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Preventing Terrorism Through Nation-Building: A Viable Way?

by

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The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

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ABSTRACT

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This SRP analyzes the effectiveness of traditional nation-building as an instrument in the current war on terrorism.



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PREVENTING TERRORISM THROUGH NATION-BUILDING: A VIABLE WAY?

The term "nation-building" has been used over many years. It became fashionable in the 1960s, during the Vietnam conflict; it is returning to center-stage right now. It always has been a highly complex term used in many different ways, describing certain historical experiences, embodying a set of assumptions about development of Third World societies and influencing the policies of governments that have been driven, among other considerations, by the desire to control and expand their own power. Contradictions of terminology still cloud the discussion about nation-building. ¹

The historical debate about nation-building has been closely linked to "de-colonization," especially in Africa. Nation-building has been a persistent policy issue. After the United States left Indochina and with global de-colonization mostly completed, nation-building receded for a time as a policy issue, both politically and academically. But with the end of the Cold War and the break-up of the Soviet Union, "the concepts and terminology of nation-building are experiencing a revival." Some states have been disintegrating in Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans, while other states (and nation states) are being created, reinvented and recognized. In some cases, we have witnessed "the construction of state structures or nations on the ruins of their predecessors." In other instances, "states and multi-ethnic or more homogeneous societies have fallen apart and broken up, sometimes resulting in situations of civil war and chaos." These unfortunate cases have revived calls for nation-building, both internally and internationally. This term has been applied to U.S. and multinational initiatives in many countries during the last two decades: Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, several successor-countries of the former Soviet Union (e.g. in Central Asia), Afghanistan and South Africa are only well known examples.

Generally, nation-building refers to the efforts of stronger, more established nations – or the international community – to support a failing state (perhaps through regime change), or to create a new state to replace a de-colonized state, or to establish a new state in an effort to restore order to the chaos emerging from a failed state. This essay argues that such "traditional" nation-building efforts are not well-suited to current U.S. efforts to support other nations or states with the objective of winning the war on terrorism.

Nation-Building - A Tool Against Terrorism

The United States has had little success with nation-building since the execution of the Marshall Plan following World War II, perhaps because of a lack of understanding of different

peoples and their cultures. The United States may have tried to remake some failed nations in its image, failing to note that it has taken more than two hundred years for the United States to evolve into its current structure. Perhaps the United States has approached nation-building haphazardly instead of as a total rebuilding effort. The United States does not have the resources to be everywhere and do everything all the time. Additionally, international politics have influenced and reshaped U.S. intentions.

In the wake of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, many authors, analysts and politicians have claimed the events of 11 September 2001 provide concrete evidence that the United States should incorporate "nation-building" into its national security strategy as a tool for preventing the formation or continued existence of states where international terrorists can organize and operate. ⁶ Such claims, however, are simplistic.

Some of those who espouse nation-building to prevent terrorism include Dereck Chollet, a former aide to Richard Holbrooke, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. Chollet asserts that "nation building" should be "a legitimate and fundamental part of U.S. foreign and military policy." He warns that "if the United States doesn't put serious resources behind such efforts now, then it's only planting the seeds for 'future crises'."

Recommending perhaps the most expansive nation-building agenda is UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. He claims that "the events of September 11 should make everyone realize that when organizations like the Taliban are allowed to violate the rights of their individual citizens, they become a menace not only to their own people, but also to their neighbors and indeed the world." Thus, he believes enforcing rights across borders should supersede traditional notions of sovereignty and national interest. "This will require us to look beyond the framework of states," he says, and "focus, as never before, on improving the conditions of the individual men and women who give the state or nation its richness and character."

Are such proposals for nation-building to prevent terrorism a realistic way to combat terrorism or a proper rationale for nation-building? According to the State Department's latest *Patterns of Global Terrorism*, there are at least 42 significant terrorist organizations operating in dozens of countries around the globe. Complicating matters still further, according to Annan's sprawling definition of potential terrorist threats, an estimated 106 countries have oppressive or semi-oppressive governments. That means as many as 3.6 billion people or 59 percent of the world's population should logically become the subjects of foreign nation-building efforts. Clearly, if one accepts those statistics, the task of nation-building is overwhelming.

Hardly a day goes by without a politician or expert proposing more foreign aid or support for education as an antidote for terrorism. "The dragon's teeth are planted in the fertile soil of . .

poverty and deprivation," British Prime Minister Tony Blair tells us.¹³ Thus foreign assistance efforts must be ramped up around the world to reduce the terrorist threat. Jessica Stern, a Harvard University lecturer on terrorism, proclaims, "We have a stake in the welfare of other peoples and need to devote a much higher priority to health, education and economic development, or new Osamas will continue to arise." According to former president Bill Clinton, the forces behind the September 11 attacks on the United States "feed on disillusionment, poverty and despair." His solution: "Spread prosperity and security to all. ¹⁵ Presidential aspirant Sen. Joseph Lieberman (D-Conn.) says that the next great foreign policy challenge is to promote "American values" in Muslim countries; doing so, he contends, will enhance America's national security. ¹⁶

However, granting aid does not in itself necessarily prevent the development of terrorism. The United States was the largest donor of food and other aid to Afghanistan before September 11; nevertheless, New York and Washington were the targets of a terrorist attack masterminded by an organization that found sanctuary in Afghanistan.

Nation-Building - Not A Tool To Prevent Terrorism

Those arguing against using nation-building to prevent terrorism point out several false assumptions about the root causes of terrorism. One assumption is that poverty and the existence of "failed states" breed terrorism. If that were true, sub-Saharan Africa would be the principal incubator of terrorism since that region is littered with chronically misgoverned failed states inhabited by desperately poor people. Yet sub-Saharan Africa is relatively quiet, whereas the more prosperous states of the Persian Gulf region have produced the greatest number of terrorists. No evidence specifically links poverty and ignorance to the present terrorist challenge faced by the United States. The hijackers who flew fully-fueled jetliners into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11 were well educated and financially well off. Osama Bin Laden is a multimillionaire. Moreover, it should be noted Osama Bin Laden has never claimed that he acts on behalf of the poor and the illiterate or that his goal is to redress the disparities between rich and poor countries. He uses extremist religious rhetoric as a tool to eliminate opposition and gain power. 18

Poverty can exist without terrorism, as it did during the Great Depression. Terrorism can thrive without poverty. Left-wing terrorists, such as the German Baader-Meinhoff gang and the Italian Red Brigade during the 1970s and 1980s, were overwhelmingly middle class. Likewise, 15 of the 19 September 11 hijackers were from Saudi Arabia, an exceptionally rich country.¹⁹ If

the assumption that poverty and ignorance cause terrorism were correct, Saudi Arabians would be among the most peaceful people on earth. Instead, Saudi Arabia appears to be a fertile breeding ground for terrorists.²⁰

Recent research suggests easy access to cash is one predictor of political violence. After analyzing 47 different civil conflicts between 1965 and 1999, World Bank economist Paul Collier found that rebellion and civil war occur largely in countries with lootable sources of cash, such as diamonds in Angola, cocaine in Columbia and timber in Cambodia. "The economic theory of conflict," explains Collier, "argues that the motivation of conflict is unimportant; what matters is whether the organization can sustain itself financially. . . . It can only fight if it is financially viable during the conflict." "Indeed," says Collier, "if anything, rebellion seems to be the rage of the rich." According to that view of conflict, generous foreign aid and nation-building could create tempting new targets for looting, which in turn could feed the cycle of violence as it did in Somalia in 1992-93. ²³

A second assumption is that "only a prolonged U.S. military presence and Washington's firm backing for a powerful central government can prevent chaos and extremism." In the case of Afghanistan, its recent troubles began when "other countries meddled and attempted to prop-up a friendly central government." The Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s and Pakistan in the 1990s sought to install and maintain friendly regimes in Afghanistan. Without the meddling of Pakistan, the Taliban would never have come to power in Afghanistan and the country would not have become a haven for al Qaeda. ²⁶

If other countries grant Afghanistan true self-governance, "it will probably revert to its traditional form of governance - a highly decentralized system with a nominal central government, with most power held by tribal leaders and regional warlords." It may not be either efficient or democratic by Western standards, but it served the Afghan people reasonably well for decades before the Soviet Union interfered. "Afghans give their primary allegiance to local leaders, their tribes and ethnic groups. All of its [Afghanistan's] borders were in effect determined by the British Empire and reflected not an internal historical or ethnic logic, but an imperial one."

If poverty and ignorance are not the real root causes of terrorism, then foreign aid cannot be seriously considered the cure. Further, this "root causes" (poverty and ignorance) approach assumes the United States and its allies are in a position to alleviate poverty and ignorance around the globe. The sources of poverty and ignorance in much of the world reside in the inability of many states to make themselves competitive in the global economy. Many poor

countries lack economic policies that could make them competitive in the global economy. Several politicians, nongovernmental organizations and policy experts advocate a new Marshall Plan for Central Asia and, in some cases, the entire Third World. The plan would be modeled on Secretary of State George C. Marshall's economic plan for the reconstruction of Europe after World War II. The chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Joseph Biden (D-Del.), says that an American-led nation-building effort in Central Asia offers a long-term solution to the terrorism problem. He feels this effort should focus on changing the economic and social climate of Afghanistan and its neighbors by offering something akin to the Marshall Plan's reconstruction of Europe. ³⁰ In a similar vein, the Washington D.C.-based Worldwatch Institute is proposing a new global Marshall Plan to provide everyone on earth with a basic standard of living.

Such advocacy of a new Marshall Plan must be approached critically. We have to look back more than 50 years to find an example of such an aid plan that worked. Plans similar to the Marshall Plan have routinely failed. Since World War II the United States alone has provided \$1 trillion in foreign aid to various countries. According to the United Nations, 70 of the countries that received aid were poorer in 1997 than they were in 1980, while an incredible 43 were worse off than in 1970.³¹

But these failures are not so surprising if we view the actual Marshall Plan experience more carefully. If massive government spending could work to build a nation anywhere, it was in Europe in 1948. Skilled labor was widely available, the rule of law and property rights had a long history and the customs of a commercial society were readily recoverable. The only thing lacking was physical capital. The real lesson of the Marshall Plan is that the rule of law, property rights, free markets and an entrepreneurial culture are all necessary for economic success.³²

The key to Germany's and Japan's post-war prosperity does not lie in the infusion of U.S. aid. Poor countries must develop and enforce policies that reduce trade barriers, respect the rule of law and private property, curb inflation, cut wasteful spending and corruption and limit meddling in domestic markets. Western governments can support those reforms by opening their markets to Third World exports. Washington could provide more immediate and longer-lasting "aid" to poor farmers and workers by allowing them to sell what they produce duty-free in the U.S. market.³³ The United States imposes its highest trade barriers on exports that are lucrative and important to poor countries, such as sugar, footwear, clothing and textiles.³⁴ But the countries themselves must make the bulk of the necessary reforms.

Today most under-developed or emerging states have little in the way of traditions, infrastructure or cultural attitudes that would enable a foreign economic reconstruction effort similar to the Marshall Plan to succeed. In contrast to Afghanistan's ascendant warlords, the wartime leaders of Germany and Japan were utterly vanquished and their political agendas were totally discredited in the eyes of their people. Historians and social scientists have also documented that the German and Japanese people were receptive to profound political change even before the war was over. These factors made both countries prime candidates for postwar nation-building. It would be futile to attempt to replicate the Marshall Plan in current troubled or failing states. Industrialized nations have spent nearly seven years and \$20 billion attempting nation-building in Bosnia, but its extremist parties and politicians have remained popular, if not highly electable.

The failure of regimes "to provide for peaceful political change, the phenomenon of economies unable to keep pace with population growth, along with demands for more evenly distributed benefits provide fertile ground for the growth of extremism and political violence." Similarly, unresolved ethnic and nationalist conflicts have traditionally been a leading source of terrorism. Diplomacy and the use of force can contribute both to the containment and the eventual resolutions of such conflicts, whether in the context of the Palestinian issue, nationalist confrontations in the Balkans and the Causasus, or ethnic frictions in Africa.³⁷

In the defense and counterterrorism communities, it is sometimes argued that molding the political landscape of other countries is now a precondition of U.S. security.³⁸ In the case of Afghanistan, a senior defense analyst at DFI Government Practices Inc., a consulting group for the Pentagon, claims the "international community" must not only eliminate the Taliban but also "disarm, dissuade and if necessary defeat local factions determined to play a 'spoiler' role.³⁹ RAND Corporation counterterrorism expert Ian Lesser recommends that the United States do more "environment shaping" all around the world to reduce the terrorist threat.⁴⁰ However, it is impossible for an intervening party, acting alone or in concert with others, to prevent its nation-building activities from altering the misguided calculations of rival factions that are still maneuvering to dominate or outlast each other. Invariably, an outside party will do something that will be seen to benefit one side's interests at the expense of the others. In many cases the aggrieved factions will respond with violence.

A policy of credible deterrence in conjunction with improving the traditional counterterrorist instruments of diplomacy, intelligence and law enforcement offers a far more effective way to combat terrorism and prevent its development than current unpromising and open-ended nation-building efforts. The groundwork for a credible deterrent policy is being laid by the Bush

Administration's handling of Afghanistan and sets an unambiguous precedent in the pursuit of American national security. President Bush has clearly announced, "If you harbor terrorists that target America, you will forfeit your control over the levers of power." Countries, which have been complacent regarding domestic terrorist activities, are hearing the message.

Rather than attempting to build new states that will aid the U.S. in the war against terrorists, the U.S. is now simply enacting a policy that will not tolerate other states' support of terrorism. Whereas nation-building may offer the prospect of some long-term relief of the terrorist threat, the short-term solution of non-tolerance of state-sponsored terrorists or of harboring terrorists seems both necessary and expedient.

Combating terrorism in failed states by nation-building also exacerbates the problem of spreading our military forces too thin. A recent example is Somalia, where the United States and the United Nations stumbled without a fully developed plan. As a result, what began as a humanitarian mission to feed starving people drifted into a misguided attempt at ad hoc nation-building. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz correctly noted that Somalia is a "special case" because it really isn't a governed country at all. If its goal is to combat terrorism, then nation-building in failed states can be counter-productive. In failed states, "terrorists are very vulnerable to covert action, commando raids, surprise attacks and local informants." Failed states are not "safe havens" for terrorists; rather, they leave terrorists defenseless. Still, many observers insist that nation-building must be the right solution in such places as Afghanistan because "it was our failure to stay engaged in the region after the Cold War that permitted the rise of the Taliban and turned Afghanistan into a safe harbor for terrorists."

Many advocates of nation-building as a deterrent to terrorism claim the right response to this danger is to provide the central government of the beleaguered nation with the military muscle necessary to enforce its writ in the country by sending in a massive U.S.-led peacekeeping force. As is so often the case with nation-builders, advocates simply assume that nation-building will work. They claim that early failure simply means that insufficient force of arms, political energy, or economic aid was applied. Nation-builders inevitably claim when nation-building fails it is not a failure because there are practical limits to what governments can do but because the nation-building efforts were not pursued vigorously enough. Many analysts and politicians persistently claim that with enough money, bureaucratic administrators and military force of arms, outsiders can impose modern economic and democratic state structures on any country in the world. Furthermore, if a country is composed of antagonistic groups, then they claim it is the duty of the West to ensure that they live together until they like it. As

Deploying a huge number of American troops in Afghanistan for nation-building is unnecessary and unwise. It is unnecessary because the security of the United States does not require a multiethnic, liberal democracy in Afghanistan. American security requires only that the government or governments there be deterred from harboring terrorists as the Taliban once did. It is unwise because using Americans as peacekeepers risks needless U.S. casualties, kidnappings and other distractions that will erode morale and public support for the war against terrorism. Additionally, the United States needs to keep its troops and resources available for potential high-intensity conflicts. Getting bogged down in another open-ended nation-building mission similar to Kosovo or Bosnia is a diversion from the real work that may still lie ahead in destroying the al-Qaeda network.

The overriding strategic problem with the nation-building prescription is sustainability. A campaign of global nation-building would spread the U.S. presence to the four corners of the earth and require far more resources than are available. Should there be a major war or need for another armed response to a terrorist attack, those missions would compete for limited manpower and resources. This could compromise the U.S. military's ability to fight and win this nation's wars, which is, after all, its primary mission. Continued nation-building efforts do not make for very good strategy. As Massachusetts Institute of Technology political scientist Barry Posen explains: "Strategy requires the establishment of priorities because resources are scarce. Resources must be ruthlessly concentrated against the main threat," which in this case is "the extended al-Qaeda organization and the states that support it.⁴⁶ Clearly, extensive nation-building would stress the U.S. military beyond its available resources in dealing with these states.

Combating terrorism requires choking off terrorists' funding and removing their motivations. Further, all nations must realize that the U.S. will no longer tolerate other nations' support or use of terroristic activities. When nations believe that violence will succeed, it becomes a more commonly adopted alternative. A realistic approach to combating terrorism, therefore, does not rely on nation-building or making the world safe for democracy. It resides in a policy of victory and credible deterrence. The objective is to prevent terrorism by making its sponsors and accomplices fear the costs. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger best expressed this concept: "Governments on whose territory terrorists are tolerated will find it especially difficult to cooperate [with the United States] unless the consequences of failing to do so are made more risky than their tacit bargain with the terrorists.

If nation-building is the wrong prescription, what is the correct prescription? To answer that, let's consider the Middle East, which seems to be the hotbed for current terrorism. First,

we should be aware of Middle Eastern history and culture. Muslims tend to see not a nation subdivided into religious groups, but a religion subdivided into nations. This is partly because most of the nation-states that make up the modern Middle East are relatively new creations, remnants of the era of Anglo-French imperial domination that followed the defeat of the Ottoman Empire. These states preserve the state-building and frontier demarcations of their former imperial masters, who had little regard for ethnic and cultural differences. The Islamic people, like everyone else in the world, are shaped by their history. But unlike some others, they are keenly aware of it. Their culture and religion bind them together far more than geographic boundaries.

In the early centuries of Islam, the Islamic people obeyed one ruler. Even after that community split up into many states, the ideal of a single Islamic polity persisted. The states were almost all dynastic, with shifting frontiers. Until the modern period when European concepts and categories became dominant, Islamic commentators almost always referred to their opponents not in territorial or ethnic terms, but simply as infidels. They never referred to their own side as Arab or Turkish; they identified themselves as Muslims. This perspective helps explain Pakistan's concern for the Taliban in Afghanistan. "Pakistan, a twentieth-century invention, designates a country defined entirely by its Islamic religion. An Afghanistan likewise defined by its Islamic identity, which is what the Taliban offered, would be a natural ally of Pakistan. An Afghanistan defined by ethnic nationality, on the other hand, could be a dangerous neighbor advancing irredentist claims on the Pashto-speaking areas of northwestern Pakistan and perhaps allying itself with India."⁴⁹ Some nations are unprepared for successful democracy and separation of "church" and "state" because their people accept rule-of-religion, not secular rule-of-law enacted by elected lawmakers. By Western standards, rebuilding a nation requires capitalism and free-markets, supported by a democratic government. So until religious law is replaced by law made by law-makers, no nation can be rebuilt. 50

For most historians, Middle Eastern and Western alike, the conventional beginning of modern history in the Middle East dates from 1798. That year the French Revolution, in the person of Napoleon Bonaparte, landed in Egypt. Within a remarkably short time, the French general and his small expeditionary force were able to conquer, occupy and rule the country. Previously there had been attacks, retreats and losses of territory on Islam's remote frontiers when the Turks and the Persians faced Austria and Russia. However, this conquest by a small Western force in the heartland of Islam was a profound shock. The departure of the French was an even greater shock. They were forced to leave Egypt not by the Egyptians, nor by their suzerains, the Turks, but by a small squadron of the British Royal Navy commanded by a young

admiral named Horatio Nelson. The Muslims learned a bitter lesson: Not only could a Western power arrive, invade and rule at will - leaving the Muslims powerless against it; further, only another Western challenger could remove them. This important lesson later determined the manner by which Middle Eastern countries dealt with the Western world.⁵¹

By the early twentieth century, the entire Muslim world had been incorporated into the four European empires of Britain, France, Russia and the Netherlands. Having learned their lesson well, Middle Eastern governments and factions learned to play these mighty rivals against one another. For a time they played the game with some success. Since the Western allies (Britain and France and then the United States) effectively dominated the region, Middle Eastern resisters naturally looked to these allies' enemies for support: In the Second World War, Middle Eastern resisters turned to Germany, in the Cold War to the Soviet Union.⁵²

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States inherited the role as the world superpower. Gorbachev and the elder George Bush ended the era of Middle Eastern history that had been inaugurated by Napoleon and Nelson. At first it seemed that the era of imperial rivalry had ended with the withdrawal of both competitors. But for most Middle Easterners, this was simply a new phase in the old imperial game. Middle Easterners viewed U.S. political and economic influence as the latest in a succession of Western imperial overlords. Because most Arab leaders and people view U.S. diplomacy in the region as greatly favoring Israel, they see Israel as a surrogate for the United States in the region. Since the greatest issue in the region is the Palestinians' struggle for independence from Israeli occupation, many Arabs view the United States as a party to Palestinian oppression. But the U.S. has no rival through which they could damage or influence U.S. policies or actions. In the absence of such a patron, some Middle Easterners found themselves obliged to mobilize their own force of resistance in the only way they knew. Al Qaeda -- its leaders, its sponsors and its financiers -- is one such force.⁵³

Diplomacy cannot work in a region where the biggest sources of insecurity and tension lie not between states but within them. The biggest problems in the Middle East are the lack of education, lack of economic opportunities and lack of personal freedom. Some countries such as Qatar and Jordan are very near to achieving the necessary improvements that will lead to better political futures. Standing in the path of this change is fear – "fear of their traditions and culture unraveling; fear of mullahs' disapproval; fear of being labeled a 'bad' or 'traitorous' Muslim state; fear of becoming a target of radical groups and terrorist networks; and, most of all, fear of being attacked from all sides for being different." Such fears cannot be alleviated through nation-building. They may be alleviated somewhat, however, by a reduction of terrorists in the region. 55

The lesson to be learned from previous attempts at nation-building is not that all such efforts should be eschewed, but that they must be well-funded, long-term commitments subject to enforceable objectives. Aid must be subject to specific conditions. Indigenous leaders must be firm and focused on proper reforms. Nation-building must also be tailored to a country's current condition and needs. There is no question that rebuilding failed states is politically and economically costly and fraught with unforeseen peril. However, if the United States fails to assume a leading role in such a mission, it runs the risk of winning the military conflict but failing to secure a meaningful or lasting peace. Further, there should be no short-term expectations that nation-building will abruptly halt international terrorism.

President Bush's recently released National Security Strategy (NSS) brings renewed focus to the issue of failed states. In his letter introducing the NSS, President Bush elaborates: "The events of September 11, 2001, taught us that weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states. Poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, weak institutions and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders. The President then cited the significant threats to U.S. national security posed by failed and failing states. Such states can and often do serve as attractive safe havens and staging grounds for terrorist organizations. Failed states create environments that spur wider regional conflicts with significant economic and security costs to neighboring states. They pose serious challenges to U.S. interests in terms of refugee flows, trafficking in illicit goods, peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance – as well as in terms of lost trade and investment opportunities. The pose serious challenges to such that the province of th

A new U.S. strategy should combine improved intelligence collection with more aggressive efforts at conflict resolution and post-conflict "nation-building" in global crisis zones. Creating pockets of improved development and security will help limit the operating space of international terrorists. To this end, "the United States must go beyond focusing its foreign assistance on recipients that are high-performing or reforming states. Instead, the United States needs to devise innovative ways to assist failed and failing states through targeted development and counter-terrorism assistance as well as improved trade access to the U.S. market."⁵⁸ Thus, we are entering an era of more tailored nation-building, but this effort should not be considered as a short-term instrument for waging war on terrorism.

A Modern Grand Strategy

Issues regarding nation-building as a tool to prevent terrorism have been discussed in this paper. It is evident that one specific plan cannot satisfy all of the requirements. Viewing

poverty as the root cause of terrorism is clearly not adequate; the September 11 terrorists were educated and not poor. These terrorists were motivated by politico-religious zeal, unrelated to a particular nation or state. Nation states can serve as hosts to terrorists by invitation, as occurred with the Taliban in Afghanistan. However, most terrorist organizations exist primarily because failed and failing states cannot control areas within their borders.

The subject is best summed up in a report by the National War College, *Combating Terrorism in a Globalized World*.

Terrorism is the societal evil of our time and the global war on terrorism is our generation's great challenge. This evil must be abolished as slavery and piracy were in the 19th century and Nazism and Apartheid in the 20th century. The strategy of abolishment seeks to create a global environment hostile to all terrorist groups, whether they operate globally, regionally, or within the boundaries of a single state. As a grand strategy, it would provide overarching guidance to orchestrate all instruments of national power while coordinating the collective efforts of the international community. The proposed strategy of abolishment is similar in scope to the strategy of containment of communism because the threat of terrorism, when coupled with weapons of mass destruction, poses no less a threat to the safety and security of the free world.

The barbaric practice of terrorism – deliberately threatening or harming noncombatants to achieve political, ideological, or material gain – must be abolished through the concerted efforts of all peaceful nations. This will inevitably be an enduring endeavor that focuses on more than defeating existing terrorist organizations; it also will aim to deter future acts of terrorism and to diminish the underlying causes that enable terrorism to flourish. Though acts of terror can never be wholly prevented, terrorism must be reduced to a level that is isolated, rare and clearly irrational; that is, useless as a tool of practical policy or politics. This will ultimately allow terrorism to be combated as criminal activity within single states, not as a global war.

At the heart of this interconnected network of terror lie several terrorist groups that seek to alter the political status quo in the Middle East and some even hope to alter the global balance of power. Propagating a marginal, radical view of Islam and employing asymmetrical terrorist attacks, they are attempting to unite Muslim peoples against Western culture in general and the United States and Israel in particular. Moved by motives and using tactics resembling those of an insurgency, their goals extend beyond a single society or nation. ⁵⁹

Nation-building is difficult. It should not become a "quagmire" as long as the effort has clear goals and sufficient resources. "The goal of nation-building should not be to impose common identities on deeply divided peoples, but to organize states that can administer their territories and allow people to live together despite differences." If organizing such a state within the old internationally recognized borders does not seem possible, the international community should admit that nation-building may require the disintegration of old states and the

formation of new ones.⁶¹ Getting a country up and running requires many years and many resources, including large sums of money from the international community. The basic structure of a country is the same: political, economic, taxation and judicial systems; infrastructure; cultural, educational and medical institutions – and more. Because these are so interconnected, fitting them together into a unified, organic whole is a complex undertaking.⁶²

The Bush administration realizes that helping certain states rebuild is indeed in the U.S. strategic interest, lest these same states once again give rise to the sort of regimes that allow the al Qaedas of this world to thrive within their borders. However, true nation-building has been replaced by what has been termed "nation-building lite." This differs from both the concentrated nation-building and capital investment that took place in former Axis countries following the Second World War and that which occurred in the Third World in the post-colonial period. Instead, the current nation-building focuses on assisting failed and failing states to train new armies and police forces and rebuild their governmental and economic institutions. The world should not be deluded into thinking that it is possible to build states without coercion. Like it or not, military might is a necessary component to state-building.

To prevent terrorism by educated and financially stable people, nations must remain strong, subscribe to the rule of law and have the capability to enforce their laws. Teaching, encouraging and promoting criminal activity should be proscribed and persons exercising such activities must be stopped. Distinctions between freedom fighters and terrorists must be agreed upon, and the International community must clearly embrace those distinctions. All nations must share information and resources and otherwise work together to prevent terrorist activity.

In the final analysis, the United States has neither the time nor the resources to build a global community of nations allied against terrorism. Likewise, the United States can ill afford to promulgate expectations that its efforts to build new, more democratic nations or to improve the lives of peoples in troubled states will reduce current terrorist threats. Such expectations cannot be fulfilled. Unrealized expectations then fuel apprehensions that the war on terrorism is being lost and that the United States should abandon worthwhile efforts at nation-building.

Further, the United States, even as the world's remaining superpower, should not assume sole responsibility for nation-building. Rather, this complex, long-term endeavor should be shared by all established nations. It should as well be supported by multiple initiatives: economic, humanitarian and educations. It should not be viewed by the global community as a U.S. effort to impose its own values, to exploit valuable resources, or to buttress narrow strategic interests. That is, nation-building should not be regarded, at home or abroad, as an

instrument of U.S. power. Rather, it should be viewed as a worthy global effort, strongly supported by the U.S. to promote stability, prosperity and human welfare.

In the short term, the United States should use all available instruments – economic, diplomatic, informational and military -- to eliminate the threat of terrorism. In the long run, the United States should adopt its nation-building efforts to the dynamics of post-Cold War global complexities and realities. But the United States should not advocate nation-building as a useful instrument in the current war on terrorism.

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ENDNOTES

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 - ² Ibid.
 - ³ Ibid
 - ⁴ Ibid.
 - ⁵ Ibid.
- ⁶ Gary T. Dempsey, "Old Folly in a New Disguise, Nation Building to Combat Terrorism," <u>Policy Analysis</u>, March 21, 2002: "Nation building can take many shapes, from full-scale occupation or establishing a UN protectorate to seizing command of a capital and installing a sympathetic government or manipulating local politics by using diplomatic pressure and financial aid."
- ⁴ Derek Chollet, "Wise U.S. Would Make Nation-Building a Priority," <u>Baltimore Sun</u>, October 18, 2001, p.27A.
 - ⁸ Ibid. p. 27A.
- ⁹ Kofi Annan, "We Can Love What We Are, Without Hating What and Who We Are Not," Nobel Lecture, Oslo, Norway, December 1, 2001.
 - ¹⁰ Ibid.
- ¹¹ U.S. Department of State, <u>Patterns of Global Terrorism</u>, April 2000, http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1999report/1999index.htm (accessed December 27, 2002).
- ¹² Freedom House, "The Map of Freedom 2001," http://216.119.117.183/pdf docs/research/ freeworld/2001/map2001.pdf (accessed December 27, 2002).
- ¹³ Quoted in Peter Ford, "Injustice Seen as Fertile Soil for Terrorists," <u>Christian Science Monitor</u>, November 28, 2001, p. 7. See also Stryker McGuire, "Onward, Christian Solider," <u>Newsweek</u>, December 3, 2001, p. 44.
- ¹⁴ Jessica Stern, "Being Feared Is Not Enough to Keep Us Safe," <u>Washington Post</u>, September 15, 2001, p. A27.
- ¹⁵ Gary T. Dempsey, "Old Folly in a New Disguise, Nation Building to Combat Terrorism," Policy Analysis, March 21, 2002, p. 16.
- ¹⁶ Joseph Lieberman, "Afghanistan and the Next Steps in the War against Terrorism," Remarks at Georgetown University, <u>Federal News Service</u>, January 14, 2002; and David Lightman, "Lieberman's Foreign Policy: Propagate U.S. Values," <u>Hartford Courant</u>, January 14,

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- ¹⁷ Ted Galen Carpenter, "Avoiding Distractions," <u>National Review Online</u>, July 11, 2002, pg. 1.
- ¹⁸ Gary T. Dempsey, "Old Folly in a New Disguise, Nation Building to Combat Terrorism," Policy Analysis, March 21, 2002, pg. 4
- ¹⁹ Edward Rothstein, "Exploring the Flaws in the Notion of the 'Root Causes' of Terror," New York Times, November 17, 2001, p. A17.
- ²⁰ For this and other arguments for questioning the link between poverty and terrorism and poverty and crime, see Bruce Bartlet, "Misreading the Scorecard," <u>Washington Times</u>, October 31, 2001, p. A20.
- ²¹ Paul Collier, "Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy," <u>World Bank</u>, Washington, D.C., June 15, 2000, p. 4. See also Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," <u>World Bank</u>, Washington, D.C., October 21, 2001.
 - ²² Ibid. p. 10.
- ²³ Gary T. Dempsey, "Old Folly in a New Disguise, Nation Building to Combat Terrorism," Policy Analysis, March 21, 2002, p. 5.
- ²⁴ Ted Galen Carpenter, "Avoiding Distractions," <u>National Review Online</u>, July 11, 2002, p. 2.
 - ²⁵ Ibid. p. 2.
 - ²⁶ Ibid. p. 2.
 - ²⁷ Ibid. p. 2.
 - ²⁸ Ibid. p. 2.
- ²⁹ Marina Ottaway and Anatol Lieven, "Rebuilding Afghanistan: Fantasy versus Reality," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Policy Brief No. 11, January 2002, p. 1.
- ³⁰ "Biden Says Up to \$15 Billion Needed in Afghan Aid," <u>Reuters</u>, January 13, 2002; and Julianne Malveaux, "U.S. Needs Marshall Plan for World and at Home," <u>Detroit Free Press</u>, December 18, 2001, p. 7A.
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- 32 Ian Vasquez, "Marshall Plan, Two Views: More Harm Than Good," <u>Journal of Commerce,</u> June 4, 1999.

- ³³ Thomas W. Hertel and Will Martin, "Would Developing Countries Gain from Inclusion of Manufactures in the WTO Negotiations?" "On average, developing countries face tariffs on their manufactured exports that are nearly four times the tariffs facing exports of developed countries. Because of that inequitable pattern of protectionism, Thomas W. Hertel and Will Martin of the World Bank have concluded that developing countries would capture around 75 percent of the world-wide economic benefits from further trade liberalization in the manufacturing sector." Paper presented at the WTO/World Bank Conference on Developing Countries, Millennium Round Secretariat Meeting, September 20-21, 1999, pp. 3, 12.
- ³⁴ J. Michael Finger and Ludger Schuknecht, "Market Access Advances and Retreats: The Uruguay Round and Beyond." "In the World Trade Organization's 1995 Agreement on Textiles and Clothing the United States pledged to phase out all textile and apparel quotas over a 10-year period, but only a tiny percentage have been scrapped so far." Paper presented at the Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics, April 1999, p.22, http://www.worldbank.org/research/abcde/pdfs/finger.pdf (accessed January 18, 2002).
- Richard L. Merritt, <u>Democracy Imposed: U.S. Occupation Policy and the German Public</u>, 1945-1949 (New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1995), p. 394. According to University of Illinois political scientist Richard Merritt, by the time the war was over substantial numbers of Germans "were disgusted by what the Nazis had done and increasingly realized that Nazi actions were not accidental but were consistent with and even prefigured by Nazi ideology To some measure, then, the American Military Government enjoyed a ready market for its product." Similarly, historian John Dower explains that, in the case of Japan, the U.S. occupying force "encountered a populace sick of war, contemptuous of the militarists who had led them to disaster, and all but overwhelmed by the difficulties of their present circumstances in a ruined land." The Japanese, moreover; embraced their defeat not as an end but as the beginning of a better future. As a result, explains Dower, "The ideals of peace and democracy took root in Japan not as a borrowed ideology or imposed vision, but as a lived experience and a seized opportunity. . . .It was an extraordinary, and extraordinarily fluid, moment never seen before in history and, as it turned out, never to be repeated." John W. Dower, "Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II," New York Norton, 1999, pp. 23-24, 84.

³⁶ Ibid. p. 128.

³⁷ Ibid. p. 128.

³⁸ Stephen M. Walt, "Beyond bin Laden: Reshaping U.S. Foreign Policy," <u>International Security</u>, 26, No. 3 (Winter 2001-02): 62, 69. Even political scientist Stephen Walt contends that "the attacks of September 11 demonstrate that failed states are more than a humanitarian tragedy; they can also be a major national security problem" and that "nation building, it seems, is not such a bad idea after all."

³⁹ Josh Pollack, "Afghanistan's Missing Peace," DFI Government Practices Current Defense Analysis No. 1, January 2002, pp.2-3.

⁴⁰ Ian O. Lesser, "Countering the New Terrorism: Implications for Strategy," Ian O. Lesser et al., <u>Countering the New Terrorism</u> (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 1999), p. 134.

- ⁴¹ Tom Donnelly, "What to Do Next: How to Consolidate the Victory in Afghanistan and Beyond," Weekly Standard, November 26, 2001.
 - ⁴² Ibid.
 - ⁴³ "Two Visions of Afghanistan." editorial, Washington Post, January 20, 2002, p. B6.
- ⁴⁴ Gary T. Dempsey, "Old Folly in a New Disguise, Nation Building to Combat Terrorism," Policy Analysis, March 21, 2002, pg. 15.
 - ⁴⁵ Ibid. p. 14.
 - ⁴⁶ Ibid. p. 15.
- ⁴⁷ Steven Van Evera, "Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict," Ithaca, N.Y. Cornell University Press, 1999, pp. 14-34.
 - ⁴⁸ Henry A. Kissinger, "Phase II and Iraq," Washington Post, January 13, 2002, p. B7.
 - ⁴⁹ Bernard Lewis; "The Revolt of Islam," <u>The New Yorker</u>, November 19, 2001, pg. 1.
 - ⁵⁰ Ibid. p. 3.
 - ⁵¹ Ibid. p. 3.
 - ⁵² Ibid. p. 3.
 - ⁵³ Ibid. p. 3.
 - ⁵⁴ Thomas P. M. Barnett, "The Pentagon's New Map," <u>Esquire</u>, March 2003, p. 5.
 - ⁵⁵ Ibid. p. 5.
- ⁵⁶ Susan E. Rice, Senior Fellow, Governance Studies; "U.S. Foreign Assistance and Failed States," The Brookings Institution, November 25, 2002.
 - ⁵⁷ Ibid.
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- ⁵⁹ National War College Student Task Force on Combating Terrorist, "Combating Terrorism in a Globalized World," May 2002.
- 60 Marina Ottaway, <u>Think Again: Nation Building, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Sept/Oct. 2002.</u>
 - ⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Delia K. Cabe, "Shedding its Isolationist Stance, the United States Begins Reaching Out To Its Global Neighbors," <u>Kennedy School Bulletin</u>, <u>Nation Building</u>, Spring 2002;

⁶³ Mark Burgess, "A Natural Fear Increased With Tales: American's Aversion to Nation Building and Peacekeeping," Center for Defense Information Terrorism Project, March 8, 2002.

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