

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY
SPECIAL FORCES IN THE OBJECTIVE FORCE

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

THE ORGANIZATION OF UNITED STATES ARMY SPECIAL FORCES IN THE OBJECTIVE FORCE, by MAJ John S. Prairie
128 pages.

The current task organization of Army Special Forces was developed fifty years ago to execute missions in a very specific operational environment against a threat that was simple to template. In the twenty-first century this organization is no longer suitable. The Army recognizes this and has initiated a program to transform all of its forces into an Objective Force with specific capabilities to successfully operate in the future operational environment in order to accomplish full spectrum dominance. This thesis examines research material revolving around the Army's Transformation Plan for the Objective Force and breaks the analysis into a four step process. The first step is to review the contemporary operational environment and the characteristics of the future threat. The second step is to identify those operations and mission areas of the Objective Force. The third step is to define unconventional operations and the required capabilities that Special Forces will need to embody in order to be successful at every point across the spectrum of operations. The paper concludes by proposing a realistic Special Forces task organization for Units of Employment and Units of Action that embody the requirements stated in the Army's vision for the Objective Force.

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ACRONMYMS

| | |
|---------|---|
| AFSO | Advance Full Spectrum Operations |
| AOR | Area of Responsibility |
| ARSOF | Army Special Operation Forces |
| ASO | Army Special Operations |
| CA | Civil Affairs |
| CALL | Central for Army Lessons Learned |
| CARL | Combined Arms Research Library |
| CDR | Commander |
| CENTCOM | Central Command |
| CGSOC | Command and General Staff Officer School |
| CINC | Commander in Chief |
| COE | Contemporary Operational Environment |
| DA | Department of the Army |
| DARPA | Defense Advance Research Projects Agency |
| DoD | Department of Defense |
| DoS | Department of State |
| DTLOMS | Doctrine, Training, Leaders, Organization, Materiel, Soldiers |
| FCS | Future Combat System |
| FID | Foreign Internal Defense |
| FM | Field Manual |
| JCS | Joint Chiefs of Staff |

| | |
|--------|--|
| JP | Joint Publication |
| LDR | Leader |
| MSN | Mission |
| ODA | Operational Detachment Alpha |
| ODB | Operational Detachment Bravo |
| OPCEN | Operations Center |
| OPS | Operations |
| O&O | Operational and Organizational |
| PACOM | Pacific Command |
| PSYOP | Psychological Operations |
| RDO | Rapid Decision Operations |
| RNG | Ranger |
| SF | Special Forces |
| SF IOC | Special Forces Integrating Operational Concept |
| SFOG | Special Forces Operational Group |
| SF O&O | Special Forces Operational and Organizational |
| SIGCEN | Signal Center |
| SOAR | Special Operations Aviation Regiment |
| SOCOM | Special Operations Command |
| SOF | Special Operation Forces |
| SPTCEN | Support Center |
| SWCS | Special Warfare Center and School |
| TEP | Theater Engagement Plan |

| | |
|--------|---|
| TNG | Training |
| TRADOC | Training and Doctrine Command |
| TSFC | Theater Special Forces Command |
| UO | Unconventional Operations |
| US | United States |
| USA | United States Army |
| USASFC | United States Army Special Forces Command |
| USASOC | United States Army Special Operations Command |
| UW | Unconventional Warfare |

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Introduction

The unresting progress of mankind causes continual change in the weapons; and with that must come a continual change in the manner of fighting. (USA, Army Vision 2000)

Alfred Mahan

The future environment will remain multipolar and multifaceted. The key powers in a regional and global framework will most probably be the United States, the European Union, China, Japan, and Russia. Future alliances, coalitions, and partnerships will be linked to these nations. This is not to say that these nations represent the most powerful in a given region; it simply offers the growing significance of certain countries in the global setting. The global political setting is now influenced by the factors of the proliferation of technology, the acceleration of modern economics, and the materialization of an information-dominated society all of which will shape the twenty-first century (USA, TRADOC White Paper on the Future Operational and Threat Environment 2000).

Currently, out of the 192 nation-states in the world as many as thirty have the potential for failure as a result of their inability to meet the needs of their populations or as a product of ethnic, cultural, or religious conflict. Since 1990 there have been more than fifty ethnic wars, 170 border conflicts and two major wars involving regional and global forces (USA, TRADOC White Paper on the Future Operational and Threat Environment 2000).

These facts reveal that, following the Cold War bipolar structure, nations, transnational actors, and non-nation-state elements are free to challenge and redefine the global allocation of power, the concept of dominance, and the characteristics of warfare (USA, TRADOC White Paper on the Future Operational and Threat Environment 2000). To counter these changes in the characteristics of warfare the United States military must transform in order to remain a powerful national tool. Thus, to prepare for this change the military must begin to convert now. Military service components must modify their task organization, doctrine, and equipment in order to accomplish the mission on the battlefields of the future. The Army Special Forces (SF) is no exception.

One event that has affected the United States Army like no other has been since the end of the Cold War. The decline of our fifty-year adversary and the simultaneous advancement in US military and civilian technology have shifted the employment of the Army from a purely combat operational role to one with a broad range of options that include peacetime operations, deterrence, and war fighting (USA, Army Vision 2000). To determine if it was adequately prepared to accomplish these missions, the Army conducted numerous self-evaluated studies and concluded that the force, as a whole, had to modernize its organization, doctrine, and equipment in order to meet these future challenges. Hence the “Transformation” concept was initiated.

Transformation has become the Army’s strategy to effectively modify the force over the next twenty-five years from its present organization to an Objective Force without breaking its war-fighting readiness (USA, Army Vision 2000). Transformation is based on changing a sizeable Cold War forward deployed fighting force into a rapidly deployable power projected force that is based in the Continental United States (USA,

CGSOC, ST-C300, War Fighting 2001). The end state to the Army's Transformation concept is to produce a land based strategic force in which each unit is responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable in order to achieve full spectrum dominance (USA, Army Vision 2000).

Problem Statement

This year (2001) the United States Army is taking the first step towards its transformation into the Objective Force of the twenty-first century. This transformation is taking place to create a force that will be able to conduct military operations in order to achieve full spectrum dominance (DoD, Joint Vision 2000). Once assumptions concerning the future threat or threats to the US have been identified, new Army doctrine will be developed to guide leaders and their units during peace or conflict. The Army's next step will be to task organize and man the force in a configuration that will lead to mission success.

Out of the thirty nation-states in the world that have the potential for failure, Army Special Forces (SF) will be active in 70 percent of these countries (Army Special Operations (ASO) Battle Lab Briefing 2001). For this reason Army SF is targeted to be one of the first organizations that will be modified. Upon the completion of the Army Transformation process, what should the Army SF organization look like in the Objective Force?

Thesis Question

How should the Army Special Forces (SF) be task organized to meet the envisioned mission requirements of the Army's Objective Force of 2032? This task organization will be configured to meet the force projection capabilities of the sister

services that will be used to deploy the force into the area of operations. It must be manned with the correct balance of military occupation specialties to provide the force with the expertise and skills required to succeed. SF's missions and capabilities will need to complement the Objective Force to maintain its interoperability on the battlefield.

Subordinate Questions

1. What will be the possible future operational and threat environment for the United States in the twenty-first century, specifically from 2010 to 2025? To answer the question of what operations and missions the Objective Force must accomplish, the possible threat environment must be defined. The Army must plan for possible changes in the current world order and operational environment setting and consider how it will be shaped by these four dimensions: global actors, common trends, critical variables, and perception of the U.S. (USA, TRADOC COE 2000). Specifically, the task organization, capabilities, and objectives of potential threats must be acknowledged and analyzed with the purpose of countering their effects.

2. What are the operations, mission areas, and capabilities of the Army's Objective Force? Once an estimate of the enemy situation is formulated the Army will know what operations the Objective Force must accomplish to succeed on the future battlefield. From this assessment, and from the requirements of the National Military Strategy, a new war-fighting doctrine will be formulated and implemented that will encompass the Army's Transformation end state: a versatile and sustainable general purpose ground force able to rapidly deploy from the US to anywhere in the world with the lethality and survivability to accomplish any assigned task (USA, AFSSO 2000).

3. What will be the missions assigned to the Army SF in the twenty-first century?

Upon defining the operations, mission areas, and the capabilities of the Objective Force the next step is to define the missions that SF must be able to accomplish in order to compliment the operations of the Objective Force.

4. What will be the unique capabilities that the Army SF must embody in the twenty-first century? Answering this question will have the greatest impact on how SF should be task organized in order to be aligned with the rest of the Objective Force to meet the goals of Transformation. These special operation unique capabilities will be utilized in the form of military occupation specialties and the number of specific positions in the design to allow for mission success.

Significance of the Study

The Army will transform. It has already started with the commencement of the Interim Force and the fielding of the two Initial Brigade Combat Teams and the development of doctrine designed for use in the current and near future operational environment (Shinseki 2001). With a change in world order and technological advancements since the Cold War there has been a need for change in the Army's organization, doctrine, and equipment. This modification will apply to all aspects of the Army, to include its SF. The United States Army will always need a "special" force that has the ability to function across the full spectrum of operations to align conditions in the new battlefield framework. For SF to accomplish its missions in the future there is a need to modify the way it should look and fight on the battlefield.

This thesis will present a recommended configuration for SF in the new Objective Force. This proposal will be based on research dealing with, among other things, how SF

should be arrayed in order to assist the military to achieve full spectrum dominance. The United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) has been tasked to develop this new organization and the doctrine that will guide it, but as with any experimental research project, a fresh perspective and innovative ideas as to how a problem can be solved are always helpful. This thesis is designed with that in mind. It is meant to provide insight and or observations from someone outside the planning cycle, with the goal of assisting the overall project.

Also, while this thesis only deals with one Special Operations Force (SOF) unit from one branch of the military, it may also be used as a stepping stone to assist sister services in the joint community with their own design and composition of their specialized forces in the twenty-first century.

Background

To effectively answer the question of how SF should look in the future, information must be provided that sets the stage of why a change in our military forces needed to occur. The following will present the critical reasoning and thought process that brought about this mission. It will also provide substantial information at the joint and Army level on the procedure of Transformation and its end state.

The Cold War was a system built around weight . . . The Globalization system is built around speed. In the Cold War, the big ate the small. In Globalization, the fast eat the slow.

Thomas Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) realized after the Cold War the need for change throughout all the armed forces and established a template in its *Joint Vision 2010* that would direct how they would fight in the future. The JCS continued to express this

ideology in *Joint Vision 2020*. Both clearly state that, “The primary purpose of those forces has been and will be to fight and win the Nation’s wars,” (DoD, Joint Vision 2000 and USA, Army Vision 2000). *Joint Vision 2020* also states that the military’s strategic concept of decisive force, power projection, overseas presence, and strategic agility will continue to preserve the nation’s presence abroad (DoD Joint Vision 2000).

“The US military is a very visible and critical pillar of our effort to shape the international security environment in ways that protect and promote US interests” (National Security Strategy 2000). This country will maintain its current international responsibilities and interests in order to preserve its global influence and retain its role as a world power.

The problem in the future security environment is that the threat will not be a clearly defined, single (monolithic) threat and will have the capability to access the commercial industrial base and easily acquire technology that is comparable to or better than what the US armed forces will possess. Due to the information revolution, the threat will learn to adapt to the military’s capabilities and cause the loss of its stability (DoD, Joint Vision 2000). It will no longer try to face the military’s conventional war-fighting abilities, but rather use asymmetric engagements with the help of the proliferation of information technology, ballistic missiles, and weapons of mass destruction (Caldera and Shinseki 2000). The threat will avoid the armed forces’ strengths and instead attack its potential weakness, thus effectively creating conditions that delay, deter, or counter its capabilities. *Joint Vision 2020* continues by stating that the threat may use a combination of asymmetrical capabilities in its engagement plan or the armed forces may face a variety of foes at one time, causing an asymmetrical danger (DoD, Joint Vision

2000). The overriding difficulty of the future threat is its ability to be highly flexible throughout the levels of war and capable of modifying its objectives, thus making it hard to identify and defeat. These future threats are not baseless estimates or speculations, but rather are based on current trends in today's global society (USA, Army Posture Statement 2000).

In order to counter this threat the military, as a whole, needs to transform into a faster, more lethal, and more precise force. Thus, the goal of transformation at the joint level is to produce a military force that will dominate across the full spectrum of military operations through the capabilities of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full dimension protection (DoD, Joint Vision 2000).

The new *Army Vision 2020* complements the *Joint Vision 2020* and develops a plan to transform the Army to better align its capabilities with the missions it will encounter across the full spectrum of military operations in the twenty-first century (USA, Posture Statement 2000). Falling in line with the rest of the US military and guided by the same reasons of a complex security environment, asymmetrical threat, and advancement in technology, the Army has concluded that it too must transform to be successful in the future. Military operations in the twenty-first century will demand that the US land components operate as a part of a joint, multinational, or interagency force conducting numerous tasks from humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to peacekeeping and peace enforcement, while remaining ready to execute the war-fighting specifications of the *National Military Strategy* (USA, Posture Statement 2000).

In order to accomplish this, the Army must reorganize and become a force that can successfully function across the full spectrum of operations in the operational

environment of the future. This organization will be the Objective Force. The Objective Force will present the US with a land component force that is responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable (USA, Army Vision 2000). This Objective Force must be capable of rapid strategic movement to quickly meet contingency operations with the ability to flow from one end of the operational spectrum to the other while adapting to changing situations, preventing armed conflict, and maintaining force protection in a continuous operation until mission completeness. With these qualifications the Objective Force will complement those mission and new capabilities set forth by the Joint Headquarters in order to achieve full spectrum dominance (see figure 1).




Figure 1. *Army Vision 2020* supports the *Joint Vision 2020*. Source: USA, Posture Statement 2000.

The execution of the Army's transformation strategy will require detailed planning, continuous support, periodic reassessments and adjustments (Shinseki 2001). The Transformation concept will follow three distinct paths: the Objective Force, the Legacy Force, and the Interim Force (see figure 2). This process began in 2001 with

plans for the first Objective Force unit to be combat effective by 2008 and the last unit completed by 2032. SF will also follow this concept with USASOC assigning different active duty Special Forces Groups to follow each of these distinct paths with a target complete Transformation date in 2010 (ASO Battle Lab Brief 2001).




Figure 2. Army Transformation Strategy. *Source:* USA, Army Vision 2000.

The Objective Force is the Army’s Transformation Strategy end state. It will be a military organization that will encompass each of the Transformation goals by building a force that will be responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable. The Objective Force will incorporate the entire Army. “Presently, the Army has heavy forces which are the world’s finest with no equal but have limited strategic deployment ability, and light forces which are easy to deploy but have limited tactical utility to conduct most operations in theater” and the Objective Force will contain both of these attributes (Shinseki 2000). The goal will be to deploy a brigade anywhere in the world in ninety-six hours; followed by a division in 120 hours; and close with five

divisions (corps size) in thirty days. Currently, the science and technology community is establishing the realm of possibilities for the common baseline Future Combat System (Cosumano 2001), as well as trying to answer difficult questions, for example, how to reduce weight of armored vehicles while increasing fire power; how to increase the deplorability of units without sacrificing survivability; and how to reduce the theater logistic footprint while maintaining combat unit sustainment. The next step is to collect the technological answers and formulate the research and development plan by 2003 (USA, Army Vision 2000).

The Legacy Force will consist of portions of the current Army as organized and equipped today. The proposal is to recapitalize the Legacy Force through on hand modernization programs, for instance, the incorporation of digital technology. This force will be maintained primarily for war-fighting readiness in order to fulfill the *National Military Strategy* over the next fifteen or twenty years (Shinseki 2000). The future integration of the Objective Force will make it obsolete.

The Interim Force is the bridge that will connect the gap between the Legacy and Objective Forces. This force will try to match the characteristics and the capabilities of the Objective Force within the confines of current technology. The Interim Force has already started with the fielding of two Initial Brigade Combat Teams at Fort Lewis, Washington, using off the shelf combat systems enhanced with cutting edge technology. Its primary purpose is to fill the immediate requirement that has been left void between current heavy and light units by not only being capable of quick strategic deployment, but also arriving with an increase in combat power in order to accomplish any mission across the operational spectrum. The organization, doctrine, and training systems developed for

the Interim Force will produce the same products that will be needed for the Objective Force (Shinseki 2000). Eventually, through technological advancements in equipment, the Interim Force will evolve into the Objective Force, thus fulfilling the Army's requirement for the future.

The Army's Transformation Strategy will not be completed overnight. To build the Objective Force will take many years of experimentation in order to contain all the Army's requested capabilities; thus, the target date for its integration is yet to be set. The need for a change has, however, been identified due to the future operational and threat environment. SF will need to reorganize its task organization in order to be integrated into this change, while maintaining its unique capabilities.

Assumptions

To explore the possible task organization of SF in the Objective Force there are assumptions that are made in order to develop these formations. This thesis describes the formation of a military unit of the future; thus, assumptions are made in various areas in order to support what the possible task organization should look like.

The prime assumption is that of the future operational and threat environment from 2010 and beyond. History has already proven time and time again that it is very difficult to foresee what might happen twenty years from now. In this study, a prediction of the possible threats is the basis from which the Army is developing those missions and the task organization of forces it will need to be successful. This assumption is more than just a guess. Research data collected by the DoD and other government agencies have shown trends in various aspects of society that would lead to theories of what the possible threats will be and how they will fight in the future. One example of these trends is the

assumption that by the middle of the twenty-first century 70 percent of the world's population will be living in complex or urban terrain. Complex and urban terrain offers a new dimension for the nation's threats to mask their capabilities and activities while interfering with military operations (Krepinevich 1996). Thus, the Army's reaction will be to adjust the way it organizes, trains, and fights in this type of scenario.

This thesis assumes that an economically strong US will remain a primary political, military, and social structure and will continue to be a world power with little or no internal turbulence (Hart and Rudman 1999). This thesis will also assume that the US Army will continue to be a professional volunteer force, armed with the latest technological weaponry, and will retain the flexibility to reorganize and adapt in order to meet these future requirements. It also assumes that the US will remain the foremost military power in the world (Hart and Rudman 1999).

It is assumed that each theater commander in chief (CINC) will have similar needs for SF unique capabilities within his area of responsibility (AOR) and will only modify this organization in order to cope with any specific geographic or environmental characteristic that the specific region may present. For example CENTCOM would require all SF teams to be vehicle mounted due to the immense amount of arid terrain in its region, while PACOM would not have that requirement, but would rather require numerous waterborne SF teams. Thus, this thesis will describe only one basic organization for SF in the Objective Force, developed around those core unique capabilities of SF instead of being based on theater CINC capabilities.

Limitations

The limitations and delimitations assist in establishing the parameters of what information this thesis includes and does not include respectively, with hopes to assist further research on this topic by other interested individuals. The following limitations describe the scope of research data contained within this thesis.

The research data for this thesis are based on the last political administration (Democratic Party 1993 to 2000). This administration set the parameters for the current National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy that have guided the military's concept of Transformation in order to achieve full spectrum dominance. Although possible developments or changes will occur continuously in national and military strategy during the research period for this thesis, an arbitrary research cutoff date of 31 December 2001 has been set. Significant changes after 31 December 2001 will be addressed in the conclusion as area for further research.

The possible twenty-first century operational and threat environment that is described in this paper is only a speculation of the future derived from available research material and the writer's own reasoning. This information should not be taken as the only scenario that the United States military might confront in the future, but rather should be used as an enemy's likely course of action that drives SF to develop a new task organization in order to function on tomorrow's battlefield.

This thesis only discusses a possible task organization of Army SF and the capabilities that they can bring to the fight of the future. The reason the rest of Army Special Operation Forces (ARSOF) are not being considered is due to their current status in the development process at the Special Operations Battle Labs. SF were the only

ARSOF unit that had a completed draft of its Objective Force Operational and Organizational (O&O) concept by the above-mentioned research cut off date. This SF O&O concept in itself is a limitation because the final draft has yet to be approved by the SOF chain of command. As of 1 December 2001, Civil Affairs (CA) and PSYOP are scheduled to complete their O&O concepts during the late spring of 2002, and there is no scheduled review time for the Rangers or the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR).

An important limitation for this thesis is that the Army's Transformation to the Objective Force is just in the conceptual stage; it is still being researched and scientifically studied by Army research and development departments. There is neither a firm organization nor framework of what the Objective Force will look like, nor is there doctrine written yet as to how it will be employed. There are draft documents developed by other TRADOC Battle Labs on the probable O&O concepts on the Units of Action and Units of Employment in the Objective Force and their missions. The operations, mission areas, and capabilities of these units are important in the development of the SF task organization, but the actual task organization of these elements will have little or no bearing on how SF should look like in the future. Based on this assumption, the possible task organization for these conventional units in the Objective Force will not be discussed.

The author's intent is to keep this thesis and its discussion unclassified to allow dissemination of this information in order to support further research on this topic.

Delimitations

The following delimitations describe the scope of research data not contained within this thesis. This study will not talk about any other special operation forces from the joint community, such as the Navy SEALs or the Air Force Para-Rescue Jumpers or Air Force Combat Control Teams, nor will it discuss any multinational special operation forces.

This information does not cover all the mission statements and possible capabilities that ARSOF may be assigned in the future, but only states those missions based on the future operational environment and the requirements of Army SF. It also does not address specific future ARSOF doctrine or how it will specifically fit into the new National Military Strategy of this century.

Finally, this thesis will not discuss the task organization or the recapilitization of the SF Legacy Force, nor will it discuss the possible task organizations of the SF Interim Force. In the ARSOF Transformation Plan the organizations and the missions of the SF Legacy Force and the SF Interim Force are described in detail in USASOC documents.

Defining Terms

The parameters of this paper deal with a very small community within the Army that uses numerous unique terms to describe or provide information on its specific organization and operations. To present the reader with a better understanding of the information presented in this thesis, the following terms must be defined. In most cases Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, published in September 2001, is used to define these terms in order to provide definitions from a single source. Certain definitions that are special operation specific are

taken from their associated joint special operations publications or Army SF manuals.

Definitions that deal with the future operational and threat environment were derived

from Training and Doctrine Command's *Contemporary Operational Environment*

document, published in February 2000. The following terms are defined:

Agile: is a tenet of Army operations, as well as a responsive force attribute. A responsive, agile force package is one that is sustainable and mobile enough to accomplish the mission. Agile forces are mentally and physically able to transition within or between types of operations without losing momentum. (USA, FM 3-0, Operations 2001)

Army special operations forces: are those Active and Reserve Component Army forces designated by the Secretary of Defense that are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. They include five organizations: Special Forces, Rangers, Special Operations Aviation Regiment, Civil Affairs, and PSYOP. (DoD, JP 1-02 2001)

Asymmetric warfare: denotes warfare where one side uses innovative (and possibly unexpected) and focuses whatever may be one side's comparative advantages against an enemy's relative weakness. It encompasses anything – strategy, tactics, technology, organization, or culture that alters the battlespace to give one side an advantage or negate the other's advantage. (USA, TRADOC COE 2000 and USA, SF IOC 2002)

Asynchronous warfare: this type of warfare is closely related to asymmetric warfare. It consists of actions or events not directly related to the current situation or conducted in direct response to current actions. It is a way of timing actions to generate asymmetries that create situational advantages. (USA, TRADOC COE 2000)

Characteristics of military operations: distinguishing traits in the execution of strategy, tactics, or the process of combat relating to the armed services. (USA, TRADOC COE 2000)

Decisive operations: combat operations that compel the enemy to submit to our will through the destruction, defeat or containment of his land forces. (USA, SF IOC 2002)

Defensive operations: defeat an enemy attack, buy time, economize forces, or develop conditions favorable for offensive operations. Defensive operations alone normally cannot achieve a decision. Their purpose is to create conditions

for a counteroffensive that allows Army forces to regain the initiative. (USA, FM 3-0, Operations 2001)

Deployable: are forces combining training, facilities, soldiers, and equipment to deploy with speed and force. Commanders view deployment as more than getting people and equipment on ships and airplanes; they visualize the entire process, beginning with the fully operational unit deployed in theater, and reverse plan to the unit's pre-deployment location. (USA, FM 3-0, Operations 2001)

Dominant maneuver: is the ability of joint forces to gain positional advantage with decisive speed and overwhelming operational tempo in the achievement of assigned military tasks. Widely dispersed joint air, land, sea, amphibious, special operations and space forces, capable of scaling and massing force or forces and the effects of fires as required for either combat or noncombat operations, will secure advantage across the range of military operations through the application of information, deception, engagement, mobility and counter-mobility capabilities. (DoD, Joint Vision 2000)

Engagement: activities conducted by U.S. Armed Forces to assist in shaping the international environment as a part of the National Military Strategy. U.S. Armed Forces help shape the international environment primarily through their inherent deterrent qualities and through peacetime military engagement. The shaping element of our strategy helps foster the institutions and international relationships that constitute a peaceful strategic environment by promoting stability; preventing and reducing conflict and threats; and deterring aggression and coercion. (USA, SF IOC 2002)

Focused logistics: is the ability to provide the joint force the right personnel, equipment, and supplies in the right place, at the right time, and in the right quantity, across the full range of military operations. This will be made possible through a real-time, web-based information system providing total asset visibility as part of a common relevant operational picture, effectively linking the operator and logistician across services and support agencies. Through transformational innovations to organizations and processes, focused logistics will provide the joint war fighter with support for all functions. Full dimensional protection is the ability of the joint force to protect its personnel and other assets required to decisively execute assigned tasks. (DoD, Joint Vision 2000)

Full dimensional protection: is achieved through the tailored selection and application of multilayered active and passive measures, within the domains of air, land, sea, space, and information across the range of military operations with an acceptable level of risk. (DoD Joint Vision 2000)

Full spectrum dominance: is the ability of U.S. forces, operating unilaterally or in combination with multinational and interagency partners, to defeat any adversary

and control any situation across the full range of military operations. It implies that U.S. forces are able to conduct prompt, sustained, and synchronized operations with combinations of forces tailored to specific situations and with access to and freedom to operate in all domains--space, sea, land, air, and information. According to *Joint Vision 2020*, full spectrum dominance is achieved through the interdependent application of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full dimensional protection. (DoD, Joint Vision 2000)

Full spectrum operations: are the range of operations Army forces conduct in war and military operations other than war. Full spectrum operations include offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations. Missions in any environment require Army forces prepared to conduct any combination of these operations. (USA, FM 3-0, Operations 2001)

Geopolitical environment: stated and implied rules that define how actors interrelate and interact and which also provides a framework within which military forces operate. Geostrategy is an element of the geopolitical environment. (USA, TRADOC COE 2000)

Global scout: a term used by the Chief of Staff of the Army in the annual Army After Next Report for FY 1998. It is the function provided to deploying ground forces by forward-deployed ARSOF. These are appropriately selected and trained ARSOF personnel who, through their assigned regional engagement activities, are effectively positioned and fully competent to observe and report information of tactical, operational, and strategic significance. Linking the deploying ground forces with the in theater ARSOF databases results in the global scout function. (USA, SF IOC 2002)

Globalization: the process of accelerating economic, technological, cultural and political integration (USA, TRADOC COE 2000). Globalization means “more and more we as a nation are affected by events beyond our borders. Outlaw states and ethnic conflicts threaten regional stability and economic progress in many important areas of the world. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD), terrorism, drug trafficking and organized crime are global concerns and transcend national borders... resource depletion, rapid population growth, environmental damage, new infectious diseases and uncontrolled refugee migration have important implications for American security.” (National Security Strategy for a New Century 1998)

Interoperability: is the ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together. (DoD, JP 1-02 2001)

Joint: is defined as activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate. (DoD, JP 1-02 2001)

Joint operations: is a general term to describe military actions conducted by joint forces or by Service forces in relationships (e.g., support, coordinating authority) which, of themselves, do not create joint forces. (DoD, JP 1-02 2001)

Lethal: are forces combine the elements of combat power to defeat the enemy. When deployed, every unit generates combat power and contributes to the fight. From the operational and tactical perspectives, commanders ensure deployed Army forces have enough combat power to overwhelm any likely enemy. The art of strategic responsiveness requires that commanders balance the ability to mass the effects of lethal combat systems against the requirement to deploy, support, and sustain the units that employ those systems. Commanders assemble force packages that maximize the lethality of initial-entry forces consistent with both the mission and the requirement to project, employ, and sustain the force. They tailor and sequence follow on forces to increase both the lethality and operational reach of the entire force. (USA, FM 3-0, Operations 2001)

Major theater war: term used in the Defense Planning Guidance that describes an environment where a significant portion of U.S. Armed Forces is committed in an armed conflict. (DoD, JP 1-02 2001)

National interest: interests that do not affect our national survival, but they do affect our national well being and the character of the world in which we live. (USA, TRADOC COE 2000)

Offensive operations: aim at destroying or defeating an enemy. Their purpose is to impose US will on the enemy and achieve decisive victory. (USA, FM 3-0, Operations 2001)

Operation: is one, a military action or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission and two, the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defense, and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign. (DoD, JP 1-02 2001)

Operational environment: a composite of all conditions, circumstances, and influences, which affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the unit commander (USA, TRADOC COE 2000). Has six dimensions: threat, political, unified action, land combat operations, information, and technology. Each affects how Army forces combine, sequence, and conduct military operations. Commanders tailor forces, employ diverse capabilities, and support different missions to succeed in this complex environment. (USA, FM 3-0, Operations 2001)

Operational level of war: is the level at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within

theaters or operational areas. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactical forces, and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives. (DoD, JP 1-02 2001 and DoD, JP 3-0 2000)

Precision engagement: is the ability of joint forces to locate, surveil, discern, and track objectives or targets; select, organize, and use the correct systems; generate desired effects; assess results; and reengage with decisive speed and overwhelming operational tempo as required, throughout the full range of military operations. (DoD, Joint Vision 2000)

Reach back: capability of deployed forces to coordinate with CONUS based forces and resources using the global information grid. (USA, SF IOC 2002)

Responsive: is an attitude that spans operational planning, preparation, execution, and assessment. It establishes the conditions for successful operational and tactical maneuver at the outset of operations. Responsiveness is more than the ability to quickly deploy: it requires that the right Army force deploy to the right place at the right time. Forward deployed units, forward positioned capabilities, peacetime military engagement, and force projection from anywhere the needed capabilities reside all contribute to Army force responsiveness. (USA, FM 3-0, Operations 2001)

Smaller scale contingencies: a broad range of military conflicts short of major theater war (MTW) that threaten important national interests. (USA, SF IOC 2002)

Special operations: is conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or informational objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. These operations are conducted across the full range of military operations, independently or in coordination with operations of conventional, non-special operations forces. Political-military considerations frequently shape special operations, requiring clandestine, covert, or low visibility techniques and oversight at the national level. SO differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. (DoD, JP 1-02 2001)

Special operations forces: are those Active and Reserve Component forces of the Military Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically

organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. (DoD, JP 1-02 2001)

Stability operations: promote and protect US national interests by influencing the threat, political, and information dimensions of the operational environment through a combination of peacetime developmental, cooperative activities and coercive actions in response to crisis. Regional security is supported by a balanced approach that enhances regional stability and economic prosperity simultaneously. Army force presence promotes a stable environment. (USA, FM 3-0, Operations 2001)

Strategic level of war: is the level at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives. Activities at this level establish national and multinational military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of national power; develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve these objectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans. (DoD, JP 1-02 2001 and DoD, JP 3-0 2000)

Strategically responsive force: responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable. (USA, FM 3-0 2001)

Support operations: employ Army forces to assist civil authorities, foreign or domestic, as they prepare for or respond to crisis and relieve suffering. Domestically, Army forces respond only when the NCA direct. Army forces operate under the lead federal agency and comply with provisions of U.S. law, to include the Posse Comitatus and Stafford Acts. (USA, FM 3-0, Operations 2001)

Survivable: combines technology and methods that afford the maximum protection to Army forces. Lethality enhances survivability: lethal forces destroy enemies before they strike and can retaliate if necessary. Deploying commanders integrate sufficient force protection assets to ensure mission accomplishment. Engineer, air defense, and chemical units increase the survivability of deployed Army forces. As with the other attributes, lift constraints and time available complicate the situation. Survivability requires an astute assessment of operational risk. In many operations, rapid offensive action may provide better force protection than massive defenses around lodgment areas. (USA, FM 3-0, Operations 2001)

Sustainable: generating and sustaining combat power is fundamental to strategic sustainability. Commanders reconcile competing requirements: On one hand, Army forces must accomplish JFC assigned missions. On the other, they need adequate sustainment for operations extended in time and depth. Commanders

tailor force packages to provide sufficient CSS while exercising every solution to reduce the CSS footprint. In some cases, commanders augment CSS capability with host nation and contracted support. (USA, FM 3-0, Operations 2001)

Tactical level of war: is the level at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives. (DoD, JP 1-02 2001 and DoD, JP 3-0 2000)

Threat: any specific foreign nation or organization with intentions and military capabilities that suggest it could be adversarial or challenge the security interests of the U.S., its friends or allies. (USA, TRADOC COE 2000)

Transformation: is described as the creation of a force that is dominant across the full spectrum of military operations. The United States must maintain its overseas presence forces and the ability to rapidly project power worldwide in order to achieve full spectrum dominance. (DoD, Joint Vision 2000)

Variables: factors or elements, which make up the operational framework. When operationalized, they define the conditions, circumstances, and influences, which affect the employment of military forces, and influence the decisions of the commander. (USA, TRADOC COE 2000)

Versatile: like agile, versatile is a tenet of Army operations. Army forces conduct prompt and sustained full spectrum operations with forces tailored to accomplish the mission. Versatility requires Army force packages able to reorganize and adapt to changing missions. Commanders carefully tailor and sequence forces into theater, making sure forces have the necessary command and control (C2), combat, combat support (CS), and combat service support (CSS) assets. Whenever possible, commanders deploy multifunctional teams. However, they understand that teams gathered from different organizations do not execute efficiently unless trained to work together. Thus, training emphasizes teamwork and adaptability. Commanders stress versatile C2 and practice reconfiguring headquarters to control multiple missions. (USA, FM 3-0, Operations 2001)

Vital interest: interests of broad, overriding importance to the survival, safety and vitality of our nation. Among these are the physical security of our territory and that of our allies, the safety of our citizens, our economic well being and the protection of our critical infrastructures. (USA, TRADOC COE 2000)

Unit of action: tactical level Army combat units of the Objective Forces that are used to conduct close combat with the enemy. In the Objective Force these units are primarily brigade and battalion size elements and are organized as combined arms teams.

Unit of employment: operational level Army combat units of the Objective Forces that are used to employ units of action. In the Objective Force these units are primarily used as command and control elements that utilize combat units against enemy forces.

Weapons of mass destruction: are weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/or of being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people. Weapons of mass destruction can be high explosives or nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological weapons, but exclude the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part of the weapon. These weapon systems are not only being proliferated by the super power nations as part of their national security strategy, but are also being developed by smaller nations as well as non-nation organizations in order to gain actor status on the world stage. (USA, JP 1-02 2001)

Summary

The Army is currently studying through research and development how it will operate in tomorrow's world. There are numerous assumptions on what the operational and threat environment will look like in the next century, but the Army, especially SF, cannot wait for these changes to occur. Rather it must start to visualize and adjust to fit into the fighting force of the future. This includes organizing, manning, training, and equipping the force now in order to meet those challenges to dominate across the full operational spectrum. The Army has initiated a plan called Transformation, and from the early scientific simulation tests the program looks promising. SF, due to the nature of its unique capabilities, will be one of the first Army units that will be integrated into this program. As chapter 2 will show there is an abundant amount of military and civilian literature that has been written about the possible future operational environment, the potential national security policy, and the Army's Transformation strategy.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

This literature review is designed around the thesis and subordinate questions that are asked in order to bring this thesis to its final conclusion. This thesis research should answer the question of the possible organization of SF in the Objective Force of the twenty-first century. Subordinate questions deal with needed information on the possible future operational and threat environments, along with possible missions and capabilities of the Objective Force. This literature review organizes the sources into major groups that were used to answer the thesis question, as well as its subordinate questions. It was designed to first deal with the possible future threat, then on to the Army's plan for the Objective Force and finally, those resources that suggest possible operational missions and the required unique capabilities of SF in the Objective Force.

Literature Review Source Review

The first group of research sources deals with subordinate question one, which is to describe the possible future threat and operational environment in the twenty-first century. There is a significant body of literature, both military and civilian, on this topic. Some of the literature tries to give possible future scenarios based on past historical trends. Others try to take the current global environment and make assumptions as to what the world will be like ten, twenty, or fifty years from now. Reviewing these resources provided information related directly to the thesis' first subordinate question and assisted in establishing the foundation that derived the missions and the capabilities needed to operate in the future for the Objective Force and SF.

Some of the first sources that were reviewed for the first subordinate question were the current US government strategies. Both the current *National Security Strategy*, dated 2000, and the *National Military Strategy*, dated 1997, talk about what the US will face in the twenty-first century. Both talk in detail about a future asymmetrical threat that will hide in complex or urban terrain while using off the shelf technology, proliferating weapons of mass destruction, and conducting information operations with the hopes of resolving the conflict on its terms.

Other government agencies produced documents about the possible future security environment to assist in reviews of their assigned government arenas. Among the more useful of these works are the 1996 Center for Strategic and International Studies' *Foreign Policy into the 21st Century: the US Leadership Challenge*, the December 1997 National Defense Panel's *Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century* and the three-phased study of the US Hart-Rudman Commission on National Security, developed to best describe the possible threat scenario that the US could face in the future.

Regarding the latter, the first phase, written in September 1999, is entitled *New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century*. It analyzes over twenty works that were written over two decades ago in order to understand how the world will likely evolve over the next twenty-five years. The second phase, written in April 2000, is entitled *Seeking a National Security: A Concept for Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom*. It takes the analysis from phase one and creates a US National Security Strategy that would function in that world. The third phase, written in February 2001, is entitled *Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change*. It recommends

numerous reforms to government agencies and a procedure to facilitate development and utilization of a new national security strategy which will vary significantly from this country's normal routines. Again, the themes of the operational and threat environments of the future were consistent with other government-produced documentation.

The government also conducted various studies that needed to describe the possible future threat scenarios to predict what projects will need to be funded in the twenty-first century. Two such studies were authored by Krepinevich: the Defense Budget Project *Restructuring for a New Era: Framing the Roles and Missions Debate* (1995), and the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments' *The Conflict Environment of 2016: A Scenario Based Approach* (October 1996). In October 1996 the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments also published *Warfare in 2020: A Primer*, written by Vickers, in an attempt to develop the possible situation the military might face and to confirm that mission development is properly financed and resourced.

An outstanding US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) White Paper document published in October 2000, entitled *Future Operational and Threat Environment: A View of the World in 2015*, gives a detailed look at the possible scenarios the military will face and why the Army's Transformation plan is time critical in order to remain technologically advanced when compared to the rest of the world. This paper specifically gave rise to the development of the Training and Doctrine Command's *Contemporary Operational Environment (COE)*, which captures the current and future operational environments that can be adapted into different Army training programs. The *COE* provides possible operational and threat environments for use in brigade and battalion training at the Combined Training Centers, such as the National Training Center

at Fort Irwin, Nevada and the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana. The *COE* is also used to support a variety of simulation command post training events, such as the programs supported by the Battle Command Training Program at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The *COE* describes the strategic and operational environment in detail and how they relate to the seven characteristics of future military operations. It defines the global actors, establishes general assumptions about the geopolitical future, and lists common threads of the twenty-first century. The *COE* then discusses how foreign governments perceive the US and what factors the enemy may use to gain a military advantage. It ends with a section on how the threat will fight and presents a detailed example of the actions of the threat in close combat. Other government publications from this past year, such as the *Joint Vision 2020*, *Special Operations Command Vision 2020*, *Army Vision 2010*, and *SOF Posture Statement 2000*, all echo this estimation of the threat and the possible setting of the future battlefield.

There are also several non-government works that state a variety of hypotheses on what the possible emerging international environment will look like in the next century: Macrae's 1984 *The 2025 Report: A Concise History of the Future, 1975-2025*, Alvin Toffler's 1991 *The Third Wave*, the Tofflers' 1993 *War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century*, Huntington's 1993 *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, McRae's 1995 *The World in 2020: Power, Culture, and Prosperity*, Kaplan's 1996 "The Coming Anarchy" from the *Ends of the Earth*, Dunlap's 1996 *How We Lost the High-Tech War of 2007*, Friedman's 1996 *The Future of War*, Kahn, Brown, and Martel's 1996 *The Ends of the Earth: A Journey at the Dawn of the 21st Century*, and Macgregor's 1997 *Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for*

Landpower in the 21st Century. Each work describes the global possibilities and scenarios the US government might face during the next century. Each author has his own theory of what the world will look like politically, economically, and even physically, but there is a common ground in the composition of the threat. The threat will no longer be a foreign army willing to stand and fight the US military in a conventional war, but rather one that would fight a long, low intensity, technologically advanced, asymmetrical fight with the goal of outlasting American public support of the conflict.

The data from these documents will help to put together the pieces of the possible battlefield and its threat that the Army, to include SF, will confront in the twenty-first century. Together they answer the first subordinate question. By knowing these possibilities the Army has already begun through its Transformation plan to identify the force organization and the associated operations and mission areas that will need to be accomplished, thus leading to answering the second subordinate question.

The second group of research literature is based on written material that describes the Army's existing doctrine and its associated Transformation plan, and assists in answering subordinate question two. This material is primarily Army field manuals and reports from the offices of the Secretary of the Army and the Army Chief of Staff. This information presents information on how ARSOF presently functions and the overall program adapted by the Army to develop the Objective Force of the future.

To accurately see how SF organization and operations in the next century will change, a review of its present doctrine must be conducted. The following Army field manuals present current fundamental ARSOF doctrine. FM 3-0, *Operations* (June 2001), describes the overall principle of how the Army operates and is sustained across the

operational spectrum. FM 3-05.20, *Special Forces Operations* (June 2001), specifically describes how ARSOF operates and is sustained across the operational spectrum. Each of the five components of ARSOF has its specific field manual that best describes its inherent doctrine and specific task organizations. Special Forces use FM 100-25, *Doctrine for Army Special Operation Forces* (August 1999), Rangers use FM 7-85, *Ranger Operations* (draft, in staffing as of this writing), Special Operations Aviation uses FM 1-108, *Army Special Operations Aviation* (draft, in staffing as of this writing), PSYOP use FM 3-05.30, *Psychological Operations* (June 1999), and Civil Affairs uses FM 41-10, *Civil Affairs Operations* (February 2000). This group of manuals became the start point for thesis research by showing how ARSOF is currently being engaged over the operational spectrum. By reviewing how they are structured and execute missions today it becomes apparent how SF will need to transform to work in tomorrow's operational environment to defeat the next century threat while achieving the proper design in order to be compatible in the Objective Force.

After reviewing this doctrine, the next logical step is to review the documents on the Army's Transformation plan and its associated mechanics. The best source of material came from recent articles and statements from the Pentagon. The Department of the Army's February 2000 *Army Vision 2020* was the best source in explaining an overview of the Transformation Plan. In clear and concise statements in a briefing format it describes why the Army needs to adjust and how it plans to conduct this modification without shirking from its duties assigned by the *National Military Strategy*. In accordance with the vision statement, the February 2000 *United States Posture Statement FY 01*, and the June 2001 *Statement by GEN Shinseki*, Army Chief of Staff,

help to reinforce the general tenets of this plan. Other material that describes the Army Transformation plan in greater detail includes MG Cosumano's July 2001 *Transforming the Army to a Full Spectrum Force*.

The third group of research material is based on written material, interviews, and results of simulation tests that try to depict SF organization and operations in the twenty-first century. This group of literature is very important in that it assists in answering subordinate questions three and four, as well as addressing the thesis problem statement. Various articles from *Special Warfare Magazine* question how ARSOF will be integrated into the future fighting force. The first three articles, "Focusing on the Future: ARSOF XXI and ARSOF Vision 2010," "ARSOF XXI: Operational Concept for the 21st Century," and "Army Special Operation Forces Vision 2010," describe how ARSOF will function in relation to the *Special Operations Command (SOCOM) Vision 2020*. The articles support this thesis by stating that ARSOF will need to adapt to the future operational environment and ensure that its qualifications are aligned with future situations in which the government might employ military forces. It is clear that ARSOF's unique capabilities will be heavily used throughout the entire operational spectrum of tomorrow. A fourth article, "ARSOF Vision 2010 and ARSOF XXI: An Alternative Viewpoint," authored by Tone, disagrees with the various vision statements, stating that they are flawed when they draw conclusions on how ARSOF should be used. The author also proposes a different view for consideration by doctrine writers on how to utilize ARSOF in future operations.

Two relatively new Army documents that are in draft form, which directly address the possible missions of the Army and SF in the future, are TRADOC Pamphlet

525-5, *Advance Full Spectrum Operations* (draft, December 2000), and *Rapid Decision Operations* (draft, FY 2000). TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5 describes the theoretical basis for the development of organizational and operational concepts, modernization plans, and battlefield functionality assessments. *Rapid Decision Operations* is an experimental concept to develop a joint rapid response capability that would enable the US to establish the condition of an operation from the start, instead of responding to conditions already set by the enemy.

The interviews with the United States Army Special Operations (ASO) Battle Labs, located at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, offered the scientific data of how SF should be organized and used in the Objective Force. ASO Battle Labs are a part of the Army's science and technology community that is tasked with developing future concepts (Battle Lab Command Brief, 2000). The interviews were conducted with Dr. Dick Basehart, Deputy Director of the ASO; Mr. Chuck Faulkner, Chief Joint and Army Division; and CW3 Ronald Hale, Special Forces Action Officer. Specifically, the ASO Battle Lab is currently working on the possible organization and operational tasks for ARSOF. They work closely with the Battle Lab Integration Technology and Concepts Directorate (part of TRADOC) at Fort Monroe, Virginia, where the data are collected and the results are reviewed to ensure that all forces, unit capabilities, and battle operating systems are congruent in the Objective Force.

During Combat Development, covered in TRADOC Pam 71-9, ASO Battle Labs are developing the task organization of the ARSOF Objective Force through the use of TRADOC manuals that describe the capabilities of the Objective Force. Some of these documents include the *Army Objective Force Concepts, Design, and Missions*; *TRADOC*

Pam 525-X, Operational and Organizational Concept, which includes a section on Units of Action (UOA); and the *Army Operational and Organizational Plans*. Specifically the ASO Battle Labs will develop *TRADOC 525-3-XX Operational and Organizational Concepts for ARSOF* (draft, 2000), *Special Forces Integrating Operational Concept* (draft, January 2002) and the *Special Forces Operational and Organizational Plans* (draft, September 2001) which will describe a possible force structure that SF will need to adopt in the Objective Force in order to accomplish those assigned missions with its unique capabilities.

The Internet offers access to Army periodicals and Department of Defense interview statements that provide theories on the shaping of the future threat and operational environment, as well as providing up to date publications about the status of the Army Transformation plan. Various DoD web sites offered additional information on scientific tests that are being conducted in the development of the Objective Force. Various military and civilian search engines were used to obtain the majority of the research material that was not available through the Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) or Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) facilities. The Internet also provided a medium with which to communicate with and interview other US government agencies that are working on similar themes.

Summary

As was stated in the Introduction, the greatest limitation is that the thesis question deals with a topic that is in the conceptual stage and will not be functional for another twenty-five years; thus, there is little existing material written about it. The above sources present substantial information on what SF is doing now, why a change is

needed, and what the plan is for SF's transform into and function in the Objective Force of the twenty-first century. This material produces a start point and assembles a solid foundation on which to build the thesis analysis by providing guidelines for the methodology of how to organize SF in the future. As research continues on this subject this list of sources will multiply and, thus, provide more data from which a conclusion can be based.

As was also stated in the Introduction, there is a possibility of new research literature emerging during the preparation of this thesis. Due to various limitations, only the data that are obtained prior to the research cutoff date will be considered. All other new and relevant information after this date will be addressed at the end of the thesis, but will not be used to formulate the thesis conclusion. The next chapter will describe the specific research method and explain how the material from the review above is used to answer the thesis problem statement and its subordinate questions.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

This chapter describes the method that was used to analyze and evaluate research material that answered the main and subordinate thesis questions. To answer these questions, research was focused on three major areas: the possible enemy situation of the future, which includes the operational environment and the characteristic of the adversary that the military might confront; the operations, mission areas, and the capabilities of the Army's Objective Force of the twenty-first century; and the identification of those missions, unique capabilities, and task organization that SF will need to incorporate in order to meet the Objective Force's end state in 2032.

The study focused on the Army's overall Transformation plan and how SF needs to be organized in order to be compatible in the Objective Force. Research was guided by the current US government strategy policies and military doctrine that were developed under the old administration. The investigation did not cover other sister service SOF and only looked at that information that was needed to formulate a potential organization of SF.

Various research techniques and tools were used to arrive at the thesis conclusion. Research started with assistance from the following sources: CARL, CALL, and several government and civilian internet web sites. Using a variety of internet search engines from these sources, data were collected using the thesis and subordinate questions as keywords and guidelines.

Information analysis started with the examination of written documents from the United States Government, concentrating on documents from the DoD and Department of the Army (DA). It then shifted to evaluating literature suggesting the global environment of the next century and the possible threats to national security. Finally, through help with scientific procedures from the ASO Battle Labs at Fort Bragg, data were assessed on various proposals on how SF should be configured and employed as a future fighting force. By the end of this chapter, the research information collected from the literature review was carefully analyzed to determine if it was viable to answer the questions and support this paper.

From this initial examination of the available material it is possible to derive a general conclusion that the future organization of SF will incorporate elements or sections from each of the five ARSOF components and incorporate them into a single, geographically oriented unit. This unit will be able to combine these ARSOF components with their unique capabilities, which will provide a highly responsive, lethal, and versatile SF unit to each geographic or theater war-fighting commander in chief (or its future equivalent).

Methodology

To establish the baseline on the direction of research for the thesis statement, the current organization of SF and its associated doctrine had to be reviewed. Current security and military strategies also needed to be evaluated in order to understand the US government's requirements of the military. The Army's Transformation plan was examined with the purpose of understanding how the Objective Force will be developed and what its desired end state is. The force management system, covered in FM 100-11,

was studied with the aim of learning how the DA officially conducts force modernization and force integration, which allows current SF units to make changes in force structure and doctrine. Finally, possible interim SF organizations and operations were also reviewed in order to get an idea of how the force is evolving towards the future.

Once the foundation was created the subordinate question dealing with the likely operational and threat environment in the twenty-first century needed to be answered. As chapter 2 stated, there is a plethora of government and non-government information on what the future operational environment might look like. The majority of the sources expressed an identical theme in the depiction of potential future threats facing the US. Some material expressed ideas and concepts that were just too far-fetched and unlikely. Use of official government studies of the future security environment, such as the findings of the three-phased Hart-Rudman Commission, the TRADOC White Paper: *Future Operational and Threat Environment*, the TRADOC's *Contemporary Operational Environment (COE)*, and the Department of Defense vision statements, offered the best criteria from which to accept or reject other documentation needed to answer this first question.

After examining the possible operational and threat environment of the future, the next step is to identify the operations and mission areas of the Objective Force and the capabilities that it will require to defeat the enemy. The research concentrated on US government and DoD statements, briefs, and interviews on the Army's Transformation plan. TRADOC's draft *Advanced Full Spectrum Operations* assisted a great deal in identifying future operations and the probable mission areas for the Objective Force. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's (DARPA) *Statement of Required*

Capabilities was able to break down the Army's 2020 Vision force requirements into Objective Force capabilities that will be needed in 2032. Very little written material from the private sector was available on this topic, other than magazine or newspaper articles regurgitating official government information.

Again, the review of the Army Battle Lab's Force Management system, covered in FM 100-11, was used to determine the "life cycle" of modifications and the sequence of events that are used to integrate this change into the force. This process is broken into three specific pieces, starting with Combat Development, TRADOC Pamphlet 71-9, which identifies requirements to change DTLOMS (doctrine, training, leadership, organization, materiel, soldiers). This procedure flows into DTLOMS development, which translates requirements into DTLOMS products and ends with force integration, which finally incorporates the products into the force. This review helped provide a scientific approach on how the operations, mission areas, and capabilities were determined for the Objective Force (ASO Battle Lab Briefing Slide 2001).

The Battle Lab Integration Technology and Concepts Directorate presented additional scientific data on the probable operations, mission areas, and needed capabilities of the Objective Force. This Battle Lab's research offered a simulated tested on a battalion size element to derive information for the *Units of Action Operational and Organizational Plan (Draft 1)*. These scientific simulations established assessment criteria which in themselves can be used to evaluate the practicability of the vast amount of material on the Army's Transformation Plan.

Along with the research material stated above, educational briefs and blocks of instruction from the Command and General Staff Officer Course C400 (Resource

Planning and Force Management) and C500 (Operational Warfighting) helped to provide the standard on which to evaluate the data significance in answering this question.

The final step in this methodology plan is to construct a model of the SF organization in the Objective Force. Understanding the enemy, the environment, and the capabilities needed in the future Army will build the blocks to answer the last three thesis questions. The answers from the first two thesis questions will provide guidance on what missions SF will be assigned and which capabilities it will need to achieve to be successful in the Objective Force. Once these missions and unique capabilities are identified they will help to dictate an efficient SF task organization.

The ASO Battle Lab ran a computerized simulations test on 17 to 21 September 2001 in order to present preliminary test results to the Commander of the Special Warfare Center and School (SWCS), Major General Boykin, with final approval by the USASOC Commander, Lieutenant General Brown. The results of these tests concluded with an updated version of the *Special Forces Integrating Operational Concept* (Coordinating Draft) and the *Special Forces Operational and Organizational Plan* (Draft 3). The results were very informative and provided material on SF's mission area of unconventional operations. They also provided data on the specific missions SF will be assigned to execute against the future threat. The *SF O&O* took this mission area and the capabilities listed in the *SF IOC* and suggested a possible formation of how SF units should be designed. As a result, the research gained from the ASO Battle Lab has become the primary resource material used to develop the analysis portion of the thesis. Again, these scientific simulations established assessment criteria which in themselves can be used to evaluate the data significance in answering the thesis question.

The possible missions for SF in the Objective Force are described in emerging USASOC doctrine that is currently in draft form. This doctrine is being analyzed and evaluated to assist in the identification of all the unique capabilities that SF should retain or develop in the future. The author recognizes that this doctrine is not yet approved and may change, but it nevertheless is still a valuable source that provides an insight into emerging trends in areas that are relevant to this thesis. Comparison of current SF doctrine and the objectives of the SOF community vision statements help to establish criteria with which to evaluate this material and its ability to answer these remaining questions.

The final step of this thesis methodology was to assemble all the evaluated and approved research material to answer the subordinate questions and construct a possible organization of SF. The goal of this thesis is to recommend a task organization that can perform unhindered in the twenty-first century operational environment, accomplish all of its assigned missions, and be compatible to the operations and mission areas of the Objective Force.

Summary

In summary, the methodology for this thesis was centered on providing information that can be used to answer the stated questions. Each subordinate question had its own source of literature and data that needed to be collected, analyzed, and evaluated against a set of criteria before it was confirmed that it was valid in providing the needed answer.

This methodology plan is comparable to a “flight of stairs” or “rungs on a ladder” (see figure 3). Each question’s answer provides the foundation and the needed data to

solve the subsequent question until the pinnacle thesis problem statement is explained. In the next chapter the information presented in chapters 2 and 3 will be utilized to answer the primary thesis question and its associated subordinate questions in order to form a clear and concise conclusion on SF's task organization in the future.




Figure 3. Thesis Methodology Diagram--“Flight of Stairs”

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a solution for the thesis question. It will build on the material of the first three chapters and implement the thesis methodology by analyzing and interpreting all the collected research data in order to answer the thesis questions.

By using the aforementioned methodology, the research material is broken into five sections in order to address the five main issues: the future operational and threat environment, missions of the Objective Force, future missions of SF, unique capabilities required of SF, and the possible task organization of SF in the Objective Force. This chapter will conclude with substantial evidence that will allow the author to derive a realistic conclusion for the thesis.

Future Operational and Threat Environment

As was stated in chapter 3, the first step in this thesis is to develop the groundwork by describing the possible operational environment and the characteristics of the possible threat of the future. In short, the future operational environment is all those factors, assumptions, trends, and variables that effect where SF will live, work, and fight in the next century (USA, TRADOC COE Brief 2000). Threat is basically defined as a potential adversary of the United States (USA, TRADOC COE 2000). By combining the likely environments in which SF may have to operate and the threat they will possible face, these elements provide the first clues as to what missions will be assigned to SF and what capabilities they must possess in order to be successful on future battlefields.

Strategic Environment

Chapter 1 presented a picture of the multipolar nature of the current strategic landscape in today's world. As was stated, there is a probability that up to thirty nation-states could fail due to their inability to provide for their people or as a result of ethnic, cultural, or religious conflict (USA, TRADOC White Paper on the Future Operational and Threat Environment 2000). Due to the ending of the Cold War (which sustained the bipolar power structure of the 20th Century), other "actors" have entered onto the world stage. These new "actors" now confront the current global powers and possess the capability to affect the "global distribution of power, the concept of sovereignty, and the nature of warfare" (USA, TRADOC White Paper on the Future Operational and Threat Environment 2000). The changes or modifications in the geopolitical boundaries and global economics, the proliferation of technology, and the surfacing of a networked society will cause the current and future Army to conduct a vast range of missions in a dynamic strategic environment worldwide (USA, TRADOC COE 2000).

Additionally, warfare in itself will also need to change as the nature of conflict mutates to adjust to the future operational environment. These changes will carry over to the conditions and the characteristics of the close fight in which the tactical level of war will be fought and won (USA, TRADOC COE 2000). Future global adversaries do not want to fight the US in a direct conflict, and instead explore options to keep the US directly out of the conflict, or at least keep it from being even tangentially involved. If the US does get involved potential adversaries will seek ways of defeating it by studying its national policies and its armed forces (USA, TRADOC COE Brief 2000). It is conceivable that the US will enjoy a period of strategic peace in that there will be "no

single conventional foreign power” that can endanger its existence, but at the same time there will be many smaller adversaries that will be able to threaten its interests on a regional level (USA, TRADOC White Paper on the Future Operational and Threat Environment 2000).

Operational Environment

The strategic environment defined above assists in building an outline regarding what to expect in the future. The intricacy of the operational environment will ensure that future military actions will cover the full spectrum of operations (Hart-Rudman 1999). By further describing its global actors, common trends, and variables, the following will help to complete the picture of the possible future operational environment.

Future combat will still be a battlefield on which bloodshed is the outcome of fighting between rivals, and on which operational objectives are achieved or lost by the use of deadly force. The future operational environment will continue to be “a dirty, frightening, physically, and emotionally draining environment in which death and destruction are the results of conflict.” In effect, due to the high casualty rate of future weapon systems, there will be an increase in death and destruction of soldiers in battle (USA, TRADOC White Paper on the Future Operational and Threat Environment 2000).

No matter how technically advanced a threat may become, it will continue to use the full range of its instruments of national power, that is, diplomatic, information, military, and economic tools, to gain an advantage. The operational environment will extend into those areas that were normally not affected by combat, including the continental US and the territory of its multinational allies. It will also include areas not confined by geopolitical borders, such as cyberspace, in which a threat could conduct

“computer network attacks” with the ability to strike “anywhere at any time” (USA, TRADOC White Paper on the Future Operational and Threat Environment 2000).

Additional issues that will need to be considered in the operational environment include news organizations enhanced with “information and communications technologies,” which will easily gain access to a military area of operations and will greatly influence the way these mission are executed; interagency and joint operations, which will be necessary to deal with the various actors and their wide range of capabilities; and any combination of other national influences, to include multifaceted cultures, ethnic and religious differences, population demographics, complex and urban terrain, humanitarian crises, and the ever changing physical environment. These factors will cause the operational environment to be continually active and extremely unpredictable (USA, TRADOC White Paper on the Future Operational and Threat Environment 2000).

Actors and Power Distribution

In order to build a framework that will assist in the explanation of the future operational environment, it is necessary to define various global actors. There are numerous configurations that can be addressed, but for the purpose of this thesis two structures are considered: nation-state actors, which are countries defined by geopolitical borders and nonnation actors, which transcend these borders and are driven by other motives. These classifications are defined in TRADOC’s *Contemporary Operational Environment* (February 2000). Nation-states are commonly referred to as countries and are broken down into four basic categories: core states, transition states, rogue states, and failed or failing states.

Core states are often called major powers, characterized as a free market, democratic, and relatively stable, and are primarily located in North America, Western Europe, Northeast Asia, and Australia. These technologically advanced states generally dominate world politics, exhibit common interests and economic integration, and share common values and standards. Most conflicts with global consequences will involve these states (USA, TRADOC COE 2000).

Transition states are larger, industrialized countries, such as China, India, Indonesia, and Russia, that want to be major powers (core states), but their “transition” is still uncertain. These states are characterized as “economically industrially based with cycles of political stability/instability.” These states are trying to make this transition but due to environmental decay and internal tensions this “transition” may lead to violence (USA, TRADOC COE 2000).

Rogue states are usually weaker countries that are hostile to core states, such as North Korea, Cuba, Iraq, Iran, and Libya. These states are characterized as “small pockets of industry surrounded by regions of dire poverty.” These states may be small and weak but they have long been described as troublemakers conducting activities such as attacking or threatening to attack their neighbors, sponsoring terrorism, and selling or giving arms and ammunition to dangerous sub-state political movements (USA, TRADOC COE 2000).

Failed or failing states, such as Zimbabwe (Central Africa), Bosnia (Southern Balkans), and Yemen (the Middle East), have not been included in global economic, political, and technological expansion due to a variety of internal tensions and, thus, are falling significantly behind the core states. Not only are they a threat to the stability of

the core states, but they also present a “major humanitarian and transnational challenge” that must be dealt with continuously (USA, TRADOC COE 2000).

Not all actors are countries; nonnation actors transcend geopolitical boundaries and have a tremendous impact on the future operational environment. They include, but are not limited to, rogue actors, third-party actors, media agencies, and multinational corporations.

Rogue actors are extremely hostile to core states and are not limited by state borders. Examples of rogue actors include terrorists, drug traffickers, and criminal organizations. Terrorists come in a variety of categories: a subnational group, part of a larger international organization, state sponsored, independent, and others. What terrorists have in common is that they typically aim at noncombatant targets that can be struck any place at any time by employing a variety of capabilities as the means to achieve the end state which is the intimidation of governments or societies in pursuit of religious, political, or ideological goals (DoD, JP-1 2001). The primary motivation of drug traffickers and criminal organizations is money. In most cases because of their financial backing from illegal dealings, they will be able to acquire top of the line technology, equipment, and weapons. These organizations use terror tactics and unconventional methods to achieve their objective: financial profit (USA, TRADOC COE 2000).

Third-part actors include displaced personnel, civilians on the battlefield, non-government organizations, and other humanitarian relief agencies. These groups are not at all hostile to core states, but they can affect (for better or worse) the ability to

accomplish a military operation while operating in a foreign country (USA, TRADOC COE 2000).

Media agencies will have reporters and cameramen on the scene in every military operation from now on. Core state military leaders must gain the skill of how to properly deal with the media in order to gain an advantage in the information campaign. The future threat will try to control the “content, distribution, and timing of information” in hopes of degrading core state information operations. Regardless of the surrounding circumstances, the media will always have an effect on public opinion and national will (USA, TRADOC COE 2000).

Multinational corporations will be found in numerous transition or emerging states as a means to build those states’ infrastructure and increase their economic position in the global market. These corporations may try to manipulate state affairs or assist in specific state projects with the intention of promoting their own economic gain. It is a fair assumption that most of these multinational corporations will maintain a heavily armed security force in order to protect their financial interests overseas. Their presence and business interests can put additional pressure on a core state military operation abroad (USA, TRADOC COE 2000).

Common Trends

The Hart-Rudman Commission’s *New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century* (September 1999) and TRADOC’s *Contemporary Operating Environment* (February 2000) describe thirteen common trends which will help shape the future operational environment. In place of facts, these trends (or assumptions) explain the possible parameters of the global future by serving as the underlying support so that

additional details may be added. Several of these trends may appear to be conflicting but this is attributed to the intricacies of the operational environment. These trends are:

1. Nation-states will still be the dominant actors with national power starting to shift to non-traditional actors. These nontraditional actors (i.e., political, economic, cultural, religious, and environmental) will confront the existing power structures in order to gain stature in the world. The concerns of transition states will dominate. States will begin to break up along tribal, ethnic, or religious lines and instability will continue (Hart-Rudman 1999).

2. An economically strong US is likely to remain a primary political, military, and cultural influence and will have a significant role in shaping the operational environment. The stability and direction of its society and politics will help shape national foreign policy goals and the way it may shape the global future (USA, TRADOC COE 2000).

3. Science and technology will continue to improve and become readily available to be utilized around the world but these benefits will not be evenly distributed (Hart-Rudman 1999). These advancements will greatly impact military capabilities and unexpected “technological surprises” will happen frequently (USA, TRADOC COE 2000).

4. Global energy supplies will remain largely based on fossil fuels (Hart-Rudman 1999). Environmental hazardous conditions and population problems can lead to increased tensions within actor states (USA, TRADOC COE 2000).

5. While much of the nation-state actors will experience economic growth there still will be disparities in income and poverty will persist (Hart-Rudman 1999). This gap

will widen causing tensions that will lead many nonnation actors to adopt terrorism and other asymmetrical methods to defy the “Western cultural invasion” (USA, TRADOC COE 2000).

6. The worldwide aspects of business and commerce which includes “trade, telecommunications, investment and finance, and manufacturing” will continue to enlarge (Hart-Rudman 1999).

7. Economic interdependence will cloud lines between foreign and domestic policy and create greater demand for precision strikes and reduce collateral damage (Hart-Rudman 1999).

8. Non-governmental organizations and private volunteer organizations such as refugee aid institutes, religious and ethnic support groups, and other single-issue lobbies will continue to grow in the international function (Hart-Rudman 1999).

9. The US will find it in its national interest to work with and strengthen an assortment of international organizations (Hart-Rudman 1999).

10. The US will remain the foremost military power in the world but will find its “homeland” increasingly open to attack (Hart-Rudman 1999 and USA, TRADOC COE 2000).

11. The US will be dependent on allies to deal with complex threats in the future, but it will discover that “reliable alliances” will become more difficult to “establish and sustain” (Hart-Rudman 1999).

12. Weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, and biological) will continue to be produced for a variety of nation-state and non-nation state actors. Maintaining a nuclear deterrence capability and inventions of new forms of theater

ballistic missile defense systems will remain necessary to the US and its allies (Hart-Rudman 1999).

13. Conflicts in which the adversaries that are cultural different from our own may put to use “forms and levels of violence shocking to our sensibilities” (Hart-Rudman 1999).

With these descriptions of common trends (assumptions), the internal structure of the probable future operational environment is complete. The next step is to identify those aspects that are common in an operational environment and how they affect the military in the twenty-first century.

Critical Variables

Studies have concluded that these thirteen variables are the critical factors that are commonly used to identify, define, and understand the operational environment. An explanation of these variables and their definitions can be found in the TRADOC *Contemporary Operating Environment* (February 2000). These specific variables have become the building blocks that will have tremendous effect on military forces, operations, and their capabilities. By identifying the actors, common trends, and key variables, a description of the future operation environment is complete. With this knowledge, the US will be able to manipulate the operational environment and gain an advantage over the possible threat on tomorrow’s battlefield.

Types of Military Environments

Actors, trends, and variables all influence the operational environment in their own way. There are three basic types of military situations that the Objective Force will confront while executing operations and conducting missions in the future. Below are

brief descriptions of these military environments and the associated factors that will need to be accomplished in each area:

Engagement

The five geographic CINCs convey their theater strategic objectives in their regional Theater Engagement Plans (TEP). Regional engagement is very important because it provides the US with the capability to have an effect on a nation-state or actor in a specific area of the world. This “influence” is a great asset in the US pursuit to develop and execute its national security strategy globally. The Department of State (DoS) is the lead agency for regional engagement, but it will always be executed as a part of an overall interagency effort with the Department of Defense (DoD) in a supporting role (USA, SF IOC 2001).

“Regional engagement activities and operations for SF encompass the spectrum of operations from those conducted in an environment devoid of crisis and war to operations in support of insurgents, resistance movements, and forces attempting to control their geographic region and the destiny of their people” (USA, SF IOC 2001). Successful engagement requires training exercises and military operations that sustain friendly governments that support the movement and activities of friendly forces in accordance with US interests. Regionally engaged forces demonstrate US resolve and commitment, while maintaining awareness of the status of US interests (USA, SF IOC 2001).

The principal core competency for SF, unconventional operations (UO), provides the ability to conduct engagement “through, with, or by indigenous populations” and retain the capability for unilateral actions if needed (USA, SF O&O 2001). Engagement with SF elements includes civil affairs, psychological operations, and, when needed, the

assistance of conventional forces. SF portrays a politically viable and relatively “low-cost” means to maintain US forward presence in the geographic CINC’s area of responsibility.

SF’s small footprint in these engagement activities reduces “political liability to both US and host governments” and can include small unconventional footprints in nation-states that are not friendly towards the US or its objectives. Not only are the “low-cost” (politically and economically) of these small, forward-deployed SF units more responsive but they also are not affected by political and resource constraints that large, conventional, CONUS based forces encounter (USA, SF IOC 2001).

Crisis Response and War Fighting

Should deterrence fail and develop into a crisis response and war-fighting situation, SF can employ their UO capabilities and the knowledge and information of the region attained during engagement to assist in the conventional force’s military operations (USA, SF IOC 2001). SF has specific combat capabilities that can enhance conventional forces:

1. Through extensive reconnaissance and information gathering within the region, SF can build a real-time virtual reality picture of the current situation, which can be relayed to commands at the strategic, operational, or tactical level for analysis.
2. SF are more capable of strategic responsiveness is capable due to smaller, more easily tailored SF organizations, with dominant language capabilities, present day regional focus, and readily deployable equipment.

3. A key factor in protecting American civilians and soldiers will be SF's in-country experience that will provide accurate information on the most current health hazards and other local threats that early entry and follow-on forces will encounter.

4. SF UO can establish the conditions for decisive operations by providing real-time situational understanding and direct action against high value targets; overcoming interoperability difficulties by integrating coalition partners into the US command and control environment; and disrupting or degrading vital enemy command and control centers, force projection nodes, air defense weapons, and logistic operations.

5. SF will have an increased self-sustaining capability and thus be less dependent on theater logistics systems. Note: in the future operational environment extensive logistic support within some theaters may not be available due to austere conditions in poorer nation-states (USA, SF IOC 2001).

In this type of military environment, SF will conduct the majority of these capabilities through, with, or by surrogate or indigenous forces (USA, SF O&O 2001). These capabilities combined provide a significant economy of force for the theater combatant commander fighting the campaign.

Transition from War Fighting to Engagement

Transition to missions other than war must secure hard-won gains. War fighting creates an environment in which conditions favorable to the long-term national security interests of the US can be reestablished. Support operations and stability operations provide a means to transition from war-fighting to the steady state of engagement (USA, SF IOC 2001).

The quicker this transition from war-fighting to engagement occurs, the earlier conventional combat forces can disengage and redeploy. This disengagement of conventional force will allow reconstitution of this US military capability to respond to potential crises elsewhere in the world (USA, SF IOC 2001).

Legitimacy of the national leadership is important to the stability and the lasting success of the operation. The SF primary role in expediting the transition from war-fighting to engagement is acting in the capacity as “soldier-diplomats” using their language skills, regional and cultural understanding, and interpersonal abilities to facilitate the integration process of all government and civilian elements of this new or reinstated nation-state (USA, SF IOC 2001).

In each of these military environments this future Objective Force, to include SF, must have the capability to flow from one environment to the next without a drop in tempo until accomplishing all the assigned tasks and reaching the operation’s end state. As it will be stated later in this chapter, SF’s operational environment is usually politically sensitive and often requires close cooperation with DoS and other non-DoD agencies in isolated locations (USA, SF O&O 2001).

Perception of the United States

Before developing a possible future threat model it is important to first describe how current adversaries view the US and its military. How these adversaries perceive the US will lend insight into how they will “base military estimates and actions” and “construct military capabilities” in order to succeed in conflict (USA, TRADOC COE 2000).

The US is generally seen as the primary core state, with a global advantage in technology and war-fighting capability. With these strengths come weaknesses that potential threats may try to manipulate to gain an advantage (USA, TRADOC COE Brief 2000). The list below contains the foreign perceptions of the US weaknesses:

1. The US avoids close combat in a direct fight and will rely on air campaigns and standoff weapon technology to engage the enemy.
2. US military operations depend on extremely technical equipment working flawlessly.
3. The US is building forces that use information superiority to execute precision strikes and maneuver. US forces rely on advance command and control equipment to include computers, telecommunications, and real-time target acquisition equipment.
4. The US is unwilling to accept heavy losses and is risk-averse.
5. The US political leadership is sensitive to domestic and world opinion and as a nation the US lacks commitment over time.
6. US military members are generally culturally unaware during deployments and fail to understand the issues and people.
7. US military operations are both predictable and easy to template.
8. The US usually acts within the confines of a political and or military coalition.
9. US ground forces require a long time to deploy into a theater and must develop it before there are effective combat operations.
10. US forces are dependent on a complex and comprehensive logistical system and prefer to deploy into prepared theaters.
11. The US military is dependent on a large number of civilian contractors to maintain its equipment and perform numerous essential tasks.
12. The US often downsizes its military forces after conflicts to the extent that remaining forces are ill-prepared and ill-equipped to conduct operations. (USA, TRADOC COE 2000)

Future adversaries will study every aspect of US doctrine, training, and technological capabilities with the purpose of capitalizing on its perceived weaknesses in order to lead to a tactical, operational, and strategic victory in the next war (USA, TRADOC COE 2000).

Future Threat Model

Now that the future operational environment has been defined and possible US weaknesses have been identified, the next step is to build a future threat model that the Objective Force will have to face in the twenty-first century. During the Cold War era, that is, the 1940s to the 1990s, the Army concentrated on one main threat: the Communist Bloc (including the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies). To a lesser degree North Korea and Cuba were also identified as possible threats. In response to these threats the US kept many military units forward deployed overseas in those specific areas in order to deter conflict. Though the US was focused primarily on this single USSR threat, its military forces participated in other major conflicts during this period (for example the Korean Conflict and the Vietnam War) that were fought in different global locations. Also during this time frame numerous humanitarian and peacekeeping operations involved combat operations, giving rise to the fact that there were and still are many threats or potential threats around the world (USA, TRADOC COE Brief 2000).

The future threat will either be in the form of nation-states or non-nations. If available, the threat will employ conventional, guerilla, paramilitary, police, and special purpose units on tomorrow's battlefield and each will affect the US and the future operational environment differently (USA, TRADOC COE Brief 2000). Whether the US is involved in stability operations, support operations, small contingencies, or major

theater war, these potential threats will look for opportunities to use “adaptive, asymmetrical means” to offset US capabilities and avoid fighting “our kind of war” in order to take advantage of US weaknesses (USA, TRADOC White Paper on the Future Operational and Threat Environment 2000).

How the Future Threat Fights

As was stated earlier, the threat will develop doctrine and maintain war-fighting capabilities that are centered on perceived US weaknesses. The threat will use “transition operations” that quickly change the nature of the conflict and employ capabilities that the US will not be prepared to handle (USA, TRADOC White Paper on the Future Operational and Threat Environment 2000).

At the strategic and operational level it is likely that the future threat will adopt methods historically seen in Vietnam and the Balkans, where the threat will deny regional access, use complex or urban terrain, disperse forces, inflict high casualties, and try to outlast the US national resolve. Military operations against the US at these levels of war will be in line with the following paradigm delineated in the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) document on the Army FCS Program (2000), the TRADOC *Contemporary Operational Environment* (February 2000), and the TRADOC White Paper *Future Operational and Threat Environment: A View of the World in 2015* (October 2000):

1. Most operations against the US will be force oriented; focused on our perceived strategic center of gravity--mass casualties and its effect on our national will (USA, TRADOC COE 2000).

2. The threat will want to have a rapid tempo early on to achieve objectives and set conditions for entry denial operations before the US can establish a foothold in the region (USA, TRADOC COE 2000).

3. Once the US arrives, the threat seeks to prolong the conflict, and avoid decisive battle to preserve his military capability. He then changes the nature of the conflict by transitioning his tactical/operational forces into “sanctuary operations” posture while continuing with his “strategic offensive” actions aimed at the US will to fight, public support, and its coalition (USA, TRADOC White Paper on the Future Operational and Threat Environment 2000).

4. As a component of “sanctuary operations,” sophisticated ambushes will be planned, integrated and conducted in order to destroy technological advanced flagship systems or to achieve mass casualties (USA, TRADOC COE 2000).

5. Adversaries will seek cover and concealment in complex terrain and urban environments to offset the US standoff weapon systems. Military units will remain widely dispersed. Maneuver to form and conduct operations will occur during periods of reduced exposure to US technologies (USA, TRADOC COE 2000).

6. Extensive internal and external information operations attacks will be conducted as a component of the threat’s “strategic offensive” (USA, TRADOC White Paper on the Future Operational and Threat Environment 2000).

7. Opponents will conduct force projection denial operations and will employ a wide array of strategies to stop or slow deployment (ranging from demonstrations to the employment of weapons of mass destruction) (USA, TRADOC COE 2000).

8. There will be significant capability upgrades to support camouflage and deception at all echelons and throughout all battlefield operating systems (USA, DARPA, Army FCS Program 2000).

9. The threat will use terrorism and other unconventional operations to deny sanctuary and disrupt force projection operations (USA, TRADOC COE 2000).

10. Use of commercial, space based intelligence systems to support precision targeting and increased situational understanding (USA, DARPA, Army FCS Program 2000).

Combined, these concepts create a threat model of the future. It clearly shows a threat that is non-linear, has the ability to conduct simultaneous operations throughout the entire area of operations, utilizes conventional and unconventional instruments of war, and is concentrated on the destruction of the US national will, as well as its strategic, operational, and tactical ability to “fight and win the nation’s wars” (USA, TRADOC COE 2000 and USA, Army Vision 2000).

An example of close combat with the future threat can be found in both the TRADOC *Contemporary Operational Environment* (February 2000) and the TRADOC White Paper *Future Operational and Threat Environment: A View of the World in 2015* (October 2000). It gives an excellent example of how the future threat might execute close combat in a complex environment against US military forces.

The future operational environment will be extremely fluid with continually changing coalitions, alliances, partnerships, and new actors (USA, TRADOC White Paper on the Future Operational and Threat Environment 2000). It will be complicated and uncertain, and it will be impossible to predict the exact nature of the operational

environment or whom and where the US may have to fight. The Army has to be ready to meet these challenges and be capable of conducting military operations in all kinds of conflicts and against all kinds of threats (USA, TRADOC COE Brief 2000).

The first thesis subordinate question has been answered. The future operational environment has been defined and the actions and capabilities of the possible threat have been acknowledged. The next step is to identify what operations, mission areas, and capabilities of the Objective Force will be assigned and what capabilities it must possess to be successful in 2008 and beyond.

Operations, Mission Areas, and Capabilities of the Objective Force

The future poses a number of challenges and opportunities for joint and army forces as they support the National Military Strategy. As outlined in the previous section, development of technology, availability of WMD, and advantages of the asymmetric application of conventional and unconventional threat capabilities will change the operating environment and character of future military operations. Modern capabilities must be built around attaining decisive victory in the close fight to decisively defeat an adversary's land forces. Such dominance must be achieved at every point on the spectrum of operations against all threats in the operating environment. Full spectrum dominance will be obtained through the application of high velocity and precision lethality at all operating levels by capitalizing on advances in technology and the full potential of the human dimension of warfare (USA, AFSO 2000).

Capability Deficiencies in the Legacy Force

The following three reasons justify the planning and the execution of the US Army Transformation strategy. First, the future operational environment poses a variety

of changing actors, trends, and variables and accommodates complex, adaptive, and asymmetric threats equipped with advanced technologies and tactics. Second, there is a requirement to make use of land forces that are decisive at every point on the spectrum of operations, in any terrain and in all types of weather. Finally, the US Army must be far less reliant on forward stationing and pre-positioned military equipment stocks. Instead it must be capable of deploying anywhere in the world on little or no notice to fight and win in the future operational environment (USA, Army Vision 2000). These shortfalls are listed and defined in the *Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency document on the Army FCS Program Competitive Solicitation* (draft November 2001).

By identifying those shortfalls of today's current fighting land force, the Army was able to focus its research and development efforts to create a statement of requirements that contains all the "expanded set of required capabilities" that are needed in the Objective Force. The Objective Forces will need to harness the advances in technology to achieve greater tactical and operational capabilities in order to field a force that can dominate the full spectrum of operations (USA, AFSO 2000).

Objective Force

General Purpose Force

The Objective Force is the unit that will achieve the end state defined within the Army Vision and Army Transformation Plan. It must be capable of dominating the battlefield by executing linear and non-linear operations in the future operational environment against conventional and unconventional threats. It will be structured with a common design and employed as a general-purpose force with a special purpose application. It will be capable of dominating at any point on the spectrum of operations

and rapidly transitioning across mission requirements without loss of momentum. This force will be strategically responsive and mobile through the use of its inherent horizontal and vertical mobility. The Objective Force will be integrated in joint operations and will possess the capability to execute a single, seamless campaign from early entry of the force through decisive operations against the threat (USA, AFSO 2000).

The Army's Role in Future Operations

The Army's role in future joint operations centers on its land forces. This land force will be able to conduct engagement, crisis response, and war-fighting across the full spectrum. Army forces are to control enemy ground forces and decisive terrain, protect the civilian population from a defeated or withdrawing enemy, and comply with international agreements. They are capable of threatening the existence of opposing governments, disrupting and confusing the employment of its forces, and conducting shaping operations in support of decisive action. When applied rapidly and decisively, these US ground forces can provide the joint commander with the ability to compel and deter an opponent's ground forces during military operations and support US allies in crisis situations. These capabilities are essential in order to meet US security objectives of the twenty-first century (USA, AFSO 2000).

Future Operations of the Objective Force

Army doctrine addresses the range of full spectrum operations across the spectrum of conflict. As in current doctrine, full spectrum operations of the future will include offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations. Missions executed in the future operational environment will require the Objective Force to conduct any

combination of these operations. Each of the four types of operations is defined in FM 3.0, *Operations* (June 2001).

Throughout a military campaign, commanders may combine and sequence the four types of operations for a particular mission. They will allocate different force proportions to each type of operation for a specific phase of a mission, thus allowing the unit to accomplish its assigned tasks and accomplish full spectrum dominance (USA, FM 3.0, *Operations* 2001).

Characteristics of Future Operations

While many of the operations conducted in the future will be recognizable, the intricacy of their individual tasks will not. In addition to being joint, multinational, and interagency in execution, future operations will be multidimensional, non-contiguous area of operations, precise, distributed, and simultaneous in order to influence the future operational environment (USA, AFSO 2000).

Multidimensional Operations

Future operations will be multidimensional; in addition to the standard parameters of depth, width, height (space), and time, the Objective Force will need to dominate an information-intense battlefield. This increase in the dimensions of the future battlespace is due to the advances in the ballistic missiles, space-based systems, and aerial platforms and will make control of the air space over unit locations and operations critically important.

The Objective Force will need to gain and maintain superiority in the realm of the electromagnetic spectrum in order to secure uninterrupted information flow between joint and coalition forces while disrupting the enemy's information operations. The ability to

access “real-time” information from sources distributed globally has made planning, logistical support, medical coverage, and command and control available to deployed forces without their historical “in-theater footprint.” In addition, the increased importance of the political, economic, and cultural factors will add to the multi-dimensional nature of future combat and will affect the activities of units at much lower levels than in the past (USA, AFSO 2000).

Noncontiguous Area of Operations

Noncontiguous area of operations will allow the Objective Force to take advantage of its superior situational understanding and agility to achieve decisive results through precision fires and maneuver without the disadvantages of a concentration of forces and limitations of linear operations utilized by today’s Army Forces. These operations use the “integration of advanced information technologies, proficient leaders, agile equipment, and versatile organizations.” Unmanned aerial and ground systems will have on-board capabilities to enhance military leaders’ decision-making.

The accuracy and timeliness of information available through the common operational picture will produce situational understanding that will transform the operation geometry. This information will allow “extremely rapid and decentralized operations throughout an expanded battlespace” without the need for force protection of a linear positioned force (USA, AFSO 2000).

Precision Operations

This characteristic is broken into three categories, precise weapons, precise knowledge, and precise logistics. These three categories are described below.

Commanders will have to apply two forms of precise weapons: physical precision, which is the striking of targets and maneuvering forces to the right locations to produce the desired effects; and psychological precision, which is employing PSYOP systems to change perceptions and intentions among the civilian populace, military units, and their leadership. Precision weapons can produce mass effects without having to mass military forces.

Precise knowledge of the situation assists to form exact tailored units to meet mission requirements, tactical employment of precision fires, decisive maneuver at increased ranges and responsive, flexible support. Information gained from precise knowledge will permit unit leaders to set the conditions of tactical engagements allowing “deliberate” actions rather than “hasty” or reactive operations that lead to an increases operational tempo.

Precise logistics in operations allows logisticians to “reach back” all the way to stateside depots and factories to resupply the expenditures of all classes of supply and to sustain the detailed maintenance posture of combat units. This is different from the current logistical concept of stockpiling massive quantities of materiel in the theater of operations.

Distributed Operations

The increase in the pace of operations will be enhanced by an ability to conduct distributed operations. These operations are conducted exactly “where and when” it will best contribute to the execution of decisive operations, all without geographic constraints. With distributed operations military commanders will be able to set the conditions of the tactical fight. Implementation of distributed operations will bring about the decentralize

execution of operations by unit leaders and soldiers which, in turn, will increase the common situational understanding of the operation for the entire force (USA, AFSO 2000).

Simultaneous Operations

As stated above, the Objective Force will conduct “multi-dimensional, precise, non-contiguous, distributed operations” and will regularly fight with “simultaneity of actions” (USA, AFSO 2000). The goal of future operations will be the simultaneous attack of critical targets throughout the operational environment. These actions at a sustained, unstoppable rate will prevent the enemy from recovering and gaining the initiative. The impact of simultaneously executed decisive and shaping operations will break the coherence of the enemy’s ability to conduct offensive operations and establish the conditions for a victory. These operations will be conducted as a joint force allowing the commander to deter, contain and resolve a crisis or conflict and restore order and stability with a much smaller, more agile force (USA, AFSO 2000).

Applying the above characteristics of future operations to the Objective Force will give commanders a wide range of options on the future battlefield. Understanding the various facets of these operations will present the enemy with a “complex, non-linear, multi-dimensional set of problems,” thereby allowing the Objective Force to strike the enemy at numerous vulnerable points, resulting in a rapid defeat of its forces (USA, AFSO 2000). Future military operations will require many of the individual tasks performed as part of a tactical mission to be modified and expanded. The nature of future operations will cause a change in the capabilities required and the nature of the conduct of operations.

Patterns of Future Operations

While conducting any one of the four stated operations, the Army will “operate in six simultaneously conducted, synergistic patterns.” The six patterns are gain information superiority, project the force, protect the force, shape the battlespace, conduct decisive operations, and sustain the force. These are defined in TRADOC Pam 525-5, *Advance Full Spectrum Operations* (2000).

Mission Areas of the Objective Force

The US Army’s contribution to joint operations is a capable land forces that can carry out rapid and sustained land operations across the operational spectrum. The Objective Force of the twenty-first century will sustain “a capabilities-based force that provides the national leadership and combatant commanders with a range of military options for promoting and protecting US interests” across the seven mission areas: promote regional stability, reduce potential conflicts and threats, deter aggression and coercion, conduct small-scale contingency operations, deploy, fight, and win major theater wars, support homeland security, and provide domestic support to civil authorities

These seven mission areas are not restricted, and Army forces may execute tasks across various mission areas or perform tasks associated with different mission areas all within a single campaign. These seven mission areas describe the range of military operations that Army forces will have to conduct in the next century (USA, AFSSO 2000).

Required Capabilities of the Objective Force

The Army Vision 2020 statement clearly defines the need for a change in the operation and organization of today’s Army if it is to succeed in the twenty-first century. As stated earlier in chapter 1, this modification is mainly due to the tasks assigned to the

Army by the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy, the changing operational environment, the pace and proliferation of technology, and the capabilities of the future threat (USA, Army Vision Brief 2000). To execute missions in this future environment and protect US interests at home and abroad, the Objective Force must possess specific capabilities that will enable it to be successful across the full spectrum of operations. The Objective Force must have specific capabilities that make it a responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable force that is “affordable and capable of reversing the conditions of human suffering rapidly and resolving conflicts decisively.” Each Objective Force capability characteristic--responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable--is defined in detail in General Eric K. Shinseki’s, Chief of Staff of the Army, (Army Vision Statement 2020, November 2001).

Specific Operational Capabilities

Future military operations will be executed within the six patterns of operations stated above and will only be possible through advancements in the tactical capabilities in the functional areas that are identified in the Universal Joint Task List (USA, AFSO 2000). In accordance with this task list and the seven Objective Force characteristics described in the Army Vision 2020 statement, six additional capabilities were for the Objective Force of the twenty-first century: develop intelligence, deploy and conduct maneuver, employ firepower, protect the force, perform combat service support, and exercise command and control.

Future Missions of Special Forces

Every day US Army SF conduct an average of sixty-one missions in thirty-nine different countries, employing over 750 soldiers and government employees (USA, SF IOC 2001). As recently as October 2001, SF have been at the forefront for the US military in the “War on Terrorism.” It is through this international involvement that SF have guaranteed their importance in today’s Army and has earned the nicknames “global scouts,” “regional scholars,” and “warrior-diplomats” (USA, SF O&O Initial Impressions Report 2001). Equipped with state-of-the-art technology, regional and cultural understanding, intensive training, and a self-sustainment capability, SF provide the US government with a force multiplier with a small operational footprint that does not require a large amount of resources (USA, SF O&O 2001).

Special Forces in the Future Operational Environment

To better understand the missions of SF it will help to see how they will likely be utilized in the future operational environment. The future operational environment can be divided into three basic scenarios: complex and urban terrain, full spectrum operations, and a distributed manner in a low threat environment. The key to success in this operational environment is a “long-term regional engagement program” that is instituted by each theater CINC. It is in these “engagement activities” that SF will create the relationships that are necessary for the role SF plays in rapid decision operations, stability operations, support operations, small-scale contingencies, and major theater war. This strategy in the operational environment is a force multiplier that provides the Army with “unconventional options to influence, deter, preclude, coerce, and defeat” the future threat (USA, SF O&O 2001).

In complex and urban terrain the effectiveness of massed fires or standoff delivery systems is greatly reduced. It is a common trend in the operational environment that the majority of future battlefields will occur in this type of restrictive terrain. SF units can enhance precise engagement of these weapon systems and limit or eliminate the collateral damage inherent in such firepower applications. This can be accomplished through the use of “laser target designators or other sensor-to-shooter technology.” This reduces risk to delivery platforms and allows the use of standoff ordnance against “elusive targets such as individual tanks and specific windows in buildings” (USA, SF O&O 2001). The new SF task organization must reflect this requirement by including a configuration that would allow maximum execution of this specific needed capability.

SF will be involved in full spectrum operations conducting UO across the range of operational environments. Through engagement, the Army uses SF in an economy of force role by employing a small proportion of force in order to have a high impact on an operation in a specific region. In most cases these small SF units are the only US presence in that area and will act as a representative of the US military and the US government. For these reasons SF requires mature, experienced, confident, educated soldiers where each unit member is a leader. An SF officer or senior non-commissioned officer may have to operate as the single “US representative to that region, area, coalition force, indigenous group, or surrogate organization” for extended periods of time. In the future operational environment there will be several situations like this, which will happen simultaneous and rapidly tie up the senior leadership (USA, SF IOC 2001). For this very reason a different rank structure within the SF task organization is required. The Legacy Force organization does not have the capability to employ numerous senior

ranking field grade officers to act as global scouts in regions where the sensitivity of the political situation may require “a government representative.” The organization of the Objective Force SF will address this problem by increasing higher ranks at the lower unit levels.

SF units operate in a distributed manner in relatively low threat environments. This indicates that SF units operate from small and secure advanced operating bases or mission support sites and extend their operations into high threat areas in “conjunction with indigenous or surrogate elements.” It is normal for smaller SF units to have widely spaced administrative and logistical support bases that require routine and relatively low technology resupply missions. In order to accomplish this there is a requirement for a small number of dedicated, unsophisticated, rotary, and fixed wing airlifts that will meet this support requirement (USA, SF O&O 2001).

Special Forces Mission Area

As stated earlier, the Objective Force has seven mission areas. SF have one, UO. UO are the core competency of SF and are described as “SF activities and operations conducted primarily through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate personnel and includes, as required, US unilateral activities and operations,” (USA, SF O&O 2001). SF conducts this mission area throughout the “operational continuum” as directed by the joint force commander (or its future equivalent). UO are characterized as being “joint and interagency; overt, covertly in support of a covert operation, or clandestine; of long duration; and are conducted by elements that are organized, trained, equipped, supported, or directed in varying degrees by SF” (USA, SF O&O 2001). UO have three categories of missions: unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, and stand-alone US

unilateral missions (see table 1). Unconventional warfare is a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces that are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source (USA, FM 3-05.20 2001). Foreign internal defense is participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion and insurgency (USA, FM 3-05.20 2001). Stand-alone US unilateral missions are military tasks that US forces plan, execute, and support without any compensating concession required from another nation-state (USA, SF O&O 2001).

Table 1. Unconventional Operations

| UNCONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS | | | | | |
|----------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------------|---|----------------------------|
| Unconventional Warfare | | Foreign Internal Defense | | Stand-alone US Unilateral Missions | |
| Guerrilla Warfare | Personnel Recovery | Security Assistance | Humanitarian Assistance | Direct Action | Personnel Recovery |
| Subversion | | Counter-Narcotics | | Sabotage | |
| Sabotage | | Counter-Terrorism | Humanitarian Demining | Counter-Terrorism | |
| Coalition Support | Anti-Terrorism | Anti-Terrorism | | Special Reconnaissance | |
| Direct Action | Special Reconnaissance | Non-Combatant Evacuation | Counter Insurgency | | Non-Combatant Evacuation |
| Counter-Terrorism | | Training Assistance | Other missions as required | | Other Missions as required |

Source: USA, SF O&O 2001.

Special Forces Missions

Each of the above-mentioned categories of operations contains numerous subcategories (or missions) that are the combinations of the current SF doctrine missions and collateral activities, as listed in FM 3-05.20, *Special Forces Operations* (2001).

These missions are low visibility, economy of force, and economy of resource operations.

SF deploys in small operational elements that work in a combined and coalition environment “through, with or by indigenous or surrogate populations.” Special Forces provide a low-risk political alternative with the promise of high levels of political return. The specific SF missions that are identified in Figure 4 are defined in detail in FM 3-05.20, *Special Forces Operations* (June 2001) and JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (September 2001).

Special Forces Roles

The US Army possesses the premier UO capability in the world: US Army SF. With its inherent organization, training, equipment, and orientation, SF has the ability to conduct the broad spectrum of UO (USA, SF IOC 2001).

SF will retain the capability to conduct stand-alone US unilateral operations, but other SOF units and specific Objective Force elements will also receive special resources to train, equip, and organize for unilateral operations. It should be kept in mind that SF’s unique contribution to the “fight” is to “accomplish missions and activities through, with or by indigenous or surrogate assets” (USA, SF O&O 2001).

Cultural aspects are what make UO unique. To conduct effective UO requires a detailed knowledge and understanding of the indigenous culture and an exceptional individual attitude. Two key elements of effective UO and the basic elements of SF training are “language training and area studies” (USA, SF O&O 2001). To achieve adequate proficiency in these cultural aspects requires regional focus and intensive training. It takes time to instill regional expertise into a unit; “a SF unit cannot change its language and regional focus every few years and be expected to develop any significant degree of expertise or understanding of a region” (USA, SF O&O 2001).

The accomplishment of unconventional warfare or foreign internal defense requires an expertise in direct action and special reconnaissance. SF will be assigned by the joint force commander (or its future equivalent) to frequently conduct engagement missions in their assigned regions, with the specific task of building rapport and identifying the capability, availability, and potential of an indigenous force. SF conducting UO can provide for regional stability through low-level US military presence. Nation-states that benefit from SF UO will become more convinced and assured of US interest in the stability and security of their state. This US interest may mitigate the spread of weapons of mass destruction and enhance its counter-proliferation strategy within that region. “UO can provide a window through which global actors can be viewed with greater clarity.” This ability of being regionally focused can provide a unique option in executing the national security strategy in an ambiguous area (USA, SF O&O 2001).

An “effective and efficient” way of gaining regional intelligence is through indigenous units trained by SF or units that SF is utilizing as a surrogate force. These units might carry out missions alone or be organized, trained, equipped, and led by SF (USA, SF O&O 2001).

Capabilities of Special Forces

SF units and soldiers must have unique capabilities that will enable them to perform in the future operational environment against tomorrow’s complicated, asymmetrical threat. These capabilities will enable today’s SF to transform into forces which have been described as “global scouts,” “regional scholars,” and “warrior-diplomats” (USA, SF O&O Initial Impressions Report 2001).

Future SF units will be “global scouts” based on their ability to be forward deployed (or rapidly deployed from CONUS), their requirement for only a small logistical footprint, and cost effectiveness while conducting regional engagement supporting the geographic CINC’s TEP. As stated before these regional engagement activities are critical to the geographic CINC because they provide an economy of force element that can establish specific entry points into parts of the theater in order to conduct rapid decisive operations, react to crisis situations, or execute small scale contingencies (USA, SF O&O Initial Impressions Report 2001).

The individual SF soldier will be a “regional scholar” and “soldier diplomat” by gaining and maintaining specific regional capabilities. These capabilities will range from “extensive cultural and language education” to “enhanced regional micro-focus and in-country experience” (USA, SF O&O Initial Impressions Report 2001). This intense education will allow SF soldiers to apply indigenous or surrogate military power towards U.S national objectives in a specific part of the world.

Through numerous deployments and maintenance of a deep understanding of the political, economic, and social aspects in a specific region, SF units and soldiers will be able to increase the opportunities to enhance the execution of the theater engagement plan and offer the geographic CINC the ability to deter a small crisis before its expansion into a larger, regional conflict.

Special Forces Operational Capabilities

There are five operational capabilities that SF must possess in order to be successful in the Objective Force: enhanced situational understanding, deployability, interoperability, lethality, and inherent reach back ability.

SF soldiers conducting UO must be highly trained, skilled, and mature. To gain and maintain situational understanding the individual SF soldier must be flexible and retain the ability to adapt to the environment. He must not only have language and cultural expertise, but must also have excellent interpersonal skills in order to understand the current political, economic, and social situation of the indigenous or surrogate forces he trains (USA, SF O&O Initial Impressions Report 2001).

SF must have the capability to deploy Operational Detachments Alpha (ODA) anywhere in the world within twenty-four hours. This will be possible through organic air and ground lift assets, enroute planning procedures, and virtual rehearsal equipment. This will be furthered by SF Objective Force organizations being modular, operationally organized, self-sufficient, and self-sustaining. Due to past engagement activities, SF will be able to revive and re-establish relationships with indigenous or surrogate forces that will best support the Objective Force capability to introduce conventional forces into the operational area within ninety-six hours (USA, SF O&O Initial Impressions Report 2001).

Inherently SF organizations are joint and multinational, which means that they already include interagency synchronization. Through coordination and cooperation, SF will be able to maintain interoperability by sharing data and information with allies, coalition partners, and friendly indigenous or surrogate forces (USA, SF O&O Initial Impressions Report 2001).

Every SF soldier will have the capability through extensive combat training to project personnel overmatch of the enemy forces, as well as be able to provide “sensor-to-shooter” target acquisition for precision weapon systems. Three items that increase

the SF soldier's lethality are technology in weapons and military equipment, the retention of the SF warrior heritage by "continual exposure to crisis response and war-fighting," and the training and utilization of regional indigenous or surrogate forces (USA, SF O&O Initial Impressions Report 2001).

SF units will have the capability to reach back for operational, intelligence or informational support from regional forward based or CONUS based SF elements. SF unique support systems that are either intelligence, administrative, or logistical in nature will be inherent in the SF organization. SF units will decrease their logistical footprint and become more dependent on host nation support, civilian contracting, or "reach back modular support packages" (USA, SF O&O Initial Impressions Report 2001).

Future Unique Capabilities of Special Forces

The following list states the unique capabilities that SF must gain or maintain in order to support the characteristics of the Objective Force. These unique capabilities will have the greatest impact on how SF should organize its elements in the twenty-first century. The list is broken into twenty-three separate capability categories in order to show how they support the required characteristics of the Objective Force. These capabilities are derived from two draft documents developed in 2001 by the Army's Special Operations Battle Lab located at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

Responsiveness

SF must be responsive enough to deploy forces to react to a crisis or threat which includes the ability to capitalize on forward-deployed forces and supplies in addition to strategic lift assets. The capabilities associated with responsiveness are:

1. SF units are inserted into an austere theater through multiple unimproved entry points without relying on fixed ports or staging bases.
2. SF units are deployed as a combined arms team by air, ground, or sea in support of early and forcible entry operations.
3. SF units are immediately capable of conducting distributed and continuous combined arms across the spectrum of operations, day or night, in open, closed, or complex terrain without going through reception and staging.
4. Aerial and ground maneuver of SF units support multiple military operations.
5. SF units support an early or forcible entry capability.

Deployability

SF must be capable of a quick and rapid concentration of combat power within twenty-four hours in order to support the deployment standards of the Objective Force. These systems must be transportable, flexible, and sustainable across the operational spectrum. Deployable capabilities are:

1. SF units are transportable by inter/intra-theater assets to anywhere in the world. All SF systems must be transportable by C130 profile aircraft or future vertical lift systems.
2. SF units must be capable of rapid inter-theater to intra-theater transshipment to gain operational momentum and meet deployment objectives.
3. SF units must be able to integrate enroute mission planning and virtual rehearsal systems from mission alert to employment. They must have the ability to integrate into gaining geographic command during movement by air, land, or sea.

4. SF units must incorporate strategic maneuver with overwhelming power upon the enemy's center of gravity and cause the rapid disintegration of the its land forces.

5. SF units must be capable of point to point deployment utilizing C-130 or future transport airframes with little or no reconfiguration. They must contain limited self-deployment capabilities.

6. SF units must be capable of long range, precision air drops and air assaults of personnel and equipment.

7. SF organic aviation assets exploit the air dimension once in theater.

8. SF units must be able to effectively maneuver highly lethal and mobile forces to conduct dominate maneuver to bring about the rapid destruction of enemy forces.

9. All SF systems and equipment must be characterized by reduced weight and cube standards with significant reduced sustainment demands and smaller logistical footprints.

Agility and Versatility

SF units will be required to transition from stability operations and support operations to war fighting and back. SF soldiers must continue to develop into leaders who can adapt quickly to the changing operational environment. SF organizations must be able to generate mission tailored units that can respond to any contingency in order to sustain land dominance at any point on the operational spectrum. The capabilities are:

1. SF units must be full-spectrum capable, optimized for offensive operations.

2. SF units must be able to quickly transitions between changes in task and purpose with the ability to maneuver in or out of contact. SF units must adapt on the battlefield faster than the enemy.

3. SF units must be able to initiate combat on its terms and be durable to withstand unexpected actions on contact.
4. SF units must be able to conduct decisive maneuver in all terrain and weather conditions synchronized with Army and Joint fires.
5. SF units must be able to provide tactical maneuverability in all terrain and weather as a dismounted and mounted combined arms team. Provide for rapid tempo, enable water crossing, and conduct dismounted maneuver with equipment not to exceed forty pounds.
6. SF units must be capable to leverage command and control on the move, assured connectivity, network sensor technology, remote precision fires and effects, unmanned systems, and responsive combat service support.
7. SF soldiers must be mobile in complex and urban terrain.
8. SF units must accomplish operational and tactical mobility and/or maneuver with indigenous or surrogate forces.
9. SF command and control systems must be interoperable with Army legacy and interim forces, joint, and interagency systems in order to pass information to allies, coalitions, and non-government organizations. These systems will include automatic language translation capacities that can be tailored to local dialects.
10. SF must provide an active, extended range, redundant communication network that has multiple paths and is self-healing. Communication systems must allow for voice and data routing through nodes without interruption of information flow and situational awareness.

11. SF units must utilize information systems and communication networks with low probability of detection, interception, or exploitation.

Special Forces Soldiers

SF needs competent and versatile soldiers able to accomplish missions in the ever changing operational environment. These soldiers must be able to accomplish tasks while operating alone or in small groups often in the enemy's area of operation. SF soldiers must be technically and tactically proficient in their assigned occupation and must employ and maintain complex and sophisticated equipment. The associated capabilities are:

1. SF units must have enhanced individual endurance and stamina in order to fight effectively in all environmental and battlefield conditions.
2. SF must be able to exploit unmanned technology in manned systems to enhance continuous operations.
3. SF must possess above average maturity level in order to control the vast firepower and lethality available during operations.
4. SF must possess a strong aptitude for computer based learning and be capable of working with advanced computer based technologies.
5. SF must be able to employ and maintain advance sensors with the "ability" to see through obstacles using unmanned ground and aerial robotic platforms.
6. SF must be able to command remote precision fire support at greater standoff from a variety of fire support platforms without compromising unit locations.
7. SF must be able to employ and maintain advanced individual and crew served weapons, line of sight bursting munitions, and numerous advance non-lethal munitions.

8. SF must be able to employ man portable sensors to “see” the full range of operational variables.

9. SF units must perform automated pattern analysis to detect, locate, and identify enemy combatants and their systems. Provide this information in order to engage precise targeting from sensor to shooter.

Lethality

SF units must contain enhance lethality to destroy any opponent quickly with devastating effects. These effects must come at the right time, at the right place, and for the right purpose in order to have overwhelming results. Lethality capabilities are the following:

1. SF must establish effective command and control in order to synchronize fire and maneuver that will close with and destroy the enemy forces.
2. SF units must employ improved precision munitions with a broad range effects and capabilities even after launch.
3. SF soldiers will employ small caliber munitions with increase accuracy and at the same time reduce overall soldier ammunition weight.
4. SF must be able to focus effects accurately on selected targets in order to reduce collateral damage and noncombatant casualties.
5. SF must be able to maximize lethality of dismounted operations while decreasing the equipment weight of individual soldiers.
6. SF must contribute to real time target detection and identification by maintaining the ability to conduct first strike on enemy forces.

7. SF soldiers must retain the ability to remain stealthy in order to remotely command long range precision munitions for immediate engagements.

Survivability

SF units must combine systems, such as enhanced observation, ballistic protection, and “first-round-kill” targeting, that will optimize the protection of individuals and achieve survivable forces on the future battlefield. This includes force protection capabilities of SF military infrastructures that are CONUS or regionally based.

Associated capabilities are:

1. SF units must provide maximum protection at the individual soldier level against threats, such as ballistic, flame, thermal, biological, and chemical threats.
2. SF soldiers and associated platforms will integrate lighter, more effective ballistic protection.
3. SF ground platforms must combine low observation technologies, ballistic protection, long-range target acquisition, responsive suppressive fires, and camouflage.
4. SF must have the ability to provide improved standoff sensors and detectors for provide early warning and real-time dissemination.
5. SF must have the ability to accomplish survivability and force protection through indigenous or surrogate forces.

Sustainability

SF units will require a combat service support reach back capability that allows forward deployed units to reduce stockpiles of supplies in theater while relying on technology to provide sustained management and real-time tracking of supplies and equipment maintenance. These capabilities are as follows:

1. Forward deployed SF elements will reduce its logistical footprint and use reach back capabilities.

2. SF units of actions will organically sustain themselves for three days of high tempo operations without resupply from external logistical sources. They must be self-sustainable for up to seven days in low-end conflicts and peacetime engagement activities.

3. SF must exhibit increased effectiveness of sustainment by ultra-reliable and redundant components, commonality of components, and high fuel efficiency, and they must simplify systems maintainability.

4. SF must be able to reduce demand and minimize sustainment through balanced system reliability, embedded diagnostics, and modular component design.

5. SF must have a knowledge-based C4ISR architecture that supports reach back logistics to local, regional, and non-governmental sources.

6. SF must be able to employ and maintain transportation assets by utilizing organic ground and aerial concepts for delivery of supplies.

7. SF must enable medical treatment and evacuation of wounded soldiers across unit echelons to standard.

These required capabilities along with the mission area of UO contribute greatly to the development of an SF organization for the Objective Force. By understanding what the future SF units must achieve through identification of assigned missions and required capabilities the author has been able to identify a structure in the next section that will best able accomplish the assigned tasks of the SF Objective Force.

Task Organization of Special Forces in the Objective Force

SF are currently conducting missions and fighting the current day threat with a task organization that was developed back in the 1950s (COL Cleveland, Special Forces Briefing, 11 October 2001). In order to execute tasks in the future operational environment against a dangerous, asymmetrical threat, SF must transform their organization into a structure that meets the characteristics of the Objective Force and embodies those unique capabilities that will allow it to successfully accomplish UO in the twenty-first century.

US Army Special Forces Command (USASFC) Organization

USASFC Characteristics

The USASFC Objective Force will be composed of five active Theater Special Forces Commands (TSFC) and two National Guard TSFCs. Each of the five active TSFCs (and only the active) will have an assigned combination of active and reserve Special Forces Operational Groups (SFOG). There are twenty-one SFOGs, fifteen active and six National Guard. The number and mix of SFOGs assigned to each TSFC will depend upon a variety of factors not listed in this thesis, but will be documented in future Joint Strategic Capabilities Plans. Each SFOG will be composed of a command group, a headquarters company, an operations center, a support center, and a signal center, and will have three organic Operational Detachments Bravo (ODB) and eighteen Operational Detachments Alpha (ODA). The USASFC Objective Force number of headquarters and operational elements will remain the same as the current Legacy Force (see table 2) (USA, SF O&O 2001).

Table 2. USASFC Number of Operational Elements

| TSFC (FWD) | TSFC (REAR) | SFOG | ODB | ODA |
|------------|-------------|------|-----|-----|
| 7 | 7 | 1 | 63 | 378 |

Source: USA, SF O&O 2001.

Peacetime Regional Engagement Structure

The diagram below (see figure 4) represents the organization and the command relationship when the Objective Force SF is operating during a peacetime environment conducting regional engagement according to the geographic CINC’s TEP). The TSFC (Fwd) will command and control deployed units of action in theater to conduct engagement activities and US unilateral training events within the region. The TSFC (Rear) will have the primary responsibility to command and control and resource mandatory training events, such as SF recertification and National Training Center rotations, or unit initiated training events while at home station.




Figure 4. USASFC Peacetime Regional Engagement Structure. Source: USA, SF O&O Initial Impressions Report 2001.

Crisis Response and War

The diagram below (see figure 5) illustrates the organizations and command relationships when Objective Force SF units of action are deployed from home station to conduct crisis response and war fighting under operational control of the theater SOC and its JSOTF. A key point is that the TSFC (Fwd) is already manned and equipped to become the crisis response or war fighting JSOTF which then allows the SOC to remain focus on the entire theater instead of being tied down to one situation.




Figure 5. USASFC Crisis Response and War Structure. *Source:* USA, SF O&O Initial Impressions Report 2001.

Theater Special Forces Command (TSFC) Organization

TSFC Characteristics

The TSFC provides the geographic CINC the geographic SOC with a greatly increased capability. The TSFC provides a robust flag officer headquarters that is forward stationed, regionally focused, and rapidly deployable. This headquarters can

easily provide the core for a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF), thus keeping the geographic commander, SOC free to address theater issues without being tied to one contingency (USA, SF O&O 2001).

The TSFC is a Unit of Employment. It is established and operated as a split-based organization in order to overcome the inefficiencies and time lost in transitioning from garrison to operations. TSFCs are organized with a TSFC (Forward) stationed in its respective region and a CONUS based TSFC (Rear), which performs the function of a mission support center (MSC). The TSFCs are regionally focused, with the majority of the organizational headquarters forward stationed in the following regions (one per region): Europe, Africa, the Pacific, South America, and Southwest Asia (USA, SF O&O 2001).

The two National Guard TSFCs have several functions. They support the United States Commander in Chief Special Operations Command (USCINCSOC) and will deploy as needed to assist geographic CINCs. While not specifically postured for rapid decision operations (RDO), these National Guard TSFCs are fully capable of participating in longer duration operations and provide command and control functions to any assigned SFOGs, active or National Guard (USA, SF O&O 2001).

The TSFC (Forward) will be under the operational control (OPCON) of the geographic commander, SOC. The TSFC (Forward) is primarily focused on regional operational requirements and will provide the day-to-day command and control for all SF elements conducting activities within its area of operation (see figure 6). Each assigned SFOG will maintain one rotational ODB forward under the control of the TSFC (Forward) in order to assist in regional engagement operations (USA, SF O&O 2001).

The TSFC (Rear) provides the “sustaining CONUS base connectivity and reach back capability for the TSFC.” The TSFC (Rear) is focused on USC Title 10 responsibilities of organizing, equipping, training, deploying, recovering, and providing administrative and logistical support to the CONUS based SFOGs and their subordinate units (see figure 7). The TSFC (Rear) also has the function and capability to provide the TSFC (Fwd) and its forward stationed elements with reach back capability, primarily in planning, intelligence, and SF peculiar logistics and administrative support. The TSFC (Rear) will have an organic airlift capability for training support to the CONUS SFOGs (note: SFOG organic airlift will be forward stationed with the TSFC (Fwd)) (USA, SF O&O 2001).




Figure 6. TSFC (Fwd) Structure. *Source:* USA, SF O&O 2001.




Figure 7. TSFC (Rear) Structure. *Source:* USA, SF O&O 2001.

Special Forces Operational Group (SFOG) Organization

SFOG Characteristics

The SFOG is a Unit of Employment (see figure 8). This SF command headquarters, commanded by a colonel (O6), provides the single greatest leap in capability in the force with minimal increase in force structure. The availability of multiple O6 headquarters enables the geographic commander, SOC to coordinate theater wide engagement and contingencies without becoming entangled in a single event (USA, SF O&O 2001).

All the SFOGs are “modular and relatively self-sustaining.” The SFOG has a relatively large staff, is integrated into the “Global Information Grid,” and has “state-of-the-art reach back capability” to either the geographic SOC or the TSFC (Rear) to which it is assigned. The SFOG also has the capability to form the core of a JSOTF and incorporate other joint special operation forces and conventional forces to provide additional UO and RDO capabilities (USA, SF O&O 2001).

One significant development is the addition of organic fixed wing and rotary airlift capability to the SFOG. Another major change is in the subordinate unit alignment. There are no more SF companies with ODAs aligned under an ODB in a company configuration as in the Legacy Force. All the ODA and ODB commanders are aligned directly under the SFOG. When tasked the ODB may provide command and control over several ODAs, this is a mission-by-mission tasking, an operational relationship and not an administrative relationship (USA, SF O&O 2001). The above

changes make the SFOG the single most important operational change in the Objective Force SF.




Figure 8. SFOG Structure. *Source:* USA, SF O&O 2001.

Operational Detachment Bravo Organization

ODB Characteristics

The ODB is a Unit of Action (see table 3). Its primary functions are: isolates ODAs, operates as an Advanced Operating Base (AOB), performs as a Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE), and performs as a temporary Special Operations Coordinating Detachment (SOCOORD). The ODB is not an administrative command headquarters for the ODA. In the Objective Force it is a control headquarters on a mission-by-mission basis (USA, SF O&O 2001).

The most important function for the new ODB will be to provide training, planning, command and control, and coordination capability at senior levels with interagency organizations, coalition partner militaries, indigenous or surrogate allies. It will perform these tasks in sensitive environments, such as UO, stability operations, support operations, and small scale contingencies (USA, SF O&O 2001).

In order to become more effective and efficient in regional engagement, there will be a substantial increase in the number of “forward stationed and regionally focused”

AOBs. The AOBs will be distributed to the geographic CINC based on requirements stated in his TEP (USA, SF O&O 2001).

Table 3. ODB Structure

| POSITION | MOS/GRADE | NUMBER |
|-------------------------|--------------------|---------------|
| COMMANDER | 18A/05 | 1 |
| XO | 18A/04 | 1 |
| OPS OFFICER | 18A/04 | 1 |
| ASST OPS OFFICER | 180A/WO 1/4 | 2 |
| INTEL OFFICER | 180A/WO 1/4 | 1 |
| SYSTEM MGMT OFF | 180A/WO 1/4 | 1 |
| SGM | 00Z/E9 | 1 |
| OPS NCO | 18B/E8 | 2 |
| INTEL NCO | 18F/E8 | 1 |
| MASTER CBT ARMS | 18B/E8 | 1 |
| MED TECH | 180D/WO 1/4 | 1 |
| MED SPECIALIST | 18D/E8 | 1 |
| C4I SPECIALISTS | 18E/E8 | 4 |
| NBC SPECIALIST | 18C/E8 | 1 |
| SUPPLY NCO | 92Y/E7 | 2 |

Source: USA, SF O&O 2001.

Operational Detachment Alpha Organization

ODA Characteristics

The ODA is a Unit of Action (see table 4). It is the basic building block of SF operations with the mission to conduct UO activities and operations. “The ODA is designed to organize, train, equip, advise or direct, and support through, with and by indigenous or surrogate military or paramilitary forces or other elements as necessary.” The ODA will have the capability to plan and conduct stand-alone unilateral operations (USA, SF O&O 2001).

All ODAs will have a core of special skills, such as: underwater warfare operations, military free fall program, special forces advanced urban course, area specialist operations, military mountaineering, surface maritime operations, and long-range vehicle operations. These abilities will enhance their capability to infiltrate and exfiltrate specified operational areas by land, sea and air. Additionally, ODAs will have the capacity to operate in remote areas and hostile environments for extended periods of time with little external direction or support (USA, SF O&O 2001).

All detachment members, through maturity, advanced training, language ability, and interpersonal skills, are capable of developing, organizing, training, advising, assisting, or directing foreign counterparts in specific functional areas and in advanced combat arms doctrine up to battalion level. They are also capable of training, advising, and assisting other US and multinational forces and agencies (USA, SF O&O 2001).

The commander of an ODA is a major and the executive officer is a senior captain. This rank structure enables required influence and prestige with indigenous or surrogate military or paramilitary and coalition and alliance forces. This rank structure also allows the junior officer to remain with the ODA for an extended period of time (three to four years) which will add to the continuity of the overall element. The specified organization will allow for split team activities with all areas of expertise represented on each. In this split team configuration the ODA will have a greater influence on the battlefield and give the JSOTF increased flexibility during mission development and planning. The detachment or multiple detachments can be organized into a tailored composite team for specific missions (USA, SF O&O 2001).

Table 4. ODA Structure

| POSITION | MOS/GRADE | NUMBER |
|------------------------|--------------------|---------------|
| COMMANDER | 18A/04 | 1 |
| XO | 18A/03 | 1 |
| OPS OFFICER | 180A/WO 1/4 | 1 |
| INTEL OFFICER | 180A/WO 1/4 | 1 |
| SGM | 18Z/E9 | 1 |
| INTEL NCO | 18F/E8 | 2 |
| CBT ARMS TECH | 18B/E8 | 2 |
| MED SPECIALISTS | 18D/E8 | 2 |
| C4I SPECIALISTS | 18E/E8 | 2 |
| EN SPECIALISTS | 18C/E8 | 2 |

Source: USA, SF O&O 2001.

Significant Changes in this Special Forces Task Organization

Increased Grade Structure

The increased grade structure at all levels is the most significant modification in this concept. During an operation, it is not unusual for a SF team (a small, self-contained twelve-man unit) to be the only US presence in a country. Most employments of SF are small but politically sensitive, requiring the deployment of high ranking senior personnel to conduct communications and coordination with the host government, United Nations, coalition force partners' leadership, or indigenous or surrogate forces leadership (USA, SF O&O 2001).

SF solve this echelon issue by increasing the rank structure at all echelons in its Objective Force. This increased grade structure (without adding additional positions)

eliminates the requirement to deploy a higher-grade structure to interact with various political, military, and interagency actors in the area of operations (USA, SF O&O 2001).

Organic Airlift Mobility

Another significant change to this organization is the addition of organic fixed and rotary wing airlift capabilities to the following headquarters: the TSFC (Fwd) has fixed wing assets for command and control; the TSFC (Rear) has both fixed and rotary wing assets to support the assigned SFOGs during training at home station; and the SFOGs have both fixed and rotary wing assets, which are regionally forward stationed under the command of their forward stationed ODB (USA, SF O&O 2001).

The SF organic airlift will be forward stationed to preclude strategic deployment needs and to provide day-to-day support to a deployed unit's engagement activities. These forward stationed, intratheater airlift assets provide the CINC the capability of "rapidly repositioning forward stationed SF and their indigenous and surrogate assets" to where they are needed most in the region (USA, SF O&O 2001).

This airlift capability is in "addition to and does not replace the high technology and state-of-the-art operational and tactical ARSOF or AFSOF aviation assets." This organic airlift asset will be utilized to fulfill the vast majority of airlift requirement for SF and lower the requirement on operational and tactical air assets (USA, SF O&O 2001).

Special Forces Planning and Assessment Cell

Each geographic commander, SOC will task the TSFC (Fwd) to provide a special forces planning and assessment cell (SFPAC) specifically organized to support the standing joint force headquarters in each theater. The SFPAC is a standing organization that is OPCON and collocated with the joint force headquarters (see figures 6 and 7). It

is not an ad hoc staff unit, nor does it come out of the ranks of other SF units. Thus, it does not hamper the TSFC (Fwd)'s mission or capabilities (USA, SF O&O 2001).

The SFPAC provides a senior headquarters element completely able to integrate and support planning. The SFPAC provides the geographic commander, SOC and the joint force headquarters commander with an SF planning element to enhance RDO. The SFPAC provides regional expertise, a senior staff, excellent reach back capability, and real time access to information from the region due to the liaison relationship with the TSFC (Fwd) and to the SF operational detachments performing routine engagement activities. The SFPAC can also immediately deploy as assessment teams for the joint force headquarters (USA, SF O&O 2001).

Special Forces Augmentation Detachment

The SF augmentation detachment is composed of female operators who have a basic SF 18 MOS. Their mission is to augment SF units when there is a requirement for this specialized capability (USA, SF O&O 2001).

These detachment members are proficient in all skills equivalent to that of a male SF soldier, with some exceptions in infiltration and exfiltration operations. This asset would greatly enhance the unit's capability to disguise its role as a combatant on the conventional and unconventional battlefield. This specialized unit would increase the SF detachment's ability to collect and analyze information from "foreign or friendly key communicators and target audiences; possess a thorough understanding of unconventional operations; maintain proficiency in a second language; [be] able to conduct limited infiltration and exfiltration operations with Operational Detachments Alpha (ODA); [be] able to conduct sustained combat operations in a UO environment;

and [be] proficient in the operation of SOF weapon systems, demolitions, communications and other SOF equipment” (USA, SF O&O 2001).

Summary

This chapter first described the characteristics of the future operational environment and the possible threat that the US will face in the twenty-first century. By answering this question the author was able to build a foundation as to why the Army had to transform into the Objective Force in order to be successful and protect its national interests. The answer to this question shows the future operational environment will contain numerous actors with different degrees of influence and shows common trends and variables that will make military operations very dynamic and complex. This chapter also described how the US is perceived by the world and how the threat will try to exploit its weakness while simultaneously trying to avoid its strengths in order to defeat its technological advancement in warfare. This section ended with a possible scenario of how the future threat will fight a close engagement on tomorrow’s battlefield.

The chapter then went into detail on what operations, mission areas, and capabilities will be characteristic of the Objective Force. It describes in detail the various patterns of various military operations the Objective Force will need to accomplish and how it will concentrate its efforts in seven different mission areas. It ended by describing the characteristics and capabilities that are required in the Objective Force as stated in the Joint and Army Vision 2020 Statements.

The next two sections dealt directly with SF in the Objective Force by answering the remaining subordinate questions. The mission area that SF will work in is called UO and contains many of the same specific tasks that SF conducts today. This mission area

will be SF's core competency and is broken into the three main categories of unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, and US stand-alone unilateral missions. The following section described those unique capabilities that are required of SF units and individual soldiers in order to function in the Objective Force. These last two sections had a large impact on how future SF elements should be task organized in order to function in the future operational environment and defeat tomorrow's asymmetrical threat.

The final section of this chapter answered the thesis problem statement on the task organization of the Objective Force SF. It described in detail the various elements from the TSFC, which is deployed forward in support of the geographic CINC, to the ODA, which is the base unit of action that will execute UO across the operational spectrum. This section is supported graphically with numerous SF element wire diagrams that assist to illustrate the future SF task organizations.

In conclusion, SF must organize its units so that they reflect current realities and incorporate the capabilities employed by the potential adversaries (USA, TRADOC COE 2000). The advantages of SF in the Objective Force are obvious: with each UO the US gains regional experts with "on-the-ground experience." This will establish trust and understanding through personal and sustained contact with regional actors. SF can develop these relationships and assist the critical interface between coalition forces in a contingency or crisis response. By maintaining a forward SF presence, we can reassure nervous nations and increase regional stability. Additionally, in the event of an incident or even conflict, these SF units will provide "a ready source of first-hand regional expertise" (USA, SF O&O 2001).

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

This chapter describes the conclusions and recommendations formed from the research material that was used to answer the thesis problem statement. By utilizing the thesis methodology, the first three chapters clearly demonstrate how the research plan will answer the thesis question. The fourth chapter starts by analyzing the research data and describes the future need for a new SF task organization and ends with proposing a task organization that can accomplish UO in the future operational environment against a new asymmetrical adversary.

This study shows that SF in the Objective Force must be organized in order to be globally responsive to any contingency or operation that affects US national interests and objectives. This task organization must be capable of operating as a joint or multinational force across every point of the spectrum of operations from peacetime engagement to major theater wars. Lastly, the research identifies new structures that need to be established in the SF task organization that will enhance its capability to conduct UO in the twenty-first century.

Thesis Question

To focus on the conclusion and recommendations of this paper the thesis problem statement will be restated: How should the Army Special Forces be organized to meet the envisioned mission requirements of the Army's Objective Force of 2032?

As it was stated earlier, SF have been conducting current operations with a configuration that was developed fifty years ago to operate in an unsophisticated

operational environment against a well-known enemy. The emerging changes in joint and multinational operations, advancements in technologies, and the vast changes in world politics, economics, and social behaviors have identified the need to transform SF and the Army as a whole. While the current SF organization does exhibit the seven characteristics of the Objective Force, its capabilities must be enhanced in order to field a force that can sustain full spectrum dominance. The first step in this SF transformation process is to develop a task organization that is appropriate to meet the required capabilities needed to conduct UO on tomorrow's battlefield.

How the Objective Force SF Supports the Army Vision

As it was stated in chapter 1 and again in chapter 4 it is very important that the SF transforms into an organization that meets the requirements of the Objective Force as written in the Army Vision Statement. The proposed SF task organization in this thesis does just that.

Responsive

The Army's goal is to achieve strategic responsiveness by forward deployed forces, forward positioned capabilities, engagement, and force projection for CONUS locations (USA, SF O&O Initial Impressions Report 2001). This new SF organization is built to be extremely responsive by developing the TSFC (Fwd) which is a command and control organization that will be permanently stationed in the theater of operations and is structured to support administrative, intelligence, logistics, and in theater aviation requirements. This organization is structured and equipped to become a Joint Special Operations Task Force Headquarters in time of crisis which can easily receive and employ SF Units of Action from CONUS. The forward stationed ODB will provide a

greater command and control and support asset that is already in theater to execute missions such as an AOB, SOCCE, or establish and command an in theater isolation facility (ISOFAC).

These forward stationed elements will enhance the TEP through building in-country relationships that are in accordance with US objectives, focusing and providing in depth study on areas of tension in the region, and developing SF “regional scholars” through long term immersion of the language and culture of that theater. These elements will also enable the execution of full spectrum operations by establishing command and control elements not only in theater with the TSFC (Fwd) establishing a JSOTF but also in regions of tension with the utilization of the three ODB executing their AOB mission. If there are regions in a theater where these SF command and control elements cannot be permanently stationed, then the option of forward positioning of equipment can be used.

This organization also allows the rapid force projection of CONUS based forces by organizing the SFOG and ODBs with a configuration that is properly manned and equipped to execute SF operations with no additional augmentation. The SFOG will have organic aviation and communication capabilities that will enhance its responsiveness to operations in theater.

Deployable

SF will be capable of deploying an Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) globally within twenty-four hours. This meets the Army's goal of a brigade combat team anywhere in the world in ninety-six hours after lift-off, a division on the ground in 120 hours, and five divisions in thirty days (USA, SF O&O Initial Impressions Report 2001). The main idea behind this capability is the forward stationed SF elements will have an

established command and control structure and maintain the support equipment in theater to receive deployed ODAs from CONUS bases. The individual detachments will already have the ability with modularized equipment and organic aviation assets to quickly deploy in response to any crisis worldwide.

These deployments will be further enhanced through the assistance of regional indigenous and surrogate forces. The relationships with these types of forces were developed during past and present engagement activities by SF elements. The indigenous and surrogate forces will help to conduct counter-anti-access operations by providing the combat power to secure points of entry for deploying SF Units.

This new SF task organization allows for rapid deployment of forces from CONUS locations with no further reorganization or augmentation of personnel or equipment needed. This structure will be organized in its combat configuration with all the specific positions already embedded in the task organization. There will be no need to delay a deployment of any SF unit waiting for an attachment to come from other Army sources, as is a major problem with the current SF organization.

Agile

The Army's goal is mental, physical, and operational agility to move forces from stability operations and support operations to war fighting and back. Tactical war-fighting agility is defined as the ability to task organize on the move, transition from defense to offense and back again, and finally, develop leaders who can negotiate and leverage effectively for engagement missions (USA, SF O&O Initial Impressions Report 2001).

SF core competency of UO is conducted primarily to influence indigenous and surrogate forces to assist in US operations within a specific region. The Objective Force SF task organization makes SF extremely agile for these three reasons. First, the forward stationed elements are positioned to support US unilateral operations within the region; second, the TSFC (Fwd) is trained and positioned to transition to a JSOTF that can easily shift from engagement to war fighting; and third, the forward stationed SF elements will already have established relationships with the regional indigenous and surrogate forces. An established theater JSOTF allows deployed forces to fall in on a command and control structure that is manned and equipped to execute full spectrum operations with or without indigenous and surrogate units.

Versatile

The Army Vision is for organizational structures and forces that can dominate at any point on the spectrum of operations (USA, SF O&O Initial Impressions Report 2001). With this future task organization the “modularity” of SF Units of Employment (TSFC and SFOG) and Units of Action (ODB and ODA) will facilitate transitions between engagement and warfighting as well as the transition back. As with agility, these SF elements are tailored, positioned, and regionally focused for full spectrum operations without internal reorganization or external augmentation. The results will allow SF units to move quickly anywhere along the operational spectrum, transition to the current circumstances, and dominate the military situation.

Lethal

The Army Vision confirms the elements of lethal combat power by utilizing fires, maneuver, leadership, and protection (USA, SF O&O Initial Impressions Report 2001).

Through this new task organization and the execution of UO, SF will have the ability to utilize indigenous and surrogate forces and their capabilities to produce lethal effects on the future battlefield. Conducting UO in conjunction with these forces will allow the US to employ a small military package to a specific region while exponentially increasing its lethality.

Survivable

Survivability is maximum protection for our forces at the individual soldier level. Ground and air platforms utilize low observation capabilities, ballistic protection, long range acquisition and targeting, early attack, and higher first round hit and kill (USA, SF O&O Initial Impressions Report 2001). The future SF organization, with its forward stationed elements and rapidly deploying CONUS forces conducting regional engagement within a specific theater, will inherently increase the knowledge of its personnel. With this “in-country” education and experience, the region’s social, political, economic, and military situation will reveal force protection dangers that might affect US conventional forces. With this regional knowledge from working with local indigenous and surrogate forces, SF can assist in the survivability of all US personnel (military and civilian) who are working in the theater during peace or conflict.

Sustainable

The Army's vision is to reduce logistics footprint and replenishment demand, maximize reach back capabilities, invest in a systems approach to weapons and equipment, and make the most of civilian contracting (USA, SF O&O Initial Impressions Report 2001). The biggest benefit from this reform in SF task organization comes in its ability to sustain the force with a small logistical signature while in theater. Again, with

command and control elements forward stationed in the region, utilization of indigenous or surrogate logistical systems and materiel becomes feasible. Built-in organic aviation assets to the TSFC (Fwd) improve SF internal resupply capabilities to deployed elements within the region. In addition, structuring an organic mission support center that is CONUS based (the TSFC (Rear)) allows for reach back capability for administrative, intelligence, and logistics support.

Conclusions

Strategic Responsiveness

Forward stationing of command and control headquarters, such as the TSFC (Fwd) and three ODBs will enable efficient execution of full spectrum operations from day-to-day activities, such as regional engagement, to crisis response and war fighting. Forward stationing and increased deployments for engagement activities will enable units to focus on missions within a specific theater. The results will enhance regional expertise, develop habitual relationships with indigenous or surrogate forces, and provide operational flexibility, agility, and sustainability.

Using the TSFC (Fwd) as a JSOTF eliminated one layer of command between a JSOTF and SF Units of Action (ODB and ODA). The SFOG will be the only SF unit between the in theater command and control element and the war fighter.

Forward stationed and deployed SF addressing an enhanced, regionally focused engagement plan will enable SF units to be a dominant factor (with or without indigenous or surrogate forces) in countering the future threat's anti-access operations. The immediate effect will allow deploying conventional forces from CONUS to use selected aerial or sea ports of debarkation and other staging areas within the region.

Task Organization Design

With the TSFC (Fwd) forward stationed and SF detachments regularly conducting engagement activities, the TSFC (Rear) role as a mission support center conducting reach back logistics and supporting home station training events is needed today and should not wait for activation as part of the SF Transformation Plan of 2008. This mission support center needs to have a continuous operational capability and be properly manned to provide the administrative, intelligence, and logistic requirements of an entire theater TSFC.

This proposed SF task organization eliminates the current SF staff with an operationally tailored structure with the TSFC and SFOG having a fully manned and equipped OPCEN, SPTCEN, and SIGCEN. This enables SF units to train and operate without internal reorganization or external augmentation, which results in the increase in the overall responsiveness and deployability of CONUS based SF elements.

The organic aviation asset, both fixed and rotary wing, that will be assigned to each TSFC (Fwd) and TSFC (Rear) is an essential capability to support administrative and logistics functions required during regional engagement and routine operations in theater and training events at home station. These aircraft do not replace nor compete with the mission of the 160th SOAR or Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) air platforms.

The addition of female SF soldiers in the Objective Force SF is also needed. Assigning female SF soldiers with unique language and cultural knowledge and expertise to special augmentation detachments in the TSFC (Fwd) and TSFC (Rear) will greatly enhance a SF unit's ability to execute numerous "unconventional" operations. This one

asset alone will increase the capabilities of SF units working with indigenous and surrogate forces in various theaters in addition to assisting in the force protection ability of deployed forces.

Joint and Army Doctrine

The proposed term “unconventional operations” is a new phrase that is used to describe all SF activities and operations in the Objective Force. This proposed definition does adequately encompass all current SF missions as written in current joint and Army doctrine by breaking the current missions into three distinct categories, UW, FID, and US unilateral missions. Though this specific definition may require further development, UO is confirmed by the SF O&O Initial Impressions Report (2001) as the future core competency of SF, “the trunk of a tree from which all other missions and capabilities come.”

Recommendations

The following are the author’s recommendations for additions and improvements to the proposed SF task organization in the Army’s Objective Force and recommendations for future research projects.

The USASOC Transformation Plan is staying within the current confines of its five separate elements: SF, Rangers, Special Operations Aviation, CA, and PSYOP. Each element is developing a proposed operational and organizational plan that will be evaluated and tested through simulation tests before final approval and implementation into the force. There are also elements that are assigned to the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) that conduct very specific missions within the realm of the new term UO.

There are specific sections of the proposed task organization that make sense and should be implemented now rather than later. These are the mission support center that the TSFC (Rear) will form: the organic aviation assets, both forward stationed and CONUS based; female SF soldiers; and an increase in SF officer and noncommissioned officer rank structure (this was not covered in this thesis). This task organization should go a step further.

The Objective Force for SF should really be the base structure for a future Special Operation Force unit. It should encompass a section or element from each of the five current USASOC forces and embody all the capabilities that USASOC and JSOC have to offer. Besides the need for those four items listed above, this proposed SOF organization should have elements with a CA and PSYOP capability as well as a Ranger or strike force capability. USASOC should develop this organization so that each of its five elements are combined into one force structure and then provide five of these organizations to each theater CINC. This will not only give each CINC the ability to conduct the entire sphere of special operations within his area of responsibility but it will make “force provider” support at the USASOC and the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) levels more efficient.

Areas for Further Research

From the information provided from this thesis, there are numerous areas for further study by other SOF Military Education Level 4 students. Specifically the author recommends looking at these three possible topics: task organization a SF Interim Force, task organization of other Army special operation forces, and the task organization of sister services.

For the SF Transformation Plan to be successful there needs to be a link between the Legacy Force and the Objective Force. Research can center on what this organization should look like or how it should be manned and equipped. The SF Interim Force is a vital key in what the Objective Force will finally look like. This particular force will have to execute UO in a uncertain operational environment against a future threat without all the technological advancements that the Objective Force will have; so how it organizes will play a very important role in its success.

For future Army and joint operations to succeed it is important that other forces execute their own Transformation Plan. Knowing that this paper deals with a proposed SF task organization it would be very educational to see what the possible task organizations of the other ARSOF forces will look like. Particularly, how will CA and PSYOP increase their ability to support SF missions while still having the forces available to support Army conventional units. Another research project could be the future of the Army Rangers; will the Rangers be absorbed as a “JSOC only” or “infantry only” element or will their specific abilities be best served alongside SF. The Rangers’ future task organization could be discussed based on the ability to conduct specific tasks or organized to function across the entire spectrum of operations. Still another topic could deal with the Objective Force task organization of special operation aviation assets. Again, future task organizations could be researched that best support their capabilities on tomorrow’s battlefield. Like Army SOF elements, the other services’ SOF units such as the Navy SEALs or the Air Force’s Para-Rescue Jumpers or Combat Controller Teams future task organizations could be made topics for future thesis projects. These organizations would become increasingly important as the US military executes more

joint special operations in the future with a JSOTF providing the command and control and logistical support of these missions.

Summary

As this paper has stated numerous times before the future is uncertain. The best that military leaders can do is to estimate the parameters of the future operational environment and the characteristics of the possible threat that they will have to face. For the US Army and its SF there is a need to change or transform into an Objective Force that will succeed on the twenty-first century battlefield.

The SF must modify in every aspect: task organization, equipment, doctrine, and training. This paper dealt with a possible task organization for SF. Currently armed with a task organization that was developed over fifty years ago, SF must make changes that will enable them to dominate at every point on the spectrum of operations.

By going through logical steps the author used current research material to develop a SF task organization that will have the ability to execute missions during peace engagement as well as during conflict. This organization is designed to support the Army Vision and be compatible with the rest of the Army's Objective Force. This structure is designed to best execute UO in surroundings that continually change in order to engage and destroy a technologically advanced threat that will be hard to define. In the end this new SF task organization will be able to continue to "fight and win our nation's wars" (Shinseki 2001).

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