

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL Monterey, California



THESIS

**SECURITY POLICY OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC
IN LIGHT OF THE INTEGRATION
INTO THE EUROPEAN UNION**

by

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INTEGRATION INTO THE EUROPEAN UNION**

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ABSTRACT

The Czech Republic was integrated into NATO in 1999, when the process of the enlargement of the Alliance by including Central and Eastern Europe had begun, and the idea of the EU expansion was being seriously considered. These changes and the unfavorable development of the Balkans crisis created a new security environment in the region, and the necessity for a revised European security policy. Membership in the EU became a primary strategic goal of the Czech Republic's foreign policy. How did the NATO strategy influence the Czech security policy? What was the evolution of the security environment in the Europe-Atlantic region and the NATO-EU relationship? This thesis analyzes this process and examines its experience. The Czech Republic, as one of the candidates for integration into the EU, has created a good position for its entry. This thesis also explores recent international security relations and their strategic continuities for the creation of the new policy. Since the armed forces play an important role in the national security, the work analyzes a new concept of the Czech Republic Armed Forces reform. In the last chapter the thesis tries to define possible presumptions for the new security policy and argues some possible proposals, which is its main objective.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
II.	THROUGH MEMBERSHIP IN NATO TO EUROPEAN UNION	11
A.	THE CZECH REPUBLIC BEFORE AND AFTER INTEGRATION INTO NATO.....	12
B.	SECURITY STRATEGY OF NATO AND ESDI.....	17
	1. Strategic Concept of NATO	18
	2. Prague Summit 2002.....	19
	3. European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI)	20
C.	COMMON FOREIGN SECURITY POLICY AND ESDP	22
	1. Common Foreign and Security Policy (SFSP)	22
	2. European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP or ESDP)	23
D.	NATO - EU RELATIONSHIP	24
III.	ESDP IN CONNECTION TO THE CURRENT DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY RELATIONS BETWEEN EUROPE AND UNITED STATES.....	27
A.	UNITED STATES SINCE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001.....	27
B.	PROBLEMS OF CFSP AND ESDP.....	32
C.	IRAQ: AS A THREAT AND 'APPLE OF DISCORD'	36
D.	STRATEGIC CONTINUITIES AND COSEQUENCES FOR THE CZECH REPUBLIC.....	39
IV.	PRESUMPTIONS FOR THE CREATION OF THE NEW CZECH REPUBLIC SECURITY POLICY.....	47
A.	NEW CONCEPT OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC PROFESSIONAL ARMED FORCES	45
	1. General Overview	45
	2. Assessment of the Security Environment	46
	3. Strategy of Military Defense of the Czech Republic.....	49
B.	CZECH REPUBLIC AND ESDP	55
	1. Importance and Potential Benefits of the EU Membership	54
	2. Future Position of the Czech Republic and Its Mission in ESDP..	55
	3. Final Proposals for the Czech Republic Security Policy	57
V.	CONCLUSION	63
	BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	67
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	71

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I. INTRODUCTION

From the security point of view, the 20th century was perhaps the most dramatic and the most horrific period of the human evolution. Europe played an inglorious role in the development of the world. Two world wars were unleashed and the cold war ran on, which resulted in tens of millions of people killed and hundreds of millions wounded. The unifying tendencies started more seriously to assert themselves only in the second half of the 20th century. As the emergence of what today is the Czech Republic was decisively influenced by the European history of the 20th century, it appears to be appropriate, at least briefly, to critically analyze that century, and educe out the conclusions for the future existence of NATO, EU and the security policy of the Czech Republic.

Politically and socially unregulated liberalism and colonialism were the basic security risks and causes of the cataclysmic 20th century. The first cause led to the social tension and culminated in revolutions, the second one led to the unequal position of the individual superpowers that responded by attempts of the new division of the world. As a matter of fact, the World Wars and subsequent social revolutions were a negative synergetic effect of this two and of many other casual factors.¹

The changes initiated by the 1980s and 1990s in Europe gradually led to the downfall of communism beginning with the dismantling of the Berlin Wall, to the exodus of the Soviet Armed Forces from its satellite countries. The disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the Council of Mutual Economic Aid also meant the end of the bipolarity. The twentieth century witnessed the reunion of Germany and the sequential triumph of democratic powers in the post-communist countries as well as tensions in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, which culminated in the break-up of both countries. The basic reason was the growth of the nationalism and religious issues.

Later on, disintegration tendencies have been gradually replaced by the integration tendencies, which led for example into the cooperation of the 'Visegrad

¹ Antonín Rašek, *Security in Europe*. Magazine Pohledy, no. 6, 1997.

Troika,² and to the preparation and the enlargement of the NATO and the EU. NATO started its reform and adopted the strategy, which was favorable for the broad cooperation with the Central and Eastern Europe countries. The North Atlantic Council for Cooperation (NACC) was founded and Partnership for Peace (PfP) activities was initiated.³

The remarkable milestone on the way to the integration of Europe was the foundation of the European Union. A European Council was held in Maastricht, the Netherlands. It reached an agreement on the 'Treaty on the European Union.'⁴ It replaced the former system of treaties on which the European Communities had been based for several decades. European Political Cooperation (EPC) has switched to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

In the same year, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe opened negotiations about the potential entry of Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia to the EU. They signed the first Europe Agreements on trade and political cooperation.⁵ A Common Market became the first pillar of the EU, Common Foreign and Security Policy as a second one, with the Justice and Home Affairs cooperation included. The abolition of the inner borders in Europe became a third pillar of the Treaty. Ironically, in that time Czechoslovakia split, and the Czech Republic came into its existence on January 1, 1993. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)⁶ was renamed to the

² Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia entered in 1991 into what is referred to as the Visegrad agreement, aimed at promoting political and economic cooperation. As a result of the split of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic in 1993 it became '*The Visegrad Four*'. Available [On-line]: <<http://www.v-4.sk/may/history-of-visegrad.html>>.

³ *Partnership for Peace (PfP)* Invitation was signed at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 10 January 1994. It is the basis for practical security cooperation between NATO and individual Partner countries (19+1). Activities include defense planning and budgeting, military exercises and civil emergency operations. There are now 27 members of PfP, which are all members of the EAPC (Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council). Available [On-line]: <http://www.shape.nato.int/PFP/pfp_nato.htm>.

⁴ Maastricht – Treaty of EU signed in February 1992, and entered into force in November 1993, EU On-line home page, <<http://europa.eu.int/abc/obj/treaties/en/entoc01.htm>>.

⁵ Signed on December 16, 1991, Available [On-line]: <<http://www.eurunion.org/infores/euguide/milestones.htm>>.

⁶ *Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)*. Available [On-line]: European Defense <<http://www.european-defence.co.uk/directory-o.html>>.

Organization of the Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) with mostly conflict prevention as its main characteristic.

The integration efforts have intensified in Europe. In 1995 the European Union was enlarged by three new countries.⁷ 50 countries signed the Stability Pact in Paris.⁸ On January 17, 1996, the Czech Republic formally applied to join the European Union. The first and later the second Chechnya war took place in Russia. The crisis in the Former Yugoslavia has continued, especially in Bosnia and Serbia (Kosovo). United Nations peacekeepers were replaced by NATO peacemaking troops in the Balkans to reestablish peace and stability.⁹

In 1997, the new Treaty of the European Union, as the annex to the Maastricht Treaty, was signed in Amsterdam.¹⁰ From January 1, 1998 the new European currency (EURO) was established. There were approved the plans of the NATO enlargement, and the first three countries from 'Former Eastern Bloc' joined the Alliance.¹¹ The possibilities of the enlargement of the European Union were significantly extended by the ratification of the Agenda 2000¹² by the European Parliament.

The events mentioned above, and many others, have gradually created a new security environment, which is distinguished by a general releasing of the security aspects

⁷ Finland, Austria and Sweden (affiliation of Norway was rejected due to negative results of the referendum) joined EU by January 1, 1995.

⁸ Stability Pact signed at final Conference in Paris in March 1995.

⁹ After the Dayton Accords (signed in November 1995), UNPROFOR was replaced by the NATO led Implementation Force (IFOR). Available [On-line]: <<http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/Bosnia/updates/dec95/12-20/ceremony2/>>.

¹⁰ *The Amsterdam Treaty – New Treaty For Europe*, signed in October 1997, entry into force in May 1999. Available [On-line]: <<http://europa.eu.int/abc/obj/amst/en/>>.

¹¹ *The Accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland*. March 12, 1999, in Independence, Missouri, USA. Available [On-line]: <<http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/access.htm>>.

¹² On July 16, 1997 EU released the "Agenda 2000" program – accession process for eleven applications from Central and Eastern Europe countries and Cyprus for EU membership (The EU later expanded this accession process to include Malta and Turkey). Available [On-line]: <http://europa.eu.int/comm/agenda2000/index_en.htm>.

mainly in Europe, as well as in the rest of the world. On the other hand, this process has generated, at the same time, lots of new security threats and risks.

A series of changes happened in World society within its geopolitical, economic, security and social system. The phenomenon that fundamentally affected the mentioned systems is the process of the globalization.¹³

The Czech Republic was also involved into that process, and two primary strategic goals of its foreign policy have been specified in the areas of the external defense and security, and in the area of cooperation with other democratic countries. These objectives are the accession into the most important organization, operating in Euro and Trans Atlantic region – North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union.

The conceptualization and implementation of the new Czech Republic security policy upon the intent to entering the European Union (EU) is a comparable challenge as experienced in the nation's recent past. Similar past difficulties have included the reorientation of the armed and police forces within the first months after the "Velvet Revolution,"¹⁴ the division of the Czechoslovakian Army in 1993, and the preparation for the integration into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The experience from the past and the critical analysis of the development in the Czech Republic has shown that the concept of democratization within the armed forces was abandoned in the beginning of 1993. Even the subsequent transformation was not entirely successful, and it has not been finished yet. On the contrary, the armed forces came into an unenviable situation because of poor conceptual development and financial mismanagement, although the transformation was announced as having been completed in 1995.

The European security policy (CFSP)¹⁵ also needed to create a new image after the culmination of the conflict in the Balkan territory during the Kosovo crisis. The

¹³ For the purpose of this thesis, The 'Globalization' is understood as an objectively existed feature that determines process in almost all areas of the human activity. It is important for the following research that the globalization brings qualitatively new economic, political and security standards, with their mutual relation and changes.

¹⁴ 17 November 1989, overthrow of the Czechoslovak communist regime. Available [Online]: <<http://archiv.radio.cz/history/history15.html>>.

¹⁵ European security policy represented by the *Common Foreign Security Policy*, was established as the second pillar of the EU in the 1993 at Maastricht. A number of important

reason for the change was the level of confrontation that the military forces of individual NATO countries displayed during bombing of Yugoslavia. The new image of the CFSP was necessary in spite of the fact that all main European institutions such as the European Union, the Western European Union (WEU), the Council of Europe (CE), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) faced the necessity of the policy reconsiderations. Probably, the main reason for these policy shifts was the fact that Europe acquired a new and greater self-confidence after the détente between the two superpowers - the United States and the Soviet Union.

The White Book of the Czech Republic Security and Defense defines the concept of the security policy as:

Generally, the security policy is a compendium of measures that codifies the responsibility of the state for creating and maintaining the internal and external security conditions necessary to enable the effective development of state prosperity. It includes political, diplomatic, technological, economic, cultural and moral factors. The key position of this policy is to determine the necessary defense based on the nature and magnitude of possible threats.

Therefore, the security policy has to be understood on two levels:

- Conceptualization - which determines the principles of the security policy;
- Implementation – where the armed forces play the main role in the neutralization and countering of different threats which are defined by the security policy according to the military strategy of the country.¹⁶

Thus, the security policy can be understood as a general category that comprises the security, defense and protection of the citizen and the country. There are many various definitions.¹⁷ Generally we can say: the security policy is a complex of the

changes were introduced in Amsterdam in 1997. It came into force in 1999 (more details see in chapter II.).

¹⁶ *The White book of the Czech Republic Security and Defense*. The Ministry of Defense of the Czech Republic 1995, p.2.

¹⁷ National Security Policy in the United States determines the basic interests and objectives of the internal and external security, and the ways and means of their implementation. The security policy in Germany concentrates only to the solution of the external security of the country. The essential goal of the French security policy is the assurance of the independence and the sovereignty of the country and the protection of the national interests.

foreign policy, political-military and internal security components. The security policy should always be the actual response to the initial impulses given by the changing security environment in the country, Europe, and the world. The security risks and threats to the country are the key signals for the formation of the security policy.¹⁸

Based on the above mentioned information, the experts from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of the Interior recommend the following definition:

The security policy of the Czech Republic is a system of basic state interests and objectives as well as the main tools for their achievement. It should insure state sovereignty and its unity, constitution abidance, the activity of democratic institutions, support the economic and social development of the country, as well as the health and life protection of the citizens, property, cultural estates, environmental protection, and fulfillment of international security commitments.¹⁹

The security of the country is never absolute; it is always relative in connection to the concrete situation and the tangible threats both military and nonmilitary in nature. Its objective aspect lies in existing threats, and the subjective aspect results from how the country or the government perceives the given threats, what importance they attribute to them, and how they respond.

The components of the internal and external security mutually inosculate. The internal security is the bilateral link to the international situation (international terrorism, migration, proliferation). A country with a low level of internal security may be considered a source of destabilization for its neighbors or for the whole region. Therefore, the internal security has its international aspect just as the external security has its own national aspect, especially with regards to sharing the sovereignty and the security of the citizens and their country.

The security policy of the Czech Republic consists of the following components:

- Foreign Policy,
- Defense Policy,

¹⁸ Jaroslav Janda and others, *The Security Policy of the Czech Republic*. The conclusive summary of a research project. The Department of Foreign Relations, Prague 1996, p. 7.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p.81-82

- Internal Security Policy.²⁰

The concept of the security policy is presented in two basic documents, Security Strategy of the Czech Republic and the White Book of the Security and Defense of the Czech Republic. The formation and implementation of the security policy, and the security system of the country including its armed forces, are subject to permanent democratic supervision.

Since the Czech Republic already successfully joined NATO, the main effort of the country, besides an active and effective participation in the Alliance, is focused on the accomplishment of the ratification process, and fulfillment of the required conditions regarding the EU membership. One of the most important documents, in the process of a successful accession to the organization is a new “Security Policy of the Czech Republic.” Its concept should be in accordance with the EFSP, and has to follow its policy, which is represented by European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).²¹

The purpose of the thesis is to examine the process of the new security policy formation, which will be adopted either during the process of integration into the European Union, or shortly after that. This work also examines and analyzes the change of the security situation in the country before and after integration to NATO.

The main goal is to define the feasible measures and tasks, which should be implemented and also included into a new document “Security Policy of the Czech Republic;” the policy, which would be able to reflect a current evolution of the security environment in Europe, when the threats are emerging due to a general releasing of the security after an end of the ‘Cold War.’

The three major objectives of this thesis are: (1) to explore and analyze how the Czech Republic built and changed its security policy after the break up of Czechoslovakia and the reaction on the newly created security environment in the European region; (2) to

²⁰ *Security Strategy of the Czech Republic*, Ministry of the Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, Prague 2001, pp.10-13.

²¹ ESDP was created for strengthening European security and defense cooperation, and non-military crisis management tools. Available [On-line]: <<http://www.basicint.org/europe/ESDP/main.htm>>.

examine how NATO security strategy represented by European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), as well as European Security Defense Policy (ESDP) have influenced the Czech Republic's security policy, and (3) to presume how requirements for security policy of the EU can be reflected in the Czech Republic's new policy and how the desired goals of future security policy could be proposed.

The methodology of the thesis is based on the research, study and analysis of the historical and organizational background, through examination of the NATO's, the European Union's and the Czech Republic's official strategic documents and national level policies, books, political and military publications, Internet, encyclopedias, reports, studies, directives, newspapers, scholars and academic studies. The results of that are applied in the creation of the possible proposals of the new 'Security Policy.'

The thesis seeks to answer two main questions and four sub-questions.

The main questions:

1. What are the Czech Republic's presumptions for the creation of the new security policy, resulting from the current Security environment in European region and from ESDP?
2. And how to apply them to the practical life?

The sub-questions:

1. Clarification of the used terminology - what does Security Policy mean?
2. How was the Czech Republic security policy developed before and after integration into NATO?
3. What are the objectives of the European Union and its ESDP in response to current security environment?
4. What is the new concept of the armed forces with regards to new structure and the character of new tasks that reflect the change of security policy?

The thesis also tries to show the importance of membership into the European Union, and to support the correct decision of the Czech foreign policy, with the underlining of long-term effects of the integration and future prosperity by being an EU member. Finally, this thesis will emphasize the importance of the relationship with

neighboring and other European countries for reinforcing stability and peace in the region, with regards to the European Security and Defense Policy.

To explore and meet the main objectives, the thesis is organized into introductory and conclusion chapters, and into four main chapters.

The introduction of this thesis after its short background tries to explain and define the concept of the security policy in general and from the Czech Republic's point of view. Then, it marginally analyzes the historical development of the main events in the course the 20th century, with the particular focus on the last decade, which was the most important for the creation of a new security environment in the European region. This period is also important for bringing the audience (students studying civil/military relations and international security affairs, military officers of the Czech armed forces, military personnel of other countries desiring to join NATO or EU, etc.) to the roots of the security policy, now that the bipolarity within international security relations has been removed.

Chapter II will play more or less the conception role, when dealing with the NATO and its security strategy, created at the Washington Summit, and modified during the Prague Summit. It also discusses the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), and its EU equivalent - European Security Defense Policy (ESDP) led by EFSP. Marginally it will analyze the situation in the country before and after the integration of the Czech Republic into the Alliance. Finally the chapter will evaluate the recent relationship between NATO and European Union.

Chapter III will examine the current development of the international security relations between Europe and the US, focusing on post September 11, 2001 policies, the Iraqi crisis and strategic continuities of the contemporary security environment. This chapter will also analyze possible implications of the current situation for the Czech Republic security strategy.

Chapter IV focuses on the analysis of the new concept of the Czech Republic Armed Forces reform adopted in late 2002. It concentrates on the concrete requirements for the creation of the Czech Republic's new security policy, based on ESDP requirements and a new reform of the Czech Republic professional armed forces. It also

discusses possible presumptions of the Czech Republic and its armed forces for ESDP and develops possible proposals.

The Conclusion will summarize the main ideas of the thesis. It will also emphasize the importance of the enlargement of both NATO and European Union organization, which will help to create stability and peace in the Euro-Atlantic region. With regards to the current relationship between Europe and the United States, the thesis will support the Czech Republic's opinion, which backs up the presence of the USA in Europe. That will reinforce very important Trans-Atlantic security, and avoid any attempts of the European superpowers for their hegemonic position, as we probably can see in the case of the contemporary French foreign policy. The thesis will also emphasize the reorganization of the United Nations, and the restoration of its predestinate role of the Peace and Security guarantee.

II. THROUGH MEMBERSHIP IN NATO TO EUROPEAN UNION

The changes that have occurred in Europe since 1989 have substantially increased the security of all European states. To be able to conceptualize our security policy upon entry into the EU, it is necessary to analyze the position of the Czech Republic after the break-up of Czechoslovakia with a particular emphasis on the position before and after our integration into the NATO, which was and still is an important intermediate stage on our way towards EU membership.

The collapse of the communist system in Central and Eastern Europe resulted in the end of world-wide tension. It also significantly diminished global security threats both, in Europe, and in the whole world. At the same time the security environment, to which the Czech Republic belongs, improved.

Unfortunately, the global security threats were replaced by a range of security risks resulting especially from different levels of stability or instability of the post-communist countries and regions. It was surprising, to a certain extent, that the post-communist nations, except for three 'Visegrad Troika' (Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia), rejected common advancement after the system changes in 1989. At that time the individual orientation of these nations on western democracies and their integration group was prevailing.

Mainly because of objective reasons, none of the dissident political structures, in these countries, was ready for such a quick system breakdown, not expecting that the system would collapse so easily. Most likely, this was due to Gorbachev's policy, which convincingly signaled that the Soviet Union would not interfere with the development of its one-time satellite nations. At the same time it has to be said that even the West was not ready for such a quick development and smooth progress, despite the fact that it had striven for the breakdown of the communist bloc and had supported the dissident movements.

A. THE CZECH REPUBLIC BEFORE AND AFTER INTEGRATION INTO NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE (NATO)

Different integration and disintegration interests might have contributed not just to the differentiation, but also to a certain destabilization of the post-communist world. The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic²² contributed to that by its split into two independent countries. This might have been the objective of some politicians. Our incorporation into western communities accelerated only partially, but mainly because of the fact that the geopolitical location of the Czech Republic was more attractive for the Alliance and thus it entered NATO together with Poland and Hungary as the first post-communist states.

After the Prague Summit, where Slovakia was invited to NATO, and after the expected EU accession of Slovakia together with the Czech Republic next year²³, the differences between both nations will be obliterated. That will be the evidence that the division of Czechoslovakia, which was carried out against the will of the Czechoslovak citizens, was not really very well politically considered and that it has most likely caused more damage than benefit. However, that is just my personal opinion, and this problem goes beyond the scope of this paper.

A decisive role in the NATO enlargement was played by the United States that regarded it as the crucial factor for stability in Europe. This eventuality had already been discussed at the beginning of 1990 when the State Secretary James Baker and NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner visited Czechoslovakia. At that time the Czechs had a hatred of military pacts and it was presumed that the crucial role would be played by the CSCE.²⁴

External risks and threats to the Czech Republic at that time could have been deduced from the geopolitical location of the country. Economic and subsequent political

²² The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic was declared on March 29, 1990 as a successor country after the collapse of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

²³ It will be the EU Summit 2004 in Seville, Spain. Candidates for membership are: Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Cyprus.

²⁴ Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe was a forerunner of OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe). The CSCE renamed itself to OSCE at the Budapest Summit in December 1994.

instabilities including the penetration of organized crime were defined as the basic security risks.

Internal risk was not fully assessed and rescue systems were not completely integrated into the internal security plan. This was confirmed by the environmental disasters in 1997 and 2002, when our country was affected by devastating floods. Also the defense capabilities of the Czech Republic and combat-worthiness of its armed forces decreased. The reason was mainly the ineffective preparation and training of conscripts within the last ten years and their low level of skills and capabilities. These were the youngest reserve soldiers designed for augmentation of the armed forces in case of mobilization. There are lots of shortages in the system of reserve soldiers training.²⁵

A negative feature of the past period was also an ineffective, permanent transformation process without any clear target model, which actually lasted till the year 2002.²⁶ This reduced the credibility of both the national and the Alliance levels. The defense potential was low because of the diffuse and minimal effectiveness of incorporated resources both nation-wide and within the armed forces. Organizational structures are oversized, which relates especially to command elements and their support components. Thus, the resulting combat-worthiness is not equal to expenses.

Karel Pezl²⁷, one of the distinguished contributors to the documentation of the “Strategic Review,” described the situation in more detail and more critically:

The current status of the national defense system and our armed forces does not correspond to both, the current common needs, and long-term potentiality of the country. Strategic and operational supplies and the condition of combat and support equipment paralyze their utilization. The defense system reacts only tardily on fundamental changes resulting from common strategy. It is inflexible, sometimes even incompetent with undefined internal responsibility. It does not comply with the new regional country organization. War time economy is not even theoretically developed. Preparation and infrastructure development projects lag

²⁵ J. Janošec and others, *Východiska pro výstavbu ozbrojených sil České republiky v letech 2004-2015*. Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Academy in Brno, Czech Republic, 2000, p. 18.

²⁶ *Development Policy of the Czech Republic Professional Armed Forces*, according to which the long period of armed forces transformation will be completed.

²⁷ Army general (Ret.) Karel Pezl was Chief of the General Staff of Czechoslovakian and Czech Republic Armed Forces in 1991-1993. Then he became an advisor of the President.

behind. The issue of national defense functions transition from peace time to war time economy remains unsettled.

An important role in the orientation of the Czech Republic and hence its security policy was played by the ‘Visegrad co-operation,’ which commenced after the downfall of the communist regimes. From the very beginning, the common, primary aim was integration into the Western European security, political and economic structures. Unfortunately, Slovakia, a part of the former Czechoslovakia, was disqualified from that co-operation because of undemocratic development and wrong policy of their political leadership headed by Mr. Vladimír Mečiar.

The Czech politicians have always demonstrated their interest in the membership, but actually they did not make such effort in foreign policy like e.g. Hungarians or Poles who also had broader support.²⁸ Nevertheless, it was President Havel, who as the first representative from a post-communist country, held a speech at a North Atlantic Council meeting in March 1991.

In July 1997, the Madrid NATO Summit²⁹ decided on the first round of enlargement, which together with Poland and Hungary also encompassed the Czech Republic. Those who did not succeed were not just Slovakia, but also Slovenia and Romania supported by France. For the time being, Austria remained aside.

The Czech Republic entered NATO on 12 March 1999. After the break-up of the Warsaw Pact, this was another historically crucial step towards our security. The NATO membership has given the Czech Republic a security status, which is at the highest possible level in the current world.

Due to the political changes and integration into NATO, as well as the change of the security environment, the Czech Republic security policy has been changed three times during post Cold War period. Successful integration into NATO in 1999 became the first step before entering the EU. The second step is to successfully meet requirements

²⁸ The first poll showed that only 5% of the population in Czechoslovakia agreed with the NATO entry which was caused by insufficient public awareness.

²⁹ *NATO Summit in Madrid, Spain, 8-9 July 1997*. Available [On-line]: NATO home page: <<http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/1997/970708/home.htm>>.

of the European Union. One of the most important areas of these requirements is represented by the security policy of the state.

Our NATO entry has changed a whole range of parameters affecting the Czech foreign policy – geopolitical position of the Czech Republic, and lots of changes have been introduced especially in the area of strategic objectives and national interests.³⁰ With the integration into the Alliance, one of the main strategic objectives of the Czech foreign policy was accomplished. The preparatory phase represented by accession talks, accession itself and initial integration into the Alliance were completed. The current position could be defined as the commencement of the full integration phase. Admission of the Czech Republic to the coalition alongside with Poland and Hungary could be seen as one of milestones in developing an undivided and safe Europe. A part of this process is the EU enlargement.

The importance of NATO membership for the Czech Republic is also based on the fact that a small nation does not dispose of sufficient economical potential. The economic potential of the Czech Republic is able to cover only a low-intensity conflict, and in the case of a higher intensity conflict or a conflict of longer duration, the national defense could not get along without the well developed infrastructure of the Allies. Only NATO can currently offer a sufficient level of deterrence and security guarantees.

Other reasons of our NATO membership are:

- Same values and interests, typical for developed democracies,
- NATO is currently the only operational and stable security organization unifying developed nations,
- Existence of security risks and eventuality of negative changes to positive trends in Europe,
- Economical, social and cultural traditions of the Czech Republic,
- Efficiency of coalition defense
- Integration processes in Europe³¹

³⁰ Zuzana Thomová, *K výročí vstupu České republiky do NATO*, ODS-Jih, 2000, p.1.

³¹ V. Ševčík, *Ekonomika a obrana státu*. AVIS Prague, 1999. ISBN 80-7278-014-X, p. 181.

In conjunction with our NATO entry it was also necessary to take a lot of actions in the juridical and legislative fields at both international and national levels. This aspect alongside with the modified structure of national administration bodies positively affected the formation of security documents, and it helped to modify the decision-making process while dealing with security issues.

External security and defense plus the capabilities of the armed forces are together one feature of entry into NATO. Another issue of equal importance is also the fact that the Czech Republic, as NATO member, has introduced operational principles of this international organization into the internal activities of a whole range of state central administration bodies. This might be very useful and convenient even from the point of view of our potential EU membership. Thus the NATO membership is shifting the Czech national administration towards standards common in Western Europe.

Probably the most significant problem related to our integration into NATO was and still is the financial resources. For example, activities within NATO structures and membership in some NATO agencies represent costs which exceed the approved Czech contribution into the common fund of the Alliance (0.9% of the total amount).³²

For the time being, the military budget complies with the resolution of the Government of the Czech Republic, which sets out that the total expenses of the defense department will not overreach 2.2% of the GDP till 2004.³³

Even after their NATO entry the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland continue in an above-standard co-operation at the political, economic, military and other levels. These three nations have a lot in common plus something really specific – it is the Central European identity³⁴, which developed over centuries of sometimes even troubled co-existence. However, the fact is that the current status of the Czech, Polish and Hungarian armed forces does not so far correspond with what the Alliance would expect from a NATO member. From military point of view, this applies especially to the Air Force and Air Defense, and to the insufficient potential of forces capable to participate in

³² Jan Kavan, *Report on Foreign Policy of the Czech Republic*, Available [On-line]: <http://www.mzv.cz/_dokumenty/zprava1999l.html>.

³³ Adopted by the '*Resolution of the Government of the Czech Republic No. D560/99*', MOD Development Policy, June 9, 1999.

operations abroad. The Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary still have similar problems within their armed forces, which can be best solved by their joint cooperation.

Due to the membership in the NATO, the Czech Republic also became a member of the European Security and Defense Identity. The armed forces are successfully involved in this activity, which contributes to the ongoing development of the Common European Security and Defense Policy of the EU. The Czech Republic in its activities supports and participates in both, the NATO – Czech Republic, and Czech Republic – EU³⁵ relationship. The Czech Republic is currently one of the Non-EU European Allies (NEEA).

B. SECURITY STRATEGY OF NATO AND EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE IDENTITY (ESDI)

At the Washington Summit³⁶ in 1999, the NATO Allies approved a strategy for the Alliance regarding its political and military development, and the security challenges of the 21st century. The Summit defined the main security tasks of the organization: security, consultations, deterrence and defense, and newly also crisis management and partnership. That strategy became the main document of the Czech Republic security policy after its entrance into NATO.

In the near future NATO should deal with following three, main challenges: next enlargement, ESDP and the change of its internal structure.³⁷

The enlargement of NATO with the entrance of the three Central European countries in 1999 created a new security situation in Europe, and became one of the main tasks of the Alliance for near future. This was already confirmed by the Prague Summit last year, during which seven new candidates were invited to join NATO in next summit, which is scheduled in May 2004.

³⁴ Dr. A. Svěrák, *Defence Department Transformation after NATO Entry*, Prague, 2001, p. 5.

³⁵ *The European Union in the World: Delegation of the EU to the Czech Republic*. Available [On-line]: <<http://www.evropska-unie.cz/eng/>>.

³⁶ *NATO Summit in Washington*, 23-25 April 1999, Available [On-line]: <<http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/1999/9904-wsh/9904-wsh.htm>>.

³⁷ Stuart Croft and others, *NATO's Triple Challenge*, *International Affairs* 76,3, 2000, pp.495.

It has had also an influence on the content of the Alliance security and defense policy, where the Czech Republic participated in the frame of the creation of its new conception of the armed forces and its security policy either within the Partnership for Peace and later as a NATO member.

The strategy also defines the Alliance's fundamental security tasks, both in terms of collective defense, and in terms of new activities in the areas of crisis management and partnership, which the Alliance undertakes in order to enhance the security and stability of Euro-Atlantic region.

Regarding the development of the Security and Defense Identity within the Alliance, the Strategic Concept confirms that the ESDI will continue to be developed within the organization. It stressed that this process will require closer cooperation between NATO and the European Union.

1. Strategic Concept of NATO

Fifty years after the foundation of NATO, nineteen member states adopted sixty-five points of a new strategic concept for the 21st century that defines the basic goals and principles of NATO:

1) To create one of the necessary bases for a stable Euro-Atlantic environment, by ensuring the security, based on the perfection of democratic institutions and peaceful resolution of disputes.

2) To serve as a natural forum for the consultations of the allies regarding the problems of living interests in accordance with Article 4 of the Washington Treaty.

3) To secure a defense against any threat of the aggression to each member, according to Articles 5 and 6.

4) To contribute to effective conflict prevention and actively become involved in crisis management, including operations for crisis surmounting.

A validity period of the new conception was presumed five to seven years (Javier Solana even spoke about fifty years during the Summit). The main reason for this change was the disintegration of the Soviet Union, which created a new security situation: NATO did not have to maintain strategic balance any longer. The conception changes were

determined by new conflicts, especially in the Persian Gulf and Yugoslavia, which led to reinforcement of readiness for peaceful operations conditioned by the consent and decision of the UN Security Council. It led and leads to the gradual transfer of defense orientation to the center in order to support peaceful operations. Experience from the Balkan conflicts, especially the resolution of the Kosovo problems, showed the necessity to build a European security architecture or identity.

The most important new strategic concepts of NATO are:

1. To strengthen the transatlantic structure,
2. To maintain a sufficient defense capacity for deterrence, defense and the implementation of NATO activities,
3. To reinforce the European Security and Defense Identity within NATO,
4. To be able to solve crises successfully,
5. To be an open organization accessible for new members, and to struggle constantly for partnership, cooperation and dialogue with other countries including armament and disarmament inspections.

2. Prague Summit 2002

The modernization of NATO, a new relationship between NATO and Russia and NATO and Ukraine, and Alliance enlargement were the main issues of the Summit.³⁸

The idea of NATO enlargement was confirmed by the invitation of seven additional members – Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia to begin accession talks to join the Alliance. They are supposed to be ready for their full membership by NATO's next Summit in May 2004. The Summit also emphasized that NATO's door will remain open to European democracies willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, in accordance with Article 10 of the Washington Treaty.

However, the enlargement did not dominate the agenda of the Prague Summit, 21-22 November 2002. Instead, the events of 11 September 2001 and the Iraqi conflict

³⁸ *NATO Summit in Prague*, 21-22 November, 2002. Available [On-line]: <<http://www.natosummit.cz/en/>>.

became the primary issues.³⁹ A comprehensive package of measures, based on NATO's Strategic Concept, was approved at the Summit. NATO leaders decided to create a rapid Response Force, which is expected to be used in global anti-terror missions and operations against so-called rogue states, and agreed to back UN efforts to disarm Iraq. NATO Response Force (NRF) consisting of a technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable and sustainable force including land, sea, and air elements ready to move quickly to wherever needed, as decided by the Council, with full operational capability not later than October 2006. This Response Force will be multinational in character and will involve approximately 21,000 troops.

The Summit approved the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) as part of the continuing Alliance effort to improve and develop new military capabilities for modern warfare in a high threat environment. Partners also committed to cooperate in fully implementing the Civil Emergency Planning (CEP), an Action Plan for the improvement of civil preparedness against possible attacks against the civilian population with chemical, biological or radiological (CBR) agents.

The new challenges posed by terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) forced the Alliance to modify its strategic concept, which was adopted in Washington.

3. European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI)

The first debate about ESDI started in 1990, when the issue of rebalancing the relationship between the two sides of the Atlantic occurred. The purpose was to enable European countries to react on European problems and necessities, and assume greater responsibility for their common security and defense than before. An effective ESDI requires political cohesion, an independent staff organization, designated forces and leadership. Political cohesion in the ESDI has been problematic.⁴⁰ There have been

³⁹ Lord Robertson, speech delivered to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly – November 2002: *"NATO is becoming a focal point for coordinating and planning the multinational military contribution to our defense against terrorism and other asymmetric threats."*

⁴⁰ James Sperling, *Europe in Change: Two Tiers or Two Speeds? The European Security Order and the Enlargement of the EU and NATO*, Manchester University Press, 1999, p.46.

differences among European countries regarding the use of the WEU Humanitarian Task Force and political objectives in the recognition of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia, and difficulties in reaching a consensus on the proper role of ESDI vis-à-vis NATO.⁴¹

Generally speaking, the ESDI is a NATO initiative, which allows European nations to make use of NATO assets and capabilities to undertake crisis management operations. This was outlined in the 1996 Berlin agreement between the WEU and NATO, which has now developed to allow European Union/NATO cooperation under what is known as "Berlin Plus."⁴²

The predecessor of the current European Security and Defense Identity was essentially the Western European Union, as the European pillar of the Alliance. Coming deeper to the history, until the early 1990s, its principal documents had been the amended Brussels Treaty, the Rome Declaration⁴³ and the Platform of European Security Interests, launched in The Hague in 1987.⁴⁴

The essential problem of Europe in general and the WEU in particular was that of the nature of the new Western European, and now European, security system. That means: should it be an independent, autonomous security and defense identity, or a part of the Alliance, its European pillar, and demonstrate the transatlantic link as its principle? The British want ESDI closely tied to NATO, while France would like the ESDI independent from NATO as the defense arm of the EU.

Although the ESDI has been under active development for over ten years, the decision to take the WEU out of the equation and locate the ESDI within the EU has created a new set of problems, which the EU and NATO must now try to resolve. The core of the problem lies in the concern of how to integrate the six European NATO

⁴¹ Ibid., p.122.

⁴² The arrangements agreed at the 1996 NATO Berlin Summit and at the 1999 NATO Washington Summit.

⁴³ 26 and 27 October 1984, *History of WEU*, "continuing necessity to strengthen western security, and that better utilization of WEU would not only contribute to the security of Western Europe but also to an improvement in the common defense of all the countries of the Atlantic Alliance", Available [On-line]: <<http://www.weu.int/History.htm>>.

⁴⁴ 27 October 1987, *History of WEU*, Available [On-line] : <<http://www.weuint/History.htm>>.

Allies, who are not members of the EU⁴⁵ into the Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP), and how to integrate the four members of the EU who are not NATO⁴⁶ Allies into the ESDI. Development of ESDI within NATO is a key part of a modernization of the Alliance and its political and military adaptation to new security environment. At the same time, it is a very important element of the development of the EU and for the future cooperation of both organizations.

C. COMMON FOREIGN SECURITY POLICY AND EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY

1. Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)

CFSP⁴⁷ comes from the European political cooperation, reestablished by a Treaty on European Union, adopted in the frame of ‘Maastricht’s upgrade’ of the initial agreements, which came into force in the year 1993.⁴⁸ The CFSP, as a new second pillar of the European architecture is together with a third pillar (Justice and Home Affairs) based on intergovernmental cooperation of the member states.

The Europeans in the European Union Treaty, concluded in Maastricht, have reaffirmed their goal, and among other things they intend:

To assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense;⁴⁹

⁴⁵ NATO, but Non-EU members are: Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Poland and Turkey.

⁴⁶ NEEA (Non-EU European Allies), but NATO members are: Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden.

⁴⁷ Provisions on a Common Foreign & Security Policy: Title V of the Treaty on EU. Available [On-line]: <<http://europa.eu.int/en/record/mt/title5.html>>.

⁴⁸ Treaty of the EU is the most extended reform of the Treaty of Rome agreements, which belong to the fundamentals of the European integration. It came into force by November 1, 1993.

⁴⁹ Treaty on European Union, Title I - Common Provisions, Article B. Available [On-line] : <<http://europa.eu.int/en/record/mt/title1.html>>.

The basic objectives of the CFSP were defined:⁵⁰

- to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the EU;
- to strengthen the security of the Union and its members, to protect peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter;
- To promote international cooperation, to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Despite CFSP provisions have been a progress in comparison with the previous stage, it did not accommodate new conditions in the international development. The Amsterdam Treaty⁵¹ has reconsidered these provisions, and with the introduction of the new tools and more effective decision methods has strengthened action ability of the CFSP.

Other changes within CFSP were indicated at the EU Summit in Nice⁵², where the European Council adopted a decision about a more narrow cooperation within the CFSP. Serious attention was focused on the European Security and Defense Policy, during the summit.

2. European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP, or ESDP)

ESDP⁵³ is an integral and key component of the CFSP. All goals and objectives of the CFSP are put into practice through ESDP. The purpose of it is to strengthen the EU capacity in the preservation of the peace and international stability in accordance with the

⁵⁰ Ibid., Title V.

⁵¹ *European Union home page*: The Amsterdam Treaty, signed on October 2, 1997, came into the force on 1 May 1999, Available [On-line]: <<http://europa.eu.int/abc/obj/amst/en/index.htm>>.

⁵² *European Council in Nice, 7-9 December 2000*. Available [On-line]: European Security, <<http://www.basicint.org/europe/EU/nice-1200.htm>>.

⁵³ *European Security and Defense Policy*. Available [On-line]: European Security, <<http://www.basicint.org/europe/ESDP/main.htm>>.

principles of the United Nations Charter. Therefore, the EU develops certain structures and tools for the management of the crisis situations. The legal frame for the development of the EU defense dimension was created by including so-called ‘Petersberg tasks’⁵⁴ to the Treaty of the EU.

The final goal of the European Union security policy is to create its own capacity (military and civilian), by which the EU will be able to manage crisis in which NATO is not involved.

European Security and Defense Policy is thus mainly a political project. A declared objective of the ESDP is not a constitution of the European Army, but a development of such military and civilian capacities, and necessary institutional back up, which will enable the Union to quickly respond to emerged crisis situations.

D. NATO - EU RELATIONSHIP

The relationship between the European Union and NATO as a part of the creation European Security and Defense Policy is a very important current issue, since it determines a shape of the European security architecture. It also represents an independent ability of Europeans to effectively prevent the conflicts and to respond to emerging crises in their region or in its vicinity.⁵⁵

Probably the main reason why the cooperation didn’t function very well in the past, and still needs some sort of improvement, is the fact that EU is primarily a political-economic structure and NATO is a political-military organization with a different membership and institutional culture. Beside these general problems the main ‘stumbling block’ is hidden in the issue of participation, as was explained in a previous sub-chapter, i.e. a way of involving the European NATO members, but Non-EU European Allies

⁵⁴ Petersberg’s tasks includes humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping mission, and combat missions for crisis management, including peacemaking. *Treaty of EU, Title V, Art.17/2*. Available [On-line]: European Union, <<http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/cig/g4000p.htm>>.

⁵⁵ British-French Summit at St.Malo, France, December 1998, The European Superpowers agreed that the EU *"must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises"*, Available [On-line]: <www.utu.fi/erill/jean-monnet/2001/c6spring/6/sld014.htm>.

(NEEA). From this point of view, there is only one problem, which is the membership of Turkey in the EU. With respect to that, there is a long-term problem and political-diplomatic struggle within both organizations, where Greece and Turkey play the role of main actors.

The principal document of the EU in the 1990s was the Declaration on the Role of the WEU⁵⁶ and its Relations with the European Union and the NATO. The WEU became the European pillar of NATO and a part of the European integration. It allowed WEU to operationally participate in the peacekeeping and humanitarian operations either together with NATO, or in independent missions. Following the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty⁵⁷, the European Council met in Cologne⁵⁸ and agreed to assume by the EU the role previously undertaken by WEU.

At the NATO Summit in April 1999, the US endorsed the EU's goal of asserting its identity on the international scene through CFSP. Thus ESDI would give strength to another European aspiration: the search for a Common Foreign and Security Policy.⁵⁹ It gives to the EU the means and capabilities for implementing ESDP.

The relationship between NATO and the EU reflected a new positive development, when the responsibilities from the WEU were taken over by the EU. It is interesting to note that the speedy integration of the WEU into the EU, permitting direct EU – NATO links, seemed to be only a theoretical possibility a few years ago. However, the Kosovo crisis changed that to reality.

The dialogue between the NATO Alliance and the European Union and their cooperation has steadily intensified from 1999 to 2002. A “Headline Goal” for EU member states in terms of their military capabilities for crisis management operations was

⁵⁶ *NATO handbook*: European Council at Maastricht on 9-10 December 1991. Available [On-line]: <<http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb1503.htm>>.

⁵⁷ *European Union home page*: The Amsterdam Treaty, signed on October 2, 1997, came into the force on 1 May 1999, Available [On-line]: <<http://europa.eu.int/abc/obj/amst/en/index.htm>>.

⁵⁸ *The European Council meeting in Cologne*, Germany, June 3-4, 1999. Available [On-line]: <http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/june99/june99_en.htm>.

⁵⁹ *European Security home page*, Available [On-line]: <<http://www.basicint.org/europe/ESDP/main.htm>>.

established.⁶⁰ Since February 2001, regular meetings of the EU Political and Security Committee and the North Atlantic Council have taken place. There have been also regular meetings of Joint NATO-EU Ad Hoc Working Groups since mid 2000. Exchange of classified information was established in July 2000, etc.

Cooperation between NATO and the European Union has been developed in a number of specific fields and specifically in relation to the campaign against terrorism, in particular after the “September 11” terrorist attacks.

Finally, the ‘EU, NATO Seal Cooperation Pact’ was signed in Brussels on December 16, 2002. The accord was adopted in a joint declaration by NATO Secretary-General George Robertson and the European Union's high representative for foreign relations, Javier Solana. Both organizations are complimentary to the ESDP and NATO. Therefore, the EU will operate only there, where the Alliance as a whole is not militarily involved.

The agreement with the Alliance has significantly increased the credibility of the collective European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). The agreement will also permit the Union to take over some military missions in the Balkans, which have been led by NATO, such as the policing mission in Bosnia, the “Amber Fox” peacekeeping operation in FYROM, and the future operation succeeding the SFOR in Bosnia.⁶¹

⁶⁰ The objective of the Headline Goal is to enable the EU, by the year 2003, to deploy and sustain for at least one year, military forces of up to 60 000 troops to undertake the full range of previously mentioned ‘Petersberg tasks’ set out in the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997.

⁶¹ *EU - NATO seal cooperation pact*. Available [On-line]: <<http://www.dawn.com/2002/12/17/int4.htm>>.

III. EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY (ESDP) IN CONNECTION TO THE CURRENT DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY RELATIONS BETWEEN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES

A. UNITED STATES SINCE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001

Since the foreign policy of the United States is very important for international relations and the creation of a security environment, it will be useful for the development of the thesis objectives to examine the current situation from American perspectives.

Although there had been plenty of warning signals (the attacks against US embassies, military bases, ships, etc.), the sophisticated operation against New York and Washington, making use of hijacked airliners to conduct a terrorist attack took the United States and the whole world by surprise. What followed was a swift and robust retaliatory operation against international terrorism and Afghanistan, supported not only by democratic countries, but also by many other states in the neighborhood, which felt threatened by extremist armed attacks.

However, before the Al Qaeda could have been defeated, bin Laden liquidated and Afghanistan stabilized, additional terrorist attacks in Bali and the Russian capital Moscow were organized. Increasingly deeper cracks started appearing in the counter-terrorist front, including the trans-Atlantic community, which prompted some analysts to lift a warning finger that the trans-Atlantic link may be, or even has already been severed, and the NATO cohesion threatened.⁶²

On the one hand, there is the statement of the US President George Bush on the “axis of evil,”⁶³ comprising three militant and totalitarian countries, Iraq, Iran and North Korea, and measures that have followed. On the other hand, there is standard rejection of the US policy by France, but also (which is more surprising) an increasing resistance of

⁶² Miloš Balabán, Antonín Rašek, *Evropská bezpečnostní a obranná politika v kontextu současného vývoje vztahů mezi Evropou a Spojenými Státy*, VAAZ Brno, 2002, p.1.

⁶³ *Bush's 'evil axis' comment stirs critics*, BBC News, February 2, 2002: Available [On-line] : <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1796034.stm>>.

Germany. However, the acceptance of a new US National Security Strategy (NSS)⁶⁴ is much more complicated, and thus perhaps ‘more dangerous.’ The new document preserves both the existing continuity of the US foreign and security policy and reflects the situation following the rise of international terrorist attacks. It is not unexpected; it only concludes logical developments that were bound to happen sooner or later.

When attempting to characterize the National Security Strategy, it is necessary to emphasize two of its features. Its purpose is to efficiently manage new security risks threatening the United States, including a provision for combining domestic and foreign policies with the acceptance of pre-emptive wars. It must also to maintain the unique position of the United States in the world, with an emphasis on the free market value. One of its anticipated objective consequences is a preference of military power to peace diplomacy, resulting in small countries, such as the Czech Republic, finding themselves in a marginal position, as they cannot exert any substantial influence on current international relations and the global security situation. The National Security Strategy is thus also a challenge to the world to look for ways to ensure a US comeback to multilateral links, despite confrontation with American unilateralism, hegemonism and isolationism.⁶⁵

The United States strives for a balance of power. Its perception of the notion is that if countries (especially developing ones) act responsibly in combating terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, their security will be guaranteed. This should be achieved in cooperation with Russia and China, which, the United States believes, have some market economy values. In reality, the issue is power division with regards to the fight against terrorism.

The National Security Strategy abandons the notion of deterrence, as it is obviously no longer effective against the “rogue states,”⁶⁶ and replaces it with one of the necessity of pre-emptive wars. The United States intends to wage such wars no matter

⁶⁴ *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, Signed in West Point, New York June 1, 2002. Available [On-line]: <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html>>.

⁶⁵ Miloš Balabán, Antonín Rašek, *Evropská bezpečnostní a obranná politika v kontextu současného vývoje vztahů mezi Evropou a Spojenými Státy*, VAAZ Brno, 2002, p.2.

⁶⁶ ‘*Rogue States*’ is a term the Americans use to denote the countries posing a real or alleged threat against their security. It is used in American NSS 2002.

whether their allies, friends and partners agree or not.⁶⁷ The United States wishes to keep the market regulation to itself. The role of the United Nations is to be reduced to one of a tool or mechanism to help solve security risks and world global development issues, not to one of a crucial decision-making body.

The United States wants to prevent other countries to build capabilities comparable with their military and intelligence-gathering potential. At the moment, the US military power is ten times the European one, and accounts for half of the aggregate military capabilities worldwide.⁶⁸

The National Security Strategy is a comprehensive document outlining a brand new foreign policy doctrine of the United States, both in terms of principal objectives and with respect to the means needed to achieve them. It does not focus solely on military strategy, but also looks for ways to improve the social situation of the world and to expand democracy, which is linked to the free market. However, its keynote concept is to make it impossible for enemies to threaten the United States and their allies. The United States does not want to hesitate to act on its own, if necessary. Thus, they also show their commitment to strengthen American hegemonism. Their attitude is based on the right of self-defense, and the right to mount a pre-emptive strike. They do not view the war against terrorism as the clash of civilizations.

However, these individual causes are not the only ones. There has been a negative synergy of factors including, apart from the new US National Security Strategy: the United States' no compliance with the Ottawa Treaty banning all use of antipersonnel mines, underestimation of adverse environmental impacts of civilization developments manifested in the US rejection of the Kyoto Protocol, the decision to build their own ballistic missile umbrella, agreements with Russia notwithstanding, efforts to protect US citizens facing the International Penal Tribunal or non-US courts, the quick courting of Russia, China and other so-called pivotal states in connection with the action in Afghanistan, and ever-increasing tendencies of the Americans to make their own

⁶⁷ Current Iraqi crisis just confirm that. US is ready to attack Iraq despite its Allies from NATO are against military action.

⁶⁸ PhDr. Jan Eichler, *Perspektivy bezpečnostní situace a politického vývoje států střední a východní Evropy do roku 2015*, Military Academy, Brno, 2002, p.11.

decisions in strategic security issues. These all combine to strengthen the world's latent perception of notions such as "Pax Americana"⁶⁹ or at least "Strong world leadership".

Europe, especially EU member states and European NATO allies, has a legitimate right to reproach America for the phenomena listed above and others. However, it must be admitted that the crisis in the Balkans could have hardly been solved without the United States. The same applies to Afghanistan. In this case, NATO resorted to invoking Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. This was a welcomed attitude, but was more or less a purely formal step. Lacking adequate weapons systems and trained soldiers, the Alliance was unable to provide more than token units to the Americans.

Europeans spend much less on domestic and external security than the United States. For the illustration, in the 1980s, European countries were spending roughly half of the US military budget in military appropriations - 156 billion USD compared to 270 billion USD. In year 2003 it is 135 billion USD in Europe and 400 billion USD for US. In terms of per capita defense costs, the difference is even more pronounced: 400 USD in Europe, while the United States used to spend 1,400 USD, which translates into 3 percent of GDP in the United States and 1.9 percent of GDP in Europe.⁷⁰

There are differences among European countries as well. For example, five out of the 15 EU member nations spend more than 2 percent or more for defense. France is an exception – the French government decided to allocate 6 percent of its annual GDP for defense appropriations in the next four years. The question is how much the future members of the NATO and the European Union will be able to afford? It probably concerns particularly the poorer ones – Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania. Consequently, there is a threat of what is called a "security differential", when the NATO and the EU will see countries with a relatively sufficient military budget existing side by side with states not able to afford it. It can bring negative impacts on future European cohesion.

⁶⁹ A Bush vision of Pax Americana: "*In the service of a balance of power that favors freedom.*" Available [On-line]: <<http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0923/p01s03-uspo.html>>.

⁷⁰ *Military Budget Watch*, Available [On-line]: <http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Military_Budget/Military_Budget_watch.html>.

Europe with its prevailing orientation to a social welfare state concept, logically opposes any major increase of military budgets since it does not feel as threatened as the United States. These attitudes naturally resulted as European defense systems are entering the new century with many shortfalls, such as insufficient air- and sea-lift capabilities for deployment of European forces and their equipment, lack of the refueling during flight capabilities, shortage of all-weather combat aircraft capable of accurate strikes, etc.⁷¹ If confronted with these facts, one finds it difficult to understand that Western European countries are unable to coordinate their production of armament and weapons systems. For example, Western Europe produces four types of supersonic aircraft, three types of main battle tanks, huge quantities of ammunition (1,500 types) etc. European countries should consider this aspect in their future cooperation, and it can help to reduce their financial burden.⁷²

As Europe is less and less able to intervene efficiently in present military conflicts, American soldiers more and more often mount preventive military operations. European countries are left with the tasks of stabilizing the political situation after armed interventions by military means and of rebuilding state administration structures of disrupted countries.

Due to humanitarian reasons, Europe is probably satisfied with the current situation. However, the increasing differences in capabilities will result a division of labor. The United States, with its high-tech equipment will provide logistic support, strategic air- and sealift, intelligence and air power, while Europe, by default, will take care of tasks, which are manpower-intensive such as long-term peacekeeping. The “division of labor”⁷³ can have a negative effect. It would lead to different perception of

⁷¹ General Rainer Schuwirth (director general of the EU Military Staff), *Hitting the Helsinki Headline Goal*. Available [On-line]: <<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2002/issue3/english/art4.html>>.

⁷² Ibid., „European decision-makers will have to think and act "European", if they wish to develop and improve European capabilities.”

⁷³ James Appathurai, *Closing the Capabilities Gap*, 2002. Available [On-line]: NATO Review, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2002/issue3/english/art1.html>>.

risk, costs and success, and put the unity and cohesion of the Alliance under a tremendous pressure.

Francis Fukuyama is one of the politologists claiming that the “Western world has probably been split.” At the same time, he also claims that “Osama bin Laden, Al Qaeda, the Taliban and radical Islamism more generally represent ideological challenges to Western liberal democracy that are in certain ways sharper than those offered by communism.”⁷⁴ In this respect, it may be noted that, according to Russia’s President Putin, the objective of the Islamic radicals is to build a worldwide khalifate⁷⁵. This is just one of the catastrophic scenarios, most of which have not happened, but some unfortunately did in the 20th century, sometimes without any warning, and many probably have not happened only because measures thwarting them were adopted in time.

Fukuyama himself admits that "in reality, the religion of Islam cannot be viewed as an alternative capable of offering a foundation to build communities of people existing in the real world”, as “it does not have anything to offer to non-Moslems, but it does not even meet expectations of a majority of Moslems.” This can be seen in countries such as Iraq and Iran. The cause of the alienation is a different perception of consequences of the demise of the bipolar world in Europe and the United States. Insofar as security and foreign policy issues are concerned, Europe is multilateral, while the United States is unilateral.

B. PROBLEMS OF CFSP AND ESDP

The strongest impetus for the development of the ESDP was the Kosovo crisis, which showed that Europe, or specifically the European Union, is unable to mount an operation on a scale comparable to the air campaign against Yugoslavia, followed by the peace-enforcing action in Kosovo, without US forces. The Kosovo experience proved

⁷⁴ Francis Fukuyama: *The West may be cracking*. International Herald Tribune, August 9, 2002. Available [On-line] : <http://coranet.radicalparty.org/pressreview/print_right.php?func=detail&par=2829>.

⁷⁵ Miloš Balabán, Antonín Rašek, *Evropská bezpečnostní a obranná politika v kontextu současného vývoje vztahů mezi Evropou a Spojenými Státy*, VAAZ Brno, 2002, p.4.

that the EU was not militarily capable of conducting such operations. At the same time it strengthened the dominant position of the United States in the Alliance, which is in contradiction to the interests of some European allies (France, Germany), and has led to greater efforts to further development of the ESDP.

This being said, it is however unquestionable that, given the technological progress in weapons systems, the European military potential obviously must be upgraded. The United States, being the leading exporter of weapons systems, are commercially interested. Nevertheless, the rearmament should mainly take place within the Alliance rather than in parallel structures, no matter how the two may be interlinked. The process should also take into account European security interests, which, the ongoing globalization notwithstanding, remain mainly in Europe itself. It is here that I can see an opportunity to restart the production of some weapons systems and military equipment by previously successful companies in the former Czechoslovakia, particularly for ground forces.

The United States is concerned that, with Europeans independently intervening even in larger-scale security operations and the NATO retaining only defense tasks, the Alliance will lose its reason of existence, as it does not have any specific and defined enemy. This would increase the objective necessity of the United States' departure from Europe. At the same time, it must not be forgotten that the United States has its foreign policy and also military interests in Europe (easier deployment of forces in the Middle East and North Africa, better monitoring of Russia and the Middle East).

In the nearest future, the EU member states will have to raise their defense expenses. However, they will probably not be able to increase them insofar as the expenses for social security systems will be drastically decreased. We assume that EU countries will not follow the USA in all aspects, and that only a small part of their armed forces will be equipped by the most sophisticated and expensive weapons, while the majority of them will have to be satisfied with less expensive weapon systems.

Present Problems of the CFSP and the ESDP

In addition to unquestionable benefits of the ESDP, it is also necessary to briefly examine its persisting shortfalls, which include, in particular:⁷⁶

- Statutory inconsistency: in addition to NATO member nations, the European Union comprises several countries with a long-standing tradition of neutrality, namely Ireland, Austria, Finland and Sweden. As a result, it is much more difficult to achieve a consensus within the EU than it is within the NATO;

- Inconsistency of opinion is one of the unpleasant consequences of the lengthy process whereby EU countries seek a common position. This is why hard decisions are difficult to achieve, and the United States are thus much quicker to decide and act, which then either mount independent actions, or initiate specific steps in the framework of the Alliance;

- The Common Foreign and Security Policy itself is indeed more of common policy than a united one, agreed upon and backed up by all EU member countries. Minor or major differences between EU members can often be seen, exemplified by the inconsistent attitude toward the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. For example:

Germany was most inclined to the independence and international recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, because of these countries' ties to the Germanic world and the influence of Croatian immigrants in Germany. Italy also favored the idea, but was much more cautious. On the other hand, France, for historical reasons and afraid of an increased German influence, advocated a preservation of a Yugoslavia, and was more inclined toward the Serbs and particularly the Moslems. Spain, with its experience of secession efforts of the Basques and Catalonians, hesitated to recognize the two independent republics, and the same applied to the United Kingdom, troubled with Ulster. Greece supported the Serbs in the name of the Orthodox Church and because of its unfriendly attitude toward the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia;⁷⁷

- Certain shortcomings can be found in day-to-day business and operation of the European Security and Defense Policy.

⁷⁶ PhDr. Jan Eichler, *Perspektivy bezpečnostní situace a politického vývoje států střední a východní Evropy do roku 2015*, Military Academy in Brno, 2002, p.22.

⁷⁷ P.Gerbet, *La construction de l' Europe. Imprimerie nationale*. Paris 1999.

Cooperation among its principal institution, namely the Committee of Policy and Security (COPS), Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), EU Military Committee (EUMC) and EU Military Staff (EUMS), is not defined clearly enough, much less a routine. At the same time, the system of coordination between these institutions and the top-level bodies of the European Union (Commission, Council, and Parliament) is not clear enough and fully in place as well. The current opinion regarding activities of the European Union in the area of foreign, security and defense policies so far is also affected by the fact that the responsibility for their implementation had initially belonged to the Commission, then transferred to the Council and the High Representative for ESDP matters, and now rests with the Committee of Policy and Security (COPS). Because of the frequent changes so far and persistent grey areas, it is not possible to say that the present ESDP works as part of a broader CFSP.⁷⁸

Last but not least, the present deficiencies of the ESDP also include the fact that it is not the EU as such, which makes decisions regarding the position or specific steps to be taken in the area of foreign and defense policies, but rather the “Troika” comprising the three strongest EU nations – United Kingdom, Germany and France.⁷⁹

All the ESDP shortfalls referred to above are reflected in a situation in which the candidates, including the Czech Republic, expect much more from the NATO, and particularly from the United States, than from the European Union. Together with Poland and Hungary, the Czech Republic is involved in almost all structures of the Alliance, focusing on specific tasks it is assigned by the NATO (especially Force Goals, Target Defense Capabilities Initiative etc.). Its involvement in and links to the ESDP are much more modest. The Czech Republic focuses on annual meetings of political directors of Foreign Ministries, and some working group meetings. Compared to the NATO, it is much less. This is why the new allies, including the Czech Republic, are now much more focused on Alliance tasks and the strengthening of their ties to the NATO than on their active involvement in the ESDP.

⁷⁸ Mgr. Radek Khol, MA: *Bílá místa v české diskuzi o evropské bezpečnosti*. (White areas in Czech Discussions on European Security). In: *Mezinárodní vztahy*, 2/2002, p. 71.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p.73.

C. IRAQ: AS A THREAT AND ‘APPLE OF DISCORD’

The most contemporary and serious security problem is the ‘Iraqi crisis’ and attack against Iraq. The United States demand, and president Bush in his speech⁸⁰ to the nation mentioned that Iraq must immediately and unconditionally relinquish weapons of mass destruction and their components, stop supporting and training terrorists and ban them from the country, stop reprisals against its own citizens, hold democratic elections, observe human rights, release prisoners of the Gulf War, return the property stolen during the Gulf War, refrain from ‘black market’ trading with oil, etc.

These requirements are based on UN resolutions, which Iraq considers as unacceptable.⁸¹ In all probability, some of them objectively cannot be met. According to the analysts, the reason behind all activities, which is not spoken about too much, may be the US interest in Iraqi oil; the United States would thus become less dependent on oil imports from the less reliable Saudi Arabia. They would also increase their influence in the oil and other natural resources rich region. From the strategic perspectives, Iraq could also be the first step for dealing with another link of the “axis of evil” – Iran.

On the other hand, defeat of Iraq could help in the establishment of democratic regime in Iraq, and perhaps reduce the intensity of the Palestinian – Israeli conflict. However, the US intention to attack Iraq is in contradiction with international law, and it faces a huge disaccord and resistance around the world. For example all Arab countries are against the intended US attack,⁸² as they believe it would disrupt the power balance in the region and threaten their theocratic and oligarchic regimes as well. They also point to the fact that there are other countries in the region, which possess nuclear weapons, namely Israel, Pakistan and India, which are not faced with similar sanctions. Beside that,

⁸⁰ *President Bush ultimatum speech on March 17, 2003* gave to Saddam 48 hours to leave Iraq, or face the war. Available [On-line]: MSNBC News <<http://www.msnbc.com/news/842500.asp?cp1=1>>.

⁸¹ *UN Security Council Resolutions relating to Iraq*: Available [On-line]: <<http://www.casi.org.uk/info/scriraq.html>>.

⁸² Summit of Arab countries in Syria, January 16, 2003. “*A US military operation against Iraq will have a negative effect on Arab-American relations.*” Available [On-line]: People’s Daily: *All Arab States Oppose War against Iraq*. <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200301/17/eng20030117_110297.shtml>.

the Iraqi situation must be watched particularly because it is the first practical test of the National Security Strategy.

From other point of view, the US adoption of the National Security Strategy is understandable. It is easy to imagine what has been going on in the minds of American people. On September 11, 2001, they were attacked by terrorists on their own territory. A comparison of September 11 and Pearl Harbor is only partly fitting. The Americans were hit hard by both, but the Japanese attack was a part of the ongoing war, while the recent one was directed straight against the United States during peace time.

Europe in disruption

The Iraq crisis has produced the biggest-ever rupture in Europe in the existence of the European Union. The situation prompted an extraordinary summit of the Union,⁸³ held in Brussels on February 17, the objective of which was to bring together divided Europe and rectify serious disputes among member states, manifested on the NATO⁸⁴ soil a while ago.

In spite of the resulting compromise, when representatives of the EU achieved a common position to the effect that a full and efficient disarmament of Iraq is to be achieved peacefully, it is obvious that the European Union remains split. The pro-American group led by the United Kingdom comprises Spain, Italy, Portugal, Denmark and the Netherlands. On the other hand, France, Germany, Belgium, Luxemburg and Greece are strong opponents of the US line, while Austria, Ireland, Sweden and Finland oscillate between the two camps. The Union warned Iraq that it had “the last opportunity” for a peaceful solution of the crisis. Iraq must disarm and cooperate.

Unfortunately, the present situation in the European Union is not attributable only to the escalating Iraqi crisis, but it also reflects some long-term disputes among large EU countries. The liberal and anti-federalist oriented triangle – the United Kingdom, Spain and Italy – has been trying already quite long to balance the French-German cooperation.

⁸³ *Emergency Summit EU on Iraq Crisis*, February 17, 2003, Available [On-line]: Integrace: <<http://www.integrace.cz/integrace/kalendarium.asp?id=1106>>.

⁸⁴ *Split looms of NATO over Iraq*, Belgium, France and Germany have been objecting to the US request to help Turkey - which shares a border with Iraq - for three weeks. Available [On-line]: BBC News. <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2743433.stm>>.

Why are candidate countries pro-American and why “don’t they realize the political dimension of the European integration”, as Chairman of the European Commission Romano Prodi said? The road to the NATO was straighter, thanks to the Americans! Perhaps speedy enlargement of the Alliance has helped the Americans to maintain their influence in Europe.

Iraq is a very tough test for the trans-Atlantic alliance. There are several factors contributing to the present North Atlantic crisis, one of which is undoubtedly the American unilateralism mentioned above. It forces some European countries to identify themselves more with the American approach, in order to be able to influence it a bit. On the other hand, some countries view the American unilateralism with resentment.⁸⁵ As a matter of fact, different countries place a different emphasis on the European Union or the North Atlantic Alliance. As it was said in previous chapter, one end of the broad range of opinions is represented by the United States and United Kingdom, which would not hesitate to make use of the NATO, if necessary. Standing on the other end is France, dreaming that the European Union will be a defense alliance one of these days. The only thing they would all agree upon is “the UN anchorage”, but they do not want to rely on it anyway, since they are afraid that they would give Russia and China too much room to promote their respective interests.

UN Attitude

The peace initiative to solve the Iraq crises, jointly proposed by France, Germany and Russia in the Security Council⁸⁶, is something that China and other countries like. In addition to the United States, the attack against Iraq is supported by three other Security Council members, namely the United Kingdom, Spain and Bulgaria. According to Berlin, now presiding over Security Council, the remaining members – Russia, France, China, Angola, Cameroon, Chile, Guinea, Mexico, Pakistan and Syria – are interested in finding a peaceful solution.

⁸⁵ Pierre Schori, *What we need is a cooperative America*. International Herald Tribune, 6.8.2002. Pierre Schori is former member of European Parliament. Today, he is a Swedish Ambassador in UN. Available [On-line]: <<http://www.rider.edu/phanc/courses/350web/F02rdgs/What-we-need-is-a-cooperative-America.htm>>.

⁸⁶ John Lichfield and Anne Penketh, *France, Germany and Russia Defy the US by Declaring That War is Unjustified*. Available [On-line]: <<http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/attack/2003/0211frangerru.htm>>.

At last, the UN Security Council will probably not negotiate and act, because the US, UK and Spain didn't submitted their proposal, and they will act in accordance already adopted UN resolutions regarding Iraq, as president Bush announced in his 'Ultimatum speech' on March 17, 2003.

As public polls have shown, the attack against Iraq does not enjoy too much support not just in Arab countries, but even among citizens of the United Kingdom, Japan and the United States.

D. STRATEGIC CONTINUITIES AND CONSEQUENCES FOR THE CZECH REPUBLIC

In the light of the development of the global and European security architecture, the independent American decision-making process is something to be concerned about, as it weakens both the United Nations and OSCE on the one hand, and the NATO and ESDP on the other. These institutions are losing their influence on situation, and it is getting dominated by the United States. It seems to be even more complicated than the attack against Iraq, no matter how dangerous the latter may be. What we should not wish at all is an increasing tension among continents, especially within trans-Atlantic region.⁸⁷

All these facts indicate a need to consider the nature of the European integration in more general terms. The reasons are that the Czech Republic has not only joined the NATO, but it strives for the EU membership, while facing a new American security challenge formulated in the National Security Strategy. The country should also think about it because of its geopolitical position in the busy Central European region.

It is obvious that the security of the Czech Republic depends to a great extent on global, European and territorial security. This means that security measures, which would gradually reduce and minimize security risks, must be taken at the global, European, regional and national levels. The primary mission should be to solve social and environmental problems of the mankind and the world, and to use a military solution only

⁸⁷ Miloš Balabán, Antonín Rašek, *Evropská bezpečnostní a obranná politika v kontextu současného vývoje vztahů mezi Evropou a Spojenými Státy*, VAAZ Brno, 2002, p.6.

as the last resort. An armed intervention is principally a failure of non-violent options. Similarly, today, it is unthinkable to solve social problems of the world without taking environmental consequences into account.

The *de facto* security of the world and its population depended mainly on the United States and the other G 7 (now G 8)⁸⁸ power countries, and institutions in which they had the decisive word, i.e. the NATO, EU, UN, OSCE, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, etc. However, today, when a bipolar division of the world is gone, security depends mainly on how the United States will rise to the occasion being world's sole superpower. The way of life in the United States is based not only on democratic principles, but also on consumerism. That is in contradiction with sustainable life principles. Although the United States has played historically mainly a positive role, it finds itself in disputes and even conflicts with other countries in many matters. The disputes have transferred in persistent tension between the United States and Russia and China to the Islamic world. Through the conflict they increase the tension between the United States and many other countries and groupings, including Europe and its institutions. Thus the US is significantly in ambivalent position: on the one hand, it can help the world to get rid of its security risks, on the other hand, it's foreign and security policy can maneuver the world into dangerous security situations.

Global security depends also much on other countries with a real or potential superpower status or influence, such as Russia, China, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan, Italy and Canada, as well as India, Indonesia, Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria etc. These countries vary a lot with regard to their respective economic and military development, and thus not all of them can contribute to solving social and security problems of the world and their respective regions on an equal level.⁸⁹

⁸⁸ Former G7: The United States, France, Britain, Italy, Germany, Canada, Japan is joined by Russia. Japan is the only G-7 country firmly opposed to inviting Russia to join a "G-8." France and Germany are most supportive of the idea, but Britain, Canada, Italy, and the U.S. "take a more cautious line."

⁸⁹ Miloš Balabán, Antonín Rašek, *Evropská bezpečnostní a obranná politika v kontextu současného vývoje vztahů mezi Evropou a Spojenými Státy*, VAAZ Brno, 2002, p.7.

However, these countries should be interested in improving the situation in the United Nations and contribute to the transformation of the organization, In particular, through increasing the number of the Security Council. Security Council, the primary institution of the UN, should have decisive position in matters of a military solution in a crisis area. In spite of a number of attempts, these efforts have not been successful for quite long time.

There will still be a persisting problem, whether continuing American self-made decisions regarding global security problems will not cause a rupture between the United States and other Western world countries, which can be seen even now, during the Iraq crisis. In reality, the American challenge can be positively countered only by a Europe integrated in the European Union with its politico-military tool, the European Security and Defense Policy.

The desired development strategy of the Czech Republic depends on all these (and other) global, European, and regional development processes. The Czech Republic might also contribute to the positive trend as well. First, it must stabilize its democratic political system and ensure its economic development, so that there cannot be any doubts whatsoever that it deserves a place in the NATO and the European Union. In parallel, it is necessary to lay the groundwork of a national security system, of which the cornerstone is civilian-controlled and reformed professional armed forces. The system should provide an adequate response to domestic and external threats, including the role of an integrated rescue system providing assistance in the event of industrial accidents or natural disasters.⁹⁰ This is also the way to influence global, European, regional, and own security.

Consequences for the Czech Republic

As a result of increasing and deeper differences between the attitudes of the United States and the European Union, the countries wishing to join the EU, including the Czech Republic, find themselves in a very difficult and sensitive situation. On the one hand, it is unquestionable that the United States played a crucial role in decisions

⁹⁰ MG Jindřich Lesný, *Bezpečnostní systém České republiky*, Sekretariát Bezpečnostní rady státu (Secretariat of the Czech Republic Security Council), Prague, 2002, p.2.

concerning the NATO enlargement, and also influenced the selection of candidates in each round of the process. On the other hand, even these countries cannot pretend that the differences between United States and the European Union are not serious. These countries too should heed the warning of professor Fukuyama to the effect that the existing line dividing the West from the rest of the world could change into one dividing the United States from the rest of the world.⁹¹ The Czech Republic, just like the other candidate countries, will have to consider to what extent the United States purposefully overrate security threats and to what extent it make use of the necessary combat against terrorism to pursue its own, purely American objectives. Such an assessment will have to be reflected in military expenditure and procurement policies.

The Czech Republic should support any efforts to reduce and overcome the trans-Atlantic tension. It may, for example, take up a format of a trans-Atlantic summit.⁹² The main idea of such summit could be focus on bringing together positions and opinions, in order to make the United States realize that it is not possible to rely solely on unilateral actions and the use of force, while Europe should admit that certain situation simply cannot be dispensed without the use of armed forces.

Interests of the Czech Republic are also consistent with the initiative for a better balance within the Alliance, presented by former top politicians and military representatives of Poland, France, Denmark, Greece and Germany.⁹³ It contains remarkable proposals both for the United States and Europe. Even with their huge lead, the United States should not follow the path of an *a la carte* partnership and do everything on their own. On the other hand, European countries should place their

⁹¹ Francis Fukuyama: *The West may be cracking*. International Herald Tribune, August 9, 2002. Available [On-line]: <http://coranet.radicalparty.org/pressreview/print_right.php?func=detail&par=2829>.

⁹² Nicolle Gnesotto and Philip Gordon: *It is time for a transatlantic summit*. International Herald Tribune, March 13, 2002. Available [On-line]: Global Politics: <<http://www.brook.edu/views/op-ed/gordon/20020313.htm>>.

⁹³ The authors of the initiative are Bronislaw Geremek, former Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Admiral Lanxade, former Chief of the General Staff of France, Peter Mandelson, former State Secretary for Northern Ireland, Margita Methiopoulos, Director of the Center for Trans - Atlantic Security and Military Affairs at Potsdam University, and General Klaus Nauman, Chairman of the NATO Military Committee between 1996 and 1999.

emphasis on drawing a credible European global policy, on improving capabilities of European armies in the fields of reconnaissance, air-to-air refueling and strategic airlift, and especially on improving the cooperation of European defense industries.⁹⁴

The Czech Republic must continue to be prepared to participate in the EU and NATO operations dealing with regional conflicts, which still represent a serious military threat. These conflicts may emerge in relatively faraway places, far from the Euro-Atlantic region. As a rule, their key protagonists are dictatorships or nationalist regimes with a variety of different motives. The first type is represented by armed aggressions against neighboring nations, the objective being to take control of their territory and wealth, as exemplified by the Iraqi attack on Kuwait in 1991. Another motive may be an effort to make use of a domestic destabilization of a neighboring country, an example of which is the Iraqi aggression against Iran after the fall of the Shah's regime. Dictatorship or nationalist regimes may even attack armed forces of traditional powers in a certain region, which is what the Argentinean military junta did in 1982, when provoking an armed conflict with the United Kingdom over the Falklands. After the Cold War, regional conflicts among successor states of the former multi-ethnic Federative Republic of Yugoslavia sprang up.

From the viewpoint of its active participation in operations outside the NATO area, it is in the interest of the Czech Republic that the existing security differential between the United States and European allies does not increase any more, as the gap brings much higher risks for ground forces deployed to separate belligerents and to fulfill civilian-military cooperation tasks.

⁹⁴ Bronislaw Geremek and others, *A global future for a balanced NATO*. International Herald Tribune, June 6, 2002. Available [On-line]: <<http://iskran.iip.net/review/june02/igt.html>>.

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IV. PRESUMPTIONS FOR THE CREATION OF THE NEW CZECH REPUBLIC SECURITY POLICY

A. NEW CONCEPT OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC PROFESSIONAL ARMED FORCES 2002

1. General Overview

In comparison with the first years of the Czech Republic's existence as an independent country a new approach is required for the country's armed forces. At the beginning of the new decade, a more conceptual approach asserts itself to the assurance of the Czech Republic's security, and more importantly, to resolving the problems of development and combat training for the Czech Republic's armed forces.

The emphasis on the complexity and creation of an integrated system within the national security structure is seen as a distinct benefit. The system reposes mainly on the mutual cooperation of all its components and strives for achievement of the maximum possible interoperability at all levels. This approach is based on a deep analysis of the trends in military warfare development. The approach especially focuses on the preventive role of the armed forces.

A contradiction between declared country abilities and its real possibilities remained as a crucial problem in the past.⁹⁵

A current development of the Czech armed forces is characterized by inosculation of four main aspects: 1) evolution of the security environment (especially after September 11, 2001), 2) integration of the Czech Republic into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 3) development of modern technologies and military warfare, and 4) a legacy of its own traditions and experiences in the recent past.

⁹⁵ „Analýza požadovaných schopností, cílové struktury a složení ozbrojených sil České republiky“, „Reforma ozbrojených sil České republiky – cíle a principy“, „Etapy reformy ozbrojených sil ČR a „Mobilizace ozbrojených sil České republiky – základní principy“, all four documents were elaborated by special commission for the reform of the Czech Armed Forces led by government attorney BG Jaroslav Skopek.

The new approach for the Czech Republic's security is not solely bounded to the country's military policy and armed forces. In contrary, it is based on an extended conception. Together with the armed forces, a state's security is leaned on four, equally important, main pillars: diplomacy, economy, internal security, and defense. Based on these four main pillars, the new approach places an emphasis not only on reaction, but also on prevention. The new security policy concept for the Czech Republic determines three basic levels of the conceptualization and implementation: 1) situation assessment, 2) defense and security planning, and 3) crisis management.

The Czech Republic's new defense strategy, as well as its security will be implemented on both an international (NATO) as well as national level, by preventive measures. The measures taken in reaction to an arisen crisis situation are considered complementary. These basic methodological approaches fully correspond with the traditional practices of the European members of NATO. Thus they create an essential and solid foundation for a link between the Czech Republic's security strategy and the security strategy of the European Union.⁹⁶

2. Assessment of the Security Environment

Euphoria from the break up of a bipolar world led interested states to a reduction in their armed forces establishments and military budgets. However, in parallel with that, no qualitative changes occurred in the area of the armed forces capabilities and more purposeful utilization of resources, in order to effectively resist the restored or new threats and conflicts.

An analogical situation has emerged in the Czech Republic, where the development of the armed forces was neglected and left out of consideration. This caused a significant decline with regard to the quality of personnel and the level of training and readiness.

According to the 'security analysts', there is no threat of armed conflict in the European region within the next fifteen years, which cannot be detected and which it is

⁹⁶ PhDr. Jan Eichler, CSc., *Perspektivy vývoje bezpečnostní situace a politického vývoje států střední a východní Evropy do roku 2015*, ÚSS VA Brno, 2002, p.24.

not possible to rationally counter to.⁹⁷ However, a militant nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism have resuscitated. International organized crime, which struggles for access to various weapons, including weapons of mass destruction has increased. Hidden terrorism has gained a new supranational dimension. It abuses peoples' self-sacrifice, and makes use of both traditional and nontraditional methods to achieve its objectives. Terrorism is able to strike places previously deemed as safe-havens. Therefore, a defensive strategy against terrorism should revolve around a set of military and nonmilitary arrangements built on national, international and global levels.

Within the security environment, which the Czech Republic is located, there is an increasing tendency of nonmilitary threats and decreasing tendency of direct military threats. The security environment is characterized by high uncertainty, threats and their possible perpetrators are not easy to identify. A flexible response is necessary to prepare for the entire spectrum of possible conflict. Simultaneously, there is a tendency in the security sphere for strong international cooperation, and the process of NATO enlargement is its eminent demonstration.⁹⁸

The external security environment of the Czech Republic has fundamentally changed by its accession to NATO. NATO involvement can provide the country with security in the best possible way. An essential role for the security of the Euro-Atlantic region is played by the maintenance and development of the transatlantic link, where NATO plays a central role in the security-political and defense dimension.⁹⁹

As reflected in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CESP), the importance of the European Union in ensuring European security is also being strengthened. Further integration of Europe is accompanied by an increase in the capabilities of the Common European Security Defense Policy (CESDP). The CESDP will provide the European Union with the tools for an independent execution of peacekeeping, rescue and humanitarian operations.

⁹⁷ Ibid., p.25.

⁹⁸ Prague Summit confirmed and reinforced the idea of NATO future enlargement.

⁹⁹ *Military Strategy of the Czech Republic*, MOD – Military Information and Service Agency, Prague, 2002, p.5.

Internal security of the Czech Republic is affected by a number of threats and risks. Risk level is assessed on a regular basis and subsequently reflected in the tasks of the relevant components of the security system. The current trends of growing threats and risks are transferred to the increased demands for the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic to be able to assist non-military security organizations.

With respect to the Security Strategy of the Czech Republic, the following vital and strategic interests are essentially related with the field of activity of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic:

Vital interests: ensuring of existence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, principles of democracy and the rule of law and creation of fundamental conditions for the life of own citizens;

Strategic interests: increase in the defensive capabilities of the Czech Republic and its sharing with Allies, participation in operations led by NATO, other international organizations and ad-hoc coalitions, reinforcing of regional cooperation, NATO enlargement, continuation of the disarmament process, continued U.S. presence in Europe, strengthening of security in the Euro-Atlantic region, participation in the ESDP.

The security situation of the Czech Republic is characterized by following aspects:

- Occurrence of large-scale conventional aggression against the Czech Republic and NATO in the foreseeable timeframe is highly unlikely and a potential threat will be disclosed sufficiently in advance to enable adequate measures to be taken;
- Serious security threats are represented by countries, non-governmental groups and organizations that do not respect the principles of international law and democracy, and commit violence, encroach human rights and freedoms on their own territory, as well as conduct terrorist attacks and actions on world-wide scale;
- Since terrorist attacks are very difficult to predict, they create specific requirements in the area of detection and prevention;
- Other threats of non-military character are connected with a natural and industrial disasters, organized crime, massive and illegal migration, drugs trafficking, disruption of information and control systems, violation of order and citizens' property.

3. Strategy of Military Defense of the Czech Republic

Security and defense of the country is a matter for society as a whole. Apart from the armed forces, the armed security corps, rescue corps and emergency services co-operating with public authorities and bodies of territorial self-government and municipalities and other legal and physical entities, is ensuring the Czech Republic's security and defense.

The fight against terrorism does not principally change the mission and main tasks of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic; it results, however, in higher demands on the development of their capabilities.

Mission and tasks

Before analyzing the strategy it is useful to describe the mission and tasks of the new Armed Forces of the Czech Republic.

Their main mission is defense of the Czech Republic and its security interests. The basic task is a preparation and defense of the country against an external attack.

In compliance with the NATO membership, the Czech Republic's armed forces will maintain and develop the capability to operate as part of a 'collective defense' in accordance with Article 5 of the 'Washington Treaty.'¹⁰⁰ At the same time, the Czech armed forces will contribute to the general defense potential of NATO and prepare themselves, should that become necessary, to receive Alliance reinforcements on the territory of the Czech Republic.

The other missions include:

- Assistance Operations

In accordance with the laws of the Czech Republic, its armed forces will fulfill the tasks necessary for securing democracy, internal order and security.

- Crisis Response Operations

a) Military crisis situations

In compliance with the UN Charter, the armed forces will participate in crisis response operations outside the territory of the home country, especially in operations led by NATO, EU, UN, OSCE, or within ad-hoc coalition grouping.

¹⁰⁰ *The North Atlantic Treaty* (Washington Treaty), Washington D.C., April 4, 1949. Available [On-line]: <<http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/treaty.htm>>.

b) Non-military crisis situations

The use of armed forces in dealing with crisis situations of humanitarian character and resulting from natural or industrial disasters, or as consequences of armed conflicts.

- Rescue Operations

Selected forces will be able to fulfill on own territory or abroad, the following tasks: search, rescue and creation of conditions for the survival of individuals or groups facing an immediate danger to their lives.

- International Military Cooperation and Confidence Building

Armed forces will contribute with their troops and assets to the implementation of confidence-building measures in the frame of the NATO, EU, or PfP program.

- Civil-Military Cooperation

Participation in civil-military cooperation, as part of educational, social, cultural and other activities on national and regional, as well as international levels.

Strategy of military defense

The Czech Republic's strategy of military defense is based on the use of its own forces and assets, and on the security guarantees and obligations following its NATO membership.

“The Czech Republic will employ all available means, including its military power, to secure its vital interests. For support of its strategic interests, it will use its means as required.”¹⁰¹

Based on effective use of resources and simultaneous acceptance of reasonable level of security risks, the strategy is supported by building up an optimum structure and developing the capabilities of the Czech Republic.

Defense strategy is based on three main pillars. Each of them always includes preventive and reactive action, as well as national and Alliance share of responsibility for their implementation.

¹⁰¹ *Military Strategy of the Czech Republic*, Ministry of Defense of the CR - Military Information and Service Agency, Prague 2002, p.10.

First pillar, pillar of the ‘preventive instruments,’ represents a capability to participate in Alliance’s operations by fully trained and equipped mobile forces. This pillar insists on maximum utilization of the preventive instruments of the armed forces, which will act after a preventive activity of diplomacy and state politics.

The security interest of the Czech Republic, especially in Europe and its closest proximity, is active support of the European Union’s preventive activity in diplomatic, economic, social, and cultural areas. The objective is to prevent the outbreak of armed conflict by all means.

The *second pillar* is protection and defense of the Czech Republic airspace, especially by active participation in NATINEADS.¹⁰² Effective fulfillment of individual tasks depends on the employment of supersonic aircraft with full operational capabilities, along with the development of appropriate ground elements for command, control and reconnaissance systems. This includes passive surveillance systems. It is important to note that currently there is a huge debate in the Czech Republic’s Security Council and Government, regarding the supersonic aircrafts purchase, especially after catastrophic flood in August 2002. Insisting on the aircrafts purchase in the current situation might have a negative impact not only in economic area, but also more in the people’s thought and their view on security policy and armed forces and their position within the society.

The *third pillar*, a pillar of ‘host nation support,’ covers the preparation and implementation of measures necessary for receiving Allied reinforcements on the territory of the Czech Republic together with the required security measures according to appropriate plans and concrete specifications. The attendance, given to the ability of the Czech Republic to deploy its own forces for strengthening of other NATO countries, fully corresponds with necessities connected with the Czech Republic membership in NATO and perspective integration into EU.

Principles of development of the armed forces

The structure, size, and capabilities of the armed forces of the Czech Republic, are derived from their expected tasks and resource limitations.

¹⁰² NATO Integrated Extended Air Defense System.

Peacetime structure will enable them to meet the full spectrum of tasks that result from the politico-military ambitions of the Czech Republic in peacetime conditions. At the same time, a system of measures will be created (planning, training, operational, mobilization, economic, legal measures, etc.), which will enable a gradual change of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic (ACR) to wartime structure.

The final stage of the new armed forces personnel, planned to be in effect by the end of 2006, is between 34,000 and 36,000 military professionals, and up to 10,000 civilians.¹⁰³ Wartime mobilized structure will not exceed 1.8-times the peacetime strength.

Particular structure elements of the ACR will be classified in readiness categories, so that their planned operational tasks, based on the Czech Republic's declaration to NATO, the European Union and the United Nations, are met with the greatest possible effectiveness.

The classification the Czech armed forces are as follows:

- High Readiness Forces that are subdivided as
 - Permanent Readiness Forces,
 - Immediate Reaction Forces/Initial Entry Forces,
 - Rapid Reaction Forces;
- Forces of Lower Readiness;
- Long-Term Build-Up Forces

A full professionalization of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic, which is connected with termination of the obligatory national conscript service while retaining legal tools for calling-up (in case of emergency such as mobilization, etc.), is one of the principal prerequisites in fulfilling their mission and tasks with the necessary quality, and achievement of the required capabilities.

¹⁰³ *Koncepce Reformy výstavby profesionální Armády České republiky a Mobilizace ozbrojených sil České republiky*, Magazin A-report, special edition, Prague 2002, p.17.

In accordance with the reform of the armed forces, the future ACR will consist of the following military services:

- Ground Forces
- Air Forces
- Supporting Forces
- Military Intelligence
- Military Police

As a contribution to the collective defense capacities and international specialization, the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic will focus primarily on the development of its capabilities in the fields of passive surveillance systems, detection and identification of chemical and biological weapons, and the development medical support systems and elements.

B. CZECH REPUBLIC AND ESDP

At the present time, the Czech Republic is much more connected to NATO than the EU as far as the security policy is concerned. This is both for objective and subjective reasons. The objective reasons are given by a much longer history and richer traditions of NATO in the region. NATO's working methods and structures are more competent and stable than those of the EU. The subjective reasons are connected with the fact that joining NATO has brought higher security guarantees than those yet provided by the EU. Moreover, in the area of security policy, NATO has a much more sophisticated methodology for working with new member states. EU has a more advanced culture of preventive influence, but simultaneously it will have to improve its capabilities to react to crises or conflicts that may break out beyond its geographical borders.

However, the Czech Republic has a positive approach to the CFSP and belongs among six associate countries, which are members of NATO, but not the EU. The Czech Republic released part of its NATO contingent. It means if NATO will not participate in the relevant operation, a mechanized battalion of about 500-600 troops is ready, with a capability to be deployed within 60 days. There is also a plan for the deployment of a

helicopter unit, field hospital, chemical company and special force company totaling the strength of troops to 1000.

The Common Foreign and Security Policy, a second pillar of the EU, does not belong to the problematic areas with regards to accession negotiations. Expectant parallel entrance of the Slovak Republic into the EU eliminated the only potential problem within the widely defined external relations of the Union from the Czech point of view.¹⁰⁴

1. Importance and Potential Benefits of the EU Membership

Because of the security aspect, accession into the European Union is going to be very important for the Czech Republic. Accession will open the door to the security community, not only to the military security sector, but also the non-military security dimensions, especially economic stability achievements and prosperity of its members. By joining EU the Czech Republic will become a member of the community, whose security strategy leans by equal volume on both military and non-military instruments. The security of the Czech Republic will be strengthened, but at the same time it is necessary to expect new tasks and demands.

The voluntary principle of the ESDP is advantageous for the candidate states, which need not to be afraid that they will have to participate in operations and actions for which they are not adequately prepared as soon as they join the Union. A preference of the national forces has the advantage that new member nations should not indefinitely or permanently assign their armed forces to a rigid, supranational army. ESDP transparency enhances mutual trust and expands the opportunities for cooperation with countries that are constituent members of both the NATO and the EU, and have thus accumulated a lot of experience.

It is very important for the Czech Republic to know how basic principles of the ESDP work. Thus, it can start thinking, which of its capacities might be offered to EU even now, and what capabilities have to be gradually improved for possible involvement.

¹⁰⁴ In case of different date of the EU integration, the necessity of the customs union termination and reinforcement of the Czech-Slovak border, which will become the external border of the EU, would be threaten.

The employment within ESDP activities accordingly gives to the Czech Republic an opportunity to plan the reform and modernize its armed forces in a broader, European-wide framework, including a utilization of the European experience and well proven methods.

2. Future Position of the Czech Republic and Its Missions in ESDP

In this respect, the conclusions from the EU summit in Nice (7-9 December 2000) have a decisive character. The measures, concerning European NATO members, but not EU members, and other candidate countries for joining EU are explicitly described in the Summit enclosure VI.

The documents elaborated and approved during the years of 2001-2002, especially the 'Concept of the professional Czech armed forces development,' is very complex. They tend to a good and extended reform not only of the armed forces, but also reform of the security policy of the Czech Republic. They emphasize the required capabilities of the armed forces, from which they derive specific missions of a short-term and middle term perspective.

Their implementation of these concepts can build up very good conditions for the successful transformation of the Czech Republic Army (ACR)¹⁰⁵, which should be one of the fundamental instruments of the Czech Republic security policy. A great advantage of these documents is the emphasis on the use of such methods, which are in accordance with attitudes and standards used in the armed forces of NATO and EU member states. After integration into the European Union no significant changes of the security policy of the Czech Republic are expected.¹⁰⁶ Its present orientation and methods should fully correspond to EU standards.

As far as the estimation of the future position and tasks of the Czech Republic as a new EU member are concerned, they can be classified as follows:¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁵ The Czech Republic Armed Forces are sometimes called as: Army of the Czech Republic with its Czech abbreviation ACR.

¹⁰⁶ PhDr. Jan Eichler, CSc., *Perspektivy vývoje bezpečnostní situace a politického vývoje států střední a východní Evropy do roku 2015*, Military Academy in Brno, 2002, p.30.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p.31.

- After joining EU the Czech Republic will have to increase its representation in the three main EBOP institutions, which are political-security committee (COPS), Military committee, and Military staff,

- Before the integration, the Czech Republic should decide, which units (with their capabilities) may contribute to the EU reserved armed forces.

- To support the efforts to reduce the military-technological differences between the USA and their European allies,

- To contribute to a gradual surmount of transatlantic tension in the attitude towards the main contemporary problems,

- To support the initiatives aiming to a higher balance within NATO,

- To improve a permanent readiness for the participation in EU and NATO operations in order to solve regional conflicts, which create serious military threats,

- There is not the interest the Czech Republic (and I think not either of EU) that EU significantly turn away, while reducing the military-technological deficit to the USA, from its long-term, high-profiled and successfully applied strategy, which emphasizes the dialogue, negotiation and consensus as ways how to settle disputes,

- A position of the Czech Republic within EU will also be influenced by its ability to join in diplomatic and economic initiatives of EU in the interest of stability and conflicts prevention.

The Czech Republic and the ACR have good conditions for participation in the European security and defense policy, especially in peacekeeping operations.

Czech soldiers were deployed in various peacekeeping and humanitarian operations under the auspices and guidance of the UN (UNPROFOR, UNTAES), NATO (IFOR, SFOR, KFOR, AFOR), and the United States (Desert Storm in Gulf War, Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan), as a part of different multinational contingents. Czech officers also served as observers within the UN, OSCE or EU missions (Angola, Georgia, Iraq, former Yugoslavia, Korea, Liberia, Moldavia, Mozambique, Namibia, Somalia, Tajikistan, Nagorni Karabach, Sierra Leone, or Western Sahara).

These activities of the Czech Republic Armed and Police Forces have met with positive reactions in the world and created the good reputation of the Czech military.

Several thousands of people have already some experience with these activities. The Czech Republic Armed Forces gained also a lot from the PfP activities and its NATO membership. All these facts create good presumptions for their successful participation within future European Union operations, and thus the implementation of the Petersberg agreements.

3. Final Proposals for the Czech Republic Security Policy

Despite all the problems, defects, damage, and losses during the transformation of armed forces, especially of the military, critical points in the contemporary strategic decision process have been clarified. In addition, barriers and limits of the present decision process have been identified. Also, the strategic architecture for further procedures has been clarified and accepted by contemporary subjects.

The basic principles of state policy in the areas of security, defense, and military strategy should be approved on the basis of four key documents – *Security strategy of the Czech Republic*,¹⁰⁸ *Defense Strategy of the Czech Republic (White Book)*,¹⁰⁹ *Military strategy of the Czech Republic*,¹¹⁰ and *Concept of the Czech Republic Professional Armed Forces Development*.

The Czech Republic should continue active participation within the EU's CFSP, with a closer orientation to some well selected preferred areas, right after its entry to the organization. It is necessary to effectively use remaining time before accession. The

¹⁰⁸ *Security Strategy of the Czech Republic*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, Prague, 2001. Available [On-line]: < http://www.mzv.cz/bezp_strategie/strategie.html>.

¹⁰⁹ *Bílá kniha o obraně České republiky* (The White book of the Defense of the Czech Republic), Ministry of Defense, Prague, 1995.

¹¹⁰ *Military strategy of the Czech Republic*, Ministry of Defense of the Czech Republic – Military Information and Service Agency, Prague, 2002. Available [On-line]: <<http://www.nato.cz/dokumenty/vojstrat.doc>>.

Czech Republic must be already able to look for potential partners for its priority, either case by case among power states, or on more stable base, in the frame of the sub-regional coalitions such as Visegrad group, Benelux, or Scandinavian states.¹¹¹ With regards to that, foreign services have to be adapted to the new style of the Czech foreign policy. For the enforcement of its priorities, the Czech Republic will have to be ready to produce relevant manpower, financial and political sources.

In the area of the EU security and military dimension, comprising particularly a new project of ESDP, the Czech Republic should abandon its actual passive position.¹¹² The Czech Republic should be able to contribute to the actual debate about the ESDP, which cannot be simplified only to EU-NATO relations, and maintaining a NATO dominating position within European security. However, it is also possible to successfully combine pro-European and pro-Atlantic policy, like in the case of the Netherlands. The Czech Republic will have a greater opportunity to influence the ESDP orientation so that it will not weaken a transatlantic link between Europe and USA, which is important for keeping a stability and peace on European continent.

The following proposals for the creation of a new security policy can be derived, with regards to the requirements of the European Security and Defense Policy, as well as the analysis of current situation and possible presumptions:

1. To support positively orientated supra-national organizations and to influence them in accordance with the Czech Republic national interests (UN, EU, NATO, OSCE, WB, IMF, etc.), especially in the reinforcement of security and defense, terrorism, disarmament, and efforts not to spread weapons of mass destruction.

2. To have influence on the strategic security and defense conception of NATO and ESDP, mainly as far as Central and Eastern Europe is concerned.

3. To support the transatlantic cooperation within NATO and EU

¹¹¹ Mgr.Radek Khol, MA, *Česká republika a Společná zahraniční politika EU*, ÚMV Praha, 2002, p.5. Available [On-line]: <http://www.mendelu.cz/user/konig/Aktual_CR_a_SZBP_EU.doc>.

¹¹² Ibid., p.5.

4. To participate in emerged peacekeeping and humanitarian operations led by NATO, or EU, especially within Europe.

5. To support the military cooperation of Visegrad countries including creation of common unites and coordination of military equipment production.

6. To create conditions for development of military thinking, mainly building workplaces with strategic orientation at the Ministry of Defense, General Staff, military universities, science, research, and medial spheres. Prevent dissolving such facilities without serious reasons, and to support the development of similar workplaces in the civilian sector.

7. To ensure realization of the whole project of the Czech Republic Armed Forces Reform, and to continue with its improvement commensurate with new EU and NATO requirements.

8. To improve the work of the National Security Council, especially by inviting and integrating independent experts and representatives of the security community.

9. To ensure a good civilian control and oversize of the military, and to create suitable environment for public and political support of the military.

10. To harmonize the attitudes and to support mutual cooperation between individual ministries, other executive offices, Parliament and the President regarding the ESDP issue.

With regards to the armed forces, the analysis of the security risks and threats requires following measures:

1. To have good anti-aircraft defense (contemporary armed conflicts begin with air-raids including threats of terrorist attacks); it is necessary to have not only adequate supersonic and ultrasonic air force, transport planes and helicopters, but also antiaircraft and antimissile devices, which have been neglected for years in the Czech Republic.

2. To have territorial defense with professional leadership based on volunteers for aerial defense and completion of the other kinds of troops (such as Switzerland, or National Guard in the USA).

3. To have adequate ground forces for territory defense from specific directions and for peacekeeping operations deployment.

4. To have rapid reaction units and specialists for the requirements of NATO, EU, UN and OSCE.

5. To create a good conception of military equipment procurement and own weapon production.

A good presumption for a gradual fulfillment of the above mentioned aspects is the fact that a much more conceptual attitude has been taken place in the Czech Republic in order to.

V. CONCLUSION

The escalation of the coordinated actions of international terrorism and new demands resulting from security threats have shown that it is not possible to ensure the security and defense of the country by only partial transformation, reforming or rationalization measures, or by some kind of improvisation. At the same time, an objective necessity of the new and complex security and defense strategy of the Czech Republic formation has been confirmed. There is a suitable social climate for formation and implementation of such important national strategy in a period when the country has successfully integrated into NATO and is heading into the EU.

The present time can be viewed as the conversion to full integration of the Czech Republic into Western security structures. NATO membership in itself offers an unprecedented degree of security. The Czech Republic thus ensures that it is protected against military aggression by the scary effect and guarantees of allied assistance.

Upon accession to the EU, the existing guarantees in external security will become much more profound. The close integration of the state with the democratic community will no doubt contribute to the strengthening of internal political and economic stability and will open up new opportunities for cooperation in the fight against organized crime, terrorism, and environmental disasters.

Integration to the EU will as well open the door for the Czech Republic to establish a secure community, which isn't focused only on the military area of security, but also the non-military aspect, in particular the achievements in assurance of the economic stability and prosperity of their member states.

European Security and Defense Policy have been a quite long time a subject of the official governmental policy, mainly from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and MOD. The Czech Republic principally supports the integration with Europe, including security issues cooperation. The Czech position is also not marked by political or psychological restrictions, as for example in militarily non-participating EU member countries¹¹³ in

¹¹³ These countries are Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden.

terms of military operations under the auspices of the EU.¹¹⁴ Czech government can directly support “use of force” in EU enforcement operations however, it is clear that perspective of the NATO member will remain a priority during ESDP consideration, at least until country’s full integration into the Union.

The Czech Republic policy insists on strength of cooperation, and the complementarities and transparency of the NATO-EU relations, which is perhaps the most realistic way in which to preserve the influence of the Czech Republic in current situations. The Czech Republic belongs among those countries, which prefer orientation of the ESDP to reinforce of the European military capacities rather than to build ambitious institutions without bringing any profit in the area of crisis management.¹¹⁵

NATO membership and a progress in EU accession talks signify that the Czech Republic is becoming a part of the institutional frame of democratic, well developed and stable countries of Euro-Atlantic regional community. The ability to be a reliable partner of other EU members is being reinforced. From this point of view, the responsibility and mission of the Czech national administration institutions is very important in the accession activities, and properly created Security Policy of the Czech Republic plays a very significant role in this process.

Security is indivisible. It is not possible to separate the Czech Republic security from those of Europe and whole World, within current globalized international environment. Today, in mutually interconnected world, relatively distant and unrelated circumstances to the Czech Republic can suddenly transfer to such image, which can threaten a security and stability of the country.¹¹⁶

Creation of the security and defense strategy depends on security threats and risks analysis. This thesis described quite in detail current threats and developed tasks and missions of the Czech Republic Armed Forces. Threats of the country are practically

¹¹⁴ Mgr.Radek Khol, MA, Česká republika a EBOP – skutečná a chybějící debata, 2002, p.1. Available [On-line]: Listy SFPa: Budoucnost Evropské Unie: <http://www.sfpa.sk/pages/common/archiv/listy_nove/listy.php?no=0302&it=8>.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., p.2.

¹¹⁶ *Koncepce zahraniční politiky: II.Evropská a mezinárodní bezpečnost*, Documents. Available [On-line]: Ministry of Foreign Affairs home page: <http://www.mzv.cz/_dokumenty/koncepce_b2.html>.

equal with those of NATO and EU. This fact also confirmed correct decision to participate on Common European Foreign Security Policy and seek for membership in the European Union, which became the main strategic interest for recent foreign policy of the Czech Republic. Positive economic results, which EU has shown during the last few years, acknowledged a correctness of that foreign policy orientation. One of the objectives of this thesis was to support this idea.

The Czech Republic successfully prepared and ensured the NATO Summit in November 2002. Beside the fact, that Summit demonstrated the ability of the Alliance to be ready and manage the challenges which emerged from the current situation and international relations, the Czech Republic proved its ability to adopt such security measures, which did not allow terrorist or other disturbances during the Summit.

According to a strategic decision of the European Committee from its meeting in February 2003, the new members might join the EU in May 2004. In this “pre-entrance phase” the highest priority for the Czech Republic remains political stability and improvement of its economic, military, diplomatic, social and other capabilities to meet as soon as possible the EU requirements.

This thesis focused on security and defense aspects of this process. The Czech Republic is well on its way to become a member of the European Union. Its own security system is compatible with those of NATO and EU countries. The functionality of the developed security system has been proved by our recent experience.¹¹⁷ For example, during NATO Summit, it was a demonstration of the Czech Republic security and defense capabilities, which have shown a significant improvement in comparison with the events of IMF/WB Summit in September 2000, when a lot of disturbances took place in Prague and even other places of the country.

This thesis tried to refer to some problems and point out on some possible proposals for the next improvement and for the activities, which might be included in the new Security Policy of the Czech Republic to meet the security requirements of the European Union Security and Defense Policy.

¹¹⁷ MG Jindřich Lesný, *Bezpečnostní systém České republiky*, Sekretarát Bezpečnostní rady státu (Secretariat of the Security Council of the Czech Republic), Praha, 2002, p.7.

Finally, we can say that the Czech Republic is relatively well prepared in terms of legislative and doctrinal requirements for security and defense issues. After implementation of the armed forces reform¹¹⁸, the ACR will be able to fully cover its obligations regarding a proper realization and a participation in EU operations.

However, a development of the international relations and creation of the security environment and European Common Foreign Security Policy, no matter whether within ESDI or ESDP, remain still very open issues. The main reason is unclear regarding the current “Iraqi crisis” and continuing worldwide effort in combating terrorism, which has shown its face after attacks in September 11 again.¹¹⁹

The crucial moment for the future development in this area will be, how world, mainly USA and Europe will deal with current security issues.

Other unpleasant problem in this area is a different position of the world society to the current international security situation, especially in connection to the Iraqi issue, the anomalous opinion of European countries on the US foreign policy. There is crisis within NATO and EU due to different attitudes and the same situation is in the Security Council, where majority of its members are against the attack on Iraq.

Unfortunately, the United Nations Security Council, which should have a decisive word in solution of the security issues did not play its role properly, which was caused by the development of international relations within last decade, when United Nations lost its credit and UN Charter is not respected. Instead of that the “use of force“ is used as an excuse for humanitarian assistance and international law is become principally useless.

Therefore, the main task within the international relations, which very narrowly correspond with the issue of ESDP, is to reform and reorganize the United Nations and to return back its hegemonic mission, which is the responsibility for world stability and peace. In my opinion it will be difficult to establish order and mutual respect in the international relations without that aspect.

¹¹⁸ The first step of the Reform is planned to be terminated till end of the year 2006.

¹¹⁹ Terrorist attacks in Bali disco club, in Moscow Theater, etc.

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