THE NATIONAL GUARD STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS BETWEEN THE CALIFORNIA NATIONAL GUARD AND THE MISSOURI NATIONAL GUARD

by

Ellen J. Reilly

December 2002

Thesis Advisor: Harold Trinkunas
Second Reader: Paul Stockton

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This thesis assesses the U.S. National Guard State Partnership Program through a review of the current and historic interaction between two of thirty-four State: the California National Guard and Ukraine partnership and the Missouri National Guard and Panama Partnership. The two sets of Partnerships are critically analyzed in light of arguments in favor of and arguments against utilizing the U.S. National Guard to conduct the State Partnership Program. Ultimately, it is determined that the National Guard is the only entity capable of bringing together all the key civilian and military players necessary to make the State Partnership Program a success. The thesis presents lessons learned from the last decade along with recommendations for future interaction and research.
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Ellen J. Reilly
Major, United States Army National Guard
B.S., Indiana University of Pennsylvania, 1990

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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December 2002

Author: Ellen J. Reilly

Approved by: Harold Trinkunas
Thesis Advisor

Paul Stockton
Second Reader

James Wirtz
Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs
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<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Active Component</td>
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<tr>
<td>AD</td>
<td>Active Duty</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFSC</td>
<td>Air Force Specialty Code</td>
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<tr>
<td>AGR</td>
<td>Active Guard and Reserve</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANG</td>
<td>Air National Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area of Responsibility</td>
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<tr>
<td>AVCRAD</td>
<td>Aviation Classification and Repair Depot</td>
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<tr>
<td>BG</td>
<td>Brigadier General</td>
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<tr>
<td>BRAC</td>
<td>Base Realignment and Closure</td>
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<td>BWG</td>
<td>Bilateral Working Group</td>
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<td>CANG</td>
<td>California National Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>C/EE</td>
<td>Central/Eastern European</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINC</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCEUR</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief, Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMOC</td>
<td>Civil-Military Operations Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPG</td>
<td>Contingency Planning Guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAO</td>
<td>Defense Attaché Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDRA</td>
<td>Drug Demand Reduction Coordinator</td>
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<tr>
<td>DLI</td>
<td>Defense Language Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOE</td>
<td>Department of Education</td>
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<td>DPS</td>
<td>Department of Public Safety</td>
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<tr>
<td>E-IMET</td>
<td>Expanded International Military Education Team</td>
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<td>EPA</td>
<td>Environmental Protection Agency</td>
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<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>European Command</td>
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<td>FAM</td>
<td>Familiarization Tour</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GoP</td>
<td>Government of Panama</td>
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<td>ICT</td>
<td>In Country Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMET</td>
<td>International Military Education and Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCTP</td>
<td>Joint Contact Team Program</td>
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<td>JSCP</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Capability Plan</td>
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<td>JSPS</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Planning System</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTG</td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>Major</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEDRETE</td>
<td>Medical Readiness and Training Exercises</td>
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<td>MET</td>
<td>Mobile Education Teams</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG</td>
<td>Major General</td>
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<tr>
<td>MLT</td>
<td>Military Liaison Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>Minister/Ministry of Defense</td>
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<td>MOS</td>
<td>Military Occupational Specialty</td>
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<td>MP</td>
<td>Military Police</td>
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<td>MPA</td>
<td>Military Personnel Authorization</td>
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<td>MSCA</td>
<td>Military Support to Civil Authorities</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAA</td>
<td>North Atlantic Assembly</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NG</td>
<td>National Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGAUS</td>
<td>National Guard Association of the United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGB-IA</td>
<td>National Guard Bureau-International Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NICI</td>
<td>National Interagency Civil-Military Institute (formerly named the National Interagency Counterdrug Institute)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIS</td>
<td>Newly Independent States</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODC</td>
<td>Office of Defense Cooperation</td>
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<td>ODT</td>
<td>Overseas Deployment for Training</td>
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<td>OEF</td>
<td>Operation Enduring Freedom</td>
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<tr>
<td>O&amp;M</td>
<td>Operations and Maintenance</td>
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<td>OPTEMPO</td>
<td>Operational Tempo</td>
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<tr>
<td>P&amp;A</td>
<td>Personnel and Allowances</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCS</td>
<td>Permanent Change of Station</td>
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<tr>
<td>PFP</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace</td>
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<td>PN</td>
<td>Partner Nation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNP</td>
<td>Panamanian National Police</td>
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<td>POC</td>
<td>Point of Contact</td>
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<td>PPP</td>
<td>Purchasing Power Parity</td>
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<td>PVO</td>
<td>Private Voluntary Organization</td>
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<td>RC</td>
<td>Reserve Component</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROA</td>
<td>Reserve Officers Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>RTI</td>
<td>Regional Training Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAD</td>
<td>State Active Duty</td>
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<td>SAO</td>
<td>Security Assistance Office</td>
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<td>SMEE</td>
<td>Subject Matter Expert Exchange</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAN</td>
<td>Servicio Aero Nacional (the Panamanian National Air Service)</td>
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<td>SAR</td>
<td>Search and Rescue</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPP</td>
<td>State Partnership Program</td>
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<td>SRP</td>
<td>Soldier Readiness Processing</td>
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<td>TAG</td>
<td>The Adjutant General</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCA</td>
<td>Traditional CINC Activities</td>
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<td>TCT</td>
<td>Traveling Contact Team</td>
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<td>TDY</td>
<td>Temporary Duty</td>
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<tr>
<td>TTAD</td>
<td>Temporary Tours of Active Duty</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>USANG</td>
<td>United States Air National Guard</td>
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<td>USARNG</td>
<td>United States Army National Guard</td>
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<td>USNG</td>
<td>United States National Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>WIF</td>
<td>Warsaw Initiative Funds</td>
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<td>WP</td>
<td>Warsaw Pact</td>
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I hope this document provides information that will contribute to the betterment of the State Partnership Program.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

The United States State Partnership (SPP) program brings together the United States National Guards with emerging democratic nations that request military-to-military support. When initiating a SPP, these emerging democracies or partner nations (PN) request National Guard support for purposes such as gaining assistance in reorganizing defense forces, creating reserve forces, reinforcing military support to civil authorities (MSCA) and building positive, long-term relationships with the United States. This program does not train the PN in lethal war fighting skills; in fact U.S. law prohibits this, but it does assist in the stabilization of institutions that support democracy, human rights and an open market.

The SPP was initiated at a time when U.S. military expenditures were diminishing and the Warsaw Pact was crumbling. There were grave U.S. policy and strategy concerns regarding instability in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The newly independent states (NIS) -- nations declaring their independence from the former Soviet Union -- had in the past, served as a buffer zone for the defense of Russia’s borders. These borders were now exposed to unstable nations that were more likely to present defense, socioeconomic and environmental problems for Russia, Europe and potentially, the world.

The U.S. and NATO recognized a need to stabilize the NIS and contemplated military involvement in these states, but acknowledged that U.S. active force movement in the area could be perceived by Russia as military posturing. Concurrently, Russian leaders indicated the possibility of downsizing the active Russian military and building a Russian National Guard. Therefore, leaders from the U.S. planned to utilize the U.S. National Guard to serve as consultants to the Russian leadership as it was downsizing the active forces. The leaders also prepared to assist the NIS in stabilizing institutions within their governments should they be asked to do so.

The National Guard was ultimately used in the NIS, but not Russia. The Guard was less threatening to Russia than U.S. active forces because Guard engagements were
less frequent, lasted for a shorter duration and involved less personnel and equipment on
the ground in the NIS. Additionally, the service members involved were primarily
citizens who were also soldiers. Since its inception in Eastern Europe and Central Asia in
the early 1990’s, the SPP has expanded into South and Central America and more
recently, the Pacific Rim.

B. THE PROBLEM

There is very little written about the SPP after one decade in existence and over
thirty partnership relationships in two hemispheres. The documents that do exist,
question the relevance and validity of National Guard involvement in the program. But
the growth in the number of Programs, the support of Congress, the theater commanders
in chief (CINC) — or, as they are now called, the Combatant Commanders — the
continued engagement activities and additional requests for partnerships from nations
around the world, indicate that the program is worthwhile and relevant. Therefore, this
document will not consider the relevance of the National Guard conducting the program.
It will however, demonstrate the utility of the Guard’s involvement by analyzing
arguments for and against Guard participation in the SPP and whether the Guard is the
appropriate entity to do the job.

Also, there is no comprehensive document explaining the program, or what has
been learned about it in the last decade. There are few, if any, collated measures of
effectiveness and there is no road map for developing a partnership relationship. No
process exists for expanding engagement activities past the event stage and there is no
process to determine an end state for National Guard involvement in the SPP.

C. ARGUMENT

Based on the aforementioned problems, I will show that the SPP is a beneficial
and foreword-looking program, which is advantageous to the PNs, the United States, the
U.S. active military forces, and the U.S. National Guard. I will show that the California

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1 For example, see Kevin Ellsworth. “SPP: Does The Partnership Between the CANG and Ukraine
Support the U.S. Engagement Strategy and Is It a Relevant Mission?” U.S. Army War College: Carlisle

2 The Secretary of Defense ordered a change in title from “CINC” to “Combatant Commander” in
2002.

3 The U.S. NGB International Affairs office does have standing operating procedures for conducting

2
National Guard (CANG) and Ukraine partnership should be used as a model for developing partnerships. This is due to the interest and participation of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD), agencies and educational institutions from state of California and especially the complete participation of the California National Guard, both the Army and the Air Guard.

However, standardization, training, measures of effectiveness, exit strategies and increased reciprocity from the PN must be injected into the program for it to increase success and remain relevant. Also, additional untapped resources from business, private voluntary organizations (PVO) and U.S. local, state and federal government should be integrated into the program.

Even though the National Guard is not the lead player in the Program (the theater Combatant Commanders are the lead players), it is the only U.S. state or federal entity distinctively cut out to accomplish the SPP mission because it has the ability to collaborate with a wealth of resources from within the civilian community and from within the Guard’s forces. Often the two overlap. The Guard practices MSCA regularly and has habitual relationships with the state governments. The Guard is demonstrating the cost savings of a reserve force and can parlay that model to the developing democracies it supports. Finally, Guard members understand the military angle of the relationship to include the chain of command, the vernacular, the funding requirements and restrictions, and military standards. This is probably the most significant area in which civilian agencies fall short. However, the U.S. law (with regard to restricting training in lethal skills) does not have to be a limiting factor on the expansion of the program because it can extend into the civilian arena; it does not and cannot remain solely in the military arena. This is where the Guard has the advantage over the active forces.

Ultimately, this paper will show that the US National Guard State Partnerships should enhance and increase cooperation with the state governments, private voluntary organizations (PVO), and other organizations to improve the National Guard’s ability to
assist partner countries in achieving the two objectives set forth by the NGB International Affairs office (NGB-IA).\footnote{4 See Appendix B.}

One unexpected finding is that the Missouri National Guard (MONG) and Panama partnership should be discontinued. The MONG has many resources to offer Panama, but any military presence is unwelcome in the country. The government of Panama (GoP) demonstrates a lackluster interest in the program and there is limited reciprocity toward the state of Missouri. The MONG/Panama SPP became hopelessly intertwined with Humanitarian Assistance (HA) and infrastructure building programs in Panama, in which the Panamanian government is very interested. While the HA programs benefit the citizens of Panama, little benefit occurs toward improving bilateral relations between the two governments. I found the SPP to be based on U.S. interests alone. The MONG should be given the opportunity to partner with a nation that truly desires its involvement.

D. THESIS RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This thesis will trace the evolution of the SPP over the last decade. The operations of the program will be analyzed in-depth and the question “What is the utility of the National Guard’s involvement in SPP?” will be answered by carefully scrutinizing the benefits and detriments of U.S. National Guard contribution to the program.

The question “What are some lessons learned after the program’s first decade?” will be answered in a comparative case study between the CANG partnership with Ukraine, and, the MONG partnership with Panama. Information and concepts described in these case studies will be supplemented with information from other partnerships as necessary.

E. THESIS IMPORTANCE

It is essential to analyze the development of the SPP, and to compare two partnerships to cull “lessons learned” from their activities. This is true for three reasons. First, it is imperative to establish a model partnership as a baseline for comparison. Second, lessons learned will prevent mistakes in emerging and existing partnerships. Third, it is necessary to present ideas for future engagement methods for partnerships that are yet to be implemented and to provide ideas for those currently engaged.
F. METHODS AND THESIS STRUCTURE

This thesis is organized into five chapters. Chapter I establishes the problems, the research questions to be answered, the importance of the thesis, the methods for research and a road map of the thesis.

In Chapter II, two partnerships were selected to compare and contrast their goals, methods, engagement procedures and practices. They include the California National Guard and Ukraine partnership; and, the Missouri National Guard and Panama partnership. These Partnerships were selected for comparison for five reasons. The first is that Ukraine falls in the United States Military European Command (USEUCOM) and in the Eastern hemisphere, whereas, Panama lies in the United States Military Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and the Western hemisphere. This allows for comparing operational practices of the two partnerships and their relationships with the different U.S. military commands. Secondly, these partnerships offer the opportunity to determine the impact that state National Guards with significant differences in size and resources can have on the relationship with the PN. California has 20,893 Army and Air National Guard personnel combined⁵, whereas the MONG has 10,942 Army and Air National Guard personnel combined⁶.

The third reason for comparing the two partnerships is that one program started as a result of the end of the Cold War (Ukraine), and the other occurred as awareness of the Partnership Program increased (Panama). I identify the variations in the development of each program and how those differences will affect the success of future programs. The fourth reason for the case studies is to determine whether the culture and history of both the state and the PN impact the operation of the Program. Finally, I identify the lessons learned from each program. Nascent partnerships can review the lessons to better plan future operations based on previously successful partnership activities and to avoid pitfalls experienced in the past.


An initial range of variables was developed to compare the two partnerships, but then after initial research, trimmed to a select few variables. The remaining variables were selected due to their impact on the success, and to highlight the differences between the partnerships. They include: the goals and engagement activities of the programs, the PN’s culture and history, whether the programs had fulltime coordinators in the U.S. and whether there is a military liaison team (MLT)/country team in the PNs. Some variables excluded from this paper for example, include the level of civilian experience of the U.S. Partnership Coordinators, the number of years the program has been in existence, and whether the Air National Guard of each state provides military transportation for engagement activities.

Program goals and engagements are reviewed for two reasons. The first is to identify differing directions in which the Program Coordinators are guiding their partnerships and to determine whether one direction is better than the other. The second reason is to determine whether the program is simply “thrown together” or if the Coordinators have strategic goals and coordinated plans for achieving these goals.

Throughout the research, the culture and history of the PNs surfaced as key factors to the success of the partnership and were therefore included as significant variables. This was especially true for Panama.

The military liaison team (MLT) concept surfaced as a key variable and is therefore presented as such. While U.S. European Command initiated this concept, it is present within the realm of other Combatant Commanders, but to varying degrees and by different names.

It would seem apparent that if a Partnership has a fulltime Coordinator it is bound to be more successful, but this is not necessarily the case. Both programs in this paper have fulltime Coordinators, yet one is more successful than the other. I break down the reasons for the differences in levels of success for the purpose of assisting future Partnerships in avoiding pitfalls.

The primary resources utilized for documenting the experiences of each Partnership were the Program Coordinators, both past and present. However, newspaper
articles, journal articles, briefings, online resources and books were consulted to round out the information provided during the interviews.

Chapter III provides the brief background of the program. It also contains and describes arguments supporting of the continuation of the SPP by the U.S. National Guard. Several sources were used for these purposes. To identify the arguments, I relied heavily on interviews with subject matter experts and primary documentation, such as news articles, memoranda and information papers.

Chapter IV analyzes the case studies alongside arguments against the program. Experiences and information from the case studies support these arguments as well.

Chapter V concludes the information presented in the thesis, sets forth recommendations for program improvement, recommendations for future research and presents two models. The first model shows how a program can develop along a continuum from the initial steps to a healthy program and recommends a potential end-state for the finished partnership. The second model recommends a potential career path for personnel in the SPP, which is essential to gaining and keeping a professional workforce and to maintaining strong, positive relationships with PN personnel.

Finally, several appendices are included to provide in-depth information to the reader looking for more about the history of the SPP and other similar global and U.S. programs impacting the SPP.

\footnote{For an in-depth review of the origins and background of the program, see Appendix A.}
II. THE CASE STUDIES

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter will compare the development of the California/Ukraine partnership to the development of the Missouri/Panama partnership. I will examine both partnerships to ascertain their level of progress in the program. Many of the partnerships in the SPP are at decidedly different levels of maturity, and there are numerous reasons for the varied levels, but the SPP is at a turning point. New paths and/or an end-state must be carved for fully developed partnerships. In addition, an end-state should be determined for partnerships that are simply unsuccessful. However, criterion to establish whether a partnership is unsuccessful has yet to be determined. By reviewing the maturation of the two programs, I intend to highlight lessons learned from their experiences for the purpose of incorporating those lessons into new engagement tools and use the lessons learned to decide criteria for success. Also, pitfalls will be identified to prevent mistakes in the less developed or newly forming partnerships.

The backgrounds of the two state programs will be reviewed along with the nature of their involvement with their PNs. For this paper, current events are those from the year 2000 to the present. Historic events are those that occurred prior to the year 2000. I examine both current and historic events to measure the development of the partnerships. Also, I will look at the situation in both countries and show that many variables impact the level of success of the programs. For example, resources available to each state National Guard, cultural norms, politics, the support of both the theater Combatant Commanders and the Adjutant General’s (TAG), the backing of both the federal and state government, and National Guard support have a significant impact on the success of the partnership.8

Examples from each partnership will be used in both Chapter III and Chapter IV to refute or confirm both arguments for and against National Guard participation in the SPP and to demonstrate the utility of the NG to the Program. Ultimately, I will show that the California/Ukraine SPP should be used as a model for emerging SPPs; and that the

8 The Adjutant General (TAG) is the most senior ranking military officer in the state National Guard, and is typically of two-star rank.
Missouri/Panama SPP should be discontinued. In the case of California, I show how the Partnership grew from solely familiarization activities to a program that now includes the participation of California and Ukrainian state agencies and educational institutions in events. In the case of the Missouri/Panama partnership, I show that the SPP was initiated from a humanitarian assistance (HA) standpoint, which now it is not sustaining and that the HA and SPP should be kept carefully separated. Also, the Missouri/Panama partnership does not enjoy the support of the state or local government in either country.

B. THE CALIFORNIA NATIONAL GUARD/UKRAINE SPP

1. Introduction

The U.S. Acting Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense officially sanctioned the creation of the California/Ukraine partnership in August 1993. The two were originally partnered because first and foremost, Ukraine requested the partnership from National Guard Bureau (NGB). Secondly, the CANG Adjutant General requested the partnership. NGB selected the CANG for other reasons as well; the leadership was prepared to begin the partnership immediately and there is a large population of Ukrainian immigrants in California. The partnership has matured tremendously over the last decade and interaction between the two countries now covers a wide range of activities from medical to emergency response operations. However, the commonality of military downsizing in each country solidified the relationship; California and Ukraine are now exploring several new initiatives that serve as exciting developments for the partnership. These initiatives will be examined in-depth in the following pages.

2. Program Goals

The program currently has three goals that the Program Coordinator, Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Mitch Brown, refers to as “focus areas”.

- emergency response activities, border guard initiatives, and environmental security. The first goal, emergency response, engages both civil and military agencies to coordinate efforts and share resources when reacting to natural disasters or other emergencies. The second goal, the border guards’ initiative, encourages cooperation, information sharing

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10 The focus areas developed by LTC Brown support portions of eight major focus areas outlined in the “US-Ukraine Joint Working Document on Bilateral Defense and Military Cooperation” developed by three Department of Defense (DOD) interagency working groups.
and strategizing between Ukraine and its bordering nations. The third goal, environmental security, involves interagency solutions to environmental hazards and cleanup. The CANG has much experience and institutional knowledge in this area, therefore National Guard Bureau International Affairs (NGB-IA) and the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Environmental Security sought out the CANG involvement in the initiative.\textsuperscript{11} The involvement of the CANG and various other institutions will be explored in-depth in the Current Activities section of this thesis.

3. Ukraine

Ukraine celebrated its tenth year of independence from the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) on August 24\textsuperscript{th} 2001. At the time of independence, the Ukrainian armed forces had approximately 1.5 million military personnel; today, that number has dropped significantly to approximately 390,823.\textsuperscript{12} Also at that time, the country had 700 military bases. Even though every branch of the Ukrainian armed forces continues to lose both volume and structure, the cutbacks emerged as a common thread between the partners and serves to draw them closer. The reorganization presents challenges to engagements however, because key leaders in the Ukrainian military rotate to other leadership positions and it is difficult to both analyze the dynamic Ukrainian force for the purpose of developing meaningful engagement activities, and to maintain communication with key players who will enact the results.

There are significant socioeconomic implications as a result of the military downsizing. As of 1999 there were approximately 100,000 military families “stranded” on closed bases. Ukrainian military conscripts were able to simply return home, but many military officers and their families remained in apartments provided by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD). These apartments can only be described as “ramshackle” with intermittent utilities and as of 2001, the number of military families residing on these bases was down to approximately 54,000.\textsuperscript{13} This is creating a huge

socioeconomic strain on Ukraine due to the remoteness of base locations, compounded by limited or no public transportation, which means little opportunity for re-training for the officers or their family members. Additionally, many of the bases are severely polluted with heavy metals, petrol chemicals and even some radiological contamination.

The California Guard is very familiar with base realignments and closures (BRAC). Since 1988, 29 military bases were closed in California. California was initially impacted economically as a result of the closures due to reduced spending by DoD personnel, and now it is affected by the necessity of environmental cleanup which carries with it legal, socioeconomic, political, and environmental difficulties.

a. The Military Liaison Team (MLT) in Ukraine

The MLT in Ukraine was established on October 1, 1998. Currently, the composition of the team includes the Chief who is an active duty army colonel, a Deputy Chief who is a National Guard LTC from the CANG, an Operations Officer, and two active component Air Force senior NCOs. (LTC Brown served as the first Deputy Chief when the MLT was initiated.) There is some flexibility in the composition of the team, however maintaining a NG liaison on the MLT ensures a method for the NG to stay abreast of leadership changes in the PN.

The MLT communicates regularly with the Ukrainian Minister of Defense (MoD). In fact, the MoD liked the idea of a U.S. MLT so much that he reciprocated by matching the military liaison team person-to-person with Ukrainian officers. Now the two teams work side by side to enhance the military-to-military and military-to-civilian contact between the U.S. and Ukraine.

4. Historic Interaction

The partnership developed slowly and according to LTC Brown, in the early years delegations attending familiarization tours were initially aloof. Many Americans were mistrustful of Ukrainians, just as the Ukrainians were wary of Americans. The Ukrainians believed the Americans were trying to uncover the defense secrets of Ukraine, and the Americans could not see past the fact that Ukrainians were enemies for so long. It took many meetings before anything productive could occur between the two sides.

LTC Brown refers to these initial gatherings as “grip and grin” meetings. In other words, very little substance came from the meetings, but both sides were trying to build personal relationships, trust and confidence.

The early partnership events consisted of familiarization tours, subject matter expert exchanges (SMEE), traveling contact teams (TCT) and senior leader visits. The familiarization tours included Ukrainian military and civic leaders visiting California to observe interaction between their American counterparts, and Americans doing the same in Ukraine. SMEEs consisted of four to six subject matter experts discussing methods or working side-by-side with their counterparts in their area of expertise. For example, in September 1993 the CANG sent a medical team to Ukraine that treated over 800 people with optometry, pediatric dentistry and pediatric oncology needs. Senior leader visits included the highest-ranking military or civilian leaders from both partners visiting the other nation to build relationships, gather ideas and develop plans. For example in October 1993, Brigadier General Zysk then the Deputy Adjutant General of the CANG, accompanied the U.S. Secretary of Defense to Kiev for a Bilateral Working Group (BWG) meeting on Defense and Military Cooperation. He “...discussed roles and missions of the United States National Guard and the possible partnership between the Ministry of Defense-Ukraine, and the California National Guard”.

The Partnership has grown so tremendously and been so successful that California and Ukraine participated in PEACESHIELD ’99 “...the largest peacekeeping exercise in Europe”.

Like the familiarization visits and SMEEs, the senior leader visits continue to this day. For example, MG Monroe flew to the Ukrainian embassy in Washington, D.C. on August 24th, 2001 to celebrate the tenth year of independence from the former Soviet

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16 Gosnell, P. Wayne, Colonel, Memorandum for Colonel Breitenbach, Director, International Programs, OSD/RA, January 28, 1994, DoD Coordinating Group on Russia, Ukraine and the NIS, (n.p.) 1993

17 Ibid.

Union. According to LTC Brown, the Ukrainians were very surprised and touched by MG Monroe’s genuine interest in their society.

5. Current Activities

Ukraine and the CANG have jointly conducted over 120 events since the inception of their partnership. Today the California National Guard units are very active in proposing engagement activities in which they can participate while utilizing their core military capabilities and assets. Both the Army and Air National Guard are heavily involved independently, but they also conduct joint operations with Ukraine. These units primarily interface with the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) however; they also work with the Ministry of Emergency Situations, the Ministry of Health and the Border Guards. In America, the CANG is coordinating with many California agencies and institutions such as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the California Office of Trade, Technology and Commerce and the University of California. The activities of the aforementioned agencies, both Ukrainian and American, are centered on the three focus areas outlined by LTC Brown and are highlighted below. Due to the number of activities conducted by the CANG, I will only review the programs that are unique and involve the largest number of agencies.

a. Emergency Response

Both the CANG and Ukraine participate in comprehensive emergency management missions in Ukraine and the United States called “Rough and Ready” exercises, generally on an annual basis. The partners reacted to a flood scenario in May of 2000 and contributed key personnel and resources to exercise and de-conflict emergency management operations, both civilian and military. Ukraine provided representatives from the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Emergency Situations and the Ministry of Health. The National Guard represented California. While the exercise focused on providing assistance to flood victims, it also subtly demonstrated and exercised civilian control of the military.

CANG conducts other emergency response activities similar to the “Rough and Ready” exercises as well, but on a lesser scale. In November 2001, members

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of the Ministry of Emergency Situations visited San Luis Obispo to experience a nuclear power plant disaster drill, and later in June 2002, four representatives from the same Ministry visited California to familiarize themselves with the procedures in a civil-military operations center (CMOC). Later this year the CANG will support the Ukrainian MLT with subject matter experts for responding to a chemical attack scenario in Ukraine.

b. Environmental Security

As stated earlier, both Ukraine and California have environmental problems stemming from the previous operations conducted on now closed military bases. Recall that Ukraine had 700 military bases, but it is approximately only the size of Texas. There is a tremendous amount of military equipment in the country. LTC Brown’s plan to address some of the issues for both partners will successfully underscore the word partnership contained in the title State Partnership Program if he can garner enough support for his proposed activities, and the plan will reap benefits for both nations. For example, there is a strategic bomber base south of Kiev that has over 1 million metric tons of aviation fuel contaminating a nearby aquifer. According to LTC Brown, the California EPA believes the fuel can be recovered, reprocessed and sold. The profits from the sale of the fuel will pay for the cleanup.

California has a similar problem on in the old Fort Ord area in Seaside, California. A local university purchased the land where the Fort used to be, but does not want to incur the cost of cleaning up environmental hazards remaining on the land, to include environmentally contaminated facilities and unexploded ordnance. LTC Brown estimates there are approximately 100,000 wooden structures contaminated with lead-based paint on all the closed bases and posts in California. In addition to the hazardous lead paint, when the structures were built initially, the wood was primed with gasoline so it would absorb the paint more evenly. Now, it is estimated that it will cost approximately fifty thousand dollars for the removal of each building. The estimates address the cost of permits, labor to deconstruct the building, and the disposal of the contaminated wood.

LTC Brown’s idea is to bring a crew of Ukrainian soldiers to the U.S. to deconstruct and properly seal the structures on the property against the environmental hazard. The idea holds many benefits for both the Ukrainian soldiers and the Ukrainian
MoD. The soldiers will have English as a second language (ESL) classes in the morning and work on the structures in the afternoon. They will gain valuable skills in environmental cleanup when they are treating the housing materials against contaminates, which can later be put to use on military bases in Ukraine and throughout eastern Europe. The soldiers will also have an opportunity to experience a market economy and a democracy first-hand in the U.S. After deconstructing and cleaning up the houses, they will then package and ship the materials to Ukraine. The Ukrainian MoD can benefit by reconstructing the houses to include fixtures, in areas closer to public transportation and educational or skill-center facilities so the military officers and their families can re-train in new occupations and transition to civilian life.

The benefits for California include a less expensive cleanup (this is also a benefit for the DoD since it is obligated by law to absorb much of the cost of the cleanup) and quicker redevelopment of the post, which is more beneficial than the property sitting in limbo. Also, the project will improve civil-military relations in the area because many U.S. civilians are angry with the U.S. military for polluting the land. The CANG and various California agencies will have an opportunity to enhance the partnership with Ukraine.

Obviously, there are many stumbling blocks in the plan. They include: the perceptions, politics, legal issues, transportation of the materials, and funding. Both sides must deal with the perception that Ukraine is receiving contaminated second hand goods that the U.S. is throwing away. Also, the CANG must ensure that the program falls within the objectives of the U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine, the State Department, the EUCOM Combatant Commander and numerous other key players. Legal issues such as environmental law, and international law must be considered. How will the materials be transported assuming all the aforementioned hurdles are overcome? Fortunately, the Antonov, the cargo plane with the greatest cargo carrying capacity, is manufactured in Kiev. There’s a good possibility the Ukrainian MoD could dispatch an Antonov to retrieve some of the materials. Finally, where will the CANG and/or the Ukrainian MoD

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20 Products on the market allow for painting over the lead-based paint on wood. These products will permanently seal the contaminants to the wood. The only time the wood is hazardous thereafter is upon disposal.
find the funds to compensate, transport, and feed the Ukrainian soldiers while they work on the project? LTC Brown believes some funding can be gained from international foundations, the DoD, USAID and grants. The funding issue has yet to be explored, however, the CANG and the Ukrainian MoD are already participating in bilateral talks to explore this event. Additionally, the CANG Environmental Officer believes he can garner corporate sponsorship to purchase environmental equipment for Ukraine. In the meantime, Ukraine and California continue to conduct events toward attaining better environmental stewardship in each location.

c. **Border Security**

The Ukrainian Border Guard, a paramilitary force, secures Ukraine’s land and coastal borders. The CANG jointly hosted with Joint Task Force 6 (JTF-6), a Ukrainian Border Guard delegation tour of the U.S./Mexican border in southern California.\(^{21}\) Later in the same year, the CANG also hosted a familiarization tour that dealt with interagency operations and border security. They had yet another traveling contact team border event scheduled to take place in Ukraine in August 2002, but that event did not occur. It is the nature of this program that events may be postponed due to real life missions or other influences.

EUCOM requested that the CANG plan and facilitate two conferences in 2002 amongst the GUUAM nations and Russia for the purpose of identifying common problems and developing future strategies for enhancing border security.\(^{22}\) The border security conferences will also identify ways to adequately seal the borders of the GUUAM nations and Russia against the trafficking of people, nuclear, chemical or biological armaments, and drugs. The hope is that by bringing security planners from the different nations together and improving border security that stabilization in the region will occur. Thus far the conferences requested by EUCOM are still pending. These trafficking problems are not uncommon in the U.S. and California and the United States can benefit from the outcomes of the meetings.

\(^{21}\) JTF-6 is the Department of Defense active component counter drug element.

\(^{22}\) The GUUAM nations include The Republic of Georgia, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova.
LTC Brown has approximately 17 events scheduled for this fiscal year. There are events in addition to the aforementioned, that include familiarization tours or traveling contact teams in military policing, search and rescue, field artillery, engineering, air defense and senior leader exchanges.

6. Non-Military Participants

The State of California has ten overseas offices for developing international business and LTC Brown is working with them to add an eleventh office in Kiev. The primary purpose of these offices is to find new markets for California products and business opportunities for California businesses. LTC Brown met with the California state employees in the Frankfurt, Germany office in May of 2001 and met with members of the California Office of Trade, Commerce and Technology to develop interest at the highest level.

In addition, the California Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is interested in getting involved in the SPP by contributing the time of its technical experts especially in the Department of Toxic Substance Control and by staffing one additional position to work on the Ukrainian project fulltime. Also the California EPA expressed a willingness to host a Ukrainian “shadow” position.

7. Training

When asked whether the SPP takes away from the military occupational specialty (MOS) or air force specialty code (AFSC) skills and/or training of the soldier or airmen, LTC Brown responded with a firm “no”. The National Guard must use the best-qualified and most diplomatic soldiers and airmen for SPP exchanges for two reasons. First, the military members conduct familiarization briefings with the PN personnel. In order to effectively accomplish the brief the member must speak with authority and completely know the military skill. In addition, the soldier or airman must prepare for the brief well in advance and make sure all the nuances of the subject are completely covered in the briefing. This may involve referring to military manuals to both perfect the brief and to ensure currency on the latest doctrine, which serves as refresher training for the briefer. Second, the person must be very diplomatic when briefing PN personnel. This skill is critical when working on a joint task force during a deployment. The soldier/airman must be very careful not to commit to requests from PN personnel, alienate the audience
and to avoid any cultural faux pas. Also, the briefer must temper his speech and presentation methods to accommodate a translator, which normally doubles the amount of time required to present the information. This assists the soldier or airman in building his public speaking and diplomacy skills. On occasion, personnel attend an Instructor Training Class (ITC) to enhance the presenter’s presentation skills. This is positive for two reasons, first it enhances the presentation of the topic, and second, the presenter receives an additional identifier on his military occupational specialty (MOS) code, which is beneficial to the soldier for promotion points. Finally, the CANG members get to observe the Ukrainian military and their methods. This may teach the soldier/airman new or economical ideas for accomplishing his mission.

8. Conclusion

The California/Ukraine SPP should be used as the model partnership for all SPPs for many reasons. First, the Partnership has support from the PN government and various agencies within the PN to include the MoD, the Border Guards, and the Emergency Situations Agency. Second, the SPP has support from the government of California and that support trickles down into the various agencies such as the Department of Trade, Commerce and Technology or the EPA. Third, the CANG/Ukraine SPP has support from the California National Guard including the most senior ranking officer in the CANG, the Adjutant General. He funds the fulltime Coordinator position and participates in the activities organized by the Coordinator. The support spans all levels of the California National Guard, too. Units volunteer to utilize their core competencies and capabilities to support SPP activities. Fourth, California educational institutions support the CANG/Ukraine SPP. Fifth, the CANG/Ukraine SPP discovered and reacted to a common problem that serves to make their Partnership unique and they are working toward a common solution for that problem. This solution will assist both countries in attaining the objectives established by NGB-IA. Finally, the Partnership continues to develop more activities and exercises to incorporate the resources and contributions of various agencies and institutions in both countries.
C. THE MISSOURI NATIONAL GUARD/PANAMA SPP

1. Introduction

The request for a Missouri National Guard and Panama Partnership emerged in a non-traditional way and the partnership continues in this original manner to this day. The process for initiating a partnership relationship with a U.S. state includes the PN formally requesting that partnership through the U.S. ambassador located in the PN. The U.S. ambassador then reviews and approves the request and forwards it to the Combatant Commander, who includes the partnership in his country plan and forwards the request through the Department of Defense (DoD) to NGB. 23

The Missouri National Guard (MONG) has conducted numerous humanitarian assistance (HA) and infrastructure building engagements in Central and South America, including Panama, since 1985. These engagements caused the MONG and Panama to already have an unofficial partnership when the Governor of Missouri, the late Mel Carnahan, visited Panama in 1995. He was visiting Panama with a Missouri employer support group. These visits allow employers to see MONG members performing their NG duties in an actual work environment. The purpose is to assist the employers in gaining a better understanding of the tasks their employees conduct on weekends and during annual training exercises. Shortly after the visit, Governor Carnahan tasked the MONG Adjutant General, then MG Raymond Pendergrass, to develop a plan for a SPP with Panama. MG Pendergrass formally requested the Partnership through NGB-IA and also proposed the Partnership to the SOUTHCOM Commander, General Barry McCaffrey.

While the U.S. officially sanctioned the Partnership in 1996, it emerged non-traditionally due to the request not being made by the government of Panama (GoP). In addition, retired Colonel Ken Gonzalez, Missouri’s former SPP Coordinator, stated that “...the State Department (DoS) and the Defense Department (DoD) felt there was some need for continued contact” in Panama. 24

24 Gonzalez, Ken, Colonel (R), Former State Partnership Program Coordinator Missouri National Guard. Telephone Interview by Author, 11 December 2001.
The second non-traditional issue in the partnership is that SPPs are at least initially, about military-to-military contact, which should later segue into civil/military to civil/military contact. However, since the GoP has no military, the partnership is strictly a military-to-civilian contact. The non-traditional approach to the emergence of the program reflects how it continues today.

2. Program Goals

Major (MAJ) Regina Kilmer is currently the SPP Coordinator for the MONG. She identified three goals for the Missouri/Panama partnership. They include:

- Continuing participation in infrastructure-building exercises in Panama
- Further developing familiarization tours, traveling contact team missions and state support for the SPP
- Building a strategic plan for a more meaningful and productive partnership

3. Panama

The Government of Panama (GoP) eliminated all military forces on February 10, 1990, but provided for security forces in October 1994 by establishing the Panamanian Public Forces (PPF), which includes the Panamanian National Police (PNP), the National Maritime Service (NMS) and the National Air Service (SAN).25 Panama has no Defense Ministry, since it has no military, so the PPF, PNP, NMS each work for the Ministry of Government and Justice. The MONG SPP Coordinator works with all of the above agencies, in addition to the System for Civil National Protection or SINAPROC. The function of SINAPROC is equivalent to that of the State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) in the United States.

The GoP wants no military uniforms or equipment in Panama, whether U.S. or Panamanian. This inhibits the ability of the American military to conduct events, or tactical engagement activities in the country, other than orientation visits in civilian attire. In addition, the GoP is very wary of U.S. military involvement in the country. The GoP is so opposed to anything military that when a Minnesota National Guard aircraft, full of humanitarian and school supplies, requested to land in Panama to distribute the goods,

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the GoP denied the request unless the pilots and crew wore civilian clothes. These personnel must wear uniforms in the interest of safety and to adhere to U.S. military regulations, therefore the flight was cancelled. In another instance, the GoP cancelled three medical readiness and training exercises (MEDRETEs) for the same reason. This aversion to anything military has thus far, prevented the U.S. from obtaining a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with Panama. And, according to the U.S. State Department, “negotiating a SOFA begins with the assumption that the presence of military forces is in the interests of the host government as well as the U.S. government.” Therefore, one infers that a U.S. military presence is not ‘in the interests’ of the GoP. In the interim, the U.S. military depends on the exchange of diplomatic notes to protect the rights of U.S. military personnel when in Panama. Diplomatic notes are one-time agreements similar to a SOFA and they must be generated each time there is an event involving U.S. military personnel in Panama.

There is veiled hostility toward U.S. citizens in Panama from past experiences with the U.S. The reasons for the hostility are numerous. First, the U.S. invaded Panama in 1989 to expel the Panamanian president, Manuel Noriega. He is currently serving a 40-year sentence in the U.S. on drug charges. Second, in 1999, the U.S. and Panama formalized the return of the Panama Canal to the nation, but the U.S. still retains rights of passage through the canal. Accompanying that agreement were several measures to significantly reduce U.S. presence in Panama. For example, the U.S. turned over all its military bases and schools to the Panamanian government. However, the GoP is concerned that the U.S. wants its military bases back. Third, there is significant apprehension over the cleanup of those bases, especially unexploded ordnance left behind by the U.S. military. Fourth, paternity issues cause another source of tension between the

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26 The Minnesota National Guard has maintained a very good relationship with the Panamanian people. In fact, after one of the engineering exercises produced a schoolhouse, it was named “The Minnesota School”.


28 The SOFA is a written agreement between the U.S. and the partner nation that protects the rights of U.S. military personnel and citizens, and deals with the legal and protective issues surrounding their stay in the partner nation.

U.S. and Panama. Finally, the previous Panamanian defense forces that were very ruthless with the civilian population were named “La Guardia Nacional”, which in English translates to the “national guard”. Therefore, the words “national guard” generally create negative connotations with the Panamanians. The combination of these issues causes great political tension between the U.S. military, the American diplomatic team in Panama, the GoP and the Panamanian population, and presents significant challenges to the partnership between Panama and the MONG.  

a. The Military Liaison Team

There is no Joint Contact Team Program in SOUTHCOM, but there are MLTs in countries other than Panama in the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility (AOR). Therefore, the MONG Coordinator orchestrates activities through the SOUTHCOM traditional CINC activities (TCA) Coordinator (or the Civil Affairs Officer in the Office of Defense Cooperation if there is no Coordinator available to serve in Panama), who is located in the proximity of the American Embassy in Panama. The SOUTHCOM Combatant Commander does have money to fund NG TCA Coordinators for six-month temporary tours in Panama. However, TAG in Missouri cannot release MAJ Kilmer to go on a temporary tour of active duty (TTAD) due to the MONG operational tempo. Furthermore, if MAJ Kilmer is in Panama, then there is no one in Missouri to coordinate the troops and equipment for engagement activities in Panama, or to fulfill her other duties. Thus, officers from other state National Guards now fill the TCA Coordinator position in Panama.

4. Historic Interaction

The MONG currently consists of 8,280 Army and 2,662 Air National Guard personnel. It is approximately half the size of California’s National Guard and this is just the beginning of the differences between the two programs.

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30 There is a possibility that some tension exists over the U.S. School of the Americas, which allegedly trained Latin American personnel who later inflicted human rights abuses in South America. The school was located in Panama until 1984 when it was moved to the U.S. in accordance with the Panama Canal Treaty.

31 See Appendix C, paragraph 5 for an explanation of the Joint Contact Team Program.

32 Interview between the Author and MAJ Regina Kilmer, SPP Coordinator for the MONG, Jefferson City, Missouri, September, 28, 2001.
Since 1985, and prior to the inception of the Missouri/Panama partnership, the Missouri Guard along with a number of other reserve component and active component forces, performed extensive engineering missions in Panama. The MONG has provided more support to Panama than any other state National Guard. Missouri and Panama were not partnered based on size or a predominance of Panamanian immigrants to Missouri, but instead due to U.S. humanitarian assistance efforts that were ongoing since 1985 and due to the Governor of Missouri initiating the Partnership. Originally, the MONG forces were deployed in many countries in South and Central America. For example, the MONG served in Ecuador to assist with rebuilding after a hurricane, but the mission quickly morphed into continual infrastructure building exercises in South/Central America and ultimately in Panama. The Panamanian exercises were called “Fuertes Caminos” (Strong Roads), “Nuevos Horizontes” (New Horizons) and “Cosecha Amistad” (Friendship Harvest). The MONG engineers (combined with engineers from other U.S. states) participated in such exercises until 1996. They enhanced the infrastructure in Panama by building roads, installing culverts, building or repairing bridges and building or upgrading schoolhouses and medical facilities. These missions were an ideal method for Missouri to establish goodwill and a relationship with Panama because the MONG has two organic engineer brigades, medical personnel, aviation units, and well-resourced maintenance facilities. Additionally, in 1997 and 1998 MONG engineer and maintenance units participated in maintenance exchanges. Other units from the MONG, both Army and Air, that have participated in exercises include military police, medical, ground and air maintenance, the band, public affairs, communications, weather, and aviation units.

COL Gonzalez traveled to Panama on a familiarization tour to assess the wishes of the Panamanian government after the MONG received permission to institute a partnership relationship in November 1996. At that time, the Panamanian Minister of Health requested the MONG to design a new hospital (not a small medical clinic) for Panama. The Missouri governor was advised of this request and became irritated because he felt it was not within the purview of the SPP. Unfortunately, this caused the

Governor’s support of the program to wane. The MONG continued to support the limited exercises, however, according to COL Gonzalez, there was “not a lot happening other than participating in ODT [overseas deployment for training] deployments [such as] MP [military police] rotations, engineer rotations and MEDRETEs” between 1996 and 1999. The situation was further exacerbated in the 1998-1999 timeframe when SOUTHCOM prepared for redeployment and later moved its headquarters to Miami, Florida. According to COL Gonzalez, “there was little support from SOUTHCOM and little support from state officials for the partnership”.

Also, COL Gonzalez stated that the U.S. diplomatic corps in Panama – like the Panamanians – had “...an aversion to anything military”. When the SPP was first initiated in Panama, it had the full support of the American Ambassador at the time. However, that support also seemed to fade. COL Gonzalez felt the diplomatic corps had insufficient knowledge and understanding of how the military works and didn’t really understand the mission of the SPP. This was evident in 1996 because the Ambassador assigned his Chair of the Humanitarian Civic Assistance Steering Committee to oversee the program. The U.S. Ambassador at the time was caught between the wishes of the GoP, the State Department, SOUTHCOM and the SPP. Ultimately, the Ambassador worked in favor of the GoP and against the SPP and no SPP activities were conducted in 1998 or 1999.

5. Current Activities

In January 2000, COL Gonzalez tried to reinvigorate and redirect the program. He compared the capabilities of both MONG and the Missouri state government to the needs identified by Panama and felt that the MONG could best support Panama in emergency preparedness subjects. Therefore, he, the MONG TAG, the Missouri State Director of Public Safety, and representatives from both the Department of Economic Development and the governor’s cabinet traveled to Panama for a senior leader visit. In

34 Gonzalez, Ken, Colonel (Retired), former SPP Coordinator MONG, Telephone Interview by Author, 11 December 2001.

35 Also, money and attention were directed toward the Panama Canal Commission, during this time, and away from the SOUTHCOM (and SPP) engagement activities.

36 Currently, the U.S. has a diplomatic team in Panama, but no Ambassador.

37 Candy, Steven A., Memorandum to Keith York. February 13, 1996.
September 2000, senior Panamanian officials visited Missouri for an exchange senior leader visit. COL Gonzalez retired shortly thereafter and the program remained somewhat stagnant until MAJ Kilmer returned to Missouri in July 2001. In August 2001, members of the SAN came to Missouri for a familiarization tour of the MONG aviation classification and repair activity depot (AVCRAD) facility, which was followed by a tour of the aviation facilities in Ft. Rucker, Alabama. In early September 2001, MAJ Kilmer conducted her first familiarization tour in Panama and took the opportunity to meet key Panamanian and SOUTHCOM players involved in the SPP. However, her focus was temporarily taken away from the SPP when she was detailed by the MONG Adjutant General to serve as the MONG Liaison Officer to the governor as the new Special Advisor for Homeland Security, a cabinet level position. In January 2002, MAJ Kilmer represented the MONG TAG at the SOUTHCOM CINC’s Strategic Steering Committee symposium. The Deputy, SOUTHCOM CINC for Reserve Affairs and Mobilization directed the meeting. All SPP Coordinators with partnerships in SOUTHCOM were brought together to outline their partnership plans for the following year. This appears to be a very useful oversight mechanism for SPP.

The exchanges for calendar year 2002 continue to utilize the maintenance capabilities of the MONG. This year, there were two unit exchanges in Missouri for the SAN and the PNP. Aviation and ground maintenance respectively, were the subjects of the visits.

6. Non-military Participants

The Panamanian National Police (PNP) visited Missouri for a maintenance exchange that was co-hosted by the MONG and the Missouri State Highway Patrol in July 2001. Later, members of the Panamanian SAN visited the Central Missouri State University aviation department in August of 2001 at the same time they visited the Missouri AVCRAD. COL(R) Gonzalez also researched the Overseas Office Network run by the Missouri Office of International Marketing. They will assist Panama with importing goods manufactured in Missouri, but they do not have an office in Panama for importing Panamanian goods to the U.S.

38 It should be noted that a new SCJ-5 arrived in SOUTHCOM shortly before MAJ Kilmer took over as the SPP Coordinator.
7. Training

Training for the partnership coordinators continues to develop. COL Gonzalez received SPP training at a five-day seminar hosted by the Florida National Guard in the spring of 2000. NGB-IA contributed funds for airfare and other expenses of the SOUTHCOM State Coordinators. The training included all the SPP coordinators from SOUTHCOM, personnel from NGB-IA and SOUTHCOM representatives.

MAJ Kilmer’s training makes her well qualified to be the current MONG SPP Coordinator. She attended the Naval Postgraduate School in 1999 where she received a Masters Degree in International Security Affairs and Civil-Military Relations in 2000. In addition, the MONG leadership felt that command of the Spanish language was critical to the success of both the SPP and the SPP Coordinator. Therefore, the MONG funded her follow-on education at the Defense Language Institute (DLI) where she became fluent in the Spanish language.

The soldiers and airmen that participate in operations in Panama consist primarily of engineers, medical, maintenance and aviation personnel, which are the predominant units in the state. So, like the California Guard, the majority of the soldiers and airmen supporting the SPP are practicing their MOS and AFSC skills.

8. Conclusion

There are several explanations why the MONG/Panama Partnership is not as healthy as it should be after seventeen years of involvement in the country, but mainly the reasons boil down to lack of complete support at all levels in the Program, and confusion about the purpose of the program. The lack of support from the Panamanian government is understandable since the GoP never requested the support in the first place. The GoP resistance to the program, but acceptance of the HA programs, places the U.S. Diplomatic team in Panama in an uncomfortable position. It also places the MONG in an awkward position since it provides both programs to the GoP. SOUTHCOM support in the past has been shaky, but it appears to be improving. However, the Missouri State government does not support the partnership. The NGB-IA, Missouri TAG and the Partnership Coordinator all support the partnership.
Conversely, the level of support offered to the CANG/UK partnership spans the range of possible support. The Ukrainian government supports the engagement, and the military liaison team, EUCOM, the U.S. diplomatic team in the country, the State of California, NGB-IA, the California TAG and the Partnership Coordinator all support the partnership as well.

I found that both Coordinators had goals for their programs, and more importantly, that these goals supplemented the country plans of the Combatant Commanders and the two objectives of NGB-IA. However, while it seems that Panama and California are running similar engagement activities, I differentiate them by two criteria. The first is the level of humanitarian assistance provided to the PNs by their SPP partners and the second is, the support offered by the various levels involved in the engagement. With regard to HA, if the SPP did not exist, then would the U.S. be conducting humanitarian assistance activities anyway? In both cases, I believe the HA is not dependent on the SPP, and therefore would continue even if the SPP did not. Therefore, the numerous engineer missions that took place in Panama for more than a decade cannot be attributed to the SPP. Conversely, if the HA did not exist, then would the SPP exist? In the case of Panama, if the HA does not exist then I propose the SPP most likely will not exist in the future either. HA and SPP programs must be operated independently because it appears the PN may become confused about the intent of the SPP and not accept it as a partnership, but a charity program.
III. ARGUMENTS FAVORING GUARD INVOLVEMENT IN THE SPP

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter will describe and address arguments favoring NG involvement in the SPP and will confirm those standpoints with examples from the case studies. I will demonstrate the utility of the National Guard in the SPP and show that the Guard’s involvement in SPP is beneficial to the PN, the U.S. active forces, the National Guard and the community.

B. THE ARGUMENTS

1. Credibility

The National Guard originally entered into the SPP because it was best suited to train emerging democracies about the benefits of a reserve component system, specifically the cost-benefit ratio of a reserve force as compared to a large active component force. Also, the Guard practices the concept of military support to civil authority, due to answering to the state Governor rather than the President, except in times of federal mobilization. Even then, the Guard members become members of the active military that answer to the U.S. government. However, as the Program progresses, new insights are gained as to other unique advantages of the National Guard. One of those advantages is that due to the continuity it provides, the Guard can achieve a higher level of credibility with the PN. This connection is accomplished in two ways, first abroad and second, at home. Personal and trusting relationships can take a long time to develop, especially with personnel from a foreign country. There are cultural and language barriers to overcome before the events and exchanges can commence. Active component personnel continually rotate out of duty positions (generally every 24 months), whereas National Guard personnel may remain in a duty position for twice that time, or longer. Should the Guard’s Program Coordinator be reassigned, he or she normally remains within the state and can provide a healthy transition period, continuity and historical knowledge and documentation to the incoming Coordinator. In addition,

the Program Coordinator’s activities are approved through the state National Guard leadership and the Combatant Commanders on an annual basis. The key National Guard leaders will most likely remain in the chain of command for five years or more and many will visit the PNs during senior leader exchanges.40

In both case studies, the partnerships have maintained relationships with their partner countries and there is historical knowledge of the Partnerships remaining in both National Guards in the form of previous Partnership Coordinators and historical documentation. Current Coordinators are networking with previous Coordinators to maintain continuity with the PN and to continue engagements that were previously agreed upon. California continues to increase credibility and strengthen the foundation of the Partnership by regularly introducing new subject matter experts from state resources who contribute to the credibility with the PN. As well, Missouri is trying to round out the foundation of the Program by including state resources and educational institutions that contribute to the credibility of the program.

NGB-IA also contributes to the credibility of the program. This organization provides some oversight and connectivity by interfacing with the state NGs, and the Combatant Commands. Individuals within the organization retain historical knowledge of past activities between the partnerships. This organization also funds some activities throughout the year and sponsors PN senior leader visits to Washington, D.C.

2. Connectivity

Guard personnel provide key links within the Guard and key associations to federal and state agencies, educational institutions, businesses, local civic groups, other community elements, and the U.S. AD military, which can serve to enhance the SPP. NG members are typically more linked to U.S. communities and resources than their active component counterparts. Many NG personnel own homes and have children attending schools in the community where they also pay taxes and volunteer. Whereas, even if members of the active forces live and volunteer in U.S. communities, they still must move on to other assignments after a relatively short time there. Also, with the

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40 Senior leader exchanges assist in the development of relationships, needs assessments, resources and goals for future engagements. The outcome of these meetings should be incorporated into the current or following fiscal year plans.
increasing demands on the U.S. military – in particular the staff supporting field troops – active component personnel lose contact with the PN personnel due to getting sidetracked with additional duties supporting increasing deployments. The defense attaché officers (DAO) and security assistance officers (SAO) assigned to the U.S. embassies in the PN become overwhelmed because there are usually only one or two military individuals per embassy. During deployments or politically charged periods, their time for working on engagement activities within the PN is very limited.

Connectivity lapses occur more frequently on the part of the active forces mainly due to Defense Attachés and their assistants continuously rotating out of duty assignments in the PN, or members of the J-5 subcomponents rotating out of duty assignments. Additionally, the Country Desk Officers (liaison officers between the NG and the AC and the AC and Country Team) representing the AD G-5 continuously travel to visit the various regions they support, which causes lapses in communications, orders processing and funding appropriation.

Guard members on the other hand, can maintain connectivity to civilian communities and resources simply because they live and work in the community. For example, Guard members occasionally work in the state agencies and law enforcement as civilians. A National Guard soldier may be a power plant engineer in civilian life and an equipment operator for an engineer unit in the National Guard on the weekends. This connectivity to civilian resources has many advantages in that the Guardsman may be better able to enhance government and businesses ties, and also provide subject matter expertise to the PN. Yet, the Guard member also understands the military aspects in the relationship and brings connectivity to AD resources to the equation. These links in turn, can assist in stabilizing the PN by bringing business and additional resources (money, technical expertise and personnel) into the relationship. Additionally, Guard members can mentor military or civilian personnel from the PN in the topic of military support to civil authorities (MSCA) because they are living it.

‘Grassroots’ Guardsmen also promote connectivity between the state and federal government and resources. For example, they interact with local politicians who intermingle with state government and occasionally, federal government. The
Guardsmen have access to senators and representatives, as constituents from their districts, and can affect politics by voting. If managed properly, and with the consent of TAG, U.S. government at all levels can support the SPP.

The CANG Coordinator is successfully maintaining and expanding connectivity between the CANG, the U.S. active components, Ukraine and U.S. federal and California state agencies. The sheer volume of activities contributes to maintaining the healthy and robust connections that are in place at the various levels of engagement. The Coordinator has the distinct advantage over EUCOM officers due to being located in the state of California. EUCOM is at a disadvantage for maintaining connectivity to the state and in particular, the state government, educational institutions and state resources. Also, the CANG Coordinator has the benefit of previously serving on the Ukrainian MLT, which enhances his knowledge of the cultural norms and mores of Ukraine, the leaders from the PN and the areas in which he is coordinating partnership activities.

The MONG Coordinator is working to rebuild connectivity after the lapse between coordinators, and the relationships appear to be weaker than those between the CANG, Ukraine, California state resources and the U.S. active forces. SOUTHCOM may be better able to maintain connectivity to U.S. resources since it is now headquartered in Miami. However, the SOUTHCOM Commander would have to allocate active force resources to that endeavor and even SOUTHCOM is at a disadvantage in Panama, since no military presence is welcome there. The lack of military personnel in Panama is also a limiting factor in general because these personnel have multiple and competing interests to attend to.

3. **Joint Interoperability**

The SPP advances linkages between the reserve forces (and homeland U.S. resources) and all the active services. Coordination for partnership activities keeps the National Guard in the minds, documents and events of the active component personnel. For example, retaining a Guard member on a military liaison team compels the Combatant Commander’s staff to maintain operational control and accountability for that person.\(^{41}\) This person can highlight available National Guard and other state resources to the Combatant Commander and the PN. Also, the SPP Coordinator from the state must

\(^{41}\) See Appendix C for more information on the military liaison teams (MLT).
deal with the active duty J4 or J5 on a regular basis, which increases the Guard member’s knowledge and understanding of the operational practices of the active forces.  

The CANG and MONG both have achieved and enhanced interoperability with U.S. active forces. The MLT in Ukraine is the epitome of joint interoperability, not only between U.S. active and reserve component forces, but also with the Ukrainians that work side-by-side with the MLT. Additionally, joint interoperability is enhanced through exercises conducted between Ukraine and California, by including the active component of the PN and the U.S. active component and NG.

The MONG excelled in joint interoperability when conducting engineering exercises in Panama. Not only did the MONG supply personnel for these exercises, but it also supplied equipment for some of the rotations, which was transported by the U.S. Navy. Intense coordination always occurs between the U.S. active component personnel and the NG to ensure the missions are accomplished.

4. Increased Readiness for Guard Personnel

Assisting the PN affords Guard members the opportunity to practice their military occupational specialty (MOS) or Air Force specialty code (AFSC), in other words their military skills, in a real-world situation, with real-world consequences. In MAJ Kilmer’s words, “it’s an incredibly useful recruiting and retention tool”.  

Even if a guardsman is conducting only a subject matter expert exchange (versus a full-blown engagement), he must know the topic completely and brief it professionally. Guard members are practiced and validated on tasks often appearing on most U.S. Army mission essential task lists (METL), such as “mobilizing” and “deploying” the unit. They are validated on their primary war fighting skills prior to leaving the U.S. They conduct all the soldier readiness processing (SRP) such as gaining passports; and ensuring wills, family care plans, and business plans are updated. Performance evaluations, physicals, shots, and dental exams must be current. These are all tangible enhancements for the weekend soldier and officer, but there are also intangible benefits as well. When deploying to another nation, the guardsman gains experience that cannot be taught from a textbook.

42 The J4 on a joint staff is the logistical representative for the commander and the J5 is the civil affairs representative for the commander.

He sees different lands, living conditions, and cultures. He hears, and occasionally learns, new languages. These opportunities cannot be duplicated by simulated exercises during annual training and they also enhance leadership skills by forcing leaders to practice planning and resourcing skills in a military setting. In all, the SPP makes better military members out of weekend soldiers, which is a force-multiplier for the active forces when necessary and contributes to the professionalization of the National Guard.

These engagements also increase the military readiness of NG soldiers by providing the opportunity to view PN soldiers performing similar tasks. They can assess the methods and incorporate new ideas into their training back at home. Ultimately, it may allow for better joint interoperability with the PN in a wartime scenario.

Each partnership has increased both soldier and unit readiness as a result of the SPP. LTC Brown estimates that over eight hundred CANG members have participated in SPP events. In Panama, there have been over twenty thousand positions filled by MONG members during various exercises, but many personnel have repeated their duties on numerous rotations throughout the years. The only apparent detractor for readiness is when an entire unit or slices of numerous units and their equipment are deployed in support of an event, and the Governor does not have access to them.

5. Military Skills for Peacetime Engagement

Proponents of the SPP emphasize the value of using military skills for peacetime activities. While Guard personnel are using their military skills to enhance the relationship with the PN, they are often providing much needed services in the host county. For example, well drillers may be practicing their MOS task, but also providing drinking water to a nation decimated by drought.

The CANG SPP built upon the ‘military skills for peacetime engagement’ concept very slowly. Initially, the program started with small subject matter expert exchanges (SMEE) and senior leader visits and slowly evolved to include search and rescue teams, military police, pilots, medical personnel and many others in exercises such as “Rough and Ready” and “Peaceshield” which incorporate the primary war-fighting skills of units, not just individual members. The exercises are also the ultimate in joint interoperability and the utilization of military skills because they include units from the U.S. and the PN
and units from other NATO nations. The CANG also found a way to exercise military skills for emergency preparedness purposes that appropriately applies the goals set forth by NGB for the SPP.

MONG also excels in the use of military skills for peacetime engagement. The MONG has exercised engineers, medical and aviation personnel and many others in go-to-war skills and have done this on a very large scale sustained over a long period of time (17 years!).

6. **Civilian Expertise for Peacetime Engagement**

The Guard provides personnel with civilian skills that can benefit the peacetime activities. For example, the previous Partnership Coordinator in Arizona is a fire investigator in his civilian job.\(^{44}\) He not only brought fire-fighting expertise with him to the PN, but he had numerous resources from his contacts stemming from his fire department experience so that he was able to collaborate with those agencies to conduct a comprehensive emergency preparedness exercise with Arizona’s partner nation, Kazakhstan in 1999.\(^{45}\)

Even though the Coordinators from both CANG and the MONG are not regularly capitalizing on Guard members with civilian skills to better the partnerships, they are using the resources of civilian state agencies for the same purpose. For example, CANG is using experts from the CA state EPA, and MONG is collaborating with civilian law enforcement and educational institutions for the betterment of their partnerships.

7. **Enhancing Active Component War-Fighting Skills**

The SPP frees the active component forces to focus on deterring or responding to aggressors within their area of responsibility (AOR). The active forces can train in their primary war fighting skills while the National Guard continues to perform non-traditional military missions as it always has. Often, the active forces must shift focus from preventing war as they deploy to suppress conflicts or to fight wars. This is true of the National Guard, but on a lesser scale.

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\(^{44}\) Arizona SPP partner is Kazakhstan.

\(^{45}\) Reichling, Mike, LTC. Interview by Author, 15 April 2002, Phoenix, Arizona, Arizona National Guard State Headquarters, Phoenix, Arizona.
The CANG enhances the active military war-fighting skill in two ways. First, there is a skeleton crew of the active forces in the country. In order to coordinate the exercises such as “Rough and Ready” the active forces would have to put a number of people on the ground in the U.S. to coordinate with the California state agencies that participate. Therefore, SPP increases the number of active force personnel that stay at their home station to train, maintain equipment, or prepare for other operations. Secondly, the Guard members who participate in the SPP do not count against the active duty end strength. While they are performing a function in the theater with the Combatant Commanders funds, the National Guard expands the active force ability to accomplish missions without causing Congress to see an increase in the size of the active force.

MONG in the past significantly enhanced the active component war fighting skills because at a minimum, it provided thousands of hours of engineer support toward building the Panamanian infrastructure. This allowed active duty engineers to perform engineering tasks elsewhere and for U.S. military engineering assets to be expanded. However, this augmentation has tapered off since 1996.

8. Political Experience and Command Relationships

Unlike the federal reserves, the National Guard is an asset for, and commanded by, the state Governor. The Guard leadership better comprehends the political implications of the Guards’ actions and the Guard regularly interacts with the civilians that control it. For example, the Adjutant General of each state is appointed to his or her position by the state Governor and serves as the military advisor to the Governor. Also, when there is a state emergency and when asked by the Governor, the National Guard supports the civilian emergency management authorities with equipment or personnel.

The Guard is a better option than the reserves to perform SPP missions because the U.S. reserve forces are commanded by the President whereas, the National Guard is commanded by the state Governor, unless mobilized by the President. The Governor can activate the Guard for various reasons; primarily to bolster state emergency management agencies with support during civil disturbance or other emergency situations. This dual-role is unique only to the National Guard, not the active duty military or the reserve.

46 In the state of Vermont, the people vote the Adjutant General into the position.
forces. This breeds a loyalty to the civilian/state chain of command and to the state itself, which in turn promulgates military support to civil authority (MSCA). Guard members better understand MSCA, as many have been mobilized to deal with natural or man-made disasters within their own states. The reserve forces are occasionally mobilized for disasters, but their mobilization may take them to states outside their state of residence.

The National Guard is also the best group to perform the SPP due to its ability to perform emergency tasks (such as riot control or fire fighting support) and the relationship this creates between the Guard and state emergency management agencies. This relationship enables many of the partnership programs to conduct joint emergency preparedness exercises as engagement events with the PN, because the Guard has already formed natural relationships with state emergency management personnel in the course of doing business. The relationship allows state and Guard personnel to share expertise and/or standing operating procedures in emergency management with the partners, and also to demonstrate MCSA.

Finally, the National Guard has more resources (transportation, personnel, and other logistical resources) than any other civilian government agency within the state to perform State Partnership duties.

The CANG excels in the politics of the Partnership. The Program has the full support of the Governor, the state Adjutant General, the Combatant Commander, the Ukrainian government and the U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine. In addition, the Coordinator has secured the support of the State Environmental Protection agency, state emergency preparedness agencies and educational institutions.

The MONG had demonstrated military support to civil authority since NG members have been working in Panama in 1985. However, MONG lost support of the Governor and has never fully gained the support of the U.S. diplomatic team in Panama due to issues presented by the Panamanian government. In addition, the Panamanian government continues to provide cursory support to the Partnership, while continuing to deny the U.S. military entry into the country on a situational basis. Also, the government will not commit to a status of forces agreement (SOFA) to protect U.S. citizens while in the country. Again, protection is provided on a situational basis.
The CANG and the MONG demonstrate opposite ends of the continuum for political support. The CANG/Ukraine Partnership demonstrates that enthusiastic political support from all responsible organizations in the partnership can create a very successful collaboration; and, the MONG/Panama Partnership demonstrates that apathetic political support can lead to a less productive collaboration.

9. The Budget

The National Guard may be a more realistic entity to bring funding information to the State Partners for three reasons. The first is that the Guard is a less expensive method of defense than the active forces. Guard leaders can explain how to maintain a solid defense force without paying for the fulltime salaries and benefits required by the active forces. This is significant for countries trying to downsize the percent of gross domestic product (GDP) spent on defense. Also, PNs are more often than not, the size of a U.S. state with similar population size. It is easier for PNs to comprehend state budgets and the organization of state agencies because the size of these resources more closely relate to the setup of the PN government.47

Conversely, there is no method for U.S. active forces to demonstrate resource requirements at the state level, short of conducting much research or bringing civilian subject matter experts from the states to the partner country to discuss the state budget. The U.S. active forces are in service at the federal level and many operators have limited or no visibility of their actual budget. The federal military spending, even at the theater level, is too sizeable for comparison to the PN budget. Also, the U.S. Congress allocates these funds purely for military use, not a combination of civilian and military use.

The second reason that the NG may be better at budget discussions is that it receives money both from the federal and state government. Therefore, the Guard works with different sources of funds on a regular basis. In the case of the SPP, the Guard is funded primarily through federal monies endowed by the active forces, mainly through theater CINC activities (TCA) funds. This not only ensures the Combatant Commanders have oversight of SPP operations in the various AORs, but also helps the Guard and active component avoid duplication of effort. However, unlike the active component, the Guard receives state funding to support state emergencies and state agencies on a

47 For information on the sources of funding for the SPP, see Appendix D.
situational basis. Funding to the Guard is increased during emergencies by the state, and
sometimes, federal government. This leads to the third reason the Guard is better able to
present funding information to the PN; the habitual relationship the Guard has with the
state, both in military matters and in MSCA. The Guard has the relationships necessary
to bring state financial managers to the PN to discuss military funding and to discuss
civilian state agency funding levels and operations. The financial managers of state
agencies manage budgets that more closely correlate to budgets of the Ministry of
Defense, or Ministry of Emergency Situations, for example.

The state budgets of the CANG and MONG are surprisingly similar to their PN
country budgets. For example, the 2001 budget for the state of California (including
federal contributions) equaled just over $103 billion U.S. dollars (USD).\textsuperscript{48} The U.S.
Central Intelligence Agency estimates the year 2000 GDP purchasing power parity (PPP)
of Ukraine be $189.4 billion USD.\textsuperscript{49} Similarly, the total appropriations for Missouri’s
budget in 2001 equaled almost $24 billion USD,\textsuperscript{50} and Panama’s GDP PPP for 2000 is
estimated to equal $16.6 billion USD.\textsuperscript{51} With similar resources and similar geographical
sizes (Ukraine “…slightly smaller than Texas”; and Panama “…slightly smaller than
South Carolina”) it stands to reason that the NG can relate to the PN better on military
issues and the state agencies can relate to the PN better on resource management issues.\textsuperscript{52}

\textbf{10. An Economic Solution}

The final argument in support of the National Guard SPP is that the NG is one of
the most inexpensive methods for enhancing stability within the various regions. The
program can augment active force activities in their AOR and develop activities,

\textsuperscript{48} State of California. “2001 -2002 Final Budget Summary,” (Undated), California Office of
02budsum.pdf], Accessed August 1, 2002.

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid. The World Fact Book 2001, “Ukraine,” Available Online:

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid. State of Missouri, “Appropriations, Disbursements and Appropriated Transfers Out” (June
30, 2001), Available Online: [http://www.oa.state.mo.us/acct/fun/jun01/junaf.pdf], Accessed September 1,
2002.

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid. The World Fact Book 2001, “Panama,” Available Online:

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid.
incentives and resources from the States. All this without the logistical support and funding required for moving dependents to the region and providing for their well-being.

Both partnerships appear to be very cost-effective solutions for U.S. interaction in the various regions. Currently no federal monies are going into the program to pay the salaries of the Coordinators, both states are taking it “out of hide”. Again, the funding of the positions by TAG of each state shows the command emphasis, support and the importance placed in the program by each states’ Adjutant General. The majority of the cost is incurred in transportation of individuals to and from the various partnership activities, but that cost would be incurred anyway if the active forces were organizing the events.

Additionally, the CANG, and to a lesser degree the MONG, are maximizing the use of existing resources by expanding the foundation of the Partnerships in their respective states. State agencies, educational institutions, private voluntary organizations and civic groups are adding resources outside the federal and state budget to the Partnerships.

C. SUMMARY

The arguments in favor of Guard involvement in the SPP were reviewed in this chapter. Several examples from the CANG and MONG Partnerships validate NG involvement in the SPP. In the following chapter, I will compare the partnerships to arguments against NG involvement to determine whether they are valid. Thereafter, I will determine how to improve the program based on the arguments.
IV. ARGUMENTS OPPOSING GUARD INVOLVEMENT IN THE SPP

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter will address the arguments against the SPP to counter or confirm some of those standpoints with examples from the case studies. I will demonstrate that there are valid arguments against Guard involvement in the SPP. However, I will make use of the case studies to demonstrate why the Guard is the best entity to continue the SPP. Ultimately I will show that the U.S. active forces or perhaps a non-governmental agency could take over the duties of the U.S. portion of the SPP, but that the Guard as a whole, is in a much better position to execute the program. However, modifications must be made to the management and execution of the program for its continued improvement and success.

B. THE ARGUMENTS

1. Stabilizing Force Reductions

   The first argument against the SPP is that it was simply the brainchild of NGB to stave off force reductions. Making the National Guard relevant in international missions ensures the receipt of at least a portion of active force funding for the purpose of maintaining National Guard numbers.

   To acknowledge the argument of stabilizing force reductions, at the time SPP was initiated there was significant military downsizing due to a perception of a lessened threat from the Baltic States and Central Asia. The Guard was, most likely, seeking new missions to avert any more downsizing. However, the program has some proven successes and value, especially most recently in Central Asia. The U.S. government required access to the area for the conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom, and it has been granted the requested access in various SPP PNs such as Kazakhstan and Tajikistan (a state that requested, but has not yet received a partnership), which ten years ago may have been next to impossible.

   Contrary to the ‘stabilizing force reductions’ argument, the majority of SPP activities are resourced with funds provided by the Combatant Commanders and these commanders acknowledge that they could not conduct all the partnership activities
without the NG. Congress allocates funds annually specifically for engagement activities with the PNs.\textsuperscript{53} There is very minimal federal funding given directly to the NG for the purpose of conducting partnership activities.

The National Guard was successful in getting the State Partnership Coordinator position authorized on the manning documents for all fifty-four states and territories, but no funds are allocated from federal resources to support the authorization. In addition, while there is one Coordinator position per state and territory, very few adjutants general actually assign personnel or fund this position. The California Adjutant General is one of the few who fund a fulltime Coordinator. While the Missouri Coordinator position is funded fulltime, a number of additional duties have been assigned to the Coordinator so that her attention to the program is diluted by other important tasks.

2. An Experiment

SPP is further criticized as an experiment with no known outcome. The difficulty in measuring success in this endeavor lends weight to this claim. For example, it is very complicated to measure the extent that SPP has affected civil-military relationship in support of U.S. policy objectives or the level to which regional stability has been enhanced due to the SPP. These benchmarks take years to measure and comprehensive evaluation systems that are not currently in place.

However, NGB-IA can reduce such criticism in the future by providing more quantifiable measures of effectiveness, which will be discussed in Chapter V. NGB and the Combatant Commanders do capture data such as the number of personnel from the PN that were engaged during the fiscal year and number of dollars spent on the various engagements, but the measures must be taken a step further such as determining the impact of the engagements over a number of years.

3. Deterring the Guard from its Primary Mission

Given the current situation in the United States there is a new emphasis on ‘homeland security’. This criticism of the Program centers on SPP diluting and expanding NG priorities. Continuing to meet new U.S. security requirements will tax National Guard resources to the maximum. The cost incurred with these new missions may turn taxpayers against any further cost or loss of resources, incurred by the National

\textsuperscript{53} NGB-IA receives very little funding for the SPP, less than one million dollars per year.
Guard outside the country. The National Guard may not be able to extend enough personnel and equipment resources to successfully accomplish the ‘homeland security’ mission, any international defense missions and the SPP. Also the SPP is already manned at such a limited level, it may not be able to stand the additional stretch of more duties.

However, the dynamics of war fighting continue to change so dramatically that the National Guard should be permitted some leeway for innovation. No person can successfully predict the threats to the U.S. or from where they may originate. The National Guard should be permitted to continue to expand the SPP until it is proven to be ineffective. Not only this, but the National Guard should continue to look for non-standard military missions that allow it to increase interaction and interoperability with active forces and allies. Neither Congress, nor DoD should keep the NG in mothballs until the next major battle, because then it truly may not be prepared to fight. At a minimum, the SPP allows Guard members to view different lands and cultures and to work through issues that prevent effective communication, such as language barriers between allies. Also, the SPP provides the Guard the opportunity to work hand in hand with its AC counterparts to learn the lingo, share and maximize resources, and eliminate communication difficulties.

Both the CANG and the MONG focus their engagements with the PNs around the primary MOSs of the service members within their organization. They try to maximize the resources available within the state NG and the CANG supplements those resources with state government resources. For example, personnel from the MONG AVCRAD conduct aviation maintenance exchanges with the Panamanian SAN.

Additionally, NG SPP coordinators must coordinate with federal, state and local civilian and military (active and reserve) resources to accomplish events and engagements. This neatly correlates with the way the active forces have to coordinate with allied military task forces and private and non-governmental organizations.

There is value in this criticism in this regard; the Partnership Coordinators get lost in the accepted military system for advancement and career progression. Many program coordinators are at the major or lieutenant colonel level, and while their counterparts are
serving on a battalion staff or commanding battalions, the program coordinator is either pigeonholed into the SPP or the coordinator cannot do an adequate job with the Partnership because he or she is sidetracked into duties additional to the SPP. The skills the coordinators need to accomplish partnership engagements match those of any operations officer, but the coordinator’s activities are not readily apparent to the military leadership in the state, and they don’t match those skills developed by following the “normal” military career path of progression. For example, the SPP will never be perceived as “command time” because the coordinators don’t command troops they simply coordinate with commanders. Ultimately the Coordinators may lose competitiveness with their peers for advancement. Additionally, most often the coordinators do not get to exercise their military specialties and lose their branch affiliation.

Finally, were the Active Forces to conduct this mission it would dilute their war-fighting skills too.

4. Guard Members Exploit the Program

One denunciation of National Guard MLT members is that they get too comfortable in the PN and start to lose the connection to the U.S. that made them valuable to the PN in the first place. The tours in the PN theoretically last no longer than 179 days, but they can be extended. The MLT Guard member receives per diem pay in addition to a salary, which can be very lucrative. This provides incentive to extend the tour as long as possible and perhaps to passively slow down the progress within the PN. The decision to extend a Guard member longer than 179 days does not “. . .lead to developing the processes, and an exit strategy, and a way out…” of the military-to-military connection for the transition to a business led, governmental led and/or educational relationship. Extending tours is not a problem with active component personnel because their tours of duty in the PN are limited by time and the need to move on to other duties. I outline a model for career progression and professionalization of SPP personnel in Chapter IV to thwart such criticism in the future.

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54 This criticism was not made in reference to either of the partnerships assessed in this paper, but to MLTs in general. Also, this was one person’s opinion and has not been proven to be true.

55 Mr. Richard Hoffman, Executive Director, Center for Civil Military Relations, Interview by Author, 8 November 2001, Monterey, Tape Recording, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.
As mentioned earlier, the CANG extended LTC Brown’s initial 179-day tour while he was serving on the MLT in Ukraine. So, there is a case to support that the tours do get extended. However, based on the success of the CANG/Ukraine Partnership under LTC Brown’s leadership for the past few years, it appears as though his extended stay was beneficial to the Partnership. The Adjutant General of each state should retain the authority to extend tours. The National Guard Bureau however, in conjunction with the active duty is exploring permanent change of station (PCS) tours for National Guard SPP personnel overseas. This will allow the National Guard to extend tours in the PNs from 179 days to two to three year tours and this will serve four purposes. First, the tour of active duty for the Guard member will further enhance connectivity between the PN and the state SPP and the active forces in the AOR; second, it will allow the Guard member to gain knowledge of the PN culture and inner workings; third, the NG representative will not lose focus on the SPP to other pressing issues in the state; and finally, PCS tours will eliminate the debate as to whether tours should be extended.

5. Politics Can Diminish Potential

Politics external and internal to the NG impact the resourcing of the SPP. For example, some state governors do not appreciate having National Guard units or personnel deployed outside the state without their consent. The governors feel it limits their ability to react to civil or natural disasters when portions of the NG resources are overseas. Therefore, the governor may choose not to support the program with state or NG resources. When the governor does not support the program, it sends a signal to state agencies that they should not support the program as well.

There can also be acrimony toward the SPP within the state NG that diminishes opportunities for advancement for two reasons. The first is that the SPP Coordinator position appears on manning documents as a required, but not resourced position. No additional funds are specifically allocated to cover the salary of the Coordinator. Therefore, TAG must utilize limited NG funding to pay the SPP Coordinator’s salary, or assign SPP management as an additional duty. In addition, TAG loses the man-hours

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56 TAG can authorize units to deploy overseas for training purposes without the knowledge or consent of the Governor.

57 Rudy Perpich, Governor of Minnesota, et. al., v. Department of Defense et. al., No. 89-542, Argued March 27, 1990, Decided June 11, 1990, Supreme Court Reporter, 2419.
exerted by the SPP Coordinator when the effort can be placed toward other missions occurring within the state. Second, units or personnel supporting the various events often perform the duty in addition to their normal training. Unit commanders may be reluctant to support the program due to the necessity for rigid training schedules and the limited time that they have soldiers or airmen available for training. The Coordinator must be politically adept to ‘beg, borrow or steal’ resources to support the Partnership.

Finally, with regard to politics, it is extremely important for SPP Coordinators to be diplomatic and to demand diplomacy from all NG personnel when interacting with the PN. PNs have complained that promises were made for a specific type of support and then not met by the NG.

Political backing for the CANG and the MONG programs vary at the different levels of the ‘political support’ continuum, which includes collaboration at the federal, state and local level of both military and civilian support. For example, both have the support of their Adjutants General, which is evident by the fact that both Coordinators are funded from the coffers of the respective NGs. However, the MONG lost the support of the Governor when Mel Carnahan was in office even though he initiated the partnership. Since then the partnership has experienced lukewarm support from the state government, even though some of the state law enforcement agencies are participating in familiarization tours.

6. Better Qualified Agencies Can Perform the Mission

Some argue that the active duty military, other government agencies or non-governmental organizations (NGO) would be better suited to carry out the mission of the SPP. For example, the U.S. Reserve forces have language and civil affairs qualified personnel and that qualification is part of their MOS. However, the Reserve forces were originally included in the concept of the SPP, but chose not to pursue the program.

While the active forces can perform the mission, they are at a loss when it comes to the state agency and community support arenas. Active force relationships with educational institutions do exist to some degree, especially with the expanded IMET program.

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58 This is normally one weekend a month and two weeks per year.
Private voluntary organizations, state agencies and community organizations lack the resources and the natural relationship with the U.S. active military that is necessary to implement events in the PN.

The U.S. Army Reserves have the relationship with the U.S. active forces, they have the resources and they live in the communities, but it lacks the natural relationship with the state government and to some degree the commitment to the U.S. community or state.

U.S. AID has the resources and the relationship with the U.S. active forces, but it does not have the commitment to one community or state within the U.S.

The CANG has a good relationship with the partner country, the U.S. active forces, California state agencies and educational institutions and the commitment to the Governor of California and the communities within the state.

The MONG has a relationship with the PN, and the U.S. active forces, and to some degree, the Missouri state agencies. It also has a great relationship with the Missouri communities. However, it is lacking a relationship with educational institutions. Therefore, it looks like the Guard is the best entity to provide connectivity to make these partnerships work.

7. Lack of Reciprocal Effort from the “Partner” Nations

The active forces, the U.S. government, and the NG continue to pour money, time and other resources into the PN and there is no reciprocal effort. There are currently no quantifiable measures to determine if the PNs are reciprocating with financial or other resources. This criticism may encourage NGB, Combatant Commanders or PNs to capture this information more formally in the future.

The Ukrainian MOD emplaced a Ukrainian MLT to make coordination easier for the CANG, the U.S. active forces and the Ukrainians to communicate more quickly and to build the relationship. This is a significant contribution from this country, although they could contribute more. Wholeheartedly participate in all exercises.

The Panamanians provide personnel for exchanges, but the U.S. government pays for all these interactions, so it is true there is limited reciprocal effort from the partner
countries. However, some improvement can be achieved by outlining the reciprocal efforts that should be proffered by the PN in the annual plan for military to military contact, which is produced by the Combatant Commanders.

8. **SPP Does Not Enhance the Military Skills of Guard Members**

Performing SPP missions does not enhance the MOS or AFSC of the Guard members. These missions take the soldier or airman’s focus off of the duty they enlisted to perform and the mission of destroying the enemy. These personnel who are supposed to be trained killers are now performing humanitarian and diplomatic missions instead.

Interestingly, it cannot be further from the truth that SPP dilutes the military skills or reduces readiness of the National Guard members participating in engagements. In fact, it enhances their military skills. All soldiers and airmen that participate in engagements do so in addition to their normally scheduled “one weekend per month, two weeks per year” commitment to the National Guard. On occasion units do perform overseas deployments for training (ODT), however, the unit is certified and validated on their mission essential tasks (or “go to war” tasks) by both the National Guard and the active force advisors long before being permitted to leave the U.S. When performing an ODT, the unit performs as a whole unit and performs mission-essential tasks. The units may not even have this opportunity within the U.S.

9. **Culture and Norms Can Negatively Impact SPP**

There are significant cultural norms that must be overcome in each country to stimulate the concept of forming a National Guard in both. In the case of the CA/UK SPPs the Ukrainians understand that the government has a difficult time providing one job for a person, much less two jobs per person. They have a difficult time comprehending that a person can work Monday through Friday as a civilian and one weekend a month and two weeks a year as a soldier.

In the case of Panama, civilians despised the La Guardia Nacional and must overcome their fear of the entity. In this case, it seems a National Guard by another name might be in order. A National Guard may be a way to ease Panamanians into a civil defense force, which serves dual purposes. The first is an entity for the protection of the country and the second is a military that citizen soldiers and civilian politicians can ensure remains under civilian control.
C. SUMMARY

This chapter summarized arguments against the National Guard involvement in the SPP. Valid arguments against NG involvement were presented such as the demonstrated lack of reciprocal effort from PNs, and they were supported with examples from the case studies, but overall the Guard is still the best entity to conduct the SPP mission. Also, the SPP remains a beneficial and forward-looking program that promotes positive relations between the U.S. government and the partner nation.

The following chapter provides a summary of this paper as well as recommendations to improve the program. Additionally, ideas for future research are included.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

A. SUMMARY

In this paper I argued that the National Guard SPP is a beneficial and foreword-looking program, which is advantageous to all civilian and military organizations involved in the program, especially the PN. I addressed the arguments for and against the program and demonstrate that those in favor of the Program far outweigh the arguments against it. The utility of the Guard’s involvement in the program is that it is a force enhancer or multiplier for the active forces, it is economical, it is good training for the National Guard members and the National Guard is the only agency that can adequately bring together all the key players necessary for successful conduct of the program. Additionally, it is necessary for the U.S. Government to maintain a positive American presence in the countries concerned, and even in those that do not have partnerships yet. Also, by comparing the case studies to arguments for and against NG involvement in the SPP, I developed the following lessons learned for future application in the conduct of the SPP.

B. LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The lessons learned as a result of research and the comparison between the two partnerships stem from relationships, training, budgeting, political support and engagement tools and methods. First, I will explore the lessons learned about relationships.

1. Lessons Learned - Relationships

This entire program is about relationships, most importantly, the political relationship between the United States and the PN. The original intent of the United States government was to develop democracies in the breakaway republics surrounding the former Soviet Union. However, there were and are, so many profound socioeconomic, cultural and political challenges in these nations and the other SPP nations that they prevent the ready attainment of democracy. Additionally, the PNs may never attain a true democracy. Therefore, the U.S. government had to take a step back and work with the nations to overcome their other challenges first.
The most appropriate arm of the U.S. government to commence partnership goals in the early 1990s was the U.S. military, due to its availability of resources and geographic proximity to the nations concerned. The original intent of the U.S. military paralleled that of the U.S. government, it was to develop democracy. That intent is now tailored to something similar to the NGB objectives for the SPP program including: “the development of regional stability and the promotion of civil-military relationships in support of U.S. policy objectives”. In an effort to reach these objectives, the U.S. active forces must interact with the government and military of the PN, the U.S. Diplomatic Corps, the U.S. State Department and the U.S. National Guard.

Moreover, the U.S. National Guard must successfully interact with all the aforementioned entities and incorporate the resources of U.S. private voluntary organizations, state agencies, businesses and educational institutions into the partnerships. Therefore, there are numerous military and civilian relationships carried on internationally at a various levels of the government and private sector.

Some of the lessons learned about these relationships include that relationships are symbiotic, that the NG must maximize existing resources, that buy-in is important and that some amount of separation from some organizations is critical to the success of the Partnership.

a. The SPP NG/AC Relationship is Symbiotic

The most important relationship for the success of the SPP is the relationship between the U.S. military and the partner nation. However, once that is established, the next most important relationship is between the U.S. active component and the U.S. National Guard. This relationship is critical to the success of the SPP because both the Guard and the AC rely heavily on each other to accomplish events and engagements. In most cases, there is no Guard presence in the PN so the National Guard relies on the country team to make contact with government officials of the PN and to host U.S. delegations to the PN. Conversely, there is no active component presence representing the Combatant Commander in the Partner State so the AC relies on the

Guard to facilitate the travel and activities of PN personnel in the U.S. state. Neither can have a successful partnership without the other.

b. The Guard is Necessary to Forge Relationships in the U.S.

A second lesson learned about relationships is that the National Guard is the only U.S. state or federal entity exclusively capable of forging relationships in the U.S. that will ensure the longevity of the SPP. This wherewithal stems from a number of sources including National Guard Bureau, adjacent State Partnerships, state agencies, Guard units within the state, private voluntary organizations and businesses. Resources continue to grow as the participant list, number of engagements and numbers of Partnerships grow. The foundation of the Program is strengthened as the participant list grows.

Also, the Guard is necessary to forge relationships in the U.S. because it is one of only two civilian-military agencies within the U.S. government. The other civilian-military agency is the U.S. Reserve Forces, but they do not share the attachment to their state of residence as the U.S. NG does. This civilian-military mix allows Guard personnel to communicate equally well with personnel from both civilian and military agencies.

2. Recommendations - Relationships

a. Bolster Overseas Duty Positions

Increasing the number of overseas duty positions for National Guard members on both military liaison teams and the civil affairs staff of the Combatant Commander, would allow Guard members to further ties with active forces and ultimately better support the SPP. Additionally, these positions would not count against the Active force end-strength, they would enhance communication and coordination between the NG SPP and the AC, and they would contribute to the professionalism of the National Guard.

b. Develop Regional Cooperation Relationships

The Regional Coordinators at NGB-IA should be observing familiarization events that occur in the various regions and notify other Coordinators with Partnerships in those regions of those events. This will provide an opportunity to combine familiarization events between PNs and SPPs located in the same region and
perhaps enhance cooperation between those entities. Additionally, Partner states have the opportunity to combine their resources to have a greater impact on the stability in the partner region.

3. Lessons Learned - Training

a. During Engagements, U.S. Personnel Receive Realistic and Useful Training

The SPP presents numerous, varied and real-life training opportunities for U.S. military personnel including the enlisted, NCOs and officers. The opportunities begin with enhancing knowledge of facts related to military skills, and extend into promotion opportunities due to the additional skills gained. Also, the soldiers/airmen increase their knowledge and understanding of the intricacies present when interfacing with NATO partners, potential NATO partners, and the AC, with whom they may some day fight. In fact, there are few programs in the NG, short of going to war or participating in humanitarian missions, which can equal the experiences gained by personnel supporting the SPP to include the opportunity to experience various cultures and languages.

b. Coordinators are Untrained

However, when it comes to the SPP Coordinator, this person usually enters the job with little knowledge of the SPP, which may cause a lapse in events until the Coordinator determines how to submit orders, write and submit country clearances and numerous other tasks that generally learned through on-the-job training. Some lack of training will be offset by a transition period with an outgoing Coordinator.

c. Coordinators Lose Promotion Potential as a Result of SPP

While conducting the SPP, the Coordinator may brush up on military skills, such as planning, coordinating with both the NG and AC staff and mobilizing soldiers. However, the Coordinator will be overlooked for promotions or awards due to lack of operational experience in “go to war” units. Also, the Coordinator runs the risk of being pigeonholed into the Coordinator job.

4. Recommendations - Training

a. Maximize Existing Resources by Utilizing the E-IMET Programs

The SPP is prohibited from conducting any kind of training for PN personnel. However, the Enhanced International Military Education and Training (E-
IMET) programs are funded and designed specifically to “educate civil and military officials” of the PN.\textsuperscript{60} NGB-IA should collaborate with E-IMET program personnel, to gain training for PN personnel to pave the way for a future SPP, or to enhance existing SPPs.

\textit{b. Develop Training for the SPP Coordinators}

NGB should develop training for Coordinators, which includes an initial training orientation to the Program and advanced training for Coordinators who have been conducting the Program for over one year. The initial training would include a two-week training course, complete with support materials. The support materials should include standard operating procedures, the organizational structure of the NG and the SPP, information papers, information on potential funding sources and fill-in-the-blank templates for items such as country clearances, requests for orders, concept papers, trip reports and the plethora of other paperwork required by the AC prior to an engagement event. Other topics can include case studies of successful or less than successful events and also, the presentation of ideas from other Coordinators on issues such as environmental security or Border Guard initiatives. Training in the vein of ‘engaging your chain of command’, ‘marketing the SPP’, ‘selling the SPP to unit commanders’, or ‘engaging civilian agencies’ could be beneficial. The training can take place at one of many NG regional training institutes (RTI), such as the National Civil-Military Institute (NICI) in California, or the Guard can utilize its distance learning system for which it has won accolades. This provides the Coordinator the opportunity to quickly understand requirements, the opportunity to meet representatives from NGB-IA and the opportunity to network with other Coordinators.

Advanced training should be considered as well. The NGB-IA is accomplishing this to some degree by offering a degree in Civil-Military Affairs from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. However, short, intense courses should be offered to a wider range of unit personnel with regard to the culture and politics of a region.

c. Develop a Career Path for Coordinators

National Guard SPP coordinators need professional development and at some point, must be reintegrated into a duty position back in an operational unit (a unit that has ‘go to war’ skills). Below is a chart recommending the career progression for a SPP Coordinator to help mitigate the impact of being assigned to a position that removes the Coordinator from the mainstream of the career progression within the states.

![Career Progression Chart]

The Coordinator can enter the Program from any area. However, at some point, he should serve on a military liaison team in the PN, as the Coordinator, as a Regional Coordinator at NGB and in a traditional role within the State NG. The duty positions as a state Coordinator, as a member of a military liaison team and as a Regional Coordinator will provide the Coordinator with both important staff time and joint experience.

5. Lessons Learned - Politics

a. Foreign and Domestic Civilian Government Backing is Very Important

Government backing, both foreign and domestic, is critical to the success of the SPP. Key leaders from various PN and state agencies will not participate in
important meetings and events without the government buy-in, nor will they contribute key resources toward the success of the Program. This causes interaction to take place with grassroots civilian personnel who are not likely to implement substantial change to society or the government of the PN.

b. **USG Assistance Programs Confuse the SPP Message**

U.S. Government assistance programs such as Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Foreign Military Sales (FMS) or Humanitarian Civic Assistance (HCA) convolute the objectives of the SPP and hamper the success of the Partnerships. These programs encourage good relations and joint interoperability amongst nations, but when they are conducted in close proximity with the SPP it confuses the relationship between the PN and the state partner. Leaders of the PN confuse the SPP with USG assistance programs and become agitated when they realize that the partner state is not performing charity work and expects reciprocal effort.

6. **Recommendations – Politics**

a. **Discontinue the MONG/Panama Partnership**

The MONG/Panama SPP does not enjoy the backing of the Panamanian government or the state government of Missouri. It is time that NGB-IA acknowledges this fact and look for another PN for the MONG. U.S. government leaders should look for other ways to maintain an American presence in Panama, if that is truly what they desire. In the meantime, the reputation of the SPP should not be tarnished.

b. **SPP Must Limit Overlap with USG Assistance Programs**

Often the AC Theater CINC Activities Coordinator is the same person that coordinates FMS or HCA. Coordinators should try to limit event planning for SPP through this person. Also, the Coordinator should try to prevent units from his or her state from deploying for HCA activities to eliminate confusion about the role of the SPP. Ideally in the future, all SPPs will have a state representative on the MLT in the country and events can be coordinated through this person.

7. **Lesson Learned – Other**

a. **States Must Capitalize on Available Resources**

The size and composition of the state NG impacts the potential for success in the PN. Obviously, when there are more personnel and a larger numbers of units, there
are more resources to draw from to make the Partnership more successful. Having more units also increases the chances for more engagement activities.

b. There are No Comprehensive Measures to Quantify SPP Success

SPP Coordinators may be documenting events and activities, but there are no formal measures of effectiveness (MOE) for the SPP.

8. Recommendations - Other

a. Develop Regional Coordination Capacity

This recommendation is the same as the recommendation in ‘relationships’. SPP states must get to know what other states in their Partnership region are doing and combine resources to limit duplication of effort and maximize the use of units within the state. Also, partner states can utilize the specialties of another state for the betterment of their SPP, especially if they are lacking in a resource that another state possesses.

b. Quantifying Results

NGB-IA should be assigned oversight and accountability for MOE for the Program. This organization should pursue funding from the Combatant Commanders for two purposes. The first purpose is to quantify accomplishments from the first decade of the program and second, to put together a measurement tool for determining success or failure in the future. Assessing success will also help determine whether a partnership is no longer viable.

c. The Evolution and Conclusion of an SPP

Figure 2 represents a recommended framework for how a State Partnership should evolve and conclude. I will discuss each stage of the evolution of the program and give anticipated timeframes for completion. This is based on the case studies.
After Action Reviews / Feedback

1 year           1.5 years            3.5 years           1 year

Engagement  Familiarization  Events  Transition

- Civic Groups
- Private Voluntary Org.s
- State Agencies
- Business Groups
- Educators
- Media

Figure 2. The Proposed Evolution to End-State of the SPP.

(1) Engagement. Engagement starts from the time NGB notifies TAG that his state is selected for partnership with another country. TAG should be anticipating this notification and should already have the Coordinator identified. The Coordinator should be identifying key contacts such as the Combatant Commander responsible for that particular nation, the U.S. ambassador to the nation and the J-5. It may be worthwhile to visit the PN’s Ambassador to the U.S. Other considerations include whether there is a MLT in the country and whether there are any National Guard soldiers or airman with experience in the PN and whether they have language proficiency.

Next the SPP Coordinator should identify the Minister of Defense, the U.S. Ambassador to the PN, the U.S. Defense Attaché and key contacts from the country to plan mutual engagements for the purposes of conducting both a needs analysis and a resource analysis. This is the time for the senior leaders from the National Guard and the PN to be heavily involved in the program. When the analyses are complete, a plan for interaction can be developed. Also, it may be beneficial for Expanded-IMET training teams to train key civilian and military leaders in the partner nation, if it has not been done already. The plan must adhere to the ambassador’s country plan, the Combatant Commander’s Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) Plan, NGB-IA objectives, state National Guard capabilities and the county’s needs. Then concept sheets with clear,
measurable objectives and desired outcomes can be developed for inclusion into these plans. In addition, the SPP Coordinator may want to list potential state agencies or local businesses that can contribute resources to accomplish the objectives and market the program to these potential resources. Concept sheets are then submitted to the subcomponent J-4 or J-5 or TCA Coordinator for review, approval and funding.

The media should be included as a partner in the system for three reasons. First, it has the potential to attract more resources for the program. Second, it can provide a form of oversight for all participants. Third, it will contribute to the historical documentation of the events. Since it is only feasible to conduct approximately one engagement activity per month and a total of approximately eight per year, the Engagement period should take about one year.

(2) Familiarization. Familiarization and confidence building exercises proceed during this phase. These activities include senior leader visits and small TCT and SMEE activities. During this phase key leaders can balance the country’s needs against the state’s capabilities. Also during this time, it is a good idea to take senior leaders to state agencies that may potentially become involved in contact. This phase takes about one and a half years. Feedback to all involved parties is ongoing throughout the process in the form of after action reviews (AARs), memoranda, and perhaps, from the media.

(3) Events. During this phase, the larger operations occur. These include activities such as National Guard units performing overseas duty training (ODT) in the partner country, or the GUARDEX program where larger delegations shadow units on annual training in the U.S. Also during this time, representatives from the state agencies and educational institutions as well as other interested parties should be taken to the PN to conduct their own needs/capability assessment.

As the engagements progress, the events expand to include all capabilities from the PN, the state agencies, businesses and civic groups and from the state National Guard. For example, a disaster preparedness familiarization can be conducted which includes search and rescue teams from the Guard, representatives from

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61 This program allows SPP partner countries to send larger elements to the United States to observe Annual Training (AT) events with National Guard units. However, due to funding limitations this option is only open to partner nations from EUCOM and CENTCOM (and other restrictions may apply).
the Ministry of Defense, fireman and policeman from both nations, NGOs such as the Red Cross, environmental personnel and educators. This phase can continue over a three and one-half year time period with TCTs, SMEEs and familiarization tours ongoing.

(4) Transition. During this time, the National Guard should transition the initiative to continue engagement activities to the businesses, civic groups and state agencies. The National Guard begins to limit participation in the program. The transition period should last approximately six months.

(5) End State. The end state for the National Guard is when state agencies, PVOs and business groups coordinate with PN agencies on their own initiative. However, the National Guard may never be completely detached from the program because they maintain critical links to the active forces. In addition, the National Guard may identify better resources or assets that better match emerging needs in the PN. Also, the NG may be more objective and less territorial than the other agencies, groups and businesses. Thus, the National Guard continues to manage the interaction and assists with resources, but should be free to pursue a new partnership with another nation.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

1. Conduct a Meta-Analysis of Numerous SPPs

   The research for this document incorporated a study of only two SPPs, which included a large NG (California) and a medium-sized NG state (Missouri). No study was conducted of a small NG state such as Vermont or New Hampshire and the impact these smaller states may have on their PNs.

   There is a need for more information about the capabilities, methods and tactics of the various SPPs for the purpose of enhancing existing and future partnerships and gaining a better understanding of the Program. An additional study may identify more resources for the SPP and it may identify more needs in PNs.

2. Develop a Standardized “Needs Assessment” for Establishing a Partnership

   A standardized needs assessment will help to capture information about a PN and establish a baseline against which to measure success in the future. It will assist the Coordinator in matching those areas in which the PN has needs to areas in which the
partner state has capabilities. Also, the Regional Coordinators at NGB-IA can evaluate the needs assessment and match it against capabilities of other partner states and PNs in the region. Then tailoring events and engagements to the needs of the PNs and the capabilities of the partner states can enhance regional stability in the area.

3. Research Reciprocal Effort from PN

No one can quantify the amount of reciprocal effort from any of the thirty-four and counting PNs in the SPP. Having some measure of the dollar amount, numbers of amount in support of or number of people from PNs contributing to the SPP would highlight the ‘partnership’ aspect of the relationship. It may also help justify funding in the future.

4. Research U.S. Government, Business, PVO and NGO Involvement in PN

There is an abundance of U.S. organizations in the PNs. A study of the amount of these organizations in one PN would highlight two things. The first is how PN key leaders can become confused about who is representing what U.S. interest and the second would identify additional U.S. resources that could support a Partnership.

5. Develop Methods for Engagement if there is Civil Unrest in the PN or War with Another Country is Imminent?

Would the NG continue to engage in a PN if there were signs of civil unrest? What about if the PN government was overthrown? Should there be a method for engagement in this case, or should the partner state and NGB-IA simply withdraw from the country? Should the rules for engagement parallel those exercised by the U.S. Diplomatic Corps? These questions should be answered by this research.

D. SUMMARY

This chapter presented lessons learned from existing partnership relationships, recommendations for the future conduct of the SPP and ideas for future research.

E. CONCLUSION

The CANG/Ukraine and the MONG/Panama partnerships provided rich examples of two partnerships on opposite ends of the partnership spectrum. There are many lessons to be learned from the experiences of these two partnership programs, some positive and some negative. However, the NG SPP continues to grow and evolve. There is a demonstrated need for partnerships in these emerging or transitioning nations, and

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bilateral relations appear to make some difference in the future of them. The U.S.
National Guard must be careful to enter into relationships only at the request of the
partner nation government and be cautious to use and share resources wisely in the
future.
APPENDIX A. THE ORIGINS OF THE PROGRAM

Throughout the late 1980s and the decade of the 1990s, conditions developed for the Reserve components to exercise a larger role in the international arena, specifically in Europe, because of congressional intervention, the implementation of new missions, and resource constraints. The United States House Appropriations Committee intended to reduce the costs of permanently housing United States Active component personnel, and the associated costs for their dependents in Europe, by rotating Reserve component personnel through assignments without permanently moving them to Europe. Therefore they directed “…the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide a plan to the [House Appropriations] Committee, by June 1, 1991, for replacing active Air Force and Army units in Europe with rotating Reserve component Units.” The Committee intended for the Reserve components to not only perform duties such as engineering or mechanical support for the active component units, but to fill key staff assignments in the headquarters of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The Joint Chiefs of Staff directed United States European Command (USEUCOM) to provide information for the congressional directive and, around the same time, directed USEUCOM to provide assistance to newly emerging democracies to stabilize countries in the European Command area of operations (AOR). EUCOM implemented several programs toward the second directive, such as the Joint Contact Team Program, but could not produce enough qualified linguists to effectively implement all the programs. Therefore, the European Combatant Commander solved the problem by using linguists from the National Guard and Reserve, which again stressed the relevance of the reserve component to the active component.

Also, the active component budget and the number of personnel on active duty were severely cut over the late 1980s and early 1990s, but their missions increased. According to John J. Spinelli:

63 The SPP was not considered when this requirement was imposed by Congress.
Army deployments increased 300 percent since 1990; Navy ship deployments on any given day are up 52 percent since 1994; and Air Force deployments since 1986 have quadrupled. During these same timeframes, the size of the Army (soldiers and civilians) dropped 40 percent; the number of Navy ships fell 30 percent; and the Air Force lost one-third of its people. Guard and Reserve forces have seen a thirteen-fold increase since 1990 in the number of days on active duty due to the increased deployments.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) similarly downsized its forces due to comparable constraints. “…the United States and its NATO allies [were] reducing their military forces, partly in response to the perceived threat reduction, partly because of small arms reduction agreements, and partly because of economic constraints.”

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm occurred throughout 1990 and 1991 and several reserve component (RC) units were called to support the operations. The combination of all these events caused the active component to rely more heavily on the reserve components to achieve mission readiness. It also served to make the reserve components more significant to the active forces.

Concurrently, on August 22, 1991, President Boris Yeltsin of Russia announced that his nation would be forming a National Guard. It was then that Lieutenant General John B. Conaway, then the Chief of the NGB in Washington, D.C., proposed to General Gordon R. Sullivan, then the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, that the U.S. National Guard and/or Reserves should work with Russia in an exchange program to develop the Russian Reserve Forces. The Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) first brought the issue to Lieutenant General Conaway’s attention in June of 1990, but Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm caused the topic to be tabled until a more appropriate time.


68 Ibid.
In December 1991, two officers from the Russian Military visited NGB and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to garner information on the U.S. model of military support to civil authorities (MSCA). They continued on to South Carolina to review the impact MSCA had in dealing with Hurricane Hugo. In that same month LTC Steven L. Funk of the U.S. Army National Guard was working as a Liaison Officer to the Headquarters, Allied Land Forces, in Southern Europe. In the course of his duties he observed meetings of the North Atlantic Assembly (NAA) and gathered information, which showed that the reserve components could be useful there in several ways. He outlined his arguments in a memorandum to Lieutenant General Conaway and he also relayed key points made by General Galvin at the annual meeting of the North Atlantic Assembly (NAA), such as the threat to NATO due to the unpredictability of the nations on the boundaries of NATO, especially in the Southern Region; that the military had to step outside of traditional war fighting roles; that the nations comprising NATO should prepare to take on new initiatives in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions; and that NATO must consider a new blend in duties between the active and reserve forces. LTC Funk suggested informing members of Congress about specific missions that the National Guard or Reserve Forces could perform when he wrote:

Perhaps a joint ROA [Reserve Officers Association] and NGAUS [National Guard Association of the U.S.], or NGAUS alone, briefing or information document for members of the U.S. Congressional delegation to NAA that addresses specific types of missions that could be useful in the future such as examples from Latin America, Africa and Desert Storm would be useful. Rebuilding City services, health care, education, justice systems, and infrastructure would be good examples. The same approach might be useful for identifying types of military assistance that could and should be provided to the former WP [Warsaw Pact] countries in order to help them restore a defensive balance of power while reducing the chances of regional conflict. Information is desperately needed in the former East Bloc countries regarding “hands-on” models with examples of how to establish and operationally maintain civilian control of the military. (pp. 4-5)

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Lieutenant General Conaway then marketed National Guard capabilities in a letter to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). It outlined qualifications such as being the entity uniquely suited to demonstrate civilian control of the military and a cost-effective professional fighting force.71 Also, the European Combatant Commander decided, that if a formal request for support were generated, he would place reserve component personnel on the military liaison teams (MLTs) in the Baltics to preclude sending a confrontational message to the Russian Federation caused by appointing active component soldiers to the duty.72 The military liaison team concept stems from a combined EUCOM/JCS initiative called the Joint Contact Team Program. It is described in Appendix C of this document.

The first formal request for a Partnership came from the Republic of Latvia. As a result, the first official state partnership was authorized in April 1993 with the pairing of the state of Michigan and the Republic of Latvia.73 Informal partnerships between states and various nations did exist prior to that time.74 These events then stirred the NGB (NGB) to seriously bolster preparations for U.S. National Guard support to former Warsaw Pact Nations. The NGB International Affairs office notified more states to develop partnership plans in the event more requests for support were made.

Since then, over thirty-four partnerships have been forged. The first partnerships originated in the Baltic States, then into the Central Asian State and South America. Now there are Partnerships in all those areas and in the Pacific Rim.75

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74 For example, the state of Missouri has been conducting engineering and medical activities in Panama since 1985.
75 For more information on current partnerships see the NGB -IA website at [http://www.ngb.dtic.mil/staff/ia/].
A. INTRODUCTION

The strategic, operational and tactical aspects of the SPP will be addressed in this appendix. The strategic portion contains a review of the National Security Strategy, the National Military Strategy, and the objectives of the SPP at the national level. The operational aspects of the program such as training, funding, operations and programs that work in conjunction with the Program will be explained. A tactical examination of the program will follow. Tactical aspects include items such as noncommissioned officer (NCO) development and aviation activity familiarization tours. The various federal, state and local agencies that support the SPP are reviewed.

B. THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND THE NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

Each SPP receives guidance from the Adjutant General of the state, NGB and other military and civilian government agencies. The National Security Strategy, the National Military Strategy and the goals that are derived from these strategies guide these agencies. Consequently, it is worthwhile to look at these strategies.

The current national security strategy is a holdover from the Clinton administration and is under review. It is based on guidance from the executive branch of the U.S. Government. The goals of the strategy include “…enhancing security at home and abroad, promoting prosperity, and promoting democracy and human rights.” The sub-elements of the strategy that are specifically relevant to the SPP include “Shaping the International Environment”, “Responding to Threats and Crises”, and “Preparing For an Uncertain Future”.

The national defense strategy incorporates the three sub-elements of the National Security Strategy, or shape, prepare and respond now. The SPP best supports the

77 Ibid. 1-3.
shape portion of the national military strategy because it focuses on promoting stability in regions throughout the world with military-specific skill sets. Moreover, the SPP is a proactive approach to preventing war rather than responding to war. The Program foments the ideals of the U.S. in a positive way so if war becomes a necessity, the PN will support the U.S.

C. OBJECTIVES OF THE SPP

As stated earlier, the NGB-IA office has two objectives for the SPP, including:

• To promote regional stability, and
• To promote civil-military relationships in support of U.S. policy objectives.

These objectives embody the National Military Strategy’s shaping objective. When a partnership can bolster any of the listed objectives in a region, it increases the likelihood of stability there. Ideally then, this decreases the potential need for U.S. military combat operations or humanitarian assistance in the area and provides increasing opportunities for trust and interaction between the countries. Wartime interoperability is left to the security assistance program. The shaping objective in the National Military Strategy enhances prospects for business opportunities (due to a secure environment in which the businesses can operate), which can lead to more tax revenue for the government to bolster the nation’s infrastructure. This in turn can lead to trade opportunities with other nations in the region to further enhance the economic security of the PN.

The U.S. NGB-IA attempts to match U.S. state National Guards with PNs that have similar features in an effort to facilitate quicker implementation of the above objectives. The criterion for matching U.S. State National Guards with PNs is evolving. After the first three state partners were paired, NGB used the following measures to match States with PNs: they reviewed “…U.S. Census Bureau ancestry data to match additional States with potential C/EE [Central/Eastern European] partners on the basis of

cultural and ethnic ties”. In addition, they matched “…geographic or economic factors that the state and European nation might have in common.” However, as more partnerships emerge, the less likely it is that optimal matches will occur. Some states (like California) can be matched with many countries based on these criteria, but smaller states or less ethnically diverse states may have very little in common with emerging partner countries.

D. STAFFING THE SPP

1. NGB- International Affairs Office

The NGB International Affairs (NGB-IA) office is located in Arlington, Virginia, and it advises the Chief, NGB in international affairs. This office also provides policy guidance and information to the various Partnership Programs throughout the United States. Additionally, it provides an interface between the states, the Combatant Commanders, the JCS and the PNs. However, involvement of NGB-IA in operational matters is very limited.

The mission of the office is to “…develop policy for international engagement of the National Guard, implement international programs for the National Guard, sustain National Guard readiness through global engagement, and perform international liaison for the NGB.”

This office is manned at a very limited level, which adds credence to the claim that the SPP is cost effective. It has a very inexpensive administrative overhead. The positions in NGB-IA include a Chief, Deputy Chief, Foreign Liaison, and two administrative assistants. In addition, Regional Coordinators serve to interface between the staff of the various Combatant Commanders and the SPP Coordinators. Currently there is one Regional Coordinator each for the Americas, Pacific Command and Central

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82 NGB International Affairs Pamphlet, “A Bridge to the Future: The Citizen-Soldier Community Based, Globally Engaged”.

83 Ibid.
Command; and two Regional Coordinators and a Desk Chief for European Command. Other personnel work for this office internationally.

2. **Staffing the State Partnership Programs in the States**

One person normally staffs the SPP in each state. This person serves as the Coordinator for program activities and his or her duties may be additional to another job that he or she holds within the state. This coordinator may also be fulltime, depending on the buy-in and intent of the Adjutant General. Additionally, there may be a LTC or Colonel from the state that works within the PN on a Military Liaison Team (MLT).

The SPP Coordinator makes arrangements with units within the state to secure personnel and other resources to conduct the missions in the PN. The personnel requirements may be as small as a one-person senior leader visit, or as large as an entire engineer unit deploying to the PN for an extended tour. Occasionally, the Regional Coordinators at the NGB-IA office may assist in locating personnel from other states to serve a specific need if the host state does not have personnel with that specialty.

In addition to organizing within the state National Guard, the Coordinator often hosts military and civilian personnel from the PN for senior leader visits, conferences, familiarization tours or visits with local businesses, educational institutions or government agencies. It is the coordinator’s job to show the PN personnel how the National Guard functions and to assist the PN in advancing toward military support to civil authorities (MSCA) and the other objectives outlined by NGB.

Finally, the SPP Coordinator manages day-to-day affairs, travel, planning and funding arrangements with his or her counterpart on the Combatant Commander’s staff, usually the J-4 or J-5 representative. He also serves as a representative from the state at various conferences and meetings.

E. **THE SPP AND FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL RELATIONSHIPS**

The National Guard SPP interacts on a regular basis with many national, state and local organizations to implement events. Some states may have more or less contact with

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84 NGB International Affairs Pamphlet, “A Bridge to the Future: The Citizen-Soldier Community Based, Globally Engaged”.

85 Explain J4-J5 staff function.
these organizations depending on whether they have a MLT in the partner country, the
tasks they are conducting at a given time and the Program Coordinator’s initiative.

1. Federal Level

   a. **Interagency Working Group**

      This group is composed of representatives from the Department of
      Defense (DoD), the DoS and the National Security Council (NSC). It encourages and
      oversees military-to-military contact. They assess and endorse proposed exchanges prior
      to their implementation in the partner country. NGB-IA communicates directly
      between the working group and the U.S. state implementing the activity.

   b. **Ambassador**

      The United States Ambassador to each country outlines his key objectives
      for U.S. interaction with the country in which he serves. These objectives are written into
      a document called the “Ambassador’s Country Plan” and coordinated with the
      Department of State. The ambassador has control over all U.S. activities in the country
      and can cancel any plans of the SPP prior to the National Guard arriving in the country.

   c. **Department of State**

      The State Department ensures the implementation of U.S. policy within
      the country and gathers information on the economy, military, politics and many other
      topics to help U.S. policymakers formulate relevant strategies for U.S. interaction within
      that country. The U.S. military often works in conjunction with the DoS due to the
      military having more resources to execute DoS plans within the country. Therefore, the
      Joint Chiefs of Staff often task the military with implementing key programs for stability
      within the region. Also, the DoS can veto or provide input to modify planned SPP
      activities if they deem them inappropriate.

   d. **Joint Chiefs of Staff**

      The JCS is comprised of senior officers of each U.S. military component.
      It provides guidance and issues directives to the components based on U.S. national
      strategies. In the case of the SPP, it also serves as an interface between NGB and the
      Unified Commanders.

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e. **Department of Defense**

This institution implements the directives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and conducts the operational programs for the U.S. It conducts several programs that have direct relevance to the SPP. For example, it may provide military equipment through the Security Assistance Program to an emerging democracy to meet a military need. This enhances goodwill between the nations and smooths the path for good relations between the SPP and the PN (but it is not related to the SPP).

f. **Theater Commanders**

The Combatant Commanders implement the defense-related portion of the Ambassadors Country Plan, weaving these elements into his Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSC). The TEP is the Combatant Commander’s engagement plan and he works with the DoS to apply U.S. foreign policy in each country within his area of responsibility (AOR). In addition, he takes direction and guidance from the JCS. With regard to the SPP, the Combatant Commander normally delegates day-to-day interaction with the Program Coordinators to the J-5, or the J-4. Regardless of who represents the Combatant Commander, this interaction will include communication with the military liaison teams in the various countries and the Program Coordinators in the state.

g. **NGB – International Affairs**

As mentioned earlier, the NGB International Affairs office implements policies and furnishes information to the Chief of the NGB. This office also provides policy guidance and information to the various SPPs throughout the U.S. and acts as an interface between the States, the Combatant Commanders, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Interagency Working Group, the PNs and their embassies and the DoS in Washington, D.C.

2. **State Level**

The state plays a very critical role in the success and comprehensiveness of the SPP although some programs have not pursued the resources offered by their states.

a. **Office of the Governor**

The governor is the Commander-in-Chief of all National Guard forces within his state. He is responsible for National Guard actions and therefore appoints the
state Adjutant General after a standard vetting process. The governor’s buy-in is critical for a successful Partnership because the governor can allocate or eliminate state resources for the program. He can also facilitate the cooperation and resources of state agencies to enhance the program if he sees beneficial relationships developing for the state. Finally, when PNs see the relationship between the National Guard and the state government, it reaffirms military support to civil authority at the state level. Even if the governor does not subsidize the program, the fact that the governor sees value in it can be beneficial.

b. **State Senators and Representatives**

U.S. senators and representatives are the states’ link to the federal government in positive or negative ways depending on the value the politicians place in the program. The SPP Coordinators may not lobby members of congress, however they may brief them on the activities and accomplishments of the program and include them in the activities, should the politicians be amenable to that. Like the governor, congress has the ability to highlight the program in the federal arena and vote for additional resources for it. Conversely, they may devalue the program or place constraints on it.

c. **The Adjutant General (TAG)**

This support is a critical component to the success of a SPP. In the case of all programs, TAG must initially support a formal partnership through a request to NGB. However, TAGs rotate out of their positions and some may support the program more than others. The TAG can provide resources to the program in terms of limited funding, transportation, liaison with other supporters who can provide resources, and by supplying personnel, equipment and man-hours to accomplish activities set up by the program coordinator. He may emphasize the program to other military personnel in the state to ensure their support to the Coordinator. He is also the National Guard conduit between Governors Office and NGB. In addition, TAGs often meet with and welcome high-level officers and civilians from the partner country both in the U.S. and on visits to the other countries. This adds credibility to the program for the Program Coordinator.

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88 Some state TAGs are voted into office by citizens.
d. **State Agencies**

State agencies are very important to the “ideal” SPP. There is an unlimited potential for agencies like the State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA), the State Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), or the State Department of Education (DOE) to become involved in partnerships and benefit from them.

3. **Local Level**

Once a program is functioning and the annual plan for partner activities is in place, local businesses, civic groups and governments may become involved in the program. This serves two purposes. First, it is another method to boost resources. Second, it reinforces military support to civil authorities. For example, local businesses may be interested in opening a business franchise in the PN. Or a city within the National Guard state may want to initiate or bolster a “sister cities” relationship with a city in the PN. Some civic organizations may have a relationship with the partner country that can enhance understanding, support and cooperation. One example might include the Polish-American Club or the Ukrainian Relief Fund. In Latvia, two civilians from Michigan who were with an SPP delegation contributed a van to an orphanage to alleviate transportation difficulties the orphanage was having when moving disabled children.\(^{89}\) Perhaps a Kiwanis or Rotary club may want to become involved in sending Christmas gifts to orphans in Kiev. In this regard, it is this author’s opinion that the development of these relationships is only left to the imagination of the Program Coordinator, but it is critical to the long-term success of the program.

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APPENDIX C. PROGRAMS THAT IMPACT SPP

A. MISSIONS AFFECTING THE SPP

Other U.S. military programs impact the aforementioned emerging democracies and share resources to ensure SPP success, as well as the success of their own programs. These other programs form a complex web of relationships that impact the SPP in both positive and negative ways. They must be analyzed for three reasons. The first is to sort out the overlap amongst the programs and to place SPP in its proper context. The second is to explain how the programs positively or negatively impact SPP and the third to explain the linkages between the programs. Once the linkages are established, they can be strengthened and exploited to streamline processes, diminish required resources and bolster effectiveness of all programs involved.

1. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Partnership for Peace (PfP)

The SPP is commonly, but mistakenly, perceived as a part of NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. SPP is a separate and distinct program. In fact, NATO did not initiate the PfP program until January 10, 1994, whereas the SPP was introduced in 1993 with ideas for its inception stemming from early 1990. There are many common elements to both programs, but the one key difference is that PfP is limited to the EUCOM area of responsibility only. The SPP, however, can interact with non-NATO countries, anywhere worldwide where a sanctioned partnership exists. The state and partner country can, however, participate in PfP exercises and receive PfP funding under certain conditions.

SPP conducts events called “In the Spirit of PfP” which are bilateral exchange activities between the National Guard SPP and the PN. These events do not include any other NATO nations. For example, rather than simply lecturing to the PN about search and rescue (SAR) operations, military and civilian representatives from both the PN and the National Guard state may plan and perform an actual SAR operation. Again, SPP is specifically prohibited from training PN personnel. This is due to the Leahy Amendment which prevents the U.S. military from training personnel in other nations if they have not

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been investigated by the U.S. Department of State to ensure they have not previously carried out human rights abuses.

2. **Security Assistance Programs**

According to Todd R. Calhoun, “security assistance, as defined in its simplest terms, concerns the transfer of military and economic assistance products and services to foreign governments through sale, grant, lease or loan.” 91 Mr. James Bodner, U.S. Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy states that, “…security assistance programs ensure that foreign militaries can work more efficiently and effectively with ours rather than be hobbled by mismatched equipment, communications, and doctrine”. 92 Furthermore, these assistance programs empower foreign militaries to build a regional defense capacity, which reduces the potential need for any U.S. intervention in their countries. There are several programs included in the Security Assistance Programs, but one in particular, the International Military Education and Training Program (IMET), has the potential to directly affect the success of the SPP in the future. 93 IMET does benefit the SPP by training U.S. operations and procedures to foreign military personnel and sowing goodwill through programs designed to benefit them. However, it also may have a very negative connotation for SPP. For example, there is a list of Latin American personnel trained by the U.S. Army School of the Americas who have allegedly committed human rights abuses. As one article implies, the name “School of the Americas” was changed to the “Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation” because the other name had such a negative connotation attached to it. 94

3. **International Military Education and Training Program (IMET)**

The IMET is a global program funded by the State Department and it has two objectives, they are:

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93 The other security assistance programs are: the Commercial Export Sales Program, Peacekeeping Operations, the Economic Support Fund and the Foreign Military Sales Program.

• To further the goal of regional stability through effective, mutually beneficial military-to-military relations which culminate in increased understanding and defense cooperation between the United States and foreign countries

• To increase the ability of foreign national military and civilian personnel to absorb and maintain basic democratic values and protect internationally recognized human rights\textsuperscript{95}

IMET provides grants for foreign military and civilian personnel to receive training in defense skills in a manner that is consistent with U.S. doctrine.\textsuperscript{96} The program is funded at $57,875,000 for fiscal year 2001. Ukraine can be allocated up to $1,500,000 of IMET funds; and, Panama can be allocated up to $150,000 for IMET training.\textsuperscript{97} There are “…a variety of military education and training activities conducted by the DoD for foreign military and civilian officials. These include: formal instruction involving over 2,000 courses taught at approximately 150 military schools and installations…”\textsuperscript{98}

Portions of this program coincide nicely with the SPP for a number of reasons. First, foreign military and civilian defense personnel are trained in the use of U.S. equipment, they are indoctrinated with U.S. ideals and they are acclimated to the culture of the U.S. Occasionally, SPP members interact with IMET trained foreign personnel and this facilitates communication and understanding. Secondly, IMET is permitted to train these personnel in military skills, whereas the SPP is prohibited from doing so by law.\textsuperscript{99} Finally, the Expanded-IMET (E-IMET) program, which receives approximately thirty per cent of IMET funding, has educational programs that further NGB international


\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{96} As of 1999, the International Military Education and Training Program trained 604 Ukrainians since they were permitted into the program in FY 1992. IMET also trained 6,554 Panamanians since 1989, but interestingly 6,552 were trained in 1989 and only two Panamanians were trained in 1999. No Panamanian was trained by IMET funds in the years in between. Source: [http://web.deskbook.osd.mil/appfiles/RL1B0539.XLS], Accessed October 28, 2001.}


\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{98} Ibid.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{99} Hamilton, Lee H., “Indiana’s Role in Partnership for Peace,” Speech to the House of Representatives, Tuesday, July 19, 1994.}
relations objectives and therefore may enhance the success of the various SPPs. The National Guard can in return, further the objectives of E-IMET, which are highlighted below.

4. **Expanded International Military Education and Training Program (E-MET)**

The Expanded International Military Education and Training Program (E-IMET) is a subset of the IMET program where educators “…train foreign military students and civilians in managing defense resources, in civilian control of the military, and in improving military justice systems in accordance with internationally recognized standards of human rights. Several educational institutions further enhance the goals of the program. E-IMET is highlighted here because it is one linkage that may have utility for the U.S. SPP, and vice versa. The activities of the E-IMET institutions may include a team of military, educational and political experts traveling to countries who have requested their assistance. These traveling teams are called Mobile Education Teams (MET). The METs train both military and civilian personnel in the importance and operational aspects of having a civilian minister of defense (MOD), and thus, civilian control of the military. The team coordinates with the requesting government to prepare for the training, which culminates in weeklong workshops with senior military and civilian participants.

In two analytical studies of E-IMET activities in both Mozambique and Guatemala, Professor Thomas Bruneau laments the lack of follow up by any U.S. agency after the training team has left the nation. Perhaps in the future, the SPP and E-IMET educators can provide that follow-up when conducting activities in a partnership country. In addition, METs can orient nations requesting a future partnership with the U.S. National Guard objectives prior to National Guard involvement in the partnership.

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5. Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP)

The Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP) was originally initiated by EUCOM as a method to engage and assist former Warsaw Pact countries after their independence from the then Soviet Union. It was to become “the means of encouraging the development of democratic military institutions in Central and Eastern Europe”\(^\text{103}\) and a means of stabilizing countries that could pose potential threats around the periphery of NATO countries.

The JCTP is made up of three elements: the Contact Team Program Office (ECJ5-J) located at EUCOM headquarters, the Military Liaison Teams, and Traveling Contact Teams. The Contact Team Program Office opened on July 1, 1992 with the duties “…to plan, coordinate, and direct the activities of the program, to include training and deploying the military liaison teams and traveling contact teams.”\(^\text{104}\) Therefore the JCTP was intact before the SPP originated and it facilitated the emergence of the Partnerships. The equivalent of the ECJ5-J in Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) is the Traditional CINC Activities (TCA) Coordinator.

a. Military Liaison Teams (MLT)

The MLTs (otherwise referred to as The Country Team) in EUCOM consist of four to six military officers and NCOs and contains a mix of Army, Air Force, Navy and Marines; active component and reserve component personnel. The team resides in the PN and coordinates regularly with the PN ministry of defense (MOD) and the U.S. Ambassador. Additionally, there is coordination between the MLT and the U.S. Department of State (DoS) and the Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC). The MLT coordinates military-to-military contact based on the needs identified by the PN and in accordance with the ambassador’s country plan.

Operational control of all MLTs in EUCOM is maintained by the ECJ5-5, but the National Guard representative also maintains contact with his or her National Guard SPP Coordinator back in the U.S. In addition, the Regional Coordinator from the NGB International Affairs office provides policy guidance and maintains the status of SPP activities in his or her assigned region.


There are some changes on the horizon for the MLTs. First, there are some PNs that have accessed into NATO and therefore the MLTs are now being reduced in size to four or less members. Accession into NATO may, in the future, become a milestone for eliminating the MLT altogether, but there should still be some opportunities for the SPP in the PN as the contacts evolve from strictly military-to-military to military/civilian-to-military/civilian interactions. The second change that is being considered is to move operational control for the teams from the ECJ5-J to the ECJ4.

b. Traveling Contact Teams (TCT)

These small teams (normally two to five subject matter experts) familiarize selected PN civilian and/or military personnel in specific subjects. The intent is for the teams to brief on subjects that support the goals of NGB and/or the Unified Commands. The teams can be made up of solely National Guard, Reserve or active component military personnel or a combination of all. They are designated traveling contact teams because they stay in the PN for short periods of time. The TCTs may familiarize PN personnel in subjects such as the rule of law, the chaplain’s role in the military and how to combine operations with other nations.105 Most importantly, the TCT “…provides non-lethal assistance and advice focused on building democratic military institutions with peacetime utility in support of civilian authorities. Training in war fighting skills is specifically prohibited. Assistance is in such areas as disaster response, civil emergencies and humanitarian assistance is stressed.”106

These teams travel to the partner country to conduct the training, but there are opportunities for PN personnel to travel to U.S. overseas installations or to the U.S. Some opportunities include the IMET training discussed earlier (but not associated with the SPP) and familiarization tours discussed below.

c. Familiarization Tours

The U.S. Active component military or the National Guard conducts familiarization tours, or “FAM” tours based on requests from PNs and the ambassador’s country plan. The purpose of these tours is to orient PN personnel with U.S. operational

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procedures and to “…give foreign national military personnel the opportunity to visit their partner state. They gain broad insights into the American way of life and the role of the National Guard in providing support to both the active military and civilian authorities. Typical Fam Tours are between four to ten days in length and have between 2-7 foreign nation personnel.” No training is conducted during these tours.

APPENDIX D. FUNDING THE SPP

A. FUNDING THE SPP

The SPP is funded with a complex mix of monies. These funds all have conditions attached to their dispersal. For example, some monies can be used to fund pay and allowances (P&A) for personnel participating in the activity, but may not be used to fund operations and maintenance (O&M) for the same activities or vice versa. Understanding the terms used in the following sections is necessary for comparing the two programs in the case studies.

1. The Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSC) and The Traditional CINC Activities (TCA) Funds

Three documents are necessary to generate missions and allocate the funding for those missions within the EUCOM and SOUTHCOM Areas of Responsibility (AOR). They are the Combatant Commander’s Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSC), the Traditional CINC Activities (TCA) program document, and “concept papers”. First, the Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSC) document specifies and prioritizes goals for the next seven years within the Combatant Commander’s Area of Responsibility (AOR). The goals in the TEP support the U.S. national security goals, the Ambassador’s Country Plan and the theater strategic goals. The second document, the Traditional CINC Activities (TCA) paper contains more specific operational objectives against which the Combatant Commander allocates funds for activities that he deems to be essential to support the TEP, which prioritizes the TCA program objectives. TCA funds provide the primary source of funds for the SPP. The Combatant Commander has much latitude when expending the funds. However, a condition when expending TCA funding is that military skills cannot be trained to the PNs when funding the activity with this type of money. This again, is due to the Leahy Amendment. The third document necessary to generate missions is the concept paper. The SPP supports selected objectives outlined on the Theater Security Cooperation Plan by submitting concept papers that support specific operational objectives listed in the TCA papers. Events that utilize TCA funds must be relatively small in nature. These include activities like senior leaders conferences, or subject matter expert exchanges (SMEE).
Strategy, Policy, and Plans has been delegated the authority to manage day-to-day execution of the program. Responsibility for the activities and exercises conducted by the MONG within Panama falls under the Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) in Panama. This is unusual because the ODC normally handles the Security Assistance Program. However, the ODC tries to keep a TCA Coordinator in the office to directly manage the SPP.

2. Other Funding

Depending on the nature of the engagement, other sources of funds are available to the SPP. One source is overseas deployment for training (ODT) funds which pay the salaries of army NG soldiers while they are in an annual training (AT) status, but performing their annual training overseas. This money must be used for NG soldiers to train in their MOS or AFSC skills. One example includes NG medical technicians giving flu shots to children in the PN. ODT funds may not be used for O&M expenses. The Air Force equivalent to this funding is military personnel authorization (MPA) days.

Newly independent states (NIS) qualify to receive cooperative threat reduction (CTR) funds. These funds are exclusively for use in reducing the nuclear threat in Russia and the NIS, but some of the monies can be used for the California/Ukraine partnership activities if they contribute to this goal. In fiscal year 2001, Congress earmarked $29,100,000 specifically for Ukraine in CTR money.

There are various funds related to construction activities that can be used in support of SPP initiatives. These include exercise related construction (ERC) funds and humanitarian civic assistance (HCA) funds. ERC funds pay to construct facilities for NG soldiers while they are performing duty in the PN. An example is constructing a base camp or a maintenance facility for NG use. However, these facilities are left behind for PN use when the Guard returns home. HCA funds pay for activities such as building medical clinics, schools or roads in the PN.

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108 James N. Soligan to various commands, 31 July 2000, Traditional CINC Activities (TCA) Program for FY 2001; Implementation Instructions, (n.p.).

109 The Government of Panama (GoP) wants as few U.S. military personnel in the country as possible, so the U.S. military personnel have numerous duty positions assigned to them.

The funding sources described above merely scratch the surface of funds available for SPP activities. Therefore, it makes sense to develop professional SPP Coordinators by assigning them to a tour on an MLT where they can observe the active component more closely to identify further resources.
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