The Shaping of Service Roles Through History - Get Back to Fundamentals

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ABSTRACT

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Over 50 proposals were made to reorganize the military between 1921 and 1945. In 1945, after
the experiences of WWII, President Truman observed, "we cannot have the sea, land, and air
members of our defense team working at what may turn out to be cross purposes...engaging in
open competition for funds." In 2003, the Army, Air Force, Navy and Marines fly a variety of
aircraft developed, acquired, maintained, flown, and fought differently. The Army of today
possesses ships and is discussing the acquisition of catamarans to help fight in future wars. The
line between the war fighting capabilities of the Services is becoming significantly more blurred
as technology expands the dominance of Service weapons systems across all environmental
 mediums. How has history shaped role duplication within the Services? What are the
implications of forcing the individual Services to concentrate on their original statutory role
specialties? That is, the Army as the sole expert and resource sponsor for all land warfare and
logistics, the Navy for all sea warfare and logistics, and the Air Force for all air warfare and
logistics. Can efficiencies be gained from this organizational setup? What are the implications
of attempting this strict Service alignment? This paper will attempt to answer these questions
with a view towards infusing efficiency into the Department of Defense as the Services march
towards transformation.
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I would like to personally thank my wife, Catherine, and my four children for their understanding and support in this endeavor. Without their allowing me to isolate myself for several months, I would never have competed this project. Special thanks to Colonel James Pierce for taking me under his already crowded wing to mentor and guide me. Additionally, Professor Pond’s instruction was invaluable to improving my writing skills. Her knowledge, enthusiasm, and concern will not be forgotten.
I have a dream that a new day is coming. That one day all of the individual Services within the Department of Defense (DOD) will operate in complete partnership in a joint fight. Weapons systems will be judged not by the color of resource sponsor’s uniform but by the content of their ability to meet Combatant Commander war fighting requirements. I have a dream that the future battlefield will be divided between the Services by discrete and well-defined responsibilities; the land the Army’s domain, the sea the Navy’s domain and the air the Air Force’s domain. That the Navy, Army and Air Force will one day join hands as brothers and sisters to jointly fight the next war. Overlapping or duplicative Service efforts would disappear and jointness and interdependence would not only be fostered but also embraced. I have a dream that a true Service brotherhood would become a reality. That Armor Officers and Black Shoes, Infantrymen and Aviators, Marines and Submariners would one day be able to join hands and sing with the Special Forces that mythical maxim of today “Joint at last, joint at last, thank god we’re joint at last!”

The current division of labor among the military Services is the product of once well-defined Service operational boundaries distorted by various forces throughout history. Whereas the shore once offered a distinct limit for the evolution of Service capabilities, time and technology have allowed the border to fade. The Service roles, as currently structured, are a product of individual Service leader personality and vision, technology embracement, battlefield success, wartime readiness, public opinion, politics and Service parochialism. This unstructured methodology has allowed the Services to develop duplicative assets and overlapping capabilities.

Service roles over the first 125 years of our Nation’s existence were able to contain Service duplication and to foster jointness. Role definitions have not kept pace with warfare changes since the Spanish American War. The Service’s ability to expand roles into new warfare areas has allowed Service parochialism to thrive. How has history shaped the merging of the Service roles and could redefining these roles without overlap create a more efficient and joint military?

**ROLES MISSIONS AND FUNCTIONS DEFINED**

To begin a discussion of the changes to the division of labor within the Services, which has occurred over the past 225 years, the terms “roles,” “missions,” and “functions” must be defined. These terms are often used interchangeably. They have become less distinguishable
even among the Services. A role is defined as the broad and enduring purposes for which Congress established the Services in law. Missions are the tasks assigned by the President and Secretary of Defense to the Combatant Commanders. Functions are specific responsibilities assigned by the President and Secretary of Defense to enable the Services to fulfill their legally established roles. The primary function of the Services is to provide forces organized, trained and equipped to perform a role to be employed by the Combatant Commander in the accomplishment of a mission.

The roles of the Services drive their capabilities and the required Service resources to meet their personnel, equipment and training functions. Ambiguously delineated roles, allowing broad Service interpretation, are at the heart of overlapping Service capabilities. Services frequently posture on the margin of the different roles and missions definitions to maintain budget percentage and relevance. The importance that the roles, missions and functions debate plays today can be gauged by the remaining Congressional requirement for a periodic report from the DOD regarding an assessment of Service roles, missions and functions.

**ORIGINAL SERVICE ROLE DIVISION**

When the Army, Navy and Marine Corps (USMC) were created in 1775 there was virtually no overlap in capabilities among the Services. The roles were easy to delineate and visualize. The formula for weapon system requirements and tactics was simply articulated; the Navy fought on the sea and required systems, sailors and marines to fight on the sea and the Army fought on the land and required systems and soldiers to fight on the land.

The Army’s role was dictated in the Constitution to “ensure domestic tranquility” and “provide for the common defense.” The Army was responsible for “the raising, fitting out, and dispatching (of) all such land forces as may be ordered…” The Department of War (DOW) established in 1789, originally administered both the Navy and the Army. Serious inadequacies of the Secretary of War to deal with the naval mobilization necessary to handle the deteriorating relations with France were the impetus for officially establishing the Department of the Navy (DON). After the establishment of the DON, the DOW contained only Army forces.

The Act establishing the Navy Department in 1798 stated that the duties of the Secretary of the Navy “shall be to execute such orders as he shall receive from the President of the United States, relative to the procurement of naval stores and materials and the construction, armament equipment and employment of vessels of war, as well as other matters connected with the naval establishment of the United States.” The Navy role was geared to the “ship,” the sea vessel of war.
In those early days of the republic, amphibious warfare was not mature. The Marine Corps, our nation’s amphibious force, was originally formed “to keep discipline aboard ship; lead boarding parties and amphibious landings; fight with muskets in short-range naval battles, and, if the captain wished, work some of the ship’s long guns.”

EARLY JOINT SUCCESS IN WAR

REVOLUTIONARY WAR

The Revolutionary War offered little opportunity for the Continental Army and Navy to clash over roles. The Army and Navy were both autonomous fighting forces. The Continental Navy of 60 vessels was too small to oppose the British. The two largest naval expeditions fought during the war were met with tremendous defeats at Penobscot, Maine and Charleston, South Carolina. At war’s end the Navy had lost almost 70% of its fleet. The 2,000 men of the USMC were too small to perform anything other than the conduct of small coastal raids and the capture of maritime prizes.

General George Washington understood the necessity for a capable Navy in war. Upon hearing of the French fleet entering the Chesapeake Bay he said “…whatever the efforts of the Land Armies the Navy must have the casting vote in this contest.” The Continental Navy was not directly involved with the French fleet in defeating the British at Yorktown. However, the battle proved coordination of naval forces and land armies was crucial to victory in the war.

After the war, the Nation felt relatively safe from future war. The country believed that any invasion would come from Europe and that there would be an extended warning, which would come from such a threat. Believing forces could be organized relatively quickly to defend against an invasion, Congress downsized the Army and the Navy; the USMC was abolished for a short period of time after the war.

WAR MOVES OVERSEAS

During the late 18th century and the early 19th century, the Quasi-War and the war with the Barbary pirates threatened sea commerce. The Navy and embarked Marines were able to come to the nation’s defense. Because of the distance to the conflicts the Secretary of the Navy gave significant latitude to Navy Commanders, “…the great distance between this country and the probable places of your operations render it improper to prescribe to you any particular course of conduct. We therefore leave you unrestrained in your movements and at liberty to pursue the dictates of your own judgment.” The Navy’s ability to operate forward and with minimal direction from its civilian leadership helped reinforce the autonomous nature of the
Navy. The Navy was helping to make the United States a world power while the Army remained safe at home.

WAR WITH MEXICO

The Mexican war has been cited as an example of joint success. President Polk “highlighted jointness as a significant dimension of the U.S. achievement.” Several factors come to play in supporting this jointness. First, the war brewed for a long time allowing the U.S. Army to build a strong force. Second, the war was fought as a series of campaigns emanating from U.S. soil and it required no overseas transportation. Third, the Mexican Navy was virtually non-existent so the U.S. Navy could afford to release assets from its blockade mission to assist the Army.

President Polk realized that a defensive struggle would “prolong the war and ruin the Democratic Party.” With Polk’s blessing, General Winfield Scott immediately began preparation for the first large-scale amphibious operation in U.S. history. He communicated with Commodore Conner, the area squadron commander requesting that he provide planning data including staging areas and tidal information. Scott built 50 Army amphibious vessels, under the design of a Naval officer, to transport 15,000 men. Conner and Scott worked closely on all parts of the assault plan and developed trust in one another. Scott embarked on Conner’s command ship and eventually put the entire amphibious fleet under Conner’s command.

The landing operations were joint from planning to final combined Army and Marine Corp infantry assaults. The relationship between Scott and Conner was crucial. Scott would write, “Commodore Conner’s squadron is indefatigable in assisting us.” President Polk himself in a message to Congress said “Both branches of the Service performed their whole duty to the country...There was concert between the heads of the two arms of the Service...By this means their combined power was brought to bear successfully on the enemy.”

THE CIVIL WAR

The Civil War was a joint success from the Union’s perspective. Initially the Union Army unsuccessfully pursued quick victories and the Navy was utilized separately to blockade the South. This changed once the expectation of a quick war vanished.

Secretary of War, Edwin M. Stanton and Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles “saw little need to coordinate their efforts.” Senior military leaders came to understand that jointness solved many strategic and operational shortfalls. As one article describes, “Ultimately success
or failure of the these operations depended on the Army and Navy commanders…it was only by

In the following example, Admiral Porter demonstrates this commitment to jointness. When he was asked by Welles why he was wasting time supporting Grant near Vicksburg, he replied, “While it is the desire to carry out the wishes of the Department in relation to all matters connected with operations here, still I must act in accordance with my judgment and a more full knowledge of affairs than the Department could possibly have.” General Grant was also committed to jointness. In his memoirs after the war he wrote, “The most perfect harmony reigned between the two arms of the Service. There was never a request made, that I am aware of, either of the flag officer or any of his subordinates, that was not promptly complied with.”

General Winfield Scott’s Anaconda plan to strangle the South by combined operations on land and sea was critical to the Union victory. This joint plan helped enable field commanders to develop joint solutions to the strategic goals of strangling the South via land and sea. A significant portion of the confederate population was found along the water, therefore the Navy and Army both had an important role to play to win the war. Each Service needed the other to meet their mission and they learned that by operating together they could mass firepower to defeat the enemy more easily.

**DEVELOPING PAROCHIAL INTERESTS**

This distinct battlefield division between the Services began to change with the Spanish-American War. This war demonstrated to Americans that there were distinct requirements for a centralized “authority in both the War and Navy Departments and also some mechanism for cooperation between those two departments.” The two departments had difficulty coordinating with each other. Individual Service autonomy and desire for prestige were significant factors in the war.

**SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR**

The Navy and Marine Corps were prepared to go to war immediately with Spain in 1898 while the Army was not. The DON was forward deployed while the Army required mobilization of the state militias before it was ready. The war allowed the DON to demonstrate many roles that they were able to fill, as the United States became a world power. Specifically, the first Marine amphibious action in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba although small, served to prove to the public that the Navy and Marines could be counted upon to quickly and decisively defeat an
enemy far from U.S. shores. While the USMC was winning battles, the Army remained in Florida preparing for future action.

Lack of political guidance during the period immediately preceding the war favored the Navy. “In any conflict with Spain, whatever the kind or its objectives, the Navy’s mission would be the same: to seek out and destroy the Spanish fleet, to sweep Spain’s merchant marine from the seas, and to blockade or bombard the coasts of Spain and her colonies. For the Army, however, the political objective would determine the war effort.” The Army needed to know war objectives to be able to determine the required force structure it needed to win. Once the force structure was determined, training and transportation would further delay entry into the war.

As indicated above, Service parochialism began to develop during this war. The Army was dependent on the Navy for transportation. The Navy was fighting a different type of war than the Army. The Navy’s mission was to establish coaling stations and defeat the Spanish Fleet and the Army’s was to destroy the Spanish Army. The following passage sent by the Navy Department to the Secretary of War on 31 May 1898, demonstrates the parochialism that began to surface during the war:

“This Department begs leave to inquire what means are to be employed by the War Department for the landing of troops, artillery, horses, siege guns, mortars and other heavy objects when the pending military expedition arrives on the Cuban coast near Santiago. While the Navy will be prepared to furnish all the assistance that may be in its power, it is obvious that the crews of the armored ships and of such others as will be called upon to remove the Spanish mines and to meet the Spanish Fleet in action cannot be spared for other purposes, and ought not to be fatigued by the work incident to landing troops stores etc.”

Secretary Long believed the Navy and Marine Corps could win the war without the Army’s assistance. Once the Army entered the war by way of Army procured seagoing vessels, Army and Navy goals continued to diverge. At Santiago for example, the Army wanted to capture the city while the Navy wanted to destroy the Spanish fleet and capture ports to secure logistical hubs. The Army did not provide adequate forces to meet the Navy goals and “Navy Commanders took a lesson from this, in that they could not depend on the Army to secure land...for Naval purposes.” The Marines were depended upon to establish shore basing in which ships of the Navy could refuel and resupply. War fighting was viewed separately between the Services because the missions were separately articulated. Both departments came to view dependence upon the other Service as a significant weakness in terms of both prestige and autonomy.
The war caused the Services to seek additional capability traditionally possessed by the other Service. The Army had a fleet of “troop transports, hospital ships, lighters, launches and river boats.” The Navy had a war certified Marine Corps, its own land force to secure needed shore basing that it believed that the Army was not “interested” in securing. In short, the Army had its Navy and the Navy had its Army. Congress and the President allowed the Services to separately obtain organic assets necessary to meet basically separate missions. Efficiency of operations became a secondary consideration to winning the war.

AIRPLANE COMPlicates THE DIVISION

The invention of powered flight in 1903 brought a significant force multiplier to each Service. In 1907, President Theodore Roosevelt showed interest in the airplane and established an Aeronautical Division and directed the U.S. Army to look into the new “air machines.” Beginning in 1910, British and American Naval pilots experimented with take-offs and landings from ships. The aircraft was being viewed by each of the Services as a legitimate extension of their capabilities to control and dominate their traditional role in war.

WORLD war I

During World War I, aviation continued to exacerbate the nascent parochialism observed during the Spanish-American War. Aircraft were employed within the Services primarily to support the doctrinal center for each Service; sea power for the Navy and land power for the Army. The United States entered the war in 1917 with about 110 military planes increasing that number to almost 15,000 military planes by the end of the war. Airplanes were used mainly to observe enemy activities either on the sea or over land and to direct artillery. Aerial bombing and the concept of air superiority had little effect on the war.

INTERWAR PERIOD

Brigadier General Billy Mitchell became the leading military advocate for air power. He headed the largest air assault operation of World War I and was named the Assistant Chief of the Army Air Service after the war. Mitchell was the leading visionary for air power and a very strong proponent for a separate Air Force during the interwar period. He was perhaps the biggest antagonist to both the Army and Navy during that time. He believed his vision for air power was “righter than hell and he knew it, and whoever wasn’t with him a hundred percent was against him.” The Army, according to Mitchell, feared innovation because it might curtail “their ancient prerogatives, privileges and authority.” Secretary of the Army Baker summarized the Army view of aviation at the time; “the infantry is the backbone of military effort,
and all other arms on land, on the sea, and in the air, are mere aids to its advance and protection to it while it is performing its functions of advance and occupation. General Pershing formed a board of senior officers to determine the lessons of aviation in World War I. The board concluded that aviation, like the cavalry and artillery, were supporting elements to the main thrust of future wars, the infantry. The panel believed that “the great cost of building an Air Force could be justified only after aviation had proved itself.” The McNerher board was formed to deal with Congressional proposals for an Air Force. The board found that because of production and maintenance costs, “no nation can in time of peace maintain military air fleets even approximating in size such as will be necessary in time of war.” This finding and subsequent budget decisions for Army aircraft procurement allowed the Navy to pursue aviation much more vigorously and establish a stronger aviation foothold than the Army.

During the interwar period, no arm of the United States Navy grew faster than its air arm. The Navy remained relatively unchallenged as she developed increased capabilities away from the sea. After the sinking of the former German Dreadnaught Ostfriesland, and realizing the possibility that the cornerstone of the Navy, the Battleship, would become obsolete, the Navy, pursued aviation with even greater vigor. Congress emphasized air power within the Navy by mandating that only qualified aviators could command aircraft carriers, a law that stands today. This served to encourage senior Naval Officers to qualify as pilots and helped ensure that Naval Aviation had high-level support. Admiral Bull Halsey soloed when he was 52 years old.

Overall, the Army reluctantly embraced aviation but saw a need to “stay abreast in aviation with modern armies of the world and to meet the requirements of coastal defense or to run the risk of losing that task to either proponents of a separate Air Force or to the Navy.” The Army lost significant ground to the Navy by keeping air power subservient to the infantry and thus limiting resources which could have capitalized on this emerging technology.

In 1925, Major General Mason Patrick, Chief of the Army Air Service, saw the battle brewing over how air power would be divided among the Services. He attempted to clarify responsibilities of the land, sea and air arms in national defense within the Navy and War Departments. He wanted to divide the functions and responsibilities of the air, sea and land forces contending, “Duplication could be eliminated not only between the Army and Navy but between the Army air arm and the coastal artillery.” The attempt to define Service war fighting borders through congressional hearings did not meet Patrick or Mitchell’s expectations. Mitchell’s public statements after the board’s conclusions were released caused him to be court-
martialed. Many felt Mitchell’s efforts were detrimental and significantly delayed “the prospect for the Air Service.” Thus allowing overlap in aviation to grow.

The people of the United States believed during this period that the major threat to the U.S. was from a foreign fleet invading the country. Since no division of labor for the air medium existed, the Army and Navy developed weapon systems to counter the invasion threat. Many of the independently developed weapon systems began to have overlapping mission capability. As such, in 1928, General Patrick again proposed to the Secretary of the Army that “clarification between the coastal defense mission of the Army Air Service and air units of the Navy,” was needed. This was an early unsuccessful attempt to define roles and missions for the Services.

A congressional resolution to “make a full investigation of the problem of sea coast defense” was undertaken. “Since the Air Corps was a necessary part of the Army…and since coastal defense was essential to the Army, for budget reasons if no other,” the Army was interested in keeping coastal defense and preventing Navy encroachment. The controversy was not resolved by Congress but was pushed down to the Joint Board, composed of active ranking members of each of the Services.

Disputes between Admiral Moffett and General Patrick, heads of each of the Services air branches, over the aerial functions of the two Air Forces concluded that something must be done “since there were no coastlines in the air.” Patrick did not wish to concede the coastal defense mission to the Navy. Moffett believed that while Navy torpedo planes and Army bombers were similar, each performed different wartime functions therefore there was no duplication.

Through the depression, the quarrels, although subdued, continued. Each Service attempted to maintain hard fought pieces of the military budget. The Army Air Corps was downsized and a Hoover administration study recommended the elimination of Marine Corps and Naval land based aircraft. The Navy was asked to justify their Naval Air expenditures in view of other foreign nation’s naval expenditures. In 1931 the Naval Air Service had the largest air force in the world. There was pressure to unify U.S. air forces because France, Germany, Italy, and Sweden had all formed independent air forces after World War I.

In 1940 after Nazi advances in Europe, Henry Stimpson, Roosevelt’s Secretary of War declared “air power has decided the fate of nations; Germany with her powerful armadas, has vanquished one people after another. On the ground, large armies had been mobilized to resist her but each time it was additional power in the air that decided the fate of each individual Nation.” In a speech to Congress, President Roosevelt advocated the construction of 50,000
aircraft. With approval, both Services got their fill of aircraft. The build up offered little time to resolve the division of missions or roles for the Services.

WORLD WAR II

World War II presented the largest demonstration of Service rivalry to date. A British Air Marshall once said, “The violence of inter-Service rivalry in the United States had to be seen to be believed and was an appreciable handicap to their war effort.” This rivalry was perhaps most noticeable in the Pacific theater. The Navy in the Pacific grew considerably; by the fall of 1944 the Pacific Fleet was bigger than the rest of the World’s Navies combined. MacArthur, after garnering significant political support was named by President Roosevelt as the Supreme Commander in the Pacific. This attempt to unify Army and Navy efforts in the region met strong Navy resistance.

An arrangement was made whereby MacArthur would drive with the Army towards Japan via New Guinea and the Philippines and the Navy would fight across the central Pacific driving across the island chains. In effect, the Navy and Army split up the battle space to prevent interference with each autonomous fighting force. The observed rivalry between the Navy and Army in the Pacific left little doubt that some unified control of the Armed Forces needed to occur.

Disputes between the two Services became so fierce that the resolution had to be left to after the war. To coordinate the war effort seventy-five “joint” agencies were developed to overcome coordination difficulties between the Services. This effort was obviously inefficient but was acceptable under the umbrella of the enormous resource base that became available to support the war. After the war, the Truman Committee concluded that “The evidence of World War II does not suggest that giving the military everything it asks for produces either maximum or balanced production. Much evidence suggests the contrary.”

In 1945 Secretary George Marshall submitted a plan to unify the armed forces. Between 1921 and 1945, as many as fifty unifying bills made it to committees in Congress. Only one made it to the floor for a vote and was defeated. Marshall’s plan was different as it came from within the military. Previously, the Armed Forces actively undermined any unification effort. With the end of World War II and the scope of coordination problems coming to light, unification was an idea whose time had finally come.
CONTROLLING OVERLAP THROUGH REORGANIZATION

After the war, Congress held hearings on the establishment of a single military department. The Army agreed to unification under a National Military Establishment (NME) however, the Navy urged further study. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) also made recommendations for unification of the military with only the Navy Chief, disagreeing with the proposal. The Army supported the unification in part because Army Air Corps officers had garnered significant influence within the Army as whole. The Navy opposed unification because of cultural differences driven by desire for independent command and decision-making and because of the fear of losing aviation to Army Air Forces. The Marines believed unification would be the beginning of the end of the Corps.

The Navy, through Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, forwarded a plan which kept the Services separate. The plan relied on inter-Service and interagency boards to ensure unity of effort and to contain duplication. Military historian Steven L. Reardon observed:

“\[\text{The JCS efforts to agree on Service functions} \ldots \text{foundered over fundamental disagreements: whether the Navy’s carrier aviation should have a role in strategic air operations, and whether the Army or the Air Force should assume primary responsibility for land-based air defense. The Army tended to side with the Air Force on the naval air issue and urged limitations on naval aviation and the Marine Corps, while the Navy stoutly resisted their efforts to limit naval freedom of action.}\]”

Congress was opposed to the unification plan because of a fear the plan would make the executive department more powerful in its military oversight. Congress believed they would lose some influence and that they could serve more constituents with a diffuse military organization. This setup allowed more voice in areas where Naval Bases and Army Battalions would be located to ameliorate constituents.

1947 NATIONAL SECURITY ACT

After progress was stalled, President Truman intervened with his own plan. The plan called for military unification with three separate service establishments for air, land and sea warfare. After procrastination, President Truman issued formal letters to the Service Secretaries to come to resolution. The Secretaries responded back that four points of contention remained:

- Unification under a single Defense Secretary
- Air Force's status as an equal to the Army and Navy
• Navy retention of land based aircraft
• Marine Corps future

Final compromise was reached with the signing of the National Security Act of 1947. The act, also called the Unification Act, legally established the Joint Chiefs of Staff and created the National Military Establishment, the Department of the Air Force, and the Department of Army from the old Department of War minus the old Army Air Corps. The Act allowed the Navy to retain carrier aviation, land based air, and the Marine Corps. The Act did not specifically address Service roles and missions because of the inability to gain consensus on them. In order to gain passage, the Act, also restrained the power of the Secretary of Defense significantly allowing the Services to appeal decisions of the new Defense Secretary.

MILITARY INTERNAL ROLE DEBATE

Amid the continued inter-Service animosity towards the legislation, President Truman encouraged all parties to develop resolution to the roles and missions debate. Secretary Forrestal, and former Navy Secretary, opted for a retreat at Key West to develop solutions. The Key West Agreement of April 21, 1948, made the Air Force responsible for strategic air warfare, for defense of the U.S. against air attack, and for air and logistic support of ground units; the Navy, for combat operations at sea; the Army, for land combat and for air-defense antiaircraft artillery; and the Marine Corps, for amphibious warfare. It also assigned each Service a number of collateral missions in support of one another. Overlap was now built into the roles of the Services not by design but by compromise.

After Key West, the Admirals refused to hand the entire long range-bombing mission to the Air Force. Understanding the future priority for Nuclear weapons delivery platforms and viewing future wars as being settled by nuclear weapons, the Navy would not sacrifice this budgetary priority. The Services came to understand that whoever controlled Nuclear weapons controlled the majority of future budgets.

Forrestal and the Service Chiefs “found it impossible to define the entire range of Service responsibilities in terms that completely eliminated overlapping activity. They resolved that the only way to minimize duplication was by fostering joint effort.” To help settle matters, they reconvened the roles, missions and functions discussion in August 1948, at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. The Newport Conference attempted to delineate Service capabilities in terms of primary and secondary missions. These terms allowed the Services to agree on a division of functions, which was open to broad interpretation. Ultimately it did not limit Service expansion.
FURTHER CONGRESSIONAL INVOLVEMENT

The 1949 amendment to the 1947 Act endeavored to stop the feuding among the Services. It attempted to strengthen the Secretary of Defense and undermine the voices of the Service Secretaries. It converted the NME to the Department of Defense and made the Secretary of Defense the sole representative of the National Security Council.

The Reorganization Plan of 1953 attempted to increase the power of the Secretary of Defense further and to bring the Services under stricter control. The President indicated his desires that “no function in any part of the Department of Defense, or in any of its component agencies, should be performed independent of the direction, authority and control of the Secretary of Defense.” In 1954, DOD Directive 5100.1 assigned functions to the individual Services based on roles already established in legislation. Since this directive, there have not been any significant changes to Service roles, missions or functions.

The last attempt to reorganize the military before the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (GNA) occurred with the reorganization act of 1958. This Act served to strengthen the Secretary of Defense and JCS and to establish clearer command channels for the unified commanders. The President lost on two issues; Service Secretaries were still allowed to appeal Secretary of Defense decisions to Congress, and the Secretary could not unilaterally transfer military functions between Services within the department. In essence the roles and missions debate was left to the future.

In 1986 GNA was passed, and like previous initiatives, it did not address Service roles, missions or functions. Congress believed the problems with the military “derived from dysfunctional relationships among the Secretary of Defense, Service Secretaries, CJCS, JCS, CINCs and Service components and the chiefs.” Most of the law dealt with standards for personnel assignment to the joint staff and strengthening lines of command. GNA did however, mandate:

“not less than once every three years, or upon the request of the President or the Secretary of Defense a report containing such recommendations for changes in the assignment of functions (or roles and missions) to the armed forces as the Chairman considers necessary to achieve maximum effectiveness of the armed forces. In preparing each such report, the Chairman shall consider (among other matters) the following:

- Changes in the nature of the threats faced by the United States
- Unnecessary duplication of effort among the armed forces
- Changes in technology that can be applied effectively to warfare.”
ROLES, MISSIONS AND FUNCTIONS DEBATE SINCE GNA

In 1989 in accordance with the provisions of the GNA and Title 10 of the United States Code, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Admiral Crowe provided a report on the Roles, Missions and Functions of the Armed Forces. The report, completed as the Chairman exited office, was not a watershed document. It did little to eliminate overlapping Service capabilities. The document is rarely used as a source when discussing military roles, missions and functions evolution.

The 1993 report, although more significant than the 1989 report and more widely cited, still left many role questions open. It did little to shift Service roles. For example, it recommended establishing Joint Depot Maintenance to reduce depot level repair costs. The report did reply to accusations that the military was operating four separate Air Forces. This accusation from Senator Nunn and Presidential Candidate Clinton had received significant attention in the news media in the previous year and was addressed. The report answered it this way: “America has only one Air Force, whose role is prompt and sustained offensive and defensive air operations. The other Services have aviation arms essential to their specific roles and functions but which also work jointly to project America’s air power.” Repackaging would therefore be the answer rather than adopting any significant Service limitation in operating in the air medium.

To be fair, the report did discuss several issues associated with air functions to help make air power more efficient. The report added helicopters to the Key West definition of close air support. It recognized the essential capability of Marine Corps tactical air and recommended the USMC squadrons deploy on aircraft carriers. It recommended the movement of all Service flight training to the same common fixed wing aircraft under development. It recommended consolidation of common aircraft:

- The Navy would take on the EC-135 mission with the E-6A
- Retain C-130 and KC-130 aircraft structures in the Services as is
- Retain electronic jammer aircraft (EF-111, EA-6) structure as is
- Maintain RC-135 and EP-3 Electronic surveillance structure the same

The report offered up what the Services were willing to give up. The Air Force EC-135 was old and expensive to maintain and the Navy had a brand new E-6A aircraft and a new base to operate from. The Air Force agreed to the change. Two years after this report the Air Force voluntarily gave up the EF-111 mission to the Navy because of the age and expense of that airframe drawing into question the comprehensiveness of the report. A complete report that
true looked at Service roles and missions and “unnecessary duplication” as required by law, would not have missed this opportunity to eliminate duplication. Consensus rather than efficiency dictated roles and mission adjustments.

The final formal report on Service roles was completed in 1995. This time an independent commission was formed from former flag officers from all the Services as well as several former DOD senior civilians. John P. White a former Assistant Secretary of Defense, chaired the Commission.

This Commission left basic roles and missions unchanged and in the interest of consensus, worked on peripheral issues. The Commission discussed such issues as:

- Should the Army be given full management of sea-based pre-positioning programs?
- Should the Army provide ground-based area air defense, heavy engineering and supplemental logistics to the USMC?
- Should the Air Force be the primary Service for acquiring and operating multi-user space systems?
- Should the Navy transfer operational support airlift to the Air Force?

The Commission called the four Service air forces complementary not redundant or inefficient. Determining that more joint training would correct any deficiencies. The rest of the commission report dealt with reengineering support activities, improving management of the department through planning, programming, and budgeting changes and organizational changes.

The Commission report concluded that “the traditional approach to roles and missions – attempting to allocate them among the Services in the context of the Key West Agreement of 1948 – is no longer appropriate. That approach leads to institutional quarrels (as reported in the press during our deliberations) and unsatisfactory compromises (as discussed in our report). More importantly, it does not lead to achieving the Department’s goals.” The report goes on to state that the report will not offer up “who does what,” or discuss role/mission disputes between the Services in an attempt to resolve them. It says that it would not address the rearrangement of U.S. forces as it “would have perpetuated the narrow institutional perspectives that inhibit development of a true joint war fighting perspective.”

OVERLAPPING CAPABILITIES

HISTORICAL RECAP

As illustrated earlier in this paper, the Military Services initially began operating solely within their individual war fighting mediums. As long as the Services operated in the separate
media, overlap and parochialism were checked. All wars before the war with Spain were fought either on U.S. soil or on the high seas. The only exception was the war with Mexico, which was fought from U.S. soil into Mexican territory. The Army did not depend on the Navy for sea transportation and the Navy did not depend on the Army to secure basing. Jointness during this period was dependent on the individual Service leaders.

The war with Spain changed the way Services dealt with one another. In this war, the Army fought its first overseas war. The Army depended on the Navy to get to the fight. However, the Navy was fighting its own war against the Spanish Fleet. This war forced the Army to expand its capabilities into the water and allowed the Navy to expand its land force, the Marine Corps.

At the turn of the century, the invention of aviation created fertile ground for Service overlap. With the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy both cabinet level positions, the only individual that could control the expansion of Service roles was the President. Mandating Service roles was not a high priority with the President as he had more pressing issues of state to deal with at the time. Additionally, President Theodore Roosevelt, a former Assistant Secretary of the Navy and arguably the most influential person in building the Navy was not particularly interested in limiting the expansion of either Service, particularly the Navy, into this new medium. Secretary Davidson, the Secretary of War during this time recognized the need to control Service overlap saying, “the extremely rapid development of aviation required constant redetermination of the roles of all arms, in both the Army and Navy.”

OVERLAP TODAY

Currently, no effective mechanism exists which allows DOD to control both continually and decisively the expansion of the Services into new war fighting roles. As long as the Services are successful on the battlefield there is little incentive for Congress to control the duplicative growth. If capabilities support efforts in a Service’s traditional war fighting medium, growth is allowed to continue relatively unabated.

The Services dominate resource allocation and thus remain relatively unconstrained to develop overlapping capability. Despite significant changes to prevent parochial biases to weapons acquisition, the Services understand the system and are able to manipulate it better than the hierarchy designed to overcome that bias. As budgets become tighter, Service duplication could become a critical source of funds to redirect towards military transformation.

If threats primarily drove the budgeting process and Service parochialism were neutralized in that process, Service budget percentages would change as threats moved across Service
war fighting mediums. However, individual Service budgets remain relatively stable with respect to the percentage of the total Army, Navy and Air Force budgets over time. Every year since 1990, the Navy has held 36.3% of the Services’ budget plus or minus .61%. The Army has held 30.1% of the Services’ budget plus or minus 1.96%. The Air Force has held 33.6% of the Services’ budget plus or minus 1.77%. Analyzing proposed budgets of the Services from fiscal year (FY) 2003 through the end of the five-year defense plan in FY 2007, the budget still remains within a 1% range year to year.65

The Navy, Army and Air Force all design, contract for manufacture, and maintain aircraft separately. The Navy currently spends about $8.2 billion on aircraft manufacturing and $6.5 billion on maintaining and flying the aircraft. The Army budgets for and operates pre-positioned ships and is leasing two high-speed catamaran transport vessels to ensure supplies and on demand transportation for its forces. All three Services operate their own unmanned air vehicles. In the war on terror, the Marine Corps is providing capability duplicative of traditional Army capability as it projected a land force 600 miles inland.

BACK TO BASICS

Our military needs to reorganize and restructure and become more focused on its core capabilities. Service capabilities are evolving from their statutory roles. The Navy’s core capability is Sea warfare, the Army’s land warfare and the Air Force’s air warfare. All warfare areas are significantly different in the manner of execution, therefore it makes sense to organize via these different mediums of warfare. Currently, major assets and fighting doctrine are developed to fight in these different mediums; Army-Tank, Navy- Aircraft Carrier and the Air Force- Fighter Aircraft. Logically it makes good business sense to develop core competencies around these major assets and therefore the three mediums of warfare. Recently the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), when it reorganized at the Prague Summit on 21 November 2002, decided to have land, sea and air components in its multinational forces.66

JOINT WAR FIGHTING

Arguably, the lack of trust has played the largest role in causing duplication within the Services and inhibiting jointness. The Marine Corps retains the close air support mission to support its ground troops because it does not believe the Air Force or Navy will be there when needed. They believe that the other Services would find higher priority taskings at a time when support was critical to their ground maneuver. Author Laurence Wilkerson suggests, “true jointness is nothing more than the trust and understanding of soldiers, sailors, marines and airman have in their comrades as, above all experts in their Service core competencies.”67
Allowing organic duplicative capabilities to be developed under the guise of “critical support” makes a mockery of jointness and wastes resources.

Giulio Douhet describes in his book *The Command of the Air* in 1921, “The Use of military, naval and aerial forces in war should be directed towards a single end, to win...The three forces should function as ingredients—or factors—of a single product in which the best results can be obtained only by the proper apportioning of the ingredients used.” NSA 1947 coalesced Douhet’s dream, as it was adopted “to provide for the effective strategic direction of the armed forces and for their operation under unified control and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval and air forces.”

**APPLYING JOINT DOCTRINE**

The Joint Forces Commander (JFC) provides for unified direction. The JFC can organize his forces in several different ways depending upon his mission and concept of operations. As Joint Pub 3-0 describes, most often joint forces are organized with a combination of Service and functional components with operational responsibilities.

By Functional Commanders we are referring to Joint Forces Land Component Commander (JFLCC), Joint Forces Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) and the Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC). This functional arrangement allows a JFC to ensure unity of effort within each war fighting medium. If roles were clearly delineated with the Services operating strictly in their original war fighting mediums, a joint functional command arrangement would not be necessary and an entire bureaucratic element developed to control Service overlap could be excised from joint doctrine. The Army would already operate all land forces as a JFLCC does; The Navy would operate all sea forces as a JFMCC does; and the Air Force would operate all the air assets as the JFACC does. Functional command and control arrangements effectively attempt to control overlapping Service capabilities by cultivating synergy in each of the air, sea and land war fighting mediums.

Today, there is little overlap in the Maritime medium of war as the Navy dominates assets on the sea. However, all four Services operate assets in the air medium of warfare. It is therefore not hard to reason why joint doctrine provides no strict recommendation for the establishment of functional components except for the JFACC, which it denotes as “normally,” established by the JFC. Aviation capability overlap has made a JFACC essential to the JFC. As Air Marshall Tedder writes, “Air warfare cannot be separated into little packets; it knows no boundaries on land or sea other than those imposed by the radius of action of the aircraft; it is a unity and demands unity of command.” Still, this arrangement has been undermined as
demonstrated when the Marine Corps was able to maintain control of their air assets during Desert Storm. They were not subjugated to the JFACC tasking.  

The goal for the relationship of the Services should be "interdependence" not just jointness. Interdependence as Dr. Johnson of the Strategic Studies Institute suggests is more of an interweaving of abilities to produce a synergistic effect among the Services. Jointness implies the Services working and participating together to accomplish a common objective. Units that operate essentially separate from each other but doing so to accomplish the same overall goal are considered joint. Jointness merely means the cooperation of the Services to meet a common end state. Jointness essentially embraces distrust by allowing overlapping capability as a substitute for trust. Interdependence conversely communicates a significant dimension of trust in the other Services to accomplish critical components of that individual Service war fighting strategy. Minimizing overlapping capabilities between the Services fosters this needed interdependence.

RECOMMENDATION

The result of truly mandating each of the Services to operate in one of the war fighting mediums would be dramatic. All aviation would be turned over to the Air Force; Navy Air wings assigned to naval vessels and ground based naval aircraft would become part of the Air Force. Helicopters from both the Army and Navy would go to the Air Force. The Marine Corps would be reassigned to the Army. The Navy would take on all Service sea transportation programs.

For example, this change would allow all aircraft procurement, training, and maintenance to be assigned to one Service. Consolidation savings would undoubtedly occur to DOD from limiting the overlap among the Services. The number of type, model and series currently maintained by the Services to accomplish different missions would diminish dramatically. Reduction of the Service staff bureaucracy to run these different aircraft types would accrue savings. Consolidation of initial flight training and refresher training programs involving simulators and base infrastructure would further produce efficiencies.

Operationally, jointness, integration and transformation would be significantly enhanced. Imagine the composition of a new deploying Battle Group. This Battle Group would include sailors operating the ships, airmen deployed on the ships operating the embarked air wings, and soldiers embarked on the amphibious ships providing the ready land force. The Army and Air Force would need to trust the Navy to get them to the fight and sustain them there. The Navy would need to trust the Army and Air Force to protect their ships and forward basing
requirements. The Army would need to trust the Air Force to provide close air support for their troops.

Through this arrangement, the Services would put more energy and resources towards transformational research in their respective war fighting mediums, as this would be the only “game in town.” Whereas now, Service research and development dollars are dispersed among different competing mediums, these dollars could be better spent to ensure the Services remain predominant in their medium in both innovation and doctrine.

This is the vision of jointness we need to obtain; sailors, soldiers and airmen working, eating and sleeping in the same environment all pursuing the same objective. This arrangement builds mutual respect and trust between the Services. Winning football teams are not formed from eleven quarterbacks working together towards a common goal they are formed from eleven different players specializing in different roles to accomplish a shared goal. The team develops trust in each individual to perform his specialized role the best he can. This trust begins changing into interdependence as success on the playing field is demonstrated.

ISSUES WITH STRICT ROLE REORGANIZATION

As with any new approach to organization there are several issues, which must be addressed prior to implementing the change. The first issue is the dimension of the change itself. In the text, *Classics of Public Administration*, the authors indicate that sweeping changes to established bureaucracies are rare and incremental change is the only way to produce change in established policy.

“It is a matter of common observation that western democracies change their policies almost entirely through incremental adjustments. Policy does not move in leaps and bounds. Part of the reluctance for sweeping changes comes from a desire to avoid mistakes. A wise policy-maker consequently expects that his policies will achieve only part of what he hopes and at the same time will produce unanticipated consequences he would have preferred to avoid. If he proceeds through succession of incremental changes, he avoids serious lasting mistakes.”

Additionally, dealing with a critical element of National Security remains problematic as any reduction in military readiness can have a dramatic impact on the Nation’s continued survival. Therefore it is understood that this vision needs to occur in small steps with strict role compliance becoming the ultimate goal not the immediate one. Unintended consequences
inevitably occur as a byproduct of change. Implementing the change slowly and methodically can help minimize the affect on the National Security of the U.S.

There is a school of thought that purports that the redundancy allowed among the Services is a good thing. The overlap allows flexibility and provides more options for commanders during conflict. In the 1993 Roles and Missions report, the commission wrote that the competition among the Services produces innovation in weapons and forces doctrine and concept of operations. It is this competition, like civilian industry, which keeps us on the edge. In other words, jointness that fosters unification kills inter-Service competition and therefore innovation.

Private industry has profit to determine the benefit of a new technological venture; a public organization such as the military does not possess this proven “evaluator” of innovation. It makes no more sense to create two separate fire departments or police departments in a town to ensure “competition and innovation” than it does to allow two or more Services to perform overlapping functions in the military. Constituent politics and uncontrolled bureaucracy make public organization competition extremely wasteful of taxpayer resources. The best way to capitalize on competition is to force this competition into the private sector by giving several companies requirements and allowing them to compete for the “best” solution to the requirements.

Under this new Service war fighting plan, roles would need to be tightly delineated. Specifically, an area that would need to be addressed would be which Service would own weapons which are designed to traverse two or more war fighting mediums. Tomahawk weapons fired from submarines, traversing air space and bearing its effects on land present a weapon system that would need to fall in either the air, land or sea warfare domains. A process would be required to be formally developed to assign these “hybrid” systems to one Service. This could be done by looking at weapons from the perspective of where their effects originate or perhaps where their effects are brought to bear. Whatever scheme is chosen, the delineation must be firm and must be adhered to or overlap will continue.

THE EFFECT OF CULTURE

Service culture would be perhaps the largest hurdle to overcome as the military moved to strict role definition for the Services. How does one do away with Navy Air or the Marine Corps without causing significant impact on the culture and readiness of the military as a whole? In 1967 Canada attempted to integrate its defense force. Recently, however, Canada deserted this effort because expected efficiencies did not accrue. Symbols and traditions of the separate
services were apparently important sources of esprit de corps and motivation within that military. Culture plays a significant part in our military as well. As Admiral Bill Owens (ret.) describes it, “The higher (military) careerists rise, the more they see their role as protectors – stewards – of service traditions, doctrine and loyalties that shape the crystal channels.”

Since the culture of the military plays a significant part of its readiness. Undoubtedly the total loss of the Marine Corps would not be possible. Its historical significance and its strong following in Congress would make its disestablishment nearly impossible. Its amphibious mission would need to be assumed by the Army. Certainly even more troops would be embarked on ships as the Army assumed this means of forward deployment from the Marines. In order to minimize the cultural impacts of the movement of the Marine mission to the Army, it may be prudent to designate Army troops deployed on ships as Marines. They could retain the uniform and with it the long and glorious roots which make a Marine a Marine. Schemes like this would need to be evaluated for all long-standing Service role transfers.

CONCLUSIONS

Overlapping roles among the Services is inefficient and undermines jointness. From the creation of the Army and Navy the seashore created an acceptable border to control Service overlap. The Navy and Army performed different functions and accordingly parochialism and interservice rivalry was minimized. In fact, jointness was a highlight of the Civil War and the Mexican American War. Military leaders came to understand the synergy that could be gained by operating land and sea forces jointly.

Movement of war from the continent caused parochialism to flourish. The Navy/USMC forward presence allowed her to immediately engage an enemy overseas. The Army needed the Navy for transportation and could not immediately engage the enemy. The War with Spain set the stage for the Services to expand roles in other warfare mediums. Specifically, the Marine Corps’ ability to quickly and decisively engage the enemy insured future public and congressional support.

As technology increased, role delineation was slow to react and the Services’ relationship to each other changed. Increased weapon range and movement of warfare into the air created a void that the Army and Navy were eager to fill. The Army’s steadfast allegiance to its infantry and the Navy’s understanding of the impact of aerial warfare on the “center of the Navy fleet,” the battleship, allowed the Navy to pursue aviation with more vigor than the Army.

Attempts to control the expansion and overlap between the Services went nowhere. Joint boards, meetings, and panels all attempted to obtain gentlemen agreements on role limitations.
Inevitably the Navy gave up little and typically held on to its ability to expand into other roles stating that these roles were critical to safeguarding the fleet.

During World War II it became accepted that overlap and parochialism would exist. Organizations were invented to control overlap. President Truman became fed up with the inefficiency. He outlined his vision for three separate armed forces operating in the three mediums of warfare under a single Secretary of Defense. Two years after this vision, after foot dragging, hand wringing and compromise his vision partially came into being with the National Security Act of 1947.

The compromise allowed overlap to occur predominantly within the Navy with its land-based air force and the Marine Corps. Attempts in Key West and Newport to redefine the roles were unsuccessful. Every commission or board since Newport, created to redefine roles, has either chosen not to address the movement of roles between Services or provided recommendations for compromise, which proved ineffective in reducing overlap.

Dividing the battle space into air, land and sea mediums is a natural division. Assets, war fighting doctrine, and training within these mediums are sufficiently different to justify the division. Even NATO’s new force will have forces split between these three mediums of war. In short the delineation makes sense.

The Services, as with private organizations, need to get back to core capabilities. This back to basics approach allows energies to be expended into transformational technologies within the functional medium and limits duplication. Airplanes operating from ships no longer are limited to attacking other fleets or shore targets. Refueling capabilities and increased combat radius make aircraft operating from Navy carriers in the littoral indistinguishable from Air Force aircraft. While the Marine Corps originates from the sea to perform its mission, missions in the war in Afghanistan has have allowed them to project power 600 miles inland, areas previously only patrolled by the Army.

As we begin the transformation of the Services to meet new asymmetric and more lethal threats, we must again review Service roles, missions and functions as a necessary means to make the joint interdependent fighting force of the future capable of meeting new and more sophisticated threats. The military does not have the funding to continue supporting duplicative efforts while attempting to meet new threats. Compromise and watered down recommendations will no longer suffice. The Nation requires a vision to once and for all put the role debate behind us and to maintain the will to see the vision through.

WORD COUNT = 9,755
ENDNOTES

1 The structure of this paragraph is based on remarks made by Dr. Martin Luther King in Washington, D.C. on August 28, 1963.


4 Powell, iv.

5 Epley, 33.


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14 Ibid., 111.


17 Nagy, 17.


23 Presidential Commission, U.S. Commission Appointed by the President to Investigate the Conduct of the War Department in the War with Spain, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1899), 120.

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25 Cosmas, vi.

26 Ibid., 308.

27 Miller, 249.

28 Williamson Murray, War in the Air 1914-45 (Great Britain: Cassell, 1999), 26-76.


31 Ibid., 5.

32 Ibid., 7.

33 Ibid.

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35 Miller, 270.

36 Tate, 6.

37 Ibid., 61.

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid., 45.

40 Ibid., 19.

41 Ibid., 66.
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74 White, 1-1 to 3-27.

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