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<b>15. Abstract:</b>  United States Forces have the potential to positively affect future Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) <i>by Influence.</i> By focusing on utilizing <i>Command by Influence</i> in future MOOTW Operations, commanders can promote success and build leaders for the future. Using the methods of command presented by Martin Van Crevald in "Command In War" this paper proposes a model for future U.S. Forces participation in MOOTW or other non-traditional military operations based on Van Crevald's definition of <i>Command by Influence.</i> The methods of command described by Van Crevald are related to the traditional military definitions. A recent case study that demonstrates the successful implementation of Command by influence -- "U.S. Forces INTERFET" in East Timor is also included.			
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**"A JTF In Support; How U.S. Forces Can Achieve Success *by Influence.*"**


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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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## *Thesis*

How United States Forces can intervene in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) is a hotly debated topic. U.S. Forces have the potential to positively affect future MOOTW operations *by Influence*. By focusing on utilizing *Command by Influence* in future MOOTW Operations, commanders can promote success and build leaders for the future.

## *Background*

Using the methods of command identified by Martin Van Crevald in Command In War, I propose a specific model for future U.S. Forces participation in non-traditional military operations.

In order to fully appreciate the proposed methodology, one needs to understand the methods of command described by Van Crevald as they relate to the traditional military definition of mission (task to purpose) as well as the current U.S. perspectives on MOOTW. Once the definitions have been presented, I will present a recent case study that demonstrates the successful implementation of Command by Influence -- "U.S. Forces INTERFET" in East Timor.

### *Definition of "Command"*

According to Van Crevald, "Command may be defined as a function that has to be exercised, more or less continuously, if the army is to exist and operate."<sup>1</sup> Van Crevald goes on to discuss the importance of the "command system," as a means for critical information collection and sharing. The crux of which is sharing the information that the subordinates should know and nothing more while constantly monitoring to ensure reliable execution, but not so closely as to stifle subordinate's initiative or ability to act independently as necessary.

### *Methods of Command*

Van Crevald identifies the need for the necessary quality of information, in the right form, at the right place, at the right time as essential for military success. He then correlates the commander's quest to deal with uncertainty and insufficient information with the methods of command. "The function of command is carried out by direction, by plan or by influence. While not mutually exclusive and often employed in combination, these methods or archetypes are dominant."<sup>2</sup> Each proposed method of

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<sup>1</sup> Van Crevald, Martin. *Command In War*. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 5.

<sup>2</sup> Czerwinski, Thomas J. "Command and Control at the Crossroads," (*Parameters*, Autumn 1996:121-132), 1.

command deals with uncertainty differently, generally the directing commander attempts to prioritize uncertainty, the command by plan commander seeks to centralize uncertainty, and the influencing commander prefers to distribute uncertainty.<sup>3</sup>

Although, command by direction is the oldest and by far the most common method, it required an extended means of communication that was beyond the reach of technological solutions until recently. As the battlespace expanded, it became harder for one commander to maintain complete and dynamic control over many dispersed forces. Therefore, modern commanders found it nearly impossible to exclusively rely on command by direction until the recent technological developments. In addition to the communications challenge, another inherent problem with the employment of command by direction is that a commander's quest to decrease the information processing requirement in an uncertain situation must prioritize attempts to reduce uncertainty. However, in doing so, the commander may inadvertently increase the level of uncertainty and create an information void that may be more troubling.

Command by plan was the first major break-through in command methodology. It has been credited to Frederick the Great, as he attempted to remove the limitations imposed by command by direction. He resorted to command by plan, leaning towards comprehensiveness over direct control. He focused on, "trying to plan every move in

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<sup>3</sup> Ibid, 2.

advance, relying on highly trained troops and strict discipline to carry out the scheme as ordered." <sup>4</sup>

However, Frederick's use of a plan to manage all of his forces all of the time met with limited success. Since the 1790's, highly centralized command by plan methodology has evolved into the most practiced and accepted method employed by modern military forces. And while we have adapted and modified doctrine, training, material, leader development, personnel and facilities (DTMLPF) to develop forces to operate within an authoritative (but not directive) joint planning process, the increased complexity of modern warfare continues to plague any increased gains in competency. The only visible statement of its success has been the air (or integrated) tasking order. "The reason is that command by plan inherently fights the disorderly nature of war as much as the adversary." <sup>5</sup> The efficacy of Command by plan is part of a continual balancing act between the specificity (and rigidity) of deliberate planning and the need for flexibility of operations. Anyone who has ever worked within the joint deliberate planning process is familiar with this often-delicate balancing act. This flexibility is often characterized by decentralized command and control in order to identify and neutralize enemy centers of gravity in a more deliberate method. When one applies Van Crevald's second iron rule of command, "drastic simplification of the organization so as to enable it to operate with less information," to command by plan, it is evident that command by plan is "inadequate

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<sup>4</sup> Van Crevald, Martin. *Command In War.*( Cambridge, MA: Harvard university Press, 1985.), 53.

<sup>5</sup> Czerwinski, Thomas J. "Command and Control at the Crossroads," (*Parameters*, Autumn 1996:121-132), 3

and...in danger of being self-defeating," in other words, command methodologies which concentrate on centralizing uncertainty do not necessarily lead to success.<sup>6</sup>

Command by influence is the most recently adopted command methodology of the three described by Van Crevald in Command In War. Its modern genesis stems from the use of "auftragstaktik" or "mission type orders", developed by the Germans in the later stages of World War I and then refined in World War II. This method of command is highlighted by the fact that only a mission outline and minimum goals are established in advance, which effectively allows the commander the latitude to influence all of his forces all of the time. Unlike the other command methodologies mentioned above, this method offers that the Clausewitzian concept of friction is not only inevitable but also desirable, especially with regard to its effect on the enemy.<sup>7</sup> Command by Influence does not come cheaply. It has two key requirements, one of which is well ensconced in Marine Corps doctrine and another that is just now being articulated.

The first key element is the absolute requirement for a high level of trust to exist between the commander and his subordinates. Another key element of command by influence is the requirement for "shared situational awareness" between the commander and his or her adjacent and subordinate commanders. Situational awareness is defined by Albert Nofi as, "the result of a dynamic process of perceiving and comprehending events in one's environment, leading to reasonable projections as to possible ways the environment may change, and permitting predictions as to what the outcomes will be in

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<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Van Crevald, Martin. *Command In War*. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985.), 188.

terms of performing one's mission."<sup>8</sup> What makes Nofi's otherwise unremarkable statement so revealing is that shared situational awareness is often mentioned but never satisfactorily defined in a wide range of military literature extending from the fighter cockpit all the way to the Pentagon's "tank".

The brevity of this paper prohibits further development but other research has indicated that Command by Influence is the most preferable method in a highly dynamic and uncertain environment.<sup>9</sup> Having decided that Command by Influence is the appropriate solution to a specific set of military problems it must employ a suitable system of command and control.

What is command and control? Command and control is defined by Marine Corps Doctrine Publication 6 as, "the means by which a commander recognizes what needs to be done and sees to it that appropriate actions are taken."<sup>10</sup> How does a commander convey what needs to be done and ensure that it is? There are two essential elements of command and control, implicit understanding and communications. Both are necessary in order for coordination and cooperation to occur.

### *Traditional Mission Type Orders*

Traditional type orders and missions have developed from a military legacy that rewards "command by direction". These orders "list a task, together with a purpose that

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<sup>8</sup> Nofi, Albert A. "Defining and Measuring Shared Situational Awareness," (Center for Naval Analysis, CRM D0002895.A1/Final. November 2000.) 1

<sup>9</sup> Dekker, Anthony. *C4ISR Architectures, Social Network Analysis and the FINC Methodology: An Experiment in Military Organisational Structure (Revised)* (C3 Research Centre, DTSO, March 21, 2002.) 22-23.

<sup>10</sup> MCDP 6, *Command and Control*. Washington, D.C. Department of the Navy, 4 October, 1996.

clearly indicates the action to be completed and the reason therefore”.<sup>11</sup> In other terms, a mission is defined as a duty assigned to a specific unit or individual or a task. A mission always articulates a task with a purpose and many times includes a specific method for completing subject task. Traditional orders value clarity and details that often do not leave room for interpretation or innovation. Thus, it is easy to see why many military organizations desire the rewards of command under less restrictive methods but are unwilling to pay the associated costs.

### *MOOTW: The Intrinsic Differences*

In accordance with Joint Pub 1-02, Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) are defined as, “Operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during and after war.”<sup>12</sup> The above definition of MOOTW, is deliberately vague and leaves much room for interpretation. Any military operations that don’t fall neatly into the category of “conventional war,” are historically lumped together in this nebulous category.

A key characteristic for operations of this type, where uncertainty is the only constant and escalation can occur in almost every dimension, is the need for flexible yet focused

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<sup>11</sup> Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. (Washington, D.C., Joint Staff, 12 April 2001.), 275.

<sup>12</sup> Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. (Washington, D.C., Joint Staff, 12 April 2001.), 268.

planning. Clearly, a command philosophy that relies on decentralized command, and exploits implicit communications, will allow subordinate commanders to react more quickly and decisively. By encouraging their subordinates to make decisions on their own initiative and based on understanding of their senior's intent, the commanders seeks to improve the opportunity for mission success. This "philosophy also requires familiarity among comrades because only through a shared understanding can we develop the implicit communication necessary for unity of effort."<sup>13</sup> While planning and the process involved in planning are generally preferred, especially with regard to MOOTW, it matters little whether the planning process itself is centralized or decentralized. The difference with MOOTW is that regardless of the type of planning utilized during the planning phase, centralized or decentralized; it is the decentralized command during the execution phase, or command by influence that has historically been more successful in MOOTW operations.

### *USINTERFET A Case Study of Command by Influence*

The United States forces participation in the United States Internal Force East Timor (USINTERFET) operation in support of East Timor was a classic example of a MOOTW scenario. Everything about American involvement and support provided to the Australian-led operation was contrary to the comfortable command by plan guidance executed in a conventional military operation. This was evident from the earliest stages of the U.S. involvement, when we clearly lacked a mission, to the final weeks when we

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<sup>13</sup> MCDPC 1, *Warfighting*. ( Washington, D.C., Department of the Navy, June 1997), 81.

had a carefully developed and subsequently met exit criteria. As will be shown, success of the U.S. support provided to the coalition was dependent in large measure on decentralized command and command by influence.

Despite the existence of UN Security Council Resolution 1264, which authorized establishment of a multinational force for East Timor, the specific mission for U.S. Forces started and remained vague through critical planning periods. Although forces began deploying to Dili on 20 September 1999, the mission and objectives remained unspecified while the Australian-led coalition struggled to “get flags on the ground as they had a responsibility to build a credible multinational force quickly. A more ideal approach would have been to develop a clear game plan before attempting to build the coalition.”<sup>14</sup> Even as late as the 30<sup>th</sup> of September, Marine Brigadier General John Castelow, the U.S. Forces Commander, was quoted in the *Washington Times*, “We are proceeding on without plan, doing it as it’s been laid out.”<sup>15</sup> In the absence of a solid plan or more specific mission guidance, it was crucial that the commander relied on stating his intent through implicit communications and decentralized command. General Castellaw’s command and communications style was easily paired with the similar outlook of the international force’s commander. “The command style adopted by General Cosgrove, (Commander INTERFET), suited the requirements of a much smaller

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<sup>14</sup> Ryan, Alan. “Primary Responsibilities and Primary Risks: Australian Defence Force Participation in the International Force East Timor,” (Land Warfare Studies Centre, Study Paper No. 304. November 2000.), 119

<sup>15</sup> Gertz, Bill. “Additional Troops Sent to East Timor,” (*Washington, Times*, September 30, 1999.), 1.

force and all but obviated the need for a formal coordination center. The afternoon chiefs of staff sessions resolved most of the bread and butter coordination that arose.”<sup>16</sup>

How did the Commander U.S. Forces INTERFET direct his forces in the absence of a clearly defined or articulated plan or mission? General Castellaw was able to convey his intent and accomplish the objective as it developed through command by influence. He communicated implicitly with his staff and subordinate commanders ensuring that they had the information that was available that they needed and did not load them up with information they didn't need to know. He also expected a similar approach from them in return. He expounded a few broad tenets to paint a mutually understood vision – thus providing guidance while leaving the flexibility and initiative to his subordinates.

Despite the lack of a precise mission during the early phases of the operation, General Castellaw was able to extract broad terms of reference from higher headquarters and establish a framework that described his conditions for success. He outlined them as:

- a. Establish a comprehensive force protection plan
- b. Minimize the footprint and exposure of U.S. forces in Dili (and other sites within East Timor)
- c. Rapidly introduce unique U.S.-only capabilities
- d. Commander, INTERFET (Australian Defence Forces) remains in charge

Utilizing these four very broad principles he deviated from established doctrine and traditions when required to provide a simple and understandable process rather than a set of rules with which to guide the actions of the task force. “Every unit and individual was

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<sup>16</sup> Ryan, Alan. “Primary Responsibilities and Primary Risks: Australian Defence Force Participation in the International Force East Timor,” (Land Warfare Studies Centre, Study Paper No. 304. November 2000.), 87

inculcated with USCINCPAC's tenets before deployment into East Timor. In many ways, these conditions for success provided the core elements for the Commander's Intent."<sup>17</sup> The use of these overarching tenets encouraged decentralized planning and execution as well as interaction among liaison cells and staffs providing specialized capabilities to INTERFET. Force protection remained a priority throughout and was an implicitly understood requirement before each new phase of the operation. U.S. participation in the operation was a phenomenal success in spite of the overwhelming uncertainty and nebulous guidance provided during the opening phases of the deployment. It was command by influence, and an appropriate command and control process that made the U.S. support to INTERFET achievable.

While some might argue that the reasons for the success in East Timor had more to do with the relatively small number of forces employed and the lack of decisive engagement by U.S. forces, I would argue the exact opposite. The requirement from the National Command Authority to keep the footprint in Dili small while providing needed communications; intelligence and logistics support to the Australian-led coalition actually complicated the initial flow into East Timor and required greater coordination and command and control. In addition, the visible presence and show of U.S. commitment in the timely arrival of the USS Belleau Wood with Marines from the 31<sup>st</sup> Marine Expeditionary Unit Special Operations Capable (MEU(SOC)) was a true force multiplier for General Cosgrove and allowed him to add depth and underwrite his thinly stretched forces.<sup>18</sup> General Castellaw's flawless coordination of the MEU/ARG despite the fact

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<sup>17</sup> Castellaw, John G. BGen, USMC. "East Timor Breaking New Ground", (Draft article 7 June 2000.) 13.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid. 7.

that these forces were not OPCON to him could not have been orchestrated had he not commanded by influence.

### *Recommendations*

In light of the increased involvement in MOOTW and Peace Operations in particular, perhaps it's time that the Joint community reassess the mindset expounded by our current joint doctrine. We should acknowledge the fact that a command methodology that works well in a conventional military operation may not only be less effective in MOOTW, but, in some cases, may actually be counter-productive. The attributes of "command by plan," which centralizes uncertainty and relies on the issuance of traditional detailed orders may be insufficient for reasons that transcend emerging technologies. Further, by attempting to capitalize on network centric warfare and feeding all information to a pervasive network (that also supports waiting for centrally developed and issued orders), we are less likely to prepare commanders and their subordinate commanders for the plethora of uncertainty and the unstable and ever changing tempo of MOOTW. In contrast, a choice to effectively use network centric warfare to aid "command by influence" by increasing shared awareness and not simply the level of information could greatly increase the speed and tempo of MOOTW operations. Highly decentralized command and control (C2) has the potential to provide the key ingredient for developing "an overwhelming advantage by allowing each individual war fighter to act on the information superiority provided by the network."<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> Zimmerman, John D., LCDR, USN. "Net-Centric Is About Choices," (*Proceedings*, January 2002.), 39.

However, merely scratching this technological itch may not be the best approach toward implementing Command by Influence. In Network Centric Warfare, the authors define the need for “self-synchronization” in achieving increased tempo and responsiveness. The elements necessary for self-synchronization are two or more entities, shared awareness and a rule set. “The combination of a rule set and shared awareness enables the entities to operate in the absence of traditional hierarchical mechanisms for command and control.” However, both the rule set and shared awareness remain woefully under defined and in search of an appropriate command method. They believe that warfighting activities of a support class (i.e. MOOTW) have significant potential for the application of self-synchronization. While the majority of experiments in this area documented to date discuss a centralized node for C2, a recent Army study conducted at Fort Hood, provided several examples where a significant emphasis was placed upon the use of commander’s intent thus allowing subordinate units more flexibility and freedom of action and the ability of lower level forces to operate nearly autonomously by retasking themselves.<sup>20</sup>

The potential for future successes of U.S. Forces involved in MOOTW when leveraging network centric attributes by applying command by influence are great. By decentralizing uncertainty and utilizing mission type orders and commanders intent to share situational awareness with adjacent and subordinate commanders, tremendous increases in speed and tempo are possible.

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<sup>20</sup> Alberts, David S., Garstka, John J., Stein, Frederick P.. *Network Centric Warfare Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority*. (Washington, D.C., CCRP, February 2000.), 176-178.

## *Conclusions*

*“As the principal guarantor of global peace, the United States, by its actions and omissions, will strongly influence, if not determine, the outcome.”*<sup>21</sup>

While, the U.S. Forces support provided to USINTERFET was an excellent example of the benefits that can be derived by employing command by influence in a MOOTW scenario, it is not the only example. Retired Marine Corps General Anthony Zinni in his address to the CIA of 6 March 1996 described the difficulty of dealing with MOOTW and non-conventional operations as compared with the traditional more specific and directed taskings, “... not the loosey-goosey mission statements associated with many of these MOOTW scenarios. The military has a hard time dealing with these scenarios – it’s a dimension that we’re not used to dealing with, setting objectives as we go along.”<sup>22</sup>

What has made some U.S. forces successful with these “loosey-goosey type mission statements” while others have been less successful? I suggest it’s an appropriate mindset, accompanied by training and long standing doctrine. The United States Marine Corps has referred to itself as the “Nation's 911 Force” and often provides the forces that are called upon when uncertainty is high and time is the essence. Peace Operations historically have required quick, bold, decisive reaction and a high degree of flexibility,

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<sup>21</sup> U.S. Congress. Senate Armed Services Committee, Statement of Admiral Dennis C. Blair, Commander in Chief, U.S. PACOM, On Fiscal Year 2001 Posture Statement (Washington, D.C., March 7, 2000.), 2.

<sup>22</sup> Zinni, Anthony, General, USMC. Address to CIA, 6 March 1996

initiative and innovation -- traits that have typically associated with the Marine Corps. Marine Corps expeditionary doctrine continues to outline the importance of being able to overcome and adapt to the unknown or the unexpected. "For the Marine Corps, being "expeditionary" is, before anything else, a mindset. An expeditionary mindset implies the versatility and adaptability to respond effectively without a great deal of preparation time to a broad variety of circumstances. This mindset is a matter of training and institutional culture." <sup>23</sup>

That expeditionary mindset is further enhanced by the Marine Corps' philosophy of command – "decentralized," "that is, subordinate commanders must make decisions on their own initiative, based on their understanding of their senior's intent, rather than passing information up the chain of command and waiting for the decision to be passed down...our philosophy must not only accommodate but must exploit human traits such as boldness, initiative, personality, strength of will and imagination." <sup>24</sup>

While the Marine Corps' traditional culture and expeditionary mindset have made it extremely suitable for MOOTW operations, there is no reason that the other services can't learn from these successes and incorporate some of the tenets of decentralized command and control and ultimately embrace a *command by influence* methodology. While the Army's doctrine of specific detailed and minutely planned taskings may seem to be in conflict with *command by influence*, the use of the shared vision of a particular scenario available to a commander and his or her subordinate and adjacent commanders, coupled with minor modifications in current doctrine that encourage decentralized

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<sup>23</sup> MCDP 3, *Expeditionary Operations*. (Washington, D.C. Department of the Navy, 16 April 1998.), 43-44.

<sup>24</sup> FM, FM 1, *Warfighting*. ( Washington, D.C., Department of the Navy, 6 March 1989.), 62.

command during the execution phase, has the potential to assist the Army transition to a more *command by influence* mindset and ultimately make the Army more relevant in future MOOTW operations. The Army mindset has begun changing as noted by Brigadier General Hank Stratman in his recent article on Adaptive Dominance, "Today as potential adversaries strike out in new technological and doctrinal directions, their employment options increase commensurately: In these conditions, the military behavior of potential adversaries cannot easily be predicted....To cope with this uncertainty, U.S. forces require adaptive dominance – the ability rapidly, and without major reconfiguration, to defeat changing enemy patterns faster than the enemy himself can exploit them...Ultimately adaptive dominance is a function of military culture, fostered or inhibited by training and leadership. But it also presumes a force design that deliberately exploits such qualities as rapid situational awareness, organizational versatility, operational and tactical agility, and the smooth integration of joint capabilities."<sup>25</sup>

Conversely, the Navy's historical lack of reliance on doctrine, makes the Navy ideally suited to incorporate the *command by influence* methodology. Its additional flexibility and decentralized command approach complement the Navy's historically decentralized command and control methodology.

With the increased role that U.S. forces are likely to play in future operations short of war, and the decreased probability that we will engage conventional forces, it is critical that we modify Joint mindset to incorporate methods and procedures that will enhance our chances of future success. The United States Marine Corps' record of success in

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<sup>25</sup> Stratman, Brig. Gen. (P) Hank, USA. "Adaptive Dominance: Army Objective Force Will produce Overwhelming Effects at Decisive Points," (*Armed Forces Journal*, February 2002), 68.

MOOTW operations is deeply rooted in command by influence and provides a sound leadership-centered path for development of future joint operations.

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