S. will face in the next 10 to 20 years. The U.S. must take aggressive proactive measures to ensure that it can interdict and perhaps stop future terrorist attacks in order to mitigate the magnitude of the attacks and the severity of their effects. This begs the question what measures should the U.S. take? This researcher proposes that the U.S. has underestimated the potential threats that exist and are evolving around the world today specifically in Southeast Asia. Additionally, this researcher proposes that U.S.’s greatest liability is its lack of knowledge about the extent of transnational terrorist organizations, intentions, and
their capabilities. Specifically stated in a rhetorical sense: The U.S. does not know what it does not know about transnational terrorism yet. This may be the United States’ greatest weakness in combating transnational terrorism.

The U.S. must learn everything it can about transnational terrorist groups, operations, and their centers of gravity, intentions, and affiliations in order to disable them in the future. The U.S. is learning more everyday about al-Qaeda’s transnational influence worldwide and in Southeast Asia. Yet until October of 2002, Abu Sayyaf was the only terrorist organization, in Southeast Asia, that the U.S. State Department had on its list of international terrorist organizations (U.S State Department 2002). Still, at the writing of this thesis, the State Department added only one new international terrorist organization to the list: the Malaysian militant Islamic group Jemaah Islamiyah. This example underscores how little the U.S. really knows about the nature of the threat and how little emphasis has historically been placed in this region of the world. Please refer to Appendix B for a more detailed list of known and suspected terrorist or extremist groups operating in Southeast Asia.

Until recently Southeast Asia has been the scene of limited physical attacks, such as kidnapping, murders, and attacks on government installations usually associated with local or national aims. It has, however, been utilized as a meeting place for transnational terrorist to conduct operational planning sessions. If history is a guide it will be a matter of time until these terrorists develop or acquire the means to escalate the level and severity of the attacks in the region and targeted at the U.S. For example, in 1995 local authorities in the Philippines accidentally uncovered Operation Bojinka (Bojinka is a Serbo-Croatian word meaning loud bang) and arrested Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, who later
was determined to be the mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, and Abdul Hakim Murad.

Subsequent investigation of Yousef’s computer revealed details about how this cell intended to build and “plant high powered liquid explosives on 11 long-haul flights between Asia and the United States, mostly on United and American airlines” (Brzezinski, 2002). These bombs were to be synchronized to explode simultaneously while the planes completed the trans-Pacific legs of their flights. Other information gathered during subsequent interrogations brought to light the difficulty that al-Qaeda bomb makers were having attempting to make complex explosives. This challenge may have foreshadowed the method of attacks used on 11 September 2002. Since constructing and transporting home made explosives was dangerous and unstable the cell had mused about simply hijacking large commercial airplanes and flying them into preplanned targets.

More recently Pakistani officials apprehended admitted al-Qaeda member Ramzi Muhammad Abdullah bin al-Shibh. They subsequently turned him over to U.S. authorities and he is being held at an undisclosed location. The New York Times recently reported, “Bin al-Shibh claims to have conducted one of the initial planning meetings for the 11 September 2002 attacks back in January of 2000 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia with Nawaq Alhazmi and Khalid al-Midhar (Flight 77)” (Johnston and van Natta 2002).

More recently, on Saturday night, 12 October 2002 a car bomb was detonated outside of the popular Sari Club nightclub on the Island of Bali in Indonesia. Approximately 180 people were reported killed and at least 250 were injured. A second bomb was detonated close to the U.S. Consulate, also in Bali; however, there were no
injuries reported. Many people suspect that al-Qaeda is responsible for the attack; however, there is no evidence to support the suspicion. The Washington Post quoted Indonesian Defense Minister Matori Abdul Djalil after a cabinet meeting in Jakarta, “We are sure al Qaeda is here, the Bali bomb blast is related to al- Qaeda with the cooperation of local terrorists” (Nakashima and Sipress 2002). The local terrorist organization is believed to be the Islamic militant group Jemaah Islamiah. Until now this organization was believed to be only a local threat and not associated with al-Qaeda.

**Thesis Question**

Can the United States effectively combat transnational terrorist organizations in Southeast Asia?

**The Research Question**

This thesis will analyze the following research question: Will the Bush 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy be effective in combating transnational terrorist organizations in Southeast Asia? In order to evaluate and analyze this question adequately it must address four secondary questions in order to understand the environment in which the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy apply.

1. What is the current terrorist threat in Southeast Asia? In order to address this question a number of tertiary questions must be analyzed: What are the transnational terrorist’s goals? What is the influence of al-Qaeda in the region? What are their strategies, operational objectives, and tactics? Who are the other existing or emerging terrorist organizations in the region?

2. What is the current U.S. policy on terrorism in Southeast Asia? In order to completely understand the full implications of the current U.S. policy it will be helpful to
answer a number of tertiary questions such as: How did the current strategy evolve or develop? What national goal is it tied to? Is it effective? Is the policy understood by all of the actors that are required to implement it?

3. How are the instruments of power employed to support U.S. policy on terrorism in Southeast Asia? This thesis will seek to determine if the four traditional instruments of power: diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME) are adequate to support this issue. These instruments of power where originally developed for application towards nation states. In today’s global environment with transnational actors (terrorists) acting outside the influence of traditional nation states are these instruments still effective or even relevant? Finally could nontraditional instruments of power, such as legal, financial, law enforcement, or education be used effectively? Are there perhaps others available that have not yet been used?

4. What U.S. government and host-nation organizations are integrated in the current U.S. strategy in Southeast Asia? In order to address this question the author will analyze the current implementation of key resources. It will answer the following tertiary questions: Are the various agencies and departments of the of the U.S. government being employed effectively? Are Foreign Internal Defense (FID) forces utilized effectively? Are military cooperation programs being implemented effectively?

Significance of the Study

The intent of this study is to provide a nonbiased assessment of the current U.S. national security strategy in order to identify its strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats as they relate to combating terrorism in Southeast Asia. This assessment should validate or refine the current strategy and explore alternative ways and means to achieve
the U.S. strategic ends. Next this thesis will enable future decision makers to leverage the current field of knowledge to help develop an effective strategy to prevent and combat the terrorist threats in Southeast Asia. The ultimate goal is to deny transnational terrorists a safe base of operations in Southeast Asia.

Context of the Problem and Research Question

As the perceived leader of post-World War II globalization in the last 58 years, the U.S. has become perceived by some in the Islamic community as the primary source of evil in the world. Thus, the U.S has become the primary target of Islamic fundamentalist terrorists and most recently the Islamist terrorists associated with al-Qaeda. This nonstate transnational organization seeks to invoke attacks on the US and her interest’s around the world. These attacks are unique because they have been conducted to achieve offensive rather than defensive (or local) objectives and perpetrated by transnational actors at different venues around the world. Many indicators to include terrorism analysts from the Center for Defense Information (CDI) terrorism project “report evidence of al-Qaeda interest and involvement in Southeast Asia states” (Huang 2002).

The most significant catalyst in the present situation was Osama bin Laden’s declaration of war or Jihad against America. In 1998 bin Laden issued a fatwa, a legal decision or edict, “ruling to kill the Americans and their allies, civilians, and the military, is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it” (bin Laden, 1998). This is exceptionally troubling when the modus operandi of al-Qaeda is analyzed. “In particular, its ability to recruit locally among Muslims who have local jobs, passports, language skills, and local residences, creates
personnel who can blend into society and be perfectly plan attacks” (Berry 2001). This is significant in light of the, at times, strained relations between the U.S. and five of the key countries in the region Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and Cambodia. Especially when their large Muslim populations are taken into account.

The CIA’s unclassified country studies report that 87 percent of Indonesia’s 228.4 million people are Muslim, approximately 59 percent of Malaysia’s 22.2 million people are Muslims, approximately 4 percent of the Philippines’ 82.8 million are Muslim, approximately 4 percent of Thailand’s 61.8 million people are Muslim and approximately 3 percent of Cambodia’s 12.5 million people are Muslim. If these countries or their Muslim populations grow disillusioned or hostile towards the U.S., this region could become a major recruiting market and base of operation for potential anti-American transnational terrorist.

Assumptions

The research of this thesis used the following assumptions: The danger of terrorist emerging in the region will continue to be a valid threat to U.S. national security and national interests. The U.S. will remain the target of a declared war from Osama bin Laden, his al-Qaeda organization, and its derivative organizations for the foreseeable future. Certain Fundamental extremist and Islamist organizations will continue to blame the West in particular the U.S. as the source of all evil worldwide for the foreseeable future.

Definitions

The English language is dynamic in its ability to give native speakers the latitude to articulate complex thoughts and ideas to one another. However, history has recorded
on more than one occasion when the meaning that was received or understood was not
the meaning that was sent. Consequently, it is necessary to articulate clear definitions that
will be used in this research project. For example, depending on one’s background a word
terrorist may have a number of different meanings. Mainstream America defines a
terrorist as murdering criminal whereas a member of the Palestinian Liberation
Organization in the West Bank or member of al-Qaeda would define a terrorist as a
freedom fighter. To avoid such discrepancies this paper will use the Department of
Defense’s definition, found in Joint publication 1-02, for terrorism, terrorist and terrorist
groups.

Terrorism: is the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful
violence inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or
societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or
ideological. (This term and its definition replace the existing term and its
definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

Terrorist: is an individual who uses violence, terror, and intimidation to achieve a
result.

Terrorist groups: are any element regardless of size or espoused cause, which
repeatedly commits acts of violence or threatens violence in pursuit of its
political, religious, or ideological objectives. (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2003, 531)

In an effort to ensure precise descriptions of Islamic terminology the following
definitions will be used. Fundamentalism, there is no direct translations of this concept.
The modern context started as a movement to renew or return the religion its purest form.
While acknowledging that not all fundamentalists are militant this term has come to
represent the “active” aspect of renewal. This active aspect has become militant, radical,
and closely tied to the revolutionary teaching of Wahhabism doctrine. An Islamist is
person who subscribes to working to create a worldwide Pan-Islamic State. This idea is
currently attributed to Abdullah Azzam. “Through Azzam he became steeped not in the
then popular ideology of pan-Arabism, which stresses the unity of all Arabs, but in a more ambitious pan-Islamicism, which reaches out to all the world’s 1 billion Muslims” (Beyers 2001). See annex A for a more detailed discussion on the evolution of Islamic fundamentalism and the emergence of the Islamist thinking.

Finally it is important to understand the term jihad or struggle. There are two types of Jihad:

The Greater Jihad (al-jihad al-akbar), which refers to the inner struggle each believer wages personally and continually against the evils of temptation and vice. And the lesser Jihad or smaller Jihad (al-jihad al-asghar), which describes the outward struggle, which can escalate to physical force, against the enemies of Islam. (Gawrych, Page 2)

The lesser Jihad is also commonly referred to as the smaller Jihad or the Jihad of the sword. There has been much written chronicling the rules governing Jihad which leave much open to interpretation. Campbell provides a brief summary on when the lesser Jihad is authorized.

The world has been divided for Muslims into three realms, which are seen both territorially and figuratively. These realms are first, the Abode of Islam (dar al-Islam) where in Islamic order holds sway, the Abode of War (dar al-harb) describing those areas inhabited by those who oppose Islam either physically or doctrinally; and thirdly, the Abode of Peace (dar al-sulh) where Muslims are permitted freedom to worship despite the un-Islamic nature of the area. Muslims are obliged to wage Jihad against those living in the Abode of war only. (Campbell 1992, 21)

Limitations

The current nature of this topic is sensitive due to ongoing operations. Some specific aspects of the evolving strategy may have been classified and not available at the
time of publication. Specifically access to information about current operations in the Philippines may have been restricted to maintain operational security and the protection of collection assets or sources.

**Delimitations**

For the purpose of this thesis Southeast Asia is defined as the foreign area officer program’s areas of concentration for Southeast Asia. This area is limited to the countries of Australia, Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Guinea, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. This area of concentration does not include, Bangladesh, China, Diego Garcia, Federated States of Micronesia, India, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Maldives, Pakistan, Palau, Russia, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, and Taiwan.

**Summary**

Each year terrorists around the world commit acts of unimaginable destruction directed against the United States. They continue to become more violent, destructive in nature and targeted against nonmilitary targets. How can the United States develop a national security strategy to combat this growing threat? This thesis paper will analyze this issue in detail; however, the author will review some of the current literature that has been published and is relevant to this issue.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

The methods of combating terrorism have been documented since the time of Machiavelli in 1513 AD (Machiavelli, 1513). In Chapter VIII of his work *The Prince*, Niccolo di Bernardo Machiavelli offered his observations of how a Prince may combat the terrorism of the day, which, was targeted assassination of the sovereign. Machiavelli recommended the course of action of anticipatory retaliation. In this scenario the Prince would be wise to put to death any man and his entire family whom might hold a grudge against prince and one-day attempt to assassinate the prince. Until recently, in the western contemporary society killing suspected enemies or terrorists before they have committed a crime was considered a bit extreme.

Regional Terrorism

From about 1960 until 1990 much of the literature focused on specific acts or specific political groups in an East--West context. Much of the literature referred to terrorism as insurgency or guerrilla warfare. Rejai’s compiled a number of articles from contributing authors who are experts on terrorism in certain regions around the world such as Palestine, Europe, Southeast Asia and Central America. Rejai asserted, “during this time the attacks were targeted and calibrated to achieve specific political goals” (Rejai, 1973).

International Terrorism

Long, Grosscup, and Hoffman in their recent studies and publications provide detailed analysis and understanding of modern terrorism. They focus on why terrorism
has evolved in its current conditions. These books give even the novice an in depth appreciation of how complex an issue that modern terrorism is. Additionally it provides a background of how multi-dimensional and unique each terrorist group is.

Miller and Kenedi, Hitti, Davis, Hourani, and Hiro have contributed vast bodies of work to the western study of Islam. They provide the English speaking world with translations and superb analysis of the Arabic language Quran and Suanna. Additionally, they provide a modern context in which to give the western world a better understanding of Islamic culture.

Laqueur, Gunaratna, Taheri, provide great incite into the world of international or transnational terrorism and all of its worldwide implications. They also provide a detailed understanding or the ideological and operational side of fundamentalist and Islamist terrorist organizations.

Other modern bodies of work, such as Freedman’s *Strategic Coercion* (Concepts and Cases), reviewed the impact and issues of strategic coercion by “transnational actors,” nation states on other lesser states and the social and legal ramifications of those actions (Freedman, 1998). In one case Lepgold compared and contrasted the nation-less transnational terrorist and drug traffickers (Freedman, 1998). He provided superb common sense, realistic observations about recent international attempts to use state-sponsored coercion to push a transnational agenda. Lepgold found a remarkable parallel between how terrorist networks and drug traffickers operate. He proposed that perhaps the lessons learned combating terrorists might aid in figuring out how to combat the drug traffickers as well.
Another prospective was developed by Lang and took a critical look at foreign intervention by transnational actors in another sovereign nation’s affairs (Lang, 1986). In this work he looked at the ethical dilemmas raised by international intervention. Recent history showed us there is a vast gulf between how the intervening forces are perceived in the modern world vice how they are perceived in the local area that they are deployed.

Military Aspects of Terrorism

In the 1990s eleven Master’s in Military Arts and Science theses and Monograph papers were written on the subject of terrorism. Of the eleven, seven are relevant to this research. Campbell conducted *An Investigation Into Islamic Fundamentalism and An Assessment Of Its Relationship With The Concept Of Jihad* (Campbell 1992). His work was a superb primer for delving into the complexity of the relationship of Jihad with Islamic fundamentalism. His thesis detailed the evolution of Islamic Fundamentalism from its earliest days in the seventh century until its modern manifestation in the post revolution Iran. The thesis exposed the readers to the importance of human psychology in implementing shift in how people see themselves fitting into the modern world. He precisely chronicled how an Islamist movement in Iran became so personal and emotional that it eventually led to the overthrow of a state Government in 1979.

Bryant analyzed how well the U.S. doctrine at the time-addressed terrorism. His thesis took a critical look at the 1998 Draft of Field Manual FM 100-5 and evaluated how well the U.S. doctrine at the operational level of war at the time addressed the evolving threat of terrorism. Bryant found that “while the 1998 FM 100-5 *Operations* did address the terrorist threat, it did not adequately address the threat across the spectrum of conflict to give the operational commander a proper focus in force protection” (Bryant 1997).
Weimer, on the other hand, looked at how the United States was conducting its anti-terrorism doctrine. He questioned if the doctrine that was in effect at the time was setting the country up for failure. He concluded that the deficiencies were indeed validated. He made the analogy “that while the U.S. Commanders (the coach) are conducting the game under National Football League rules while the various players are using Canadian rules, Australian league rules and English rugby rules simultaneously” (Weimer 1998). He made a number of recommendations designed to get all services of the U.S. military on the same anti-terrorism doctrine.

Wille and Hickey in 1998 and 2001 respectively conducted analyses on applying operational art to countering terrorism in their theses (Wille 1998) and (Hickey 2001). Wille conducted a critical analysis of the Army’s new doctrine Field Manual 3-0 Operations (which replaced FM 100-5). In his thesis he used the doctrine as written to build a campaign plan to defeat Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda organization and tested it against the elements of operational design. Wille determined that FM 3-0 could be used to frame a counter terrorism campaign to deal with al-Qaeda but that it did have certain limitations in particular dealing with nonstate actors.

Hickey on the other hand framed his thesis to determine if the theory behind operational art applies to an asymmetric threat such as terrorism. He examined the nuances of Presidential Directive 39, the nations counterterrorist strategy as they addressed the ends, ways and means of the policy to determine if they were sufficient to links strategic aims to tactical action. He determined that it was a useful tool and could be utilized to combat sophisticated and complex terrorist organizations.
Finally, two theses dealt with taking the fight to the terrorist. Haskins looked at how to deal with transnational players in his. He addressed the possibility that the U.S. could become embroiled fighting against transnational actors such as al-Qaeda terrorist, international drug organizations and international criminal organizations. He determined that because of the dispersion of the organizations and their tactics that the U.S. will “likely fight indefinitely on the strategic defensive against these criminal organizations” (Haskins 1996).

Four years prior to Haskins Hogg analyzed aspects of using legal terror against the terrorists themselves (Hogg 1992). Hogg determined that there are certain instances when terror may be used as a legitimate weapon. However, it should be used judiciously and only within the laws of war.

**Studies in Terrorism**

In the past five years at least seven private and governmental studies have been conducted on the issue of global terrorism of which two are relevant to this research topic (Department of State Patterns of Global Terrorism Report 1999) and (Center for Defense Information, Terrorism Project). One of the most substantial reports published recently, which addressed the actual U.S. policy, was the National Commission on Terrorism in 1999. This report, dated 8 October 1999, identified 28 major foreign terrorist organizations. Of those mentioned the most prominent and active in Southeast Asia was the Abu Sayyaf Group, primarily active in the Philippines. The commission’s assessment of the last 35 years states:

Terrorist attacks are becoming more lethal. Most terrorist organizations active in the 1970s and 1980s had clear political objectives. They tried to calibrate their attacks to produce just enough bloodshed to get attention for their cause, but not
so much as to alienate public support. Groups like the Irish Republican Army and the Palestine Liberation Organization often sought specific political concessions. Now a growing percentage of terrorist attacks are designed to kill as many people as possible. (Commission Report, 1999)

Since 1996 the U.S. State Department has maintained a database and watch list of international terrorist organizations, periodically adding and deleting organizations based on threat and operations. The most recent addition to the foreign terrorist organization list was the group Jemaah Islamiyah that was suspected of the Bali Car Bombings in October 2002.

The Center for Defense Information has commissioned the “Terrorism Project.” This ongoing study maintains a database and sponsors a number of analysts, who research issues and organizations, conducts country assessments and assesses current events. Huang has published a number of articles highlighting the possible links between terrorist groups that have traditionally been thought of as maintaining only limited goals. For example in April 2002 he published an article that examined the links between Jemaah Islamiyah, “al-Qaeda’s foremost Southeast Asian collaborator” (Huang April 2002) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). What is significant to understand, is before October 2002 these two groups had not drawn much attention from the U.S. The U.S. Department of State had identified them as only regional or national threats.

This research project compiled numerous articles from contributing authors from these two significant programs from Center for Defense information’s Terrorism Project and the U.S. Department of State’s substantial libraries to supplement research. Those articles were written about recent events and provide much of the foundation for understanding the current and evolving terrorist threat in Southeast Asia.
Since 11 September 2001 the shear volume of U.S. literature published on terrorism has grown exponentially. Any reliable, credible, and influential newspaper, such as the *New York Times* or weekly news publication, such as *Time Magazine* has published a wide variety of articles and essays on the issue of terrorism in each issue since 11 September 2001. Many of these articles focused on the sensational aspects of the incidents rather than solutions to the current problem. They did however, help document the most recent terrorist attacks.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

The research methodology was model-based qualitative content analysis. The model was derived from the Army’s 7-step combat decision making process: 1. Identify the problem. 2. List facts and make assumptions. 3. Develop courses of actions. 4. Compare courses of action. 5. Select best course of action. 6. Implement selected course of action. 7. Supervise and refine course of action as necessary. The combat decision making process is generally applied yet specifically modified to accommodate the complex nature of contemporary transnational terrorism.

Methodology Concept

This research methodology (see figure 1) first, defined precisely the current transnational terrorist threat in Southeast Asia. The model involved an in depth regional assessment of this area of operation, with emphasis on Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand. This resulted in identifying many existing and emerging transnational terrorist threats in the region.

Second, it analyzed the current National Security Strategy and the current regional programs that relate to combating terrorism in Southeast Asia.

Third, the analysis examined the strategy’s utilization of the four traditional instruments of power: diplomatic information, military and economic (DIME) with emphasis on the military. The military aspect of the analysis focused on four subordinate programs: foreign internal defense (FID), theater engagement strategy, military to
military and interagency operability. The analysis of the DIME determined if they were employed. If so, were they effective? And if not, determine why. They may not have been relevant to the current situation or they may have been overlooked or ignored by the policy makers. Next, the analysis examined how the U.S. employed both national assets and coordinated with foreign assets to implement the U.S. Strategy. Specifically, four nontraditional instruments of power: legal, financial, law enforcement, and education were included in the analysis. Next, the analysis attempted to answer the question: Are there other instruments of power that were not identified but may be applicable?

Figure 1. Research Model.
Forth, the various aspects of the strategy were evaluated against historical and current case studies of transnational terrorism in Israel and in the Philippines. The operational criteria of feasibility, acceptability and suitability, as defined by the Department of Joint Multinational Operations at the Army’s Command and General Staff College were used for the analysis. The functional criteria of ways, means and ends were used to determine the effectiveness of the strategy. This was determined by applying the following question: Were the “means” adequate to support the particular “ways” implemented in order to achieve the desired strategic “ends.”

Fifth, certain aspects of this paper were theoretical in nature. However, every attempt was made to ground the theory in practical applications. This research attempted to determine: If the current U.S. Strategy is sufficient to counter the transnational terrorist threat in Southeast Asia? If it was found otherwise, make recommendations or offer solutions to fill the deficiencies. The analysis supported one of two possible outcomes:

1. The current U.S. strategy is effective in combating transnational terrorism in Southeast Asia as written, understood, and employed and should be continued;

Or

2. The current U.S. strategy is not effective in combating transnational terrorism in Southeast Asia as written, understood, and employed and should be modified.

Practical Methodology

This research project was conducted utilizing library and Internet based research of subject matter experts from primary source terrorist analysts from the U.S. Department of State, the Brookings Institute, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Center for Defense Information, Headquarters Pacific Command, Fort Bragg, and the Pentagon. These
analysts provided a majority of the threat, regional and organizational assessment information from secondary or tertiary analysis of primary source information.

This research also utilized press releases, or public record of addresses via official transcript, or declaration to include past and forthcoming primary source information, such as the NSS and the NMS. These sources included key influential decision makers with respect to the evolving national security strategy.
CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

The Threat

The primary transnational terrorist threat to the U.S. in Southeast Asia is from Islamist Extremist. The catalyst is al-Qaeda working directly or by indirectly utilizing local groups that are ideologically compatible. The end they hope to achieve is “establishing a Daulah Islamiah--an independent Islamic state encompassing Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Muslim islands of the southern Philippines” (Huang, April 2002). This county would then be used to spread the Islamist’s lesser Jihad in a domino effect to other countries in the region. This region is just a portion of al-Qaeda’s overall world strategy.

Strategy of Terrorism

The threat’s or al-Qaeda’s strategic goal is world conquest and domination under a fundamental Islamist state. This worldwide state will be administered under the Sharia. Though proclaimed back in the 1930s Shaikh Hassan al-Banna captures the essence of the al-Qaeda’s mission “It is in the nature of Islam to dominate, not to be dominated, to impose its law on all nations and to extend its power to the entire planet” (Taheri 1987). What is often overlooked is that al-Banna of the Muslim Brotherhood greatly influenced Abdullah Azzam, Osama bin Laden’s mentor and founder of al-Qaeda. In addition to bin Laden’s rhetoric invoking world jihad (lesser) one must look at the cover of the al-Qaeda supported Taliban training manual in which a globe is impaled on a sword emblazoned with the words that translate to “Military Studies in the Jihad against the tyrants” (unknown). This symbol is the epitome of Islamist intentions.
Al-Qaeda only recognizes two traditional aspects of national power; military and informational when dealing with countries that oppose them. These relate to the power of the sword and the word of the Quran. They do not recognize diplomacy as an instrument of national power. They will not negotiate or compromise to achieve their strategic aims. Since they are nonstate actors the only economic influence that they can exert is to destroy economic symbols, systems, facilities, or to deter economic prospects, such as foreign investors as a result of their action. However, when it comes to recruiting allies in different countries al-Qaeda is very astute at using diplomacy to recruit supporters. This proactive recruitment effort well supports their operational objectives.

The most dangerous course of action is that al-Qaeda has established self-sustaining and self-replenishing terrorist cell at the local level. Long-term danger exists if the seeds of cells they have planted will be allowed to develop, grow, function, and spread on their own.

**Operational Objectives**

The Operational objectives are targeted at each country in the world. They include a systematic, long term, country-by-country overthrow of local and state governments. The operational objectives focus on destabilizing a country or region in a country, overthrowing the government, and finally installing a fundamentalist Islamic government that is preferably supportive of al-Qaeda. This is not intended to be a quick process it is more focused on long-term results. The method is simple infiltrate, recruit, expand, convert, and overthrow from within.

While al-Qaeda makes contact with many organizations around the world only a few very select militant organizations are retained to be their proxy in the region. They
have been very discrete about who they associate with. They normally deal with only one organization in each country. For example they have “established ties with Jemaah Islamiah in Indonesia, Kumpulan Mujahideen Malaysia in Malaysia,… and Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines” (Huang 2002, 1-2). However, this is not a hard rule, Al-Qaeda has also been connected with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines.

Al-Qaeda is the professional level of the terrorist league. They accept a very low percentage of only the most committed and devoted Islamic fundamentalists “freedom fighters” recruited around the world. This is very similar to the Muslim Brotherhood’s “secret apparatus” (Mitchell 1969, 20). Al-Qaeda is to modern day Islamic transnational terrorism as the Sicilians were to the American Italian Mafia or Cosa Nostra: which translates to: “our thing.” Like the Mafia of the 30s and 40s al-Qaeda utilized Omerta, which is the Sicilian code of silence, and through much of the 90s they were able to operate internationally with impunity.

Using the basic Jewish terrorist template developed Irgun in the late 1940s; al-Qaeda has refined and adapted it to fit the transnational character of the organization. They have been infiltrating operatives into population centers of each country in the region for years. These operatives come in a wide variety of skill sets divided into four categories.

First, operatives are designed to plan and conduct terrorist operations. Second, cell developers are recruiters who are tasked to establish links with local extremist or separatist groups who are already conducting anti-government operations. Third, financiers are designed to mix with the local population to build infrastructure, such as Mosques, schools, such as Madrassas with dorms, and even hospitals. Operating on the
marketing principle of reciprocity they spend large sums of money and in return for their investments they gain sympathetic support from the local population even if it is passive. They also will set up front organizations that funnel money through back channels to the organization that will support local operations. Fourth, the religious educators and clerics will establish and run the Madrassas (as they are known in the Middle East) or Pesantrens (as they are known Southeast Asia) or teach at local universities. Madrassas are Islamic boarding common in Afghanistan and Pakistan that are established under the guise of providing the local population, usually the underprivileged such as orphans, with a free parochial education. Orphan’s are left in the care of local fundamentalist Madrassas, such as Pakistan’s Haqqania Madrassa, which is commonly called Taliban University because:

It graduated more leaders of the Taliban . . . than any other school in the world . . . The school enrolls more than 2,800 male students, drawn mostly from the dire poor. Tuition, room and board are free; the Madrassa is funded by wealthy Pakistanis and devout, politically minded Muslims in Persian Gulf countries. (Goldberg 2002, 72)

Maulana Samiul Haq acknowledged, his students are not taught to become terrorists. “But when the Taliban was faring badly in battle against the Northern Alliance—the foe of the Taliban in Afghanistan’s seemingly endless civil war--Haq closed down the school and sent the students to the front.” (Goldberg 2002, 74)

Bjorn Blengsli, a Norwegian anthropologist who is studying Islam in Cambodia, acknowledges that Cambodia “is ripe for Muslim missionaries” though he has not personally seen radical militant Muslims in the country. He has noticed an influx of Arab and Islamic immigration and “The number of mosques has risen to more than 150 from about 20, and there are many smaller places to worship” (Mydans, 2002). Additionally, other governmental sources confirm this observation.
A Cambodian intelligence official said in an interview that some Islamic militants, possibly traveling on forged passports, appeared to have met with foreign Muslim clerics who are based here. Everything is easy because this is a corrupt country, he said. (Mydans, 2002)

The main danger is that these Madrassas and Pesantrens are being used as fundamentalist indoctrination programs that teach the next generation of fundamental Islamist. The remarkable issue is that these Madrassas and Pesantrens are predominately Wahhabi schools of thought. After proper fundamentalist indoctrination these children are very likely to become the next generation of freedom fighter or terrorist.

What is significant to understand is that the children are being taught to hate not only the enemies of Islam but to hate in the name of Allah. It is only a matter of time until they start acting on this hate. This type of narrow education has the potential to be a long-term problem. Just as the Haqqania Madrassa is a breeding ground for freedom fighters in Pakistan so too could the Islamic schools located throughout Southeast Asia.

Money has flowed in from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Malaysia and Indonesia, and scores of new Islamic boarding schools are staffed in part by teachers from other Muslim nations. Every year Muslim officials say about 80 Cambodian students travel abroad to study in Wahhabi schools. Another 400 travel to Malaysia where a fundamentalist movement called Dakwah is widespread. (Mydans, 2002)

Goldberg observed of his visit to the Haqqania Madrassa is that “These are poor and impressionable boys kept entirely ignorant of the world and, for that matter, largely ignorant of all but one interpretation of Islam. They are the perfect jihad machines” (Goldberg 2002, 77). The world saw what the Nazi’s were capable of after advocating and sponsoring anti-Semitic feelings and openly teaching a generation to hate the Jews from 1935-45. Put in the proper context some Madrassas and universities in the Middle East and around the world have been teaching radical fundamentalist and Islamist
extremism since the 1970s. Throughout the Muslim world Saudi Arabia has pacified the local fundamentalist

By funding religious schools (Madrassas) and centers that spread a rigid puritanical brand of Islam-Wahhabism. In the past thirty years Saudi-funded schools have churned out tens of thousands of half-educated, fanatical Muslims who view the modern world and non-Muslims with great suspicion. America in this worldview is almost always evil. (Fareed 2001)

Abu Bakar Bashir who is believed to head Jemaah Islamiyah has denied any involvement with al-Qaeda. However, he has declared, “His unequivocal admiration for bin Laden, a man he has called a ‘true Islamic warrior’ pitched against the ‘terrorist’ United States” (Jacinto 2002). The concept of Omerta has served al-Qaeda well and since 11 September 2001 it is not good public relations to be too closely associated with al-Qaeda.

Just as al-Qaeda has developed a pattern of target selection and methods of attack so too have radical fundamentalist groups developed a method of spreading their extremism. The common factor is the Islamic missionaries are getting into remote places and establishing educational institutions. It is no coincidence that Islamic boarding schools have been established it Southeast Asia by men like Bashir.

In 1972 he co-founded Al Mukmin, an Islamic boarding school or Pesantrens, as it is know across Indonesia. Like Pakistan’s Madrassas, Pesantrens are mostly private schools offering Koranic education, although some of the larger Pesantrens also offer the official state curriculum that enables students to take university entrance examinations. (Jacinto 2002)

Men like Bashir are priming the next generation of Muslim children by indoctrinating them in only Wahhabian Islamic fundamentalism. Remember one of the key components of this worldview is that the survival of Islam depends on the sword.
Tactical Applications

To the Islamist such as Osama bin Laden and his disciples, terrorism is a legitimate tactic or method of waging war that has strategic implications. Two of the most common errors that nation states and conventional military forces commit are to believe the incorrect assumptions that terrorism is a random act and that terrorists are “crazy fanatics” (Hoffman 1998, 7). Terrorism authority Bruce Hoffman explains how terrorists often view themselves.

Cast perpetually on the defensive and forced to take up arms to protect themselves and their real or imagined constituents only, terrorist perceive themselves as reluctant warriors driven by desperation--and lacking viable alternative--to violence against a repressive state, predatory rival ethnic or nationalistic group, or unresponsive international order. (Hoffman 1998, 30)

The Islamist believes that he maintains the moral high ground and that his actions are supported, if not sanctioned, by Allah. Though westerners and in particular Americans view the Islamist’s beliefs as extreme or radical or his actions as fanatical, these are not mentally deficient people. Rather, the contrary is true. The Islamist views himself as a warrior of Allah, a storm trooper fighting for the greater good of his people or his country and the world; a Muslim world.

Understanding Contemporary Terrorism

To fully appreciate the effectiveness of terrorism as a strategy one must understand that terrorism is not about the terrorist attack itself but about the secondary and tertiary effects of the attack. Contemporary transnational terrorists consider their attacks as legitimate military actions just like guerrilla warfare. Additionally they consider civilian casualties as acceptable collateral damage even though they may have been the intended targets of the terrorist attack. The victims of the terrorist attacks are
considered pawns in the bigger scheme of things because the ends the terrorist seeks to achieve, especially in the name of Allah, always justify the means.

Terrorism as a tactic has an insidious method to the madness. This is how contemporary terrorism works. A local organization determines that they want to overthrow the current government or remove outside influences such as an oppressive national or colonial government. They determine that they do not have the manpower, equipment or technology to fight the current regime in a conventional war or even an unconventional guerrilla war.

They move to the cities or area with high population densities. They then organize into squad size elements, cells, or units generally from six to twelve people. They blend into the local population using them as shields and screens while they conduct their operations. They select, plan, and conduct detailed reconnaissance of their targets. They then revise, refine and rehearse their attack in secrecy. Finally, at the appointed time they attack their target and then blend back into the local population before the authorities realized what has happened. The terrorist maintains the advantage of surprise because only a select few know the target and timing of the attack. Normally they outclass the local civil authorities because they are essentially conducting military operation against civilian opponents and targets.

Eventually the government response comes. Normally, at a minimum, it inconveniences the local population but more likely oppresses or even harms them. Many times the government response kills or injures the local population in an attempt to capture or kill the terrorists. The stories about these deaths and injuries are pretty easy for the terrorist to frame, manipulate, and exploit through the media. The local population
perceives that the government is in fact harming and oppressing them. This in turn causes the local population to become sympathetic towards the terrorist who committed the first atrocity. What is ironic is that the logic loop is counter intuitive but effective. The local population now perceives that the original terrorist act, though it was done against them, was done on their behalf. If the conditions are correct over time the government response to successive attacks will become too oppressive for local population it will trigger a mass revolt. Now the local population will attempt to overthrow the sitting government to stop the government oppression, which serves the terrorist’s ends.

The primary target of terrorist attacks is the media. Terrorists want to bring notoriety to the cause for that they believe in. Since these attacks are sensational they will be picked up by the media and bring attention to their cause. Historically most groups claimed responsibility for their attacks to put name recognition with the cause. However, this also identifies or defines a threat to the local authorities. Though al-Qaeda may praise an attack they usually do not claim responsibility for the attack. They preferred to bring notoriety to their cause not themselves.

A secondary effect of the terrorist attack is the destruction of the prestige of the sitting government. Because they were not able to stop the attack from happening they appear weak or inept. In response to the fear generated by the attacks the government will attempt to restore order and their reputation thus they will take measures to catch the perpetrators and prevent future attacks. This is when the government really starts to oppress and inconvenience the local population.

Tertiary effects of the terrorist attacks include support from the local population because the terrorists are perceived as attacking the government on behalf of the people.
The symbolic nature of the target is significant; it is designed to send a message that “we do not approve of this type of activity (such as night clubs bombings) and that those who continue this type of behavior are at risk. Additionally, extreme fear is generated by the ferocity of the attacks; this is designed to break the will of the sitting government or the imperial society’s civilian population making continued involvement seem too costly. Finally, it projects determination and commitment by the terrorists and generates respect through fear.

**Historical Cases**

What is ironic is that the Jewish terrorist organization “Irgun” (*Irgun Zvai Le’umi-National Military Organization*) developed the Modus Operandi or template for what most modern Islamist terrorist organizations use today to include al-Qaeda and the Palestinian terrorist organizations operating in Israel today (Hoffman 1998, 56).

The Jewish terrorists in the late 1940s perfected this technique against the British Imperial Forces as an anti-colonial movement. They realized that they could not win an insurgent or guerrilla war against conventional forces. They thus broke into small squad sized elements in urban areas and conducted their operations in and among the populations. The most notable of Irgun’s attacks was the bombing of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem.

On two floors of its southern wing (beneath which the explosives were placed), the hotel housed the nerve center of British of British rule in Palestine: the government secretariat and headquarters of British military forces in Palestine and Transjordan. (Hoffman 1998, 51)

Though they targeted the actual seat and symbol of British Imperial rule the attack killed ninety-one people including local Arabs and Jews. To this and many other terrorist attacks,
The government could only respond by imposing on Palestine a harsh regimen of security measures encompassing a daily routine of curfews, roadblocks, cordon-and-search operations and, for a time even martial law. (Hoffman 1998, 52)

Ironically, fifty-five years later, these are the same conditions that the current Israeli government continues to impose on the Palestinians in response to recent terrorist attacks. Even more ironic is the Palestinians use this same basic template with a new twist the suicide murder bomber.

Actions such as these worked then and continue to work to the terrorist’s advantage. The remainder of the population who might not have supported the terrorist before became disillusioned with the oppressive then British government and current Israeli government. Both populations perceived that the terrorists were actually fighting for them. The British committed tens of thousands of troops and still could not stop the attacks. After three years of attacks and numerous casualties the British decided to cede rule of the colony to a local government. This in turn strengthened the terrorist’s position and validated their methods.

Hoffman explains in detail that this became the basic template for a series of successful anti-colonial movements in Cyprus, Algeria, and South Africa. Of course each movement modified the template to suite their specific situation and environment.

This template is neither perfect nor fool proof. Hoffman also discusses a number of times when this template did not work, such as the Armenians in Turkey, South Moluccans in the Netherlands, and the Kurds in Turkey. These terrorist organizations failed to win the support of the people for various reasons and were viewed as common criminals and murders rather than freedom fighters.
The Palestinians further improved this template with the addition of international attacks in other countries such as high jacking international airplanes and the 1972 Munich Olympics massacre. Conducting terrorist operations in other countries and at major media events has now become the model for transnational terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda. The tragic news is that in the proper circumstance terrorism as a tactic works.

Within four years, a handful of Palestinian terrorist had overcome a quarter-century of neglect and obscurity. They had achieved what diplomats and statesmen, lobbyist and humanitarian workers has persistently tried and failed to do: focus world attention on the Palestinian people and their plight. (Hoffman 1998, 74)

The Philippines on the other hand has been the venue of numerous terrorist attacks for the last 100 years. The Muslim community on Mindanao has been fighting for independence since as early as 1902. The communist have been fighting to take over the country since the end of World War II. The nature of their struggle has been a struggle for independence. In 1977 the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) separated from its parent organization the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). Both the MILF and Abu Sayyaf have Afghan trained operatives conducting operations. Since the 1980s the nature of the attacks have changed focus from local or nationalistic objectives to conducting operations that fit in with al-Qaeda’s strategy. In early 2003 ASG or MILF detonated bombs at two local airports attempting to kill foreigners. The international nature of these attacks, that is attempting to create a media event, appears to have been sponsored or encouraged by al-Qaeda.

The Philippine government treats all of the terrorist organizations operating within its boarders as insurgents. This is significant because it utilizes the military to fight the
terrorist rather than local law enforcement agencies. In this capacity they have been
directly combating these organizations for years with various degrees of success.

U.S. policy on terrorism in Southeast Asia

The *Bush 2002 NSS* is quite a departure from past strategies of being able to fight
two major theaters of war simultaneously. The primary focus of this strategy is waging a
global theater of war on terrorism against rogue states and non-state actors, such as
transnational terrorist. Historically, nation states have only had to deal with the economic
effects of transnational actors such as multinational conglomerate business entities acting
primarily for economic gains. Now, the U.S. must address the development of nonstate
transnational terrorists using violent military type attacks for political gains. Though the
strategy is heavily influenced by the 11 September 2001 attacks it has evolved with the
changing nature of the post cold war threat. President Bush asserts “America is now
threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones” (*Bush 2002*, 1). For it is
in these failed, failing or undeveloped states such as Afghanistan, Sudan, Indonesia, and
parts of the Philippines that transnational terrorist are able to operate freely.

The current U.S policy on terrorism is a global rather that a regional strategy. The
*Bush 2002 NSS* addressed terrorism more so in general terms and on a global scale. The
threat in Southeast Asia was not specifically defined nor addressed. The *Bush 2002 NSS*
did however, provide enough specific guidance that defined the President’s long-term
goal or ends and clearly articulated his intent. Gaining an understanding of the national
strategy will provide a better understanding of its regional application.
The National Security Strategy

The Bush 2002 NSS is aggressive, engaging, universal, and proactive which provides the implementing agencies with clear intent. The ends are well defined without necessarily prescribing the ways or means. For the implementing agencies the strategy it is empowering and encourages latitude of action while establishing a system to coordinate the effort. The Bush 2002 NSS established the department of Homeland Security. This was first new cabinet level federal department to be established since 1988. This department was designed to be an information clearinghouse and coordination center.

The policy is a clear shift from the concept reacting to threats too proactively engaging would be threats. This idea attempts to defuse a situation when it is small and manageable rather then waiting for the threat to fully develop before responding to it. The most significant aspect of the strategy is idea of “acting preemptively” against threats.

While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country; and denying further sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorist by convincing or compelling states to accept their sovereign responsibilities. (Bush 2002, 6)

This statement has paved the way for the U.S. departure from the cold war mentality of wait for something to happen with the threat of a “Massive Response.” This departure was consummated in deed with a preemptive attack by a CIA controlled Predator unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) in Yemen. “The UAV attacked a vehicle carrying suspected al-Qaeda member Abu Ali with a Hellfire anti-tank missile, killing him and five other suspected al-Qaeda members in the vehicle” (CNN, 2002). Preemptive
strikes are not limited to military action they include freezing financial assets, sharing intelligence and law enforcement information.

Global War on Terror

The events of 11 September 2001 have brought about a revelation that the county is at a state of war. This is a significant paradigm shift because a nonstate entity, al-Qaeda, is waging war against a nation state and using transnational terrorism as a strategy. The precedent of al-Qaeda declaring a war on the U.S. has gone unacknowledged by many people in the U.S. since 1998 (bin Laden 1998). This is precisely why the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks were such a surprise to the general U.S. population.

The strategy identifies the terrorist’s infrastructure as their center of gravity. Further, the President identifies three decisive points to stop current or ongoing operations. First, the President states, “Our priority will be first to disrupt and destroy terrorist organization of global reach and attack their leadership; command, control, and communications; material support; and finances” (Bush 2002, 5). The intent of this activity is to stop the terrorist’s current operations thus providing a sense of day-to-day security. This aspect is heavy in the military and economic components of the DIME. The U.S. accomplishes this through direct action, foreign internal defense training, military to military training and international military education and training.

Second, the President emphasizes the importance of countries and regional organizations such as Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) working together to stop the terrorists. This will create a synergistic effect in mobilizing combined resources to combat terrorism in the region. The President proposes, “Wherever possible,
the United States will rely on regional organizations and state powers to meet their obligation to fight terrorism” (Bush 2002, 7). This is both a challenge and an opportunity to foreign nations, organizations, and the U.S. agencies charged with this policy. The challenge is to engage other states and encouraging or helping them live up to international standards in stopping terrorism within their borders. The U.S. agencies will be able to work with foreign governments to accomplish their tasks. The opportunity in this challenge is putting a good face on America. Every person that the U.S. employs to act on its behalf is a defacto an unofficial Ambassador. If nurtured properly developing these individual grassroots relationships could prove very beneficial in engaging other countries and educating foreign populations about the American way of life. This aspect of the policy addresses the diplomatic and information components of the DIME.

We will continue to encourage our regional partners to take up a coordinated effort that isolates the terrorist. Once the regional campaign localizes the threat to a particular state, we will help ensure the state has the military, law enforcement, political, and financial tools necessary to finish the task. (Bush 2002, 6)

This concept is currently being tested in places like the Philippines and Malaysia. For example, the Malaysian government is going to start videotaping sermons at six mosques where militant imams have been preaching anti-government messages. What will prove most challenging is that each country has its own unique conditions, culture, and goals. The Cold War idea of us against them that created a common one size fits all foreign policy will not work here. The U.S. must commit to long-term relationships with each country that she seeks to engage. This will build trust and credibility with other nations. The intent is “Denying further sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists” (Bush 2002, 6). This aspect emphasizes diplomatic and cooperative aspects of the DIME reinforced by military if necessary.
Third, the President’s the long-term plan to defeat terrorism is to wage a war of ideas. This campaign attempts to defeat terrorism by initially by engaging the international community, “to make it clear that all act of terrorism are illegitimate so that terrorism will be viewed in the same light as slavery, piracy, or genocide” (Bush 2002, 6). Next, he diplomatically extends U.S. support for developing nations that employ “moderate and modern government, especially in the Muslim world, to ensure that the conditions and ideologies that promote terrorism do not find fertile ground in any nation” (Bush 2002, 6). Further, he seeks to leverage economic and informational instruments by, “Diminishing the underlying conditions that spawn terrorism by enlisting the international community to focus its efforts and resources on areas most at risk” (Bush 2002, 6). Finally, the best most pervasive aspect is “promote the free flow of information and ideas to kindle the hopes and aspirations of freedom in those societies ruled by the sponsors of global terrorism” (Bush 2002, 6).

Chapters VI, “Ignite a New Era of Global Economic Growth Through Free Markets and Free Trade” (Bush 2002, 17) and VII, “Expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy” (Bush 2002, 21) focus on this aspect. This plan is based on the assumption that if economic and government conditions change then thinking will change. Only one sentence in Chapter VII of the NSS addresses education. It states: “Emphasize education. Literacy and learning are the foundation of democracy and development.” (Bush 2002, 23) This passage does not go far enough in that it only encourages literacy a rather than a general education. This is an indirect approach to education through literacy and requires the free flow of information. The U.S. must take a direct approach to encouraging other countries to establish general
education systems. Granted encouraging free trade and economic development will generate the revenues required to support educational programs they do not however, provide a method to supervise those systems.

Education is the key to end the transnational terrorism threat from the Islamist. This aspect will be the hardest to implement because it will require a massive overhaul of many education systems around the world. First, the U.S. must ensure that all children receive a well-rounded general education that includes studies of arts and sciences not just religious classes. This is the part of the information campaign or the war of ideas that the U.S. is loosing in many Muslim communities. There are many moderate Islamic thinkers in many countries of the world that are looking for ways to modernize their local practices of Islam. However, they too run the risk of being labeled as Kafirs by Islamists and extreme fundamentalists.

The cooperation sphere opens new channels of communication and interaction between countries. Through these new channels the U.S. should recommend to partner governments that they require all education institutions to make public their curriculums and lesson plans. This will encourage government supervision of their education systems. This effort addresses a critical aspect that the fundamentalist’s have been utilizing for years.

Additionally the U.S. should make it clear that Islamist and certain extreme fundamentalists are a threat to local and state governments that are not Islamic governments. They must understand that if these entities are left unchecked they will seek to overthrow every government that is installed until an Islamic government that governs by the Sharia is established. A prime example of this is the Muslim Brotherhood’s
actions which has opposed every government in Egypt since 1928. See Campbell, Ruthven and Enayat for more detailed analysis in the case in Egypt. This concept will stop the Islamist and Muslim fundamental extremists, and any other similar type movement, at the grass roots level by denying them information superiority.

The policy tacitly acknowledges that transnational terrorist attacks not only target the U.S. but also many other countries around the world. To emphasize this point every time an international flight is brought down, such as Pan Am 103 nationals from countries other than America are murdered. Further, over ninety countries lost citizens in the World Trade Center Attacks. So acting with the U.S. on this issue is in the best interest of that country as well.

Second, remove the economic conditions that make people feel oppressed. This will remove the support base because the terrorists will have no oppressed people to champion or to act on their behalf. As Sun Tzu stated over 2500 years ago is still true today “That which drives men to kill the enemy is provocation” (Tzu 1991). The intent here is to remove the conditions that provide the impetus to kill or conduct terrorist attacks.

If the local population does not feel oppressed politically or economically and they have access to information beyond their immediate surroundings it will reduce the support base for the terrorist. The more transparent that the terrorist’s goals are the more apparent that they are only criminals operating outside civilized cultural and legal norms. The truth will be exposed that the terrorists are using religion to further their own personal goals in the name of Islam. The true motivation is power. They want to establish an Islamic state that only they would control.
Instruments of National Power

As the world continues to evolve socially and technologically so too will the threats against the U.S. and so too must the means to counter these threats. The development of transnational or nonstate actors in world politics has demanded the development and use of new instruments of national power. The traditional instruments of national power, DIME, are still relevant for building multinational coalitions to combat the transnational character of al-Qaeda and other similar organizations. Even though the world is more interconnected and open it is still composed of nation states. As the world has evolved so too have the instruments that nations may use to influence other nations. They are more specific instruments of power that focus on certain relevant sectors.

The *Bush 2002 NSS* and the subsequent *2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* specifically define the intent to bring all elements of national power to bear to solve the problem of terrorism. The President acknowledges this aspect and makes this point clear.

> We must fight terrorist networks, and all those who support their efforts to spread fear around the world, using every instrument of national power—diplomatic, economic, law enforcement, financial, information, intelligence and military. (Bush 2003, 1)

The President has acknowledged three non-traditional instruments of national power, law enforcement, financial and intelligence, in addition to the traditional four instruments included in DIME. By nations combining and sharing law enforcement, financial and intelligence and states lift the veil of secrecy and remove critical enables the transnational terrorist require. An example of this is utilizing the FBI in Pakistan and Indonesia to assist foreign countries in investigating crimes that may have international implications or consequences. The ability of al-Qaeda to operate in many different
countries at the same time conducting seemingly unrelated operations has been a great source of power for that organization. Now with those countries sharing information and intelligence it will be much harder for al-Qaeda to operate unnoticed and thus unobstructed.

A forth non-traditional instrument of national power is education. Many people see this aspect as a subset of Information. Regardless of how it is categorized the Islamic fundamentalists have capitalized on this aspect and are using it to breed anti-western and specifically anti-American sentiments throughout the Muslim world. The Islamic fundamentalists understand this concept very well. They acknowledge how vitally important it is especially in this region of the world. They have been murdering and kidnapping non-Muslim religious missionaries for years, while expanding their own.

Interagency and International Cooperation

With the recent establishment of the Office of Homeland Security (OHS) the Bush administration is taking action to ensure that the U.S. is coordinating the effort of all agencies charged with combating terrorism. At publication of this paper it is too early to determine if the U.S. is employing the various U.S. government agencies effectively in this effort. What is clear is that establishment of the OHS displays an active step in that direction.

President Bush provides clear objectives for guiding the international effort in the war on terrorism to “Strengthen and sustain the international effort to fight terrorism” (Bush 2003, 19). This concept outlines his guidance in the NSFCT of how the U.S. is prepared to deal with other nations states on a continuum of cooperation from willing and able states, to enabling weak states, to persuading reluctant states, to compelling
unwilling states. This effort is designed to leverage the actions of all U.S. agencies and organizations under the supervision of the State Department.

To synchronize this effort, the Department of State will take the lead in developing specific regional strategies for the defeat of terrorism. We will further leverage regional relationships, by ensuring appropriate allied participation with the regional Combatant Commanders as they prosecute the war on terrorism. (Bush 2003, 17)

This policy is empowering at the operational level because it prescribes the strategic ends, provides the means without prescribing the ways. Each combatant commander is able to develop a course of action that is unique to his region or specific situation. It further harnesses all of the resources of the U.S. government not just the military aspect. By placing the entire operation under the State Department shows that the diplomatic aspect of the DIME is primary and supported effort.

The U.S. is currently supporting and training Foreign Internal Defense (FID) forces in a number of countries around the world most notably in the Philippines. This activity is in accordance with the NSS (Use Quote) which helps other countries help themselves. This historically has been a point of contention with the international community on U.S. policy. At times the U.S. has appeared inconsistent with respect to the types of governments it has supported such as the Contras in Nicaragua or the Shaw in Iran. Of course each decision was made in it’s own time, it’s own set of circumstances and in it’s own context that appeared to be in the best interest of the country at the time. However, this has also created an unpredictable track record. Thus nations may be weary to trust the U.S. Even so it is comes down to this if the U.S. does not support FID she will have not any influence or knowledge of other countries internal dealings. Historically this has led to both strategic and tactical surprises.
The U.S. is currently utilizing military cooperation in all countries in the region of study except for Indonesia. In 1999 congress banned US training of the Indonesian military because of their use of excessive violence in East Timor. In some countries military cooperation is more aggressive than in others. This may involve different types of exchange programs such as officers attending the other country’s various officer schools to bilateral training events involving units from both countries conducting maneuvers together. This program has historically paid large dividends. If the government of a developing country fails the military usually fills the power void. The relationships established by military to military cooperation maybe the only relationship that the U.S. has with that country. They are also significant in developing the foundation of FID missions. For example, much of the anti terrorism and counter terrorism training being conducted in the Philippines and Thailand are being conducted by military to military cooperation. This supports the concept of helping countries to help themselves.

Summary

The modern world of globalization is extremely complex with many different actors. Transnational and nonstate actors are exerting power in new ways and creating many security challenges. The primary threat to the U.S. in Southeast Asia is al-Qaeda. Their transnational terrorist network has ties in almost every country in the region with a Muslim population. They have clear strategic ends, superb operational support, and employ terrorist tactics in this theater of their global war against non-Muslims. They have been successful at establishing terrorist cells and Pesantrens in the region in order to establish bases of operation and local support. The Bush 2002 NSS initiates an aggressive new strategy that seeks to stop terrorism by utilizing all instruments of national power.
The President seeks to consolidate the efforts of the international community and consolidate every resource available the U.S. government.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

This thesis attempted to answer a series of questions that would establish the effectiveness of the *Bush 2002 NSS* as applied to combating terrorism in Southeast Asia.

The answers to these questions would then reveal the strengths and weaknesses of the policy to draw conclusions and make recommendations about the Strategy.

Conclusions: The Threat

First, the strategic, operational and tactical aspects of threat were identified. The most significant result of this analysis was how deep al-Qaeda’s penetration was to this region. Only by combining seemingly unrelated events worldwide were their strategic ends revealed. There can be no doubt that al-Qaeda’s goal is world conquest. A fundamentalist Islamist government similar to that of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan or the Islamic State of Iran will manage this Islamic world.

Second, the analysis revealed that the conditions in many of the countries of this region accommodate the operational level of their plan. Weak central governments that lack uniform legal codes and the means to enforce the rule of law, lax immigration laws and nonstandard education systems enable groups like al-Qaeda to operate uninhibited. The *Bush 2002 NSS* is very well suited for addressing these issues.

Third, at the tactical level terrorism derives its strength by inciting a violent and predictable response. To take this advantage away from the terrorist the response must be unpredictable and precise to minimize collateral damage. Further, the response must not be more oppressive on the population than the terrorist attacks. If the response is
transparent to the local population they will not feel as though the government has turned on them.

Conclusions: The National Security Strategy

TheBush 2002 NSSis suitable because it addresses many facets of the threat at once. The Strategy uses the synergistic effect of the combined resources of other nations and international organizations to augment the joint resources of the U.S. The approach is proactive but acknowledges that it must be flexible to react to changing or new events.

The strategy is acceptable for dealing with terrorists, once they become terrorists, but does not go far enough to deter terrorist from developing. Chapters VI and VII, of the NSS attempt to remove the underlying conditions that enable terrorism to exist such as poverty and corruption in government. They do a superb job attempting to use economic and information as a weapon in combating terrorism.

They do not however, go far enough in addressing the sensitive issue of religious education that spreads radical Islamic fundamentalism through the primary schools such as Madrassas and Pesantrens. These institutions are promoting anti-Americanism and hate. The U.S. must work through other countries to establish the rule of law, end governmental corruption and standardize their education systems. To win President Bush’s war of ideas the U.S. must target the education systems of these countries.

Granted opposing a religious education system is a very sensitive subject. Traditionally, America has been hands-off with respect to the clergy unless they break a law. However, many of the clerics in the Madrassas, and Pesantrens are encouraging anti-Americanism and respect for terrorist. By cloaking their political views in religion they are hiding behind the religious aspect of their profession. The U.S. must seek to
encourage other countries to remove the clerics that are advocates of terror as a method. They are directly responsible for creating the underlying mental conditions that are required to develop future terrorists. They create a common enemy, which their movement requires; by attributing all of the ills of their society to the U.S. Radical Islamic Fundamentalists have used the U.S. as that overpowering evil since 1958. The world observed how much damage Hitler did with only 10 years of his unopposed demonizing of the Jews. The radical Islamic Fundamentalists have been targeting the U.S. for 45 years. Does the world know how much damage has been done to America already?

Areas for Further Research

Combating transnational terrorism is a complex, time consuming and expensive business. Imagine if the world community could eliminate terrorism completely? An optimist would say anything is possible but a realist would say this is easier said than done. This thesis has revealed a number of common themes in the make up terrorist that if further researched may provide valuable information and perhaps a solution to the problem.

Further research should focus on the circumstances that cause a person to become a terrorist. What is it in one’s life that would generate enough hatred to cause him to want to take another’s life or many other lives for his cause? What are the social norms or religious tenants that make it acceptable to murder civilians in the name of spreading that cause? These are some of the questions whose answers may provide insight to the motivations of the modern transnational terrorist. Additional research should be conducted to determine if there are economic, political or social factors that the U.S. can
influence that will change the Islamist’s perception that the U.S. is an anti-Islamic nation. Or what actions can the U.S take to make it clear the U.S. in the Abode of Peace with Islam not the Abode of War with Islam?

**Recommendations**

It is recommended that U.S. strategic leaders continue to maintain and develop the coordination of U.S., foreign nation and international organization’s assets against active terrorists. The U.S. response must never be predictable and must attempt to avoid collateral damage because either could prove counterproductive.

To win the war of ideas the U.S. must first, change the exploitable fundamentalist idea that the U.S. is the source of all evil. The message must be clear that the U.S. wants to live in the abode of peace with the Muslim community, thus removing the notion that America is trying to destroy Islam. The themes should make it clear that first, “modernization should not be seen as ‘Westernization’” (Federspiel 1998, 16). Second, the U.S. believes that we are all one world community and that modernization should be “for the real good of humankind” (Federspiel 1998, 15) not just America.

The information must not be perceived as being exploitative or representing hegemonic aims. The U.S. must work through the local intellectual and opinion leaders to support this effort. The ideas would be more acceptable if they came from with in the local community. The Ideas should be presented in an empowering way that is supporting of Islamic traditional beliefs and local customs. This will help remove the belief that the radical fundamentalist and Islamist are the champions of the people. If this perception is removed, they will then have no evil outside forces such as imperialist, oppressors, or infidels to protect the local population from.
The U.S. must encourage a government supervised general education campaign in developing countries. The U.S. should work through local intellectual and opinion leaders to support this effort. The initiative would be more acceptable if the idea came from within the country.

The intent is to give a general education to the people who are most susceptible of being recruited by terrorist organizations. The general education would replace the Fundamentalist education in the Madrassas or their local equivalent around the world. However, the U.S. must be sure that the information does not run counter to the currently accepted moderate practices and teachings of Islam.

If the Madrassas and Pesantrens of the region are left unchecked they will continue to breed anti-American hatred. Once the local population internalizes this hatred it is just a matter of time until the proper catalyst, such as al-Qaeda or a similar organization motivates the next generation of terrorist to act. Islamic Fundamentalists have always been about action. The radical fundamentalist and Islamist require an evil entity that is threatening their way of life and thus their religion. Once this threat is well established they hold the moral high ground and thus are able to easily incite the properly indoctrinated people to become “freedom fighters” or terrorists.
APPENDIX A

HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE FUNDAMENTALIST TO THE ISLAMIST

The religion of Islam has evolved in many societies and has had a tendency to
develop local customs. This made the religion more user-friendly and acceptable to the
local population. However, these local additions to or interpretations of Islam may or
may not have been in line with the writings of the Quran and the Hadith. Periodically,
throughout Islam’s history a number of intellectuals have lead movements to return Islam
to its fundamentals. This section shows how different fundamentalist, and at times
extremist movements have directly and indirectly influenced the evolution of the modern
Islamist terrorist.

The earliest recorded fundamentalist movement occurred as a result of the Battle
of Siffin in 657. This battle between the revolting Umayyads against the fourth Caliph
Ali and the shia of Ali or the party of Ali proved too costly for Ali and he agreed to
arbitrate a negotiated a peace with the rebel Mu’awiyah. He believed that “Muslims
should not fight Muslims; Jihad should not be directed against fellow believers”
(Campbell 1992, 24). A group known as the Kharijites, [outsiders or seceders] resolved
that this was “a clear-cut conflict between right and wrong, they emphatically argued that
in such matters there could be no arbitration” (Enayat 1982, 7). Rather, the issue should
be solved by the “decisive purity of the sword” (Campbell 1992, 35). They seceded from
the Umayyad regime, however they continued to challenge the legitimacy of that
government by attempting to instigate revolts against it. What is significant to note is that
the Kharijites were the first documented militant and political fundamentalist movements
in Islam. Further, “both the Sunnis and Shia considered the Kharijites as extremist a
detested them as such” (Enayat 1982, 7). They established a precedent of religious warriors willing to kill other Muslims in the name of Islam.

They played an important, albeit indirect, part in the development of Islamic political thought by acting for a while as the incorruptible conscience of the Muslims forcing them to keep in sight the absolute and ideal, as opposed to the relative and the actual. . . in their efforts to construct an Islamic society. (Enayat 1982, 7)

The next major influence in the evolution of modern Islamic fundamental thinking was Ahmad ibn Hanbal (780-855). Noticing many deviations and branches were developing in Islam Hanbal was determined to unite all Muslim thinking of the time. He did not believe that Muslims should fight Muslims “Above all the community should remain united; dissension and conflict should be avoided” (Campbell 1992, 36). This concept is a common theme throughout Islamic history yet; more militant interpreters of the Quran commonly challenge it. “He was one of the first prominent radical thinkers in Sunni doctrine; he set a standard and suggested a method of religious analysis that left a clear and simple example for later Sunni fundamentalist to follow” (Campbell 1992, 35).

The basic principle he believed was that “God was the God of the Quran and Hadith, to be accepted and worshipped in his reality as he had revealed it” (Hourani 1991, 179).

Ahmad ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328) further developed Hanbal’s ideas four centuries later. In an effort to ensure Sufism or Islamic mysticism and local Saint type worship did not supplant the basic tenants of Islam Taymiyya updated fundamentalist ideas. He believed that by actively returning to the basics of Islam the Muslim community could develop in together or unit as one.

He was able to articulate the principles of the most orthodox school and give them a practical role in renewing and reforming religious attitudes. . . He made the Hanbali tradition a powerful force, which could help to shape and unify Islamic trends in a contemporary world. (Campbell 992, 36)
Returning to the Quran and the ancient teachings Taymiyya examined the issues surrounding Sufism, other disbelievers and Muslims who rebel against Islam. A saying attributed to the prophet Mohammad is: “My community will fall apart into two parties. From amongst them there will emerge heretics (mariqa). The party that is closest to the truth will be in charge of killing them” (Peters 1996, 52). This concept is significant because empowers one branch of Islam to declare Jihad against other Muslims who are not as pure in their beliefs as interpreted by the fundamentalists. Fellow Muslims are then identified as *kafirs* and considered disbelievers. The principle established a historical precedent in which once a group is identified as disbelievers then it is of the utmost importance to declare jihad against them. Further, it is the responsibility of every Muslim to wage Jihad against the disbelievers understanding that Allah will favor those who are closer to the fundamentals of Islam.

Four centuries later Mohammad ibn Abd al Wahhab (1703-1792) built upon Taymiyya’s ideas and developed what is now referred to as Wahhabism. This is school of thought has had a significant influence on Islamic fundamentalist evolution and the emergence of the modern Islamist terrorist. “Wahhabism is virtually the paradigm of Sunni fundamentalism and could almost serve as a prototype for reforming religious movements” (Campbell 1992, 37). First, the movement is based on unity of all Muslims and “a standardization of belief based on the purest principles” (Campbell 1992, 38). Second, the movement emphasizes the “Arabness” in that the religion was initially an Arab religion as revealed to Mohammad and was spread outward from Mecca and Medina. As such reform or renewal should come from within Islam in particular Mecca and Medina as well. Finally, this movement was backed by military support from
Mohammad ibn Saud of Dariya. Wahhabism fundamentalism is significant today because it is a modern example of how important military force is to support great ideas. This movement led to the development of modern day Saudi Arabia. Fundamentalist movements and eventually Islamist movements since have combined fundamental religious beliefs, political ideas, and military action as the template to achieve their goals. Alastair Campbell put it succinctly.

It had a more lasting influence—surviving strongly even today in the modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia—and it combined religious fervor with a military power that helped to ensure its success: Wahhabism acknowledged that the force of ideas alone was not enough to carry the day, as Mohammad himself demonstrated in the 7th century. (Campbell 1992, 39)

For the last 200 years Wahhabism provided the basis for Islam to face modern external challenges such as colonialism, westernization, and communism. The Islamic world enjoyed the benefits of western technology and the emergence of new markets; however, it was not as willing to accept western morals or values. “It was the moral arrogance more than anything else that upset the Muslims” (Campbell 1992, 43). Wahhabism set the stage for modern fundamentalist movements that have become progressively more militant.

The modern fundamentalist movement that has had the most influence on modern Anti-western and Islamist organizations is the Society of Muslim Brotherhood. Founded in 1928 in Egypt by Hasan al Banna, it attracted members from all social groups in particular the cultural elite. Banna like many others in Egypt at the time was dissatisfied with the British colonial occupation. He regarded the Egyptian government as a British puppet regime. Unlike many of his contemporaries and predecessors who “had limited
themselves to writing and giving sermons, Banna believed in political action” (Hiro 1989, 64). He believed that:

Moral values could not be separated from the political and constitutional framework in which Muslims live; he advocated activism. . . only by amending the existing European codes of law and replacing most, if not all them, with the Islamic Sharia, could this state be brought into being. (Campbell, 1992, 59)

The early years 1928-1938 were spent recruiting, organizing and spreading his teachings. They made alliances with palace, and refined their political objectives culminating in the publication of a weekly newsmagazine called al-Nadhir. The government viewed this as subversive banned the magazine and imprisoned Banna. He was an eloquent and persuasive speaker, a superb leader, and master or organization. Members were arranged into units called ‘families’, families into ‘clans’, clans into ‘groups’ and groups into ‘battalions’. Members met for prayer, including nocturnal vigils. Much stress was placed on athletics for the young--in order to keep their minds off of sex. Members were enjoined to observe religious duties assiduously, and to avoid the evils of gambling, drinking, usury and fornication. Stress was placed on the ‘Islamization’ of home and family, and loyalty to Brotherhood leaders. (Ruthven 1984, 311)

In 1936 Banna declared Jihad against the British. He recognized the great utility of Jihad as a tool to maintain unity of effort within the Brotherhood. Looking back to the times of Mohammad he saw its value as weapon against an oppressive outside government and as a rallying point against the unbelievers. This too is a great consequence when viewed in the modern context. The modern equivalent is a nonstate social/religious organization declaring war on a Nation-State.

As an organization built on the principles of action the Brotherhood also looked outside of the borders of Egypt to support other Muslims who were being oppressed. These acts earned the Brotherhood immense respect and to great support for their cause from other Arabs.
In 1948 a group of Brotherhood volunteers fought in the Palestine War, alongside the Egyptian army, where they came into contact with the Free Officers, the nationalist group in the Egyptian army, which was to overthrow the monarchy in 1952. (Ruthven 1984, 312)

In 1948, following the defeat of Egypt’s army in Palestine and the unrest that followed, the Government dissolved the Brotherhood. “The dissolution of the organization led to the emigration of many Brothers, who spread its message to Palestine, Transjordan, Syria, and even Pakistan.” (Ruthven 1984, 312) This was a significant event when taken into the modern context. Many if not all of the Islamist movements in these countries draw their roots from this exodus.

After Banna’s murder in 1949 Sayyid Qutb became the driving ideological force in the Brotherhood. Despite all of these major setbacks the Brotherhood was able to reestablish itself in 1951.

Qutb believed that all Muslims had a religious duty to strive for the nation or ‘watan’ of the Islamic community, which was not the same ‘watan’ equated with Egypt and patriotism; this duty was a Jihad. If such a Jihad led a Muslim into a seditious position with the government of a territory defined by un-Islamic borders and secular policies, that was all part of the Muslim’s struggle. (Hiro 1989, 26)

In this belief lies the genesis of the Islamist movement. This is an important precedent. First, it directly challenges the legitimacy of any non-Islamic state. Second, it dictates that all Muslims must place their loyalty to Islam and an Islamic state first, rather than to any other non-Islamic state. These beliefs, if spread, could be problematic in countries with weak central governments and large Muslim populations. This places the average Muslim in a bad situation with only one option: to join the Jihad or become its target. Finally, the language used is remarkably similar to the rhetoric of modern day
Islamist organizations such as al-Qaeda. There are other striking parallels between the Brotherhood and modern day Islamist terrorist such as their selection of targets.

In 1952 during an event referred to as ‘Black Saturday’ “Much of Cairo went up in flames. The role of the Brotherhood in the disturbances was evident the symbolic character of the targets selected--foreign clubs and hotels, bars, cinemas and restaurants: establishments where foreigners and Muslim \textit{kafir} (Disbelievers) congregated. (Ruthven 1984, 313)

The targets mentioned above have been and will continue to be targets of fundamental Islamist because they represent the social decadence and moral decay of the infidels in western civilization. They too are viewed as local symbols of the evil influences from the west, which are subversive to Islam.

Since its beginning the Brotherhood has opposed every Egyptian Government for being more focused on modernism and secularism than on becoming and Islamic state. In an effort to create an Islamic state in Egypt they planned and conducted several assassination attempts on President Nasser and Sadat between 1952 and 1980.

Conversely, The Brotherhood was careful not to accept an office in the government because they “may have feared that the Brotherhood’s image would be tarnished by the responsibilities of office” (Ruthven 1984, 313).

After the failed assassination attempt on President Nasser in November 1954

The whole leadership (of the Brotherhood) was implicated in the plot. Seven were sentenced to death, including Hudaybi, and Nasser’s would be assassin, Mahmud ‘Abdal Latif. Hudaybi’s sentence was, however, commuted on grounds of age and health. The hangings produced a shocked reaction in Egypt, and were greeted with angry demonstrations in Jordan, Syria and Pakistan. (Ruthven 1984, 314)

Ironically these are all countries in which former Brotherhood members immigrated to.

Could this be a coincidental or perhaps nurtured?
During the 1970s the Brotherhood became viewed as too conservative or moderate and had been superseded by more aggressive and militant organizations. These organizations such as *Al Takfir wa’l Hijrah* (Denunciation and flight from sin), *Al Jihad* (Holy War), *Mukfirtiya* (Denouncers of the Kafirs/Infidel), and *Jund Allah* (Soldiers of God) are just a few. To draw a parallel ‘Takfir means ‘denunciation’ (as an infidel): the group’s name thus carried clear Khariji overtones--first denounce one’s fellow Muslims and infidels, then make the *hijra* separating oneself from them” (Ruthven 1984, 315).

When all this is added to the Khariji exaltation of action as a criterion of faith, and their use of violence against their opponents, the full import of their radicalism, and the conscious or unconscious affinity that some fundamentalist groups in modern history have had with them, becomes apparent. The Muslim Brothers in Egypt have sometimes been accused of being Khawarij. They have always denied the charges and even spoken of the ‘errors’ of the Khawarij, but they have never the less praised ‘rectitude’ and their ‘struggle in the path of God. (Mitchell, 1969)

One of the more radical splinter group *Al Jihad* conducted the assassination of President Sadat in 1981. Neither the assassination attempts nor the assassination of President Sadat achieved the desired outcomes of an Islamic state in Egypt. *Al-Jihad’s* belief in “sacred terror” is manifested in “A fifty-four page booklet entitled *The Missing Pillar*” (Wright, 1986). This belief identifies Jihad as the sixth pillar of Islam. The book states that:

The first battlefield in our jihad is to uproot the infidel leadership. . . The tyrants of this earth will only vanish by power of the sword. . . The way to get rid of a ruler imposed on one is by revolt . . . Today’s leaders have become apostates of Islam, bread in the ways of imperialism, whether it be crusader or communist or Zionist” the booklet charged adding that dialogue or other legal channels were insufficient means of changing the system. “The peak of worship is jihad. . . we are asked to do God’s bidding and not worry about the results. (Wright, 1985, 183)
The concept of Jihad as the Sixth Pillar or Islam is of particular concern to all non-Islamic nations when placed in the context of modern times. This belief claims that there can be no Islam without Jihad. The Islamists who follow this doctrine are forcing a fracture between Islam and every other culture on the planet that is not Islamic. The rhetoric of al-Qaeda is quite clear on this issue.

It is possible that there are disciples of the Muslim Brotherhood in every country around the world in which Muslims reside. One of the men who were affiliated with the Brotherhood is Abdullah Azzam who happens to be the mentor of Osama bin Laden. “In the early 1980s, Abdullah Azzam founded the Maktab al Khidmat, which later morphed into an organization called al-Qaeda (the Base)” (Beyers, 2001). This international terrorist organization is at the center of the transnational terrorist threat throughout the world. They are operated through local affiliations throughout the world providing financial, technical, organizational and operational support to local terrorist organizations that they have deemed worthy.

This fundamental Islamist organization that developed its roots from the Muslim Brotherhood.

Through Azzam he became steeped not in the then popular ideology of pan-Arabism, which stresses the unity of all Arabs, but in a more ambitious pan-Islamicism, which reaches out to all the world’s 1 billion Muslims.” (Beyers, September 2001)

What is unique about this generation of Islamist terrorist is that there is no room to negotiate as otherwise traditional cultures do. This point is well established in the fact that they have on more than one occasion targeted embassies such as Beirut in 1983, Tanzania and Nairobi in 1998, Singapore 2001.
Their political aims are clear: to overthrow all non-Islamic governments and replace them with Islamic governments. The ramifications of the fruition of these aims could prove catastrophic for the western world. At best case the entire planet would be united under a benevolent Islamic government that treated everyone equitable under one god. The challenge would be how could the Islamist rule the ‘Infidels’ in the lands that they just occupied. Would they try to educate the world or would they continue to kill all ‘Infidels’? The record of al-Qaeda and other extremist Islamist organization has been not to negotiate with the Infidels rather to identify them and kill them. The logical result then would be the killing of non-Muslim population.

This appendix was designed to show how different historical fundamentalist movements throughout history have directly influenced the evolution of the modern Islamist. It is provided to give the reader a sense of how vast this issue is and provide a context in which the Islamist developed. Additionally it is important to understand how and why the logic trail evolved. Finally, this appendix explained why the Islamist chooses the tactics they did and how they justified the use of such tactics.
APPENDIX B

TERRORIST AND EXTREMIST GROUP OPERATING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Groups with ties to al-Qaeda

Abu Sayyaf (ASG)
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)
Kumpulan Militian/Mujahideen Malaysia (KMM)
Indonesian Islamic Liberation Front (IILF)
Jemaah Islamiah (JI)
Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI)
Indonesian Islamic Liberation Front (IILF)

Indigenous extremist groups with no reference to transnational terrorist (various sources)

Hizbut Tahrir
Laskar Jundallah
Laskar Mujahidin
Laskar Jihad (Indonesian)
Islamic Defenders Front

Groups that al-Qaeda shares ideological and political links with (From Inside al-Qaeda)

Parti Islam Se Malaysia (PAS)
Al Maunah A Muslim Cult dedicated to overturning the Malaysian government through jihad. Followers believed that leader Muhammad Amin Razali had mystical powers that would protect them (Sufism)
The Movement of Islamic Unity (APU)
Islamic Youth Movement of Malaysia (ABIM)
Islamic Front of Malaysia (IFM)
Front Malaysian Islamic Council (FMIC)
Kongress Indiana Muslim Malaysia (KIMM)
Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement (MIYM)
Barisan Nasional (BN)
al-Qaeda. Arabic word meaning “The Base”. Name of Osama bin Laden’s international terrorist organization believed to be operating in at least 20 countries worldwide. Suspected to have tie with Abu Sayyaf and maintains interests in the Region.

The International Front of Islamic Movements. An alliance of extremist organizations created by bin Laden, an umbrella organization to all organizations fighting the Jihad against the Jews and the crusaders

Fatwa. Arabic word for a religious order or edict.

Daulah Islamiah. An independent Islamic state encompassing Indonesia, Malaysia and the Muslim islands of the southern Philippines. The organization has been held responsible for a series of bank robberies, hijackings and bombings of civilian targets” (Huang, 01 April 2001) and they are suspected of the 10 OCT 02 car bombing in Bali.

Glossary. This is the format for a glossary. There is an example of a glossary in Turabian on page 271. Glossary items are in alphabetical order.

Hadith. (pl. ahadith) ‘Tradition’ or report of a saying or actions of the Prophet. One of four roots of Islamic law. (Ruthven, 1984).

Hijra. ‘Emigration’ of Muhammad from Mecca to Medina in 622CE, the base year in the Muslim calendar.

Kafir. ‘Disbeliever’ or infidel who had rejected the message of the Quran (Ruthven 1984).

Sharia. Literally means “approach to a water hole.” In Islam it means revealed law (Ruthven 1984).

Madrassa. A Muslim religious seminary (Ruthven 1984). This term is used primarily in the Middle East

REFERENCE LIST


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Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, *Appendix B: Background on Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, to Patterns of Global terrorism*, United States Department of State, 21 May 2002.


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