A NEW MODEL FOR MILITARY/NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION RELATIONS IN POST-CONFLICT OPERATIONS

by

LIEUTENANT COLONEL CRAIG J. CURREY
United States Army

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.
**REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE**

**1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)**
07-04-2003

**2. REPORT TYPE**

**3. DATES COVERED (FROM - TO)**
xx-xx-2002 to xx-xx-2003

**4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE**
A New Model for Military/Nongovernmental Organization Relations in Post-Conflict Operations

**5a. CONTRACT NUMBER**

**5b. GRANT NUMBER**

**5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER**

**5d. PROJECT NUMBER**

**5e. TASK NUMBER**

**5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER**

**6. AUTHOR(S)**
Currey, Craig J.; Author

**7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS**
U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks
Carlisle, PA17013-5050

**8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER**

**9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME AND ADDRESS**

**10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)**

**11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)**

**12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT**
PUBLIC RELEASE

**13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES**
See attached file.

**14. ABSTRACT**
See attached file.

**15. SUBJECT TERMS**

**16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:**
a. REPORT
Unclassified  
b. ABSTRACT
Unclassified  
c. THIS PAGE
Unclassified

**17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT**
Same as Report (SAR)

**18. NUMBER OF PAGES**
40

**19. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON**
Rife, Dave
RifeD@awc.carlisle.army.mil

**19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER**
International Area Code
Area Code Telephone Number

---

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)  
Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39.18
A plethora of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) has emerged to overwhelm the combatant command military planner. In post-conflict operations, with its emphasis on humanitarian relief missions, the military and responding agencies must direct appropriate resources to the primary critical relief functions that provide security, food/water relief, shelter of civilians, medical treatment, demining, restoration of infrastructure, return of displaced persons, and restoration of government and police functions. Balancing the NGOs’ capabilities to perform these functions with NGOs’ interests and goals, a new strategic model arises for military/NGO relationships. Essentially, the military/NGO interaction can be characterized in four possible manners: reliance, assistance, autonomous, or adversarial. Knowing these model relationships before a conflict enables the military planner to synchronize military resources, area coverage, and military/NGO actions better. The model development and agreement would occur at an annual week-long interagency conference under USAID lead in which NGOs, DoD, State Department, various contributing agencies, and combatant command representatives would establish roles and missions. They would also determine capability and scale for potential contingencies in various operational theaters. This directive model will serve the national strategy far better than the current reactive, ad hoc model in which military planners respond to on-the-ground operational and NGO situations.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**ABSTRACT** ......................................................................................................................... iii

**ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS** ...................................................................................................... vii

**A NEW MODEL FOR MILITARY/NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION RELATIONS IN POST-CONFLICT OPERATIONS** .................................................................................................................. 1

- **BACKGROUND OF NGOS AND AFGHANISTAN EXAMPLE** ........................................ 2
- **ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT MILITARY/NGO DOCTRINE** ...................................... 6
- **ACADEMIC MILITARY/NGO PROPOSALS** ............................................................... 8
- **INVOLVEMENT OF U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (USAID)** 11
- **NEW MODEL FOR MILITARY/NGO RELATIONS** ...................................................... 13
- **CONCLUSION** ............................................................................................................... 19

**ENDNOTES** ....................................................................................................................... 21

**BIBLIOGRAPHY** ............................................................................................................... 25
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The inevitable suffering in war will never be eliminated, but where possible, every means to alleviate the degradation of the human condition must be undertaken. So it is with the military and nongovernmental organizations as they work together after contingency operations, fighting to return devastated areas to some semblance of normalcy. This project was made easier through the professional efforts of the library staff of the Army War College who assisted greatly in the research efforts. The watchful eye of Colonel George Teague helped the paper mature and take shape into what it is. My family, especially my wife Maria, endured time away from them while I plucked away on the computer in the basement of our humble Smurf Village home. Finally, I give all glory to God who sustains and leads me on a daily basis.
LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 1. MILITARY/NGO INTERFACE PRINCIPLES......................................................8
TABLE 2. SUMMARY OF PROPOSED MILITARY/NGO IMPROVEMENTS.......................... 11
TABLE 3. CRITICAL RELIEF FUNCTIONS (CRFS) IN POST-CONFLICT OPERATIONS...... 15
TABLE 4. DIRECTIVE MODEL PLANNING TOOL............................................................. 18
There are currently over 25,000 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) all over the world with more forming continuously.¹ The number of NGOs has doubled since 1978 and is 20 times greater than the total in 1951.² NGOs provide critical support and aid valued at over 10 billion dollars annually to some 250 million people.³ Engaged throughout the world, they are already working in potential trouble spots to which US forces may be deployed. Their vision is long-term, focusing on a conflict, its resolution, and subsequent nation building. The military can ill-afford to avoid maximizing this important international resource, especially in post-conflict operations. The Army’s FM 3.0 Operations notes that NGO capabilities are a significant factor that can dramatically reduce military resources and directs that they “must be integrated into planning, preparing, executing, and assessing military operations.”⁴

Since the 1990s, armed conflicts and humanitarian operations have thrust the military and NGOs together. Lacking extensive military doctrine, the military and NGOs have been mutually supportive in an effort to save lives and to accomplish post-conflict missions. Centered on the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) within the theater, the planning effort has been reactive in nature. Meeting on the ground, operators have worked out solutions, overcoming differences for the common good.⁵ As the number of NGOs continues to grow, this coordination process will become increasingly difficult—eventually yielding inefficient use of limited aid resources, delayed humanitarian relief efforts, and even conflicting objectives in the post-conflict environment. The military must encourage a better post-conflict planning process to enable the best working relationship with the plethora of NGOs.⁶ It cannot be the organizational lead of NGOs, as neither the Department of Defense nor the U.S. Government (USG) have any authority over these civilian organizations. In fact, the desire for NGO neutrality and often distrust of the military makes the military an unlikely catalyst for change in the process.

The answer lies in the interagency process. This issue is also joint as all services wrestle with better NGO relationships. The State Department has a large role in the solution as they coordinate U.S. foreign policy and provide other U.S. agencies and ambassadors with the policy lead. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is the lead U.S. agency for interaction with NGOs.⁷ It already maintains an extensive computer database of NGO information, available to military planners over the internet, and has habitual working relationships with NGOs through conferences and the aid granting process.⁸ USAID can also be the necessary conduit between the military and NGOs to promote improved relations and
commitments for post-conflict operations. It is already the major player, through its Office of Private and Voluntary Cooperation (PVC) and Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster and Assistance (OFDA), in coordinating U.S. aid to NGOs. Through these organizations, it provides substantial NGO aid and direction after any conflict in which the military is involved. Improving upon already existing NGO conferences, USAID and the military could partner to bring the military and NGO communities closer. The linkage would be natural for American NGOs but needs to include international NGOs as well—bringing all the post-conflict players together. USAID, because of its working relationships with United Nations relief organizations, could leverage UN participation in its conferences, preparing habitual relief rapport during conflict recovery for which the UN is in charge.

As peacetime NGO engagement improves, the military will need a new planning model for post-conflict NGO relations. In an era of high operational deployment tempo, the military benefits from a quick transition to civilian control of nation building tasks. Fast solutions, however, are usually not in the interests of NGOs and many intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) who see long-term solutions and involvement as critical to development and recovery. The military planner, consequently, must know the required humanitarian recovery tasks of the most immediate nature—what must be done to prevent human suffering and ensuing catastrophe. Knowing these relief tasks, the planner can allocate committed NGO assets against the problem in order to minimize military assets to nation building tasks and expedite the recovery process, reducing human suffering. The military planner must also know the limitations of each NGO and how much military support is required to initiate each one’s life-sustaining mission. A planning model and peacetime engagement become critical, so in an ever increasingly complex international NGO environment, the best post-conflict recovery can be installed with maximization of limited aid assets. The improvement of the process will benefit all, most importantly the innocent civilians caught in the wake of warring armies. Consequently, this paper will argue that the U.S. military must implement an improved military/NGO planning model for post-conflict operations. This military/NGO interaction model must identify clear humanitarian roles for the military and NGOs while defining their relationship. To foster this enhanced mutual interaction, this paper will also propose that the military and USAID initiate more aggressive peacetime planning efforts to cultivate better military/NGO performance in future contingencies.

BACKGROUND OF NGOS AND AFGHANISTAN EXAMPLE

Joint doctrine defines NGOs as:
transnational organizations of private citizens that maintain a consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. Nongovernmental organizations may be professional associations, foundations, multinational businesses or simply groups with a common interest in humanitarian assistance activities (development and relief). “Nongovernmental organizations” is a term normally used by non-U.S. organizations. This definition delineates a distinction with private voluntary organizations (PVOs) that refers to private, nonprofit American humanitarian organizations—a term joint doctrine will no longer use in favor of merging PVO into NGO. Civilians refer to NGOs as:

private, self-governing, not-for-profit organizations dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society.

Critical to note in both definitions is the lack of accountability of NGOs to any American governmental agency, the U.S. or any other military, or the United Nations. These organizations are, however, on the battlefield, answering only to their own headquarters in response to humanitarian or environmental crises.

The military must avail itself of the valuable capabilities that NGOs bring to the post-conflict environment. Effective cooperation and synchronization of NGO humanitarian efforts are critical to USG recovery efforts. Because of increased deployments and an inability to leave any committed area quickly, the military needs to maximize NGO abilities and resources after a conflict, so that it can redeploy its own assets or deploy to other theaters of operation. The U.S. military has exercised post-conflict NGO coordination in Iraq (Operation Provide Comfort), Kosovo, and Afghanistan. The military was also involved with NGOs in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia, although these were not post-conflict operations in which U.S. forces were engaged in combat. Even though much of this research project would be applicable in those instances as well, we will focus on the post-U.S. conflict scenario, emphasizing an environment in which NGOs become involved concurrently with U.S. forces or one from which they were expelled and now are re-entering.

Afghanistan, the most recent example of post-conflict operations, demonstrates the continued need for better military/NGO relationships. Civil affairs Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells (CHLCs) from the 489th Civil Affairs (CA) Brigade from Knoxville, Tennessee and the 401st CA Brigade from Rochester, New York have been in country since March of 2002. Working with the well-established CMOC model, they have completed some 234 projects worth
about 10 million dollars in Department of Defense Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid funds. In October 2002, the White House credited DoD with delivering 2.4 million food rations, rebuilding 61 schools, working on 10 water projects, digging 83 wells, repairing 15 hospitals, and building transmitters for a national radio system for 10 million dollars. Once again, U.S. forces have proven their versatility and value in humanitarian operations; however, one must remember that civilians generally perform these functions ten times cheaper. NGOs also use privately donated monies, decreasing the reliance on limited USG aid dollars. Maximizing NGO use remains a priority in efficiency and freeing military forces for other activities.

As in prior post-conflict periods, the main USG humanitarian effort comes under the direction of USAID. In Afghanistan, USAID is working as a conduit between the military and NGO community in country. It also co-hosted a Washington DC conference in October 2002 with the Department of Defense to review civil-military lessons learned in Operation Enduring Freedom. Because of the millions of dollars in U.S. aid, USAID becomes the controlling USG agent for foreign aid and grants. The DoD aid and relief efforts pale in comparison to the overall USG and world grant amounts. Coupled with the NGO relief projects, USAID is postured to head the relief effort better than any other U.S. agency. This leadership was evident in Afghanistan and will be in any foreseeable contingency. A USAID Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) that deployed to Afghanistan originally for drought relief in June 2001 became the major aid director until it was deactivated on 7 June 2002. With a maximum of four DARTs in the region during this period, USAID converted the OFDA effort in June 2002 into a Program Office and is still in Kabul coordinating the humanitarian relief effort in Afghanistan. Of the 464 U.S. NGOs registered with USAID in November 2002, 42 of them were operating in Afghanistan. This NGO figure fails to include international NGOs or local Afghan NGOs—a sizeable additional work force in country. Thus the substantial U.S. and international aid dollars are not controlled or directed by the military, but rather are controlled by NGOs and non-DoD agencies.

The Afghanistan humanitarian crisis relief functions remain consistent in type and magnitude with previous complex humanitarian crises. Returning of refugees/displaced persons, providing shelter and food, re-establishing infrastructure, and demining are critical to the Afghanistan humanitarian effort. For example, the refugee problem was exacerbated by continuous conflict in Afghanistan. In August 2001, prior to Operation Enduring Freedom, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) assessed that there were some 3.5 million refugees from Afghanistan in Pakistan and Iran. As of January 2002, in
the wake of even more refugees, over 1.75 million refugees had returned to Afghanistan. By August 2002, there were some 850,000 internally displaced persons of which 630,000 had returned home. Of these, 230,000 were assisted in returning home by UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). This massive human displacement and subsequent repatriation required significant intervention by relief agencies to avoid a potential humanitarian crisis of tremendous magnitude.\textsuperscript{17}

Much of the sizable USG relief effort to Afghanistan (U.S. aid for FY 2001-2004 is $714,644,624) was aimed at food, shelter, and infrastructure repair to alleviate human suffering.\textsuperscript{18} Present at any conflict termination will be the inevitable destruction of homes, governmental structures, and food production. In Afghanistan, the USG solved these problems and shortages quickly under the inevitable scrutiny of the world press, as it will need to in any future contingency. For the Afghans, much of this aid was channeled through NGOs for food (319,000 metric tons), winter clothing issues, and shelter and heating assistance in the form of blankets, coal, plastic sheeting, tents, and stoves. This immediate aid fulfilled much of the emergency food and housing needs, averting a serious humanitarian disaster. The U.S. military, NGOs, and USAID also conducted and financed infrastructure repairs to include fixing water-supply systems, rebuilding roads and bridges, repairing housing, drilling new wells, performing agriculture projects, distributing some 30,000 radios, and re-opening schools.\textsuperscript{19} American Friends Service Committee, CARE, Catholic Relief Services, Christian Children’s Fund, International Organization for Migration, International Rescue Committee, Mercy Corps, Relief International, Save the Children, Shelter for Life, and the United Methodist Committee on Relief are all NGOs currently rebuilding Afghanistan schools and providing educational services.\textsuperscript{20}

As in previous conflicts, demining remains a major critical relief function. The proliferation of landmines in Third World countries creates a hazard that has remained for decades. Removal of mines to enable travel on major roads and restore critical infrastructure will be necessary in any conflict recovery. Limited military explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) detachments for this mission necessitate substantial NGO involvement in this critical function. In Afghanistan, the United Nations is heading the effort with its Mine Action Program for Afghanistan (MAPA). By July 2002, it assessed that 723 square kilometers were mined with some 5 to 7 million mines. The worst areas are adjacent to Pakistan and Iran. This dangerous hazard leads to 150-300 people killed or injured by mines each month in Afghanistan. The U.S. has paid 38.4 million U.S. dollars (USD) for Afghanistan demining since FY 93, with 3 million USD in FY 00 and 2.8 million USD in FY 01. The Department of State increased this figure in
FY 02 to 7.03 million USD. Much of this money goes to NGOs who perform the painstaking
work of mine removal in the field. MAPA has some 201 teams that conduct clearance
operations—teams that are more numerous than the limited military assets available for this
hazardous duty. DoD even transferred more than 3.7 million USD to the State Department for
contract support in clearance around airstrips. 21 Another example of the NGO effort is the Mine
Detection and Dog Center, an extensive dog mine-detection unit run by NGOs. It has some 186
dogs spread throughout Afghanistan reportedly doing half of the clearing effort in country. 22
NGOs have also conducted mine-awareness education for the Afghans, reducing the casualty
rate by an estimated 50 percent. HALO USA, an NGO, received a direct U.S. grant of 3.2
million dollars in FY 02 that employs 1,200 plus Afghan mine clearers. HALO works under the
direction of MAPA, further relieving U.S. forces from the dangerous burden of mine clearance.
The State Department also gave 3.1 million to RONCO Consulting Corporation to train Afghans
in demining and to equip them with detectors, ambulances, protective gear, and radios. This
NGO-provided training frees Special Forces trainers to perform other necessary missions in
country. Because of the abundance of mines in their country, demining will remain a major
NGO activity in Afghanistan for years. 23

ASSSESSMENT OF CURRENT MILITARY/NGO DOCTRINE

Having reviewed the current Afghanistan military/NGO interaction and roles, it is
profitable to review where current military doctrine stands on NGO relationships. The 1990s
provided numerous contingencies that involved NGOs. These included relief efforts in Northern
Iraq; humanitarian assistance in Bangladesh, Somalia and Rwanda; and peace operations in
Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. These contingencies led to many academic studies and formulation
of the current military doctrine. Because of the complex NGO interaction in the above
contingencies and a desire to afford commanders latitude in future contingencies, the doctrine is
broad and somewhat vague. It is not directive and relies on operators to formulate the
interaction.

One of the key joint documents to emerge out of these experiences was The Joint Task
Force Commander’s Handbook for Peace Operations. It states that the connectivity between
NGOs and the U.S. military “is currently ad hoc, with no specific statutory linkage.” 24 Joint
doctrine acknowledges the importance of the NGO contribution to Military Operations Other
Than War (MOOTW) and even provides a forty-one page listing by region and country of
hundreds of NGOs. 25 However, despite years of interacting with NGOs, the U.S. military has not
developed a formal model for dealing with NGOs; as with many issues, the on-the-ground
commander must figure out the appropriate working relationships and match mission needs with capabilities. The difficulty for the military planner is to know the capabilities of each of the myriad NGOs, their desires to support US goals in post-conflict operations, and the ability to plan on their support in initial pre-deployment planning. Presently, the military coordinates with NGOs upon arrival in the Joint Operations Area (JOA), for which the NGO’s involvement in the conflict or crisis may pre-date that of the military. In concert with other agencies, the military integrates an immediate post-conflict plan that attempts to use those NGOs present in theater in the best possible manner. Unfortunately, the post-conflict military plan already may have military resources committed to some NGO tasks, may have inadequate military resources for legitimate support tasks, or may delay NGOs from immediately maximizing NGO relief activities as an appropriate plan is formulated.

In reality, little doctrine exists to aid the military planner in NGO concerns. Joint doctrine advances several principles in civil-military interfacing with NGOs (See Table 1). Accordingly, the military must understand civilian operational and financial accountability, the relative reduced cost of civilian NGOs doing a task (10 times cheaper than the military), and the likelihood that many military assistance tasks need to be included early in NGO planning. These legitimate military assistance support tasks loosely include: protection of sites, lines of communications (LOCs), victims, and workers; logistics, particularly transportation of NGO assets and relief articles; and engineer and communication services such as restoring relief LOCs and air traffic control. Interface principles also include excessive independence of NGOs that flow rapidly into the JOA, requiring direct military contact with accountable parent organizations or governments. The military must also promote trust and respect to facilitate better information sharing. The military must also analyze the mission to see where its role properly lies. The civilian NGO effort may be more important than the supporting military effort. Additionally, foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) must be administered impartially. Both the military and NGOs may be involved in this activity, often requiring strict neutrality to avoid any appearance of favoritism towards a particular warring faction. Intense civil-military coordination also is critical in all phases of planning to avoid compartmentalized responses.

Because of the independent nature of the myriad NGOs, civilian guidance within the NGO community varies and is non-binding. One authoritative source that comments on the NGO role is the Guide to IGOs, NGOs, and the Military in Peace and Relief Operations, a United States Institute of Peace publication. It asserts that there are four main activities that an NGO performs in conflict: humanitarian assistance, human rights, civil-society and democracy building, and conflict resolution. Military planners and USAID must use the existing joint
doctrine and these four broad NGO capabilities in determining what role NGOs will have in post-conflict operations. The ambiguity in doctrine and roles requires a better pre-deployment understanding between military planner and NGO. Academic studies at the end of the 1990s identified some shortcomings in current military/NGO relations. The next section will review

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principle (Military “Must Do/Know”)</th>
<th>Benefit/Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>--Understand and facilitate principles of civilian operational and financial accountability</td>
<td>--Better rapport and understanding of intent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--Realize NGOs are cheaper than the military in relief functions</td>
<td>--Save money and military resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--When possible, have military assistance tasks included early in NGO planning</td>
<td>--Military support tasks include: protection, logistics, and engineer and communication services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--NGO independence can require direct military contact to accountable agent</td>
<td>--Military call responsible government or NGO national/international headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--Promote trust and respect with NGOs</td>
<td>--Gain information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--Military effort may be supporting effort to main civilian effort</td>
<td>--Better concept of relief operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--Foreign Humanitarian Assistance must be administered impartially</td>
<td>--Maintain neutrality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--Intense military/NGO coordination is critical in all phases of planning</td>
<td>--Avoid compartmentalization and prolongation of military mission</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 1. MILITARY/NGO INTERFACE PRINCIPLES

some of the salient proposals that will enable military planners to improve the NGO role in post-hostilities.

ACADEMIC MILITARY/NGO PROPOSALS

There were numerous studies on military/NGO relationships in the late 1990s. Many valid suggestions that pertain to this study have been made that warrant consideration and in
some cases implementation (See Table 2). These academic studies investigated the crises up to Bosnia but neglected Kosovo and Afghanistan because of their recentness. A review of these latest two crises only reinforces the proposals made in many of the studies, confirming what has already been written. Military doctrine also evolved over this same period, and it improved in joint publications such as Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations (JP 3-57) released in February 2001.

NGOs’ cultures also have been reviewed. Their desire for low administrative costs tends to preclude formal schooling and training programs that would help their professionalism. Often well-meaning, they lack the knowledge to coordinate large-scale operations with multiple countries and agencies. Their desire to minimize administrative costs and any external control also leads to little formal evaluation and self-improvement of techniques. Their diversity, fixation on their particular humanitarian activity, non-governmental accountability, and lack of coordinative ability make them unlikely candidates to lead any international recovery effort resulting from a complex contingency. Hence, directive reforms will be difficult to impossible in the NGO community. One think tank reform calls for better horizontal relationships by NGOs in academia and various agencies. NGO administrators would build relationships with academics and government officials to better comprehend recovery issues and enhance personal interaction within the relief community. This rapport, however, calls for greater funding of conference attendance by NGOs and schooling in graduate programs, raising administrative costs for the NGO. Improvements in the NGO community in administration and understanding of governmental processes can only aid DoD. However, it is unfeasible for DoD or even the USG to fund the extensive interaction and exchanges required to improve NGO performance and planning abilities. NGOs will have to increase this administrative burden for selective cadre while the USG and DoD must do whatever is possible to promote NGO involvement in conferences and training.

Many academic studies call for strengthening of the interagency process. To accomplish this, many leading academics suggest first creating a national-level doctrine to formalize how agencies plan and react to complex humanitarian crises. Others propose an interagency working group (now known as a Policy Coordination Committee) or Washington Coordination Group to lead the policy execution and planning effort. There could be an Interagency Assessment Team that included NGOs to survey an impending crisis. Coordination groups improve the USG reaction to a crisis, but interagency squabbles and competing agendas still can hinder the process. To alleviate this internal governmental conflict, a RAND Corporation study proposes leadership models for the interagency process that would
have either direct National Security Council leadership, a Special Representative heading the effort, or a combination of the two.\textsuperscript{32} Formalizing the leadership process and the roles and missions of each agency could only benefit the crisis response. Reviewing previous contingencies, combatant commands and academics realized that the military and NGOs should be incorporated more into the interagency planning process. Combatant commands could include NGOs in unclassified annexes and at the earliest practical point in the military planning process regardless of any change in the interagency process.\textsuperscript{33} Furthermore, interagency rehearsals with all should occur prior to execution.\textsuperscript{34} These basic planning considerations could improve the interagency process, yielding better military/NGO relations.

The military also could review some force structure positions as a means of improving NGO integration. Some military and civilian officials recommend institutionalizing a Humanitarian Advisor (HUMAD) who would work with the Combatant Commander or CJTF similar to a Political Advisor (POLAD). The HUMAD could be a senior Foreign Service Officer with significant humanitarian experience who would coordinate with other combatant command HUMADs and NGOs.\textsuperscript{35} This process would create a perpetual military/political/NGO interface in peace and war. Horizontal relationships would naturally improve with greater interaction amongst all parties. This concept could be further enhanced by a similar proposal to include a USAID representative on each Combatant Command staff.\textsuperscript{36} Again, the interface within the relief community could only prosper. Unfortunately, USAID would have to provide these additional billets during an administration interested in governmental reduction, not growth.

Other officials recommend a Center of Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance such as USPACOM has. It performs similar functions to the HUMAD, promoting research, training, and expertise.\textsuperscript{37} It also could be a tool for improved military/NGO interaction in peace and war. Rather than trying to draw the NGOs into centers or liaison positions, one proposal suggests creating military liaison positions with NGOs and government agencies. All these improvements seem to have merit, but may be impossible in the current manning and headquarters reducing environment. If additional positions are unfeasible, another approach might be to realign the duties of some existing positions. For example, the Security Assistance Officer (SAO) on the Embassy Country Team could be the liaison with NGOs and build rapport, performing some of the roles suggested in other reforms.\textsuperscript{38}

Some academics correctly want the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) to be the central point of contact for NGOs with the USG. They would coordinate all efforts, building on their current leadership in the field. All NGOs would come to them for solutions.\textsuperscript{39} This reform is aimed at correcting the problem of NGOs bouncing between USG agencies,
attempting to coordinate. DoD, as one of these governmental agencies with multiple sub-agencies and departments, must be more ready to cope with large amounts of NGOs. Simply understanding who the thousands of NGOs are is a monumental problem. To alleviate information problems, the military could maintain its own database on NGOs, so it would be better able to plan activities.\textsuperscript{40} Better than InterAction or USAID databases, the new military database could target areas around the world with all pertinent NGO data required by military planners. This database should be centrally controlled and joint; combatant commands could update it as necessary with Joint Staff oversight. Finally, the military could improve its joint doctrine with more specificity to better prepare the military planner to respond to NGO challenges.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Summary of Proposed Military/NGO Improvements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>--Training/Schooling for NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--NGOs must build better horizontal relationships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--Strengthen Interagency Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--Conduct prior planning with Combatant Commands and NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--Military/Civilian exchanges and exercises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--Institutionalize a Humanitarian Advisor (HUMAD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--Greater use of Security Assistance Officer and Country Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--Establish OFDA as central point of contact for NGOs with USG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--Maintain military NGO database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--Improve joint doctrine</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 2. SUMMARY OF PROPOSED MILITARY/NGO IMPROVEMENTS\textsuperscript{41}**

**IN VolVEMENT OF U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (USAID)**

Upon reviewing current joint doctrine and the various academic proposals, the military is clearly an interagency player in the post-conflict period. USAID already is assuming a leadership role with NGOs and the recovery effort. The reality of the contingencies in the 1990s and Afghanistan confirm the centrality of USAID in any humanitarian operation in which U.S. forces are involved. USAID is leading by directing and controlling USG aid money--often having other world relief monies follow the U.S. lead. The USG must refine the interagency process and establish doctrine to be more proactive in post-conflict recovery. USAID, working in conjunction with the State Department, ambassadors, and DoD, must be ready for hostility termination and subsequent relief operations. USAID must galvanize the NGO community, so all participants in humanitarian efforts will better comprehend each other's roles and missions.
In order to understand why USAID should be the lead agent in humanitarian operations, one must know its history and stated purpose.

President Kennedy signed the Foreign Assistance Act in 1961 thus creating USAID. Its purpose is to further U.S. policy interests and to improve the lives of people in the developing world. Independent of the State Department but receiving direction from its foreign policy objectives, USAID maintains relationships with over 3,500 American companies and 464 U.S. NGOs.42 Headquartered in Washington D.C., it has offices around the world and facilitates operations with subordinate organizations such as the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), and the Office of Private and Voluntary Cooperation (PVC). These sub-elements hold conferences, provide on-the-ground leadership of relief efforts, and coordinate with NGOs. They also conduct conferences that agencies and NGOs attend. Military attendance at these conferences, however, has been sporadic. An annual conference led by USAID to better attract NGOs seeking to maintain neutrality from any military would be useful. DoD would support the conference with strong attendance from OSD, the Joint Staff, services, and combatant commands. At the conference, the military could build horizontal relations with NGO leadership, gather lessons learned, and maintain the positive work accomplished in recent contingencies.

USAID could decide which of its organizations would be the lead in the conference, but all could certainly participate. PVC, whose strategic goal is to strengthen partnership with all NGOs, could update its database on U.S. PVOs to include agreed upon critical relief functions that each NGO could perform and their desired relationship with any coalition military force in future conflicts. The database currently only gives a brief NGO history, stated purposes, and financial support accounting. Additional verbiage on the military relationship could remain generic enough to imply no contractual arrangement that could be perceived as violating the NGO’s neutrality or committing the military to support. International NGOs would also be invited to join the database. Those interested in U.S. aid money, including a large portion of NGOs, would probably be very concerned with the accuracy of their data on this website. The NGO incentive to attend the conference is to develop better rapport with PVC, the USAID primary grant provider, and OFDA, the crisis director with whom the NGO will interface on the ground. The military planners could then plan on using these committed NGOs to fulfill as many critical post-conflict relief functions as possible while USAID could begin planning the longer term (after 30 days from conflict termination) developmental relief tasks that are important for ultimate peace and recovery. The proposed conference creates better integration between USAID, the
military, and NGOs, promoting better horizontal relationships within all organizations and leading to improved post-conflict operations in future crises.

NEW MODEL FOR MILITARY/NGO RELATIONS

Nowhere in the literature is there a definitive list of post-conflict functions for the military, nor is there a blueprint for improving cooperation between the military and NGOs that demonstrates how to employ more effectively the capabilities each brings to the battlefield. Although the military must be able to respond to any mission required by the national leadership, the open nature of many of these missions allows the military to be drawn into any nation building task. A new model is required to synthesize what the military has accomplished in previous post-conflict humanitarian operations. Defining a model with appropriate tasks and military/NGO relationships will enable the military planner to improve planning for post-conflict operations.

The current military model for NGO relations in post-conflict operations is ad hoc. It essentially is reactive in nature and deals with each NGO upon military arrival in the JOA. The military generally coordinates with the NGO at civil military operations centers (CMOCs). A few general relational principles exist, but the military planner is left to integrate the existing NGOs that are involved in the conflict into the best possible recovery plan. Additionally, UN organizations (UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UN Human Rights Commission (UNHRC), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and World Food Programme (WFP)), and collective NGO organizations such as InterAction may have oversight of many NGOs and ongoing or planned relief efforts. These agencies are not subordinate to either the USG or the military, and generally will do as they deem appropriate. If it is a UN operation, the U.S. military may find itself in a supporting role to them. In any event, the military must follow a State Department or USAID lead as it coordinates with the IGOs, NGOs, and other agencies to include the principle financial backers, USAID, the World Bank, and the European Humanitarian Office (ECHO). This complex environment makes the current military planning model difficult and limits NGO-military relations.

A directive model for military/NGO relations in post-conflict operations could significantly improve planning and the military/NGO relationship. This model, proactive in nature, develops from an interagency conference that is pre-conflict. Preferably led by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) as previously discussed, an annual week-long conference in Washington D.C., or at another appropriate site such as the Peacekeeping Institute at the Army War College, would gather representatives from the State Department, combatant
commands, DoD, Joint Staff, USAID, and the various NGOs. The Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, and USAID Administrator would initiate an international effort to implement this strategy for nongovernmental organizations. The conference would likely grow in attendance each year as its importance was realized in the international community. Its purpose would be to improve humanitarian community relationships, to begin a formalized planning process by participants agreeing to roles and missions in post-conflict operations, to have NGOs commit to what humanitarian tasks they can fulfill, and to refine the directive model presented in this paper.

Along with the above stated purposes, USAID could expand its tracking of NGOs and improve its database on them. Rather than simplistically grouping each NGO into a holistic solution, each NGO, albeit there are now thousands, must be studied prior to any conflict. Each NGO would be analyzed and categorized as to its capabilities, scale, and the organizational inclinations that it brings to post-conflict operations. At the meeting, each participating NGO would articulate the exact functions that it brings to post-conflict operations, placing its own description in the database. The USG would be interested in maximizing NGO participation in the conference to enhance USAID’s database, to gain greater NGO acceptance of post-conflict roles, and to improve participant relationships. USAID would mail appropriate explanations and surveys to NGOs unable to attend the conference to obtain their information. The conference would lead to a greatly improved database that would be on-line for all participants. The entries would define capabilities and expected roles in future contingencies. USAID and DoD could then use the database to initiate planning, albeit the NGO may not arrive at the future theater with the necessary capability.

In the turbulence following conflict when combatants cease direct combat operations, the military planner is most concerned with humanitarian assistance aimed at preventing serious suffering. These Critical Relief Functions (CRFs), informally defined elsewhere and formally agreed to at the annual conference, are the primary needs that the military must ensure are fulfilled at the cessation of hostilities. The military or preferably NGOs can perform CRFs, but the military will avoid any other nation building task. Undefined to this point but manifest in past complex emergencies, CRFs include: security (includes disarming), food/water relief, shelter of civilians, medical treatment, essential demining/unexploded ordnance removal, restoration of necessary infrastructure, return of displaced persons, and restoration of government and police functions. All interagency players and NGOs should realize that these are the only appropriate tasks for the military. USAID would defer other tasks to NGOs, host nation, or other interagency players. The U.S. military would also involve coalition military resources in the CRF effort to
minimize the burden on U.S. forces. As addressed, NGOs would register for any of these critical relief functions that they were capable of performing and the scale to which they could accomplish the task. Additional NGO capabilities such as human rights and legal investigating or education development also would be recorded but not considered primary in immediate post-conflict operations. These developmental NGO functions would not receive priority of support with military assets until the other basic human needs were met. The NGOs and military would know this established priority prior to the conflict, resulting in both developing better plans. In the immediate 30 days after conflict termination, USAID would direct the military to accomplish these CRFs, using NGOs to fulfill as many of them as possible. Developmental humanitarian tasks not included on this list would not receive military priority and could be delayed until any humanitarian crisis subsides. If OFDA or the ambassador determined other tasks to be essential, other resources would be used to accomplish the mission. As more contingencies occur, all players would know their roles and their expected degree of military support, and plan accordingly.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Critical Relief Functions (CRFs) in Post-Conflict Operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>--Provide Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--Food/Water Relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--Shelter for Civilians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--Medical Treatment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--Demining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--Restoration of necessary infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--Return of Displaced Persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--Restoration of Government and Police Functions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After the NGO capability is determined at the conference, each NGO would then be grouped into one of four possible military relationships for post-conflict operations based on their view of U.S. national interests and their overall capabilities. These four categories include: reliance, assistance, autonomous, or adversarial. They are critical to the model because they dictate the relationship that the military planner and USAID will use in incorporating the NGO into the post-conflict plan and in determining the military support required by the NGO.

The **reliance relationship** is one in which the NGO depends on the military for support. Without it, it is incapable of accomplishing its mission. Consequently, the NGO is supportive of military recovery efforts and wants military support in large measures to accomplish its part in
the humanitarian effort. The NGO may be a local one and small in scale, receiving its grant money entirely from USAID. The military support could entail transportation, protection, communication, and logistical help from the Army. It is usually in U.S. interests to provide this support effort because host nation assets are often unavailable, and the food or relief is necessary to avert a humanitarian disaster. Further, the support may develop an indigenous capability that will augment all future relief efforts. The NGO in this case is an extension of the Critical Relief Function effort. Operation Restore Hope in Somalia provides an example of such a relationship. Initially, the military’s goals were to secure ports, ensure passage of relief supplies, secure relief convoys and operations, and assist NGOs in humanitarian relief under UN control.\textsuperscript{45} The military was critical to resuming humanitarian operations that had stagnated from inadequate security. InterAction, an umbrella organization for U.S. NGOs, had written to President Bush requesting help in a “desperate security situation.”\textsuperscript{46} Without the military’s security CRF, NGOs could do nothing.

The \textbf{assistance relationship} is similar to reliance, but far more minimal in scale of assistance. Here the NGO can accomplish its mission, but needs some military assistance to initiate or sustain operations efficiently. Without military assistance, the NGO would be severely hindered in its mission performance. An example would be the current World Food Programme (WFP) relief efforts in Angola where demining teams are required to open routes, so the humanitarian assistance can flow to vital areas.\textsuperscript{47} The military could provide minimal demining or transportation, freeing the NGOs to accomplish their relief efforts in other vital areas.

The \textbf{autonomous relationship} is one in which the NGO requires no military support to accomplish its mission. Significant here is that it is working for purposes that coincide with those of the US military. Many well-established NGOs will want to operate in this relationship, because they can remain independent of the military, better maintaining their perceived neutrality. They will be able to operate independently in the operational area, but the military will still need to know their location and efforts. The DART or UN leadership will assess their efforts, allowing the military to focus on other CRFs or NGO assistance. An example of this type of group is the Mines Advisory Group, a British NGO, that currently clears mines in the Kurdish held areas of Iraq. Having demarcated 230 square miles of mined territory and disposed of 85,000 mines, they are capable of continuing their demining operations without military support but would probably support general coalition goals to rebuild Iraq after any future conflict.\textsuperscript{48}

The final relationship is \textbf{adversarial}. This is a new potential trend and bears considerable alertness in the future. In this mode, the NGO is working at cross-purposes to US
interests in post-conflict operations. In this case, the NGO may avoid the US military, despise it or even offer assistance to hostile elements. It most certainly would not attend any USAID annual planning conference because of resentment towards the United States. An example would be an NGO conducting protests against the U.S. forces or their allies in the Joint Operations Area. Another case would be conducting unsanctioned war crimes investigations against U.S. forces or its allies. Some NGOs, such as Global Relief Foundation in Kosovo and Benevolence International, have allegedly been supporting terrorists and planning attacks against U.S. and European targets. These NGOs operate in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. These are examples of NGOs that the military would need to know have hostile intentions and realize that they may be terrorist fronts. Another form of adversarial NGO could be a faith-based NGO that limited aid only to Muslim recipients regardless of the humanitarian need. This example from Kosovo, related by a War College student, could cause the commander to “juggle” aid resources or fix only certain houses. Additionally, the actions of an NGO could have unforeseen consequences and be adversarial for a time period in the post-conflict phase. Examples include NGOs providing money for Somali warlord weapons by hiring local security personnel, hurting the indigenous Mozambique health system through fund diversions, and weakening the Afghan central government by totally controlling the relief process.

Although the military has no authority over these adversarial groups, NGOs with conflicting goals must be ostracized from the post-conflict efforts as they are undermining U.S., coalition, or UN interests. Although military tools against NGOs are limited, the military would be able to deny them aid and to restrict their access and movement where possible. If an NGO-military dialogue existed, the military could attempt to convince the NGO to stop its harmful activities. The State Department or USAID/OFDA also could use diplomatic and financial pressure to limit NGO actions or financial support as well as to galvanize host nation opinion against them.

Therefore, the proposed military/NGO model is directive and groups NGOs by capability and function as well as their post-conflict objective interests. The resulting product of this model is a matrix planning tool that matches the eight critical post-conflict relief functions against the four NGO relationships (See Table 4). Armed with this matrix that could be developed at the initial planning conference and updated at subsequent ones, the combatant command planner would then assess what NGOs would provide to his or her regional post-conflict operations and what their support requirements might be. With the initiation of hostilities, military planners, the Department of State, USAID, and the country team could begin coordinating potential NGO participation at the cessation of hostilities. Knowing the established NGO capabilities, the
military and NGOs could confirm their in-theater assets for restoration activities, ensure proper area coverage for critical relief functions, deconflict competing NGO activities, and ensure the plan for military support is ready for execution. USAID, through OFDA and PVC, could be involved in this planning and offer grant monies to NGOs accordingly. With USAID/PVC involvement, NGOs probably will be willing to coordinate with military planners and commit to relief functions, especially ones totally or partially funded by USAID. OFDA or PVC could maintain an NGO computer database that all could use to know NGO capabilities. If the current PVC database were to be used, it would be expanded and reformatted to include military planning considerations. Additionally, this planning could aid UN umbrella organizations and, most importantly, minimize the human suffering after a conflict. The current ad hoc model has shown itself to be plagued with coordination and planning shortfalls and leadership deficiencies. The directive model could benefit all players in the complex military/NGO relations—the end state would be better relief operations for all.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Post-Conflict Critical Relief Functions (CRFs)</th>
<th>Type of Military/NGO Relationship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Host Nation and Military Function</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food/Water Relief</td>
<td>NGO 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelter of Civilians</td>
<td>NGO 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Treatment</td>
<td>NGO 3, 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demining</td>
<td>NGO 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restoration of Infrastructure</td>
<td>NGO 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return of Displaced Persons</td>
<td>NGO 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restoration of Government/Police</td>
<td>NGO 8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 4. DIRECTIVE MODEL PLANNING TOOL**
CONCLUSION

The USG must implement a directive model to replace the current informal planning arrangement for NGO employment. Defining the critical relief functions (CRFs) in which the military will become involved in the immediate 30 days of the post-conflict phase will provide a clearer view for all agencies participating in recovery operations. To avoid further military involvement in nation building and an over commitment of limited military assets, the CRFs will enable civilian leadership to focus military resources on only the most severe humanitarian problems while immediately directing NGOs into the recovery efforts. Many will want the military to be involved across the spectrum in every conceivable nation building task, but with the War on Terrorism and limited defense dollars, the military will need to rewind continually to be ready for the next contingency. It cannot remain as a security or humanitarian force across the globe, suffering a form of strategic attrition. The second part of the model, the four military/NGO relationships, will articulate the military support requirements that the NGO will require to perform its mission. This pre-crisis openness will help all parties realize shortcomings in the logistical plan and ensure proper military assets are available in theater when and where they are needed. NGOs not willing to participate in internationally recognized forums will be suspect of an adversarial relationship, possibly disqualifying them for any U.S., European, coalition, or UN grant monies.

The proposed annual USAID/military/NGO conference will draw this directive model together and formalize it for all participants. Knowing that contingencies will continue and that NGOs will remain critical players in post-conflict recovery operations, the interagency and NGO interaction is critical to ensure continued recognition of each others’ attributes, limitations, and goals. Recording and expanding these capabilities and desires on existing USAID/PVC databases will aid military and NGO planners with recovery efforts. The final matrix planning tool will enable the military planner to summarize and to articulate the military and NGO support required by the combatant command for post-conflict operations.
ENDNOTES


6. Ibid., 178, 186.


11. Aall, 89.


27 Aall, 94.


29 Ibid., 16.


31 Smith, 29.


33 Pirnie, xvi.

34 Steven A. Banks, Planning for Future Humanitarian Assistance Operations: Using the SAO to Establish the NGO Working Relationship (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1999), 10.


36 Hinson, 30.


38 Banks, 14; Wright, 16.


43 Aall, 98.


45 Seiple, 109.

46 Seiple, 104.


50 The idea in this sentence is based on remarks by an Army War College student made during non-attribution discussions.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


25


