



INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

## **Improving Personnel Recovery in a Coalition Environment**

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## **UNCLASSIFIED**

### **PREFACE**

This document was prepared by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) for the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Prisoner of War and Missing Personnel Affairs (DPMO), in partial fulfillment of the task Personnel Recovery in a Coalition Environment. The objective of this effort was to provide independent support to DPMO in identifying and resolving policy issues that would help a Combatant Commander execute the personnel recovery mission in a coalition environment during operations other than war. The first phase of the study focused on the European theater and the NATO alliance, leveraging experience gained during Operation Allied Force. The second phase of the study focused on the remaining geographic theaters and non-traditional coalitions.

The IDA Technical Review Committee was chaired by Mr. Robert R. Soule and consisted of Mr. James Doherty, Mr. Rick Sayre, RADM Robert P. Hilton, Sr., USN (Ret.), Gen William W. Momyer, USAF (Ret.), and RADM Samuel H. Packer, USN (Ret.).



# IMPROVING PERSONNEL RECOVERY IN A COALITION ENVIRONMENT

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### A. PURPOSE

The Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) is providing analytical support for the Defense Prisoner of War (POW) and Missing Personnel Affairs Office (DPMO) in the assessment of Personnel Recovery (PR) efforts in a Coalition Environment during Operations Other Than War (OOTW). By identifying and addressing policy issues, IDA seeks to improve the ability of Combatant Commanders to execute PR missions, and the overall effectiveness of PR missions in OOTW with coalition partners.

For the first phase of this task (FY2000), IDA's goal was to identify policy issues that would specifically address the Department of Defense's (DoD's) most pressing need: PR support for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Alliance. An interim report primarily focused on the PR issues within Europe and the NATO Alliance, and stated IDA's findings and recommendations regarding those issues.<sup>1</sup> For the second phase of this task (FY2001), IDA's objective was to identify policy issues that address PR support for non-traditional coalitions found in all of the geographic theaters. This final report addresses findings and recommendations based on input from each of the major Combatant Commands, and a broad range of allies and coalition partners.

In short, IDA recommends that DPMO:

1. Implement a policy to establish and maintain theater Search and Rescue (SAR) Alliances;
2. Implement a policy that U.S. Forces be responsible for combat recovery of allied and coalition personnel; but
3. Not implement a policy at this time to plan for coalition forces to conduct combat recovery of U.S. personnel.

These recommendations are explained at the end of this Executive Summary, and the body of this report provides detailed rationale and specific implementation recommendations.

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<sup>1</sup> IDA Document D-2573, "Improving Personnel Recovery in a Coalition Environment," Interim Report, April 2001.

## **B. BACKGROUND**

PR is defined by Joint Publication 1-02 as “the aggregation of military, civil, and political efforts to recover captured, detained, evading, isolated or missing personnel from uncertain or hostile environments and denied areas. PR includes, but is not limited to Combat Recovery; Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE); Evasion and Recovery (E&R); the coordination of negotiated as well as forcible recovery options; and repatriation of isolated personnel. PR may occur through military action, action by non-governmental organizations, other U.S. Government-approved action, and diplomatic initiatives, or through any combination of these options.”

This report focuses on the aspects of PR most relevant to the DoD in a coalition environment: combat recovery (primarily Combat Search And Rescue (CSAR)); and SERE. IDA determined early in the study that the DoD does not normally conduct E&R in a coalition environment, so we excluded that topic from the scope of this report. IDA also determined during the course of this study that International Civil SAR is quite relevant to the issues, so we have included discussion of this topic where appropriate.

DPMO tasked IDA to:

- Assess CSAR-specific interoperability issues between U.S. and coalition partners (Operation Allied Force revealed significant interoperability problems between U.S. and NATO forces, as well as within the U.S. Joint Task Force (JTF)).
- Assess the impact of these problems on joint U.S.-NATO PR efforts.
- Assess the impact of interoperability problems on joint recovery efforts with other Allies, including South Korea and/or Saudi Arabia, and the feasibility of conducting joint recovery efforts with non-traditional coalition partners, such as took place in cooperation with Syria in Operation Desert Storm.
- Assess the impact on PR efforts of the releasability of classified information to none of or a subset of coalition partners.
- Assess the impact of coalition partners’ different PR policies on coalition PR.
- Assess the impact of differences between Allied PR policies, including Isolated Personnel Report (ISOPREP) systems, SERE training, and recovery operations.
- Assess the limitations to integrating U.S. and coalition rescue efforts as a result of policy restrictions and the impact of those limitations on rescue efforts.

In support of these assessments, IDA examined PR planning in established theaters of operation and researched lessons learned from previous and ongoing coalition military efforts with traditional and non-traditional coalition partners.

### **C. SCOPE**

The scope of this final report has been broadened from the interim report to study improving PR policy for both traditional Alliances and non-traditional coalitions. For purposes of this report, the phrase “coalition environment” is used in a general sense to refer to multi-national or combined military operations involving one or more allies and/or coalition partners. In all other cases, the term “coalition” is distinct and different than “alliance.” Where applicable, IDA discusses the cases of coalition partners and allies separately.

### **D. METHODOLOGY**

IDA’s task order from DPMO outlined a number of tasks. The first two focused on assessing the DoD’s ability to conduct PR in a coalition environment. For the first year of the project, IDA took the following approach:

- Focus first on Combat Search and Rescue-specific interoperability issues
- Specifically focus on U.S.-NATO operations.

For the final year of the project, IDA used a different approach for assessment:

- Focus on key issues identified during the first phase of the study
- Study coalition and allied operations in all of the major geographic theaters.

In an effort to focus the scope of the problem, IDA attempted to identify those problems that were unique to the PR mission, and that could be found only in the coalition environment. IDA began by identifying problems generic to the overall PR mission area, and problems generic to all mission areas operating in a coalition environment. These problems were drawn from earlier studies, reports, white papers, and journal articles. After screening general problems, what remained were problems that were potentially unique to PR operations in a coalition environment. IDA initially focused on the following problems to assess their impact and identify solutions:

- Incompatible policy and doctrine
- Incompatible tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP)
- Insufficient numbers of Liaison Officers from allied and coalition countries within Command and Control (C2) elements of the PR system.

It became apparent early in the study that IDA would have to go out to the responsible agencies and the warfighters in the field in order to gather the information needed to complete the assigned tasks. IDA conducted interviews with individuals who were directly involved in Bosnia/Kosovo actions and, in particular, with individuals involved in rescue operations. IDA correlated interview notes with information from lessons learned studies to build a clearer picture of actual events and issues. IDA personnel observed exercises in Korea, Alaska, Australia, continental United States (CONUS), and Europe that involved PR operations. IDA visited every major U.S. military command involved in or responsible for PR, including Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), European Command (EUCOM), Pacific Command (PACOM), Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), Central Command (CENTCOM), Special Operations Command (SOCOM), and U.S. Forces Korea (USFK).<sup>2</sup> In many cases, IDA personnel interviewed PR representatives of the component commands subordinate to the combatant commands, as well. IDA gathered sufficient actual experience information, in combination with the views of those individuals and responsible agencies, to provide an understanding of the problems and potential solutions for PR in a coalition environment. IDA correlated these experiences and views with information from lessons learned studies as well. IDA personnel interviewed CSAR representatives from Germany, Spain, Portugal, France, Hungary, Denmark, Korea, Australia, Indonesia, the Netherlands, Bulgaria, Romania, Sweden, Canada, Austria, and the United Kingdom to gain an understanding of PR from the perspectives of our allies and coalition partners. These countries were actively involved in combined CSAR operations or exercises during the study.

IDA distributed surveys to personnel within the PR community at formal courses, conferences, PR council meetings, and site visits. IDA collected over 150 completed surveys over the course of the study. IDA validated 135 questionnaires that contained usable data.

## **E. FINDINGS**

During the early months of this phase of the study, IDA made these preliminary findings:

- There is a complete lack of an accepted taxonomy for the “PR in a coalition environment” mission area (even the mission is undefined). The lack of a

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<sup>2</sup> Section II.C. contains a complete list of U.S. organizations interviewed.

common language at times made even a discussion of the issues challenging. This stems not from the incompatibility of guidance, but from the lack of documentation (policy, doctrine, and TTP) by DoD, the Joint Staff, and the Services on the subject of PR in a coalition environment.

- The consensus among those responsible for executing combat recovery missions, as well as those at risk of isolation during combat, is that combined training, particularly exercises with our coalition partners, is the best solution to our problems. Despite this, emphasis on coalition training runs a distant third to Service training and joint training. This emphasis extends to other mission areas as well.
- Some theaters emphasize civil SAR (PACOM, SOUTHCOM), while others emphasize combat SAR (EUCOM, CENTCOM), but no theater weights each type equally. Limited resources force them to choose one or the other. The major limitation is manpower within U.S. organizations, not limited personnel from allied and coalition countries.

These findings were briefed to the Personnel Recovery Advisory Group and documented in the interim report. IDA's findings regarding DoD PR in a coalition environment can be summarized in these ten areas:

## **1. Similarity of Joint and Combined Operations**

For PR in a coalition environment, the leading problems are: a lack of training – combined exercises for U.S. forces and rescue training for coalition partners; a lack of a common “language” – terminology, acronyms, and brevity codes; and the restricted releasability of classified information within the coalition. These problems highlight a theme in coalition interoperability: *Our coalition interoperability problems mirror our joint and interagency interoperability problems.* Therefore, solving the joint and interagency problems within the U.S. PR community serves two purposes. One is to assure coalition partners that the U.S. “has its own house in order.” The other is to provide a roadmap to establishing coalition interoperability through the process of establishing joint and interagency interoperability.

## **2. Interoperability**

Because PR missions happen infrequently, it is not possible to build a case for specific interoperability problems based on recurring examples. The PR mission area needs a continuing training or testing program to do this. IDA discovered that there is a lack of programs designed to identify and resolve coalition interoperability issues. DoD sponsors the Joint Test and Evaluation program, which has successfully addressed

interoperability issues in the joint arena, such as the incompatibility of night vision systems used for searches, and the incompatibility of computer hardware for PR information technology systems. There is a need for a similar program focused on coalition issues if the issues are to be resolved in a methodical and timely manner. As the U.S. increasingly builds coalitions with nontraditional partners, the level of interoperability becomes less and less known.

### **3. Training and Readiness**

There is a “training gap” between the U.S. and our coalition partners. There are two aspects to the issue of a “training gap.” The first is the lack of opportunities for PR forces to exercise as a coalition in preparation for contingency operations. The second is the disparity between the levels of training in U.S. and coalition PR forces, including high risk of capture (HRC) personnel. Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS) Guidance notes that there will be operational difficulties arising from differences in the level of training of involved forces in a coalition environment.<sup>3</sup> The warfighters’ perception of PR in a coalition environment, at the grass-roots level, is that a lack of combined training exercises is the root problem. Not surprisingly, the warfighters perceive that more combined training exercises is the solution. However, implementing this solution depends on having both U.S. and allied or coalition PR/CSAR forces in the theaters where they will exercise and operate.

The warfighters in the field need and want a “credible insurance policy” with regard to PR. They know an “incredible” (as in “too good to be true”) PR capability when they see one, regardless of what the theater Headquarters (HQ) is promising. Indications of a non-credible capability include: a lack of PR-capable assets in place; a lack of training and exercises for those assets, if they are in place; and inadequate or insufficient survival radios. They perceive that the current capabilities of our allies and coalition partners would further detract from the “credibility” if used as part of the “PR umbrella” over their military operations. They also perceive that the current lack of credibility damages morale, and adversely impacts the capability of combat forces.

The lack of training and exercises is masking capability shortfalls and other PR-related problems. The theaters will most readily accept changes in DoD Personnel

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<sup>3</sup> JP 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, 4-7.

Recovery Policy that promote or improve training with our coalition partners. There are significant policy barriers to training our coalition partners.

#### **4. Theater Engagement**

The U.S./coalition partner interface for PR purposes has, so far, proven to be loose and on a case-by-case basis. Each of the theaters engages its coalitions differently. The number of “assistance” visits to coalition partners within a theater conducted in a given time period varies greatly, as does the emphasis on PR during those visits. Each of the theater PR staffs interprets the combatant command PR roles and responsibilities differently, and implements the guidance differently. DoD theater engagement policy does not enforce or encourage inclusion of PR as an element of theater engagement.<sup>4</sup>

#### **5. Guidance and Documentation**

For better or worse, all doctrine in use today by our coalition partners is derivative of U.S. doctrine. Unfortunately, our current PR doctrine does not address coalition issues. DoD and NATO guidance specifically written for combined operations has nothing for the PR community to build a PR concept upon. PR doctrine is not capturing lessons learned from combined operations. The theater staffs have all strongly stated the need for standardization of basic PR guidance documents, including PR Concepts of Operations (CONOPS), Air Tasking Order/Integrated Tasking Order CSAR Special Instructions (SPINS), and PR Standing Operating Procedures (SOP). The requirement to conduct PR in a coalition environment has impacted the development of the CSAR CONOPS and SPINS in two ways. First, it has generated “multiple” CONOPS. The main PR CONOPS document may have multiple annexes for each recovery asset found in the coalition. While this permits the CSAR forces to best exploit their respective capabilities, it adds complexity to the planning and command and control functions. Second, the SPINS have been simplified to the lowest common denominator. This simplification of the SPINS for some members of the coalition in effect nullifies the advantages of the superior equipment of other coalition members.

#### **6. Classification and Releasability**

The difficulties of exchanging classified information between coalition partners is a significant problem. Timely distribution of classified information is critical to effective

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<sup>4</sup> DoD Directive 2310.2, Personnel Recovery, 22 December 2000, section 5.14.

and successful rescue operations. Key elements of classified information, such as the location and identity of isolated personnel, and authentication information, must be provided to coalition partners to effect a recovery in a coalition environment. Recent incidents of failure to release information to allies have resulted in confusion, waste of valuable resources, delays in rescue missions, execution of unnecessary missions, and unnecessary exposure of friendly forces to enemy fire. However, recovery operations are very vulnerable, and depend heavily upon operational security and communications security for protection from the threat. Solving the releasability problem is broader than just PR, and is beyond the purview of the PR community. However, in the interim, education is the key to managing the releasability problem within the PR community. Most people, particularly in the intelligence community, tend to err on the side of caution when they are unsure of what is releasable. Thus, much of what is releasable does not get released. It is essential that PR staff members who work with coalition partners clearly understand what information is releasable and what is not.

## **7. Organization**

Each theater Combatant Commander and each Service HQ has different PR requirements and responsibilities that drive their PR organizational structures. Only SOCOM is assigned the responsibility for theater SAR by Title 10, U.S. Code (Chapter 6, Section 167). Responsibilities of other Combatant Commands, including Theater Commands, are assigned by the Secretary of Defense (DoD Directives) and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS Instructions). DoD PR policy does not enforce or encourage standardization of PR organizations across the Services or Combatant Commands. There is no effective theater staff to work planning and execution issues, such as requirements, training and exercises, operations plans (OPLANs), and deployments. When a component command is designated the theater PR “Executive Agent,” its actions are not enforceable on other components within the theater, which limits the executive agent’s ability to standardize PR programs within the theater. Component commanders are equals in the theater command structures.

## **8. Languages and Culture**

Communications problems go beyond the lack of equipment compatibility with coalition partners. They include language capabilities and limitations; the impact of military-unique terms, acronyms, and brevity terms; and the availability, skills, and experience levels of interpreters. The biggest barrier is the terminology problem.

Acronyms, brevity codes, and the “military language” of military-unique terms generate more problems than the English language. Those in the CSAR community who worked with Allies also felt the language barriers experienced in a coalition environment would increase under the stress of actual combat. The cultural barriers encountered were not unique to the PR mission area. For example, the Muslim culture makes it difficult for Arabic military personnel (all of whom are men) to work with women in the U.S. military. Also, Arabic officers have difficulty working with U.S. enlisted personnel and ethnic minority personnel in the U.S. military.

## **9. Alliances and Coalitions**

The IDA study team has identified three different types of multinational, or combined, operations: allied operations, coalition operations led by the U.S., and coalition operations not led by the U.S. Each type can have a different impact on how the PR mission is performed. Alliances are coalitions of equals governed by formal treaties, and treaty provisions do not place one nation “in charge” of an alliance. Decisions, and policies, are made by consensus of the allies. The enduring nature of alliances allows them to develop alliance policy in advance of actual contingencies. A disconnect between alliance policy and DoD policy can lead to problems, and impact our ability to conduct PR effectively.

Non-traditional coalitions, such as the recently-formed coalitions in East Timor and Afghanistan, rely on the “coalition builder” for leadership. Because they are informal, and formed only when needed, coalitions have to rely on many bilateral agreements established when the coalition is formed. The issue of leadership in a coalition is clearer. The nation that builds the coalition is the leader. The coalition builder, or leading nation, has the authority and the responsibility to establish PR policy. When the U.S. is the coalition builder, as it is in Afghanistan, it has the privilege of establishing coalition PR policy that aligns with DoD PR policy. When the U.S. is a coalition partner, but not the coalition builder, as is the case in East Timor, the U.S. is responsible for following coalition PR policy set by the coalition builder. Currently, DoD policy does not address this responsibility, and disconnects can result.

## **10. Coalition Current Capability**

Although no other nation currently has written policy that specifically addresses PR, representatives of every nation interviewed supported a de facto policy similar to U.S. policy: they will make an effort to recover those placed in harm’s way. The IDA

study team did note that no other country seemed to share our “cultural imperative” that no one will be left behind. However, our coalition partners are aware of America’s cultural imperative, and expressed a willingness to hold the U.S. to a higher standard when it comes to committing U.S. recovery forces to rescuing a coalition isolated person. Despite the similarity in ideologies, fiscal realities prevent most nations from implementing a PR capability in any way comparable to our capability. IDA did not find any nation, alliance, or coalition that was able to provide a combat recovery capability without the U.S. providing the leadership, training, and the preponderance of assets.

## **F. POLICY ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

IDA has developed a number of recommendations that DPMO may implement to improve PR in a coalition environment. They include general recommendations that DPMO may use as strategic guidance to chart a long-term course for DoD into the future of coalition operations. They also include specific recommendations that DPMO may implement in the near-term to have an immediate, positive impact on the PR mission area in future coalition operations.

It is DoD policy that:

4.1. Preserving the lives and well-being of U.S. military, DoD civilian and contract service employees placed in danger of being isolated, beleaguered, detained, captured or having to evade while participating in a U.S.-sponsored activity or mission is one of the highest priorities of the Department of Defense. The Department of Defense has a moral obligation to protect its personnel, prevent exploitation of its personnel by adversaries, and reduce the potential for captured personnel being used as leverage against the United States.

4.2. The Department of Defense has primary responsibility for recovering U.S. personnel identified in paragraph 4.1., above, who are deployed outside the United States and its territories.

4.3. When requested, and when directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, the Department of Defense shall provide personnel recovery support to other governments, agencies, and organizations, in accordance with all applicable laws, regulations, and memoranda of agreement or understanding.

4.4. The Department of Defense shall support Civil Search and Rescue efforts on a strict not-to-interfere basis with primary military duties, roles,

and missions in accordance with applicable national directives, plans, guidelines, policy, and agreements.<sup>5</sup>

## 1. Policy Analysis

IDA has identified the following issues with DoD's current policy:

- DoD cannot currently meet its “primary responsibility” for recovery of U.S. personnel in all of the current, ongoing deployments, worldwide and around-the-clock. There are insufficient low density/high demand (LD/HD) assets needed to support personnel recovery operations, such as E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), and Sandy-qualified A-10s. Recently, the U.S. has been reliant on support from allies and coalition partners to make up the shortfalls in key assets.
- Policy does grant DoD a great deal of flexibility regarding recovery of allied and coalition isolated personnel by providing support only on a case-by-case basis. However, the policy defines no standing requirement to recover non-U.S. isolated personnel. Hence, DoD has no authority or opportunity to organize, train, or equip for “directed” support to our allies and coalition partners, should the need arise.
- Policy is not presently aligned with the expectations of many of our current coalition partners. Because of America's relatively plentiful military resources, they expect U.S. recovery forces to behave as a “big brother” and recover allied and coalition isolated personnel just as we would recover our own personnel. Our allies and coalition partners do not expect the U.S. to consider these recoveries on a case-by-case basis. Recoveries planned and executed after the fact are *ad hoc* and subject to increased risk.
- Policy does not disallow the possibility that U.S. forces might be directed to support a recovery of allied or coalition isolated personnel after the fact, or on a mission-by-mission basis. This presents operational and mission planners with an added challenge of planning for an “unknown demand” for PR support.
- The consequence of direction to support a recovery of allied or coalition isolated personnel after the fact is execution of an unplanned, or *ad hoc* recovery mission. An *ad hoc* recovery mission for allied or coalition isolated personnel adds more risk to an already high risk mission. There is both the tactical risk of losing forces, and the political risk of mission failure.

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<sup>5</sup> DoD Directive 2310.2, Personnel Recovery, 22 December 2000, Section 4.

## 2. General Recommendations

IDA recommends that DPMO change current PR policy to address the three specific situations of U.S. participation in multinational military operations:

- Allied operations
- Coalition operations where the U.S. is the coalition builder
- Coalition operations where the U.S. is not the coalition builder.

*It should be DoD Policy to establish and maintain a theater SAR Alliance as an aspect of theater engagement.*

IDA recommends that DPMO adopt this policy for the DoD. In the long-term, the benefits of SAR alliances within the theaters clearly outweigh the costs, and it is important that the agencies at the highest levels of the PR community take the long view toward the PR mission. A theater SAR alliance, and the resultant infrastructure of C2 nodes, communications channels, and recovery assets, is an essential part of the PR umbrella for any contingency or military operation.

*It should be DoD Policy to make U.S. forces responsible for the combat recovery of allied and coalition personnel.*

IDA recommends that DPMO implement this policy as soon as possible for NATO, and other formal alliances to which the U.S. is party. A number of the findings determined over the course of this study, the opinions of the subject matter experts (SMEs) within the PR community, and the consensus of opinion among U.S. Air Force leaders interviewed for this study support this policy. Other Services' leadership did not state a position on this policy.

IDA also recommends that DPMO implement this policy as soon as possible for coalitions in which the U.S. is the coalition builder, or otherwise the nation leading the coalition. It is IDA's assessment that this policy is not appropriate for coalition operations in which the U.S. is not the coalition leader. The coalition operation in East Timor is a good example of where this policy would be inappropriate.

*It should not be DoD Policy to plan for coalition forces to conduct combat recovery of U.S. personnel at this time.*

IDA recommends that DPMO implement a policy of planning for only U.S. recovery of U.S. personnel. DPMO may consider incorporating a coalition recovery concept into Joint Vision 2020, and position itself to begin working this issue, circa 2010,

if DPMO is successful in establishing and maturing a program to build theater-wide peacetime SAR networks (as described in the first issue) between 2000 and 2010.

### 3. Specific Recommendations

IDA's specific recommendations to DPMO for improving PR in a coalition environment are categorized under the following channels for implementation:

- DoD Directive 2310.2, *Personnel Recovery*

IDA recommends that DPMO make 37 specific additions and changes to DoD Directive 2310.2, *Personnel Recovery*, December 22, 2000. The changes and additions impact PR policy and responsibilities of key organizations. These changes and additions are described in detail in Chapter IV.

- 2002 DoD Personnel Recovery Conference<sup>6</sup>

IDA has identified seven key issues and proposals that are beyond the immediate purview of DPMO, but are nonetheless worthy of immediate action. IDA recommends that DPMO present these issues and proposals to the PR community, during the appropriate workshops of the 2002 DoD Personnel Recovery Conference. These issues are described in detail in Chapter IV.

- Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment<sup>7</sup>

IDA recommends that DPMO include IDA's assessment of PR in a coalition environment in its Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) proposal to the Joint Staff.

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<sup>6</sup> Under the Missing Persons Act (MPA), paragraphs 1501(a)(1)(B), and (a)(2), DPMO is responsible for "coordination for the Department of Defense with other departments and agencies of the United States on all matters concerning missing persons," and "within DoD among the military departments, the Joint Staff, and the commanders of the combatant commands."

Since 1997, DPMO has hosted an annual DoD Personnel Recovery Conference in order to exercise this aspect of its responsibilities under the MPA. Although specific objectives for the conferences vary each year, the overarching purposes of the conference are consistent – to heighten awareness of personnel recovery at the highest levels of the U.S. Government, exchange ideas within the recovery community, identify and resolve policy-level issues pertaining to personnel recovery within DoD and the interagency community, and chart a course for the future of personnel recovery within the Department.

<sup>7</sup> (DoD) A team of warfighting and functional area experts from the Joint Staff, unified commands, Services, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Defense agencies tasked by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council with completing assessments and providing military recommendations to improve joint warfighting capabilities. Also called JWCA.

## **G. COMBATANT COMMANDS**

Appendices C through G address the issues and programs specific to the major geographic and functional commands. They highlight the significant differences in each Combatant Commander's organization and also identify the various intra- and inter-Service issues. The appendices are key to a complete understanding of personnel recovery in a coalition environment.

**CHAPTER I**  
**INTRODUCTION**



## I. INTRODUCTION

### A. PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE

Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56, entitled “Managing Complex Contingency Operations,” was promulgated in May 1997. PDD 56 states:

In the wake of the Cold War, attention has focused on a rising number of territorial disputes, armed ethnic conflicts, and civil wars that pose threats to regional and international peace and may be accompanied by natural or man-made disasters which precipitate massive human suffering. We have learned that effective responses to these situations may require multi-dimensional operations composed of such components as political/diplomatic, humanitarian, intelligence, economic development, and security: hence the term complex contingency operations.

PDD 56 cites Operation Provide Comfort (1991), Operation Support Hope (1994), and Operation Sea Angel (1991), as recent examples of complex contingency operations. War has not been formally declared in numerous military operations in the past century, so it is very likely that a majority of DoD activities will support Operations Other Than War (OOTW) in the future.

PDD 56 further states:

In recent situations as diverse as Haiti, Somalia, Northern Iraq, and the former Yugoslavia, the U.S. has engaged in complex contingency operations in coalition, either under the auspices of an international or regional organization or in *ad hoc*, temporary coalitions of like-minded states. While never relinquishing the capability to respond unilaterally, the PDD assumes that the U.S. will continue to conduct future operations in coalition whenever possible.

In fact, most military operations this century have been coalition efforts, so it is a safe assumption that future military operations will continue to be coalition efforts. It is DPMO’s interpretation of PDD 56 that the U.S. must have a personnel recovery (PR) capability that operates effectively in a coalition environment in order to support future complex contingency operations.

To further strengthen that capability, DPMO developed a draft National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) that is being forwarded by the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. The title of the draft NSPD is *Recovery and Accounting for Personnel Serving America Who are Isolated or Missing as a Result of Hostile Action*. The language of the draft NSPD includes the following policy statement:

The United States Government will develop and maintain a fully integrated national architecture that ensures the nation's capability worldwide to recover and account for Americans who become isolated or missing as a result of service to the United States.

There are five principles that guide U.S. efforts in this task. One of them is:

We will work closely with all nations that can assist in our recovery and accounting efforts, or that might have relevant information concerning the fate of our personnel. We will stress that the recovery and accounting of Americans is high on our diplomatic agenda.

It is important for decision-makers at all levels to understand the importance of personnel recovery and its relevance to military objectives and national objectives when deciding on allocation of scarce resources to competing military mission areas. In addition to funding and equipment, resources such as training, manpower, and experienced leadership are in high demand, and must be considered. Changes in DoD policy will result in changes in allocation of resources. In the past ten years, numerous examples have demonstrated the profound impact of personnel recovery events on military operations, national objectives, and public opinion.<sup>1</sup> Although the importance of personnel recovery is not in dispute, care must be taken when changing policy not to adversely impact other, equally important mission areas.

## **B. PERSONNEL RECOVERY**

Personnel recovery is defined by Joint Publication 1-02 as:

...the aggregation of military, civil, and political efforts to recover captured, detained, evading, isolated or missing personnel from uncertain or hostile environments and denied areas. Personnel recovery includes, but is not limited to Combat Recovery; Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape; Evasion and Recovery; the coordination of negotiated as well as

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<sup>1</sup> Operational Desert Storm, Iraq, 1991; the Durant incident, Somalia, 1993; the O'Grady incident, Bosnia, 1995; Operation Allied Forces, Serbia, 1999.

forcible recovery options; and repatriation of isolated personnel. Personnel recovery may occur through military action, action by non-governmental organizations, other U.S. Government-approved action, and diplomatic initiatives, or through any combination of these options.

IDA has focused this report on the aspects of PR most relevant to the DoD in a coalition environment: combat recovery (primarily combat search and rescue); and Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE). IDA determined early in the study that the DoD does not normally conduct Evasion and Recovery (E&R) in a coalition environment, and so excluded that topic from the scope of this report. IDA also determined during the course of this study that International Civil Search and Rescue (SAR) is quite relevant to the issues, and has included discussion of this topic where appropriate.

The following is an excerpt from DoD Directive 2310.2, *Personnel Recovery*, 22 December 2000.

#### 4. POLICY

It is DoD policy that:

4.1. Preserving the lives and well-being of U.S. military, DoD civilian and contract service employees placed in danger of being isolated, beleaguered, detained, captured or having to evade while participating in a U.S.-sponsored activity or mission is one of the highest priorities of the Department of Defense. The Department of Defense has a moral obligation to protect its personnel, prevent exploitation of its personnel by adversaries, and reduce the potential for captured personnel being used as leverage against the United States.

4.2. The Department of Defense has primary responsibility for recovering U.S. personnel identified in subsection 4.1., above, who are deployed outside the United States and its territories.

4.3. When requested, and when directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, the Department of Defense shall provide PR support to other governments, agencies, and organizations, in accordance with all applicable laws, regulations, and memoranda of agreement or understanding.

4.4. The Department of Defense shall support Civil Search and Rescue efforts on a strict not-to-interfere basis with primary military duties, roles, and missions in accordance with applicable national directives, plans, guidelines, policy, and agreements.

IDA is studying the costs and benefits of both implementing and not implementing changes to this policy. Paragraphs 4.2 and 4.3 are the key policy statements relevant to this study, and IDA has conducted a great deal of data collection and analysis on these core issues. IDA has solicited inputs on these issues from all of the key players within the Personnel Recovery community, as well as from a representative cross-section of the warfighters, through interviews, questionnaires, and conferences.

### **C. LESSONS LEARNED IN OPERATION ALLIED FORCE**

OSD's Report to Congress, *Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report*, 31 January 2000 stated a number of lessons learned about combined PR operations during Operation Allied Force. The following is a summary of that report:

1. The Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) made Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) operations his number one priority in the event of a downed NATO aircraft and insisted on full integration of search and rescue planning into all air operations and throughout the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) staff.
2. CSAR Task Forces are composed of numerous components that must train as a totally integrated team to be effective. Training shortcomings were evident during Operation Allied Force, where the lack of procedural familiarity among task force members created significant coordination problems during the two operations conducted to recover downed U.S. pilots.
3. The legal status of isolated personnel should be determined through close consultation with legal counsel. Before the onset of hostilities, the National Command Authorities, in coordination with the Joint Staff, the OSD General Counsel, and other authorities as appropriate (e.g., NATO, the United Nations), must establish the legal status of U.S. personnel participating in operations, and convey that decision to the combatant commander.
4. The combatant commanders and the Services did not prepare for repatriation of captured Americans until it was reported that President Milosevic might release the three Americans captured in Albania in March 1999.
5. Personnel recovery operations are among the most complex and dangerous missions that our forces undertake. Accordingly, the combatant commands must include PR training in joint exercises as often as possible, and this training must include the full range of recovery operations. During combat search-and-rescue exercises, the combatant commands should regularly incorporate all the normal components of combat search-

and-rescue task forces (CSARTF), especially the command-and-control elements, so that they can learn to work together before called upon to do so under combat conditions.

6. The Department of Defense must clarify the importance of PR in modern warfare, especially in operations other than war. Judging its priority in relation to the myriad other competing training interests will enable commanders of both conventional and special operations forces to determine the extent to which PR training consumes limited training time and resources.

7. The combatant commands should designate in contingency plans a primary combat search-and-rescue force for each component and joint task force. Identifying those forces in advance will enable them to train together and make unnecessary the use of *ad hoc* organizations for this important mission.

8. Repatriation of recovered personnel is a complicated process that involves numerous agencies. It must be an integral part of all contingency planning prior to and during operations. It is imperative that the well being and legal rights of the individual returnee be the overriding factors when planning and executing repatriation operations.

It was these problems encountered and lessons learned during Operation Allied Force (OAF) that prompted DPMO to initiate this study. DPMO tasked IDA to:

- Assess CSAR-specific interoperability issues between U.S. and coalition partners (Operation Allied Force revealed significant interoperability problems between U.S. and NATO forces, as well as within the U.S. JTF).
- Assess the impact of these problems on Joint U.S.-NATO PR efforts.
- Assess the impact of interoperability problems on joint recovery efforts with other Allies, including South Korea and/or Saudi Arabia, and the feasibility of conducting joint recovery efforts with non-traditional coalition partners, such as took place in cooperation with Syria in Operation Desert Storm.
- Assess the impact on PR efforts of the releasability of classified information to none of or a subset of coalition partners.
- Assess the impact of coalition partners' different PR policies on coalition PR.
- Assess the impact of differences between Allied PR policies, including ISOPREP systems, SERE training, and recovery operations.
- Assess the limitations to integrating U.S. and coalition rescue efforts as a result of policy restrictions and the impact of those limitations on rescue efforts.

IDA examined PR planning in established theaters of operation and researched lessons learned from previous and ongoing coalition military efforts with traditional and non-traditional coalition partners in support of these assessments.

#### **D. COALITIONS AND ALLIANCES**

Once IDA began to study the issues within the European Theater, it became clear that the difference between a coalition and an alliance is significant with respect to this study.

Webster's dictionary provides these general definitions of the terms:

- **Alliance** – A *formal* pact of union or confederation between nations in a common cause.
- **Coalition** – An alliance, especially a *temporary* one, of factions, parties, or nations.

Joint Publication 1-02 defines alliances and coalitions as the following:

- **Alliance** – An alliance is the result of *formal* agreements (i.e., treaties) between two or more nations for *broad, long-term* objectives which further the common interests of the members. See also “coalition; multination”.
- **Coalition** – An *ad hoc* arrangement between two or more nations for common action. See also “alliance; multination”.
- **Multination** – Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more nations or coalition partners. See also “alliance; coalition”
- **Combined Operation** – An operation conducted by forces of two or more allied nations acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission.

The key issue is the difference: alliances are formal and lasting, and coalitions are informal and temporary.

The scope of this final report has been broadened to study to improving PR policy for both traditional alliances and non-traditional coalitions. For purposes of this report, the phrase “coalition environment” is used in a general sense to refer to combined military operations involving one or more allies and/or coalition partners. In all other cases, the term “coalition” is distinct and different than “alliance.” Where applicable, IDA discusses the cases of coalition partners and allies separately.

**CHAPTER II**  
**STUDY METHODOLOGY**



## II. STUDY METHODOLOGY

### A. APPROACH

IDA's project order from DPMO outlined a number of tasks. The first two tasks focused on assessing the DoD's ability to conduct PR in a coalition environment. Those two tasks are broken down as follows:

- Assess CSAR-specific interoperability issues between U.S. and coalition partners.
  - Operation Allied Force revealed significant interoperability problems between U.S. and NATO forces.
- Assess the impact of these problems on Joint U.S.-NATO PR efforts.
  - Assess the impact of interoperability problems on joint recovery efforts with other Allies, including South Korea and/or Saudi Arabia.
  - Assess the feasibility of conducting joint recovery efforts with non-traditional coalition partners, such as took place with Syria in Operation Desert Storm.
- Assess the impact on PR efforts of the releasability of classified information to none of or a subset of coalition partners.
- Assess the impact of coalition partners' different PR policies on coalition PR.
- Assess the impact of differences between Allied PR policies.
  - ISOPREP systems, SERE training, and recovery operations.
- Assess the limitations to integrating U.S. and coalition rescue efforts as a result of policy restrictions and the impact of those limitations on rescue efforts.
  - Study PR planning in established theaters of operation.
  - Study lessons learned from previous and ongoing coalition military efforts with traditional and non-traditional coalition partners.
- Brief the PR Advisory Group (PRAG) quarterly.
  - The PRAG can provide course corrections as they feel necessary.
  - Preliminary findings will be briefed within 12 months, at next year's PR conference.

IDA took the following approach to assessing PR operations in a coalition environment:

- IDA focused first on CSAR-specific interoperability issues.
  - CSAR-specific interoperability issues between U.S. and coalition partners, since Operation Allied Force revealed significant interoperability problems between U.S. and NATO forces.
  - The impact of these problems on Joint U.S.-NATO PR efforts.
  - The impact of interoperability problems on joint recovery efforts with other Allies.
  - The impact on PR efforts of the releasability of classified information to none of or a subset of coalition partners.
- IDA initially focused on U.S.-NATO operations.
  - Take advantage of Kosovo experience base before it disappears.
  - Take advantage of ongoing lessons-learned studies and after-action reports on Operation Allied Force.
- In the latter stage of the study, IDA broadened the scope to include all of the geographic theaters, as shown in Figure II-1. IDA collected information on the PR policies of both allies and non-traditional coalition partners.
  - Expand on key issues identified during the first phase of the study.
  - Examine, in order of DPMO priority: PACOM; CENTCOM; and SOUTHCOM.
  - Assess the differences in U.S. and allied/coalition policy, doctrine, and tactics.
  - Look at ISOPREP, SERE training, and recovery operations.
  - Ascertain the status of planning efforts within the theaters.

## **B. SCOPE**

Two major elements served to scope the boundaries of the study. The first was the Personnel Recovery Mission Area Analysis (PRMAA) being conducted in parallel to the IDA study by Analytical Services, Inc. (ANSER) for DPMO. Because ANSER was tasked to analyze the PR mission area in the joint environment, IDA was able to narrowly focus on the coalition environment. The second was the “unconstrained” nature of the study. A cost analysis of the recommendations proposed in the final chapter was beyond the scope of this study. This report represents a “snapshot in time” of a very dynamic

mission area, and some facets will quickly be overcome by events. The investigation phase of the study concluded on 31 December 2001.




Figure II-1. Geographic Theaters

### C. INITIAL INVESTIGATION

In an effort to focus the scope of the problem, IDA attempted to identify those problems that were unique to the PR mission, and that could be found only in the coalition environment. IDA began by identifying problems generic to the overall PR mission area, and problems generic to all mission areas operating in a coalition environment. These problems were drawn from earlier studies, reports, white papers, and journal articles.<sup>1</sup>

#### 1. General PR Problems

- Lack of interoperable equipment among Services
- Different levels of training among Services
- Releasability of highly classified intelligence
- Lack of communications infrastructure among Joint forces
- Lack of training with Joint forces.

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<sup>1</sup> See Appendix H, Bibliography.

## **2. General Coalition Problems**

- Lack of interoperable equipment
- Language barriers
- Different levels of training
- Releasability of classified intelligence by/to coalition partners
- Releasability of information on sensitive systems to and by partners
- Lack of communications infrastructure among coalition partners
- Lack of training with coalition partners.

What remained were problems that were potentially unique to PR operations in a coalition environment. IDA initially focused on these problems to assess their impact and identify solutions.

## **3. Problems Specific to Coalition Personnel Recovery**

- Incompatible policy and doctrine
- Incompatible tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP)
- Insufficient numbers of Liaison Officers from allied and coalition countries within C2 elements of the PR system.

During the early months of this phase of the study, IDA made these preliminary findings:

- There is a complete lack of an accepted taxonomy for the “PR in a coalition environment” mission area (even the mission is undefined). The lack of a common language at times made even a discussion of the issues challenging. This stems not from the incompatibility, but the lack of documentation (policy, doctrine, and TTP) on the subject of PR in a coalition environment.
- The consensus among the warfighters is that combined training, particularly exercises with our coalition partners, is the best solution to our problems. Despite this, emphasis on coalition training runs a distant third to Service training and Joint training.
- Some Theaters emphasize civil SAR (PACOM, SOUTHCOM), while others emphasize combat SAR (EUCOM, CENTCOM), but no Theater weights each type equally. Limited resources force them to choose one or the other. The major limitation is manpower within U.S. organizations, not limited personnel from allied and coalition countries.

These findings were briefed to the Personnel Recovery Advisory Group and documented in the interim report. IDA also posed a series of questions, representative of the issues, to the Theater PR staffs, in order to stimulate discussion on the subject.

***What are the operational, security, and technical problems in adding coalition partners to the JSRC staff?***

- Operational – The key operational issues are guidance and training. Coalition forces will have different doctrine, concepts of operations (CONOPS), tactics, and procedures, or perhaps none at all. Their levels of training and experience will be different, most likely lower.
- Security – The JSRC staff uses information classified as high as TS/SCI. Coalition forces that do not have access to U.S. classified information will be limited in their ability to provide, as well as be provided with, services for CSAR. The severity of the problem is proportional to the amount of classified information restricted to U.S. forces.
- Technical – There will be technical issues if coalition personnel on the JSRC provide or need C4I equipment that is incompatible or non-compliant with U.S. C4I equipment or communications infrastructure.

***Will the problem of coalition partners in the JSRC get worse or better when CSEL is fielded (with the resulting SIPRNET connection)?***

- Export CSEL – If an exportable version of the CSEL system were to be approved, and developed, it might relieve some of the operational problems by forcing the coalition users of the system to develop doctrine, CONOPS, tactics, and training programs. It would certainly increase the technical issues, with the addition of unique communications architectures for every user country in the coalition. (The CSEL system depends on existing U.S. DoD SATCOM, intelligence, and SIPRNET infrastructure. An export version would not include that, and would rely on the user country's communications architecture.)
- U.S. CSEL – If U.S. CSEL hand held radios were provided to coalition forces, *and if coalition personnel on the JSRC staff were granted access to the CSEL workstation in the JSRC*, then many operational and technical issues would be alleviated. Clearly, there are significant security issues that currently prevent implementing this concept. CSEL depends on U.S. national intelligence assets to function covertly, and a CSEL workstation operator would have limited effectiveness without that functionality. If only U.S. personnel could access the workstation, then coalition manning would be redundant, as U.S. manning would be needed at all times.

***How does the U.S. handle a downed F-117 or other sensitive U.S. aircraft?***

- U.S.-only ATO – If an air operation were to use a U.S.-only ATO to limit distribution of sensitive information throughout the coalition, then the JSRC must have either an alternate index to the information found by using the

ATO, or the JSRC must have the information immediately available through another source. Key information elements that are indexed by call sign include: aircraft type; souls on board; aircraft unit; target location; TOT; ARCT; landing time; and route of flight. Use of a U.S.-only ATO also requires a U.S.-only C2 structure for planning and execution.

- Alternate CSAR procedures – If U.S. forces had a need to conceal the recovery mission for the pilot of a sensitive U.S. aircraft from the coalition, then C2 of the mission would have to be conducted from a U.S.-only JSRC or delegated to a U.S.-only subordinate RCC. The most likely choice would be the RCC under the JFSOCC. Of course, only U.S. forces would execute the recovery.
- Inefficient use of resources – If U.S. forces were to operate in this fashion, it effectively defeats the purpose of a coalition for the PR mission. Since it has already been identified that coalition warfare is a necessity because no country alone has the needed resources to wage war, this is not the preferred way of conducting PR.

***How much coalition participation exists at major CSAR/PR exercises such as Desert Rescue, Cope Thunder, and Woodland Cougar?***

- Observers – If any coalition forces are participating in the exercise in any role, senior officials from participating countries typically spend some time observing the CSAR/PR aspects of the exercise. Canada and the UK regularly observe these exercises. Officials from Japan, Korea, Thailand, and Singapore observe PACAF/PACOM CSAR/PR exercises.
- Isolated personnel – Coalition forces that actually participate in CSAR/PR exercises usually participate in this role. In comparison to a JSRC or recovery force, participating as a survivor costs very little, requires very little time and manpower, requires minimal training, and provides significant insight into U.S. CSAR/PR operations for the investment.
- C4I – Because of the high demand for this type of training among U.S. forces, and the significant travel costs for allied participation in U.S.-based exercises, coalition participation is minimal.
- Rescue forces – Because of the high demand for this type of training among U.S. forces, and the significant travel costs for allied participation in U.S.-based exercises, coalition participation is minimal.

***How can DPMO improve coalition participation in CSAR/PR exercises?***

- Policy – Removal of the barriers posed by the operational and security issues described above begins with changes in U.S. DoD policy. The policy of limiting the access of our coalition partners to classified information would need to be changed. A reciprocal change on the part of our coalition partners

would also be beneficial. A policy of coalition involvement in development of military doctrine, CONOPS, tactics, and procedures would both improve our doctrine and greatly improve the implementation of common guidance throughout coalitions.

- Funding – Legislation without execution is meaningless, and execution requires resources. Non-material solutions, such as the ones described above, are relatively inexpensive, but the U.S. should expect to bear the majority of the cost to initiate and mature coalition security and guidance programs. Maintenance of a coalition security classification program, and continued development of coalition doctrine and tactics could be cost-shared on a pro-rated basis by coalition partners over the long run.
- Stateside exercises – DPMO could directly improve coalition participation in the major CSAR/PR exercises held in the CONUS and Alaska by providing sponsorship and administrative assistance to coalition forces wishing to participate. DPMO can address issues such as country clearances, visas, exercise objectives, travel arrangements, interpreters, and unit spin-up training.
- Overseas exercises – Participation of coalition forces in CSAR/PR exercises is best accomplished under the mentorship of U.S. CSAR/PR forces. To this end, DPMO could expand the scale of CSAR/PR training in overseas exercises. Increasing the number of U.S. CSAR/PR forces and the number of CSAR/PR training events in Theater exercises will open the door for quality coalition CSAR/PR training.

***Is the coalition problem more severe at the location/ID, command and control, or mission execution function?***

- Location/ID – There is a combination of technical and security challenges to this function. The ability of U.S. forces to locate and ID coalition isolated personnel is technically limited by the radios and signal devices carried by coalition forces, which are usually older and inferior (but not much) to our own. The ability of coalition forces to locate and ID U.S. isolated personnel is limited by the security barriers to the effective flow of information, in both directions.
- Command and Control – The problem is most severe within the C2 function from a quantity standpoint because this is the function most likely to have coalition involvement. Thus, the greatest number of problems will occur in this functional area, although most problems will be minor. From a materiel and resources standpoint, integration of the coalition is easiest here, because the JSRC can accept people without equipment. However, doctrine, CONOPS, tactics, procedures, language, training, and security issues all contribute to the problem.

- Mission execution – The problem is most severe within the mission execution function from a quality standpoint because the delta between the capabilities of U.S. and coalition CSAR/PR forces is greatest here. The cost of organizing, training, and equipping dedicated CSAR/PR forces is beyond the resources of most countries. The problem is further aggravated by the insulation of these forces from one another. Even U.S. forces lack the resources to train in conjunction with their coalition counterparts. On the upside, though the problems may be severe, they are few and far between, because CSAR/PR missions are rarely executed by a coalition force package.

#### **D. INTERVIEWS**

It became apparent early in the study that IDA would have to go out to the responsible agencies and the warfighters in the field in order to gather the information needed to complete the assigned tasks. Much of the information presented in this report is attributed to a position, an organization, or representatives thereof. IDA conducted interviews under a non-attribution policy to encourage a candid exchange of views.

IDA conducted interviews with individuals who were directly involved in Bosnia/Kosovo actions and, in particular, with individuals involved in rescue operations. IDA correlated interview notes with information from lessons learned studies to build a clearer picture of the actual events and issues. IDA personnel observed exercises in Korea, Alaska, Australia, CONUS, and Europe that involved PR operations. IDA visited every major military command involved in or responsible for PR, including JFCOM, EUCOM, PACOM, SOUTHCOM, CENTCOM, SOCOM, and USFK. In many cases, IDA personnel interviewed PR representatives of the component commands subordinate to the combatant commands, as well. IDA gathered sufficient actual experience information, in combination with the views of those individuals and responsible agencies, to provide an understanding of the problems and potential solutions for PR in a coalition environment. IDA correlated these experiences and views with information from lessons learned studies, as well, IDA personnel interviewed CSAR representatives from Germany, Spain, Portugal, France, Hungary, Denmark, Korea, Australia, Indonesia, the Netherlands, Bulgaria, Romania, Sweden, Canada, Austria, and the United Kingdom to gain an understanding of PR from the perspective of our allies and coalition partners.

Over the course of the study, IDA personnel interviewed PR representatives from the following organizations:

**Department of Defense and Joint Staff**

Defense POW/Missing Persons Office, OSD(ISA)  
Office, Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS) J7, J8

**European Theater and NATO**

HQ U.S. EUCOM/J35, PA (IO)  
HQ NATO  
HQ SHAPE  
Vice Commander, U.S. Air Forces, Europe (USAFE)  
Director of Operations, HQ USAFE  
Operation Allied Force Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC)  
Balkans Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) Director  
Balkans CAOC PR Coordination Center (Italy)  
32 Air Operations Group (AOG)  
32 Air Operations Squadron (AOS) Rescue Coordination Center  
USAFE Air Operations Squadron (AOS)  
Director of Operations, NATO Regional HQ Air North  
NATO Regional HQ Air South, J-3/5/7  
NATO CAOC #1 (Denmark)  
NATO CAOC #4 (Germany)  
RAF School for Combat Survival and Recovery (SCSR)  
Swedish Air Force Rapid Action Force

**Pacific Theater and Korea**

HQ U.S. PACOM/J3  
HQ PACAF/DOTV  
U.S. PACOM Joint Rescue Coordination Center (JRCC)  
U.S. PACOM PR Council  
Commander, U.S. Air Forces Korea  
HQ U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) J2, J3  
HQ 7th AF (USAF Korea)  
Korean Combined Rescue Coordination Center (KCRCC)

Alaska Rescue Coordination Center (Air National Guard)

HQ U.S. ALCOM/J5

HQ 7<sup>th</sup> Fleet

RAAF Combat Survival School

RAAF HQ Air Command

HQ Australian Theater/J5

Australian Rescue Coordination Center

**Special Operations Forces**

Commander, SOCPAC

HQ U.S. SOCOM/J5

HQ AFSOC

HQ ARSOC

HQ NAVSPECWAR

HQ SOCEUR/J3, J5

HQ SOCPAC/J3

HQ SOCSOUTH

HQ SOCKOR

6<sup>th</sup> Special Operation Squadron (Foreign Internal Defense)

352<sup>nd</sup> Special Operations Group (MH-53, MC-130)

**Central Theater**

HQ U.S. CENTCOM/J5

HQ CENTAF/A3 (DOOR)

U.S. CENTCOM Personnel Recovery Council

Director, JSRC, JTF Southern Watch

**Southern Theater**

HQ U.S. SOUTHCOM/J3, J353

HQ SOUTHAF/J3

U.S. SOUTHAF Rescue Coordination Center (RCC)

U.S. SOUTHCOM PR Council

**United States Air Force**

Director of Requirements, HQ USAF

HQ USAF/XOOP

Commander, Air Combat Command (ACC)  
Director of Operations, HQ ACC  
HQ 10th AF (AFRES)  
41<sup>st</sup> Rescue Squadron (HH-60)  
66<sup>th</sup> Rescue Squadron (HH-60)  
71<sup>st</sup> Rescue Squadron (HC-130)  
81<sup>st</sup> Fighter Squadron (A-10)  
305<sup>th</sup> Rescue Squadron (HH-60)  
354<sup>th</sup> Fighter Squadron (A-10)  
422<sup>nd</sup> Test and evaluation Squadron (HH-60, A-10)  
USAF Weapons School (HH-60)

**Other Agencies, Commands, and Services**

HQ U.S. Coast Guard  
HQ U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM)  
Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA)  
Department of the Army HQ  
HQ Chief of Naval Operations  
HQ Commandant of the Marine Corps

**E. QUESTIONNAIRES**

Questionnaires consisted of one section to collect point-of-contact and demographic information on questionees, and one section containing a series of open-ended questions designed to solicit the questionees' views on the problems and issues of PR in a coalition environment.

**1. Data collected in the first section consisted of:**

- Name, Rank, Grade
- Service (USA, USAF, USMC, USN, OSD)
- Component (Active Duty, Guard, Reserve, Civilian)
- Title/Position
- Unit/Organization
- City, State, Country

- Career Field/Background (CSAR Operations, Special Operations, Other, Intelligence, Command and Control, Acquisition)
- Business phone (commercial), DSN prefix, e-mail address

This information was retained for research purposes and was not analyzed.

**2. Questions asked in the second section were:**


1. Have you ever been directly or indirectly involved in working with or coordinating with coalition forces?
2. If so, what were the major problems and issues in working with or coordinating with coalition forces?
3. And what were your major challenges when training with coalition forces?
4. What policy problems and/or issues were encountered?
5. What policy changes by either the United States or coalition forces are needed?
6. Based on your experiences and/or knowledge, please rank-order the following factors according to their impact on military operations with coalition forces.
  - a. Incompatible policy and doctrine
  - b. Incompatible tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP)
  - c. Lack of interoperable equipment
  - d. Language barriers, cultural barriers
  - e. Different levels of training, lack of coalition training exercises
  - f. Releasability of classified intelligence, lack of coalition security clearances
  - g. Host Nation policies, restrictions, and rules of engagement
  - h. Lack of Liaison Officers
  - i. Lack of communications infrastructure among coalition partners
  - j. Other
7. Please state any ideas, views, or opinions you have that might improve U.S. military operations with respect to PR in a coalition environment.

IDA distributed surveys to personnel within the PR community at formal courses, conferences, PR council meetings, and site visits. IDA collected over 150 completed surveys over the course of the study. IDA validated 135 questionnaires that contained usable data. Most of those surveyed were U.S. personnel, but a small sample of personnel from coalition nations was surveyed.

Figure II-2 summarizes the data collected from question 6 of the survey. The statistics are based on a sample of 135 data points. The respondents rank-ordered the listed factors according to their impact on military operations with coalition forces. The

factor rank-ordered first was considered by the respondent to have the most impact. The factors were defined on the survey as shown above in question 6. The meaning and definitions of the factors were left to further interpretation by the individual respondents.


IDA manipulated the rank orderings into an average score for each factor, which fell between 2.0 and 6.0. The higher the score, the more impact or importance that factor is perceived to have, according to the sample of respondents surveyed. The transition line between the red and yellow region indicates the mean, or average, score for that factor. The top of the yellow region indicates the upper bound of the 90 percent confidence interval. The bottom of the red region indicates the lower bound of the 90 percent confidence interval. With the exception of the first factor listed, the 90 percent confidence intervals of all the factors overlap. Taken alone, this chart indicates that there is no single factor that clearly has more impact than the others. It is important to note that the two leading factors are language barriers and releasability of classified intelligence.



**Figure II-2. Factors that Impact Military Operations with Coalition Forces**

Figure II-3 summarizes the data collected from questions 2 through 5 of the survey. The statistics are based on a sample of 114 validated data points. The

respondents provided answers to open-ended questions, based on individual experiences during training exercises and actual operations. IDA grouped all of the answers to the questions into groups of similar responses, and then defined the groups by summarizing the responses. The summary definitions are shown below. IDA did not pre-define the groups. Figure II- 3 shows the number of respondent comments in each group.



**Figure II-3. Problems Noted During PR Operations with Coalition Forces**

The problems listed in Figure II-3 are further defined below, based on summaries of the answers to the survey questions:

1. Different Languages – Different languages among coalition countries (including military terminology, acronyms, and brevity codes) that degrade the ability of individuals to communicate.
2. Releasability of Classified Information – Limits on releasability of classified information to coalition countries, including releasability to the U.S. from its allies and coalition partners.
3. Differences in Doctrine and TTP – Differences in both published, and “traditional” doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures (including concepts

of operations and SPINS). This includes deficiencies in, or a lack of published guidance.


4. Different Levels of Training – Different levels of training among coalition countries, resulting in different levels of capability when forces arrive for exercises or operations. The difference is significant enough to degrade combined operations.
5. Coalition Partner Policies – Policies of Coalition Partners (including legal status of isolated personnel, rules of engagement, host nation restrictions, and right of national sovereignty) that adversely impact or restrict PR operations or training.
6. Communications Interoperability – The lack of communications interoperability of coalition countries (including secure communications), focusing primarily on C4 systems, including air-to-ground radios, OTH radios, air-to-air radios and survival radios.
7. Equipment Interoperability – The lack of general equipment interoperability of coalition countries (includes ability to operate at night).
8. Cultural Differences – Cultural differences of coalition countries that adversely impact or restrict PR operations or training.
9. Insufficient Planning and Coordination – Insufficient planning and coordination among coalition partners before and during coalition operations that results in degraded execution of PR missions, focusing primarily on staff functions.
10. Lack of Force Structure and Resources – Lack of force structure and resources within the coalition (including major weapon systems, manpower, and funding) that limits PR planning, training, and operations. This considers shortages within the U.S. Military and the forces of allies and coalition partners.
11. Politics of Coalition – The politics of a coalition or alliance (including designation of command, OPCON, and TACON) that adversely impact or restrict PR operations or training. Common political problems are multiple chains of command, and leadership by committee.
12. Lack of Exercises – The lack of exercises before and during coalition operations to permit coalition forces to train together. Exercise deficiencies include the consistent failure to include airborne C2 elements and airborne support elements in CSAR exercises.

It is important to note that a number of anomalies manifested themselves in the data sample.

- Host Nations do not trust that U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) are being used as a “CSAR only” asset. They are concerned that U.S. SOF may be supporting rebel forces or the Host Nation’s enemies (e.g., Turkey, Italy). Problem #5, “Coalition Partner Policies,” may be overrated because of the use of SOF for PR commitments.
- The use of SOF causes OPCON and TACON problems that are not existent when Combat Air Force (CAF) CSAR forces are used (e.g., Operation Allied Force). Problem #3, “Differences in Doctrine and TTP,” and problem #11, “Politics of Coalition,” may be overrated because of the highly visible issue of “CAF Rescue vs. SOF.”
- The few comments on problem #12, the lack of coalition exercises, and corresponding low rank as a problem is anomalous when considering the large percentage of suggestions for more exercises as a means of improving PR in a coalition environment. No explanation was offered for this anomaly.

It should be noted that the two largest groups of problems noted in Figure II-3 are “Different Languages” and “Releasability of Classified Information.” Considered together with the data presented in Figure II-2, it is reasonable to conclude that these two problems are perceived by the PR community to be the two most significant problems impacting PR operations in a coalition environment.

Figure II-4 summarizes the data collected from question 7 of the survey. The statistics are based on a sample of 114 data points. The respondents provided answers to an open-ended question, based on individual experiences during training exercises and actual operations. IDA grouped all of the answers to the questions into groups of similar responses, and then defined the groups by summarizing the responses. The summary definitions are shown below. IDA did not pre-define the groups. Figure II-4 shows the number of respondent comments in each group. Because IDA felt that every suggestion had potential value, every individual suggestion for improvement is enumerated below.



**Figure II-4. Suggestions for Improving PR Operations with Coalition Forces**

The data shown in Figure II-4 makes it very clear that the Combatant Theaters will most readily accept changes in DoD PR Policy that promote or improve training with our coalition partners.

There are two aspects to the training issue:

- Alleviating the lack of opportunities for PR forces to exercise as a coalition in preparation for contingency operations
- Mitigating the disparity between levels of training in U.S. and coalition PR forces, including HRC personnel.

A summary of the training solutions proposed from the field are listed below:

- In-theater CSAR exercises hosted by U.S. for coalition recovery forces
- Opportunities for coalition PR forces to attend U.S. Exercises and Schools
  - Red Flag, Unified Endeavor, C2WS, JPRA PR 101/301 Courses
- Exchange visits to coalition PR units from U.S. PR forces in-theater
- In-theater SERE training provided by U.S. MTTs to coalition HRC personnel.

## **F. SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVING PR OPERATIONS**

All of the suggestions for improvement from the questionnaires are listed below. They are grouped in the areas for improvement depicted in Figure II-4. The number following the group heading is the total number of suggestions in that group. The number following a particular PR suggestion indicates the number of similar suggestions, to suggest the degree of consensus.

### **1. DoD Policy (17)**

1. U.S. PR staff (in Theater or JTF) should know upfront that they will be responsible for PR of coalition IPs, and plan accordingly (policy should acknowledge reality). (2)
2. There should be an active U.S. policy that says “the U.S. needs coalition support to conduct operations.” The U.S. does not currently present the case for coalition PR. (2)
3. There should be a single common policy for resistance, code of conduct, and legal status for combatants in coalition warfare.
4. Rely only on U.S. CSAR assets. (3)
5. Determine the liability that the U.S. Government and the PR operation incur by recovering a coalition IP. Is the U.S. responsible for the death of a coalition member in the event the recovery vehicle is lost?
6. U.S. policies and doctrine should reflect the constraints of coalition relationships.
7. Include Search and Rescue in Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) Engagement Methods to include coalition cooperation.
8. Conduct joint/combined training at the policy coordination level. Include other actors in these sessions, e.g., respective foreign policy representatives, DoS, foreign offices, etc. (PRRC).
9. Allow the U.S. to conduct SAR in Host Nations (permissive conditions) as well as CSAR (non-permissive conditions).
10. Try to fix Joint problems first; solutions to coalition operations will follow.
11. Focus on working toward common objectives vs. common C4I, TTP, etc.
12. Policy emphasis should be on mutual interests shared by coalition partners.
13. Establish a policy that states “If coalition members do not sign on to, and adhere to, approved coalition programs (such as EPAs, ISOPREPs, HRC personnel training) or TTP (such as mission tactics, security, authentication, training), they

will not be involved in the recovery of U.S. personnel, nor will U.S. assets be used for the recovery of that coalition member's personnel.”

## **2. Manpower and Force Structure (12)**

1. More liaison officers would add continuity and improve understanding between coalition partners.
2. A well-trained/well-rounded SARLO in the Theater (JPRA type) would greatly contribute to coalition coordination, as he is usually the Theater POC for CSAR issues.
3. Insert a specialist team, qualified in PR operations and knowledgeable with respect to POCs, in a Theater Command.
4. The U.S. should have a POC in each Allied Nation that is responsible for SAR. The U.S. should build positive relationships with agencies and organizations responsible for SAR within each Nation. There are many advantages to having a POC within a particular Country that can be contacted for SAR-related issues. Once relationships have been established, there must be a constant exchange of information, ideas, capabilities, and training opportunities. (3)
5. We need to have active force structure in place in areas of the world where we see CSAR as a most pressing need. The current U.S. CSAR force structure is insufficient to meet our worldwide CSAR commitments. The HC-130 fleet needs to be an active duty force. (3)
6. The Theater Combatant Commanders need to make assignments of CSAR proponents/experts on the Theater staffs mandatory. (3)

## **3. Training and Exercises (36)**

1. Units and Tactical Commands should have quarterly or semi-annual refresher training on basics/introduction to PR. (2)
2. Use multi-national tiger teams, or mobile training teams, at the pre-deployment or pre-employment stage, to raise awareness of PR procedures and ensure a high standard of recovery planning by high-risk-of-capture (HRC) personnel. A coalition-releasable “minimum standard of knowledge and equipment” training package would alleviate the disparity in training among coalition nations. (2)
3. Make PR into a joint function. Set up dedicated CSAR cells vice collateral duties. Task USJFCOM/J9 to set up a joint CSAR cell that trains and fights together. Integrate J2 and J3 into the cell. Train this cell during Unified Endeavor exercises. Once sufficiently developed, add coalition forces to the program and incorporate it into coalition-supported exercises. Implement PR as an integrated joint mission focus area.

4. Foster exchange-training opportunities, such as those done by AFSOC FID, to provide SAR/CSAR advisory and training support to coalition partners.
5. If coalition forces are allocated to CSAR, ensure they are equipped and trained. Then integrate forces and train together prior to hostilities.
6. Language and cultural training would improve PR within the coalitions.
7. Correct the problems in the Service schools, such as Host Nation basic training, NCO Academies, and Officer training schools, because that corrects the underlying problems.
8. The key to achieving effective CSAR in the coalition is to exercise the CSAR option at regular intervals. JTFs should have one CSAREX per calendar month (with current personnel turnover rates). (15)
9. In-country PR forces that spend more time with coalition forces will earn their trust. (2)
10. Make JPRA's PR 101 and PR 301 courses available to coalition forces in a mobile training team format. Sanitize the information for release to coalition forces, and present it to those forces deployed in-theater. (2)
11. Make CSAR training as realistic as possible, and include USMC TRAP forces in all training.
12. PR needs to be funded, staffed, trained, and exercised to meet PR objectives. U.S. forces should not plan to pick up coalition isolated personnel if they have not trained to that mission.
13. Use U.S. Foreign Internal Defense (FID) forces to train coalition CSAR/PR forces. (3)
14. The U.S. should reduce the bureaucratic challenges of trying to conduct Joint combined operations and training. The U.S. should streamline the approval process for allowing the interaction of forces.
15. Workshops, exchange visits, and conferences between the U.S. and South American SAR/PR personnel would greatly enhance the cooperation and understanding between U.S. and South American forces in any future operations. (2)

#### **4. Releasability of Classified Information (11)**

1. Establish a policy/guidance for declassification of PR information to make information available to coalition countries. (7)
2. Identify a methodology that would enable an IP of any nationality to use the range of recovery options without compromise of security/intelligence.

3. The U.S. should streamline the approval process for allowing the exchange of information.
4. If we are going to have a Coalition PRCC, then a single coalition classification standard must be used. (2)

## **5. Doctrine and TTP (12)**

1. Simplify planning and procedures between (coalition) users.
2. Standardization of procedures between Theaters is also crucial, so there is no confusion about CSAR procedures and SPINS. This has particular relevance as units frequently rotate between different operations (e.g., ONW and OSW). (5)
3. Coalitions could use more cross-flow of information regarding PR, so that coalition IPs and recovery forces know what to expect during the recovery.
4. Working with coalition/commonwealth partners can be facilitated by extensive prior coordination and planning. This is critical to success. Everything else can be accomplished if there is agreement to the staff process. (2)
5. Coalition operations should be conducted at the operational staff level, not in mixing units at the tactical level. Use different sectors/zones for different coalition players.
6. There should be just a single rescue TTP for the U.S. We have too many TTP publications. A single TTP publication is needed before we can truly be ready to integrate with a coalition force. (2)

## **6. Interoperability (6)**

1. Exercise interoperability in CSAR operations and C2 in coalitions exercises. CSAR requires the highest degree of coordination, and we don't exercise to that level.
2. Where the U.S. has committed itself to partner organizations, whether on a standing basis (NATO), or during operations (ODS, IFOR, SFOR), commonality of terminology, doctrine, equipment, tactics, and operational channels of C2 need to be addressed. All PR operations also need to be coordinated and included in operational planning documents (ATO, SPINS, etc.). (2)
3. Conduct interoperability checks [with coalition systems] on new equipment prior to fielding.
4. Coalitions should get communication equipment that works at all involved levels and units, along with a common understanding of procedures, etc. (2).



**CHAPTER III**  
**FINDINGS**



### III. FINDINGS

#### A. SIMILARITY OF JOINT AND COMBINED OPERATIONS

- The issues identified highlight a theme in coalition interoperability:
  - *“Our coalition interoperability problems mirror our joint and inter-agency interoperability problems.”*
- This similarity suggests a course of action:
  - *Solve the Joint and inter-agency problems within the U.S. PR community first*
  - *Assure our coalition partners that the U.S. “has its own house in order”*
  - *Provide a roadmap to coalition interoperability.*

For PR in a coalition environment, the leading problems are: a lack of training – combined exercises for U.S. forces and rescue training for coalition partners; a lack of a common “language” – terminology, acronyms, and brevity codes; and the releasability of classified information within the coalition. These problems highlight a theme in coalition interoperability: *“Our coalition interoperability problems mirror our joint and inter-agency interoperability problems.”* Therefore, solving the Joint and Inter-Agency problems within the U.S. PR community serves two purposes. One is to assure our coalition partners that the U.S. “has its own house in order.” The other is to provide a roadmap to establishing coalition interoperability through the process of establishing Joint and inter-agency interoperability.

The PR community’s joint problems are monumental, and institutional changes are needed to solve them. “We need to clean our own house first before we can really start to help across the board with our coalition partners.”<sup>1</sup> Joint CSAR problems and issues have been thoroughly documented by studies and test and evaluation programs.<sup>2</sup> Interagency operations are relatively new, and the PR community has just begun to identify and document issues with interagency PR operations.

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<sup>1</sup> NATO PR Coordination Center Director, Balkans Combined Air Operations Center, Vicenza, Italy.

<sup>2</sup> VEDA Corporation, Joint CSAR Study, 10 February 1997; JCSAR JT&E, JCSAR Current Capability Test Report, August 1998.

## B. INTEROPERABILITY

- There is a lack of interoperability among coalition C4I systems.
- The level of interoperability among coalition forces is still unknown.
  - *Anecdotal evidence from a small number of operations and exercises supports the theory that interoperability is an issue.*
    - **NATO AWACS vs. U.S. CSARTF (Operation Allied Force, 1999)**
  - *The lack of continuing operations and exercises prevents identification of specific interoperability problems.*
  - *DoD must initiate a training or testing program in order to address this issue.*
  - *It is reasonable to extrapolate documented joint interoperability problems to the coalition environment.*
    - **NVG vs. FLIR (JCSAR JT&E)**
    - **UNIX vs. Windows NT™ (ASD/C3I JSRC Study)**
  - *Problems increase in coalitions with other than our traditional allies.*
    - **Britain, Canada, Australia**
  - *The impact of training and exercise deficiencies will be more severe.*
    - **There is a wider “Training Gap” between the U.S. and non-traditional coalition partners.**

Interoperability is the ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together. It is the condition achieved among communications-electronics systems or items of communications-electronics equipment when information or services can be exchanged directly and satisfactorily between them and/or their users. The degree of interoperability should be defined when referring to specific cases.

OJCS Guidance states that a coalition environment will present challenges to standardization and interoperability.<sup>3</sup> IDA’s investigation confirmed that statement for the PR mission area. During OAF,

Problems regarding communication interoperability persisted throughout the campaign. The limited interoperability of today’s systems creates friction at all levels of the deployment planning process. Among the

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<sup>3</sup> JP 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, 1-6.

specific problems are inconsistent data requirements and electronic data formats that cannot be easily shared between systems. This lack of “user friendliness” slows data development and places an unnecessary premium on the relatively few individuals with the experience to work through an ad hoc end-to-end [planning] process. Unfortunately, the pressure of crisis action planning can significantly strain such an ad hoc system. Dissemination networking and procedures were ad hoc, and it was never possible to present a common operational picture to joint and allied commanders.<sup>4</sup>

According to the Director of the PRCC during OAF,

There was no theater standard for communication equipment, which caused the rescue C2 element to resemble something of a “Star Wars” command bunker, equipped to handle every possible source of communication on the European continent. It worked, but it took a huge effort by the CJ-6 to support it. In fact, after the war it was stated that CSAR cost more than any other operation in terms of communication support. More than 38,000 sorties were flown and only two resulted in CSAR missions. It is important to note the up-front costs of an effort to prepare for an event that might never happen. The rescue element was lucky to have a JFACC that understood this.<sup>5</sup>

Improved planning and preparation for interoperability produced better results over previous PR operations.<sup>6</sup>

There are indications of interoperability issues beyond technical communications shortfalls. As for the NATO AWACS and the U.S. AWACS, the issue is interoperability of training and configurations. NATO does not train to act as the Airborne Mission Commander (AMC) and does not have the on-board stations to handle this role. NATO AWACS performs an advisory role only, and reports to the AMC. NATO AWACS cannot manage the air picture and coordinate a rescue mission simultaneously, like a U.S. AWACS can.

Over time, NATO was able to address interoperability issues while preparing for OAF. All operations in Vicuña, including rescue, were combined operations and well-seasoned, because of the on going peace support operation (PSO). This meant that the

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<sup>4</sup> Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report to Congress, Secretary of Defense and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 31 January 2000.

<sup>5</sup> NATO PR Coordination Center Director, Balkans Combined Air Operations Center, Vicenza, Italy.

<sup>6</sup> During Operation Allied Force, 100 percent of downed airmen were rescued from enemy territory (2 of 2). During Operation Desert Storm, 17 percent of downed airmen were rescued from enemy territory (4 of 23). The other 19 downed airmen were captured and became POWs.

entire system was built around the idea of “making it work” no matter the equipment, language, or any other limiting factors that had to be dealt with. If it did not work [i.e., it was not interoperable], it was simply not part of the system. However, without the luxury of the long build-up period, NATO rescue operations would have been at significant risk from interoperability “unknowns.”

Because PR missions happen infrequently, it is not possible to build a case for specific interoperability problems based on re-occurring examples. The PR mission area needs a continuing training or testing program to do this. IDA discovered that there is a lack of programs designed to identify and resolve coalition interoperability issues. DoD has the Joint Test and Evaluation program, which has successfully addressed interoperability issues in the Joint arena, such as the incompatibility of night vision systems used for searches, and the incompatibility of platforms for PR information systems. There is a need for a similar program focused on coalition issues rather than joint issues, if the issues are to be resolved in a methodical and timely manner. Presently, no such program exists.

As coalitions start moving away from working with the traditional partners, such as the UK, Canada, and Australia, the level of interoperability becomes less and less known. Other countries have greater gaps in qualifications from U.S. forces. For example, there is significant risk involved in any attempt by the U.S. to recover an untrained/unequipped survivor from a high-threat environment. Coalition isolated personnel are more likely than U.S. isolated personnel to be ill-trained or ill-equipped. The lack of interoperability of coalition HRC personnel with the U.S. PR architecture increases the risk to U.S. forces. This risk is further increased with non-traditional coalition partners.

It is essential to have a theater standard! It doesn't matter if it's from Europe or Asia, but rescue C2 elements need a standard. None exist today anywhere. Today, rescue C2 elements have to go in with the understanding that there is no standard, and build their systems to work around the needs of each theater. The bottom line is that it must work 100% of the time. If the command & control structure is a single, unbroken chain, then the rest resolves itself down through the tactical level.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> NATO PR Coordination Center Director, Balkans Combined Air Operations Center, Vicenza, Italy.

## C. TRAINING AND READINESS

- There is a “Training Gap” between U.S. and Partner Nation PR forces.
  - *Lack of opportunities for PR forces to exercise as a Coalition in preparation for contingency operations.*
  - *Disparity between levels of training in U.S. and Coalition PR forces, including HRC personnel.*
- The warfighters in the field need and want a “credible insurance policy” with regard to PR.
  - *They know an “incredible” PR capability when they see one.*
    - ***A successful exercise is the #1 indicator of a “credible insurance policy.”***
  - *They perceive current capabilities of Allies and Coalition Partners would detract from “credibility” if used as part of the “PR umbrella.”*
  - *They perceive the current lack of credibility.*
    - ***Warfighter confidence in a “credible insurance policy” will remain low.***
- The lack of training and exercises is the number 1 PR problem in the coalition environment.
  - *Confusion during the OAF CSAR missions was a result of the lack of full-up, integrated CSAR exercises.*
  - *CSAR capability will remain an unknown quantity until a training and exercise program is initiated.*
  - *The lack of training is preventing DoD from identifying and solving other PR-related problems.*
- Policy changes that improve training have overwhelming support from the Combatant Commands!

Training and readiness are the top priority issues for the personnel recovery mission area in the coalition environment. These issues are directly impacting force effectiveness and are also masking other issues. Despite the DoD-wide effort to reduce training and its resultant impact on operations tempo and personnel tempo, policy-level decisionmakers should consider policy changes that increase emphasis on combined personnel recovery training and readiness, given the importance of personnel recovery to national objectives.

There is a “training gap” between the U.S. and our coalition partners. There are two aspects to the issue of a “training gap.” The first is the lack of opportunities for PR forces to exercise as a coalition in preparation for contingency operations. The second is the disparity between the levels of training in U.S. and coalition PR forces, including

HRC personnel. OJCS Guidance notes that there will be operational difficulties arising from differences in the level of training of involved forces in a coalition environment.<sup>8</sup>

The warfighters' perception of PR in a coalition environment, at the grass-roots level, is that a lack of combined training exercises is the root problem. Not surprisingly, the warfighters perceive that more combined training exercises is the solution. However, implementing this solution depends on having both U.S. and allied or coalition PR/CSAR forces in the theaters where they will exercise and operate.

The warfighters in the field need and want a "credible insurance policy" with regard to PR. They know an "incredible" (as in "too good to be true") PR capability when they see one, regardless of what the Theater HQ is promising. Indications of a non-credible capability include: a lack of PR-capable assets in place; a lack of training and exercises for those assets, if they are in place; and inadequate or insufficient survival radios. They perceive that the current capabilities of our Allies and Coalition Partners would further detract from the "credibility" if used as part of the "PR umbrella" over their military operations. They also perceive that the current lack of credibility damages morale, and adversely impacts the capability of combat forces.

Based on the research and analysis conducted in the course of this study, IDA has determined that U.S. Southern Command is currently DoD's highest risk AOR for a failed PR mission. The primary factors contributing to this high risk are the large number of HRC personnel operating in "contested territory" within that theater, and the smallest recovery force in place for any of the theaters.

The lack of training and exercises is masking capability shortfalls and other PR-related problems. For example, during the O'Grady incident in 1995, the AFSOC forces and the rescue C2 element effectively concealed from the JFACC and the Combatant Commander their inability to conduct a quick daylight CSAR, which is why the USMC TRAP force was eventually employed. The lessons learned in Bosnia were brought to bear on the OAF force structure, and the AFSOC forces and all other forces performing CSAR roles were closely controlled by the C2 element. Still, there was some confusion when the time came to execute, because exercises did not involve all of the players.

The Combatant Theaters will most readily accept changes in DoD PR Policy that promote or improve training with our coalition partners. There are significant policy barriers to training our coalition partners. For instance, according to JPRA's chief SERE

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<sup>8</sup> JP 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, 4-7.

psychologist, JPRA has current agreements with Canada, the U.K., and Australia, to provide SERE training and assistance. JPRA cannot provide training or assistance to foreign nations without such agreements. JPRA is considering development of a releasable syllabus for the PR 101 course. The concept is to develop a distance learning course available through the internet. JPRA does not have the manpower to support Mobile Training Teams (MTT) for this course. This concept could mitigate the issue of training assistance to foreign nations.

The most popular coalition training solutions proposed from the field include:

- In-theater CSAR exercises hosted by the U.S. for coalition recovery forces, such as Unified Endeavor and Cooperative Key
- Opportunities for coalition PR forces to attend U.S. Exercises & Schools, such as Red/Green/Blue Flag, the C2 Warrior School, and JPRA's PR-101/301 courses
- Exchange visits to coalition PR units from U.S. PR forces in-theater
- In-theater SERE training provided by U.S. MTTs to coalition HRC personnel.

There are already precedents set for some of these proposed solutions. The C2 Warrior School (C2WS) has already had a Canadian, a German, and two Australians attend the Joint CSAR Controller Course. The application process has been slow, because of the foreign clearance procedures. NATO regional HQ Air North has said that it would like the C2WS to teach a course in Europe. Also, C2WS does have a JCSAR lesson for Flag Officer selectees (Capstone) and there are allied officers in that program. Additionally, in Blue Flag 00-02, the C2TIG had a class for the JSRC controllers and there were officers from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia attending.

IDA interviewed the OIC of the Red Flag CSAR Division, 414 Combat Training Squadron. During one two-week period of a previous Red Flag Exercise (2000-2), the Royal Singapore Air Force (RSAF) participated (F-16s, C-130s, and CH-47s). The CH-47s belong to the U.S. Army and are stationed in NRAS Dallas, Texas. The RSAF maintains a training detachment there, where the U.S. Army trains RSAF aircrew to fly the Chinook. The RSAF CH-47 unit executed a few "generic" pre-planned CSAR events as well as other missions, such as special operations and assault, in order to accomplish basic training objectives, such as flying in a realistic electronic threat environment. There were no documented lessons learned. The CSAR OIC stated that the process for Coalition partners to participate in Red Flag is already in place, and if a Coalition unit selects a CSAR event as a training objective, his division will support that objective by

providing a CSAR scenario, ATO tasking, a survivor, threats, munitions, logistical support, etc.

#### **D. THEATER ENGAGEMENT**

- There is little continuity between Theaters.
  - *Some theaters focus on civil SAR and theater engagement.*
  - *Some theaters focus on combat recovery.*
  - *Theaters need to address all areas to develop a viable “PR umbrella.”*

The U.S./Coalition Partner interface for PR purposes has, so far, proven to be loose and on a case-by-case need. There are no set procedures for PR coalition actions or structure. Each of the Theater Combatant Commanders engage their coalitions differently. The number of “assistance” visits to coalition partners within a theater conducted in a given time period varies greatly, as does the emphasis on PR during those visits. Each of the theater PR staffs interprets the combatant command PR roles and responsibilities differently, and implements the guidance differently. Some Theaters emphasize Civil SAR (PACOM, SOUTHCOM), while others emphasize Combat SAR (EUCOM, CENTCOM). No Theater weights each type of SAR equally, because limited resources forces them to choose one or the other. DoD theater engagement policy does not enforce or encourage inclusion of PR as an element of theater engagement.

Both civil SAR and combat recovery are important missions. The conduct of civil SAR establishes and maintains the infrastructure of communications and personal relationships throughout the Theater. This infrastructure is an essential part of the PR umbrella during contingencies. Periodic combat recovery training is essential to develop and maintain proficiency for actual combat, should the need arise. OJCS Guidance states that the impact of host nation support on CTF infrastructure should be considered for operations in a coalition environment.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> JP 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, 3-4.

## E. GUIDANCE AND DOCUMENTATION

- Combined PR doctrine and tactics are derived from unclassified U.S. publications.
- Combined PR CONOPS are reduced to the lowest common denominator of the most limited Partner Nation.
- Current DoD PR Policy does limit U.S. rescue efforts in a coalition environment.
  - *Policy is not aligned with NATO “Framework Nation” Policy*
  - *Policy is not aligned with the expectations of our coalition partners*
  - *Policy prevents DoD from programming and planning to recover isolated allied and coalition personnel*
  - *Policy of case-by-case approval results in planning after the fact, and high-risk “ad-hoc” rescue missions.*

For better or for worse, all doctrine in use today by our coalition partners is derivative of U.S. doctrine. Unfortunately, our current PR doctrine does not address coalition issues. DoD and NATO guidance specifically written for combined operations has nothing for the PR community to build a PR concept upon. PR doctrine is not capturing lessons learned from combined operations. One of NATO’s biggest concerns today is that no lessons learned during OAF were documented, and next time, NATO will not have the right people in the right place at the right time.

The theater staffs have all strongly stated the need for standardization of basic PR guidance documents, including PR Concepts of Operations (CONOPS), Air Tasking Order/Integrated Tasking Order CSAR Special Instructions (SPINS), and PR Standing Operating Procedure (SOP).

Tactical guidance for PR is better standardized than operational guidance. IDA interviewed the Director of Operations (DO), Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (AFTTP) 3-1 Center, HQ, Air Warfare Center. The DO showed that each aircraft-specific volume (volumes 3 and up) already contains roles, responsibilities, procedures, and checklists for SAR/CSAR On-Scene Commander or Airborne Mission Commander, as appropriate. In addition, the General Procedure volume (volume 1) also contains roles, responsibilities, procedures, and checklists for SAR/CSAR On-Scene Commander and Airborne Mission Commander. Aircraft-specific volumes can refer the reader to the General Procedures volume for more information, as needed. The AFTTP 3-1 Center staff is working to coordinate and standardize the OSC and AMC information among the different volumes. The DO and his staff are confident that the right information is in the right place in the documentation. He expressed a concern that, even though the information is available, the forces are not training to the OSC and AMC roles

during CSAR events, so the warfighters are not studying the information provided. Tactical guidance does not address coalition-specific issues.

The requirement to conduct PR in a coalition environment has impacted the development of the CSAR CONOPS and SPINS in two ways. First, it has generated “multiple” CONOPS. The main PR CONOPS document may have multiple annexes for each recovery asset found in the coalition. While this permits the CSAR forces to best exploit their respective capabilities, it adds complexity to the planning and C2 functions. Second, the SPINS have been simplified to the lowest common denominator, such as beacon-only survival radios. Simplified SPINS make no attempt to exploit the advanced capabilities of advanced survival radios, such as the PRC-112B “Hook,” at the operational level. Tactics, techniques, and procedures are being developed and used, but not on a Theater-wide scale. This simplification of the SPINS for some members of the coalition in effect nullifies the advantages of the superior equipment of other coalition members.

Current DoD PR policy does place limitations on PR when working in a coalition. The policy is not aligned with NATO policy or current concepts of operations in the Balkans. DoD PR policy states that the U.S. is responsible only for its own people. OAF had very specific guidance from the JFACC to conduct PR as a coalition, not as individual nations. Commanders at the operational and tactical levels had to compensate for this disjoint guidance from higher echelons. DoD policy is not aligned with the expectations of our coalition partners, who know that only the U.S. has a combat recovery capability. If our coalition partners send their people into harm’s way in support of a U.S.-led coalition, they fully expect the U.S. to recover their people who become isolated.

The policy also prevents the DoD from programming or planning for allied operations by removing partner nations forces from DoD’s planned “customer base.” DoD policy is one of “case by case” approval. The policy makes it necessary for the CFC to wait for an ally or coalition partner to be shot down before a recovery effort can be planned. This *ad hoc* approach to PR planning increases the risk to the U.S. forces that will conduct the recovery.

## F. CLASSIFICATION AND RELEASABILITY

- There is a reluctance among nations to share and release classified information.
- The impact of releasability of classified information to coalition partners is Significant!
  - *Withholding information fosters an environment of distrust.*
  - *Withholding information causes confusion, delays the mission, and endangers lives.*
- This issue goes beyond the PR community
  - *Releasability impacts every consumer of information products.*
  - *This was major issue in the Operation Allied Force After-Action Report to Congress.*
  - *Releasability policy is the purview of ASD/C3I and DIA.*

The release of classified information between coalition partners is a significant problem. Timely distribution of classified information is critical to effective and successful rescue operations. Key elements of classified information, such as the location and identity of isolated personnel, and authentication information, must be provided to coalition partners to effect a recovery in a coalition environment. Recent incidents of failure to release information to allies have resulted in confusion, waste of valuable resources, delays in rescue missions, execution of unnecessary missions, and unnecessary exposure of friendly forces to enemy fire. However, recovery operations are very vulnerable, and depend heavily upon OPSEC and COMSEC for protection from the threat. Repeated instances of withholding information have and will continue to foster an environment of distrust between allies and coalition partners.

According to OJCS guidance, intelligence sharing and releasability is governed by U.S. National Disclosure Policy and releasability issues impact every mission area within DoD, as well as other USG agencies that work with other nations.<sup>10</sup> DoD reported significant impact of releasability issues during Operation Allied Force to Congress.

In addition to dissemination problems on the data networks, U.S. sensitivity to releasing certain types of information greatly inhibited combined planning and operations in some areas. Battle damage assessment products generated by the Joint Task Force Noble Anvil J2 were classified at a level that limited their use by allied forces. The same kinds of concerns precluded any integration of deception planning between U.S. and NATO information operations planners. Much of the U.S. information in question [could be] effectively used by both U.S. and

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<sup>10</sup> JP 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, 3-3.

coalition warfighters [if it were] classified at the SECRET collateral level releasable to the coalition operation.<sup>11</sup>

In their OAF after-action report to Congress, the SecDef and CJCS found that “to the extent possible, imagery and signals intelligence data should be classified ‘SECRET/NOFORN Releasable to NATO,’ and sources and methods should be protected ‘by exception,’ rather than the other way around.<sup>12</sup>

Solving the releasability problem is beyond the purview of the PR community. However, education is the key to managing the problem within the PR community. Most people, particularly in the intelligence community, tend to err on the side of caution when they are unsure of what is releasable. Thus, much of what is releasable does not get released. It is essential that PR staff members who work with coalition partners clearly understand what information is releasable and what is not.

For example, an intelligence system operator may collect a survivor’s location and report the location to the JSRC as SECRET-US ONLY information because of the classification of the system. JSRC personnel need to be educated to understand that the classification of operational information, such as the survivor’s location (once isolated from the source), is determined by the Combined Force Commander’s designated PR representative. The commander’s PR representative, usually the JSRC director and author of the PR portion of the operation plan, needs to be educated to understand what operational information should be classified as releasable to coalition partners.

To address this need for understanding releasability, JPRA has been developing a software application called “Secure Information Releasability Environment,” or “SIREN.” This tool is designed to facilitate the sharing of classified information among coalition partners while protecting security in accordance with U.S. foreign disclosure policy. While the concept of SIREN is elegant in its simplicity, its usefulness is a direct function of the quality and quantity of information loaded in its database.

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<sup>11</sup> Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report to Congress, Secretary of Defense and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 31 January 2000.

<sup>12</sup> Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report to Congress, Secretary of Defense and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 31 January 2000.

## G. ORGANIZATION

- Theater rescue staffs lack the manpower to create and sustain viable PR programs.
  - *Manning is deficient at the combatant command and component command levels.*
  - *Personnel assigned to rescue staffs lack experience and training.*
  - *Component commands lack the authority to establish standards for other components.*
  - *The lack of organization and the lack of standardization are closely linked.*

Each Theater Combatant Commander and each Service HQ has different PR requirements and responsibilities, which drives its individual PR organizational structure. Only USSOCOM is assigned the responsibility for Theater SAR by Title 10, U.S. Code (Chapter 6, Section 167). Responsibilities of other Combatant Commands, including Theater Commands, are assigned by the Secretary of Defense (DoD Directives) and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS Instructions). DoD PR policy does not enforce or encourage standardization of PR organizations across the Services or Combatant Commands.

According to OJCS Guidance,<sup>13</sup> the use of liaison networks and coordination centers improve command and control of operations in a coalition environment. Currently, there is no standard PR organizational structure among the Theaters or Services. The level of interest in PR activities varies significantly from Service-to-Service and command-to-command. Some Theater component commands have not yet identified a PR point-of-contact. PR representation on the Theater staffs at the Joint and Component levels is inadequate. This shortfall in manning is adversely impacting training and readiness. The cancellation of the Balkans CSAREX scheduled for June 2000 was a result of manning and staff training deficiencies and severely impacted the Theater's CSAR capability. The CSAREX was delayed 15 months, which resulted in more than a one-year period between theater CSAREXs, and multiple turnovers of PRCC and CAOC personnel, who are assigned on 90-day TDY tours.

Representatives of the CSAR squadrons responsible for mission execution stated that theater staff proponency, advocacy, and expertise for CSAR is a problem. There is no effective Theater staff to work planning and execution issues, such as requirements, training and exercises, OPLANs, and deployments. There is a lack of experienced CSAR personnel on the staffs; a lack of U.S. Air Force Weapons School graduates on the staffs;

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<sup>13</sup> JP 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, 2-7.

and a lack of promotion opportunities from JSRC/RCC positions to encourage the best-qualified and most-experienced personnel to volunteer for those positions. The actions of the designated Theater PR “Executive Agent” (usually the air component) are not enforceable on other components within the theater, which limits the executive agent’s ability to standardize PR programs within the theater. All of the Theater PR staffs have repeatedly asked for “someone” with authority spanning the DOD to standardize guidance to the Theaters, such as CONOPS, SPINS, and SOP. Unfortunately, that “someone” does not exist in the DOD organization.

## H. LANGUAGES AND CULTURE

- Military terminology and acronyms are the most common barriers to communication.
- Language is not usually an issue for rescue forces or C2 organizations.
  - *CSAR is an aviation-based mission.*
  - *English is the international language of aviation.*
- Under the stress of a survival/evasion situation, survivors may revert to their native language.
  - Rescue forces may need linguists for radio communications.

Communications problems go beyond the lack of equipment compatibility with coalition partners. They include language capabilities and limitations; the impact of military-unique terminology, acronyms, and brevity codes; and the availability, skills, and experience levels of interpreters. The biggest barrier is the terminology problem. Acronyms, brevity codes, and military-unique terms generate more problems than the English language. The ACC Commander said, “Language is not an issue since English is the standard international language for aviation.” For most countries, aviation is the basis for their PR capability. Another problem noted is a reluctance on the part of people from some cultures to acknowledge and clarify any confusion or misunderstanding as a result of poor language or interpretation abilities.

Those in the CSAR community who worked with Allies also felt the language barriers experienced in a coalition environment would increase during operations under the stress of actual combat. One language-qualified CSAR airborne mission coordinator (AMC) was accustomed to foreign personnel from Central and South America reverting to speaking Spanish under stressful situations, such as a survival or evasion situation.

The OAF PRCC Director noted that the terminology problem is exacerbated for the PR mission area because the PRCC staff requires support from so many mission areas during execution of a CSAR. Thus, the PRCC staff must understand a great depth and

breadth of mission areas, and be able to communicate with many different military specialists using their unique terminologies. His staff noted that checklists and briefing guides help to lower the language barriers.

OJCS Guidance states that force employment in a coalition environment may be constrained by the political will and national interests of member nations. Combined operations will face the challenge of language differences, and must have consideration for cultural differences.<sup>14</sup>

During Operation Allied Force, the need for specific foreign language skills severely stressed Combatant Commander and Service force personnel providers.

Linguist shortfalls are the subject of several ongoing studies. Currently, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3I) is developing a strategy, policies, plans, and resource programs to meet the Department's language requirements. The shortfall in linguists is also being reviewed by the Joint Staff, with help from Service language program offices. In a complementary initiative, the National Security Agency has convened a task force to look at all aspects of the linguist issue to ensure that the United States is better prepared to deal efficiently with the full range of potential crisis scenarios. Among the topics of major interest are the development of an overall linguist requirements strategy and the use of contracted services.<sup>15</sup>

The cultural barriers encountered were not unique to the PR mission area. For example, the Muslim culture makes it difficult for Arabic military personnel (all of whom are men) to work with women in the U.S. military. Also, Arabic officers have difficulty working with U.S. enlisted personnel. In the Middle East, much of the manual labor work force is composed of immigrants from across Asia. Many are indentured servants, and do not enjoy the same civil rights as native Arabs. As a result, Arabic military personnel also have difficulties working with ethnic minority personnel in the U.S. military.

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<sup>14</sup> JP 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, Chapter 3.

<sup>15</sup> Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report to Congress, Secretary of Defense and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 31 January 2000.

## I. ALLIANCES AND COALITIONS

- There are three different types of multinational operations
  - *Allied operations (Allied Force)*
  - *Coalition operations where the U.S. is the ‘coalition builder’ (Enduring Freedom)*
  - *Coalition operations where the U.S. is NOT the ‘coalition builder’ (East Timor).*
- The nature of the operation affects the PR mission.

OJCS Guidance defines multinational operations as military actions conducted by two or more nations. The guidance notes that the multinational environment may dictate the need for non-traditional command concepts, such as consensus, diplomacy, and coordination.<sup>16</sup> The IDA study team has identified three different types of multinational, or combined, operations. Each type can have a different impact on how the PR mission is performed.

The U.S. is a signatory to seven mutual defense treaties. These seven treaties involve the U.S. in three bilateral alliances and four multilateral alliances:

- U.S.-Republic of the Philippines (Mutual Defense Treaty, 1951)
- ANZUS (Australia - New Zealand - U.S., 1951)
- U.S.-Republic of Korea (Mutual Defense Treaty, 1953)
- South East Asia Collective Defense (U.S. - France - Australia - New Zealand - Thailand – Philippines – Pakistan – United Kingdom, 1954)
- U.S.-Japan (Mutual Defense Treaty, 1960)
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization (19 Member Nations, 1949)
- Organization of American States (34 Member Nations, 1947).

As an example, Australia is part of the Australia-New Zealand-U.S. (ANZUS) Alliance, which makes a *combined* operation involving the defense of Australia or the United States an *allied* operation rather than a *coalition* operation.

Alliances are coalitions of equals. As such, it is politically incorrect to state that one nation is “in charge” of an alliance. Decisions, and policies, are made by consensus of the allies. The enduring nature of alliances allow them to develop alliance policy in advance of actual contingencies. A disconnect between alliance policy and DoD policy can lead to problems, and impact our ability to conduct PR effectively.

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<sup>16</sup> JP 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, 1-1.

Non-traditional coalitions, such as the recently-formed coalitions in East Timor and Afghanistan, rely on the “coalition builder” for leadership. Because they are informal, and formed only when needed, coalitions have to rely on many bilateral agreements established when the coalition is formed. The bilateral agreements are between the coalition builder and the other coalition partners. Despite written agreements, personal relationships remain essential for solving resultant problems.

During operations in East Timor, the Australians found that the responsibility for fixing releasability problems falls to the coalition builder, which, in the case of East Timor, was Australia. Based on this experience, the Australians pointed out an important advantage of a *coalition* over an *alliance*. The issue of leadership in a coalition is clearer. The nation that builds the coalition is the leader. The coalition builder, or leading nation, has the authority and the responsibility to establish PR policy.

When the U.S. is the coalition builder, as it is in Afghanistan, it has the privilege of establishing coalition PR policy that aligns with DoD PR policy. When the U.S. is a coalition partner, but not the coalition builder, as is the case in East Timor, the U.S. is responsible for following coalition PR policy set by the coalition builder. Currently, DoD policy does not address this responsibility, and disconnects can result.

## J. COALITION CURRENT CAPABILITY

- The differences in other countries’ PR policies are *Negligible!*
  - *The ideological differences are relatively insignificant.*
- However, limited resources severely impact other countries’ abilities to implement policy:
  - *Coalition partners have limited PR capability, assets, and resources.*
  - *Coalition partners have no combat recovery capability.*
- Therefore, fielding a true “coalition PR” capability is not possible at this time

Although no other nation currently has written policy that specifically addresses PR, every nation that IDA interviewed demonstrated a de facto policy similar to U.S. policy.

Despite the similarity of national values, fiscal realities prevent most nations from implementing a PR capability in any way comparable to our capability. NATO has been told by almost every European country that they cannot afford to develop and sustain a robust PR capability. They count on the U.S. for this support and are looking to a

combined capability in the future. They want the U.S. to let them develop what works for them and augment and assist, as needed.

PR SMEs identified the requirements for an effective coalition PR capability:

- A combined command and control cell
- A program of regular training exercises
- A network of LNOs to link the coalition countries
- Contributions from all the coalition partners to build cohesion
- A single combined doctrine.

DoD PR policy does not currently support or direct a PR capability that incorporates all of these elements. This is in addition to the basic elements of a PR capability:

- Properly trained and equipped HRC personnel
- Rescue forces trained and equipped to operate in a non-permissive environment
- A rescue C2 element able to locate and identify isolated personnel.

Using these requirements as criteria, IDA did not find any nation, alliance, or coalition that was able to provide a PR capability without the U.S. providing the leadership, training, and the preponderance of assets.

## **K. COALITION ACTIVITY**

- Recovery Forces:
  - *Most countries are training to NATO or U.S. doctrine and TTP.*
  - *Some countries have acquisition programs for CSAR helicopters, but they are unfunded or under-funded.*
- Command and Control Elements:
  - *Most countries do not have military C2 elements for PR.*
  - *Training of C2 elements is provided by the U.S.*
  - *Countries lack common C4 equipment.*
- High-risk-of-capture personnel:
  - *All countries are training to NATO or U.S. doctrine.*
  - *There is standardization in survival gear, but diversity in survival radios.*

There is a tremendous amount of discussion going on in many nations around the world about improving PR capabilities. As in the U.S., however, progress is inhibited by scarce resources and a dilution of advocacy as PR issues rise through the many levels of the military establishment and government. Those nations with SAR forces and available training funds are training using NATO or U.S. doctrine and TTP. NATO doctrine is derived from U.S. and British doctrine. Most of the SAR assets training for combat recovery are not equipped to do so. Some nations have planned or established programs to acquire combat-capable recovery assets, but these programs are either un-funded or under-funded.

Most nations do not have organizations or agencies to provide command & control for PR forces. The U.S. is the only nation providing PR command & control training for personnel who man rescue C2 elements. NATO has a robust command post exercise program for rescue C2 elements, and ongoing operations in the Balkans helps to sustain some level of proficiency. C2 of rescue is based on NATO or U.S. doctrine and TTP. Based on lessons learned in the Balkans, NATO is emphasizing the need for increased interoperability of future C4 systems.<sup>17</sup>

Most nations are providing survival training to their aircrews and other HRC personnel. All those who are do so using NATO or U.S. doctrine and TTP. Evasion and resistance training is less common. Because of limited changes in survival equipment, there is substantial standardization and commonality of survival equipment. Again, evasion equipment, such as covert signaling devices, is more limited. Unfortunately, there is quite a bit of diversity, and a broad spectrum of capability, in the most important survival equipment: survival radios. A number of allied and coalition partners are in the process of developing or increasing their SAR and/or CSAR capabilities. In the European Theater, France and Turkey are buying the Eurocopter Cougar Mk2 (AS-532A2) for the CSAR role. Greece is considering the Cougar Mk1. Italy is interested in purchasing the EH-101 for CSAR duties. The Royal Air Force (UK) has commissioned a study to report on the status of “CSAR in Europe.”

In the Central Theater, Saudi Arabia is planning to purchase 12 Eurocopter Cougar Mk2 helicopters for SAR and CSAR missions. There is a great deal of interest in the Pacific Theater, with a number of countries in the process of procuring helicopters for the SAR and CSAR roles. Singapore is developing Boeing CH-47SD Chinooks for SAR

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<sup>17</sup> Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report to Congress, Secretary of Defense and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 31 January 2000.

and CSAR. The Philippines are shopping for fourteen SAR helicopters and are considering the Bell 412, the Kaman SH-2G, and the AS-565 Panther. South Korea is in the process of purchasing Sikorsky UH-60Q Blackhawks that are MEDEVAC, SAR, and CSAR capable. Taiwan has purchased three Boeing CH-47SD Chinooks. Thailand is considering the Sikorsky S-70B, a civilian version of the Black Hawk. Australia and New Zealand have the SH-2G, Hong Kong has the AS-332-L2, Japan has the H-60 Blackhawk, and Malaysia has the Westland Super Lynx.

In September 2001, Denmark announced the selection of the multi-role EH101 to meet its search and rescue and troop transport requirements following a straight competition with the Sikorsky S-92 and NH Industries NH90 to replace its long-serving fleet of Sikorsky S-61s. The first two of Canada's 15 new Cormorant search and rescue helicopters were delivered in October 2001 and the manufacturing program is both on schedule and on budget. The first unit to operate Cormorant will be 442 Transport and Rescue Squadron at 19 Wing in Comox, British Columbia. In December 2001, the Portuguese Government formally announced the decision to procure 12 EH101s for Search and Rescue, Combat SAR role and fishery protection to Agusta Westland. The selection of the EH101 comes at the end of a thorough and extensive evaluation and as a result of flight evaluation of the EH101 against the Sikorsky S-92 and the Eurocopter Cougar Mk2+. This achievement underlines the superior ability of the EH101 to satisfy the extremely demanding requirements of Combat SAR missions as well as its already well-proven performance in the maritime and utility SAR roles.<sup>18</sup> See Figure III-1.

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<sup>18</sup> GKN-Westland Press Release, December 2001.



**Figure III-1. EH-101 Merlin Mk3**

In September 2001, the Nordic Standard Helicopter Program (NSHP) Committee, representing Finland, Norway and Sweden, announced the selection of the NH90 as the common helicopter for the NSHP. The NH90, now selected by 8 European Countries (France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal, Finland, Norway and Sweden) represents a major step forward in terms of rationalization and standardization of equipment within the Nordic Armed Forces, and optimum interoperability in multinational tasks forces and United Nations missions. Between September and November 2001, Norway contracted for 24 NH-90s, Finland contracted for 20 NH-90s, and Sweden contracted for 25 NH-90s. 23 German Air Force NH-90s are foreseen for Combat Search and Rescue missions.<sup>19</sup> See Figure III-2.

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<sup>19</sup> NHI Press Release, November 2001.



**Figure III-2. NH-90**

In December 2000, the People's Republic of China selected two Sikorsky S-76C+ helicopters for search and rescue (SAR) missions, a first step in a major upgrade of the nation's airborne offshore SAR capability. Six S-76 helicopters have been flying rescue missions since the early 1990s from Hong Kong for the Government Flying Service, which also operates three Sikorsky S-70A Black Hawk derivatives. Other S-76 SAR operators around the world include the governments of Japan, Australia, Thailand and Spain. As of December 2000, Black Hawk helicopter variants, including naval derivatives, are serving, or have been selected by 25 international customers — Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Brazil, Brunei, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, Greece, Hong Kong, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, People's Republic of China, Spain, The Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, Thailand and Turkey.<sup>20</sup> See Figure III-3.

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<sup>20</sup> Sikorsky Press Release, December 2000.



**Figure III-3. H-60 Black Hawk**

In May 2000, Turkey received the first of 20 AS-532 UL/AL Cougars sold to the Turkish Air Force for Search And Rescue (SAR) and Combat Search And Rescue (CSAR) assignments. The first Cougar will be commissioned by the Turkish Air Force, mainly for CSAR operations involving the recovery of aircrews downed behind enemy lines. See Figure III-4. In November 2000, the new MK2+ version of the medium-lift twin engine, Cougar/Super Puma helicopter completed its maiden flight from the Eurocopter plant in Marignane, France. The French Air Force plans to benefit from the very enhanced performance of this new version for its future Combat Search and Rescue helicopters and has already placed orders for it. In-flight refueling will be possible for the military version to increase the helicopter's operating range. This system has already been successfully tested on a Cougar MK2. These tests were conducted in cooperation with the Saudi Air Force on board a KC-130 Hercules tanker airplane and a combat SAR version Cougar Mark 2 helicopter, both on loan from the customer.<sup>21</sup> See Figure III-5.

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<sup>21</sup> Eurocopter Press Release, November 2000.



**Figure III-4. Cougar Mk2**



**Figure III-5. A Cougar Mk2 Air Refueling**

## **CHAPTER IV**

### **POLICY ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**



## **IV. POLICY ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

IDA has developed a number of recommendations that DPMO can implement to improve PR in a coalition environment. They include general recommendations that DPMO can use as strategic guidance to chart a long-term course for DoD into the future of coalition operations. They also include specific recommendations that DPMO can implement in the near-term to have an immediate, positive impact on the PR mission area in future coalition operations.

### **A. GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS**

The current DoD policy regarding PR for coalition operations is stated in DoD Directive 2310.2, *PR*:

4.1. Preserving the lives and well-being of U.S. military, DoD civilian and contract service employees placed in danger of being isolated, beleaguered, detained, captured or having to evade while participating in a U.S.-sponsored activity or mission is one of the highest priorities of the Department of Defense. The Department of Defense has a moral obligation to protect its personnel, prevent exploitation of its personnel by adversaries, and reduce the potential for captured personnel being used as leverage against the United States.

4.2. The Department of Defense has primary responsibility for recovering U.S. personnel identified in paragraph 4.1., above, who are deployed outside the United States and its territories.

4.3. When requested, and when directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, the Department of Defense shall provide PR support to other governments, agencies, and organizations, in accordance with all applicable laws, regulations, and memoranda of agreement or understanding.

4.4. The Department of Defense shall support Civil Search and Rescue efforts on a strict not-to-interfere basis with primary military duties, roles, and missions in accordance with applicable national directives, plans, guidelines, policy, and agreements.

IDA has identified the following issues with DoD's current policy:

- DoD cannot currently meet its “primary responsibility” for recovery of U.S. personnel delineated in paragraphs 4.1 and 4.2 in all of the current, ongoing deployments, worldwide and around-the-clock. There are insufficient low density/high demand (LD/HD) assets needed to support personnel recovery operations, such as E-3 AWACS and Sandy-qualified A-10s. Recently, the U.S. relied on support from allies and coalition partners to make up the shortfalls in key assets. For many years CAF rescue force have relied on SOF to fill the shortfall in conventional combat recovery capability.
- Paragraph 4.3 is not presently aligned with the expectations of many of our current coalition partners. Because of America’s relatively robust military resources, they expect U.S. recovery forces to behave as a “big brother” and recover allied and coalition isolated personnel just as we would recover our own personnel. Our allies and coalition partners do not expect the U.S. to consider these recoveries on a case-by-case basis.
- Paragraph 4.3 does grant DoD a great deal of flexibility regarding recovery of allied and coalition isolated personnel by providing support only on a case-by-case basis. However, the policy defines no standing requirement to recover non-U.S. isolated personnel. Hence, DoD has no authority or opportunity to organize, train, or equip for “directed” support to our allies and coalition partners, should the need arise.
- Paragraph 4.3 does not disallow the possibility that U.S. forces would be directed to support a recovery of allied or coalition isolated personnel after the fact, or on a mission-by-mission basis. This presents operational and mission planners with an added challenge of planning for an “unknown demand” for PR support.
- The consequence of direction to support a recovery of allied or coalition isolated personnel after the fact is execution of an unplanned or *ad hoc* recovery mission. An *ad hoc* recovery mission for allied or coalition isolated personnel adds more risk to an already high risk mission. There is both the tactical risk of losing forces, and the political risk of mission failure.

IDA recommends DPMO change the current policy to address the three specific situations of U.S. participation in multinational military operations:

- Allied operations
- Coalition operations where the U.S. is the coalition builder
- Coalition operations where the U.S. is not the coalition builder.

In the early stages of the study, IDA interviewed subject matter experts (SMEs) from many organizations, agencies, and headquarters staffs responsible for PR. Those

SMEs interviewed by IDA identified three key policy issues of PR in a coalition environment:

- Should it be DoD Policy to establish and maintain a Theater SAR Alliance as an aspect of theater engagement?
- Should it be DoD Policy to make U.S. forces responsible for the combat recovery of coalition personnel?
- Should it be DoD Policy to permit coalition forces to conduct combat recovery of U.S. personnel?

IDA presents a more detailed discussion of the issues in the following paragraphs. Each discussion begins with a descriptive listing of the pros and cons of establishing such a policy, and concludes with a recommendation to DPMO with supporting rationale.

***Should it be DoD Policy to establish and maintain a Theater SAR Alliance as an aspect of theater engagement?***

PROs:

- A SAR alliance is an excellent means of establishing military-to-military contact and a point-of-entry into countries with newly-formed U.S. relations. The recently established relationship between the U.S. and Vietnam is a good example of DoD SAR capability providing a vehicle for military-to-military contact between former enemies.
- A SAR alliance or agreement strengthens existing alliances, both formal and informal, and is an excellent means of achieving the objectives of the Combatant Commander's overall theater engagement plan (TEP).
- A SAR alliance promotes the development of Allied and Coalition Partners SAR/CSAR capabilities, through exchanges of information and expertise. This enhanced capability, in turn, would some day support the rescue of U.S. citizens.
- A SAR alliance is the current foundation of a Theater Command's SAR infrastructure of C2 nodes and recovery assets. Continuity of a Theater's SAR infrastructure during the transition from peacetime to wartime is a necessity in today's environment of expeditionary forces and rapid responses to contingencies.
- The bottom line is that a SAR alliance is value-added. The alliance provides allied recovery capability to DoD persons in distress, a cost that would otherwise be borne by the U.S.

CONs:

- A meaningful SAR alliance has a very long development time. Both the U.S. and the ally must commit time and resources to developing the capability, and the return on the investment might not be realized for ten years or more.
- In the current resource-constrained environment, the development of SAR alliances detracts from immediate CSAR needs, the highest priority PR concern of the DoD right now.
- A SAR alliance could possibly result in a tactics or technology transfer to future adversaries.
- With limited resources, Coalition training in support of the SAR alliance comes at the expense of Joint and Service training.

IDA recommends DPMO adopt this policy for the DoD. In the long term, the benefits of SAR alliances within the Theaters clearly outweigh the costs, and it is important that the agencies at the highest levels of the PR community take the long view toward the mission of PR. A Theater SAR alliance, and the resultant infrastructure of C2 nodes, communications channels, and recovery assets, is an essential part of the PR umbrella for any contingency or military operation. Since 1960, SAR was the PR method used to recover the majority of personnel isolated in the AOR during every conflict. Operation Allied Force was the latest example, where the Balkans PR Coordination Center (PRCC) executed two CSAR missions to recover two isolated personnel, and three SAR missions to recover six personnel in the Balkans Theater in 1999. The establishment and maintenance of a Theater-wide PR network during peacetime will ultimately improve the Commander's combat recovery capability during conflicts in the Theater. Also, the process of establishing a PR network provides the Combatant Commander with a tool to implement other aspects of his TEP. Although the new National SAR Plan<sup>1</sup> no longer designates most of the Combatant Commanders as SAR Coordinators, it still provides the Combatant Commands a great deal of authority in the area of international civil SAR. The Combatant Commanders should exercise this authority to further develop the SAR infrastructures within their Theaters.

The U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) Rescue Coordination Center (RCC) suggested a concept of progressive engagement with allies and coalition partners for DoD PR policy. The policy would consist of multiple levels, with a specific set of roles and

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<sup>1</sup> National Search and Rescue Plan of the United States, 1999, Interagency Committee on Search and Rescue.

responsibilities at each level for both the U.S. and the partner country. Each partner country would progress through the levels at its own pace. The starting level and the rate of progression would be based on several factors, including: maturity of U.S.-partner relations; partner military capabilities and limitations; partner economic strengths and weaknesses; and partner cultural values. At the lowest level, engagement would begin with basic government-to-government contacts. The initial goal would be to develop the partner's civil SAR capability. In many cases, the U.S. Coast Guard would be involved in the initial contacts. The ultimate objective of the partner countries that reach the highest level is to achieve the role and responsibility of fielding a combat recovery capability that is interoperable with U.S. recovery forces in coalition exercises and operations.

IDA considers USPACOM's suggestion to be a good model for theater engagement by the DoD PR community. IDA recommends DPMO and JPRA establish policy and operations positions or sections, respectively, to further develop this concept as a means of implementing a DoD policy of theater SAR alliances/theater engagement. The positions should assist the Theater PR staffs with the integration of theater SAR activities into the theater engagement plans and activities. The positions should act as a central clearinghouse for coordination of theater SAR activities and assist in standardization of SAR plans and programs among the theaters. The positions should be the focal point for monitoring PR-related support provided by DoD to allies and coalition partners, to ensure consistency among the theaters in the implementation of the DoD policy of engagement. PR-related support would include theater engagement team visits, SME exchanges, SAR conferences, SAR demonstrations, mobile training teams, combined exercises, etc.

***Should it be DoD Policy to make U.S. forces responsible for the combat recovery of coalition personnel?***

PROs:

- A policy of recovering coalition isolated personnel builds coalition unity by demonstrating U.S. commitment to its coalition partners.
- Using only U.S. forces to conduct PR simplifies operational planning and standing operating procedure (SOP) by reducing the number of planning and operational variables in a combined operation.
- Using only U.S. forces to conduct PR improves the PR capability of the coalition by ensuring that the best organized, trained, and equipped forces are used for the mission.

- A stated policy of recovering allied and coalition isolated personnel would establish the requirement and the opportunity for the Services to organize, train, and equip PR forces sufficient for, and interoperable in, combined operations.
- A stated policy of recovering allied and coalition isolated personnel allows the U.S. to retain PR capability internally, and protects PR tactics and technology.
- Relieved of the obligation to provide PR support when operating in alliance or coalition with the U.S., allies and coalition partners can concentrate on providing quality training and equipment for their high-risk-of-capture (HRC) personnel. Allied and coalition countries can improve the interoperability of their training and equipment if they know in advance that their HRC personnel will be recovered by U.S. forces.

CONs:

- Under a policy of recovering allied and coalition isolated personnel, the U.S. loses autonomy over some portions of the PR process. Specifically, the U.S. cannot direct the programs for training and equipping HRC personnel of allied and coalition countries.
- Under a policy of recovering allied and coalition isolated personnel, the U.S. must support the lowest common denominator in a multi-lateral alliance or coalition, with respect to HRC personnel. This can result in a degradation of tactics and procedures for all HRC personnel in a combined operation, and can result in increased risk to the recovery forces.
- Under a policy of recovering allied and coalition isolated personnel, the U.S. incurs the political risk of a failure to recover isolated personnel of an ally or coalition partner. If the U.S. attempts a recovery effort and fails, the political risk is minimal. If the U.S. fails to attempt a recovery, the political risk could be significant.
- There is an increased cost associated with a policy of recovering allied and coalition isolated personnel. While the marginal increase in demand for PR support by allied and coalition isolated personnel will not require additional force structure,<sup>2</sup> current and future recovery assets will require resources to improve interoperability to the levels needed for combined operations. Interoperability resource requirements are driven by many factors, including cooperation of coalition partner nations.
- As already noted, the present force structure is insufficient to meet the demand for support of U.S. HRC personnel involved in current military

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<sup>2</sup> Force structure is driven by the requirement to provide geographic coverage. Increasing the number of personnel at risk within a geographic area does not impact force structure.

operations around the world. This forces structure shortfall would be extended to the added demand for support of allied and coalition HRC personnel.

IDA recommends DPMO implement this policy as soon as possible for NATO and other formal alliances to which the U.S. is party, as well as for coalitions in which the U.S. is the coalition builder. A number of the findings determined over the course of this study, the opinions of the SMEs within the PR community, and the consensus of the USAF leadership interviewed during this study support this policy. General John Jumper, Commander, Air Combat Command, was very clear in his assertion that, “The U.S. can never afford to depend on another nation [to recover our isolated personnel] ... Nobody can do what we can do.” General Jumper remarked that no other country has the people, equipment, or capability to recover isolated personnel, as does the U.S. One of the critical deficiencies General Jumper cited in support of his position was the necessity for the, “CSAR commander [to] have intimate knowledge of what the ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance] systems can bring to the fight.” Only U.S. CSAR commanders are provided this information and are taught how to apply it.

Brigadier General Dan Leaf, USAF, the Commander of the Fighter Wing at Aviano AB, Italy, who served as the core of the combat air forces for Operation Allied Force in 1999, concisely summarized the “‘Warfighters’ position on PR in a Coalition environment.” Based on his well-informed perspective of the operation, Gen. Leaf said,

PR including CSAR, should be a U.S.-only effort, even in coalition environments. PR is a pivotal mission that can have strategic impact on the war, far beyond its immediate tactical significance. PR is also an extremely challenging mission, requiring a high level of training, technology, and coordination. The U.S. should build a unilateral capability to conduct PR, and maintain autonomy over the CSAR mission, because the motivation and sense of urgency of Coalition forces is not aligned with U.S. expectations in these situations, and to become dependent on Coalition support would be to incur unacceptable risk. Conversely, the U.S. should recover Coalition isolated personnel, not just because the U.S. can do it with the least amount of risk, but also because it is the right thing to do. If the U.S. makes a sincere effort to recover a downed Coalition pilot, but fails in the attempt, the political backlash should be minimal, because the Coalition partners are aware that their own capabilities pale in comparison to U.S. capabilities, and the likelihood of them succeeding where the U.S. failed is nearly non-existent. In any respect, a failed attempt by the U.S. is certainly less damaging to Coalition cohesion than no attempt at all. Despite the need for a unilateral capability not reliant on Coalition forces, the U.S. should still avail itself of the

opportunity to leverage the capabilities of Coalition forces, when it presents itself. Italian forces demonstrated that they are ‘very special Coalition partners’ with capabilities that were complimentary to U.S. capabilities. Beyond such special cases, there is not much merit in developing Coalition CSARTFs. The mission is too complex and too dynamic for the amount of compromise that would be needed to build a Coalition package. There is simply too much risk in the concept for the benefits gained.

IDA has made specific recommendations to DPMO to implement this policy. These recommendations are described in the following section.

***Should it be DoD Policy to plan for coalition forces to conduct combat recovery of U.S. personnel?***

PROs:

- A policy of using coalition forces to recover U.S. isolated personnel builds coalition unity by demonstrating U.S. trust in its coalition partners, and by allowing coalition partners to demonstrate their commitment to the coalition.
- Combat recovery assets provided by coalition partners is value-added. They provide recovery capability to DoD persons in distress, a cost that would otherwise be borne by the U.S.

CONs:

- If a coalition country attempts to recover U.S. isolated personnel, and the mission fails, there is a strong possibility that there will be a political backlash from the American public, stemming from a perception that the U.S. “sat back and did nothing to rescue one of its own in harm’s way.”
- A policy supporting many or all coalition forces in a multi-lateral coalition to conduct combat recovery complicates operational planning and SOP by increasing the number of planning and operational variables in a combined operation.
- A policy supporting coalition forces to conduct combat recovery complicates HRC personnel training programs by substantially increasing the number of recovery forces, methods, and tactics that isolated personnel must be prepared to work with. Similarly, this policy complicates HRC personnel equipment programs and pre-mission evasion planning efforts for HRC individuals.
- Under a policy of planning for allied and coalition countries to provide combat recovery capability, the U.S. loses autonomy over most of the PR process. Specifically, the U.S. cannot direct the programs for organizing, training and equipping recovery forces and C2 elements of allied and coalition

countries. The U.S. also loses autonomy over PR operations, to include planning, command and control, and execution of combat recoveries.

IDA recommends that DPMO not implement this policy at this time. DPMO may consider incorporating this concept into Joint Vision 2020, and position itself to begin working this issue, circa 2010, if DPMO is successful in establishing and maturing a program to build theater-wide peacetime SAR networks (as described in the first issue) between 2000 and 2010. Based on the evidence IDA gathered during SME interviews, it is clear that America's allies' and coalition partners' PR forces are either non-existent or ill-prepared to perform combat recovery. Representative SME opinions are presented below:

The warfighters in the field need and want a "credible insurance policy" with regard to PR, and they know an "incredible" [too good to be true] PR capability when they see one. They perceive that the current capabilities of Allies and Coalition Partners would detract from the credibility if used as a part of the "PR umbrella" for DoD military operations. They perceive that the current lack of credibility damages morale, and subsequently adversely impacts the capability of combat forces.

Because the U.S. is the only country capable of conducting CSAR, the obvious conclusion is that the U.S. will recover Coalition personnel. In a Coalition, there are two perspectives: the recovery force; and the survivor. A successful PR mission is largely determined by the proficiency of the survivor, so Coalition HRC personnel need to be trained to operate with U.S. CSAR forces, which they are not.

The British are considered to be the most capable U.S. Ally, but OSW and ONW demonstrated that, although the British are "interested" in observing and learning about CSAR, they contribute little to the Coalition's CSAR capability.

In order to conduct CSAR in a Coalition environment, there must be an accepted "International standard procedure" (for initial contact, command and control, survivor procedures, etc.) and standard CSAR equipment, such as the survival radio. [Today, there is neither an international standard for CSAR procedures nor equipment.]

## **B. SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS**

IDA's specific recommendations to DPMO for improving PR in a coalition environment are categorized under the following channels for implementation:

- DoD Directive 2310.2, *PR*

- 2002 DoD PR Conference
- Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment.

## C. DOD DIRECTIVE 2310.2, PERSONNEL RECOVERY

### 1. IDA's Recommendations

IDA recommends that DPMO make additions and changes to DoD Directive 2310.2, *PR*, December 22, 2000. Additions and changes to the original text are shown in bold italics. The rationales for these recommendations follow in section C.2. below, and are indicated by bracketed numbers following the change or addition. IDA acknowledges that these recommendations will require significant coordination throughout the DoD. Many of these recommendations will also impact key processes such as Defense Planning Guidance.

#### 4. POLICY

It is DoD policy that:

4.1. Preserving the lives and well-being of U.S. military, DoD civilian and contract service employees placed in danger of being isolated, beleaguered, detained, captured or having to evade while participating in a U.S.-sponsored activity or mission is one of the highest priorities of the Department of Defense. The Department of Defense has a moral obligation to protect its personnel, prevent exploitation of its personnel by adversaries, and reduce the potential for captured personnel being used as leverage against the United States. ***The Department of Defense shall provide PR support across the spectrum of conflict from Major Theater Wars (MTW) to Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) such as Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) and counter-narcotics operations.*** [1]

4.2. The Department of Defense has primary responsibility for recovering U.S. personnel identified in subsection 4.1., above, who are deployed outside the United States and its territories.

4.3. When requested, and when directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, the Department of Defense shall provide PR support to other governments, agencies, and organizations, in accordance with all applicable laws, regulations, and memoranda of agreement or understanding. ***The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ASD(ISA)) shall seek Secretary of Defense direction in the early stages of an operation or contingency, and the direction shall be consistent***

*for the duration of the operation or contingency. [2] The Department of Defense shall provide PR support to allied personnel, participating in an Alliance-sponsored activity or mission, in accordance with the formal treaty, or alliance policy to which the U.S. is party. [3] The Department of Defense shall provide PR support to coalition personnel, participating in a coalition-sponsored activity or mission, for a coalition led by the U.S. [4]*

4.4. The Department of Defense shall support Civil Search and Rescue efforts on a strict not-to-interfere basis with primary military duties, roles, and missions in accordance with applicable national directives, plans, guidelines, policy, and agreements. *When, by international agreement, a sovereign nation has primary responsibility for recovering U.S. personnel identified in subsection 4.1., above, within its boundaries or territorial seas, the Department of Defense will support civil search and rescue or other appropriate PR operations of the host nation, in accordance with international law. [5]*

## 5. RESPONSIBILITIES

5.2. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, under the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, shall serve as the principal staff assistant and civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense and to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on PR. The ASD(ISA) has designated the Defense Prisoner of War (POW)/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) as his OPR for PR. DPMO, on behalf of ASD(ISA) shall:

5.2.2. Evaluate the policies, processes, and programs that affect the DoD ability to execute PR operations; recommend actions, as necessary, to enhance PR capabilities; and assist USJFCOM to perform its responsibilities in regard to PR, *including actions to develop Joint, multi-Service, and/or multi-Nation support for resources. [6]*

5.2.5. Represent the Department of Defense at all interagency *and international fora* [7] on PR matters.

5.2.11. *Consistent with his legal authority, promulgate DoD PR policy, and Joint PR doctrine and procedures to allies and coalition partners to improve standardization and interoperability of PR forces in multi-national operations. [8]*

5.2.12 *Consistent with his legal authority, coordinate with allies and coalition partners on their PR policies, processes, and programs to improve*

*standardization and interoperability of PR forces in multi-national operations. Initiate actions that shall enhance the commonality of materiel, doctrine, training, and TTP among allied/coalition PR forces.* [9]

5.2.13. *Consistent with his legal authority, assist allies and coalition partners in acquiring PR-related training to improve standardization and interoperability of PR forces in combined operations.* [10]

5.5. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics shall review all acquisition efforts impacting PR requirements and shall issue guidance necessary to:

5.5.6. *Ensure PR-related equipment and technology programs, when applicable, plan for use of their respective systems by allied and coalition forces.* [11]

5.6. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness shall ensure PR is an integral part of military training programs, *and shall issue necessary guidance to:*

5.6.1. *Ensure the DoD Components train personnel assigned PR duties on Combatant Command staffs, Component Command staffs, and the Joint Staff, on the planning, command, control, coordination, and execution of PR operations. The training shall include conduct of PR operations in Joint and Allied/Coalition environments, as appropriate.* [12]

5.6.2 *Ensure the DoD Components train personnel assigned to PR forces to execute PR missions in Joint and Allied/Coalition environments. The training shall include execution of PR missions in accordance with Joint and Allied/Coalition doctrine and TTP, as appropriate. The DoD Components shall maintain their PR forces at a high state of readiness during extended military operations through continuous training and exercises.* [13]

5.8. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence shall:

5.8.1. Provide oversight, guidance, and direction to ensure that the DoD Intelligence Community is coordinating and conducting planning and operations necessary to support PR, to include directing periodic PR intelligence steering group meetings, as appropriate. *That group shall address and resolve issues of releasability of PR-related intelligence to Allies and Coalition Partners participating with U.S. forces in multi-national operations.* [14]

5.8.4. In coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, ensure standardization and interoperability of C3I architectures for PR across the Combatant Commands and Services and, when applicable, compatibility with that of allied and coalition forces. [15]

5.8.5. Provide oversight, guidance, and direction for preparing C3I architectures and planning documents, such as C3I support plans, to ensure adequate support to PR. ***C3I architectures and planning documents shall support Joint and Combined PR operations in both U.S.-only and multi-national environments.*** [16]

5.11. The Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Commander, United States Special Operations Command, shall:

5.11.1. Ensure that PR capabilities (facilities, equipment, training, personnel, etc.) are developed, programmed, and budgeted to accommodate the PR requirements of the Services, the Combatant Commands, ***and the Allied Commands to which the U.S. contributes forces. Ensure that PR facilities and equipment are interoperable in Joint and Allied/Coalition environments. Ensure that personnel are trained to conduct PR operations in Joint and Allied/Coalition environments.*** [17]

5.11.11. ***Ensure that sufficient PR capabilities are available to the Services, the Combatant Commands, and the Allied Commands to which the U.S. contributes forces, from the commencement of military operations through the entire duration of military operations. Ensure that their PR forces maintain a high state of readiness during extended military operations through continuous training and exercises.*** [18]

5.13. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall:

5.13.4. ***Establish an office of primary responsibility for PR matters.*** [19]  
Designate a single point of entry to the Joint Staff for coordinating all PR matters on the Joint Staff. Notify DPMO, USJFCOM, and JPRA of the designation. ***Identify the CJCS action office(s) responsible for PR, CSAR, E&R, SERE, and CoC issues.*** [20]

5.13.6. ***Coordinate requirements for PR forces, facilities, equipment, personnel, and training from the Combatant Commands and the EA for PR.*** [21]

5.13.7. ***Identify budgetary, training, and personnel requirements to support the PR-related CJCS staff functions.*** [22]

5.14. The Commanders of the Combatant Commands are responsible for planning and executing PR operations within their area of responsibility and shall:

5.14.1. Establish and maintain an office of primary responsibility for PR operations, training, doctrine, support, **planning**, [23] and execution and notify DPMO, USJFCOM, and JPRA of the office designated. **Identify the Command action office(s) responsible for PR, CSAR, E&R, SERE, and CoC issues.** [24]

5.14.3. Include PR as an integral part of all operational planning and training. This shall include the full spectrum of recovery operations (including repatriation) and include training of recovery forces as well as those at high-risk-of-capture (e.g., aviators and special operations personnel). **Develop operational plans for PR support to Joint Task Forces (JTFs)/Combined Task Forces (CTFs). Ensure JTFs/CTFs have sufficient PR support from the commencement of military operations through the entire duration of military operations. Conduct integrated PR training exercises for all elements of the PR process: recovery assets, command and control, and high-risk-of-capture (HRC) personnel. Fully-integrated PR exercises should be conducted prior to commencement of military operations; should be conducted in Joint and/or Allied/Coalition environments, and should use Joint or Allied doctrine and procedures, when applicable. Fully-integrated PR exercises should be periodically conducted to maintain PR forces at a high state of readiness during extended military operations.** [25]

5.14.4. Identify requirements for and shortfalls in PR capabilities **to support Joint Task Forces (JTFs)/Combined Task Forces (CTFs).** [26]

5.14.5. Submit operational intelligence requirements for PR to the J-2, USJFCOM. **Identify intelligence releasability requirements and issues for PR-related information essential to multi-national operations in an Allied/Coalition environment.** [27]

5.14.8. Support requests for PR assistance from allied, coalition, and paramilitary forces, when directed by the National Command Authorities, **or in accordance with the formal treaty, or alliance policy to which the U.S. is party.** [28]

5.14.10. Develop theater admission requirements for DoD civilian and contractor service personnel as required. Include SERE training requirements for DoD civilians and contract personnel operating in-theater in accordance with the “risk-of-capture” environment in which they will work. **Include requirements for specialized personal equipment for PR, CSAR, E&R, and SERE. Requirements shall apply to Allied and Coalition HRC personnel supported by DoD PR capabilities.** [29]

5.14.14. ***Include PR as an integral part of the Command's Theater Engagement Plan (TEP). Include PR subject matter experts (SMEs) on Theater Engagement Teams.*** [30]

5.15. The Commander in Chief, United States Joint Forces Command, is the DoD Executive Agent for PR, less policy. JFCOM responsibilities include but are not limited to those prescribed in paragraphs 5.15.1. through 5.15.21., below. JFCOM has designated JPRA as the DoD OPR for DoD-wide PR matters responsible for executing his Executive Agent functions, and shall exercise Combatant Command authority over it. JFCOM shall:

5.15.8. Advocate PR requirements in the JROC process and monitor implementation. ***Advocate requirements for interoperability in Joint and Coalition environments.*** [31]

5.15.9. Promote interoperability of Services, ***Allies, Coalition Partners,*** and USSOCOM recovery capabilities by reviewing PR procedures and training and equipment standards. [32]

5.15.10. Identify, budgetary, ***training, experience,*** [33] and personnel requirements to support JPRA's PR functions.

5.15.12. Monitor joint and combined exercises and planning processes for integration of PR requirements into each, and, as requested, assist the Combatant Commands, Services, and USSOCOM in developing, managing, and planning PR scenarios. ***Develop joint and combined PR scenarios.*** [34]

5.15.14. In coordination with the Joint Staff, Services, Combatant Commands, and USSOCOM, assist in developing and coordinating joint PR doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures (***TTP, Concepts of Operations (CONOPS), Special Instructions (SPINS), PR*** [35] publications, and equipment requirements.

5.15.15. Publish and disseminate ***CSAR, E&R, SERE, and CoC*** [36] products to the DoD Components to assist in unit training and mission planning. ***Publish and disseminate CSAR, E&R, SERE, and CoC products to the Combatant Commands to assist in theater and component training and operations.*** [37]

## **2. IDA's Rationale for Additions and Changes to DoD Directive 2310.2**

1. This statement emphasizes that the DoD will provide PR support for ***all*** DoD operations. HQ SOUTHAF requested a policy that specifically requires the DoD to

assume “primary responsibility” and provide PR support to all DoD assets and personnel supporting counter-drug operations.

2. This sentence was added to this statement to emphasize the need for timely and consistent direction from U.S. authorities to enable DoD to be pro-active.

3. This statement was added to align the category of “allied personnel” with the PR policy of the NATO alliance, to which the U.S. is party. This statement allows the DoD the necessary flexibility to align its PR policy with all current and future formal alliances.

4. This sentence was added to clarify DoD’s role and responsibility in a coalition built, founded, or led by the United States. The current language of paragraph 4.3., along with rationale [2], allows the DoD the necessary flexibility to align its PR policy with any future coalition that the United States may join, but not lead.

5. This statement clarifies the DoD’s responsibilities for the special case of DoD personnel who are isolated within the sovereign territory of an allied, coalition, neutral, or otherwise “friendly” nation. It is the primary responsibility of the host nation to recover the isolated personnel. The provision for DoD to support recovery efforts IAW international law still permits the SAR Coordinator to execute the recovery in a life-or-death situation.

6. This added clause clarifies the authority of ASD(ISA) to seek support from all Services, Allies, and Coalition partners for PR resources.

7. This added clause expands the authority of ASD(ISA) to represent DoD at PR-related international events, such as NATO, IMO, and ICAO conferences.

8. This statement clarifies the authority of ASD(ISA) to implement a policy of standardization and interoperability among Allied and Coalition forces.

9. This statement clarifies the authority of ASD(ISA) to implement a policy of standardization and interoperability among Allied and Coalition forces, and to increase commonality between U.S. and foreign PR assets.

10. This statement clarifies the authority of ASD(ISA) to implement a policy of standardization and interoperability among Allied and Coalition forces by providing PR-related training and training materials oriented to PR in Allied and Coalition environments.

11. This statement clarifies the authority of USD(AT&L) to implement a policy of standardization and interoperability among Allied and Coalition forces through guidance directing PR-related acquisition and technology programs to address issues such as exportable versions, foreign military sales, and technology transfer.

12. This statement clarifies the authority of USD(P&R) to implement a policy of ensuring the readiness of PR capabilities by directing the Services to provide trained and qualified personnel to the appropriate command staffs. The Personnel Recovery Office of the current operations directorate of the Air Staff (HQ USAF/XOOP) requested a policy that specifically requires the Services to place *qualified and trained* personnel on the Theater Staffs to conduct planning and training.

13. This statement clarifies the authority of USD(P&R) to implement a policy of ensuring the readiness of PR capabilities to operate in Allied and Coalition environments. HQ NATO requested a policy that specifically requires all CSAR units that can be deployed to NATO operations to be able to conduct CSAR missions IAW NATO ATP 62, to the same proficiency standards as set by Service and Joint doctrine publications.

14. The DoD intelligence community is largely responsible for the issues of releasability of information to foreign military forces, and the problems that arise when conducting coalition warfare. This statement assigns the responsibility for resolving releasability issues to the DoD Intelligence Community.

- General Jumper, then Commander of ACC, said that we are often our own worst enemy in this regard by “over-classifying” critical information. He said that it was his experience in Europe (and throughout his career), that the U.S. intelligence community often classifies information solely because the “source/means of collecting” the information is classified. He said that the challenge is to, “Operationalize the information that is classified so that we [the warfighter] can use it at the operational level. [Our allies/coalition partners] don’t need to know the system, but need to know the effect.”<sup>3</sup>

15. Existing language clearly states the authority of ASD(C3I) to implement a policy of standardization and compatibility with Allied and Coalition forces through guidance directing C3I-related acquisition and technology programs to address issues such as interoperability, exportable versions, foreign military sales, and technology transfer.

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<sup>3</sup> IDA interview of General John Jumper, USAF, Commander of Air Combat Command, 30 May 2000.

16. This statement clarifies the authority of ASD(C3I) to implement a policy of standardization and interoperability of C3I systems for use in Allied and Coalition environments.

17. This statement clarifies the responsibility of the Services and USSOCOM to organize, train, and equip *sufficient* and *interoperable* PR forces to fulfill the requirements of the Combatant Commanders and Allied Commanders.

18. This statement addresses the deficiency in some theater operational plans for sufficient PR support during the first days of hostilities, when the requirement for PR support is expected to be the greatest.

19. This statement explicitly states the requirement for CJCS to establish a PR staff function.

20. This statement clarifies the responsibility of CJCS to provide staff expertise for the entire spectrum of PR.

21. This statement clarifies the breadth of the responsibility of the CJCS PR staff with respect to PR requirements.

22. This statement clarifies the authority of CJCS to identify requirements of its PR staff function.

23. This clause emphasizes the responsibility of the Combatant Commands for planning for PR operations.

24. This statement clarifies the responsibility of the Combatant Commands to provide staff expertise for the entire spectrum of PR.

25. This statement addresses the deficiency in some theater operational plans for sufficient PR support during the first days of hostilities, when the requirement for PR support is expected to be the greatest. This statement addresses the lack of full-up CSAR exercises for all in-theater forces with a PR role. HQ USAF/XOOP requested a policy of conducting training while CSAR forces are deployed to contingencies. XOOP cited the deployment of the 41 RQS to Mozambique as an example. The 41 RQS was deployed to ONW for 90 days, but volunteered to divert to Mozambique for an added two weeks to perform humanitarian support missions, in order to gain flying proficiency. This statement addresses the lack of joint and combined training exercises.

26. This clause clarifies the authority of the Combatant Commands to identify requirements for conducting Joint and Combined operations. If the Combatant Commands fail to identify the requirement, the necessary resources will not be provided.

27. This clause clarifies the authority of the Combatant Commands to identify classified information releasability issues. All of the Theater and Component staffs identified these issues as major obstacles to operations in a coalition environment.

28. This clause allows the Combatant Commands to support long-standing alliances on a continuing basis.

29. This statement delineates and clarifies the authority of the Combatant Commands to identify training and equipment requirements for all HRC personnel to be supported by DoD PR assets. For the NATO alliance, this aligns U.S. policy with NATO CSAR doctrine.

30. This statement emphasizes the responsibility of the Combatant Commands for including PR in the Theater Engagement Plan. The establishment and maintenance of a Theater-wide PR network will ultimately improve the combat recovery capability during conflicts in the Theater.

31. This clause clarifies the authority of JPRA to ensure Joint and Combined interoperability issues are addressed and resolved.

32. This clause clarifies the authority of JPRA to ensure Joint and Combined interoperability issues are addressed and resolved.

33. This clause clarifies the authority of JPRA to identify training and experience requirements for personnel assigned to JPRA.

34. This statement assigns the responsibility for developing scenarios that address training in joint and coalition environments to JPRA.

35. This clause assigns the responsibility for coordinating standard templates for CONOPS and SPINS to JPRA. All of the Theater and Component PR staffs have identified a need for standardization of these documents. Staff personnel stated that JPRA could fulfill the need for standard CONOPS and SPINS templates for the Theaters. Staff personnel stated that CONOPS and SPINS templates should be tailored for Coalition operations and releasable to Coalition partners.

36. This clause delineates the types of products included in the PR mission area to emphasize the responsibility of JPRA for the entire spectrum of PR.

37. This statement clarifies the responsibility of JPRA to provide support to the Combatant Commands as well as to the Services.

#### **D. 2002 DOD PR CONFERENCE**

IDA recommends DPMO present the following issues and proposals to the PR Community, during the appropriate workshops of the 2002 DoD PR Conference.

##### Workshops

- PR in a Coalition Environment
  - Propose a recommendation to proceed with the development of an unclassified CSAR “starter package” on CD-ROM for export to Coalition/Allied Countries. Consider what languages it should be translated into (Spanish, French, German, Arabic, Korean, etc.). The CD-ROM should also be usable as a training aid for U.S. SAR/CSAR forces operating in a Coalition environment. Include doctrine, CONOPS, Air Tasking Order/Integrated Tasking Order SPINS, and TTP for SAR, CSAR, and TRAP. Do not include E&R, NAR or UAR. Provide training packages for SAR/CSAR recovery forces, C2 elements, and SERE training for HRC personnel. Include doctrine and TTP from NATO ATP 62. Include ‘catalog’ of survival and evasion equipment, including covert and overt signaling devices, EPIRBs, PLBs, ELTs, and survival radios. Include C2 checklists, and mission/incident folders. Include the National SAR Supplement, and the IAMSAR Manual, volumes I, II, and III. Include Joint and Multi-Service pubs on standard terminology, brevity codes, and acronyms. The focus of this package should be on making U.S. and Allied/Coalition forces more interoperable when executing CSAR in a Coalition environment. OPR: JPRA/J7.
- Command and Staff Organizations
  - Propose an issue that the 1999 PR Re-Alignment Initiative is not being implemented in a timely manner by OJCS or the Combatant Commands. OJCS still does not have an office responsible for PR matters, and the Combatant Commands have not established legitimate offices at the Joint level. Their true capability still resides in the air components. OPRs: Director, Joint Staff; Combatant Commands.
- Personnel and Training
  - Propose an issue that the Air Force is not assigning appropriately trained and qualified personnel to Theater CSAR staffs. Recommend that the Air Force implement a policy that either improves promotability of personnel assigned to Theater CSAR staffs (JSRC, RCC); or, requires Theater CSAR

staff experience prior to assuming a leadership position within a CSAR organization (Squadron DO, CC; Wing CV, CC). HQ AF/XOOP suggested the U.S. should have a policy of placing qualified and trained personnel on the Theater Staffs to conduct planning and training. OPR: HQ AF/DP.

- Propose a recommendation to develop an in-theater training program designed to provide training oriented to PR in a coalition environment for U.S. and coalition personnel. The training program should require CSAR forces to be co-located for training and CSAR planning staffs co-located to conduct planning at the operational level. The training program should include integrated PR training exercises for all elements of the PR process: recovery assets, command and control, and high-risk-of-capture (HRC) personnel. Fully-integrated PR exercises should be conducted in Joint and/or Allied/Coalition environments, and should use Joint or Allied doctrine and procedures, when applicable. SIREN should be employed in all coalition environments to improve the combined forces' ability to apply foreign releasability rules to classified information. OPR: Director, Joint Staff.
- Propose an issue to HQ ACC that one two-week period of at least one Red Flag or Green Flag exercise per year should be a dedicated "CSAR Flag" exercise. Each mission should include an isolating event requiring immediate PR. The objective of the event is to integrate all of the forces into the CSAR mission, executing their respective CSAR roles. OPR: HQ ACC/XO.
- Doctrine and TTP
  - Propose a recommendation that JPRA could fulfill the need for standard CONOPS and SPINS templates for the Theaters. CONOPS and SPINS templates should be tailored for Coalition operations and releasable to Coalition partners. OPR: JPRA/J5.
  - Propose a recommendation that USCINCPAC Instruction 3130.4, cited below, be used as a template for revising U.S. Combatant Commander, JCS, and OSD PR Instructions/Directives..

USCINCPAC Instruction 3130.4, *PR in the U.S. Pacific Command* replaces USCINCPAC Instruction 3130.1J, *SAR in the U.S. Pacific Command*, and USCINCPAC Instruction 3305.2E, *Responsibilities for CSAR and E&R Operations*.

- USCINCPAC Instruction 3130.4 states, "PR operations...contribute to the theater engagement strategy when PR efforts involve coalition and civil SAR operations."

- USCINCPAC Instruction 3130.4 states, “PR operations are an integral part of military operations in peacetime and contingency operations, and many times extend across service and national lines. Successful PR operations require the establishment of a cooperative network of all available SAR resources and efforts.”
- Combatant Commander Pacific assigns the following responsibilities to the Combatant Commander Pacific-designated PR Executive Agents (EAs):
  - EAs will coordinate with host nation civil and military authorities, component commands, and HHQ, and other U.S. civilian and military organizations as required to execute duties as PR EAs.
  - EAs will coordinate negotiated international SAR agreements with U.S. Combatant Commander Pacific, DPMO, DOS, USCG, ASD(ISA), and other interested parties.
- USCINCPAC Instruction 3130.1J states that it is PACOM policy that, “USCINCPAC provides SAR assistance to U.S. and foreign civilian and military personnel and property in distress by using available forces and facilities within USCINCPAC’s AOR.”
- USCINCPAC Instruction 3130.1J states that it is a COMPACAF responsibility to, “remain abreast of international SAR developments affecting USPACOM. Coordinate SAR matters as necessary to enhance international SAR and keep USCINCPAC advised.”
- USCINCPAC Instruction 3305.2E states that, “when operating as a combined force commander, [it is a CJTF Commander responsibility to] coordinate CSAR/E&R plans to include allied/host countries’ involvement and responsibilities. Allied forces should provide representatives to the JSRC to coordinate the specifics of unique authentication procedures and evasion plans, as well as the availability of CSAR assets.”

## **E. JOINT WARFIGHTING CAPABILITIES ASSESSMENT**

IDA recommends DPMO augment its proposed Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) topic to include IDA’s assessment of PR in a coalition environment. JWCA topics are ‘high level’ issues, and the Joint Staff (OJCS/J8) is only able to address a limited number of topics, so IDA recommends DPMO submit only one, all-inclusive JWCA topic. DPMO should integrate IDA’s ten findings from Chapter III (paragraphs A through J) or from the executive summary (paragraphs 5.a through 5.j into its assessment of PR.

The Joint Staff has re-structured the JWCA to align categories for JWCA topics with the themes of Joint Vision 2020. JWCA topics go to the Joint Requirements

Oversight Council (JROC). The purpose of the JROC is to tie the acquisition and requirements process to the “Joint Warfighter.” The JROC serves as the link between the Services, the Combatant Commanders, and OSD on warfighting requirements. The JROC has two ways to address issues: 1) the requirements and acquisition process, and 2) the Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) process. JWCA topics are consolidated into the Chairman’s Program Assessment (CPA), which is forwarded to the Secretary of Defense as advice for Defense Planning Guidance (DPG).

An assessment of PR that includes an assessment of DoD’s ability to operate in a coalition environment will be of more value to the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense when they make decisions that impact the requirements and acquisition process.



## **APPENDIX A**

### **ACRONYMS**



## **APPENDIX A**

### **ACRONYMS**

ABCCC	Airborne Command, Control, and Communications
AC2ISRC	Aerospace Command & Control, Intelligence, Surveillance, & Reconnaissance Center
ACC	Air Combat Command
ACT	Aircrew Coordination Training
ACTD	Advanced Concept & Technology Demonstration
AEF	Air Expeditionary Force
AEW	Airborne Early Warning
AFB	Air Force Base
AFRES	Air Force Reserves
AFSOC	Air Force Special Operations Command
AFSOF	Air Force Special Operations Forces
AIRNORTH	Air Forces, Northern Region
AIRSOUTH	Air Forces, Southern Region
AMC	Airborne Mission Commander
ANG	Air National Guard
ANGB	Air National Guard Base
AOA	Analysis of Alternatives
AOB	Air Order of Battle
AOC	Air Operations Center
AOG	Air Operations Group
AOR	Area of Responsibility
AOS	Air Operations Squadron
ARCT	Air Refueling Control Time
ARL	Army Reconnaissance-Low
ARSOC	Army Special Operations Command
ASD	Assistant Secretary of Defense
ATAF	Allied Tactical Air Force
ATO	Air Tasking Order
ATO/ITO	Air Tasking Order/Integrated Tasking Order
ATP	Allied Tactical Publication
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System
AWFC	Air Warfare Center
BCAOC	Balkans Combined Air Operations Center

C2	Command and Control
C2ISR	Command and Control, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
C2TIG	Command and Control Training and Innovation Group
C2WS	Command and Control Warrior School
C3I	Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence
C4I	Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence
C4ISR	Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
CAF	Combat Air Forces
CAOC	Combined Air Operations Center
CAP	Combat Air Patrol
CAS	Close Air Support
CAX	Computer-Aided Exercise
CENTAF	Central Command Air Forces
CENTCOM	Central Command
CFACC	Combined Force Air Component Commander
CFC	Combined Force Commander
CG00	Cobra Gold 2000
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CJCS	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
COBRA	Collection Of Broadcasts from Remote Assets
CoC	Code of Conduct
COMACC	Commander, Air Combat Command
COMCENTAF	Commander, Central Command Air Forces
COMPACAF	Commander, Pacific Air Forces
COMSEC	Communications Security
COMSOUTHAF	Commander, Southern Command Air Forces
COMUSAFE	Commander, U.S. Air Forces Europe
CONOPS	Concepts of Operations
CONPLAN	Concept Plan
CONUS	Continental United States
COS	Chief of Staff
CPA	Chairman's Program Assessment
CPX	Command Post Exercise
CRCC	Combined Rescue Coordination Center
CSAR	Combat Search and Rescue
CSAREX	Combat Search and Rescue Exercise
CSARTF	Combat Search and Rescue Task Force
CSEL	Combat Survivor Evader Locator
CSRC	Combined Search and Rescue Center

CTAPS	Contingency Theater Automated Planning System
CTF	Combined Task Force
DA	Department of the Army
DAR	Designated Area for Recovery
DART	Downed Aircraft Recovery Team
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DO	Director of Operations
DOD	Department of Defense
DOS	Department of State
DOT	Department of Transportation
DPG	Defense Planning Guidance
DPMO	Defense POW and Missing Personnel Affairs Office
DSN	Defense Switched Network
DUSD	Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
DUSD(AS&C)	Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Advanced Systems & Concepts
E&E	Escape and Evasion
E&R	Evasion and Recovery
EA	Executive Agent
EAF	Expeditionary Air Forces
ESC	Electronic Systems Command
EFX	Expeditionary Force Experiment
ELT	Emergency Location Transmitter
EPA	Evasion Plan of Action
EPIRB	Emergency Position Indication Radio Beacon
EUCOM	European Command
FAC	Forward Air Control
FAO	Forward Air Operations
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
FLIR	Forward Looking Infrared
FS	Fighter Squadron
FTX	Field Training Exercise
FY	Fiscal Year
GOB	Ground Order of Battle
HD	High Demand
HHR	Hand Held Radio
HHQ	Higher Headquarters
HN	Host Nation
HQ	Headquarters

HRC	High Risk of Capture
IAMSAR	International Aviation and Maritime Search and Rescue
IAW	In Accordance With
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
ICSAR	International Civil Search and Rescue
ID	Identification
IDA	Institute for Defense Analyses
IDCAOC	Interim Deployable Combined Air Operations Center
I-FOR	Implementation Forces
IMO	International Maritime Organization
IO	Information Operations
IO/IW	Information Operations/Information Warfare
IP	Isolated Personnel
ISA	International Security Affairs
ISOPREP	Isolated Personnel Report
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
ITO	Integrated Tasking Order
IW	Information Warfare
JAC2C	Joint Air Command & Control Course
JCET	Joint-Combined Exchange Training
JCRA	Joint Combat Rescue Agency
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JCSAR	Joint Combat Search and Rescue
JEFX	Joint Expeditionary Force Experiment
JFACC	Joint Force Air Component Commander
JFC	Joint Force Commander
JFCOM	Joint Forces Command
JFSOCC	Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander
JIATF	Joint Inter-Agency Task Force
JIC	Joint Intelligence Center
JMETL	Joint Mission Essential Task List
JPRA	Joint Personnel Recovery Agency
JPO	Joint Program Office
JRCC	Joint Rescue Coordination Center
JROC	Joint Requirements Oversight Council
JS	Joint Staff
JSOTF	Joint Special Operations Task Force
JSRC	Joint Search and Rescue Center
JSTARS	Joint Surveillance, Tracking, and Reconnaissance System
JT&E	Joint Test and Evaluation
JTF	Joint Task Force
JWCA	Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment

KCRCC	Korean Combined Rescue Coordination Center
K-FOR	Kosovo Forces
KTO	Korean Theater of Operations
LD	Low Density
LD/HD	Low Density/High Demand
LNO	Liaison Officer
LOC	Location
LOC/ID	Location and Identification
LOS	Line-Of-Sight
LPD	Low Probability of Detection
LPE	Low Probability of Exploitation
LPI	Low Probability of Interception
MAJCOM	Major Command
MARLO	Marine Liaison Officer
MAS	Military Agency for Standardization
MC	Mission Commander
MCM	Multi-Command Manual
MDS	Mission Designator Series
MEDEVAC	Medical Evacuation
METL	Mission Essential Task List
MEU	Marine Expeditionary Unit
MEU(SOC)	Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)
MIJI	Meaconing, Intrusion, Jamming, and Interference
MOA	Memorandum of Agreement
MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MTT	Mobile Training Team
MTW	Major Theater War
NAR	Non-conventional Assisted Recovery
NAS	Naval Air Station
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVSPECWAR	Naval Special Warfare
NCA	National Command Authority
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
NCOIC	Non-Commissioned Officer-In-Charge
NEO	Noncombatant Evacuation Operation
NIC	National Intelligence Center
NOB	Naval Order of Battle
NRAS	Naval Reserve Air Station
NSA	National Security Agency

OAD	Operational Aviation Detachment
OAF	Operation Allied Force
OB	Order of Battle
ODS	Operation Desert Storm
OIC	Officer-In-Charge
OJCS	Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
ONW	Operation Northern Watch
OOTW	Operations Other Than War
OPCON	Operational Control
OPLAN	Operation Plan
OPR	Office of Primary Responsibility
OPSEC	Operational Security
OPSTEMPO	Operations Tempo
OSC	On-Scene Commander
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSW	Operation Southern Watch
OTH	Over The Horizon
PA	Public Affairs
PACAF	Pacific Air Forces
PACOM	Pacific Command
PCS	Permanent Change of Station
PDD	Presidential Decision Directive
PERSTEMPO	Personnel Tempo
PJ	Pararescue Jumper
PKO	Peace Keeping Operation
PLB	Personnel Locator Beacon
PLS	Personnel Location System
POC	Point of Contact
POW	Prisoner of War
PR	Personnel Recovery
PRAG	Personnel Recovery Advisory Group
PRCC	Personnel Recovery Coordination Center
PRMS	Personnel Recovery Mission Software
PRRC	Personnel Recovery Response Cell
PRTWG	Personnel Recovery Technology Working Group
RAAF	Royal Australian Air Force
RAF	Royal Air Force
RCC	Rescue Coordination Center
RECCE	Reconnaissance
RESCAP	Rescue Combat Air Patrol
RESCORT	Rescue Escort

RJ	Rivet Joint
RMC	Rescue Mission Commander
ROE	Rules of Engagement
ROK	Republic of Korea
RQG	Rescue Group
RQS	Rescue Squadron
RSAF	Royal Singapore Air Force
RTIC	Real-Time Information in the Cockpit
SAASM	Selective Availability/Anti-Spoofing Module
SAFE	Selected Area For Evasion
SAID	SAFE Area Intelligence Description
SAR	Search and Rescue
SAR	Synthetic Aperture Radar
SARDO	Search and Rescue Duty Officer
SARDOT	Search and Rescue Dot
SARIR	Search and Rescue Incident Report
SARLO	Search and Rescue Liaison Officer
SARNEG	Search and Rescue Numeric Encryption Grid
SARPO	Search and Rescue Planning Officer
SARREQ	Search and Rescue Request
SARSAT	Search and Rescue Satellite Aided Tracking
SARSIT	Search and Rescue Situation Report
SATCOM	Satellite Communications
SCANIC	Scandinavia & Iceland
SCI	Sensitive Compartmented Information
SCIF	Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility
SCSR	School for Combat Survival & Recovery
SE	Survivor-Evader
SEAD	Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SER	Survival, Evasion, and Recovery
SERE	Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape
SF	Special Forces
SFG	Special Forces Group
S-FOR	Stabilization Forces
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SIPRNET	Secure Internet Protocol Router Network
SIREN	Secure Information Releasability Environment
SMC	Search and Rescue Mission Coordinator
SME	Subject Matter Expert
SOAR	Special Operations Aviation Regiment
SOCCENT	Special Operations Command, Central Command
SOCEUR	Special Operations Command, Europe

SOCKOR	Special Operations Command, Korea
SOCOM	Special Operations Command
SOC PAC	Special Operations Command, Pacific
SOC SOUTH	Special Operations Command, Southern Command
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SOG	Special Operations Group
SOLE	Special Operations Liaison Element
SOP	Standing Operating Procedure
SOR	Statement of Requirements
SOS	Special Operations Squadron
SOUTHAF	Southern Command Air Forces
SOUTHCOM	Southern Command
SPECAT	Special Category
SPINS	Special Instructions
SPO	System Program Office
SRR	Search and Rescue Region
SSN	Social Security Number
ST	Special Tactics
SWA	Southwest Asia
TAC-EVAL	Tactical Evaluation
TACON	Tactical Control
TBMCS	Theater Battle Management-Core Systems
TDY	Temporary Duty
TEP	Theater Engagement Plan
TES	Test and Evaluation Squadron
TOA	Transfer of Authority
TOT	Time on Target
TRAP	Tactical Recovery of aircraft and Personnel
TS	Top Secret
TS/SCI	Top Secret/Special Compartmented Information
TTP	Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
U.S.	United States
UAR	Unconventional Assisted Recovery
UARM	Unconventional Assisted Recovery Mechanism
UART	Unconventional Assisted Recovery Team
UBS	UHF Base Station
UFL	Ulchi Focus Lens
UK	United Kingdom
UNC	United Nations Command
USA	U.S. Army
USASOC	U.S. Army Special Operations Command
USAF	U.S. Air Force

USAFE	U.S. Air Forces Europe
USCG	U.S. Coast Guard
USD	Under Secretary of Defense
USD(A&T)	Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology
USD(ISA)	Under Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
USD(P)	Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
USD(P&R)	Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
USFK	U.S. Forces Korea
USMC	U.S. Marine Corps
USN	U.S. Navy
USNR	U.S. Navy Reserves
USPACOM	U.S. Pacific Command
UW	Unconventional Warfare
WESTPAC	Western Pacific
WG	Wing
WS	Weapons School



## **APPENDIX B**

### **GLOSSARY**



## APPENDIX B

### GLOSSARY

**airborne mission commander** – The commander serves as an airborne extension of the executing component’s rescue coordination center (RCC) and coordinates the combat search and rescue (CSAR) effort between the combat search and rescue task force (CSARTF) and the RCC (or joint search and rescue center) by monitoring the status of all CSARTF elements, requesting additional assets when needed, and ensuring the recovery and supporting forces arrive at their designated areas to accomplish the CSAR mission. The airborne mission commander (AMC) may be designated by the component RCC or higher authority. The AMC appoints, as necessary, an on-scene commander. Also called AMC.

**alliance** – (DoD) An alliance is the result of formal agreements (i.e., treaties) between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members. See also **coalition; multinational.**

**assistance mechanism** – (DoD) Individuals, groups of individuals, or organizations, together with material and/or facilities in position, or that can be placed in position by appropriate US or multinational agencies, to accomplish or support evasion and recovery operations. See also **evasion; evasion and recovery; recovery; recovery operations.**

**assisted recovery** – (DoD) The return of an evader to friendly control as the result of assistance from an outside source. See also **evader.**

**coalition** – (DoD) An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. See also **alliance; multinational.**

**coalition action** – (DoD) Multinational action outside the bounds of established alliances, usually for single occasions or longer cooperation in a narrow sector of common interest. See also **alliance; coalition; multinational operations.**

**coalition force** – (DoD) A force composed of military elements of nations that have formed a temporary alliance for some specific purpose.

**combat search and rescue – (DoD)** A specific task performed by rescue forces to effect the recovery of distressed personnel during war or military operations other than war. Also called **CSAR**.

**combat search and rescue mission coordinator – (DoD)** The designated person or organization selected to direct and coordinate support for a specific combat search and rescue mission. Also called **CSAR mission coordinator**. See also **combat search and rescue; component search and rescue controller; search and rescue; search and rescue mission coordinator**.

**combat search and rescue task force –** All forces committed to a specific combat search and rescue operation to search for, locate, identify, and recover isolated personnel during wartime or contingency operations. This includes those elements assigned to provide command and control and protect the rescue vehicle from enemy air or ground attack. Also called **CSARTF**.

**combat survival – (DoD, NATO)** Those measures to be taken by Service personnel when involuntarily separated from friendly forces in combat, including procedures relating to individual survival, evasion, escape, and conduct after capture.

**combined operation –** An operation conducted by forces of two or more allied nations acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission.

**component search and rescue controller – (DoD)** The designated search and rescue representative of a component commander of a joint force who is responsible for coordinating and controlling that component's search and rescue forces. See also **combat search and rescue; combat search and rescue mission coordinator; search and rescue; search and rescue mission coordinator**.

**conventional recovery operation –** Evader recovery operations conducted by conventional forces.

**evader –** Any person isolated in hostile or unfriendly territory who eludes capture.

**evasion – (DoD)** The process whereby individuals who are isolated in hostile or unfriendly territory avoid capture with the goal of successfully returning to areas under friendly control. See also **evasion and recovery**.

**evasion aid – (DoD)** In evasion and recovery operations, any piece of information or equipment designed to assist an individual in evading capture. Evasion aids include, but are not limited to, blood chits, pointee-talkies, evasion charts, barter items, and

equipment designed to complement issued survival equipment. See also; **evasion; evasion and recovery; evasion chart; recovery; recovery operations.**

**evasion and escape – (DoD, NATO)** The procedures and operations whereby military personnel and other selected individuals are enabled to emerge from an enemy-held or hostile area to areas under friendly control.

**evasion and escape intelligence – (DoD)** Processed information prepared to assist personnel to escape if captured by the enemy or to evade capture if lost in enemy-dominated territory.

**evasion and escape net – (DoD)** The organization within enemy-held or hostile areas that operates to receive, move, and exfiltrate military personnel or selected individuals to friendly control. See also **unconventional warfare.**

**evasion and escape route – (DoD)** A course of travel, preplanned or not, that an escapee or evader uses in an attempt to depart enemy territory in order to return to friendly lines.

**evasion and recovery – (DoD)** The full spectrum of coordinated actions carried out by evaders, recovery forces, and operational recovery planners to effect the successful return of personnel isolated in hostile territory to friendly control. See also **evader; evasion; hostile; recovery force.**

**evasion chart – (DoD)** Special map or chart designed as an evasion aid. See also **evasion; evasion aid.**

**evasion plan of action – (DoD)** A course of action, developed before executing a combat mission, which is intended to improve a potential evader's chances of successful evasion and recovery by providing recovery forces with an additional source of information that can increase the predictability of the evader's actions and movement. Also called **EPA.** See also **evader; evasion; evasion and recovery; recovery force.**

**high-risk-of-capture personnel –** U.S. personnel whose position or assignment makes them particularly vulnerable to capture by hostile forces in combat, by terrorists, or by unfriendly governments.

**inland search and rescue region – (DoD)** The inland areas of continental United States, except waters under the jurisdiction of the United States. See also **search and rescue region.**

**isolated personnel – (DoD)** Military or civilian personnel that have become separated from their unit or organization in an environment requiring them to survive, evade, or escape while awaiting rescue or recovery. See also **combat search and rescue; search and rescue.**

**isolated personnel report – (DoD)** A DoD Form (DD 1833) that contains information designed to facilitate the identification and authentication of an evader by a recovery force. Also called **ISOPREP**. See also **evader; recovery force.**

**joint combat search and rescue operation – (DoD)** A combat search and rescue operation in support of a component's military operations that has exceeded the combat search and rescue capabilities of that component and requires the efforts of two or more components of the joint force. Normally, the operation is conducted by the joint force commander or a component commander that has been designated by joint force commander tasking. See also **combat search and rescue; search and rescue.**

**joint search and rescue center – (DoD)** A primary search and rescue facility suitably staffed by supervisory personnel and equipped for planning, coordinating, and executing joint search and rescue and combat search and rescue operations within the geographical area assigned to the joint force. The facility is operated jointly by personnel from two or more Service or functional components or it may have a multinational staff of personnel from two or more allied or coalition nations (multinational search and rescue center). The joint search and rescue center should be staffed equitably by trained personnel drawn from each joint force component, including U.S. Coast Guard participation where practical. Also called **JSRC**. See also **combat search and rescue; joint search and rescue center director; rescue coordination center; search and rescue.**

**joint search and rescue center director – (DoD)** The designated representative with overall responsibility for operation of the joint search and rescue center. See also **combat search and rescue; joint search and rescue center; search and rescue.**

**life support equipment – (DoD)** Equipment designed to sustain aircrew members and passengers throughout the flight environment, optimizing their mission effectiveness and affording a means of safe and reliable escape, descent, survival, and recovery in emergency situations.

**maritime search and rescue region – (DoD)** The waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States; the territories and possessions of the United States

(except Canal Zone and the inland area of Alaska) and designated areas of the high seas. See also **search and rescue region**.

**multination – (DoD)** Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more nations or coalition partners. See also **alliance; coalition**.

**multinational operations – (DoD)** A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, typically organized within the structure of a coalition or alliance. See also **alliance; coalition; coalition action**.

**on-scene commander** – The person designated to coordinate rescue efforts at the rescue site.

**overseas search and rescue region – (DoD)** Overseas unified command areas (or portions thereof not included within the inland region or the maritime region). See also **search and rescue region**.

**Pararescue team** – Specially trained personnel qualified to penetrate to the site of an incident by land or parachute, render medical aid, accomplish survival methods, and rescue survivors.

**personal locator beacon – (DoD, NATO)** An emergency radio locator beacon with a two-way speech facility carried by crewmembers, either on their person or in their survival equipment, and capable of providing homing signals to assist search and rescue operations.

**personnel recovery** – Personnel recovery is the umbrella term for operations focused on the task of recovering captured, missing, or isolated personnel from danger. It is the sum of military, civil, and political efforts to obtain the release or recovery of personnel from uncertain or hostile environments and denied areas whether they are captured, missing, or isolated. That includes U.S., allied, coalition, friendly military, or paramilitary, and others designated by the President or Secretary of Defense. Personnel recovery includes, but is not limited to, theater search and rescue (SAR); Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR); Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE); Evasion and Recovery (E&R); and the coordination of negotiated as well as forcible recovery options. Personnel recovery may occur through military action, action by non-governmental organizations, other U.S. Government-approved action, and diplomatic initiatives, or through any combination of those options (DoD Directive 2310.2). Though it could be construed as a form of personnel recovery hostage rescue or other “rescues” associated with terrorism or counter-terrorism do not come under the personnel recovery umbrella

overseen by DPMO. Additionally, personnel recovery is not the same as non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) though a personnel recovery incident could certainly occur during a NEO. ASD(SO/LIC) is responsible for counter-terrorism activities and NEO. DPMO is responsible for personnel recovery as defined above.

**precautionary search and rescue/combat search and rescue – (DoD)** The planning and prepositioning of aircraft, ships, or ground forces and facilities before an operation to provide search and rescue or combat search and rescue assistance if needed. The planning of precautionary search and rescue or combat search and rescue is usually done by plans personnel with search and rescue or combat search and rescue expertise and background on a J-3 (operations) staff, a joint search and rescue center, or a rescue coordination center. Also called **precautionary SAR/CSAR**. See also **combat search and rescue; joint combat search and rescue operation; search and rescue**.

**recovery – (DoD, NATO)** In evasion and recovery operations, the return of evaders to friendly control, either with or without assistance, as the result of planning, operations, and individual actions on the part of recovery planners, conventional/unconventional recovery forces, and/or the evaders themselves. See also **evader; evasion; evasion and recovery; recovery; recovery force**.

**recovery activation signal – (DoD)** In evasion and recovery operations, a pre-coordinated signal from an evader that indicates his presence in an area to a receiving or observing source that indicates "I am here, start the recovery planning." See also **evader; evasion; evasion and recovery; recovery operations**.

**recovery force – (DoD)** In evasion and recovery operations, an organization consisting of personnel and equipment with a mission of seeking out evaders, contacting them, and returning them to friendly control. See also **evader; evasion; evasion and recovery; recovery operations**.

**recovery operations – (DoD)** Operations conducted to search for, locate, identify, rescue, and return personnel, sensitive equipment, or items critical to national security.

**rescue combat air patrol – (DoD)** An aircraft patrol provided over a combat search and rescue objective area for the purpose of intercepting and destroying hostile aircraft. Its primary mission is to protect the search and rescue task forces during recovery operations. Also called **RESCAP**.

**rescue coordination center – (DoD)** A primary search and rescue facility suitably staffed by supervisory personnel and equipped for coordinating and controlling search and rescue and/or combat search and rescue operations. The facility is operated unilaterally by personnel of a single Service or component. For Navy component operations, this facility may be called a rescue coordination team. Also called **RCC (or RCT for Navy component)**. See also **combat search and rescue; joint search and rescue center; search and rescue**.

**rescue ship – (DoD, NATO)** In shipping control, a ship of a convoy stationed at the rear of a convoy column to rescue survivors.

**safe area – (DoD)** A designated area in hostile territory that offers the evader or escapee a reasonable chance of avoiding capture and of surviving until he can be evacuated. Also called **selected area for evasion**.

**SAFE area intelligence description – (DoD)** In evasion and recovery operations, an in-depth, all-source evasion study designed to assist the recovery of military personnel from a selected area for evasion under hostile conditions. Also called **SAID**. See also **evasion; evasion and recovery; recovery operations; Safe Area**.

**SANDY** – Callsign for a US Air Force pilot specially trained in search procedures, aircrew survival and authentication techniques, and helicopter support tactics.

**search and rescue – (DoD, NATO)** The use of aircraft, surface craft, submarines, specialized rescue teams, and equipment to search for and rescue personnel in distress on land or at sea. **(DoD)** Also called **SAR**. See also **combat search and rescue; combat search and rescue mission coordinator; component search and rescue controller; isolated personnel; joint combat search and rescue operation; joint search and rescue center; joint search and rescue center director; rescue coordination center; search and rescue mission coordinator**.

**search and rescue alert notice – (DoD)** An alerting message used for United States domestic flights. It corresponds to the declaration of the alert phase. Also called **ALNOT**. See also **search and rescue incident classification, subpart b**.

**search and rescue incident classification – (DoD)** Three emergency phases into which an incident may be classified or progress, according to the seriousness of the incident and its requirement for rescue service: a. Uncertainty phase – Doubt exists as to the safety of a craft or person because of knowledge of possible difficulties or because of lack of information concerning progress or position; b. Alert phase – Apprehension exists

for the safety of a craft or person because of definite information that serious difficulties exist that do not amount to a distress or because of a continued lack of information concerning progress or position; c. Distress phase – Immediate assistance is required by a craft or person because of being threatened by grave or imminent danger or because of continued lack of information concerning progress or position after procedures for the alert phase have been executed.

**search and rescue mission coordinator – (DoD)** The designated person or organization selected to direct and coordinate support for a specific search and rescue mission. Also called **SAR mission coordinator**. See also **combat search and rescue; combat search and rescuer mission coordinator; component search and rescue controller; search and rescue**.

**search and rescue region –** See **inland search and rescue region; maritime search and rescue region; overseas search and rescue region**.

**tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel –** A U.S. Marine Corps term describing a mission performed by an assigned and briefed aircrew for the specific purpose of the recovery of personnel, equipment, and/or aircraft when the tactical situation precludes search and rescue (SAR) assets from responding and when survivors and their location have been confirmed. Also called **TRAP**.

**unconventional assisted recovery – (DoD)** Evader recovery conducted by directed unconventional warfare forces, dedicated extraction teams, and/or unconventional assisted recovery mechanisms operated by guerrilla groups or other clandestine organizations to seek out, contact, authenticate, support, and return evaders to friendly control. See also **assisted recovery; evader; recovery**.

**unconventional assisted recovery mechanism – (DoD)** That entity, group of entities, or organizations within enemy-held or hostile areas, which operates to receive, support, move, and exfiltrate military personnel or selected individuals to friendly control. See also **assisted recovery; recovery; unconventional assisted recovery**.

**unconventional recovery operation – (DoD)** Evader recovery operations conducted by unconventional forces. See also **evader; recovery operations**.

**unconventional warfare – (DoD)** A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low

visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape. Also called **UW**.

**unconventional warfare forces – (DoD)** United States forces having an existing unconventional warfare capability consisting of Army Special Forces and such Navy, Air Force, and Marine units as are assigned for these operations.



**APPENDIX C**  
**CENTRAL COMMAND**





## **APPENDIX C**

### **CENTRAL COMMAND**

Central Command's (CENTCOM's) area of responsibility (AOR) includes 25 culturally and economically diverse nations located throughout the Horn of Africa, South and Central Asia, and Northern Red Sea regions, as well as the Arabian Peninsula and Iraq.

The entire Central Region is larger than the Continental U.S., stretching more than 3,100 miles east-to-west and 3,600 miles north-to-south. It includes mountain ranges with elevations over 24,000 feet, desert areas below sea level and temperatures ranging from below freezing to more than 130 degrees Fahrenheit. The Central Region is shown in figure 1.

Arabian Peninsula, Iraq and Northern Red Sea: CENTCOM's Northern Red Sea and Arabian Peninsula area consists of Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, and Yemen as well as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Strategic oil resources and waterways make the area of paramount importance. Our forward presence operations and an ambitious combined exercise program with the GCC members, Egypt, and Jordan help maintain stability. The primary challenge to that stability is the resurgence of military power in Iraq. The invasion of Kuwait was a clear example of Iraqi adventurism, and Saddam Hussein has been only reluctantly compliant after his crushing defeat. Moreover, Iraq

continues to pursue unconventional capabilities in chemical, biological, and nuclear technology.

Horn of Africa: The countries in or near the Horn of Africa area are Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, and Sudan. Off the coast is the island nation of Seychelles. The region borders the critical sea lines of communication through the Red Sea, via the Bab el Mandeb. Famine, drought, and disease ravage the region, and civil wars in most of these countries have exacerbated the problems. In the worst example, Somalia, anarchy and inter-clan fighting caused widespread starvation by 1992 and triggered both U.S. and UN intervention to alleviate the suffering.

Southern and Central Asia: CENTCOM's South Asian area includes Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan; all are important to the United States and face daunting challenges. The primary challenge to stability is the resurgence of military power in Iran. Iran's expansion in the political, military, and economic spheres is also of increased concern. Iran's more moderate leadership has not quelled its desire to rid the region of a U.S. presence and attain its goal of regional hegemony. Pakistan and Afghanistan's developing relationships with the Central Asian Republics to the north, along with Iran's military buildup to the west, add new dimensions, which could change the geopolitical outlook, further undermining stability. Of course, the Pakistani dispute with India over Kashmir threatens to flare up, and the continuing problems in Afghanistan and drug traffic originating from the "Golden Crescent" are also of great concern. Finally, the acquisition of ballistic missile and nuclear weapon technology by regional adversaries, including Iran, presents another long-term threat to stability. The key to countering these challenges is a strong, stable, and friendly Pakistan.

The addition of the five Central Asian States (CAS) has brought new challenges and opportunities to CENTCOM's area of responsibility. The Central Asian nations of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan remain relatively stable, and we have increased our contact programs with their military forces. Of the four, Kyrgyzstan has made the most progress in implementing democratic ideals. The civil war in Tajikistan is the single most violent case of unresolved conflict plaguing the region, but even there, progress toward peace and stability has been made. Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan possess a potential wealth of natural resources, and Caspian region energy (oil and gas) development has moved out of its early, formative stage and is poised for extensive development in the next several years. However, development decisions are taking place within an environment of differing agendas on the part of CAS and Caspian Sea oil producing states and intense competition from the

potential transit states. Because of the enormous energy riches at stake the potential for instability exists as countries settle questions of ownership and acceptable export routes.

Recent Developments: The preceding paragraphs described the CENTCOM region in general and the challenges and opportunities in the area prior to 11 September 2001. After that date, the regional situation was dramatically exacerbated as the War on Terrorism brought significant combat operations primarily to Afghanistan as well as to the region in general to pursue the perpetrators of the 9-11 disaster, in the persona in the persona of Osama Bin Laden and his followers, and the fractious governing group in Afghanistan, the Taliban, that had provided sanctuary and support for the terrorists and their activities. The counter terrorist operations included massive air strikes to bomb the terrorist strongholds throughout the region, unique and precise special forces operations to rally the forces in Afghanistan opposed to the Taliban, significant deployments of forces from each of the U.S. Services to operate under the command of Combatant Commander CENTCOM, similar deployments by many other nations with similar goals as the U.S., and extensive support activities. The major objectives of the mission have been achieved and operations continue to assist the newly restored government, to continue to pursue terrorists who have so far nor been apprehended, and to attempt to achieve peace in the region.

As related to the issue of PR in the CENTCOM AOR, there have already been examples of the importance of this capability in a variety of events. One early event in the war related to the rescue of two U.S. missionary women by helicopter and later to several events involving U.S. military personnel.

In conclusion, the Central Region has continued to grow in importance and is the overseas area where U.S. interests have most recently been directly threatened. The area has assumed global center stage as the War on Terrorism continues its primary military focus there. Concerns with Iraq and with the impact of the Middle East peace process continue to dominate the region as well. Maintaining stability in this volatile region is key to the free flow of oil and other commerce essential to the world economy. Through continued attention to the legitimate defense needs of our friends, and by maintaining appropriate military presence and access, we can promote regional security while protecting our own vital interests.



**Figure 1. Central Region**

## **A. ISSUES**

The listed issues and problems were ones presented and discussed at the majority of the team's meetings. In the paragraphs that set forth the specifics of each category of issue, these items are brought out as they pertain to the agency that identified the issue. It should be noted that several issues/problems of U.S. Joint Forces and U.S. individual services have a direct impact on the effectiveness of a Coalition Force when assigned.

### **1. Policy & Doctrine**

There are two main policy and doctrinal issues:

- Deficiencies in policy and doctrine
- Inability of forces to train for employment of doctrine

Key PR agencies cited examples of each of the issues.

The extent of the U.S. responsibility to recover coalition personnel is unclear. There is no written responsibility, yet coalition partners expect recovery by U.S. forces,

and prepare for it. All Services and Commands are taking a hard look at the various documents and manuals that relate to PR/CSAR activities. In many cases, such actions are long overdue, but it is a good sign the subject of PR/CSAR is getting needed attention at many levels of command. In this situation, the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) can play a major role in coordination, interoperability and standardization.

In July of 1999, a CENTCOM PR/CSAR Team was sent to Jordan to brief and discuss PR/CSAR activities with senior Jordanian Officers. The Team was quite amazed, at first by the interest demonstrated by the Jordanians, and second, by a near total lack of knowledge concerning the subjects of PR and CSAR.

The Australian Theater Headquarters Plans Division has Australian Special Air Service personnel assigned who were involved in providing personnel recovery support from Australia to the coalition forces involved in Operation Desert Fox, in the Middle East in 1997. They identified the Australian Defense Force's lack of policy to drive combat search and rescue requirements and survival/evasion training requirements as an issue that impacted their ability to operate effectively in that coalition environment.

## **2. Interoperability**

Key PR agencies identified interoperability/compatibility/standardization issues for:

- Operational concepts and procedures
- Systems and equipment.

CENTCOM pointed out that the issue of a U.S.-only Air Tasking Order (ATO) for stealth aircraft is no different than the issue of U.S. Army aircraft on a frag order, but not on the JFACC's ATO. Both situations resulted in coordination and integration shortfalls. However, there is still only one frag order, and all U.S. forces have access to it, so the analogy is not entirely accurate. But the analogy does support the argument that once the U.S. solves the joint problem, we will know how to solve the coalition problem. The same can be said for language/terminology differences, communication system interoperability, joint doctrine development, and joint training.

During Operation Desert Fox, in the Middle East in 1997, the Australian Special Air Service identified communication system interoperability as an issue. U.S. special tactics teams were attached to Australian Special Air Service teams to provide interoperable communications. The Australian Special Air Service units did not note any interoperability problems at the tactical level within the personnel recovery force

packages. Doctrine, tactics, and training levels were similar. Operation Desert Fox was “U.S.-centric.” Since neither Australia nor the UK had a combat search and rescue capability, the U.S. provided the rescue support for the entire operation.

### **3. Cultural and Language Barriers**

CENTCOM identified the following factors as key issues of PR in a coalition environment:

- Communication and language
- Cultural Differences.

Arabic linguists in the U.S. military and English linguists in Middle East armed forces are both uncommon. That, coupled with the unique language of personnel recovery terminology, presents a communications barrier that is difficult to overcome.

The Muslim culture makes it difficult for Arabic military personnel (all males) to work with women in the U.S. military. Also, Arabic officers have difficulty working with U.S. enlisted personnel. In the Middle East, the much of the manual labor work force is composed of immigrants from across Asia. Many are indentured servants, and do not enjoy the same civil rights as native Arabs. As a result, Arabic military personnel also have difficulties working with ethnic minority personnel in the U.S. military.

### **4. Training and Exercises**

Far and away the most common issue encountered during this study has been training. Nearly every representative, agency, and organization that IDA interviewed cited the lack of training, training deficiencies, or the need for more training as a problem for PR capability in all environments, including the coalition environment. There are three main training issues for CENTCOM:

- A lack of combined CSAR exercises for coalition forces to train together; small combined exercises that do not include all of the key assets and the critical interactions; a lack of CSAR assets in-theater to participate in combined exercises.
- Deficiencies in Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) training for high-risk-of-capture personnel within the DoD as well as allied and coalition countries.
- Differences in capabilities of coalition forces that cause interoperability problems when employed in combined operations. The incompatibility is a

result of a lack of or deficient training for PR forces from allied and coalition countries.

CENTCOM cited the following examples of key issues of PR in a coalition environment:

Central Command Air Force (CENTAF) identified the Bright Star Field Training Exercise (FTX) as the primary coalition exercise for CSAR training. The last exercise was held in Cairo, Egypt. Coalition participants included Egypt, Italy, Britain, and France. CSAR forces did not participate in Bright Star 2001 because of a conflict with Operation Desert Shift. The lack of Isolated Personnel Report (ISOPREP) training and use by coalition partners is of concern to the CENTAF Rescue Office and the Joint Task Force–Southwest Asia (JTF-SWA) Joint Search and Rescue Center (JSRC). The JTF-SWA JSRC also runs bimonthly CSAR exercises in-theater. The exercises are primarily U.S.-only, and typically include only the primary CSAR forces, such as HH-60s and A-10s. Secondary support and C2 elements do not always participate. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Britain are the Allied Nations routinely present in the JTF.

The Australian Theater Headquarters Plans Division has Australian Special Air Service personnel assigned who were involved in providing personnel recovery support from Australia to the coalition forces involved in Operation Desert Fox, in the Middle East in 1997. They identified training issues that they encountered:

- Over-reliance on technology. The Australians felt that U.S. special operations forces were too reliant on UHF satellite communications systems. When these systems failed or were unavailable, U.S. forces appeared uncomfortable with high frequency radio equipment. Because the Australians use this as their primary communication system, they felt more comfortable and proficient. U.S. special operations forces were also over-reliant on helicopter support for emergency extraction. The Australians noted that some evasion plans of action prepared by U.S. Forces did not plan for evasion all the way to friendly territory, but only to a point where a helicopter would be required to complete the recovery.
- Complexity of unconventional assisted recovery (UAR) concept. Almost every UAR exercise conducted in preparation for Desert Fox failed. Failures were attributed to communication problems, and difficulties in executing complex mission plans. Of the few exercises that did succeed, the Australians considered them to be over-rehearsed.

## **5. Releasability of Classified Information**

CENTCOM identified access to classified information as a key issue of PR in a coalition environment. The access issue works both ways. We do not have access to our coalition partners' classified information either.

CENTAF's most recent experience working with its Coalition partners came from Blue Flag 2000, in March, 2000 at Hurlburt Field, Florida. Ten foreign nations attended Blue Flag that year, and four countries provided JSRC personnel, which was less than the previous year. Of all the participating nations, Jordan demonstrated the most effort and interest in combined CSAR. Foreign personnel had little or no training, and acted primarily as observers. There was no value added to the operation by their presence. In addition, their presence dictated the use of security firewalls that became barriers to effective training for all participants. Security procedures required U.S. personnel to monitor coalition personnel when using "Coalition" C4I systems. This generated an environment of distrust of the U.S. among the coalition partners. CENTAF personnel pointed out "without establishing friendships and relationships, you cannot get beyond the mistrust."

During Operation Desert Fox, in the Middle East in 1997, Australian Special Air Service personnel identified releasability of classified information to coalition partners as an issue. It became necessary to use unofficial information channels to accomplish the mission, because foreign disclosure policies effectively blocked official channels. There were problems with even the best bilateral alliances. As more nations joined the coalition, the problem became bigger.

## **6. National Sovereignty**

In the CENTCOM AOR, coalition partners traditionally only conduct civil SAR within their own borders, which is their sovereign right as the Host Nation. If a U.S. pilot goes down in an Allied country, that Nation has the right to deny U.S. recovery forces access while it makes a recovery attempt. Nevertheless, the U.S. has a "primary responsibility" to recover U.S. personnel, according to DoD policy. It is in the best interest of the U.S. to assist coalition partners in developing a civil SAR capability, because the Host Nation has the authority to recover U.S. personnel, even though by DoD Directive, the U.S. is responsible for recovery of its own. CENTCOM has presently established no international SAR agreements with any country in the AOR. The JTF-SWA JSRC does, however, maintain informal personal relationships with the Host

Nation Rescue Coordination Centers (RCCs) within the AOR, to facilitate access for cooperative SAR efforts, should the need arise.

## **7. Rules of Engagement and Status of Forces**

The Director of the JTF-SWA JSRC noted that the JTF coalition partners do not participate in CSAR training, and that the U.S. forces cannot train the way they fight because of restrictive rules of engagement imposed by the Host Nations. CSAR forces cannot get clearance to fly in the air space, and cannot deploy to forward locations. The Director's number one issue is the lack of cooperation from the Host Nations.

## **8. Roles and Responsibilities**

The personnel recovery community uses a process to accomplish the PR mission. That process is broken down into roles and responsibilities. All of the roles and responsibilities must be assigned to, and accomplished by, some combination of units, agencies, and individuals. For successful accomplishment, these units, agencies, and individuals must be properly organized, trained, and equipped. Within CENTCOM, there are two main issues with roles and responsibilities:


- An improper division of responsibilities within theaters of operations; a mal-assignment of PR responsibilities to allies and coalition partners.
- The lack of resources and technology in most countries to develop a PR system capable of meeting the PR responsibilities for an alliance or coalition; the lack of a dedicated CSAR force for coalition forces.

Key CENTCOM PR agencies cited examples of each of the issues.

Currently, SAR/CSAR support to a coalition is not identified as an element of Combatant Commander CENTCOM's theater engagement plan. But such an element would be politically attractive. Figure 2 illustrates personnel recovery command and control within CENTCOM.

CENTCOM is opposed to using coalition forces to recover U.S. isolated personnel because there was too much risk of failure, given the limited capabilities of the partners within the SWA coalition. A theater planner's typical approach to conducting PR in a coalition environment is to divide up the theater geographically and assign a zone to each coalition partner. Their theory is that there is no military necessity for coalition PR capability. Use of coalition PR forces in an operation is merely a political arrangement. This is "Isolation vs. Integration." The problem with this approach is the

issue of different threat levels within a geographic zone. There are likely to be areas within a country's zone where the threat level exceeds its capability to conduct PR. U.S. planners attempt to develop zones with a low likelihood for isolating events to assign coalition partners to, as a means of risk management.



**Figure 2. Personnel Recovery Command and Control (CENTCOM)**

CENTAF CSAR and SERE subject matter experts felt that using coalition CSAR forces to recover downed U.S. personnel added risk to the mission. SERE specialists train HRC personnel to allow the CSAR forces to lead the recovery effort and do most of the work. If a survivor lacks faith in the CSAR forces (through perception or demonstrated facts), he attempts to improvise procedures in order to compensate for the CSAR forces' problems. This improvisation could result in a miscue, miscommunication, and/or mission failure.

## **B. PROGRAMS AND RESULTS**

Two staff members from HQ 3<sup>rd</sup> Army, Ft. McPherson GA, presented a briefing on the Army's PR program. 3<sup>rd</sup> Army is the Land Component for CENTCOM, also called ARCENT. They briefed the status of 3<sup>rd</sup> Army's efforts to establish a component CSAR/PR office, create an Army RCC, and train officer and enlisted RCC controllers. 3<sup>rd</sup> Army now maintains and staffs a standing RCC in-theater, which did not exist in 1999. This is a first, and currently, only, in the history of the U.S. Army. 8<sup>th</sup> Army, the equivalent command in Korea, does not have a similar program (yet). 3<sup>rd</sup> Army has had a lot of success in establishing the C4I function of the PR/CSAR mission area, but, as mentioned above, their biggest issue is getting SERE training for all Army personnel in-theater.



**APPENDIX D**  
**SOUTHERN COMMAND**





## **APPENDIX D**

### **SOUTHERN COMMAND**

The United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) is the unified command responsible for all U.S. military activities on the land mass of Latin America south of Mexico; the waters adjacent to Central and South America; the Caribbean Sea, with its 13 island nations, and European and U.S. territories; the Gulf of Mexico; and a portion of the Atlantic Ocean. The Southern Region is depicted in figure 1. Since September 26, 1997, the command headquarters has been located at Miami, Florida. It is one of nine unified commands (five of which are regional or geographic unified commands) under the U.S. Department of Defense.

SOUTHCOM's area of responsibility (AOR) encompasses 32 countries (19 in Central and South America and 13 in the Caribbean) and covers about 15.6 million square miles. The region represents about one-sixth of the land mass of the world assigned to regional unified commands.




Figure 1. Southern Region

## A. ISSUES

The listed issues and problems were ones presented and discussed at the majority of the team's meetings. In the paragraphs that set forth the specifics of each category of issue, these items are brought out as they pertain to the agency that identified the issue. It should be noted that several issues/problems of U.S. Joint Forces and U.S. individual services have a direct impact on the effectiveness of a coalition force when assigned.

The SOUTHCOM Joint Search and Rescue Center (JSRC) Director stated that the coalition PR issues identified by IDA's brief on PR in a coalition environment closely parallel SOUTHCOM's inter-agency PR issues. Specifically:

- Personnel recovery in SOUTHCOM is a conventional mission, executed with conventional assets.
- The DoD is supported by many other U.S. government agencies, and those agencies depend on DoD for PR support. SOUTHCOM must consider that in its PR planning.
- U.S. government agencies have specific capabilities that can be integrated into DoD PR packages.
- Training is even more important in an inter-agency/joint environment.
- SOUTHCOM is dependent entirely on Host Nation PR capability for a timely response to an isolating incident. Inter-agency capability is not an operational planning factor, but may be a political factor.
- Information sharing is an education issue.

SOUTHCOM anticipates using the results of this study to resolve both coalition PR and inter-agency PR issues within the region. Because of the number of other government agencies operating within the SOUTHCOM AOR, and the relative numbers of DoD vs. non-DoD Americans, SOUTHCOM is in need of a "code of behavior" for American civilians more than the other theaters.

Regarding the current status of HRC personnel in the AOR, Special Operations Command, Southern Command (SOCSOUTH) has 50+ missions operating in 15 countries with 400+ personnel deployed to the AOR on any given day. Army Special Operations Command has a similar number of ground personnel deployed in the AOR, as well. The highest risk operation is at La Grandia, Columbia, which can only be resupplied by air. All U.S. resupply aircraft are required to be equipped with chaff and flares to defend against enemy ground forces. SOCSOUTH reported that many aircraft operating at that base come under enemy ground fire.

The SOUTHCOM PR representative, SOUTHCOM/J331, identified the Theater's most critical needs:

- SOUTHCOM needs a dedicated Air Component Commander. Currently, SOUTHAF/CC is the third hat worn by the 12AF/CC, and the perception at HQ SOUTHCOM is that SOUTHAF receives the least attention of the three responsibilities.
- SOUTHCOM needs emphasis placed on Personnel Recovery equal to that placed on Safety and Force Protection.
- SOUTHCOM's most critical technical challenge is "searching" for survivors. SOUTHCOM needs a solution to the location/ID problem.

In consideration of IDA's evaluation of the PR situations of the other Combatant Commander's Commands (EUCOM, PACOM, CENTCOM and SOCOM), there can be no question that the greatest threat for individuals and groups who are "High Risk" candidates for being in harm's way is in SOUTHCOM. Also, no one can argue that SOUTHCOM has the least resources for PR and that its AOR is, in every respect, extremely complex.

## **1. Doctrine**

There are two main doctrinal issues within SOUTHCOM:

- Deficiencies in doctrine
- Inability of forces to train for employment of doctrine.

Key SOUTHCOM PR agencies cited examples of each of the issues.

AFSOC representatives stated that the ideal recovery objective is the "golden hour." The SOCSOUTH representative replied that recovery in one hour was "too hard to do." SOCSOUTH does not have the capability to respond that quickly.

The Army Reconnaissance-Low (ARL) crash in Columbia in 1999 pointed out the need for up-to-date and accurate Isolated Personnel Reports (ISOPREPs), which was not the case in this incident and made identification very difficult. It was noted that ISOPREPs should be kept up to date on all individuals who could possibly be in harm's way. Also, discussions centered on the availability and currency of Special Instructions (SPINS) and Concepts of Operations (CONOPS). The SPINS were non-existent and the CONOPS were out of date. SOUTHCOM would like the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) to produce standard SPINS and CONOPS that could be supplemented to fit the theaters' specific needs.

## **2. Tactics**

SOUTHAF identified the primary tactical issue as a deficiency of tactics for the forces that support SOUTHCOM. The 305 RQS representative pointed out the difference between Air Force Special Operations Forces (AFSOF) and Combat Air Forces (CAF) Rescue Forces was not the equipment or the procedures, it was the training and the CONOPS. CAF Rescue Forces train to integrate into the “Big Blue Air Force.” “CAF Rescue pilots talk like fighter pilots, while Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) pilots talk like helicopter pilots.” Until AFSOC pilots learn to integrate into conventional air operations, they will be unable to perform CSAR during an air campaign. They will only be able to perform a deliberate PR mission in a time and battlespace deconflicted for all other operations.

## **3. Cultural and Language Barriers**

The SOUTHCOM Staff made a comparison of the countries in their AOR with those in the CENTCOM AOR. With the exception of Brazil, there is a common language spoken by all countries with many common inherent cultural similarities. The AOR is unlike CENTCOM, wherein there are many different languages, ethnic variations, religions and cultural origins. However, like CENTCOM’s AOR, the rivalry between countries and within countries causes serious problems of unrest, often resulting in fighting breaking out between and within the countries. It makes for a volatile situation with democratic governments often being very fragile. Of importance to SOUTHCOM is the difficulty of moving about within the countries and attempting to capitalize upon possible training and other engagement opportunities for bilateral or multi-lateral military activities. Because Spanish is a common second language in the U.S., SOUTHCOM traditionally has more qualified linguists than other Combatant Commands. One language-qualified CSAR airborne mission coordinator (AMC) was accustomed to foreign personnel from Central and South America reverting to speaking Spanish under stressful situations, such as an isolation incident.

## **4. Training and Exercises**

The most common issue encountered during this study has been training. Nearly every representative, agency, and organization that IDA interviewed cited the lack of training, training deficiencies, or the need for more training as a problem for PR capability in all environments, including the coalition environment. There are three main training issues within SOUTHCOM:

- A lack of combined CSAR exercises for coalition forces to train together; small combined exercises that do not include all of the key assets and the critical interactions; a lack of CSAR assets in-theater to participate in combined exercises.
- Deficiencies in Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) training for high-risk-of-capture personnel within the DoD as well as allied and coalition countries.
- Differences in capabilities of coalition forces that cause interoperability problems when employed in combined operations. The incompatibility is a result of a lack of or deficient training for PR forces from allied and coalition countries.

Key SOUTHCOM PR agencies cited examples of each of the issues.

As a result of the ARL crash, SOUTHCOM strongly advocated SERE training for both military and civilians who can possibly be in harm's way. In the SOUTHCOM AOR, there is the constant threat of terrorist acts, guerrilla attacks, and conflicts between countries, none of which can be accurately predicted. The numerous contract civilians spread throughout the SOUTHCOM AOR further exacerbate the problem in this environment. There is currently no means of training HRC civilians for survival, evasion, and capture. SOUTHCOM's concept for establishing SERE/Code of Conduct (CoC) training requirements is based on stating the training standard in the Foreign Clearance Guide, and making the training a requirement for obtaining a country clearance for high-risk-of-capture (HRC) personnel coming into the Theater. This concept allows training to be tailored to the specific country of deployment.

The SOUTHAF RCC used to host a quarterly exercise, "Team Rescue," when the Rescue Coordination Center (RCC) was located in Panama. The exercise was Joint and Inter-Agency, but not Combined. No coalition partners were involved. Team Rescue was a Field Training Exercise (FTX), with live SAR and CSAR events, involving survivors, recovery forces, airborne C4I assets, and C2 functions. Since the RCCs move to Key West, the exercises have been discontinued. The SOUTHAF RCC (also the SOUTHCOM JSRC) now tasks SOUTHAF personnel to deploy to Coalition RCCs, usually set up in U.S. Embassies, during crises. Recent examples include: Columbia, Paraguay, Peru, and Bolivia. RCC personnel conduct no training or planning for executing these missions. They are expected to use the expertise that they bring from their previous duties. In recent history, only one person with previous RCC experience has been assigned to the RCC. Conduct of PR within the theater also has a huge

dependency on diplomatic channels and resources, such as communications infrastructure and personal points of contact.

In 2001, HQ SOCSOUTH was planning to conduct one PR exercise for that year at Hurlburt Field, Florida. The exercise would incorporate RCCs at the SOUTHCOM JSRC, HQ SOUTHCOM, and HQ SOCSOUTH. The exercise scenario would use civilian contractors as isolated personnel to enhance the inter-agency aspect of the mission. This exercise would be done using a “crawl-walk” method, where mistakes would be detected and corrected as the exercise unfolded. The SCJ331 representative expressed concern that if the exercise were nothing more than a communications drill, and an execution phase offset in CONUS, then they are not actually exercising their PR capability in the theater. Another issue was the responsibility to explain the State Department’s role and the DoD’s role in the process if SOUTHCOM intended for the State Department to concur and participate.

A member of JPRA’s SOUTHCOM Theater Support Team debriefed the PR Council on Exercise Unified Endeavor, a JCS-sponsored Command Post Exercise (CPX) focused on the Southern AOR. JPRA support for the exercise consisted of a 7-man team, performing white cell and blue (role-playing) force functions. This was SOUTHCOM’s main JCS exercise for the year. Participants included elements up to the Joint Task Force (JTF) level. The USAF, USN, and USMC components participated in PR training events. The USAF RCC was dual-hatted as the JSRC, and deployed to HQ SOUTHAF to operate from the JAOC, under the JFACC. JPRA debriefed the following exercise issues:

- JFCOM used computer simulators for the exercise. The most obvious deficiency was that, in a CSAR task force, there was no standard system by which to completely execute the mission. As an example, the Navy couldn’t talk to Air Force via the simulation. Scripted exercise events didn’t necessarily work, because they did not match the Air Tasking Order (ATO). Only five PR events were scripted. The rest of the PR events were computer generated.
- At the planning “rock drill” prior to the exercise, the CSAR piece of the exercise was mentioned by the special operations component, but no other component ever briefed anything about it.
- During the crisis action planning phase of the exercise, JPRA assisted the SOUTHAF PR representative in developing the PR CONOPS, SPINS, and OPOD. However, none of the documents flowed up from SOUTHAF to the

JSRC or to the JTF. On the first day of execution, the ATO contained CSAR SPINS for Korea.

- JPRA assessed the exercise planning effort as “marginal,” which resulted in very poor execution during the first day of the exercise. By the end of the exercise, quality of execution had recovered to an acceptable level. As an example, the Army lost two soldiers, who were captured, became POWs, and were shown on CNN. When asked by the JTF staff what was being done to correct the situation, the Army representative responded that they were requesting that replacements for the soldiers be sent to the losing units. That was the wrong answer, and the JFC corrected the individual immediately. The JFC informed all of his components that they would undertake a PR effort for all lost personnel.
- CSAR became the high point of the exercise. At the daily briefings, the JFC requested that all briefing slides be modeled after the JSRC slides.
- JSRC personnel performed well, particularly the enlisted controllers at the Davis-Monthan AFB Air Operations Center (AOC).
- There was a great deal of miscommunication, as previously mentioned, due to three differing information management systems being used by the Service components with minimal connectivity between them. There were also chat room areas within programs that were mislabeled, causing further communication difficulties within the components.
- With the exception of one ad hoc international civil SAR event resulting from collateral damage to a civilian target (a misidentified ship), there was no coalition play in this exercise.

The 6<sup>th</sup> Special Operations Squadron (6 SOS) is the main conduit of information on host nation PR capabilities to SOUTHCOM. 6 SOS reports that most host nation PR capability “begins degrading the day after we leave,” from a combined training deployment. It is common for 6 SOS personnel to return to a host nation after 6 to 12 months and have to start over at the beginning with PR training.

## **5. Releasability of Classified Information**


SOUTHCOM evasion plans of action, primarily those produced by U.S. Army Special Operations Command and U.S. Army South, are classified SECRET NOFORN. This limits host nation involvement in PR efforts for those HRC personnel.

## 6. Command and Control

In 2000, the SOUTHAF JSRC, located at Key West, Florida was a two-person organization with an around-the-clock mission. This arrangement seriously degraded the organization's ability to perform its primary mission, let alone conduct any training, planning, or secondary missions. The JSRC's real-world mission prevented JSRC personnel from going TDY to required training courses and training exercises. During a discussion of CSEL, and its impact on PR in a coalition environment in the SOUTHCOM Theater, JSRC personnel noted the following issues:

- SAR/CSAR command and control elements and forces must be prepared for multiple scenarios, each using different systems and processes. This increases the complexity and thus the cost of preparedness.
- The approach to integrating coalition PR forces remains one of Isolation vs. Integration, similar to other theaters.
- No classified communication channels exist in-theater among coalition partners to support command and control.
- No CSAR SPINS are included in SOUTHCOM ATOs because of the issue of releasability of classified information. SOUTHCOM ATOs are entirely unclassified. SOUTHCOM has not developed unclassified CSAR SPINS.
- The JSRC has no tactical communications equipment. It depends entirely on the Joint Inter-Agency Task Force (JIATF), located in the same building on NAS Key West, for tactical communications and technical support within the theater during contingency operations. The JIATF mission is counter-narcotics operations. The JSRC cannot deploy without the JIATF, and is rendered ineffective if the JIATF deploys.

Figure 1 shows the SOUTHCOM JSRC's chain of command.



**Figure 1. SOUTHCOM JSRC Chain of Command**

## 7. Systems and Equipment

There are three main systems and equipment issues:

- A lack of communications equipment; an inability of defense acquisition systems to keep pace with emerging information technology; and a reliance on old systems, using outdated technology, and requiring obsolete components for maintenance.
- Poor interoperability of communications systems among nations; an inability of alliances to standardize communications; and policies restricting technology transfer that prevent allies and coalition partners from developing common communications systems.
- A lack of combat-capable recovery assets; the lack of resources available for acquisition of CSAR-capable platforms; and the cost of developing a credible capability for current threats.

SOUTHCOM PR agencies cited examples of the issues.

There is a distinct difference in coalition SAR capability between South America and Central America. For example, all countries in South America but one (Ecuador) have Search and Rescue Satellite-Aided Tracking (SARSAT) capability, but not one country in Central America has SARSAT capability.

Every country in South America has an RCC. There is only one RCC in all of Central America, located in Honduras, which is, in theory, “responsible” for the region.

However, RCC Honduras owns no dedicated SAR assets or resources, and therefore, has no reliable capability.

The SOUTHCOM JSRC Director briefed on improving communications. The Theater has established an Imminent Threat Warning capability, with all players on one frequency monitoring the same net for quick reaction to any threat event. The down side of this is that not all players have access to satellite communications. So, in order to pass imminent threat information to those assets, the theater uses clear HF communications and a threat matrix with encoded digraphs for each airfield. The threat matrix was expected to go into effect in June 2001. There were concerns from SOCSOUTH that threat warning information would prompt SOCSOUTH air assets to retrograde or abort missions due to perceived threats, which would otherwise not be showstoppers for their missions. The JSRC Director explained that the purpose of threat warning is to more effectively disseminate imminent threat information to assets that would not normally have access to it. Examples of these are the CORONET OAK missions flying from Puerto Rico to Central and South America.

## **8. National Sovereignty**

Key SOUTHCOM PR staff members briefed in detail the crash of the U.S. Army aircraft (Army Reconnaissance Low, or ARL) in Columbia in 1999. This incident directly pertains to PR in a coalition environment, as it was fraught with many local, national, and international political problems. The U.S. Embassy and our ambassador were directly and continuously involved, as were host nation political leaders, the Colombian Army and Air Force, USAF, and U.S. Army personnel. Effectively, the U.S. and its coalition partner (Columbia) executed two simultaneous, and competing, PR operations to recover survivors and remains from the crashed Army DeHavilland DH-7 Twin Otter. International efforts were made to minimize the sharing of incident and mission information by each competing operation. Even after the recovery of the bodies it was difficult to secure their release for shipment to the U.S. Of importance to the U.S. was the recovery and identification of not only the crew's remains, but also the recovery and destruction of sensitive equipment aboard the ARL.

In 2001, HQ SOCSOUTH was planning to conduct one PR exercise for that year. SOCSOUTH acknowledged that the host nation would have the lead, with U.S. forces acting in an assistance role for any PR mission in the AOR, once assistance was requested by the host nation. This request was to be communicated to U.S. participants by SOCSOUTH via the SIPRNET.

## 9. Roles and Responsibilities

The personnel recovery community uses a process to accomplish the PR mission. That process is broken down into roles and responsibilities. All of the roles and responsibilities must be assigned to, and accomplished by, some combination of units, agencies, and individuals. For successful accomplishment, these units, agencies, and individuals must be properly organized, trained, and equipped. There are three main issues with roles and responsibilities:

- An improper division of responsibilities within theaters of operations; a mal-assignment of PR responsibilities to allies and coalition partners.
- Deficiencies in HQ staff structure to meet the responsibilities for PR planning, training, and C2; shortfalls in theater staff proponentcy, advocacy, and expertise for CSAR.
- The lack of resources and technology in most countries to develop a PR system capable of meeting the PR responsibilities for an alliance or coalition; the lack of a dedicated CSAR Force for Coalition Forces.

SOUTHCOM PR agencies cited examples of each of the issues.

SOUTHCOM is seeking to stand-up a multi-person PR cell within HQ SOUTHCOM/J3 around the inbound JPRA representative. JPRA does not yet have a liaison officer (LNO) stationed at HQ SOUTHCOM. SOUTHCOM's representative from JPRA is located at HQ JPRA at Ft. Belvoir Virginia. SOUTHCOM proposed elevating the PR cell from J331 to J33. Without the JPRA representative to act as the "center of mass," SOUTHCOM cannot dedicate the manpower to PR needed to sustain continuity and day-to-day advocacy for the mission area. HQ SOUTHCOM does not have an individual assigned as a primary duty to PR. Currently, one J3 staff officer has PR as an additional duty. However, HQ SOUTHAF has an assigned Officer with the primary duty of CSAR/PR.

The SOUTHCOM executive agent for PR and CSAR is at HQ SOUTHAF (12<sup>th</sup> AF), Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona. HQ SOUTHCOM does not support PR management, direction, or planning at the joint level. This is delegated to the SOUTHAF Component. However, actions taken by the SOUTHAF Component are not enforceable upon the other Components. The PR Executive Agent for the Theater needs an office on the Combatant Commander's staff, at the joint level, because the AF Component cannot give direction to the other Components. Between the JCS and the Theater Combatant Commander Staffs, the SMEs agreed that the priority should be to develop more robust Theater PR staffs to support the Combatant Commanders, rather than a JCS PR staff.

HQ 12 AF is interested in a “Rescue 911” deployable package, that sits alert in the CONUS, and can immediately deploy to anywhere in the SOUTHCOM theater when called to support a recovery operation. They expressed an interest in the status of the CSAR package supporting the Air Expeditionary Forces (AEFs). HQ 12 AF wants a basic CSAR task force package (helo/RESCORT/tanker/SEAD) to deploy together to one base for training and mission planning during contingency deployments. The helicopters could forward-deploy to a forward operating location after mission planning. They also stated a need for a common “off-the-shelf” SPINS template that every theater could use as a basis for standardization, and then modify it to their specific theater needs. They expected JPRA to be leading this standardization effort, and indicated that JPRA needs to take more action in standardization and dissemination of PR information. They felt that personnel recovery should be a mindset for all HRC personnel (similar to safety) and that the role and responsibility of an On-scene Commander (OSC) should be ingrained through training at the beginning and throughout the career of HRC personnel. HQ 12 AF SMEs also suggested that OSD needs to emphasize PR in the same way as, or as an aspect of, Force Protection. The emphasis that Force Protection has received lately is what PR needs to make progress toward a viable capability.

Columbia is the number 1 priority country within the AOR. HQ SOUTHAF and SOUTHCOM JSRC are developing a PR plan for Columbia. Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru are the number 2 priority countries. SOUTHAF is also developing a theater-wide PR plan. However, in every case these plans do not take into account the assets, meager though they are, of the countries within the PR plan. They are set for a unilateral U.S. action. To a certain extent this is counter to the mission and desire of establishing some means and procedures for PR in a coalition environment.

## **B. PROGRAMS AND RESULTS**

Several countries have recently shown an increasing interest in PR, specifically, Columbia, Guatemala, Ecuador, Argentina and Bolivia. Within the recent past, 13 countries participated in a Regional PR Conference. The overriding problem is a lack of equipment in most countries, or if equipment exists, its obsolescence. Funding for PR activities is also a problem for all concerned. This holds true for SOUTHCOM as well, as it has a very restricted budget. SOUTHCOM has a low priority relative to the other theaters, and in almost all cases is dependent upon the use of U.S. Reserve Forces (Reserve and National Guard). This is particularly true for air assets. The issue with the Reserve Forces is that they can select the deployments they wish to support, and they are

limited in the time available on “active” duty. In addition, the Reserve Forces are not as proficient as the regular forces and this limits their employment. On the plus side are the SOF activities within the AOR. SOCSOUTH is quite active in some of the countries, particularly in a training mode.

Southern Command is heavily involved in regional engagement. In 1999, \$104.7 million of its \$819 million budget, plus \$1.5 billion of crisis resources were devoted to engagement of 32 Countries in the AOR. The primary goals of Combatant Commander South’s Theater Engagement Plan (TEP) are regional stability and cooperation. Regional objectives include countering the drug threat, reducing transnational tensions, preparing nations for cooperative work, and supporting a “New Vision for Armed Forces and Institutions.” The tools the Combatant Commander uses to pursue these objectives include exercises, operations, security assistance, and military-to-military contacts. For the PR mission area, SOUTHCOM funds military-to-military contacts between PR SMEs on the SOUTHCOM and SOUTHAF staffs and SAR agencies in Countries within the AOR. These contacts are critical to building a peacetime network of PR C2 nodes and PR assets, which translates directly to a theater-wide PR network in times of war. The SOUTHCOM PR staff acknowledges there are deficiencies in PR exercises, PR support to operations, and security assistance to PR agencies within the coalition environment.

HQ 12 AF sends assessment teams to countries in the SOUTHCOM Theater to assess those countries’ airpower and provide assistance in developing air combat capability. The HQ SOUTHAF PR Staff Officer is a member of the team, responsible for SAR/CSAR assessment and assistance. He is permitted to provide assistance in the form of advice and unclassified documents. He has already visited Guatemala and Honduras, with plans to visit Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. SOUTHCOM just began their theater engagement strategy in 1999. Personal relationships are key to getting support. In SOUTHCOM, Military groups at the U.S. embassies are the preferred vehicles for establishing and maintaining these relationships. Part of this dependency is based on language skills. Specifically, SOUTHCOM uses the U.S. Air Force section chief of the Military Group as a point-of-entry into the Host Nation’s SAR network. The HQ SOUTHAF PR Staff Officer is unfamiliar with the avenues and points of contact for conducting inter-agency PR in a peacetime environment. He identified the need for SAR CPXs with the various host nations in the theater to maintain a network of personal relationships, once they are established. Many of the countries in South America have civilian RCCs, even if the SAR-capable helicopters are military. Countries in the SOUTHCOM Theater emphasize the SAR mission for its political value (value added to

the civilian population from the government). HQ 12 AF noted that Honduras and Guatemala have a basic civil SAR capability. Many of the countries in this theater need support and resources from the U.S. in order to develop and maintain a SAR capability. There is a need for SAR training information and products to be translated into the foreign languages of the Coalition countries. There is a need for events that promote the interaction between people to develop a SAR network – conferences, training deployments, and combined exercises.



**APPENDIX E**

**PACIFIC COMMAND AND U.S. FORCES, KOREA**





## **APPENDIX E**

### **U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND AND U.S. FORCES, KOREA**

The U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) has the largest area of responsibility of any unified command. The command's geographic region is depicted in Figure 1. The Pacific Command's area of responsibility encompasses:

- More than 50 percent of earth's surface; approximately 105 million square miles (nearly 169 million square kilometers). From the west coast of the United States mainland to the east coast of Africa (excluding the waters north of 5° S and west of 68° E); from the Arctic to Antarctic; including the states of Alaska and Hawaii. The AOR traverses 16 time zones.
- Nearly 60 percent of the world's population.
- 43 countries, 20 territories and possessions, and 10 U.S. territories. The 43 countries are listed in Table 1.
- The world's six largest armed forces: (1) Peoples Republic of China, (2) United States, (3) Russia, (4) India, (5) North Korea, (6) South Korea.
- Five of the seven worldwide U.S. mutual defense treaties:
  - U.S.-Republic of the Philippines (Mutual Defense Treaty, 1952)
  - ANZUS (Australia - New Zealand - U.S., 1952)
  - U.S.-Republic of Korea (Mutual Defense Treaty, 1954)

- South East Asia Collective Defense (U.S. - France - Australia - New Zealand - Thailand - Philippines, 1955)
- U.S.-Japan (Mutual Defense Treaty, 1960).
- 35 percent of U.S. trade is within the region, amounting to more than \$548 billion in 1998. In contrast, 19 percent of U.S. trade is with the European Union, 20 percent is with Canada, and 18 percent is with Latin America. Asia-Pacific nations, not including the U.S., account for about 34 percent of the Gross World Product (the U.S. accounts for 21 percent of GWP).




Figure 1. Pacific Region

**Table 1. Countries of the Pacific Region**

Australia	Mauritius
Bangladesh	Micronesia
Bhutan	Mongolia
Burma (Myanmar)	Nauru
Cambodia	Nepal
China	Niue
Comoros	New Zealand
Brunei	Palau, Republic of
Cook Islands	Papua New Guinea
Fiji	Philippines
New Caledonia/French Polynesia (France)	Russia
India	Samoa
Indonesia	Singapore
Japan	Solomon Islands
Kiribati	Sri Lanka
Korea, Republic of	Taiwan
Korea, North	Thailand
Laos	Tonga
Madagascar	Tuvalu
Malaysia	Vanuatu
Maldives	Vietnam
Marshall Islands, Republic of	

The U.S. Air Force Pacific Rescue Coordination Center (RCC) was officially established in 1994, but existed prior to that as a Sub-RCC to the WESTPAC RCC since the 1970's. The Pacific RCC is responsible for the PACOM Overseas Search and Rescue (SAR) Region. In support of PACOM's Theater engagement plan and the National SAR plan, the RCC has an objective of conducting an exchange visit with each country, for which a SAR agreement exists, once every 3 years. As of 2000, PACOM had 6 active

SAR agreements, and 19 pending SAR agreements, awaiting renewal. Responsibility for SAR agreements now lies with Department of State and U.S. Coast Guard, in accordance with latest edition of National SAR Plan. Purposes of exchange visits include: updating SAR agreements, crosstell of SAR C2 and operations, and promoting U.S.-Allied relations. There are a total of 49 RCCs within PACOM's AOR, including the Alaskan RCC, but excluding the U.S. Coast Guard RCCs that have SRRs in the Pacific. Forty-eight of the RCCs are run by allied nations with membership in the International Maritime Organization (IMO)/International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).

## **A. ISSUES**

The listed issues and problems were presented and discussed at the majority of the team's meetings. In the paragraphs that set forth the specifics of each category of issue, these items are brought out as they pertain to the agency that identified the issue. It should be noted that several issues/problems of U.S. Joint Forces and U.S. individual Services have a direct impact on the effectiveness of a coalition force when assigned.

### **1. Policy and Doctrine**

The main policy and doctrinal issue within PACOM is the deficiency of existing policy and doctrine for PR. PACOM PR agencies cited examples of the issue.

An issue that arose at Exercise Cobra Gold 2000 for the recovery of a Thai pilot was a denial by the U.S. Marine Corps aviation unit to use their helicopters because, "they were not permitted to use their assets to recover non-U.S. personnel." It is an issue that has been raised during actual combat situations. There should be conscious decisions, reflected in OPLANs and CONPLANs, regarding the role of U.S. recovery assets in supporting other nations' personnel. Although this seems obvious when examining the issue in peacetime during training, it can present real problems in an actual conflict when recovery resources are scarce, if not agreed upon pre-conflict.

The SOCPAC Commander noted that the CSAR force commander needs the authority to be able to decide whether to execute a recovery, defined as the "authority to enable success." This is an issue that potentially conflicts with DOD policy of "President or Secretary of Defense direction" to recover allied and coalition personnel.

Since being assigned to HQ PACOM in 2001, the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) representative to PACOM/J-3 PR has primarily focused on establishing a foundation of documentation and guidance upon which to build an ongoing theater PR

training program. Documentation in work includes the PACOM Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETLs), the Combatant Commander Training Plan, and a PR Annex to the JTF OPLAN. Prior to the creation of the JPRA representative's position, these documents were non-existent or insufficient.

The HQ Australian Air Command SAR Office has been tasked by the Air Standard Coordination Committee<sup>1</sup> to develop a coalition-interoperable combat search and rescue capability for all Services of the Australian Defence Force. The coalition consists of the U.S., Canada, UK, Australia, and New Zealand. The Air Standard Coordination Committee is headquartered in the Pentagon. Working Party #45 in the committee, which is responsible for combat search and rescue, is producing document #45/134, combat search and rescue doctrine, tactics, and procedures. The SAR Office is committed to maximizing interoperability of rescue forces during coalition operations with the other four countries in the alliance.

The Australian Defence Force has established a combat search and rescue-working group to develop combat search and rescue doctrine, based on U.S. doctrine from the 3-50 series of Joint Publications. However, as is the case in most other countries, the Australian Defence Force's combat search and rescue development effort has been hampered by a lack of both funding and strategic directive at the national level. The development effort has also been hampered by over-classification of intelligence products, labeled "Australian Eyes Only." The doctrine for Australian civil search and rescue is joint, and applies to all components of the Australian Defence Force. It consists of two documents: a civil search and rescue manual, which contains doctrine and procedures, and a publication on military support to search and rescue.

A rescue subject matter expert from the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) identified the RAAF's most pressing needs:

- A personnel recovery policy
- A strategic personnel recovery plan that identifies a "vision" of future capability, and a 5-year plan to achieve that vision

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<sup>1</sup> The Air Standardization Coordinating Committee (ASCC) is an active organization working for the air forces of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States. Its principle objective is to ensure member nations are able to fight side-by-side as airmen in joint and combined operations. It is organized at three levels with national directors, a management committee and assistants for standardization. More information can be found on the Headquarters, U.S. Air Force web site at url: <http://www.xo.hq.af.mil/xor/xorg-iso/ascc/general/overview.htm>.

- Support from the Australian Force Development Agencies to the Royal Australian Defense Force
- Resources to proceed with developing Joint rescue doctrine and tactics.

## **2. Tactics**

Similar to doctrine, the main tactical issue within PACOM is the deficiency of existing tactics for PR. PACOM PR agencies cited examples of the issue.

During Exercise Cobra Gold 2000, a Thai pilot had a mechanical failure and was forced to eject in hostile territory. This raised several issues in the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC). First, the JSRC Director asked her Thai counterpart for Isolated Personnel Report (ISOPREP) and Evasion Plan of Action (EPA) information on the downed pilot. Although the ISOPREP was readily available, the Thais did not have any EPA information. Thus, if the pilot began to evade, the rescue force would not have any idea of where to look, in which direction the pilot might have gone, or even if he would have left the vicinity of the crash site.

In Exercise Cobra Gold 2000 and Exercise Cobra Gold 1999, PACOM effectively integrated SOF into their PR activities. At one point in the 2000 exercise, the conventional recovery assets were unavailable for use by the CAOC, so they tasked the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) Commander to provide assets, particularly MH-53 helicopters and HC-130s for a rescue operation. This raised three issues plaguing other commands as well:

- Timing of the operation – SOF almost always prefers to wait for darkness to execute its operations, but in this case darkness was 6 to 7 hours away.
- The size of the recovery package executing the recovery. Does the commander integrate conventional RESCORT, RESCAP, C2 aircraft, etc., or does he make it an entirely SOF package (often preferred by SOF)? If so, are the conventional and SOF assets familiar with each others' operating procedures?

On this mission, the JSRC turned to the JSOTF to supply the recovery assets. The delay until darkness meant that the survivor was on the ground in hostile territory for a much longer period than desired. In an actual situation, this delay could strain coalition cooperation if our allies see a delay in the rescue of their personnel that might not have occurred had it been an isolated U.S. pilot.

During the 2001 SOCPAC PR Council meeting, the following tactical issues were identified:

- To address a standardization shortfall, SOCPAC requested a standard template for a SOF CSAR SOP and a SOF CSAR Instruction (outlining roles and responsibilities) from HQ SOCOM/PR. HQ SOCOM/PR has recently published its first SOF PR Instruction.
- Special Operations Command, Korea (SOCKOR) is exploring the concept of using South Korean SF teams as Unconventional Assisted Recovery Teams (UARTs) in the Korean Theater of Operations (KTO). An earlier attempt to do this during an exercise proved unsuccessful. No one was able to develop a feasible contact plan for linking evaders with South Korean SF soldiers wearing North Korean uniforms.

The Commanding General (CG) of SOCKOR spoke on the subject at the 2001 DoD PR Conference. He identified two tactical issues:

- ROK does not aggressively participate in the process of developing guidance and documentation. Staffing and review of publications is typically delayed in ROK channels.
- The Unconventional Assisted Recovery Mechanism (UARM) in denied territory on the Korean peninsula incorporates the use of ROK SF ODAs. CG SOCKOR is not comfortable with this concept because it is not routinely exercised and has not been successfully demonstrated.

During the PR Council briefing on the status of UARTs in PACOM, a number of tactical guidance deficiencies were identified:

- Is there a situation that justifies pre-positioning UAR Teams?
- Should SOCPAC man DARs with “waiting” UAR Teams?
- How does SOCPAC get contact procedures to the evader?
- What is the impact on other SOCPAC missions of providing UAR Teams?
- How does SOCPAC document new/expanded UART and CSAR mission areas?
- How does SOCPAC provide better integration of the missions into OPLANs?
- What are the reporting procedures for IP locations, when using the Search and Rescue Dot (SARDOT)?
- What are the methodologies for development of PLS codes?
- What should be included in the ATO CSAR SPINS?

A rescue subject matter expert from the RAAF identified the RAAF's tactics requirements:

- Rescue special instructions, procedures, and techniques to support operational planning.
- A Joint Standing Operating Procedures document. Only the RAAF has any documentation, based on United States Joint doctrine, and it is incomplete.
- Resources to proceed with developing Joint rescue doctrine and tactics.

### **3. Interoperability**

PACOM PR agencies identified interoperability/compatibility/standardization issues for:

- Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) and doctrine
- Systems and equipment
- Training and personnel.

IDA had the opportunity to observe the U.S. working with Australia and the Republic of Korea, both longstanding U.S. allies. There were interoperability issues in both combined operations, although they were distinctly different.

#### **a. Australia**

The problem of “interoperability” came up in every discussion with the Australians on the subject of PR during Exercise Tandem Thrust 2001. For personnel recovery, interoperability above the tactical level is the biggest issue. Also, Australian Defense Force personnel recovery doctrine is not yet mature enough to support coalition operations at the operational or strategic level. Because of the lack of doctrine and systems support for coalition operations, coalition support is still very much personality-driven. In other words, the support of one nation to another typically flows through a single individual of the supporting nation to a single individual of the supported nation. When either of those two individuals becomes unavailable, the ability of the nations to work together is lost – until another personal relationship is established. Although both interoperability and the release of classified information presented problems, much can be overcome by workarounds and patience. The most important way to overcome these two sensitive problems is to train and exercise together with common goals and objectives. Almost all the Australian military interviewed echoed this sentiment.

The Tandem Thrust Exercise CAOC was located at Headquarters Air Command RAAF, RAAF Glenbrook. IDA discussed interoperability with the Tandem Thrust 2001 CAOC Air Operations Commander, an Air Commodore of the RAAF. To achieve effective interoperability, the Air Commodore explained that it is paramount that all coalition partners have effective and standardized communications, operate with the same basic doctrine and the senior personnel must know one another. He pointed out joint/coalition operations can be legislated, but must be accepted on a cultural basis. In the case of the Pacific Rim Countries, particularly the U.S., Australia, and Canada, this relationship among the senior commanders and the various component commanders has worked well and to the advantage of the involved countries.

In his discussion of the ATO, the Air Commodore pointed out that the Tactical Battle Management Core Systems (TBMCS) used by the U.S. Air Force was also used by the RAAF and the Canadians in forming the ATO. Therefore, all recipients of the ATO understood and could readily employ their ATO assignment and were well aware of what missions all air units involved were assigned. The Tandem Thrust ATO contains a variety of supporting information, involving airspace assignment information, special instructions and information that in the recent past has been a standard input to U.S. Air Force ATOs. Now all U.S. Services, as well as some foreign air forces, are using TBMCS to formulate their standard ATOs.

The Air Commodore talked briefly about the importance of interoperability among the Pacific Rim coalition partners, which traditionally have been only those friendly Pacific Rim nations in the Eastern Pacific. Recently, Chile, the U.S., and Canada have become active in Pacific Rim military activities such as exercises, conferences, and working groups. Obviously, with the recent activities of the Peoples Democratic Republic of China, the relationship of the friendly nations of the Pacific Rim takes on a more important meaning.

The Royal Australian Army has more difficulty in creating joint and combined training opportunities, as a result of Australia's isolation and the high cost and logistics involved in training deployments. However, this geographic isolation also reduces the likelihood of any real-world coalition operations, and therefore reduces the need for coalition interoperability. The Royal Australian Air Force, on the other hand, is less restricted by deployment logistics, is more likely to be involved in coalition operations, has a greater need for interoperability, and takes advantage of more combined training opportunities, such as Red Flag at Nellis AFB, Nevada. Red Flag has set the benchmark

for air operations. Doctrine around the world is based on Red Flag. This fact makes interoperability of air forces easier to achieve, because of common doctrine and tactics.

Combined training is necessary to determine whether interoperability has been achieved. The four essential elements of interoperability are:

- Compatible communications systems
- Releasability of information
- Common doctrine and tactics
- Common tasking (campaign planning from a central command center).

Compatible communications and information sharing are needed to achieve battlespace awareness. Battlespace awareness is needed to permit informed decision making. Centralized decision making is needed to ensure a coordinated effort.

#### **b. Republic of Korea**

IDA observed coalition personnel recovery training events at Combined Exercise Ulchi Focus Lens (UFL) 2001 at Osan Air Base, Republic of Korea (ROK). Although UFL is a longstanding combined exercise, interaction between U.S. and Korean participants was minimal. UFL is a Command Post Exercise (CPX) in which the players perform command and control tasks and functions. The forces in the field are replaced by three major computer simulations that “war game” the fighting of land, sea, and air battles, respectively. Using the terminology defined in the study, UFL is an example of an exercise of a “Bilateral Alliance” made up of the U.S. and the ROK.

For the most part, the Korean and U.S. sides of the Korean Combined Rescue Coordination Center (KCRCC) operated independently. Each side requested assistance from the other for just one of their SAR missions. This interaction was not even an objective of the exercise during the planning phase. The incoming KCRCC Director added the coalition scenarios to the exercise after it was already underway.

Unlike all other coalition rescue command and control centers that IDA has observed during the course of this study, the technical interoperability within the KCRCC is very good. Of the three voice networks and the four data networks available within the KCRCC, only the SIPRNET is U.S.-only. The remaining six networks are common throughout the “alliance,” comprised of the U.S. and the ROK. In order to maintain a high level of technical interoperability, the KCRCC staff is investigating the feasibility of having the CSEL workstation reside on a releasable to the ROK (RELROK) network.

Procedural interoperability between the U.S. and ROK sides of the KCRCC is also very good. ROK guidance publications are translated copies of U.S. guidance publications. ROK rescue incident checklists, rescue mission checklists, mission status boards, asset status boards, and ISOPREPs are all identical in format to the U.S. equivalents. ROKAF ISOPREPs are even filled out in English. The authentication statements used by ROKAF pilots are of marginal value, and do not contain four independent facts, as specified in U.S. guidance.

#### **4. Language Barriers**

IDA observed four shifts during the second week of the UFL 2001 exercise. The Korean and U.S. sides of the KCRCC are divided by a wall, with a large window in the wall, facilitating observation of both sides. The barrier is significant far beyond its physical presence. It represents a tremendous cultural and language barrier between the U.S. and South Korean staffs on the KCRCC that they have been unable to overcome in the 50+ years of the alliance's history. This barrier prevents meaningful "combined" operations as a coalition. Rather, it forces the two staffs to operate independently, performing the same tasks with two sets of resources, supporting two sets of customers. As an example, ROK has an airborne command and control center (ABCCC), similar in capability, roles, and responsibility to the U.S. ABCCC. However, since the onboard controllers do not speak English, it is not interoperable with U.S. forces. Thus, ROK and U.S. ABCCCs must operate simultaneously and independently.

Despite the ease of communication via technical means and excellent classified and procedural information sharing, the operational interoperability observed is as poor as any observed by IDA. The U.S. exercise participants all attributed the problem to the significant language barrier between the two sides of the KCRCC. None of the U.S. exercise players spoke Hangul (Korean national language), and only one Korean exercise player (a Major) spoke English well enough to discuss military issues, using military terminology, without an interpreter. Although this Korean Major had been previously assigned to the KCRCC, he was an augmentee, and departed after the exercise. The current Korean KCRCC Director speaks minimal English. Because most U.S. personnel are assigned to Korea on one-year tours, language training is not practical or cost-effective. As many Korean officers will interact with U.S. counterparts for a majority of their careers, English language training for those officers is more sensible. Language skills vary from office to office within the Theater Air Control Center (TACC). The Korean Special Operations Coordination Center has four Koreans assigned who speak

excellent English. None of the Koreans permanently assigned to the KCRCC speak English well. The U.S. KCRCC staff noted that English-speaking skills are evidently key to promotion within the ROK military, as most ROK General Officers speak very good English.

Although the actual interoperability within the KCRCC is poor, this fact is well concealed from the casual observer. Without fail, the one daily task that was conducted by U.S. and ROK personnel together was the development and presentation of the daily status briefing to the General Officers in command of the exercise forces. These combined briefings served to make exercise operations appear to be “combined.” This phenomenon was not unique to the KCRCC, as it occurred throughout the TACC.

## **5. Training and Exercises**

Far and away the most common issue encountered during this study has been training. Nearly every representative, agency, and organization that IDA interviewed cited the lack of training, training deficiencies, or the need for more training as a problem for PR capability in all environments, including the coalition environment. There are four main training issues:

- A lack of combined CSAR exercises for coalition forces to train together; small combined exercises that do not include all of the key assets and the critical interactions; a lack of CSAR assets in-theater to participate in combined exercises.
- Training and experience deficiencies for personnel assigned permanently and temporarily to key positions responsible for planning, coordination, and C2 of PR operations.
- Deficiencies in SERE training for high-risk-of-capture personnel within the DoD as well as allied and coalition countries.
- Differences in capabilities of coalition forces that cause interoperability problems when employed in combined operations. The incompatibility is a result of a lack of or deficient training for PR forces from allied and coalition countries.

PACOM PR agencies cited examples of each of the issues.

### **a. Theater-wide Exercises**

PACOM integrates PR operations into its exercise program, but not to as high a degree as needed to build and maintain proficiency in PR operations. During discussions at the PACOM PR Council meeting, Combatant Commander Pacific did not seem

pleased by the fact that the PR play in CG 2000 was relegated to only command post exercise play and that so few people manned the JSRC. He directed his J311 to provide him a list of all PACOM exercises and the level of PR activity in each. The high priority Combatant Commander Pacific obviously places in recovery training and his statement that a good PR program requires not only the right personnel and equipment, but also “practice, practice, practice,” does not track with the level of PR play in PACOM’s exercise program.

SOCPAC identified Exercise Ulchi Focus Lens and Foal Eagle (both in Korea) as the only “good” PACOM exercises for SOF PR/CSAR training events. SOCPAC noted that previous experiences at Cobra Gold showed PR is not an exercise priority. SOCPAC identified “Combatant Commander’s emphasis” and a “full-up JSRC” as prerequisites for future PR training at Cobra Gold. The PACOM Council identified the exercises that it wants to focus its efforts on for inclusion of personnel recovery training events:

- Northern Edge (JPRA-supported PACOM exercise)
- Foal Eagle
- Keen Sword.

IDA interviewed the JPRA representative to PACOM/J-3 PR. Because of the timing of his arrival, he was too late to implement JPRA support for PR events in major PACOM exercises for 2001 (i.e., Tandem Thrust). U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) exercises (Ulchi Focus Lens (UFL) and Foal Eagle) are technically beyond his purview, as they fall under a Sub-Unified Command. It is his hope that he will have the guidance foundation complete and be able to coordinate JPRA support for one major PACOM exercise in FY 2002. When asked whether he was establishing training guidance suitable for operations in a coalition environment, he said that “joint training issues overwhelm any coalition training issues” in PACOM. PACOM/J-3 PR is not currently addressing coalition PR issues.

The 33 RQS is a U.S. Air Force squadron that operates Sikorsky HH-60G Pave Hawks. The 33 RQS is based at Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, and maintains a detachment at Osan Air Base, Republic of Korea. The 33 RQS participates in combined SAR training exercises with Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Thailand. The 33 RQS also recently participated in an exchange visit to a South Korean rescue squadron. The 33 RQS representative clearly stated that combined training events with these coalition partners provided no training value to the 33 RQS CSAR mission. The proficiency levels

of the SAR forces from these countries is low enough, compared to the proficiency of the 33 RQS, that 33 RQS aircrew were not challenged by the mission scenarios. The 33 RQS has not had any opportunity to train with Australian forces recently. The 33 RQS wanted to participate in Exercise Tandem Thrust, but the CSAR training events did not have sufficient priority to survive the airlift budget cut. Because of that incident, and others like it, the 33 RQS Commander identified the need for airlift support to the 33 RQS for CSAR exercises as the unit's top issue before the Council. The squadron representative stated that a limited number of unit aircrew had participated in Northern Edge/Cope Thunder 2000, through an inter-fly agreement with the Alaska Air National Guard (AKANG). The participating crews identified it as the best training event of that year. The 33 RQS intends to work with the 210 RQS (AKANG) to arrange a similar inter-fly for the next Northern Edge/Cope Thunder exercise.

PACOM takes great advantage of the 571<sup>st</sup> Combat Operations Squadron (571 COS), Missouri Air National Guard, to man their CAOC and JSRC. The 571 COS JSRC Director had not, however, attended any training on performing JSRC duties. JPRA instituted two courses to train JSRC personnel, PR 101 (3 days) and PR 301 (2 weeks). Although the director has tried to get unit funding to attend the PR 301 course, the unit has denied her requests.

#### **b. Australia**

Exercise Tandem Thrust is part of Exercise Freedom Challenge, which includes Exercise Cobra Gold and Exercise Balikataan. These exercises, which are all conducted in Southeast Asia, include coalition forces from various countries in the region. The United States Forces for Exercise Tandem Thrust consisted of a command and control ship, a carrier with supporting vessels, U.S. Air Force fighter aircraft, U.S. Army Special Forces, and a number of U.S. military individuals who participated in various direct control and exercise planning activities. The Australians and the U.S. provided the major military effort; there was limited Canadian involvement.

The U. S. Air Force did not provide combat search and rescue forces for either the command post or field training portions of Exercise Tandem Thrust. Headquarters Pacific Air Forces "forgot" to include notional rescue units in the notional force list for the command post exercise. There is no cost for inclusion of notional forces in a command post exercise. Funding to deploy rescue units to the field training exercise was cut. As the Navy PR representative pointed out during IDA's visit to *Blue Ridge*, the

problems of inadequate planning were apparent at the combined exercise control group (CECG) with respect to CSAR activities.

At the Tandem Thrust 2001 Special Operations Task Force HQ, the staff discussions covered a wide variety of topics and PR issues:

- More time is needed to train and prepare for the formal part of the exercise. Two days were allocated, but a week would have been much better.
- The exercise lacked authentic U.S. Air Force aircrews as survivor/evaders. Fighter pilots were hard to get as part of the exercise.
- There were no H-60 helicopters, even though they are assigned to the 33<sup>rd</sup> Rescue Squadron under the Pacific Air Force. Also, no Navy helicopters were available.
- It was a good Personnel Recovery Exercise, but much was new to the many participants. There need to be more exercises.
- Planning by the U.S. Air Force was poor.
- The Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) helped initially, but did not furnish any personnel during the exercise.
- Foreign players had inadequate SERE training and equipment.
- There is a lack of understanding of unconventional assisted recovery (UAR) by the PACAF RCC personnel.

### **c. Republic of Korea**

During combined exercises in the Korean Theater, such as Foal Eagle and Ulchi Focus Lens, both the U.S. and the ROK exercise CSAR, but *coalition* CSAR is not exercised. South Korean forces do not train to recover U.S. isolated personnel, and U.S. forces do not train to recover South Korean isolated personnel.

As a prelude to DPMO's and IDA's visit to Korea to observe the combined exercise Ulchi Focus Lens 2001, the KCRCC Director discussed the status of coalition SAR operations between the U.S. and South Korea. The Director of the KCRCC, located at Osan Air Base, provided a brief assessment of South Korea's personnel recovery capability. According to official documentation, South Korea organizes, trains, and equips recovery forces, and conducts personnel recovery operations in nearly identical fashion to the U.S. since all South Korean military guidance on personnel recovery is directly derived from U.S. guidance. However, actual demonstrations of PR capability observed by the Director have not always met the published standard. He cited examples, such as:

- Limited night vision goggles (NVG) capability
- Limited formation flying capability
- Limited over-water capability
- Restrictive weather minimums
- Lack of a Pararescue (PJ) capability.

The KCRCC is manned around-the-clock, primarily by ROK Air Force (ROKAF) personnel. When U.S. aircraft are flying in the Korean area of responsibility, one of the three U.S. Air Force personnel permanently assigned to the KCRCC must also be on duty. During UFL, the KCRCC shifts from an armistice manning level to a wartime level. For UFL 2001, manning was particularly robust. The KCRCC consisted of three shifts of 10 personnel each. Each shift was at least one deep in most of the necessary specialties. These include directors (O-5); controllers; SAR duty officers; intelligence specialists; SERE specialists; tactical planning computer specialists; and liaison officers to the Army, Navy, and Special Operations Forces. Notably absent were SAR planners and U.S. Marine Corps liaison officers. A key element of the UFL after action report was the identification of a critical need for assignment and integration of SAR planners into the combat plans cell within the TACC.

During the 2-week exercise, both the Korean and U.S. sides of the KCRCC each participated in over 20 SAR events. During the first week of UFL, the operations tempo on the Korean side was slightly higher, with more missions accomplished by a smaller staff. All of the events were straightforward aircraft losses generated by the computer simulations.

During UFL, the personnel recovery white cell was responsible for using the results (aircraft losses) generated by the computer simulations to create and sustain training scenarios for the KCRCC. Like the KCRCC, the white cell had a U.S. and a ROK side. Also like the KCRCC, the two sides of the white cell operated completely independently. The barriers to operating effectively in a coalition environment were not unique to the KCRCC. From the white cell, one could observe that similar barriers exist in all mission areas.

The U.S. side of the PR white cell was made up of five people, divided between two shifts. Each shift had a computer simulation technician, responsible for interfacing with the computer system, and one or two exercise controllers. Unfortunately, only one controller was a qualified CSAR subject matter expert, in this case, a U.S. Air Force HH-60G pilot. The quality of the training inputs received from the white cell was decidedly

bipolar, according to the directors in the KCRCC. The fact that the CSAR white cell needed more CSAR experts was noted in the white cell's after action report. While there were sufficient simulation technicians, there should be a CSAR expert on each shift.

The white cell staff noted that the war game simulations need guaranteed or built-in attrition rates to support an effective operations tempo for CSAR training. As the exercise progressed, fewer aircraft were lost, thus reducing exercise activity in the KCRCC. It decreased to the point of no rescue activity at all for the final 36 hours of the exercise. Options proposed by the white cell to remedy the problem include adding extra assets/sorties solely for sacrificial purposes, or adding a notional "Country X" to the alliance as a source of attrition. The personnel recovery white cell received no planned event inputs from the Master Scenario Event List (MSEL) to generate additional scenarios for rescue training. Typically, CPXs use the MSEL to inject special rescue scenarios, such as mass casualty evacuations, and prisoner-of-war repatriations, into the exercise. The total absence of rescue events in the UFL 2001 MSEL resulted in a number of lost opportunities for valuable training.

Regarding live recovery forces in Korea, IDA found the situation to be similar to those encountered in other theaters over the course of the study. Like all nations, the Republic of Korea has fiscal restraints on developing a CSAR capability. The two Korean helicopter squadrons are in competition for funds with the rest of the ROKAF, which is also trying to modernize, to include purchasing Boeing F-15 Eagles. Because of limited training resources, the ROKAF helicopter squadrons are not as capable as U.S. Air Force rescue helicopter squadrons. The ROKAF does not have a reliable night or all-weather capability. ROKAF helicopter crews are not as proficient at tactical flying tasks as U.S. Air Force rescue helicopter crews. This training gap between ROKAF and U.S. Air Force forces has, so far, inhibited true combined CSAR training events during field training exercises (FTXs) in Korea. Through the course of the study, IDA has found coalition partners that have successfully integrated coalition forces into U.S. CSAR task forces. The integration of select ROK CSAR force elements into a U.S. CSAR task force still seems plausible, but the U.S. has not yet identified which ROK forces might be suitable. The 33 RQS and the KCRCC are working through the approval process to fly with ROKAF CSAR helicopters. The ROKAF has already successfully completed its approval process. The 33 RQS and the KCRCC see the inter-fly events as a training benefit to the ROKAF but not to the 33 RQS. The inter-fly events serve more as a theater engagement tool than as an alliance training tool.

## **6. Releasability of Classified Information**

The PACAF RCC identified information releasability as one of its key issues. The PACAF RCC representative asked, “Is there any move from JPRA to act as a focal point for different theaters to get a common answer? Is there a common office that we can work through JPRA to exchange information between theaters?” The response from JPRA in 2001 to the questions was, “No, not at this time.” There is a concern that the unique requirements of each Theater may limit the utility of any standardization effort.

The 2001 PACOM PR Council Meeting was the sixth annual meeting of the Council, making it one of the most mature PR Councils in DoD. Although the PACOM Council is now beginning to address the issues of coalition warfare, the PACOM PR Council Chairman opted not to invite the Australian Command SAR Officer this year because the agenda already included issues that were SECRET-U.S. ONLY. The Chairman is considering coalition participation in next year’s council meeting as an objective, and tailoring the issues to meet that objective.

“Although both interoperability and the release of classified information presented problems, much can overcome by workarounds and patience. The most important way to overcome these two sensitive problems is to train and exercise together with common goals and objectives.” Almost all the Australian military IDA met echoed this sentiment. Even though New Zealand is part of the Australia-New Zealand-United States Alliance, the classified information releasability problem is more difficult because the United States is more restrictive with respect to New Zealand than Australia in its foreign disclosure policy. During operations in East Timor, the Australians found that the responsibility for fixing releasability problems falls to the “Coalition Builder,” which, in the case of East Timor, was Australia.

Although there were no combined personnel recovery missions during Exercise Tandem Thrust, the Combined Special Operations Task Force developed plans that included Australian Special Air Service units as the ground element for combat search and rescue, personnel recovery, and emergency extraction missions. The special operations subject matter experts identified the need for releasability of information regarding unconventional assisted recovery procedures, tactics, and doctrine in order to execute unconventional assisted recovery missions and mechanisms successfully in a coalition environment. The exercise releasability restrictions that would not apply to real-world contingency operations were providing negative training to the exercise participants.

The U.S. Navy PR representative for Tandem Thrust 2001 informed IDA that, since the Australians could not have access to the secret internet protocol router network between the 7<sup>th</sup> Fleet ships, the 7<sup>th</sup> Fleet created a Combined Wide Area Network. All information releasable to Australia was fed into the Combined Wide Area Network. The Australians did not participate in any of the personnel recovery or combat search and rescue events during Tandem Thrust because of a miscommunication between the U.S. and Australian planners during the planning conferences: the U.S. planners were told that Australia had no personnel recovery or combat search and rescue capability, which was not the case. However, the Australians wanted to observe a combat search and rescue mission, which became a stated objective at the initial planning conference. Although units of the Australian Special Air Service were available to participate, they were not included by the exercise controllers. No scenario events were generated at any of the planning conferences. Based on the objective to *observe* a rescue mission, the Australians and the rescue exercise planners twice attempted to set up a visit to USS *Kitty Hawk* to observe a U.S. Navy rescue mission. However, on both attempts, Australia's Command Search and Rescue Officer (the nation's highest ranking officer responsible for rescue) was denied permission by USS *Kitty Hawk's* Intelligence Section Chief (N2), who claimed the execution of the mission would be classified SECRET NOFORN.

As is the case in most other countries, the Australian Defense Force's combat search and rescue development effort has been hampered by a lack of both funding and strategic directive at the national level. The development effort has also been hampered by over-classification of intelligence products, labeled "Australian Eyes Only." A rescue subject matter expert from the RAAF identified improved releasability of personnel recovery information and supporting intelligence from the U.S. as a pressing need.

The RAAF recognized the problems involved in the release of classified information because of existing bilateral and multilateral treaties that allow some members of a coalition partnership to receive more information than others. Although there is no easy solution, every effort should be made at all levels to put forth as much information as possible, recognizing that each country has classified information that must be guarded. However, there seems to be some over classification as well as rather bureaucratic systems that hinder the release of needed information.

Information sharing should be automated in order to satisfy all coalition partners/allies that information is being shared appropriately. Automation of information sharing was accomplished at Tandem Thrust (at the air campaign level) through the use of the Integrated Tasking Order, which was distributed over the combined wide area

network. This process required a great deal of work prior to the beginning of the exercise. In addition, Tandem Thrust was an experiment of the “CFACC Afloat” concept. The Combined Force Air Component Commander (CFACC) was aboard USS *Blue Ridge*, and was supported by reachback to the CAOC Rear at Hickam AFB. The CFACC was supported by the Current Operations section of the CAOC aboard USS *Blue Ridge*. The remainder of the CAOC was rearward. Reachback was provided via TBMCS. For the command post exercise, the TBMCS database contained information releasable to all partner nations participating in the coalition exercise. Building this database for the exercise was very expensive and time-consuming. The Integrated Tasking Order included 24-hour ground alert lines for all helicopter missions, including combat search and rescue missions. For training and safety purposes, each combat search and rescue mission had a planned time on target. The airspace control order was also used to identify force zones and airspace blocks for further safety deconfliction by space as well as time.

The Australian Defence Force purchased the TBMCS from the U.S. through the Foreign Military Sales program. Personnel at Headquarters Air Command, Glenbrook, work closely with the Command and Control Training and Integration Group, Hurlburt Field for TBMCS testing, training, and development purposes. The Australian version of TBMCS does not have the U.S.-only modules.

Releasability of classified information between the U.S. and the ROK is excellent. Nearly all SECRET information available to U.S. forces within the theater is releasable to ROK (RELROK). Two of the three voice networks and three of the four data networks support SECRET RELROK communications. This is quite unlike all other coalition environments observed by IDA, where releasability of classified information is usually the most significant issue. However, HQ Seventh AF (7AF)/IN provides intelligence support for the CSAR mission in Korea. The intelligence support process and products are very well defined and documented. There is no provision in the process for declassifying the products for distribution to U.S. Allies.

## **7. Systems and Equipment**

There are four main systems and equipment issues:

- A lack of communications equipment; an inability of defense acquisition systems to keep pace with emerging information technology; and a reliance on old systems, using outdated technology, and requiring obsolete components for maintenance.

- Poor interoperability of communications systems among nations; an inability of alliances to standardize communications; and policies restricting technology transfer that prevent allies and coalition partners from developing common communications systems.
- A lack of combat-capable recovery assets; the lack of resources available for acquisition of CSAR-capable platforms; and the cost of developing a credible capability for current threats.
- Deficiencies and shortfalls in survival and evasion equipment for high-risk-of-capture personnel; incompatibility of fielded personal equipment with recovery assets; a lack of covert signaling devices, and a reliance on overt signals designed for peacetime SAR.

PACOM PR agencies cited these examples of the issues.

The AFSOC MH-53s (31 SOS) departed the PACOM Theater in March 2001, and the USASOC MH-47s (160 SOAR) were scheduled to replace them in April 2001. There is some concern about a loss in PR capability with the departure of the MH-53s. SOCPAC has engaged the 33 RQS (HH-60Gs) to augment future OPLANs and CONPLANs.

HQ SOCPAC noted that CSEL is needed to support coalition warfare. Recent coalition operations have demonstrated the need either to establish multiple rescue mechanisms to support personnel with different equipment from different countries, or to establish a single rescue mechanism geared to the “lowest common denominator.” From a flag officer’s perspective, he saw the potential for political fallout from CSEL “haves” vs. “have nots” within a coalition operation, because the CSEL “haves” would, in effect, be more likely to be rescued.

The RAAF identified a strategic deployment capability to conduct personnel recovery operations outside of the Australian region as one of the RAAF’s most pressing needs. A major limiting factor is the lack of aircraft carriers and strategic airlift aircraft in the Australian Defense Force, which forces them to conduct operations from land bases.

The Australian Defence Force is in the process of procuring the Siemens Personal Locator Beacon (PRC-807) for all aircrew members. This system is more tailored for peacetime operations, since it is designed to broadcast automatically on international distress frequencies. The PRC-807 features a 406 MHz beacon, a GPS, and a synthetic voice that automatically announces its GPS location repeatedly on guard frequencies (121.5 and 243.0 MHz). The driving requirement of the Australian Defence Force is the

ability to notify rescue forces quickly when personnel are isolated in remote areas of Australia's search and rescue region. The search and rescue office has examined the Motorola PRC-112 but is not interested in procuring it for Australian forces. The office, however, has been monitoring the progress of CSEL, and is interested in evaluating it when available.

## **8. Roles and Responsibilities**

The personnel recovery community uses a process to accomplish the PR mission. That process is broken down into roles and responsibilities. All of the roles and responsibilities must be assigned to, and accomplished by, some combination of units, agencies, and individuals. For successful accomplishment, these units, agencies, and individuals must be properly organized, trained, and equipped. There are three main issues with roles and responsibilities:

- An improper division of responsibilities within theaters of operations; a mal-assignment of PR responsibilities to allies and coalition partners.
- Deficiencies in HQ staff structure to meet the responsibilities for PR planning, training, and C2; shortfalls in theater staff proponentcy, advocacy, and expertise for CSAR.
- The lack of resources and technology in most countries to develop a PR system capable of meeting the PR responsibilities for an alliance or coalition; the lack of a dedicated CSAR Force for Coalition Forces.

PACOM PR agencies cited examples of each of the issues. The PACOM PR Council noted a number of roles and responsibility issues, and took the issues listed below as action items:

- Selection of the proper organization to be the executive agent for PR in the Korean Theater of Operations.
- A lack of robust PR annexes in PACOM OPLANs.
- JSRC and RCC manning and documented requirements for experienced personnel.
- A lack of Active Duty HC-130s assigned to the Pacific Theater.

### **a. National SAR Plan**

The following are findings from IDA's review of the U.S. National SAR Plan (1999) that impact the roles and responsibility of PR agencies in the Pacific Theater:

1. The “new” National SAR Plan has changed substantially to align the U.S. with the International SAR Plan, promulgated by the ICAO and IMO. The IAMSAR Manual significantly revised the SAR Regions (SRR), which dictates the assignment of recognized SAR Coordinators and RCCs. The ICAO/IMO broke up the Overseas SAR Region, previously the responsibility of PACOM, and assigned the new SRR fragments to other countries in the South Pacific. Because the Pacific RCC no longer has responsibility for a recognized SRR, it is no longer a recognized RCC in the eyes of the ICAO/IMO. In fact, no U.S. Theater Command has responsibility for any portion of the Overseas SAR Region, so the ICAO/IMO no longer recognizes the RCCs of the other Theater Commands either. The DoD has lost the authority to designate a SAR coordinator and act as the U.S. official for overseeing coordination of all U.S. SAR interests in the Overseas SAR Region. Not all nations are members of the ICAO/IMO, so there are still territories, territorial waters, and international waters that are not in a designated SRR. This situation of “coverage gaps” did not exist when the U.S. Theater Commands had responsibility for the Overseas SAR Region, which was continuous across the globe.
2. PACOM is still the SAR Coordinator for the Alaskan SRR, and the ICAO/IMO recognizes the Alaskan RCC as legitimate.
3. The U.S. Air Force will provide an aeronautical SAR expert to serve as a member of the ICAO-IMO Joint SAR Working Group.
4. The DoD combatant commands retain the authority and responsibility to provide SAR *support* within their respective geographic areas of responsibility.
5. The DoD and its combatant commands retain the authority to maintain liaison and cooperate with authorities of other nations that have comparable civil SAR responsibilities. The DoD should coordinate its liaisons with the U.S. Coast Guard, Office of SAR.
6. For distress situations in international waters or airspace where no SRR exists for which an RCC is responsible, the DoD combatant commands have the authority to assist as appropriate.
7. There may be nations which are not parties to, or which have not yet fully complied with ICAO-IMO conventions. Therefore, situations may exist for U.S. resources to supplement SAR capabilities in certain geographic areas, or to support these nations by training or other means, consistent with U.S. domestic law, to help develop their SAR capabilities. [DoD combatant commands] may take advantage of such situations as appropriate.

**b. Australia**

The U.S. Navy PR representative felt that the Pacific Air Command Personnel Recovery Coordination Center (PACPRCC) in Hawaii should have played a more active

role in the planning phase of Exercise Tandem Thrust 2001. He also stated that, in the future, the Joint Personnel Recovery Representative (JPRA) to the Pacific Command should be active in planning and conducting these types of exercises. They all felt that a dedicated CSAR Exercise should be held prior to CSAR events of the exercise to set the procedures and get an idea of exactly what is to be accomplished. At this point in the exercise (14 May – about 2 weeks into the exercise), there was still a great deal of white team confusion resulting from lack of knowledge, experience, and detailed planning.

The Australian Defence Force established a Command SAR Office within the RAAF's HQ Air Command. This one-man office provides all of the coordination for military support to civil search and rescue in the Australian search and rescue region, which covers 11 percent of the world. Because of this arrangement, Australia actually has very good linkage to its civil search and rescue infrastructure for support of permissive search and rescue missions within a theater of operations. East Timor is a good example of theater support.

For operations in East Timor, the Australian Special Air Service provided the personnel recovery force. The Special Air Service was the only organization capable of performing the mission. There was no helicopter rescue capability, because none of the units in East Timor was organized, trained, or equipped to perform the mission. The Special Air Service operated without the benefit of any rescue specific doctrine or tactics. The Royal Australian Army does provide helicopter airlift support to the Special Air Service. Australia led the INTERFED Coalition during the initial phase of the operation, when forces were engaged in combat. To facilitate coalition interoperability, Australia provided linguist liaison officers. After the Australian-led coalition stopped open hostilities in East Timor, the United Nations took over leadership of the ensuing peacekeeping operation. The United Nations divided East Timor geographically and assigned different countries to different geographic sectors. The United Nations assigned Australia the border sector, which is the only sector containing hostile elements of the two nations in conflict.

By the time the conflict in East Timor began, the Australian Special Air Service had a ground-based personnel recovery capability. The Australians provided personnel recovery support to all of the nations involved in East Timor. The personnel recovery capability was based on unconventional assisted recovery doctrine. The concept included unconventional assisted recovery teams, designated areas for recovery, and escape and evasion tactics. The concept did not include an unconventional assisted recovery mechanism.

The Australians pointed out an important advantage of a *coalition* over an *alliance*. The issue of leadership in a coalition is clearer. The nation that builds the coalition is the leader. The coalition builder, or leading nation, has the authority and the responsibility to establish personnel recovery policy.

Australia is part of the Australia-New Zealand-U.S. (ANZUS) Alliance, which makes a *combined* operation between Australia and the United States an *allied* operation rather than a *coalition* operation. Coalitions have to rely on many bilateral agreements established when the coalition is formed. The bilateral agreements are between the “Coalition Builder” and the other coalition partners. Despite written agreements, personal relationships remain essential for solving resultant problems.

The RAAF had helicopters until 1989, when the Royal Australian Army took over all helicopter missions and organizations. The Air Force units were trained to conduct combat search and rescue, based on doctrine and tactics developed in Vietnam. The Army helicopter units no longer train to the rescue mission. Although the Army is responsible for combat search and rescue, they maintain only an Army commando regiment that is trained and equipped to conduct ground combat search and rescue missions. A rescue subject matter expert from the RAAF identified RAAF needs for a rescue command and control organization capable of coordinating rescue and support assets, and a rescue planning cell to conduct proactive planning of personnel recovery operations for military campaigns.

The three Service operational commands of the Australian Defence Force plan to merge into a Joint Headquarters with the Australian Theater Command. At that time, the search and rescue office intends to use the added manning to establish a rescue command and control element (joint rescue coordination center) that operates round the clock to provide military support to civil search and rescue, and coordinate rescue missions for Australian military personnel in distress during peacetime and wartime. The command center at Headquarters Air Command is already experiencing an increased workload from the fielding of the 406 MHz personnel locator beacons. As each beacon is fielded, it must be registered and the registration information loaded into a database at the Headquarters.

Headquarters Australian Theater is a joint operational command similar to U.S. geographic unified combatant commands, such as European Command, Southern Command, and Pacific Command. Headquarters Australian Theater plans and executes military operations using Australian forces. Although the assigned theater is in the region

around Australia, the Headquarters is unique, and must support Australian forces around the world. In order to plan large military campaigns, the Headquarters draws on the three Service operational commands, all located near Sydney, Australia, for personnel with appropriate operational and planning experience.

### **c. Republic of Korea**

The Commanding General of SOCKOR spoke on the subject of roles and responsibilities at the 2001 DoD PR Conference. He noted that South Korea (ROK) does not provide recovery assets in sufficient numbers to support its own operations. According to the KCRCC “Personnel Recovery in Korea” mission statement, the KCRCC’s mission during armistice is to “provide a coordinated and effective SAR capability within the Korean Area of Operations using U.S. and ROK military assets and ROK civil resources.” The KCRCC’s mission during contingency operations is to “recover allied aircrews and other isolated UNC/CFC personnel.”

According to USFK Regulation 525-40, *Personnel Recovery Procedures*, May 1997, USFK’s PR concept recognizes that, “most PR operations extend across Service and national divisions of responsibility. The availability of recovery capable assets determines the potential for successfully recovering isolated personnel. No single recovery system, force, or organization is suitable in all situations or can meet all requirements. Therefore, many recoveries must be conducted as joint or combined operations.” Also, it is the responsibility of the Commander, USFK, to “coordinate with Republic of Korea JCS to develop Combined SAR and CSAR capabilities.”

Since the de-activation of the 38 RQS at Osan Air Base, the presence of U.S. CSAR forces in Korea has been markedly reduced. To replace the six helicopters lost with the closure of the 38 RQS, the 33 RQS, based at Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, maintains a detachment of one helicopter and one helicopter pilot, the Detachment Commander, permanently assigned to Osan Air Base. Additional aircrew and maintenance personnel augment the detachment from the 33 RQS on 5-week temporary duty assignments. The primary mission of Det 1 is to maintain the SAR alert for U.S. aircraft operating on the Korean peninsula. Thus, the aircrews receive reduced training while deployed to Korea, impacting their proficiency in a very demanding flying environment. With the exception of the Detachment Commander, the 33 RQS pilots have very little experience and knowledge of the Korean flight environment. Having only one helicopter assigned to the detachment also impacts the rest of the U.S. aircraft operating in the Theater. When that one aircraft is down for maintenance, the KCRCC is

forced to restrict all U.S. aircraft to flying in the times, locations, and conditions that the ROKAF rescue helicopters can operate in, so that SAR coverage can be provided. This typically restricts the ability of the U.S. to operate at night, over water, and in marginal weather. The best flying weather in Korea is in March-April (Fool Eagle) and August-September (Ulchi Focus Lens). June and July mark the Korean monsoon season, when the flying weather is typically poor.

Figure 2 depicts the personnel recovery responsibilities assigned to organizations in the Republic of Korea.




Figure 2. Peninsula PR Responsibilities

## B. PROGRAMS AND RESULTS

### 1. Theater Guidance

The PACOM PR Council reviewed the draft CINCPAC Instruction 3130.4, *Personnel Recovery in the U.S. Pacific Command*. This instruction replaces CINCPAC Instruction 3130.1J, *SAR in the U.S. Pacific Command*, and CINCPAC Instruction 3305.2E, *Responsibilities for CSAR and E&R Operations*. The following excerpts from the instructions all serve to promote PR in a coalition environment, and should be considered for inclusion in all DoD, JCS, and Combatant Command Instructions:

- CINCPAC Instruction 3130.4 states, “Personnel Recovery operations...contribute to the theater engagement strategy when PR efforts involve coalition and civil SAR operations.”
- CINCPAC Instruction 3130.4 states, “PR operations are an integral part of military operations in peacetime and contingency operations, and many times extend across service and national lines....Successful PR operations require the establishment of a cooperative network of all available SAR resources and efforts.”
- Combatant Commander Pacific assigns the following responsibilities to the Combatant Commander Pacific-designated PR Executive Agents (EAs):
- EAs will coordinate with host nation civil and military authorities, component commands, and HHQ, and other U.S. civilian and military organizations as required to execute duties as PR EAs.
- EAs will coordinate negotiated international SAR agreements with Combatant Commander Pacific, DPMO, DOS, U.S. Coast Guard, ASD(ISA), and other interested parties.
- CINCPAC Instruction 3130.1J states that it is PACOM policy that, “CINCPAC provides SAR assistance to U.S. and foreign civilian and military personnel and property in distress by using available forces and facilities within CINCPAC’s AOR.”
- CINCPAC Instruction 3130.1J states that it is a COMPACAF responsibility to, “remain abreast of international SAR developments affecting PACOM. Coordinate SAR matters as necessary to enhance international SAR and keep USCINCPAC advised.”
- CINCPAC Instruction 3305.2E states that, “when operating as a combined force commander, [it is a CJTF Commander responsibility to] coordinate CSAR/E&R plans to include allied/host countries’ involvement and responsibilities. Allied forces should provide representatives to the JSRC to coordinate the specifics of unique authentication procedures and evasion plans, as well as the availability of CSAR assets.”

## **2. SERE Training**

The Commander of the RAAF Combat Survival Training School gave IDA a tour of his school facilities and an informative briefing.

The combat survival school, run by the RAAF, provides survival and evasion training for all three Services: Air Force, Army, and Navy. Only the Special Air Service runs its own school to meet more stringent training requirements, including 72 hours of resistance training, and more emphasis on land survival and evasion. Australian doctrine,

tactics, and procedures for survival and evasion are all based on U.S. Air Force and British Royal Air Force doctrine. The curriculum is oriented toward downed aircrew. All aircrew from all Services are required to attend the combat survival school. In addition, airfield defense force personnel (similar to security forces) attend the course. The course is also open to volunteers from any combat-coded organization in the Australian Defence Force, on an as-capable basis. The course, which is 3 weeks long, is taught seven times a year. The maximum class size is 40 students, giving the school a throughput of 280 students per year, or 47 students per instructor per year. The school, which has a cadre of ten personnel – the Commander, six instructors, and three support personnel, as well as a position for an exchange instructor from the United Kingdom – currently has a memorandum of agreement with the British Royal Air Force to train approximately 20 British students per year. The school has also trained aircrews from New Zealand, Canada, Scandinavia, Thailand, and Holland.

The course curriculum includes Isolated Personnel Report development, use of CSAR special instructions, CSAR planning, survival, land navigation, foraging, game skinning, survival radio and communication procedures, resistance theory, unconventional assisted recovery mechanisms, and contact procedures.

All instructors assigned to the school must be graduates of the school, and most attend the U.S. Air Force or Royal Air Force survival schools for additional training. This also promotes interoperability.

Currently, the Australian Defence Force has an official requirement for continuation training every 2 years. However, because of limited personnel, training time, and resources, there is no organized continuation-training program. The combat survival school, which has noted this as a deficiency, is working to establish a training program. Operations in East Timor have raised the awareness level of senior officers in the Australian Defence Force with respect to the need for survival/evasion training. The combat survival school did support a pre-deployment training program for forces deploying to East Timor.

### **3. Search and Rescue Coordination**

The Australian Search and Rescue Agency is responsible for all aviation and international standard maritime (large commercial vessels) search and rescue coordination within the Australian search and rescue region, excluding military assets, which are the responsibility of the Australian Defense Force. A majority of the rescue

controllers in the Australian rescue coordination center are reservists in the Australian Defense Force, but their reserve jobs are not associated with search and rescue. The Australian rescue coordination center does not have the tasking or the capability to produce a deployable rescue command and control element to support military operations.

Australia has tried to align its national search and rescue system with the international search and rescue plan, but is hindered to a degree by its federal system of government. The individual states retain the authority and responsibility to conduct search and rescue for isolated ground personnel and small boats lost or in distress. Agency personnel stated that they were “not happy” with the U.S. Coast Guard’s decision to eliminate the overseas search and rescue regions from the U.S. National Search and Rescue Plan. The elimination of DoD’s authority and responsibility to coordinate search and rescue in those regions has resulted in less support in areas near Australia. Australia has stepped in to provide added support at its own expense.

Rescue Coordination Center personnel have specialized training in maritime search procedures. Australia supports adjoining search and rescue regions, such as Indonesia, heavily. The Agency has memorandums of agreement with all rescue coordination centers that have search and rescue mission coordinator authority for adjoining search and rescue regions. The agency participates in semiannual search and rescue exercises with Indonesia and New Zealand. The Agency’s operations manager stated that the Australian Defense Force was responsible for the search and rescue of isolated military personnel for both Australian forces and forces of visiting nations.

Through the use of search and rescue satellite-aided tracking systems, the Agency is able to monitor distress beacons around the world on 121.5 MHz, 243 MHz, and 406 MHz, using their mission control center. The Australian mission control center is responsible for three local user terminals – located in Western Australia, Eastern Australia, and New Zealand. In addition, the Australian mission control center is a “node” mission control center that serves as a hub for a few other mission control centers in the region. As a hub, it ties the mission control centers together via a network that links only the node mission control centers (the U.S. mission control center is the primary node mission control center). The current search and rescue satellite constellation consists of eight satellites, two of which are geosynchronous; the remaining six are in low-earth polar orbits. Agency personnel pointed out that the system was also useful for following U.S. Navy carrier battle groups, because the carriers typically inadvertently have one or more beacons active.

The agency is staffed with 36 rescue controllers, which enables it to maintain a crew of five personnel on duty around the clock. This five-person crew performs search and rescue coordination for 11 percent of the earth's surface, or 53 million square kilometers. The agency has rescued people from many different nations, including American citizens. The rescue coordination center responds to more than 10,000 incidents each year, including three or four distress beacons every day. The center conducts about 40 searches each month for persons in distress, and saves about 37 lives each month. Including beacon searches, the center has a 75 percent search resolution rate. That is, the center and supporting search assets find three out of every four things they search for.

#### **4. Combined Exercises**

Cobra Gold (CG) is a regularly scheduled joint/combined exercise and was one of the largest exercises involving U.S. forces in PACOM for 2000. CG 2000 is part of the continuing series of U.S.-Thai military exercises designed to ensure regional peace and strengthen the ability of the Royal Thai armed forces to defend Thailand or respond to regional contingencies. Armed forces from Singapore participated in CG 2000 for the first time. U.S., Thai, and Singaporean SAR specialists manned the relatively small JSRC established by the JTF. This was a notable improvement over U.S.-only manning of the CG 1999 JSRC and facilitated the effective coordination of the coalition effort to recover isolated personnel during the exercise. Issues of interest included coalition force coordination during recovery operations, dedication of recovery-capable aircraft for PR operations, incorporation of SOF into the PR plan, control of SOF assets dedicated to recovery operations (JSOTF CC vs. CAOC Director), and priority of recovery operations during operations other than war.

A significant improvement during this year's Cobra Gold was the incorporation of allied officers in the JSRC. A Singaporean and Thai CSAR specialist manned the day and night shifts, respectively, providing key expertise in CSAR planning and execution. Their presence allowed discussion of the various considerations that would confront the JSRC in actual coalition operations; e.g. national pick-up procedures, sharing of ISOPREPs and EPAs, etc. Of note, the coalition officers worked side-by-side with their U.S. counterparts, even at the same computer terminal, a relationship not observed during exercises in all theaters.

PACOM has three exercises for which PR operations are the focus of one of more of the Command's exercise objectives:

- Ulchi Focus Lens (UFL) – Korea
  - UFL needs to document all gaming losses for consideration as PR events.
  - There is an opportunity to test the ability of the PR structure to handle the data flow of the PR process.
  - UFL requires an increased effort from the unit representatives and gamers to ensure good CSAR play.
  - UFL requires a fully functional Korean Combined Rescue Coordination Center and component RCCs.
- Foal Eagle – Korea
  - Foal Eagle includes a Command Post Exercise (CPX) and a live-fly Field Training Exercise (FTX).
  - Foal Eagle includes heavy SOF participation, which supports PR events.
  - Foal Eagle is the initial exercise of Unconventional Assisted Recovery (UAR) events.
- Tandem Thrust – Australia
  - Tandem Thrust is a combined FTX/CPX, made up primarily of Navy participants.
  - There is an opportunity to incorporate all five phases of recovery operations: report, locate, support, recovery, and repatriate; into Tandem Thrust.
  - The PR Council would like to have evaders from different components, and PR events for UAR teams to contact, move, and extract evaders.
  - Tandem Thrust needs a fully functional JSRC to produce SPINS, pass information, and allocate resources.
  - The PR Council wants to play what is normally a missing link – the lash up between the Navy RCC and the JSRC.

## **5. Theater Support to Civil SAR**

DPMO is seeking to augment its staff with a full time action officer to address the issue of DoD support to international civil SAR. In November 2000, DPMO attended a summit meeting between U.S. Coast Guard and PACOM to begin establishing a process for negotiating DoD-International civil SAR agreements. The summit conference

produced a draft memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the U.S. Coast Guard and PACOM. DPMO and HQ U.S. Coast Guard intend to use this MOU as a model for other Combatant Command MOUs. The National SAR Plan (NSP) gives the Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, the authority to negotiate international SAR agreements. DoD Directive 5530.3 gives the Combatant Commanders (through CJCS) the authority to negotiate international SAR agreements. U.S. Coast Guard identified the need for the Combatant Commands to get the Command's U.S. Coast Guard LNO involved in planning of all international SAR events (exercises, meetings, conferences, etc.). Currently, these U.S. Coast Guard LNOs are under-utilized. The ICAO maintains a website ([www.rcc.net.org](http://www.rcc.net.org)) that provides information on SAR communities around the world.

## **6. Indonesia**

Recently, Indonesia has become more active in developing a combat recovery capability. Indonesia has long been a participant in military exercises in the Pacific Region. Indonesia sent a delegation to participate in the 2001 DoD Personnel Recovery Conference. Indonesia is heavily involved in the conflict in East Timor.

Indonesia currently has a SAR capability, based on helicopters. The capability consists of ten units, approximating squadron strength. These units are training and equipping to provide a CSAR capability. Equipment for the helicopters includes guns, night vision, and armor. Indonesia is funding a modernization program as well as a CSAR training program. Training is based on doctrine and tactics sourced from outside Indonesia. The units are organized to conduct SAR and CSAR as primary missions. The units do not have a mobility capability to deploy outside of Indonesia.

Indonesia is providing SERE training and survival/evasion kits to its HRC personnel. Indonesia has initiated a modernization plan to provide more reliable survival radios to HRC personnel, but has not selected a specific radio for acquisition yet.

Indonesia does have an RCC. The RCC participates in SAR FTXs with live forces and survivors, as well as CSAR exercises. Indonesia has an established training program for RCC controllers. Indonesia does not currently have a SAR agreement with the U.S., but does have current agreements with other nations, including Australia.

Indonesia participates in annual SAR FTXs and CPXs. Indonesia is not currently participating in any combined technology development, R&D, or acquisition programs for SAR or CSAR systems with any other nations.



## **APPENDIX F**

### **EUROPEAN COMMAND AND NATO**





## **APPENDIX F**

### **EUROPEAN COMMAND AND NATO**

The area of responsibility (AOR) of the United States European Command (EUCOM) covers more than 13 million square miles and includes 91 countries and territories. This territory extends from the North Cape of Norway, through the waters of the Baltic and Mediterranean seas, most of Europe, parts of the Middle East, to the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa. See Figure 1 for a map of the European Theater.



**Figure 1. European Theater**

Tables 1, 2, and 3 contain the lists of countries in the three regions of the European Theater.

**Table 1. Europe**

- Albania
- Andorra
- Armenia
- Austria
- Azerbaijan
- Belarus
- Belgium
- Bosnia and Herzegovina
- Georgia
- Germany
- Greece
- Holy See
- Hungary
- Ireland
- Italy
- Latvia
- Liechtenstein
- Netherlands
- Norway
- Poland
- Portugal
- Romania
- San Marino
- Serbia and Montenegro
- Slovakia
- Slovenia
- Spain
- Switzerland
- Turkey
- Ukraine
- United Kingdom
- USA

- Bulgaria
- Croatia
- Cyprus
- Czech Republic
- Denmark
- Estonia
- Finland
- France
- Lithuania
- Luxembourg
- Macedonia,  
Former Yugoslav  
Republic of
- Malta
- Moldova
- Monaco
- Slovenia
- Spain
- Sweden
- Switzerland
- Turkey
- Ukraine
- United Kingdom

**Table 2. Middle East**

- Israel
- Lebanon
- Syria

**Table 3. Africa**

- Algeria
- Angola
- Benin
- Botswana
- Burkina Faso
- Burundi
- Cameroon
- Cape Verde
- Central African  
Republic
- Gabon
- The Gambia
- Ghana
- Guinea
- Guinea-Bissau
- Lesotho
- Liberia
- Libya
- Malawi
- Mali
- Rwanda
- Sao Tome and  
Principe
- Senegal
- Sierra Leone
- South Africa
- Swaziland
- Tanzania
- Togo
- Tunisia

- Chad
- Congo
- Cote D'Ivoire
- Democratic Republic of the Congo
- Equatorial Guinea
- Mauritania
- Morocco
- Mozambique
- Namibia
- Niger
- Nigeria
- Uganda
- Zambia
- Zimbabwe

The meetings, discussions and briefings at all of the installations throughout EUCOM and NATO were informative, productive, and covered wide ranging aspects of Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) and Personnel Recovery (PR). Throughout the study, the team encountered numerous issues that pertained directly to coalition forces, joint U.S. Service operations, and to individual U.S. military forces. It was particularly difficult to identify issues and problems that pertained only to coalition forces, as in many cases they were related only to military service personnel and equipment capabilities and limitations, and could not be related directly to “policy” type issues. This problem applied to both U.S. Services and to the services of coalition partners. Of significance is the fact that budgetary limitations have a profound impact on all coalition partners. Budgetary limitations, obsolete equipment, equipment shortfalls, limited personnel, and training shortfalls causes serious problems in their contributions to CSAR and PR activities.

DPMO and IDA are not alone in recognizing the CSAR problem in Europe and studying the issues. In his *Jane's Defense Weekly* article, “Lost and Found,” Darren Lake reports on other European Nations’ efforts to address CSAR issues.

Low budgetary priorities have meant the CSAR area has largely been overlooked. While the USA leads the way in developing its assets, some European NATO members are looking to bridge that gap.... Most NATO members have neglected the CSAR capability in recent years. The USA is a notable exception. National capabilities have neither kept pace with advances in doctrine and technology nor have they sought to assuage growing social unease about the cost of war by providing a capability sufficient to do everything possible to save lives in combat.... The main problem is growing demand on shrinking military budgets.... Given the

modern operational environment, CSAR missions are likely to be conducted during a joint operation, as in the NATO action against Yugoslavia.... In an age when there is believed to be an increasing need to keep casualty levels in the armed forces down and when captured soldiers and pilots prove a good propaganda tool, it is a sensible policy to provide a [CSAR] capability.<sup>1</sup>

## **A. ISSUES**

The listed issues and problems were ones presented and discussed at the majority of the team's meetings. In the paragraphs that set forth the specifics of each category of issue, these items are brought out as they pertain to the agency that identified the issue. It should be noted that several issues/problems of U.S. Joint Forces and U.S. individual services have a direct impact on the effectiveness of a Coalition Force when assigned.

### **1. Doctrine and Policy**

There are three main doctrinal and policy issues:

- Multiple versions of PR doctrine and policy
- Deficiencies in doctrine and disconnects with policy
- Inability of forces to train for employment of doctrine.

Key PR agencies cited examples of each of the issues.

#### **a. Multiple Versions of Doctrine and Policy**

At the NATO policy level, CSAR is not considered a NATO function. NATO ATP 62 states CSAR is a component responsibility. Additionally, NATO ATP 10 states SAR is a national responsibility, which is doctrinally different. In accordance with NATO ATP 10, one component could provide SAR support for all national forces. In accordance with NATO ATP 62, each component would provide for its own SAR support. In reality, both CSAR and SAR functions are accomplished through contributions of member nations, principally the U.S.

Representatives of Special Operations Command, Europe (SOCEUR) expressed what they perceive to be the requirements for a coalition PR capability:

- A combined C2 cell (such as the Personnel Recovery Coordination Center (PRCC))

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<sup>1</sup> Lake, Darren, "Lost and Found," Jane's Defense Weekly, 30 May 2001, pp. 22-26.

- A program of regular training exercises
- A network of LNOs to link the coalition countries
- Contributions from all partners to build cohesion
- A single combined doctrine.

Currently, NATO is deficient to some degree in each of these requirements. The single largest barrier to implementation of a single combined doctrine is the U.S. While the other NATO Nations use NATO ATP 62, each Service within the U.S. military still uses its own unique PR doctrine.

The Chief of HQ U.S. Air Force/ XOOB, stressed that the current problems of the U.S. in the Joint CSAR arena are preventing the solution of coalition problems. The joint problems continue because of funding shortages. One example was the “hybrid” joint doctrine practiced in Operation Allied Force. With respect to C2, the SOF were conducting PR unilaterally, under Service doctrine. With respect to mission execution, the CAF and SOF were using Joint TTP to conduct the mission as a CSAR Task Force.

#### **b. Deficiencies in Doctrine and Disconnects with Policy**

The following are findings from IDA’s study of NATO ATP-62, *CSAR*, Ratification Draft 1:

- NATO doctrine and TTP is primarily sourced from U.S. doctrine and TTP, with some British CSAR doctrine and TTP added. Unfortunately, some outdated U.S. doctrine was carried. For example, a major tenet of U.S. doctrine is that each Service Component is responsible for recovery of its own personnel. This is proven to be ineffective doctrine because it results in redundant PR systems, inefficient use of resources, and unnecessarily complex coordination challenges.<sup>2</sup> NATO ATP 62 adopts this tenet and adds more complexity by extending the concept to combined components, made up of multiple nations. Thus, each nation involved in a NATO operation must contribute CSAR expertise and assets to *each* component that it provides forces for. So for a NATO operation, not only will there be five separate PR systems in the five components (land, naval, air, marine, and special operations), with responsibility to coordinate through a single Combined Joint Rescue Coordination Center, each of the five Combined Component Rescue Coordination Centers could conceivably be comprised of elements from all nineteen NATO member nations.

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<sup>2</sup> JCSAR Current Capability Surface-Based C4I Test Report, August 1998, Joint Combat Search and Rescue Joint Test and Evaluation.

- In reality, it is inconceivable that all of the member nations will be able to provide this level of resources, as even the U.S. has serious difficulties fulfilling these doctrinal requirements. If NATO attempts to employ this command and control structure for PR, the elements will most likely prove ineffective during an actual PR mission.
- Like U.S. Joint doctrine and U.S. Air Force doctrine, NATO CSAR doctrine still describes the threat in terms of high-medium-low. ATP-62, Section 503, *Threat Level*, reads, “There is no precise delineation on what constitutes a particular threat level since what may be a low threat level for one type of aircraft/rescue vehicle is often a high threat for another. Additionally, threat levels are often contingent upon parameters such as the state of enemy training and morale, maintenance of weapon systems and availability of spare parts, and other such intangibles. However, the following general guidelines can be used to help determine the level of threat to a particular CSAR mission.” In effect, ATP 62 states that the threat is too complex to delineate, and then it proceeds to delineate it.
- NATO ATP 62 also copied some “good” U.S. Service doctrine that has not yet found its way into U.S. Joint doctrine. A good example of this is the mission command and control concept of a Rescue Mission Commander (RMC) and a Mission Coordinator (MC).
- ATP-62 establishes CSAR training requirements that the U.S. will be challenged to fulfill. ATP-62, Section 1101, *Training*, states, “Completion of CSAR training to NATO standards is a national responsibility. Appropriate training must be provided for all elements of the CSAR organization, specifically C4I, operational CSAR forces, and potential survivors. Collective CSAR training must occur routinely at the component, joint, and combined levels.” The U.S. thus far has found it impossible to *routinely* conduct CSAR training at all three levels.

HQ U.S. Army is concerned that the DoD approach to PR is one-dimensional. Currently, Deep Attack Operations, conducted by AH-64 Apaches, is the only conventional Army mission that is suited to the doctrinal “CSAR process.” Small units of conventional ground forces that are cut-off, enveloped, or isolated, are best recovered by the larger parent unit, using conventional combined-arms tactics. Assigning the recovery to a special force controlled at the Theater-level does not make sense.

The NATO SAR Working Group is in the process of refining the definition of CSAR to state that:

- CSAR should be offered only to military personnel (properly trained and equipped).

- CSAR should be conducted within a theater of operations.
- CSAR operations are intended to achieve a rescue, rather than a recovery.

U.S. doctrine does not currently have a similar definition of CSAR.

According to Darren Lake, the policies of other NATO Nations is to rely on the U.S. for CSAR, which is not aligned with NATO doctrine:

Outside the USA, less time has been spent on CSAR. According to a NATO military official, the present situation can be described as “the U.S. doing the job and the other nations participating. The other nations do not have any specific programs for CSAR.” The possible exceptions to this are France, Germany, and the UK. According to well-informed sources, there has been no real effort by NATO to coordinate CSAR policies and initiatives. In Western Europe, this realization has given the issue a new sense of urgency, spurring the region to begin looking at possibly conducting major coalition operations under the auspices of the EU, rather than NATO. A UK MoD spokesperson said that all current UK operations, with the exception of Sierra Leone, relied on U.S. CSAR cover.<sup>3</sup>

Current DoD PR policy does place limitations on PR when working in a coalition. The policy is not aligned with NATO policy or current concepts of operations in the Balkans. The policy also prevents the DoD from programming or planning for allied operations by removing partner nations forces from DoD’s planned “customer base.” DoD policy is one of case-by-case approval. The policy makes it necessary for the CFC to wait for an ally to be shot down before a recovery effort can be planned. It should be noted that the PR CONOPS for OAF was not aligned with this policy. NATO Regional HQ AIRNORTH is awaiting a change in DoD policy to provide further impetus to initiate changes in NATO ATPs for better PR doctrine.

There is NATO policy that provides guidelines for coalition operations. For example, the “framework nation” of an operation gets to select the language, the communications architecture, and the command and control structure for the operation. The framework nation has certain responsibilities, CSAR support being one of them – that is the extent of the policy that IDA has been able to find. The UK has the responsibility for NATO ATP 62, which was just ratified in 2000; however, the UK is looking for a new agency to take ownership of the document. The doctrine has not come into contact with a true operation yet, so it is not proven.

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<sup>3</sup> Lake, Darren, “Lost and Found,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, 30 May 2001, p. 25.

The CSAR representatives from NATO HQ AIRNORTH, confirmed the NATO policy, and the disconnect in NATO doctrine. They will work with HQ U.S. Air Force/XOOP and the UK to revise ATP 62. IDA contacted HQ NATO for source documents on NATO CSAR/SAR policy. “Framework Nation” is not an official term. In the opinion of the U.S. representative at HQ NATO, to officially state that some countries are not capable of conducting CSAR would be politically incorrect. NATO policy can only come from the NATO Military Committee or the NATO Council.

**c. Inability of Forces to Train to Doctrine**

Because the Clean Hunter CSAR exercise scenario involved quasi-unconventional personnel recovery methods (submarine insertion and extraction, ground team link-up), and employed forces not dedicated to CSAR, there was no suitable written NATO doctrine or TTP available to the Combined Rescue Coordination Center (CRCC) staff. NATO ATP 62 does not contain doctrine relevant to these recovery methods, and the forces used do not train to employ ATP 62 tactics. The CRCC staff spent a lot of time engaged in brainstorming and what-if discussion. It was evident that there was no personnel recovery plan in place to support the combat operation, and there were no capable, dedicated CSAR assets available. The recovery option used for this scenario could definitely be categorized as “ad hoc.”

The 32<sup>nd</sup> Air Operations Group mission briefing states that when the 32<sup>nd</sup> Air Operations Group (AOG) stands up and deploys the Interim Deployable Combined Air Operations Center (IDCAOC), the CONOPS for combat air operations will mirror that of USAFE. This implies that when the U.S. provides the key command and control function to a NATO air operation, then U.S. doctrine and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) will be forced upon the NATO operation. This is an acknowledgement that the 32<sup>nd</sup> AOG is unable to effectively train using NATO doctrine and TTP. 32<sup>nd</sup> AOG personnel must employ U.S. doctrine and TTP during operations in order to be effective, because of training limitations. As long as both U.S. and NATO doctrine exist, the U.S. is unlikely to have the resources to train to both standards.

**d. Suggestions**

The 352 Special Operations Group (SOG) suggested that CSAR might not be the best doctrinal approach to PR for coalition forces because of resource limitations. Unconventional assisted recovery teams and mechanisms (UART/UARM) may be more cost effective uses of coalition capability. Unconventional assisted recovery is evader

recovery conducted by directed unconventional warfare forces, dedicated extraction teams, and/or unconventional assisted recovery mechanisms operated by guerrilla groups or other clandestine organizations. As noted by SOCOM, there are more releasability issues with this approach. Also, UARMs are not movable, and would most likely be limited to countries neighboring the coalition country. Thus, a French, British, or Portuguese UARM would have very limited value.

JPRA identified a possible doctrinal solution for coalition operations that include a U.S.-only operation, such as Operation Allied Force/Operation Noble Anvil. In addition to the coalition PRCC, a U.S.-only PRCC could be established to support aircraft on the U.S.-only ATO. However, JPRA noted that running parallel PR/CSAR efforts like this shows a lack of understanding of coalition operations. It prevents development of a cooperative working relationship. A good, standing relationship is an essential prerequisite to working as a team if and when a PR incident does occur.

## **2. Tactics**

Similar to doctrine, there are two primary tactical issues:

- Multiple versions of PR tactics
- Deficiencies in tactics.

Key PR agencies cited examples of each of the issues.

### **a. Multiple Versions of Tactics**

The Director of Operations of U.S. Air Forces, Europe is concerned about the CSAR CONOPS and SPINS, and has USAFE people working hard to update them. As seen in the all the various commands, understaffed and overworked individuals are trying to put together from scratch all the documents (CONOPS, SPINS, SOP, etc.) needed to do the CSAR/PR tasks. There is no DoD agency working to standardize these products and eliminate redundant efforts.

The requirement to conduct personnel recovery in a coalition environment is impacting the development of the CSAR CONOPS and SPINS in two ways. First, for the recovery forces, it is generating “multiple” CONOPS. The main CONOPS document has an annex for each type of helicopter found in the coalition: SOF, CAF, and NATO. While this permits the CSAR forces to best exploit their respective capabilities, it adds complexity to the planning and C2 functions. Second, for isolated personnel, the SPINS have been simplified to the lowest common denominator, the PRC-90 and PRC-112A

survival radios. The CONOPS and SPINS make no attempt to exploit the advanced capabilities of the PRC-112B “Hook” radio, at the operational level. TTPs are being developed and used, but not on a theater-wide scale. This seems unusual, given that the U.S. Air Force purchased Hook radios especially for the European Theater. This simplification of the CONOPS for some members of the coalition in effect nullifies the advantages of the superior equipment of other coalition members.

The 32 AOS PR staff also identified the SPINS issue with U.S. recovery of coalition isolated personnel. The SPINS written for coalition isolated personnel were degraded to be compatible with the lowest common denominator, the PRC-90. The PRCC Director for OAF stated that one set of common procedures and SPINS was essential, even if it meant reduced effectiveness to accommodate the lowest common denominator.

#### **b. Deficiencies in Tactics**

HQ U.S. Air Force/XOOP sees the need for the CSAR community to broaden its range of TTP to provide PR capability across the spectrum of threat and conflict. They would like to broaden the Air Force’s mission to the scope of combat recovery: more than CSAR, but less than PR. Accordingly, XOOP is pushing the Air Force (primarily Air Combat Command (ACC)) to establish CONOPS and requirements that are capability-based, rather than equipment-based.

The Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) PR representatives identified a number of issues they had with the way the Combat Air Forces (CAF) (primarily ACC) conducts CSAR:

- They want the OSC to be aboard a SOF asset (helicopter or C-130). They do not want an A-10 or a wingman to be an OSC, having ‘abort’ authority for the mission. [They referred to the role as AMC, but they misunderstood the definitions/ terminology.]
- They do not want the RMC (A-10 Sandy) to be able to make a GO/NO-GO decision for SOF assets. They feel non-SOF personnel do not understand SOF capabilities well enough to make this decision.
- They disliked graduates of the U.S. Air Force Weapons School. It was their opinion that “Patch Wearers” only do things one way and are unwilling to change. They felt the CAF approach to CSAR was “inflexible.” They stated that the coalition environment demands flexibility.

- They are concerned with ACC's intentions to man the RCCs within the AEF AOCs. They do not feel that ACC will provide people with the needed experience and skills.
- Development of standard NATO Allied Tactical Pubs (ATPs) for CSAR is necessary, and does improve the Allies' ability to do CSAR, but that alone is not enough. "CSAR has to be the same no matter how you look at it." All coalition partners have to conduct CSAR the same way to be effective.

The AFSOC PR representatives identified the following issues and lessons learned that resulted from OAF in the Balkans:

- PR (specifically, CSAR) CONOPS and tactics are still too reactionary in nature to be responsive.
- There was no attempt made to execute a program of tactical deception.
- The PR forces were not proactive enough; more effort was needed for operational battlefield preparation.

SOCEUR also identified a deficiency in proactive tactical deception programs incorporated early on into the operational planning process.

At NATO CSAR exercise Clean Hunter, there were a number of lessons learned about how the CRCC was organized:

- The CRCC was too isolated from the CAOC, resulting in a lack of integration of efforts.
- The CRCC needs a SAR Duty Officer (SARDO) in the CAOC Combat Operations area to integrate CSAR operations into air operations.
- The CRCC needs a SAR Planning Officer (SARPO) in the CAOC Combat Plans area to integrate CSAR planning into air operations planning.

These lessons learned, or re-learned, were a result of using outdated TTP that suggested establishing the CRCC in an area physically separated from the CAOC.

The UK is currently revising NATO ATP-10, *Search and Rescue*, to include details of RCCs for all NATO nations, as well as a list of national military SAR assets. The revised ATP-10 will be a military supplement to the IAMSAR publications.

Many European nations lack basic PR and CSAR guidance and tools. Partnership for Peace (PfP) nations do not use ISOPREPs and HQ AIRSOUTH decided that was too advanced of a concept to teach them at this time. Many nations do not have a blood chit program, and there is no guidance for establishing a coalition blood chit program. There is a lack of coalition UAV employment guidance. Even basic information management

procedures for PR are deficient. Vega 31, the F-117 pilot shot down in Serbia, related his experience in great detail. One of the key points of his discussion was that operational and intelligence sources provided 19 different locations during the recovery operation. Five of these locations were determined at some point to be accurate, and were passed to various elements of the CSARTF by C2 elements. Obviously, four of them were actually incorrect.

### **3. Interoperability**

Key PR agencies identified interoperability/compatibility/standardization issues for:

- TTP and doctrine
- Systems and equipment
- Training and personnel.

One of the biggest issues of Operation Allied Force was the limited ability to communicate because of a lack of interoperability. While the entire communications plan, including the alerting procedures, was NATO standard, the entire Operation Allied Force CSAR system was made to operate with NATO systems, as communications systems offered by the partner nations were not interoperable.

The AOC baseline being developed by the U.S. Air Force may impact smaller coalitions because the AOC baseline is technology-based, and coalition partners do not use the same high-tech equipment. The baseline AOC will be disadvantaged because the technology it depends on to replace the lost manning will not be available or will be incompatible in a small coalition operation.

The major issues that the 6 SOS has to contend with are the lack of commonality in C4I systems, and the releasability of classified information. In order to execute its mission, the 6 SOS depends upon its people to establish, maintain, and use “human relationships” with personnel from our Coalition partners. 6 SOS supported the notion that every country is different and that each training deployment is tailored for the country.

The Personnel Recovery Mission Software (PRMS) Users’ Advisory Group is currently concentrating on refining the ISOPREP and Evasion Plan of Action (EPA) applications within PRMS, and discussing possible concepts for employment. The facilitators and the group, in general, routinely discuss the impact of Coalition operations on the system, and adapt the system to the needs of Coalition partners. Regarding the use

of U.S. social security numbers as a key field on ISOPREPs, nine other NATO Nations were polled, and it was found that each of the nine countries use a different format for military serial numbers. While this does not present a technical challenge, it does require additional time and money to make the system interoperable in a coalition environment. The combination of the current resource-constrained environment and the low priority associated with 'coalition interoperability' consort to all but eliminate the possibility of funding these kinds of improvements. This situation is not unique to the U.S. Addressing the issues of interoperability of the EH-101 program is currently a funding issue for the RAF. Capability to operate in a coalition environment may be too low of a priority to justify the added expense.<sup>4</sup>

HQ U.S. Marine Corps noted that coalition operations between the U.S. and UK experienced problems because of the disparate levels of technology employed by the two forces. Obviously, Coalition partners with even older technology will generate more problems. U.S. Marine Corps's experience is that a broad range of technology levels is encountered by the MEUs around the world. In some cases, countries with modern technology bought from the U.S. are unable to maintain or operate it, because of its unfamiliarity within the country's culture.

A concern of the USAFE XO was the considerable difficulty that the Coalition Partners have communicating with one another. During NATO CSAR exercise Clean Hunter, the German Air Force squadron that "lost" the Tornado and the two downed airmen sent their EPA and ISOPREPs to the NATO CRCC electronically via a German C4I system called "EIFEL." EIFEL reports could only come into the CAOC on special,

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<sup>4</sup> The EH101 is a long range, medium lift helicopter ideal for military, civil, humanitarian, and disaster relief operations. Developed by Agusta of Italy, a Finmeccanica Company, and GKN Westland Helicopters of the UK, EH101 brings together military utility, naval, and civil variants in a single integrated program. The three-engine EH101 is designed to operate in adverse conditions including extremes of temperature, high humidity, icing and dusty environments. Its three engines substantially improve margins of safety, particularly at take-off and landing where it can tolerate the loss of an engine without loss of pilot authority. It can achieve in excess of 1000km mission range on standard fuel tanks and can carry more than 30 fully equipped troops or 4000+kg of internal or external stores. Strategic deployment can also be achieved by in-flight refuelling. Two EH101 aircraft are currently involved in a 6,000 flying-hour intensive flight operations program. They have been operating from Aberdeen since September 1998. The primary aim of the program is to demonstrate the reliability and maintainability of EH101 and to prove the time between overhauls of major components. The first phase in Brindisi, Southern Italy, lasted 2 years and to date well over 1,000 sorties have been flown and a total of some 4,000 flying hours completed. EH101 is in full production in both Italy and the UK and has now entered service with the British Royal Navy and the Tokyo Metropolitan Police. It will be delivered to the Armed Forces of Canada, Italy and the United Kingdom over the next 2 years in search and rescue, anti-submarine warfare, airborne early warning, commando, and tactical troop transport configurations. (GKN-Westland Press Release)

dedicated machines, so it is likely not very interoperable. The Clean Hunter CSAR exercise uncovered another interoperability problem. Images taken by the German Air Force RECCE aircraft could not be transmitted to the NATO CAOC or to the Danish Special Forces tasked to perform the recovery. This example is proof that exercises are valid means to reveal interoperability problems.

Hungary is the newest member of the NATO alliance. They joined in 1999, just one week prior to the beginning of OAF. Hungary is struggling with the significant interoperability problem of having Soviet equipment vs. NATO equipment. Hungary has a plan to phase out the Soviet equipment with NATO replacements. Hungary traditionally developed its own TTP and doctrine. The Soviet Union only provided operator manuals with its equipment. The Soviet Union provided no CSAR TTP to Warsaw Pact Nations, even though they are suspected to have a CSAR capability based on lessons learned during the war in Afghanistan. LtCol Zolton Gulyas is the Chief of SAR for the Hungarian Air Force. In LtCol Gulyas' opinion, interoperability of communications systems and equipment is the number one issue regarding operations in a coalition environment.

The ACC Commander said that there are some steps NATO can take to enhance recovery interoperability such as standardization of procedures and getting an effective, if not identical, survivor radio for all its aviators. NATO is currently concentrating on the former, with the publication of NATO ATP 62. NATO requires the highest level of standardization for CSAR: commonality. This level applies to equipment, procedures, training for recovery forces, and training for HRC personnel.

France is developing a proposal to establish common training standards for CSAR and SAR. The standards will be in the format of a STANAG or Allied Publication (AP). These standards would be integrated into the NATO course on CSAR planning and execution, in due course.

During a JFCOM briefing on SERE technology and training, it was pointed out by many present that there is a lack of standardization amongst the U.S. Services and this is also readily apparent in the Nations that make up NATO. The lack of standardization applies not only to equipment, but also to all facets of SERE activities. However, it is obvious that JPRA has a good grip on SERE activities and is moving ahead rapidly to correct many the deficiencies. It just needs to get out to the customers, both U.S. and Coalition personnel.

As coalitions start moving away from working with the traditional partners, such as Canada and the UK, the level of interoperability becomes less and less known. Other countries have greater gaps in qualifications from U.S. forces. NATO has some advantages in this respect. For example, many NATO countries use the Israeli-built PRC-434A survival radio, which is quite interoperable with the U.S.-built PRC-112. However, interoperability within NATO is not perfect, and not all HRC personnel carried identical survival radios. The least capable radio used during OAF was the PRC-86 radio beacon carried by the British Tri-Star crews. Because of this situation, the OAF PRCC Director developed his PR CONOPS to accommodate the lowest common denominator. He believed that to do otherwise was foolish. It is his position that the dilemma that ACC faces today is a result of attempting to re-engineer its SAR system backwards to accommodate all of its legacy systems without giving up the latest operational concepts.

IDA discovered that there is a lack of programs designed to identify and resolve coalition interoperability issues. DoD has the Joint Test and Evaluation program, which has successfully addressed interoperability issues in the Joint arena. There is a need for a similar program focused on coalition issues, if the issues are to be resolved in a methodical and timely manner.

It has been proposed that NATO could reduce the scope of the interoperability problem by concentrating CSAR capabilities in one or two countries. NATO presumes that the U.S. will not be present in some cases. In those cases, this would reduce a lot of the interoperability issues to have another country provide a CSAR capability as a “specialist.” According to the AIRNORTH CSAR representative, NATO is focusing on getting a CSAR alert capability in the region as soon as possible and getting every country involved in it. NATO must keep in mind the attitudes of its various members. All nations must be involved in tactical guidance sharing because they may be involved in the operations. NATO needs CSAR capability in more than one nation, because any time that NATO has more than one crisis, it must deploy many nations’ assets, because of a lack in assets.

#### **4. Language Barriers**

Communications problems go beyond the lack of equipment compatibility with coalition partners. They include language capabilities and limitations; the impact of military-unique terms, acronyms, and brevity terms; and the availability, skills, and experience levels of interpreters. The biggest barrier is the terminology problem. Acronyms, brevity codes, and the “military language” of military-unique terms generate

more problems than the English language. The ACC Commander said, “Language is not an issue since English is the standard international language for aviation.” For most countries, aviation is the basis for their PR capability. Another problem noted is a reluctance on the part of people from some cultures to acknowledge and clarify any confusion or misunderstanding as a result of language or interpretation abilities. Those in the CSAR Community who worked with NATO Allies during OAF also felt the language barriers experienced in a Coalition environment would increase during operations as a result of the “fog and friction of war.” They noted that checklists and briefing guides help to lower the language barriers.

These language barriers are not unique to the PR community. After hearing IDA’s presentation to the PRAG, The U.S. Coast Guard SAR Representative noted that the International Civil SAR (ICSAR) community has a number of problems parallel to those noted in Coalition CSAR. First, language is a problem even though the ICSAR Community has established English as the standard for International maritime and aviation operations. The problem results from special terms and acronyms used by members of the community. To alleviate the problem the IMO/ICAO SAR Manual contains a list of standard terms to promote commonality. There are two aspects to this commonality: the commonality between countries, and the commonality between the maritime and aviation industries.

The OAF PRCC Director noted that the terminology problem is exacerbated for the PR mission area because the PRCC staff requires support from so many mission areas during execution of a CSAR. Thus, the PRCC staff must have an understanding of a great depth and breadth of mission areas, and be able to communicate with many different military specialists using their unique terminology. Because of the language problems in coalition operations, it is important that operations personnel carefully monitor briefings to ensure that all participants really understand what is being said. Extra time must be taken to enable an adequate interpretation of the briefing in the primary language of the aircrews.

## **5. Training and Exercises**

Far and away the most common issue encountered during this study has been training. Nearly every representative, agency, and organization that IDA interviewed cited the lack of training, training deficiencies, or the need for more training as a problem for PR capability in all environments, including the coalition environment. There are four main training issues:

- A lack of combined CSAR exercises for coalition forces to train together; small combined exercises that do not include all of the key assets and the critical interactions; a lack of CSAR assets in-theater to participate in combined exercises.
- Training and experience deficiencies for personnel assigned permanently and temporarily to key positions responsible for planning, coordination, and C2 of PR operations.
- Deficiencies in SERE training for high-risk-of-capture personnel within the DoD as well as allied and coalition countries.
- Differences in capabilities of coalition forces that cause interoperability problems when employed in combined operations. The incompatibility is a result of a lack of or deficient training for PR forces from allied and coalition countries.

Key PR agencies cited examples of each of the issues.

**a. Combined CSAR Exercises**

*There is no substitute for end-to-end live exercises. More exercises, on a regular basis, and with all our potential coalition partners, are needed.*

It is the opinion of HQ U.S. Air Force/XOOP that, although interoperability may be the most serious problem with Joint and Coalition operations, the lack of training is the most visible shortfall, and may be masking other problems. CSAR forces do not train together enough to work out interoperability problems. Currently, the biggest issue that XOOP is working is the lack of HH-60 and HC-130 Rescue Squadrons for the European Theater. This presence of CSAR forces in the European Theater is the first step in filling the critical need to train Allied Forces to conduct CSAR. All elements of the CSAR mission have to exercise on the same day and time, and on a recurring basis. Until this happens, actual U.S. CSAR capability is going to remain as an unknown.

At the EUCOM PR Council meeting, there was quite a discussion by all on the lack of U.S. CSAR assets in Europe, with the exception of the Special Forces (SOF). There is no positive indication that CSAR assets will be furnished in the near term. However, the 32<sup>nd</sup> Air Operations Squadron had not asked for CSAR Forces from units in the States. It was strongly recommended that they be requested on a regular basis to establish the precedent for such units to be a normal support element to USAFE.

The Director of Operations, HQ USAFE was adamant about the need for a dedicated CSAR Force assigned to USAFE. He stated that the previous Commander of

USAFE had sent a message to HQ U.S. Air Force and HQ Air Combat Commander (ACC) strongly requesting the assignment of a complete dedicated CSAR package to USAFE. The USAFE XO strongly supports frequent exercises that employ all the participants involved in CSAR actions; AWACS, Sandy A-10s, ABCCC, rescue helicopters, RESCAP, CAS, etc. He emphasized the need for exercises that involve all the coalition players, as it is the only sure way to identify and solve the numerous coalition problems, short of actual combat. He cautioned that training is a different situation than the actual operation, "You do know all of the variables when you train. You don't know all of the variables during an actual operation."

The 347 WG CSAR SMEs concurred that development of a coalition capability to provide CSAR support must begin with the U.S. putting CSAR forces in-theater. The presence of U.S. CSAR forces may need a time limit to prevent host nations from developing a dependency on U.S. capability (the Iceland Syndrome). The SMEs acknowledged that the current force structure does not currently support the concept of training for or conducting coalition CSAR operations. ACC needs access to AFSOC forces just to meet the current demand for forces.

The Balkans PRCC had scheduled and planned a NATO CSAR exercise for 1-9 June, 2000, to be held at Tuzla, Bosnia. The CSAR exercise was to include: U.S. Air Force A-10 Sandys; Canadian F-18 Strikers; AFSOC MH-53 RVs; AFSOC MC-130 Tankers; NATO E-3 AEW Airborne Mission Commanders; and Coalition pilots acting as survivors, with a U.S. Air Force SERE Escort. The CSAR exercise participants would use BCAOC SAR SOP-10 as the TTP. SAR SOP-10 was written after OAF, and lessons learned were incorporated. A primary objective of the CSAR exercise was to provide AMC training to the NATO E-3 AEW crews, as this was the biggest deficiency not yet addressed.

The CSAR exercise was ultimately cancelled because an as-yet undetermined HHQ failed to submit a Transfer of Authority (TOA) to chop U.S. forces from EUCOM to AIR SOUTH (NATO). It is interesting to note that the HQ EUCOM PR/CSAR Representative had recently PCS'd, and the EUCOM Staff had not appointed a replacement. Therefore, there was no one on the EUCOM staff tasked with the responsibility for initiating the TOA from EUCOM to NATO. As a result, the Balkans Theater went more than a year (until September 2001) without a live CSAR exercise. In that period, there was a complete changeover of personnel; in some cases a two-fold or three-fold turnover of TDY personnel. There is a need, from the very beginning of an exercise, for a robust core exercise planning team to assist in setting up the scenarios and

helping with all the nuts and bolts that make an exercise go. Exercises are doomed to fail and to be a waste of time and precious resources if amateurs plan and run them.

NATO forces executed multiple CSAR exercises prior to combat operations during OAF. CSAR exercises involved recovery helicopters (Italy, France, Britain), Sandy OSCs, AMCs (ABCCC or AWACS) and live isolated personnel. Of note is the lack of involvement of CAP, SEAD, and SOF assets. The OAF PRCC Director noted that the rescue of Vega 31 was the first large scale CSAR exercise in the last 25 years. It was the Director's intent to take the many lessons learned from Operation Desert Storm and use the lessons to fix known problems.

The 32 AOG PR staff identified the current efforts to develop coalition PR capability. NATO hosts two exercises that include CSAR events: Exercise Clean Hunter, an FTX that includes three CSAR events; and Exercise Cooperative Chance, a CPX that includes multiple CSAR events. USAFE hosts two U.S.-only exercises that include CSAR events: Exercise Union Flash, and Exercise Trail Blazer. NATO and EUCOM are not doing as many exercises as some other combatant commands that are exercising monthly.

A lesson learned at the Clean Hunter CSAR exercise by the CAOC and CRCC staffs is that CSAR training events must include C2 elements, live recovery forces and live survivors in order to produce realistic training and viable lessons learned. The integrated CPX/FTX nature of this year's Clean Hunter exercise did provide some classic lessons learned. For example, the AMC aboard the NATO AEW mistakenly injected an erroneous survivor location into the mission, possibly because of a transcription or SARNEG conversion error. This "full live" aspect of the exercise made it an excellent learning tool for the participants.

The lessons learned during OAF by Task Force Hawk after the loss of two Apaches validated the long-standing issue of a lack of in-theater dedicated CSAR forces. One Apache was lost while practicing CSAR, a mission the unit is not organized, trained, or equipped to do. The OPR for Task Force Hawk lessons learned is the U.S. Army Aviation Warfighting Center, Ft. Rucker, Alabama.

NATO emphasized the need for realistic coalition training exercises to improve the entire CSAR process, including repatriation, as well as peripheral functions (public affairs, mortuary services, etc.). NATO has identified the lack of exercises as an issue. NATO has difficulty conducting exercises because of operations tempo. Also, the CSAR

mission is not part of the standard NATO TAC-EVAL. It is too small of an issue for NATO forces.

From the A-10 Sandys' perspective (81 FS), the number one CSAR issue or lesson learned from OAF was the level of training provided to the NATO AWACS crew for the CSAR Airborne Mission Commander (AMC) role was unsatisfactory. CSAR Mission Commanders need to have intimate knowledge of ISR platform capabilities and limitations. Allied pilots do not have this experience. The Sandy representative noted that while there was also an ABCCC airborne, with a U.S. Air Force A-10 LNO aboard, the ABCCC lacked the air picture, and thus the situational awareness, of the AWACS. So, there was no optimum solution available to the CSARTF. The sub-optimal situation was masked until execution of an actual mission by a lack of robust pre-employment CSAR exercises, involving the AMC. He noted the lack of experience with On-Scene Commander (OSC)-to-IP interaction in a coalition environment because of the lack of training during large-scale exercises. The deficiencies in this relationship are uncertain because of this lack of experience.

Service Component recovery of an isolated person from another Service Component is still considered a "Joint" operation, training for such a mission should be funded using Joint training funds. HQ ACC needs Joint funding assistance for CSAR exercises, because it is a Joint problem, even though it is not an equally-split 1/3 Army, 1/3 Air Force, 1/3 Navy mission.

PR is one of several additional duties for all HQ Navy PR POCs. Most of the issues that they address are internal Navy CSAR and TRAP issues. They rarely staff Joint PR issues, and never (until now) staffed Coalition PR issues. There were U.S. Navy Reps (SpecWar) on the JSOTF staff in San Vito, Italy, during Operation Provide Promise. The operation involved U.S. C-130s airdropping humanitarian relief supplies in Bosnia. The JSOTF planned for PR support, although never executed a PR mission. They did identify training to be a major problem during that and other deployments. The HQ Navy PR POC stated that the first step to solving Coalition problems is training.

The U.S. Marine Corps currently has extremely little experience in conducting TRAP with Coalition forces. HQ U.S. Marine Corps supposes that integration of small elements of Coalition forces could be accomplished during TRAP training, but not during actual missions. Until combined TRAP training increases substantially, the U.S. Marine Corps is not prepared to conduct TRAP with coalition forces.

Everyone has stressed the need for recurring joint and combined training of all the individuals and systems involved in a CSARTF. They all agreed that the Red and Green Flag exercises are still only doing CSAR as a sidelight. Another challenge to training forces to employ the CSARTF concept is the current OPSTEMPO of the LD/HD assets needed to perform the mission.

During the recovery mission for Hammer 34, the NATO AWACS would not pass information to Sandy because he did not recognize the callsign. This problem is a symptom of the lack of a “full-up” CSAR exercise that includes all the players in a CSAR mission. The same situation exists today in OAF, OSW, and ONW. In order to solve this problem, CSAR events must be fully integrated into Red and Green Flag exercises. He noted that SOCEUR helicopters did not train with the A-10s for CSAR during OAF, and have not since. This has been primarily a function of OPSTEMPO. Unlike other pilots in the CAF, CSAR pilots do not get their “first ten combat sorties” at a Red/Green Flag exercise, prior to actual combat. Hammer 34’s wingman, Hammer 33, was the OSC while waiting for ABCCC to re-position in order to support the CSAR as AMC. The NATO AWACS was in position, but not trained in the AMC role, so could not help. All Unit Representatives present agreed that Coalition forces need to have very comparable equipment, procedures, and terminology before attempting to train together with U.S. forces. Currently there is a significant secure communications incompatibility. There is a need for more training using secure and anti-jam communication systems.

As briefed by U.S. Army representatives at the DoD PR Conference, the lessons learned from TF Hawk focused on deficiencies in SERE training for Army aviators. It was noted that Allies and Coalition partners look to U.S. personnel for leadership in a captivity situation, because of their SERE training. In the case of U.S. Army POWs, they would have no more functional expertise than their fellow captives from allied nations. Panelists at the conference identified some limits to coalition training: safety, cost, range resources, and real-world commitments. The CSAR representative at AIRNORTH identified the U.K., France, and Germany as the only Nations with some CSAR capability. Exercise Clean Hunter 2000 demonstrated that U.S. allies put a lot of effort into training, and take it seriously, but do not have much PR capability. Gen Bailey proposed that U.K. PR capability was equal to U.S. capability, and France and Germany were also very capable. Gen. Smith suggested that the reason the U.S. places so little emphasis on integrated training is that coalition operations is the hardest thing to do, and coalition training is harder than coalition operations. He suggested that CSAR is better because the allies don’t have CSAR forces that train with U.S. forces in combined

training. There are political constraints as well for U.S. allies. Some nations have difficulty committing to a training exercise if the exercise scenario involves “invading another country.” The conundrum is that politically-acceptable scenarios may not provide the training needed by U.S. forces and agencies (NIMA was cited as an example).

The U.S. military should offer, whenever possible, PR and CSAR training to potential and actual coalition partners. Cooperative Key 2001, as well as the others IDA has observed, clearly demonstrated the intense interest other nations have in CSAR, and their lack of knowledge and experience. A representative from the Rescue Division of the U.S. Air Force Weapons School (WS) participated in PFP Exercise Cooperative Key 2001. His observations were clearly highlighted during two combined escorted missions. On 19 September, he coordinated and planned a CSAR mission with U.S. A-10 escort, Bulgarian Mi-24 escort and Austrian Bell 212 recovery vehicles to rescue a French fighter pilot. Again on 20 September, he coordinated another CSAR mission with U.S. A-10 escort, Bulgarian Mi-24 escort and Hungarian Mi-8 recovery vehicles to rescue an Italian fighter pilot. As with CSAR missions conducted at the Weapons School, the communication plan was the weakest link and exacerbated by language barriers of three different nations, but was overcome by patience.

Weapons school HH-60 division participation added greatly to the success of the exercise. The participating nations brought good equipment for escort missions, but had no experience. The WS representative recommends participation in subsequent years by the WS. Participation allows them to keep their currency on the NATO Theater where they do not have any rescue squadrons. It also keeps them abreast of combined CSAR tactics, avoiding the problem of becoming parochial in their course of instruction. Additionally, the Air Force should participate with an HH-60 squadron in the future. The training opportunities with coalition forces is very unique and would allow crews to prepare for future coalition operations in a combined arena.

The OAF PRCC Director noted that the U.S. is training for exercises, which is not the same thing as training for combat:

Most CSAREXs even today have no C2, ISR, SPACE, tankers, SEAD, ABCCC, AWACS, RESTRIKE, or RESCAP. It looks like we are still training to exercise, not exercising to train. I thought we were going to fix this? It's an institutional breakdown. For example, we train HH-60 CSAR copilots today that have ZERO actual knowledge of how we are

going to employ! I'm not sure why the TAC phase<sup>5</sup> is so long because we really do not train these guys in any way close to CSAR as we know it. [We train them to fly at] low level to a point and a time on target (TOT)... This isn't special operations, it's CSAR! It's not preplanned, it's a pick up game, and we have to learn to win on the fly. Train like we fight? How about train like we employ!

#### **b. Personnel Training and Experience**

There is a shortage of qualified PR people and it appears to be getting worse. PR Agencies and Organizations said they were working hard to create, at all levels, an understanding of CSAR/PR via the courses given at JPRA and C2WS. There are a few hours dedicated to CSAR and PR at the Armed Forces Staff College. The C2WS has been given time to brief the selected Brigadier Generals at the CAPSTONE course, which all selected colonels are required to attend. All Agencies agreed that all the Services have got to provide qualified people for the various agencies involved in CSAR/PR activities.

32 AOG's primary NATO responsibility is to form the core element of HQ AIRNORTH's Interim Deployable Combined Air Operations Center (IDCAOC). However, 32<sup>nd</sup> AOG PR/CSAR SMEs rarely have the opportunity to train using NATO doctrine and TTP, or train to the standards set by NATO guidance. For example, at NATO Exercise Clean Hunter 2000, only three CSAR SMEs from the 32<sup>nd</sup> AOG were able to participate, and they each participated in only one CSAR event, over the course of three days. 32<sup>nd</sup> AOG personnel only had one other opportunity to participate in a NATO CSAR exercise that year. NATO HQ AIRNORTH identified a similar problem for other NATO nations. During Clean Hunter 2000, all six phases of CSAR were exercised in accordance with NATO ATP 62, the major NATO publication for CSAR TTP. However, some of the nations are not all that familiar with these operations.

EUCOM has identified a deficiency of CSAR expertise on the EUCOM staff, particularly in J35 and J5 for planning. Most contingency operations conducted in EUCOM have no standing OPLAN. The lack of an OPLAN and the lack of CSAR/PR planning expertise on the EUCOM planning staff impact the ability of the staff to produce a quality CSAR OPLAN in a timely manner for crisis contingencies.

The Balkans Personnel Recovery Coordination Center (PRCC) is located within the NATO CAOC, located on an Italian military installation in Vicenza, Italy, until 2001.

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<sup>5</sup> Tactical phase of mission qualification training for U.S. Air Force HH-60 aircrew members at Kirtland AFB, New Mexico.

The CAOC used to be a standing function of 5 ATAF, a standing NATO HQ. 5 ATAF de-activated on 1 January 2000. When OAF ends, it appears the CAOC and PRCC will disappear as well. It is likely all the corporate knowledge and lessons learned will vanish too. The Director of the Balkans CAOC was very concerned about the effectiveness of TDY versus PCS personnel, pointing out the very short TDY periods of sixty days, wherein individuals cannot get up to speed soon enough to be effective. CSAR standing operating procedure and continuity of the rescue element involvement in the planning process from beginning to end of the operation are key to success. No one in the OAF PRCC was left untrained in the local PR system. The same can no longer be said.

The Balkans PRCC staff identified several significant coalition PR training issues. U.S. members assigned to any combined PR staff or C2 element (JSRC, PRCC, CRCC, etc.) must have specific training and expertise to be credible coalition leaders. Staff members from allied countries invariably look to the U.S. personnel for leadership. Currently there is no such leadership training course. There is a need for coalition versions of the PR courses taught at JPRA and the C2WS. They need to be composed of material releasable to coalition partners, and geared to current/near-future coalition capabilities. Personnel going to augment any combined PR staff or C2 element (JSRC, PRCC, CRCC, etc.) on a TDY basis should pass through JPRA or C2WS for training en route. Currently, the vast majority does not.

The re-location of the Balkans CAOC to Poggio Renatico, near Bologna, Italy is complete. The new location is approximately 100 km South of the CAOC's previous facility. The CAOC staff anticipates continuing problems working at the new location because of a lack of infrastructure to support the facility and the transient staff (hotels, rental cars, etc.). 5 ATAF, previously co-located with the CAOC, has now completely shut down. There are now only about five to eight U.S. personnel who are permanent party at the CAOC. The remainder of the CAOC staff is TDY augmentees and turn over every 60 to 90 days. With 5 ATAF removed, the CAOC now reports directly to HQ Air South (Naples, Italy). The HQ Air South PR/CSAR Representative is a U.S. Air Force MH-53 Pilot. PR/CSAR is one of his additional duties. The Balkans PRCC has become the staff agency for HQ Air South for all PR and CSAR matters, because the PRCC has all the CSAR-experienced personnel assigned to Air South. Now, all Air South PR/CSAR taskings are passed down to the PRCC. This is very similar to the relationship between HQ EUCOM and the 32 AOS, under USAFE.

Three years ago, the PRCC staff consisted of 19 personnel, during the height of Operation Allied Force (OAF). Prior to OAF, there were eight persons on the PRCC

staff. Since last year the PRCC staff has drawn down to 5 personnel: a U.S. Air Force Director (90-day TDY); a Spanish AF Deputy Director (120-day TDY); a French AF Controller (TDY); and a German AF Controller (60-day TDY).

The C2TIG provided some background information on C2 training and exercises for U.S. and Coalition personnel. The C2WS tracks personnel who have taken the JCSAR Controller Course. However, they have never been called upon to provide a list of RCC-qualified personnel for any contingency deployment. The C2WS has supported requests for the controller course for Saudi Arabia, Australia, Germany, and Jordan. The course was tailored for Coalition partners with minor changes to address releasability of classified information. This included removal of lessons learned from OAF, space operations, and intelligence support.

The Army and Navy leadership, knowledge and understanding of PR are weak to non-existent. This, to a lesser extent, is true of many of the senior officers in the Air Force. A supported education program is a must if PR is going to become a reality. In this regard, a JPRA PR SME said, “Individuals must have the same mindset with respect to PR that they do for safety. It must be ever present and an inherent way of life.”

U.S. military and civilian personnel involved in coalition operations must be schooled in the capabilities, limitations, and culture of potential and active coalition partners. They should be knowledgeable of their equipment, military experience, and training orientation, and try to determine their views on specific operations, such as PR and CSAR. They should not go into an exercise with partners without knowing their capabilities and limitations.

- The U.S. military should push hard to be part of all aspects of an exercise – bringing experienced personnel and U.S. equipment. By this involvement, we can both learn and pass on to our partners our proven tactics, techniques, procedures, and doctrine.
- Although difficult to do, senior military and civilian leadership must be persuaded to allow sufficient time to visit coalition exercises, in order to understand their value. Typically, senior officials make only quick visits and speak only to the senior staff.
- For a coalition exercise, the U.S. needs to provide standardized checklists, forms, terminology, and definitions, all of which should be as simple as possible. In CK 2001, most of the briefings were very disorganized because checklists were not available. In addition, individuals were taking mission procedures down in notebooks and not on “knee board” forms that are common within the U.S. military.

- The most successful briefings and CSAR missions flown were those in which all the aircrews briefed together. Two of the CSAR briefings were held with all the airlift helicopters, the gunships, and the A-10s present. Numerous questions – good ones – were asked, and on-the-spot answers were given. It is essential that, whenever possible, all members of a CSAR Task Force brief together, even if by telephone.

Vega 31, the F-117 pilot shot down in Serbia, related his story to the PR Council in great detail. Some of the key points of his discussion were the mistakes made by the rescue forces during his recovery. The mistakes were failures to follow well-documented procedure, suggesting insufficient training. For example, early in the mission, Vega 32 (another F-117) reported Vega 31's location using the Theater Bullseye, which is an OPSEC violation. Also, it was unclear who, if anyone, was monitoring SAR-Alpha for mayday calls.

The OAF PRCC Director stated the need for CSAR planners and mission commanders to understand the capabilities and limitations of NATO CSARTF elements to ensure proper employment, "For example, there are capable SEAD/DEAD assets in NATO, but it takes careful planning on when and how to employ these capabilities. Sandy One should know the limiting factors (i.e., reactive vs. preemptive) associated with employment of different coalition assets for CSARTF support. This should be a U.S. concern at this moment. The U.S. and NATO will likely have to deal with other coalition support to build a cost effective force when the next operation shows up on the scope."

### **c. SERE Training**

HQ U.S. Air Force/XOOP is currently working a number of SERE training and qualification issues. In the U.S. Air Force, SERE Instructors do the majority of SERE training, in the form of initial SERE training, Code of Conduct (CoC) training, EPA planning, and development of E&R programs. However, life support, SERE, and intelligence specialists all contribute to SERE continuation training, and the quantity and quality of the continuation training is very personality-dependent. This problem is a symptom of a lack of: a SERE training master plan; a training pipeline; and robust PR staff offices at Combatant Commander, Service, and MAJCOM levels.

A current Navy training issue they are dealing with is the identification of HRC personnel, and the determination of SER training capacity needed. They are unsure of who in the Navy is at "high risk of capture" and do not know if they have sufficient capacity in the Navy SER Schools to handle the throughput.

The level and quality of SERE training varies greatly among coalition partners. The British and Australian SERE schools are considered to be very good by U.S. SERE Specialists. The French and Spanish survival schools are rated as satisfactory. The training provided to coalition partners by the U.S. could be considered level B training, without the resistance training.

The RAF SCSR teaches a 6-day practical course on survival, evasion, recovery, and resistance. The course includes extensive hands-on training and fieldwork. It is fairly new, has limited class size, and is restricted to RAF HRC personnel, who fly combat aircraft. It currently has no excess capacity to train coalition personnel. The school teaches eight courses per year, mostly in the winter, because the training area is a tourist attraction in the summer. Instructor positions at the school are career-broadening tours for many related career fields, much like our RCC positions. Instructors included helicopter pilots, Army and Navy special forces, divers, medics, and fighter pilots. Instructors may not have any prior SERE experience, as it is not a duty requirement. The SCSR has a recognized issue with the disconnect between SERE training for HRC personnel and CSAR training for recovery forces. HRC personnel do not get the opportunity to work with actual CSAR forces during recovery training, and recovery forces do not get to work with SERE-trained HRC personnel during recovery training.

All French aircrews attend a one-week survival school for initial training. The school includes survival and evasion training, and concludes with a night CSAR. The curriculum is similar to U.S. SERE training. French aircrews do not receive refresher training. All German Air Force pilots receive land and sea survival training in a 1-week initial course. They do not normally receive evasion or resistance training.

Although SERE training is a national responsibility for NATO Nations, much of the training burden falls upon the U.S. As an example, the U.S. provided a Mobile Training Team (MTT) to conduct pre-employment SERE training for all coalition forces deployed to OAF. Even though SERE requirements are standardized by NATO, the burden still falls to the U.S. to implement the policy. As an example, the U.S. provided PRC-112 radios to all countries participating in OAF to meet the NATO requirement for standard survival radios for all HRC personnel.

According to Jane's Defense Weekly, the U.S. is helping NATO transition to a self-sufficient SERE training posture:

NATO is active in survival training for aircrews embarking on NATO operations however, over and above the standard 'escape and evasion'

courses that aircrew have to undertake as a matter of course.... A SERE MTT from NATO/USAFE was at the Swedish Armed Forces Survival School (SwAFSS).... The SwAFSS is looking to be cleared to conduct SERE training according to NATO procedures without having to have an MTT present in the future.<sup>6</sup>

An Austrian Augusta-Bell 212 pilot described what Austria was doing to prepare its aircrews for survival and recovery. Austrian aircrews did not have survival vests or survival kits until 1999, when Austria sent helicopters to Albania to join the United Nations “A-FOR.” For that deployment, each helicopter was equipped with one Iridium satellite telephone, and each of the 24 aircrewmen was provided a survival vest. The vests contained standard survival gear and a peacetime survival radio with fixed frequencies. Today, Austria still only has 24 survival vests for its helicopter force.

When asked how long it had been since he had received any SERE training prior to his shoot down, Vega 31 responded that the most recent training he had received was as an Academy cadet and during his initial entry training as a Lieutenant. He opined that this was a serious deficiency in U.S. Air Force training requirements and that refresher training at regular intervals should be mandatory. He added that his former unit at Holloman AFB now requires mandatory SERE refresher training for all its aircrews. It is a two-day course presented by survival instructors from the U.S. Air Force’s survival school at Fairchild AFB. He said that the training was very popular with the crews and increased their confidence that they could survive an isolating event.

After the deployment of Task Force HAWK to Operation Allied Force, HQ U.S. Army, Europe documented the need to increase the level of survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE) training as a lesson learned. The Army identified the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) as the implementing proponent. The General Accounting Office (GAO) identified it as a lesson learned requiring a long implementation period.<sup>7</sup>

#### **d. Incompatible Coalition Forces**

32 AOS PR staff identified a number of allied training and exercise issues. NATO has basic PR mission training problems. The NATO AWACS is not trained for

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<sup>6</sup> Lake, Darren, “Lost and Found,” *Jane’s Defense Weekly*, 30 May 2001, p. 25.

<sup>7</sup> U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) report to the Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, March 2001, KOSOVO AIR OPERATIONS, Army Resolving Lessons Learned Regarding the Apache Helicopter, **GAO-01-401**.

the CSAR AMC role. Regular exercises are needed to determine deficiencies and develop coalition-suitable TTP and work-arounds. Manning during operations involving coalitions of a large number of countries is not an issue. If anything, too much manpower is provided, and finding meaningful tasks for everyone is an issue. Experience and relevant training is an issue for the manpower provided. Most U.S. Allies have no PR-trained or experienced personnel to provide.

As noted by others, the 81 FS A-10 Sandy pilot confirmed a substantial difference in combat capability between U.S. and Allied helicopters. Conducting CSAR with Coalition partners would be even harder than with NATO Allies. The forces are trained differently, and do not have the same capabilities.

The UK helicopter units conduct regular CSAR exercises, using single-ship, unescorted tactics. CSAR is not an official mission or task for these units, so there is no funding for these training events. They come at the expense of training for other missions. Because of their tactics, they primarily train at night. Flying unescorted provides only a limited daytime capability in very benign threat environments.

The French “CSAR-capable” squadron conducts very minimal unilateral CSAR training, and the French Air Force has no “Sandy” capability. There is no French CSAR TTP. They use NATO ATP 62.

For the past two years, one H-1 squadron of the German Air Force has been focusing on CSAR training in preparation for a transition to NH-90s in another two to three years. The squadron has not participated in any joint or combined CSAR exercises in the last two years. The squadron uses NATO ATP 62 as a guide.

Germany is developing common knowledge/terminology for SAR diver training within NATO. Germany surveyed NATO nations and found that some nations had fully-qualified SAR divers and some nations had no SAR divers at all. NATO is continuing to explore systems that fulfill its CSEL requirement. The NATO AIRNORTH CSAR Chief briefed the lessons learned from Clean Hunter 2000 to the 2000 NATO SARWG. He identified a deficiency in CSAR planning and C2 training. He recommended three courses of action:

- 1) Align the U.S. courses with NATO ATP-62 and send European students to the U.S. schools
- 2) Encourage a European nation to establish a school
- 3) Establish a CSAR course at the NATO School in Germany.

Ten NATO nations supported the third course of action. The SARWG recommended that the U.S. Air Force C2 Warrior School forward CSAR C2 training materials to interested NATO nations.

During CK 2001, IDA interviewed the Commander of the Bulgarian Air Force, Lt. General Popov. The General was very interested in CSAR activities. He noted that CSAR was an essential mission for his air force, but they had no mission experience. The Bulgarian Air Force has the basic equipment to put together a CSAR Task Force with their airlift and gunship helicopters, the MI-17s and MI-24s. It was very obvious that General Popov's keen interest and support for the exercise was a key factor in it being hosted by Bulgaria. This was also borne out by testimony of the U.S. Air Force exercise planner who had worked with the General in the early planning stages. The General also noted the exercise was an outstanding opportunity for his personnel to learn new and valuable tactics, techniques, and procedures in all areas of air combat operations. IDA's observation of the members of the Bulgarian Air Force clearly indicated their very professional attitudes and their intense desire to increase their knowledge.

IDA observed the Austrian Air Force helicopter unit at CK 2001. Although they had a great amount of flying time in helicopters, CK 2001 was the first time they had been involved in CSAR missions. They were all interested in all aspects of CSAR and picked up the mission requirements rapidly, even though it was the first time they had flown in a CSAR Task Force. The Austrian Detachment Commander led two CSAR missions, involving U.S. Air Force A-10s and Bulgarian MI-24 gunships, and did all the briefings and flight planning. Although mistakes were made, it was an excellent example of CSAR in a coalition environment.”

## **6. Releasability of Classified Information**

A common thread IDA has encountered when gathering information for this study has been the difficulty of sharing critical intelligence information with our allies and coalition partners. Problems with sharing intelligence include the breadth of dissemination of the information; and the accuracy, timeliness, and presentation of the intelligence released. A demonstration of trust, on the part of the U.S., is essential to maturing an environment of trust within a coalition. The two biggest roadblocks to developing that trust between the U.S. and its coalition partners are U.S. policies for releasing classified intelligence, and U.S. limits on training foreign military forces. Both policies are aimed at slowing the flow of information from the U.S. to other countries. Throughout the course of the study, everyone made it clear that the U.S. military must

share as much information as possible on tactics, techniques, procedures, and doctrine with coalition partners for an efficient and effective combined operation. There is a continuing need for the interchange of ideas and views among coalition partners – not just during exercises.

The ACC Commander said that we are often our own worst enemy in this regard by “over-classifying” critical information. He said that it was his experience in Europe (and throughout his career), that the U.S. intelligence community often classifies information solely because the “source, or means of collecting” the information is classified. He said that the challenge is to, “Operationalize the information that is classified so that we [the warfighters] can use it at the operational level. [Our allies/coalition partners] don’t need to know the system, but need to know the effect.” The transition from how we get the information (via intelligence technology) needs to be separated from the information provided. He seemed to insinuate that this is more a command problem than a true classification problem. He said that as a commander he continues to ask the question, “Why [is this classified]?” until he gets a satisfactory answer. He said that the normal bottom-line answer he receives to his inquiries is because the classifier says so. At that point he says, “You shoot them between the eyes and get on with it.”

Too often, if intelligence comes in through a classified system, there is not enough knowledge within the receiving CSAR staff to identify whether the information is actually classified. The rescue element needs to be involved early in the operation in order to deal with this on the spot to figure it out as it happens. During OAF, an 117 representative was always present in the CAOC with all EPA and ISOPREP data in a sealed container in the event an F-117 was lost. Once Vega 31 was shot down, there was minimal effort to gather this otherwise classified data. Once the container was open, the information was made available to all CSAR assets, of which only 50 percent were U.S. The U.S. commanders of OAF made a conscious decision that if information was essential and time critical, they were not going to hold any information back if that would jeopardize a CSAR operation, and the U.S. forces involved.

The U.S. decides the releasability of information on a country-by-country basis. In a 19 Nation alliance, releasability becomes a very complex issue. Because of the complexity and the lack of education on the issue, CSAR planners and controllers often do not know to whom the information can and cannot be transmitted. It’s the nature of the rules that if someone in the room is not cleared for receiving the information, then no one in the room gets the information. Thus, it is essential that CSAR planners plan ahead

to ensure that the information needed gets to those who need it. For OAF, the PRCC Director found it necessary to simplify the PR procedures for the operation in order to release procedural information to all of the NATO partners. The risk in this “lowest common denominator” approach is the loss of the ability to employ effective TTP because of its classification.

During the NATO Clean Hunter 2000 CSAR Exercise, the intelligence situation updates did not provide all the information the CRCC Staff needed. The intelligence specialists attributed the intelligence shortfall to two causes: a lack of exercise intelligence “inputs” to the scenario, and the releasability of classified information from the National Intelligence Centers (NICs) of the various countries participating. They said that every country has a problem with releasability to other countries, but the U.S. has the worst restrictions in NATO. They cited the alliance of SCANIC countries (Denmark, Norway, and Sweden) as a better example of close cooperation and releasability among allies.

The major issues that the 6 SOS has to contend with are the lack of commonality in C4I systems, and the releasability of classified information. In order to execute its mission, the 6 SOS depends upon its people to establish, maintain, and use “human relationships” with personnel from our Coalition partners. The ability to release classified information goes a long way toward building these relationships. Conversely, a refusal to release information can quickly destroy a relationship. JPRA has been getting requests from other countries to share survival training information. Currently, JPRA is prohibited from sharing information with other countries, with the exception of Britain, Australia, and Canada.

The HQ AFSOC PR representatives agreed that using the SOLE to perform the RCC/JSRC function is Coalition-Unfriendly. The SOLE operates in a U.S.-only facility because of the classified information it uses. Issues with releasability of classified information created this situation in the Balkans CAOC during OAF. The operation built perceptions of barriers between Theater Components and Coalition partners. The physical separation of the SOLE, the PRCC, and the CAOC attributed to this perception.

HQ NATO identified technology transfer as an issue that limits the capability of coalition partners to support personnel recovery. U.S. reluctance to transfer technology first results in coalitions with a lack of capability, and then results in coalitions that have developed individual, incompatible capabilities. NATO cited C4I systems as an example: TBMCS, CTAPS, and NATO C2 systems. For this reason, CSEL is not

currently the answer to coalition CSAR, because of its classification and export issues. However, there is a critical need for a common radio for all allies and coalition partners. The U.S. continues to develop U.S.-only systems that are classified, and not accessible to Allies. ACC is undertaking a coalition AOC Initiative to address this issue. This was a lesson learned in Operation Noble Anvil, where the Allies were isolated in one small room of the AOC.

HQ EUCOM identified an Information Operations/Information Warfare (IO/IW) issue with PR in a coalition environment. Coalition partners and their forces are not bound by U.S. public affairs policy, and are able to release any information they desire, even if the U.S. considers it sensitive. Thus, coalition PR has an added Operational Security (OPSEC) issue over U.S.-only PR. HQ EUCOM treats PR and CSAR as a Special Category (SPECAT) or “sensitive” mission during the operational planning process, to improve OPSEC. This, however, creates its own issues. There is a lack of coordination during planning, because the information is “compartmented.” There is no distribution of the OPSEC ROE during execution of the OPLAN. HQ EUCOM identified a need for an OPSEC annex to PR/CSAR OPLANs. EUCOM is aware of the issues and difficulties in conducting PR when both U.S.-only and coalition ATOs are being used simultaneously. But at this time, EUCOM has not yet identified a better solution for maintaining OPSEC.

The 355 FS representative discussed the problems experienced during OAF with releasing ISOPREPs and EPAs to Coalition partners because of U.S.-only information on SAFE areas contained in EPAs. This impacted the capability of the Coalition helicopters that were on CSAR alert during OAF. Vega 31, the F-117 pilot shot down in Serbia, noted that the use of two separate ATOs for Operation Allied Force (NATO) and Operation Noble Anvil (U.S.-Only) degraded situational awareness for the CSARTF alert crews.

At CK 2001, a helicopter pilot and Joint Search and Rescue Coordination Cell (JSRCC) controller from the Royal Canadian Air Force noted that the U.S. will not be able to standardize combat SAR capabilities within NATO or the PfP coalition if the U.S. does not share combat SAR information. This was done, to the extent allowed by U.S. disclosure policy, through the excellent efforts of the contingent from HQ USAFE.

## **7. Command and Control**

From the A-10 Sandys' perspective (81 FS), the number two CSAR issue or lesson learned from OAF was that the dual chains of command between the JFACC for CAF assets and the JSOTF for SOF assets is a critical disconnect. The lack of a clear chain of command nearly resulted in the fratricide of three SOF helicopters and crews. Although this is a "Joint" problem, it can be extrapolated to a Coalition problem for the CSAR mission area, particularly for the scenario of a downed allied pilot.

The CSAR SMEs at the 347 WG felt the number one PR issue within the coalition environment of OAF was the multiple chains of command the CSAR forces were responsible to within NATO, the Joint Special Operations Component, and the Joint Air Component.

According to the PR Representative at HQ U.S. Marine Corps, coalition operations would primarily remain at the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) level (equivalent to a Brigade or Group). Recent examples include the 22<sup>nd</sup> MEU participating in Bright Star with Syria and Jordan; the 11<sup>th</sup> and 31<sup>st</sup> MEUs operating in East Timor with Australians, under an Australian JFC. The U.S. Marine Corps would not give TACON of its assets to another JFC. Most U.S. Marine Corps interfacing with Allies and Coalition partners is directly with the Marines of those countries.

In the Balkans, command and control is being done on a daily basis for ongoing peacekeeping operations. This allows the C2 element to stay current in routine procedures. But, without regular combat recovery exercises, the C2 element will not be proficient at CSAR tasks and functions. For example, elements within the CAOC communicate daily to share intelligence, but do not address rescue-specific intelligence requests. Thus, they are not proficient at intelligence support functions for rescue. Each country is building up a cadre of experienced command and control personnel through temporary duty rotations. However, there is no mechanism in place to ensure experienced personnel support contingency operations.

A major problem within NATO is the lack of compatibility between command and control systems. The U.S. is generating its own problems with command and control systems, leaving other countries to go elsewhere to get the information that they need. The only viable approach that the OAF PRCC found was to use just one C2 system, and not waste effort attempting to integrate different "compatible" or "interoperable" C2 systems. The interoperability issue in NATO is magnified when PfP nations are considered.

The OAF PRCC Director identified the transfer of authority (TOA) from U.S. command to NATO command as a major issue in the European theater. Problems with TOA can delay deployment and employment of forces, and confuse the chain of command, violating the principle of “Unity of Command.”

## **8. Systems and Equipment**

There are four main systems and equipment issues:

- A lack of communications equipment; an inability of defense acquisition systems to keep pace with emerging information technology; and a reliance on old systems, using outdated technology, and requiring obsolete components for maintenance.
- Poor interoperability of communications systems among nations; an inability of alliances to standardize communications; and policies restricting technology transfer that prevent allies and coalition partners from developing common communications systems.
- A lack of combat-capable recovery assets; the lack of resources available for acquisition of CSAR-capable platforms; and the cost of developing a credible capability for current threats.
- Deficiencies and shortfalls in survival and evasion equipment for high-risk-of-capture personnel; incompatibility of fielded personal equipment with recovery assets; a lack of covert signaling devices, and a reliance on overt signals designed for peacetime SAR.

Key PR agencies cited these examples of the issues.

The Balkans CAOC has the state-of-the-art suite for providing a real-time air picture. However, the CAOC does not have a real-time picture of ground order of battle (GOB) or naval order of battle (NOB). A real-time surface picture is equally important to the PRCC as the air picture. All NATO forces experienced significant communications problems during OAF, including MIJI, LOS problems caused by the mountainous terrain, and overall degraded performance from adverse weather conditions.

The 32 AOS PR staff identified two major systems issues. First, the communications capability across coalition partners in NATO has significant interoperability problems. Although most can communicate satisfactorily internally, they cannot communicate with each other when acting in coalition. Second, NATO, and European countries in general, lack C4I infrastructure, particularly for secure communications, for their forces.

According to HQ NATO, standardization of C4I equipment is the current priority issue with regard to materiel standardization. The NATO CJTF concept will require a strategic C4I infrastructure. This infrastructure would be a candidate for a CSEL or PRMS ground segment, should either of those systems be exported.

The CSEL Program Manager from the U.S. Air Force System Program Office (SPO) discussed coalition applications of the CSEL system. The CSEL SPO has been tasked to examine the issues related to the sales of CSEL segments to Coalition partners. They have not yet done so, so the issues and their impact are as yet unknown. The SPO is currently proposing the sales of user segments (HHRs) and combined OTH/JSRC segments (in the form of a portable UBS/workstation similar to the system purchased by SOF) to allied forces. Each country would be responsible for providing its own on-orbit satellite(s). Who would develop the interfaces between the allied satellites and the ground-based systems was as yet undefined. The SPO proposed removing the LPE functionality from the export versions of the systems. The SPO is currently of the opinion that SAASM and NSA encryption are exportable features.

Beyond CSEL, NATO has identified other national C4I deficiencies, including imagery, and information management. NATO does not have all of the satellites that the U.S. has. The imagery platforms that NATO employs are outdated. NATO is looking for good imagery from higher sources. NATO can request U.S. support on an as-capable basis, but NATO does not always get the requested support. There is a new program in development between France and Germany on satellite capabilities to address shortfalls.

HQ SHAPE identifies CSAR as a serial line item. The serial line item defines a CSAR capability requirement (minimum package) for a NATO operation. There is no list of framework nations for the CSAR mission, but the current serial line item defines a minimum package that only the U.S. can fulfill. No other NATO nation currently has the necessary assets.

The French Air Force has identified the major issues with air refueling and is working solutions for guidance pubs, training programs, equipment, and integration/standardization with NATO. The French are not developing an end-to-end CSAR capability. They are focusing on a low-permissive threat capable CSAR force of combat helicopters and non-penetrating tankers. They are not addressing the issues of C2, RESCORT, OSC, Pararescue support, etc.

Spanish pilots are issued survival vests with a basic load of survival equipment. Optional items may be added at the pilot's discretion. The survival vest may be worn at

the pilot's discretion, so there is the possibility that the pilot could become isolated and not have the equipment issued to him, or have additional equipment not issued to him.

The USAFE CSAR representative expressed a need for a system to rapidly collect and disseminate PR information, and a need for a standardized information format. During OAF, the NATO ATO SPINS became the vehicle for information management. The SPINS contained the SARIR format, checklists, briefing guides, etc.

The U.K. is drafting a NATO Standards Agreement (STANAG 7007) to set a standard for electronic location systems used in CSAR. The standard will include survival radios and covert signals. The Exercise Bright Eye report identified the need for an RCC "intra-net based" secure message system to permit RCCs to communicate with each other (text messages and attachments).

A Romanian helicopter pilot and a Romanian pilot who flew C-130s and Mig-21s described their survival equipment. Romanian aircrews have survival vests, but the vests do not have strobes, night signal devices, or survival radios. The vests do have built-in battery packs for NVGs to enable the downed aircrew to navigate and evade at night. The vests do not contain GPS receivers, but many Romanian aircraft are now equipped with portable Garmin and Skyforce GPS receivers that can be removed from the aircraft and used for land navigation. The survival "seat kits" in the Mig ejection seats contain Russian-built VHF survival radios, but the Romanian pilots stated that they were of very low quality.

After the deployment of Task Force HAWK to Operation Allied Force, HQ U.S. Army, Europe documented the need for improved survival radios for aviation units. The Army identified the U.S. Army Systems Command as the implementing proponent. The General Accounting Office (GAO) identified it as a lesson learned requiring a long implementation period.<sup>8</sup> Other nations identified the same problem during OAF. OAF forces used PRC-112s, PRC-434As, and PRC-90s, which have limited range and LOS problems. Rescue forces experienced problems contacting survivors outside a 5 mile range while training with the PRC-90. Some UK forces had only radio beacons, with no voice capability. There was also a shortfall of covert signaling devices among partner nations during OAF. The U.S. provided 15,000 fireflies<sup>9</sup> to allied aircrews during OAF.

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<sup>8</sup> U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) report to the Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, March 2001, KOSOVO AIR OPERATIONS, Army Resolving Lessons Learned Regarding the Apache Helicopter, **GAO-01-401**.

<sup>9</sup> Fireflies are flashing LED signal devices visible in the infrared spectrum.

Vega 31, the F-117 pilot shot down in Serbia, discussed some of the equipment and technology shortfalls he encountered while evading. Immediately after the shootdown, Vega 31 was only able to establish two-way radio communication with Frank 36, a KC-135. He was not able to contact the designated AMC (Magic, a British AWACS), or a suitable OSC. Vega 31 practiced very good radio discipline, which frustrated friendly efforts by intelligence assets to locate him. When Vega 31 was asked what survival gear he did not have during his isolation that he would have liked to have had, his immediate answer was a STU-III telephone. His most pressing concern was getting good two-way communications with his rescuers and his concern that the Serbs could pick-up his transmissions on the PRC-112. Other than that, he said his next desire would have been some type of small night vision device (maybe one of the small monocle/telescoping devices) to improve his situational awareness in the dark; i.e., he couldn't see very far and this concerned him.

U.S. forces have experienced difficulties employing the latest technology in a coalition environment. Navy aircraft have encountered problems with anti-jam communications when using NATO key material. U.S. forces are putting information into Link 16, which is intended to be readily available and shared with our allies. However, it is the responsibility of our allies to provide their own Link 16 receivers.

Different countries have different capabilities, and many countries have aging assets. Modernizing CSAR capabilities are cost-intensive, and no other country has the budget of the U.S. Darren Lake writes:

As in many military matters, France is in some respects furthest along the path to independent action of all the European NATO nations. Like the USA, the French Air Force's (FAF) movement on the CSAR issue was shaped by its experience over the former Yugoslavia. Germany and Italy have also made moves towards gaining at least a minimal CSAR capability. Both countries have chosen to order a quantity of CSAR-capable NH-90s as part of their larger orders for the transport helicopter. The UK's CSAR capability is far less mature. There are no dedicated CSAR forces, nor is there a policy guiding CSAR needs yet agreed.... JDW understands that a policy has been formulated and is awaiting committee and ministerial approval. UK forces were twice involved in what could be characterized as CSAR missions while deployed in Sierra Leone last year. *One mission was relief airlift of 231 soldiers under siege by rebel forces. The other mission was forcible recovery of 7 hostages from rebel forces. Both are more correctly characterized as personnel recovery missions, as they do not fit the strict definition of CSAR.* Among the other NATO nations, several have shown a burgeoning interest in

CSAR. Last year, the Hellenic Air Force ordered four AS 532 Cougars configured for the CSAR role.... Turkey has also expressed interest in acquiring CSAR-configured helicopters. The armed forces are set to receive five CSAR-configured UH-60s as part of their larger order of 50.... Poland, one of the newest NATO members, has also begun showing an interest in CSAR although given its financial difficulties it is unclear how far the country will be able to go in building up a capability.... The Ministry of National Defense requested this year that four Mi-24 ('Hind') helicopters be outfitted for the CSAR role. The European NATO members are beginning to move towards developing CSAR. However, these nations are still behind providing even an approximation of the capability that the USA deems necessary for its forces.<sup>10</sup>

## 9. National Sovereignty

National sovereignty is not an issue for combat recovery. If the U.S. is engaged in open hostilities with another country, the PRCC need not concern itself with the violation of the enemy's national sovereignty when executing a recovery of isolated personnel from enemy territory. However, in many other circumstances, national sovereignty is a significant issue:

- During military operations other than war, such as peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations, the legal status of personnel isolated within the "subject country" can be unclear. The Host Nation can leverage any vagueness to limit the U.S.' recovery options to a negotiated recovery. This is the de facto situation today for peacekeeping forces flying over Serbia, as there are no U.S. recovery forces in the AOR. A recovery effort under this situation may require U.S. State Department involvement.
- If U.S. forces become isolated within the borders of an ally or coalition partner during a conflict, that ally or coalition partner has the right to disallow a U.S. recovery effort. By international law, the Host Nation has the right and the responsibility to recover personnel isolated within its territory and territorial waters. The U.S. cannot effect a recovery without a request for assistance from the Host Nation. This situation exists today in Operations Southern Watch and Northern Watch, with the countries bordering Iraq.
- An ally, coalition partner, or neutral country can deny U.S. recovery forces over flight privileges or right of passage through its territory. This can significantly delay a recovery mission, or even make it impossible. Syria's refusal to grant U.S. recovery forces right of passage resulted in the failure to rescue two downed aircrewmembers during Operation Desert Storm in 1991.

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<sup>10</sup> Lake, Darren, "Lost and Found," *Jane's Defense Weekly*, 30 May 2001, pp. 22-26.

- Although international law and the International SAR Plan permit rescue forces to enter sovereign territory or territorial waters without permission in “matters of life or death,” such actions may still precipitate an international incident, and might possibly trigger a hostile response from defense forces. For a number of African Nations (within the EUCOM Theater), no one can unequivocally state that the country will respect international law.

The USAFE AOS handles the RCC function for EUCOM when incidents of an aviation nature require U.S. assistance. The USAFE AOS has no requirement or billets for PR-trained personnel. All three of the USAFE PR positions are within the 32 AOS (which is also located at Ramstein AB, Germany). EUCOM and USAFE depend heavily upon host nation support for theater SAR responsibilities of U.S. citizens. USAFE does not monitor and coordinate all SAR missions for U.S. citizens within EUCOM AOR. USAFE only gets involved when a support request comes in from a host country. The 32 AOS PR staff concurred that this is a less-than-desirable situation, and has the potential for a disconnect with serious consequences. The USAFE AOS is a standing organization that handles daily operations for USAFE and performs current operations staff functions for the USAFE Commander.

The EUCOM theater has a wide range of PR capabilities and environments, much like SOUTHCOM. Europe is a very benign PR environment, and host countries have highly developed SAR capabilities. Africa is a very challenging PR environment, and few host countries have any SAR capabilities. Those that do are very limited: daytime only, clear weather only, no C2 infrastructure, etc.

National sovereignty also comes into play in efforts to address equipment and interoperability deficiencies. In the coalition arena, it is an additional barrier to acquisition of new, standard systems. Because of the financial impact, NATO has to deal with the politics of various countries and protectionist special interest groups. NATO cannot tell individual countries what systems to buy. The best NATO can do is set a standard, and encourage individual nations to build to that standard, using their domestic defense industries.

## **10. Rules of Engagement and Status of Forces**

The rules of engagement and legal status of forces established by other countries during a coalition operation all have the potential to significantly degrade the U.S.’ ability to effect the recovery of isolated personnel. A nation’s rules of engagement can be influenced by that country’s culture, ethnic background, political organizations and

motives, religion, and by international attitudes based on perceptions of the operation. These perceptions can be and are influenced by the way the media covers the operation.

HQ EUCOM has identified a deficiency in the mechanism for establishing the legal status of isolated personnel, particularly coalition personnel. Currently, NATO, the U.S., the coalition partners, and the adversary determine the legal status jointly. It is usually determined in real-time, after the isolating incident has occurred. Since the isolated person's legal status determines the recovery options available to the PRCC, this method severely degrades the PR planning process, and significantly delays execution of recovery efforts.

HQ SOCEUR voiced their concerns regarding the impact of other nations' cultural perception of the "value of PR" on coalition PR capability. There are different levels of risk tolerance among coalition partners. This includes both the risk to combat forces of being isolated, and the risk to forces recovering isolated personnel. It is possible that a nation with a low tolerance for these risks might place undue restrictions on a military operation or on personnel recovery missions.

The HQ USN PR Representative noted that the Italians have an aversion to the presence and activities of Special Operations Forces, much like Turkey does. Turkey's distrust of U.S. SOF is such that their rules of engagement are restrictive to the point of rendering them virtually ineffective.

The OAF PRCC Director noted that having ROE for PR forces that were different than the ROE for other combat forces had a negative impact on his ability to effectively employ. Consistent ROE for all forces is a key tenet of integration of the PR mission into the overall campaign.

## **11. Roles and Responsibilities**

The personnel recovery community uses a process to accomplish the PR mission. That process is broken down into roles and responsibilities. All of the roles and responsibilities must be assigned to, and accomplished by, some combination of units, agencies, and individuals. For successful accomplishment, these units, agencies, and individuals must be properly organized, trained, and equipped. There are three main issues with roles and responsibilities:

- An improper division of responsibilities within theaters of operations; a mal-assignment of PR responsibilities to allies and coalition partners.

- Deficiencies in HQ staff structure to meet the responsibilities for PR planning, training, and C2; shortfalls in theater staff proponentcy, advocacy, and expertise for CSAR.
- The lack of resources and technology in most countries to develop a PR system capable of meeting the PR responsibilities for an alliance or coalition; the lack of a dedicated CSAR Force for Coalition Forces.

Key PR agencies cited examples of each of the issues.

#### **a. Division of PR Responsibilities**

The SOCEUR concept of PR in a coalition environment is similar to the SOF concept of PR in a joint environment: Each Service/Country is responsible for the recovery of its own personnel. If the Service/Country is unable to recover its personnel immediately, the responsibility and mission will be assigned to SOF to plan and execute a deliberate PR mission. SOCEUR does not envision coalition operations below the JSOTF level. Thus, a single mission would be conducted unilaterally, without mixing forces of multiple countries (Isolation vs. Integration). That notwithstanding, the 352 SOG does train with British helicopters for Special operations missions.

SOCEUR views NATO's execution of OAF as such: NATO assigned geographic zones of responsibility commensurate with the capability of the coalition partner's force assigned to the zone. It seems highly unlikely that each zone could be geographically contiguous and, at the same time, homogeneous with respect to the threat. However, the plan was not always well executed. In 1994, the Norwegians and the British provided CSAR support for Allied forces enforcing the no-fly zone over Bosnia. During this period, the U.S. Navy noted a lack of clear delineation of zones for the elements of both Joint and Coalition forces.

The written NATO plan for PR is similar to the other PR plans in CENTCOM and PACOM that IDA has reviewed. Divide the theater into geographical zones, and assign coalition partners their zones. The same issues with non-permissive threat areas within zones still exist. The written plan for PR in a coalition operation is effectively non-applicable. The unwritten plan is to employ U.S. Air Force CSAR forces (either CAF or AFSOF) during contingency (combat) operations to conduct PR, regardless of threat, geography, or nationality of isolated personnel. Though unwritten, it is widely known and accepted. The underlying premise of the British SER course is that U.S. CSAR or PR forces will recover British pilots down behind enemy lines. Therefore, the course

syllabus is almost entirely based on the latest U.S. doctrine, CONOPS, terminology, and TTP.

The Balkans PRCC still relies on host nation support to perform SAR in friendly-controlled territory during peacetime. When no combat operations are on-going (the current case), the plan to recover isolated personnel from unfriendly-controlled territory (Serbia) involved diplomatic recovery efforts for “illegal detainees.” NATO has not currently planned for, or provided, PR assets to S-FOR or K-FOR for conduct of OAF.

All forces assigned to S-FOR, K-FOR, and the Balkan Air Operation are articulated by NATO through a Statement of Requirements (SOR) process. Once the SOR is sent to [participating] nations, each nation has the chance to send forces to fill the respective serials within the SOR. With respect to the current SOR for Balkan Air Operations (this covers the requirements for both S-FOR and K-FOR), the U.S. has not provided any personnel recovery assets. The personnel recovery requirements are met by other multi-national assets. This is a NATO operation, so the NATO PRCC within the Balkans CAOC manages all the personnel recovery forces.

The HQ EUCOM staff acknowledged that there is a political requirement to accept all forces offered to a coalition by each partner. This requirement is a leading factor in the “Isolation vs. Integration” concept that keeps appearing as a recurring theme in operations planning. It was the opinion of the EUCOM staff that the U.S. chain of command is unlikely to risk a coalition recovery effort for a U.S. IP, because of the potential effect of a failure of the mission. The EUCOM PR Representative did stress the need for theater based U.S. recovery assets, and the capability to plan and operate PR effectively throughout the spectrum of conflict, in order to back this policy with actual capability.

HQ EUCOM/J33 stated that the recovery forces tasked to recover a U.S. IP would depend on a number of factors: the proximity of the incident to friendly forces; the weather conditions; daylight or night mission; the enemy threat in the vicinity of the incident; and the availability of assets. In all likelihood, only the U.S. would have possessed the capability to recover the downed airmen if [they] had been downed in anything other than a permissive environment. The bottom line is that “the CAOC would task the best possible assets for the mission.” Only the U.S., the French (two French Navy Super Frelons and three French Air Force Pumas), and the Bulgarians (four Bulgarian MI-17 Hips) contributed CSAR assets to the force mix. Other than the U.S., only the French assets had even a minimal ability to operate in anything other than a

permissive environment, but even so, they are not nearly as capable as the U.S. assets provided during OAF. In the case of OAF, “the best possible assets for the mission” would, in all likelihood, have been U.S. assets.

The 352 SOG is presently the primary CSAR force provider for EUCOM. Their concept of PR in a coalition environment is similar to that of SOCEUR and EUCOM. Coalition forces are each assigned their own sectors. Forces are not integrated at the squadron level. Forces are integrated at the operational level, by geographic sector, but not by threat capability. However, there were some coalition training exercises at the squadron level (French Pumas flew with U.S. Pave Lows). Disconnects were noted in the operational planning process between and among coalition partners. Planning efforts were not shared, resulting in some duplication, and other shortfalls. This indicates a lack of advertised integration.

#### **b. HQ Staff Structure**

HQ U.S. Air Force/XOOP feels that Theater Command PR staff offices should be at the Combatant Commander staff level, rather than at the air component staff level. The PR staff office should be organized, trained, and equipped to plan, train, and execute (C2) all aspects of PR, including: CSAR, E&R, SERE, CoC, and NAR (UART/UARM).

A major issue identified by the 347 WG is theater staff proponency, advocacy, and expertise for CSAR. There is no effective theater staff to work planning and execution issues, such as: requirements, training, exercises, OPLANs, and deployments. They identified a lack of experienced CSAR personnel on the staffs, a lack of U.S. Air Force Weapons School graduates on the staffs, and the lack of promotion opportunities from JSRC/RCC positions as major factors of the issue.

Because of the manning situation, HQ EUCOM has not planned or implemented a PR/CSAR theater engagement effort. Also, USAFE cut CSAR personnel billets from the 32 AOG on two occasions. From 1999 to 2002, the CSAR staff drew down from five to three. Because the 32 AOG is the only unit having CSAR expertise within the European Theater, this has seriously impacted the Theater’s ability to plan CSAR operations and deploy CSAR C2 forces.

NATO CAOC #1 is permanently manned with 66 to 70 personnel. While all NATO Nations are responsible for manning, the vast majority of the personnel assigned are from Denmark. Britain and Germany also provide significant shares. There are *NO* U.S. personnel assigned to CAOC #1. Augmentation for Clean Hunter 2000 was

approximately ten personnel, four of whom were U.S. personnel. The CRCC consumed most of the augmentees, because it was the only cell of the CAOC that did not have a permanently assigned standing cadre. Execution of the PR missions during Clean Hunter 2000 was impacted by the lack of a permanent PR staff. After the exercise, the AIRNORTH CSAR Chief stated, "There is a lack of expertise in the CSAR side of the house." He identified the need for specialists to develop robust CSAR exercise scenarios, and improve the intelligence scenario.

PR is one of many additional duties for the single POC within HQ Army for all PR issues. All of his staff actions on PR issues has been coordination of joint issues, most of which originate from DPMO and JPRA. No one within the Army is generating any Service-specific PR issues requiring his staffing. The biggest gap in PR capability within HQ Army, and the Army in general, is the lack of knowledge. A basic education for Army Leaders on their PR responsibilities is lacking.

The U.S. Coast Guard has been participating in PACOM's execution of its Theater Engagement Plan (TEP), primarily because PACOM funds U.S. Coast Guard efforts. The U.S. Coast Guard is not resourced for worldwide theater engagement, regardless of the identified need.

### **c. Coalition CSAR Force**

There are three groupings of nations, both in terms of leadership and capability. The first is the Partnership-For-Peace Nations, who came from the Warsaw Pact, and are now seeking sufficient interoperability with NATO to join. The second is the NATO Alliance Nations. And the third is the U.S., who is technologically and resource-wise, ahead of all others and gaining ground continually. The U.S. is the only country that is able to put forward a full PR capability. The way that we do CSAR, no one else can do it without our assets.

The U.S. Air Force Representative to the NATO Military Agency for Standardization (MAS) emphasized the difficulties of working within the NATO structure and the slowness of real accomplishments. He stressed the need for the "leader nations," or "framework nations," mainly the U.S., Great Britain, and France; to get on board and out in front as a prerequisite for making any progress on an initiative. He noted that other NATO nations must increase their PR efforts to a level more comparable to U.S. efforts in order to make any progress.

The U.S., UK, and France are considered “framework” nations for conducting operations. Framework nations lead the operations and set the standard/requirement for: doctrine, TTP, language, C2 infrastructure, etc. Framework nations are responsible for providing all nations involved in an operation with the standard capability required by NATO for C4I (to include survival radios).

The Director of the Balkans CAOC was very positive about the need for a dedicated CSAR Force: A force trained specifically for CSAR Operations. He stated clearly that CSAR was a special mission that demanded specifically trained individuals.

Presently, HQ USAFE is not anticipating or planning for a major non-NATO military operation. They anticipate any unilateral U.S.-only military operations will be very limited in scope (the Libya raid, for example). For the foreseeable future, it is clear that military operations in Europe will be conducted in a coalition environment. If PR is to be conducted by an allied or coalition force in the future, a better way must be found. The HQ AIRNORTH CSAR Representative suggested that the CSAR mission is sufficiently important and specialized to warrant the creation of a NATO CSAR unit. The CSAR unit would be similar in concept to the NATO AEW unit. NATO funded the acquisition of Boeing E-3 AEW aircraft and funds their operations and maintenance. All NATO nations contribute to the unit’s manning.

The CK 2001 Deputy Director, a United Kingdom Royal Air Force Group Captain, had quite a few comments regarding the shortfalls in equipment and experience of the PfP Nations. In particular, he noted that “there is a shortfall of coalition assets capable of employing weapons in support of a combat SAR mission,” such as rescue escort (RESCORT), rescue combat air patrol (RESCAP), and rescue suppression of enemy air defenses. The actual CSAR missions were performed the second week of the exercise when seven CSAR missions were flown, five of which contained the necessary forces for an effective CSAR Task Force. Granted, the U.S. Air Force furnished the A-10s for RESCORT, but there are fighter aircraft within the PfP that, with proper training, could provide such support.

After the deployment of Task Force HAWK to Operation Allied Force, HQ U.S. Army, Europe documented the need to develop, resource, train, and sustain a combat search and rescue capability. The Army identified U.S. Joint Forces Command as the

implementing proponent. The General Accounting Office (GAO) identified it as a lesson learned in progress.<sup>11</sup>

The AIRNORTH CSAR Chief noted that all NATO nations have the same shortfall in PR planning expertise that the U.S. has. He is willing to accept assistance from 32 AOS, but it is not prudent to have all of the planners from the U.S. NATO will have to establish and sustain its own CSAR planning capability. One of the issues is continuity between exercise planning and execution. Within NATO, those who plan exercises do not always show up to execute the exercises. Also, NATO has been unable to deploy the same people to real-world operations that deployed to the training exercises. The people that show up for the operations lack the necessary experience.

## **12. Impact on National Will and Morale**

According to the USAFE Commander during OAF, the President of the U.S. was concerned with the timeliness of the CSAR mission to recover Vega 31, which took only 4.5 hours to accomplish. This high-level interest demonstrates that CSAR is a high-profile mission, and, although it is difficult, it must be done quickly and successfully. No other Country has a CSAR capability that equals the U.S.' combination of tactical helicopters and pararescue specialists. "This is our show and we'll never forgive ourselves if we left it to someone else [and they failed]."

The Wing Commander at Aviano AB, Italy, during OAF, noted that his Wing fought the war from home station. This provided the spouses and families of his pilots a high level of visibility into the operation. When he did lose a pilot, it was impossible to keep the information from quickly spreading across the base. He noted that conducting military operations in today's "information age" allowed a high level of scrutiny to be focused by the U.S. public and the political leadership on all aspects of the operation, including personnel recovery. This scrutiny would have jeopardized the political and national will to continue the operation, had the U.S. failed to recover a "recoverable" downed pilot. He also noted that the forces' morale was "high, but fragile." Assertions of excessive collateral damage, by opponents of the operation, were impacting morale. Failure to recover a recoverable survivor would have significantly impacted the troops' morale.

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<sup>11</sup> U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) report to the Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, March 2001, KOSOVO AIR OPERATIONS, Army Resolving Lessons Learned Regarding the Apache Helicopter, **GAO-01-401**.

HQ SOCEUR voiced their concerns with using assets from allies and coalition partners to provide a coalition PR capability. It was their opinion that the confidence of U.S. HRC personnel in the abilities of coalition forces was too low. They felt it was important that the U.S. make the effort to provide the “best capability” available for recovery of isolated personnel. They felt the cost of failure was too high to do otherwise.

The 347 WG CSAR SMEs did not feel there would be a problem with British CSAR forces recovering U.S. isolated personnel. Beyond that, they believed there is a lack of confidence among U.S. HRC personnel within the forces in the CSAR capability of other Coalition Nations. They felt the U.S. forces need a “credible insurance policy,” and using Coalition forces to provide CSAR support degrades the credibility of that support. Any threat to the credibility of the insurance policy will damage morale and capability of the combat forces.

While the Balkans JTF supports PRCC and CAOC plans to recover U.S. isolated personnel using coalition forces, it is unlikely that HQ EUCOM or HQ USAFE would support such a plan, considering the political cost of failure. Should a coalition force fail to recover a U.S. isolated person, the perception that the U.S. “stood by and did nothing” could undermine popular support within the U.S. for military operations in the Balkans.

The 32 AOS PR staff supports the use of coalition forces to recover U.S. isolated personnel. 32 AOS personnel flew with coalition CSAR forces during exercises, and have developed a respect/trust for their capability. This seems to be the deciding factor in this issue. People with experience working with coalition forces on PR missions support the integrated coalition PR concept. People without experience in coalition PR operations believe that only U.S. forces have a PR capability and should recover U.S. personnel.

Losing the will to fight as a result of the loss of an isolated person is less likely in other countries than it is in ours. Other countries’ resolve may be more susceptible to other circumstances, such as the financial impact of war.

## B. PROGRAMS AND ACTIVITIES



### 1. Cooperative Key (10-21 September 2001)

Cooperative Key 01 (CK01) is an annual Partnership for Peace (PfP) exercise. Host Nation responsibilities rotate among PfP and NATO countries every year. For 2001, CK01 was conducted at Graf Air Base in Plovdiv, Bulgaria, in September. The exercise is scenario-based and focuses on close air support, combat air patrol, combat search and rescue, medical evacuation and tactical airlift operations in peace support operations. The exercise also focuses on command and control structure and interoperability and allows the participating nations to practice setting up a multi-national air operations center. CK01 demonstrates support and commitment between NATO and PfP countries and supports U.S. European Command's commander-in-chief theater engagement policy.

The PfP program is a U.S. Secretary of Defense initiative designed to promote cooperation and mutual understanding between NATO and PfP nations. Exercises conducted under the auspices of PfP are designed to promote interoperability for future peace support missions that involve NATO and PfP nations. CK 01 affords the opportunity for NATO and PfP countries to practice and refine interoperability. Participating nations include:

- Austria
- Azerbaijan
- Bulgaria
- Croatia
- France
- Greece
- Hungary

- Italy
- Latvia
- Moldova
- Poland
- Romania
- Slovakia
- Slovenia
- Sweden
- Switzerland
- Turkey
- United Kingdom
- United States.

Within Europe, the significant differences among the countries of the NATO alliance are magnified when the PfP nations are included in an exercise. While the PfP coalition includes some Western European countries, it also includes a number of former Eastern Bloc countries. Most senior officers from these former Warsaw Pact countries speak Russian, rather than English, as a second language. Junior officers who speak English are difficult to retain, since they are in high demand, and are drawn to the high-paying civilian sector. Like most NATO nations, PfP nations have difficulty supporting their military logistically outside their own national boundaries. Their forces do not have an organic “supply train.” In addition, the problems that, over the years, have plagued NATO standardization, interoperability, and communications become serious when encountered in a PfP Exercise.

The CAOC was the focal point for all facets of the operational missions held the second week of the exercise (17 through 20 September). CAOC equipment and experienced key personnel were furnished by NATO’s AIRSOUTH Command located in Naples, Italy. In fact, a majority of the planning for the exercise was accomplished by personnel from AIRSOUTH, which also furnished the Exercise Director and key personnel throughout all exercise areas. The CAOC was made up of a combat plans section and a combat operations section, which is normal for NATO operations. Combat plans generated Air Tasking Orders (ATOs), and combat operations executed them. Both sections used a networked computer system called Initial CAOC Capability (ICC). ICC, which is based on a network of SUN/UNIX workstations, is a typical planning system

similar to Consolidated Theater Automated Planning System (CTAPS) or Theater Battle Management Core Systems (TBMCS). Although ICC is not as capable as TBMCS, it is much more user-friendly. ICC operates on the NATO CHRONOS network, which can support NATO classified information, although all information for this exercise was unclassified. ICC, which was developed by the NATO C3 Agency, a component of NATO, is deployed to more than 100 locations within NATO. Within the CAOC, the ICC battlespace picture was merged with the Recognized Air Picture (RAP), provided by the NATO AWACS. The AWACS transmits its radar picture via the Joint Tactical Information Dissemination System (JTIDS) Link-11 to a Dutch “link van” parked outside the CAOC. The link van translates the JTIDS transmissions to a RAP feed, much like a gateway.

Seven PfP nations furnished helicopters for CSAR events. In addition, Switzerland furnished a PUMA helicopter configured for medical evacuation and SAR, and the U.S. Air Force provided four A-10s with very experienced CSAR aircrews. In every respect, the CSAR events provided a great deal of much needed training for all participants – most of whom had never participated in CSAR events. The nations and their helicopters are:

- Austria                    3 Augusta-Bell 214Ns
- Bulgaria                   2 MI -17 Hips; 2 MI-24 Hind Gunships; 1 Bell-206
- Italy                        1 Augusta-Bell 212
- Hungary                    3 MI-17 Hips
- Romania                    2 PUMA SOCAT Gunships
- Slovenia                    2 Augusta-Bell 212s
- Slovakia                    1 MI-17 Hip
- Switzerland                1 Super PUMA.

The training week (11 to 15 September) began with academics on CSAR operations conducted by two experienced U.S. Air Force majors from the Air Force Special Operations Command at Hurlburt AFB, Florida, and the Air Force Weapons School at Nellis AFB, Nevada, respectively. This training proved invaluable, since almost all of the aircrews had never been involved in a CSAR Task Force, flown with gunships in formation, or even flown in formation with other helicopters in tactical scenarios. None had ever flown with the A-10s operating in a combat rescue role (Sandy

mission). The flying training during this week was dedicated to formation flying since it was not possible to fly with the A-10 squadron, as they were restricted to the hotel area.<sup>12</sup> However, the available U.S. Air Force CSAR-experienced personnel assigned to NATO were able to teach the various PFP aircrews about Joint CSAR tactics, techniques, and procedures, which proved to be quite valuable during the actual missions during the following week. Fortunately, the A-10 aircrews were released to participate in the exercise in time to fly in support of the CSAR Task Forces during the week of 17 to 20 September. In addition, their flight leader briefed with the helicopter crews for each mission, which also proved to be useful.

The improvement in aircrew knowledge and flying performance was remarkable. One of the Hip missions was a CSAR mission in which two Hips landed to pick up two survivors. This mission included escort by two Bulgarian MI-24s and two A-10s in the Sandy role. Although there were some mistakes, considering the experience of the aircrews, their overall performance was excellent.

A total of seven CSAR missions were flown, four of which were supported by U.S. Air Force A-10s. On each mission, there were armed men who acted in the role of security personnel and/or pararescue personnel (PJs). Once on the ground in the survivor's area, these armed men deployed for force protection. The Austrians flew a three-ship CSAR mission to pick up two survivors, one of whom was 'wounded' (in scenario) and needed to be placed upon a stretcher. Two Bulgarian MI-24s and four A-10s escorted the second Austrian mission of three AB-212Ns. A real mix was the CSAR mission consisting of two Slovenian AB-212s and an Italian AB-212 escorted by two Romanian PUMA Gunships and four A-10s. In a fourth mission, the three Hungarian Hips were escorted by two Bulgarian MI-24 Hinds and four A-10s. These missions were examples of "Personnel Recovery in a Coalition Environment." In addition to CSAR events, the helicopter crews participated in missions involving medical evacuation, troop transport, high-altitude parachute drops, ground assault, non-combatant evacuation, mass casualty evacuation, and the transport of refugees. Considering the low level of experience of the aircrews involved (with the exception of the A-10 aircrews), the results were outstanding. The aircrews maintained a very professional attitude and high-level of enthusiasm throughout the exercise.

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<sup>12</sup> Immediately after the attack on the World Trade Center on 11 September, the U.S. instituted the highest level of force protection conditions. U.S. military personnel not assigned to NATO were restricted to their hotel areas.

## 2. Sweden

IDA interviewed the Commander of the Swedish Air Force contingent, and a junior Viggen pilot. The Saab Viggen is a Swedish-built fighter aircraft. The Viggens deployed to Cooperative Key 2001 were configured as reconnaissance aircraft. Sweden identified the need for combat SAR in 1995, and began exploring options for developing a capability. The need was driven by Sweden's joining of the PfP and the European Union (EU), and the desire to transform a portion of its military into an expeditionary force. The Swedish Air Force now has one reconnaissance squadron and one airlift squadron that make up the "Swedish Air Force Rapid Action Force," or SWAFRAF. The SWAFRAF has considerable organic support infrastructure, enhancing its expeditionary capability outside Swedish borders. Since both SWAFRAF squadrons perform both day and night combat missions, both have the potential for daytime and night combat losses. Sweden has not yet developed a combat SAR capability, and depends on whatever coalition framework that it joins for combat SAR command and control, and recovery forces. The Swedish Army does have a newly formed combat survival school that teaches survival, evasion, and recovery procedures. The school was established with the assistance of a U.S. SERE mobile training team (MTT). The aircrew assigned to the two SWAFRAF squadrons were the first students to go through the school. The school did not have any SERE publications for the initial classes. The Swedish survival school is supported by a Swedish SAR helicopter squadron during combat SAR training exercises. The helicopters use combat recovery procedures provided by the U.S. SERE MTT, but are not currently equipped for CSAR. The SWAFRAF reconnaissance squadron, equipped with Saab Viggens, participated in CK 2001. For the first two combat SAR scenarios, pilots from the squadron played the role of "survivor." The survivors received spin-up training from U.S. and Swedish SERE instructors immediately prior to their respective exercise events.

One of the Swedish Viggen pilots from the reconnaissance squadron, who spoke excellent English, gave IDA the opportunity to examine, in detail, one of the new survival vests developed for all the SWAFRAF aircrews. The vest contained a compass, four penguin flares, a new U.S.-built strobe with an IR filter, a Garmin-12 GPS receiver, a poncho, and several plastic water packs. The poncho and water packs are placed to act as padding around the wearer's lower back. The poncho pocket could also hold a map or evasion chart. The vest also has pockets for a survival radio and a semi-automatic pistol. For training missions, the pistol pocket contains a plastic-coated dummy pistol that replicates the size, shape, and weight of the actual weapon. This helps the wearer

become accustomed to the feel of the vest under actual combat conditions. The survival radio pocket is large enough to hold a PRC-90, PRC-112, or PRQ-7 survival radio. The Swedish Air Force has purchased survival radios that operate only on UHF/VHF guard frequencies, in voice and beacon modes. These radios are suitable only for peacetime operations. The Swedish Air Force intends to purchase combat survival radios in the future.

### **3. Bulgaria**

IDA interviewed a junior officer in the Bulgarian Air Force who speaks excellent English, in addition to Russian, and, of course, Bulgarian. The 1<sup>st</sup> Lieutenant, an Mi-24 gunner, flew as element lead of a two-ship escort element of Mi-24s on his first combat SAR task force (CSARTF) mission, and flew as flight lead of a four-ship flight of Mi-24s and Mi-8s on his second CSARTF mission. He was trained by Russian flight instructors who had flown Hinds in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation, 1979-1989. He described for U.S. improvements made to the Hind and to Soviet Hind tactics as a result of the Soviet experience in Afghanistan. The Hind is well-armored against small arms fire, particularly from the bottom and front. The pilot's upper body, visible from the side through a large canopy, is the most vulnerable element of the helicopter. The Afghans developed anti-helicopter tactics using sniper rifles and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). Afghan snipers would shoot at the pilots. Because Hinds were originally built with only a single set of flight controls in the back seat, if the sniper hit the pilot, the helicopter inevitably crashed. Hinds are now built with dual controls, so the gunner can fly the helicopter as well from the front seat.

The nose gun on the Hind is a four-barrel 12.7mm machine gun that is slaved to the gunner's helmet, so that it points where the gunner is looking. The gun has a very fast slew rate and a very high rate of fire. If the gunner saw an Afghan shoot an RPG at the helicopter, the gun could react fast enough that he reportedly could lay down "barrage fire" in the flight path of the RPG and destroy it in flight. The Soviets did not attempt to rescue the helicopter crews shot down in Afghanistan. The Soviets considered the helicopters to be inexpensive, and the crews to be "expendable," and, as such, did not warrant the risk of further casualties to a recovery force. The Lieutenant noted that the Afghans never took prisoners during the 10-year war. Any aircrewman captured was killed, many in terrible ways.

The Mi-24 Hind was originally designed for deep attack operations up to 100 kilometers behind enemy lines. The Hind is a combination anti-tank weapon and

insertion platform for special forces. The Mi-24 has a small, air-conditioned cabin that can hold an eight-man team. The Mi-24 has four weapons stores stations and four anti-tank missile rails. The anti-tank missiles are command radar guided and have shaped charges that are extremely effective against armor. The Hind's command radar guidance system is an interesting combination of optical and radar cueing. The Mi-24 gunner observed the target through an optical sight in the helicopter's right chin blister. A radar antenna in the left chin blister is slaved to the optical sight, and illuminates the target. The missiles "ride the beam" to the target. While the radar is obviously susceptible to jamming, the targeting system is more effective than IR systems for targets that are concealed by smoke or other obscurants. The optical component allows the gunner to shoot at anything he can see. Reportedly, this includes aircraft. The Lieutenant stated that the missiles were effective for tail shots and face shots (minimal traversing velocity) against aircraft within 2 kilometers.

Although the Mi-24 was intended for the anti-tank role, the Soviets found it to be an excellent anti-personnel weapon in Afghanistan. The preferred configuration was the 12.7mm chin gun; with two similar guns mounted in pods on the inboard hard points and CBUs, rocket pods, or grenade launcher pods on the outboard hard points.

#### **4. The Netherlands**

The Netherlands presently has a SAR capability, consisting of: one Navy Lynx helicopter squadron; one Air Force AB 412 helicopter squadron; and one Navy P-3 patrol aircraft squadron. SAR is the primary mission for the helicopter squadrons, and a secondary mission for the patrol squadron. None of the squadrons has a mobility capability for deployment outside the Netherlands. The Netherlands does not currently have a combat recovery capability, and their SAR aircraft are not armed or otherwise equipped for Combat SAR. They are planning to develop a CSAR capability in the near future, and they have an established CSAR training program. The training program is based on NATO ATP-62 and U.S. CSAR doctrine.

The Netherlands has identified all its aircrewmembers as HRC personnel and is providing SERE training and survival/evasion kits for them. The survival kits are standardized, and include: PRC-112 (when deployed out-of-area), GPS, infrared strobe light, additional signal devices, water, food, and protective equipment. All aircrewmembers are required to carry their survival kits when flying. The Netherlands is planning to replace its PRC-112s with CSEL, if and when it becomes available. They are not

currently participating in any combined technology development, R&D, or acquisition programs for SAR or CSAR systems.

The Netherlands has a Rescue Coordination Center (RCC) acknowledged by the IAMSAR Organization. The RCC does participate in SAR exercises with live forces and live survivors, but it does not presently participate in CSAR exercises. The RCC does not have a mobility capability. The Netherlands does participate in joint and combined SAR and CSAR field training exercises, such as Cooperative Key. Dutch pilots participating as survivor/evaders documented the need to faithfully and diligently execute their EPAs as a lesson learned from a recent coalition CSAR field exercise.



**APPENDIX G**

**FUNCTIONAL UNIFIED COMMANDS – SPECIAL OPERATIONS  
COMMAND AND JOINT FORCES COMMAND**





## **APPENDIX G**

### **FUNCTIONAL UNIFIED COMMANDS – SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND & JOINT FORCES COMMAND**

#### **A. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND**

U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) was formally established as a unified combatant command at MacDill AFB, Florida, on 16 April 1987, and commanded by a four star general officer with the title of Combatant Commander Special Operations Command (SOCOM). SOCOM, one of nine unified commands in the U.S. military's combatant command structure, is composed of Army, Navy, and Air Force special operations forces (SOF). SOCOM's mission is to support the geographic Combatant Commanders, ambassadors and their country teams, and other government agencies by preparing SOF to successfully conduct special operations.

The SOCOM Commander has two roles. In his capacity as a supporting combatant commander, he provides trained and ready SOF. In his role as a supported

combatant commander, he must be prepared to exercise command of selected special operations missions when directed by the President or Secretary of Defense.

Congress mandated the creation of SOCOM in 1987 to correct serious deficiencies in the ability of the United States to conduct special operations and engage in low-intensity conflict activities. The command was assigned many Service-like responsibilities, including training, ensuring combat readiness, monitoring personnel promotions and assignments, and developing and acquiring SOF-peculiar equipment. SOCOM was also given responsibility for managing a separate major force program (MFP), MFP-11, which ensures the SOF program has visibility at the Department of Defense and congressional levels. These last two tasks give SOCOM great flexibility in training, equipping, and employing its forces. Combatant Commander SOCOM is the sole unified commander with responsibility for planning, programming, and budgeting of military forces. In addition, he has the authority similar to that of a Service chief for the development and acquisition of special operations-peculiar equipment, materials, supplies, and services. In short, he is the only Combatant Commander with a checkbook.

Under the same legislation that created SOCOM, Congress also established the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)) as the policy and resource focal point for all special operations and low-intensity conflict activities of the Department of Defense. Aided by these reforms, enormous improvements in the readiness and capabilities of special operations forces were made.

Special Operations (SO) encompass the use of small units in direct or indirect military actions focused on strategic or operational objectives. They require units with combinations of trained specialized personnel, equipment, and tactics that exceed the routine capabilities of conventional military forces. SO are characterized by certain attributes that cumulatively distinguish them from conventional operations. These operations are politically sensitive missions where only the best equipped and most proficient forces must be deployed to avoid detection and possible mission failure that can result in damage to U.S. prestige and interests.

All SOF of the Army, Navy, and Air Force based in the United States are placed under Special Operations Command. SOCOM has three service component commands: Army Special Operations Command (ASOC) Ft. Bragg, North Carolina; Naval Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM) Coronado, California; Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) Hurlburt Field, Florida; and one sub-unified command,

Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) Ft. Bragg, North Carolina. SOCOM exists to provide special operations forces to the President and Secretary of Defense, regional combatant commanders, and American ambassadors and their country teams for successful conduct of special operations during both peace and war. SOCOM prepares SOF to successfully conduct special operations, including civil affairs (CA) and psychological operations (PSYOP). Responsibilities of SOCOM include:

- Readiness of assigned forces and monitoring the readiness of overseas SOF
- Monitoring the professional development of all SOF personnel
- Developing joint SOF tactics, techniques, and procedures
- Conducting specialized courses of instruction
- Training assigned forces
- Executing its own program and budget (its funding comes directly from Congress and not from the Services)
- Conducting research, development, and acquisition of special operations peculiar items.

Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) was established in 1980 and is located at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. JSOC is a joint headquarters designed to study special operations requirements and techniques; ensure interoperability and equipment standardization; plan and conduct joint special operations exercises and training; and develop joint special operations tactics.

Since 1988, each of the theater unified commands have established a separate Special Operations Command (SOC) to meet its theater-unique special operations requirements. As subordinate unified commands, the theater SOCs provide the planning, preparation, and command and control of SOF from the Army, Navy, and Air Force. They ensure that SOF strategic capabilities are fully employed and that SOF are fully synchronized with conventional military operations, when applicable.

Theater SOCs offer several advantages to regional commanders. As peacetime elements, the SOCs are the nucleus around which a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) can be structured. They provide a clear chain of command for in-theater SOF as well as the staff expertise to plan, conduct, and support joint SO in the theater's area of responsibility. These special operations may include General Purpose Forces (GPF) under operational control (OPCON) to a SOC. Theater SOCs normally exercise OPCON of SOF (except PSYOP and CA) within each geographic Combatant Commander area of responsibility. Additionally, the SOCs ensure that SOF personnel fully participate in

theater mission planning and that theater component commanders are thoroughly familiar with SOF operational and support requirements and capabilities. While Combatant Commander SOC provides funding and personnel for the SOCs, each SOC reports directly to the geographic Combatant Commander.

SOCs, established as sub-unified commands of the combatant unified commands, are the geographic Combatant Commanders' sources of expertise in all areas of special operations, providing the Combatant Commanders with a separate element to plan and control the employment of joint SOF in military operations. Additionally, SOCs provide the nucleus for the establishment of a joint special operations task force (JSOTF), when a joint task force is formed. There are six SOCs supporting geographic Combatant Commanders worldwide.


## **B. JOINT FORCES COMMAND**

U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) has a unique mission. Unified commands may be categorized as geographic (Central Command, European Command, Pacific Command, and Southern Command) or functional (Special Operations Command, Space Command, Strategic Command, and Transportation Command). Today's Joint Forces Command forms a hybrid. Joint Forces Command's main effort goes to the functional role as the chief advocate for jointness and leaders of U.S. military transformation. The Command also applies a powerful effort supporting other Combatant Commanders, its own Atlantic Theater, and emerging domestic U.S. requirements.

JFCOM retains responsibility for the North Atlantic and adjacent arctic and subarctic waters. Although the threat in this region is low, the political and economic importance of the Transatlantic link remains as vital as ever. Iceland, Greenland, the Azores, and Bermuda constitute vital ground. The Atlantic sea lanes and air lanes are always crowded with traffic crucial to the well being of many countries, including the U.S. The Combatant Commander's title as Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) for NATO keeps the theater in full perspective. It's important to both U.S. allies and U.S. citizens.

JFCOM speaks for the joint warfighters, in partnership with the Services. JFCOM's purpose is to ensure that joint operations become as coherent and capable as they can, to allow for the widest range of effective options for joint force commanders, the President and SECDEF.

New mission needs have to be defined and entered into the Department of Defense (DoD) Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). With that in mind, the Command looks to find those issues that cross joint boundaries and come up with the right documentation to advance them throughout the DoD. JFCOM can resolve many inter-service issues in the near term, without pushing into the more deliberate realm of joint requirements. Interoperability can be improved with technical fixes, procedural adjustments, and shared experiences.



**Figure 1. Atlantic Region**

Every joint training event, experiment, and actual operation results in lessons learned. JFCOM gathers those lessons, analyzes them for fixes, and then proposes practical solutions for joint warfighters. JFCOM is a joint trainer that has a distinct role assisting other unified commands with joint training worldwide. Because JFCOM believes that how the U.S. fights is more important than specific weapons, transformational concepts, like RDO, intentionally build on the training excellence that characterizes U.S. joint forces. Each of the U.S. Services reinvented quality training in the wake of the Vietnam War. Building on that strength, JFCOM continues to develop and enhance the same kind of ethos at the joint level.

Most conventional forces in the continental United States fall under the combatant command of JFCOM. Some important joint capabilities are also resident here, accessible through cybernet pathways. Together, forces and capabilities provide the muscle for

meeting the needs of the other unified commanders. JFCOM ensures that U.S. stateside contingents launch into action trained and ready to succeed.

## **C. ISSUES**

The listed issues and problems were ones presented and discussed at the majority of the team's meetings. In the paragraphs that set forth the specifics of each category of issue, these items are brought out as they pertain to the agency that identified the issue. It should be noted that several issues/problems of U.S. Joint Forces and U.S. individual Services have a direct impact on the effectiveness of a coalition force when assigned.

### **1. Policy**

The main policy issue is a deficiency of "enabling" policy. Brigadier General Wurster, U.S. Air Force, the SOCPAC Commander, provided a clear position on the subject of policy for "personnel recovery in a coalition environment." The CSAR force commander needs the authority to be able to decide whether to execute a recovery, defined as the "authority to enable success." This is an issue that potentially conflicts with DoD policy of "President or Secretary of Defense direction" to recover allied and coalition personnel.

### **2. Tactics**

The primary tactical issue is a deficiency of PR tactics. ASOC personnel indicated that the "PR Umbrella" is too complex when viewed from the warfighter level. Presently, there is no tactical guidance coming down from the Theater SOCs to the supporting special forces groups (SFGs) for the HRC personnel. The SFGs want Theater-specific, detailed guidance in the form of CONOPS and TTP. ASOC is also concerned about the pending transition of vertical lift support from the AFSOC MH-53 to the 160<sup>th</sup> SOAR MH-47. SFGs do not work routinely with the Navy, and the 160<sup>th</sup> SOAR has resisted attempts to train for PR missions. 160<sup>th</sup> SOAR policies hinder PR training and capability (i.e., live hoist restrictions). When the AFSOC units are deactivated, ASOC is concerned that the PR capability will be lost.

### **3. Interoperability**

Key SOCOM and JFCOM PR agencies identified interoperability, compatibility, and standardization issues for:

- Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) and doctrine

- Systems and equipment

Brigadier General Samuel Helland, U.S. Marine Corps, the JFCOM J-3/5, opened the JFCOM PR Council proceedings with some very pertinent and positive statements which in many ways set the tone for the council meeting. In his remarks, he stressed the need for “jointness” across the board. He stressed the need for Service standardization, interoperability and the employment of set tactics, techniques, concepts of operations, and doctrine. General Helland came to center stage with a CSEL radio in his hand. He made the point that there are a lot of survival radios in the various Service inventories, but they are not standard and they are not using the latest technology.

When using SOF to conduct rescue, the Joint Force Commander faces an interoperability dilemma. Does the commander integrate conventional RESCORT, RESCAP, C2 aircraft, etc., or does he make it an entirely SOF package (often preferred by SOF)? If he chooses to integrate, are the conventional and SOF assets familiar with each others’ operating procedures?

SOCAPAC does not want JPRA involved in “standardizing” SOF CSAR. This was a surprising position from the SOF community, that JPRA is not “SOF-oriented” enough, given that the conventional community sees JPRA as too “SOF-oriented.” The SOCPAC Commander’s position is that there is significant risk involved in any attempt by the U.S. to recover an untrained/unequipped survivor from a high-threat environment. Coalition isolated personnel are more likely than U.S. isolated personnel to be ill-trained or ill-equipped. The lack of interoperability of coalition HRC personnel with the U.S. PR architecture increases the risk to U.S. forces.

#### **4. Training and Exercises**

Far and away the most common issue encountered during this study has been training. Nearly every representative, agency, and organization that IDA interviewed cited the lack of training, training deficiencies, or the need for more training as a problem for PR capability in all environments, including the coalition environment. There are two main training issues for SOCOM and JFCOM:

- A lack of combined CSAR exercises for coalition forces to train together; small combined exercises that do not include all of the key assets and the critical interactions; a lack of CSAR assets in-theater to participate in combined exercises.

- Training and experience deficiencies for personnel assigned permanently and temporarily to key positions responsible for planning, coordination, execution, and C2 of PR operations.

Key SOCOM and JFCOM PR agencies cited examples of each of the issues.

AFSOC PR Representatives concurred with the concept that U.S. forces need to train well jointly before trying coalition CSARTF training in a live-fly environment. As an initial step, AFSOC is making an effort to get involved in Blue, Red, and Green Flag exercises, and Desert Rescue. They require scenario events that support “deliberate” PR missions as well as “immediate” CSAR missions. They identified the AC-130 as a potential AMC/OSC platform, but acknowledged that no aircrew on AC-130s receives any special training for those roles. It was their opinion that airborne C2 training for the CAS mission was sufficient.

The AFSOC representatives unanimously agreed that SOF technology and SOF training standards are necessary to successfully conduct CSAR on today’s and future battlefields. They all considered ACC’s training standards to be insufficient.

A JFCOM J-72 representative gave an excellent presentation on JPRA training issues. There is no question that all types of PR training have the attention of the PR Community and in many areas there have been positive improvements. However, much needs to be done for “Joint Training between U.S. Services and with Coalition Partners.”

## **5. Releasability of Classified Information**

ASOC does not currently teach any unconventional assisted recovery or non-conventional assisted recovery (UAR/NAR) doctrine or TTP to coalition partners, although ASOC used to train with Germany and Britain for unconventional assisted recovery team or mechanism (UART/UARM) missions. Recent technologies have made it more difficult to move coalition personnel through a UARM. The classification of technology used in UARMs prevents its release to coalition partners.

Security is ASOC’s biggest concern with coalition operations. The inclusion of coalition partners increases the operational security risk to the “SF on the ground” during execution of an operation. This is why SOCSOUTH does not do coalition special operations.

SOCPAC does not advocate UAR because, at Exercise Tandem Thrust 2001, held in Australia, the Australian deputy commander assigned to the JSOTF could have potentially been supported by UAR, but was not allowed visibility into the process

because of its classification. SOCPAC does not want limited capabilities, such as UAR, to compete for resources with new aircraft, CSEL, or other elements of PR that have broad capabilities applicable to all environments.

## **6. Command and Control**

ASOC identified the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) as a means of deconfliction during execution of actual special operations (separate but simultaneous), but not a means of combining Coalition forces under a single commander.

## **7. Systems and Equipment**

There are three main systems and equipment issues within SOCOM:

- A lack of communications equipment; an inability of defense acquisition systems to keep pace with emerging information technology; and a reliance on old systems, using outdated technology, and requiring obsolete components for maintenance.
- A lack of combat-capable recovery assets; the lack of resources available for acquisition of CSAR-capable platforms; and the cost of developing a credible capability for current threats.
- Deficiencies and shortfalls in survival and evasion equipment for high-risk-of-capture personnel; incompatibility of fielded personal equipment with recovery assets; a lack of covert signaling devices, and a reliance on overt signals designed for peacetime SAR.

Key SOCOM PR agencies cited these examples of the issues.

SOC SOUTH does not exercise its PR plans, because its plans are based on assets that are not available.

ASOC explained its need for fingerprints on the ISOPREP in detail. Fingerprinting is a low-tech, foolproof method that requires minimal training and no language commonality. This makes it an ideal method for use in a Coalition environment. Fingerprint coding is an art and, as such, fingerprint codes are not suitable substitutes for actual fingerprints on the ISOPREP. Fingerprints are also used to prevent infiltrators from entering the escape and evasion net. ASOC's issue with the fingerprints is an example of their overall concern that the DoD has a narrow perception that PR is just for downed pilots. In fact, they referred to PR as an acronym for "pilot recovery." ASOC is concerned that the needs of the SF ground teams are being neglected. Another example is the shortage of survival radios in SOF, where there is only one radio for every

three soldiers. The survival radios the SFGs do have are not secure, and the forces do not have access to them for training on a regular basis. All these factors increase the risk of SF personnel not being rescued and/or being captured because of poor employment of the radio.

It is SOCPAC's position that CSEL is needed to support coalition warfare. Recent coalition operations have demonstrated the need either to establish multiple rescue mechanisms to support personnel with different equipment from different countries, or to establish a single rescue mechanism geared to the "lowest common denominator." From a commander's perspective, there is the potential for political fallout from CSEL "haves" vs. "have nots" within a coalition operation, because the CSEL "haves" would, in effect, be more likely to be rescued. SOCPAC also identified a need for a technology solution that overcomes the language barriers between nations.

## **8. Rules of Engagement and Status of Forces**

SOCOM identified the impact on host nations of deploying SOF for SAR and CSAR as a key issue of PR in a coalition environment. SAR and CSAR can be used as a non-threatening opportunity to encourage combined training exercises with our coalition partners. However, many countries are wary of SOF's duality of purpose. Foreign governments recognize SOF's ability to support insurgency as well as SAR. As a result of this concern, host nations have imposed more restrictive rules of engagement on SOF performing SAR duties. Rescue forces do not carry the stigma that SOF carries with respect to our coalition partners. HQ SOCOM cited Turkey as an example, and the Air Staff cited Italy as an example.

## **9. Roles and Responsibilities**

The personnel recovery community uses a process to accomplish the PR mission. That process is broken down into roles and responsibilities. All of the roles and responsibilities must be assigned to, and accomplished by, some combination of units, agencies, and individuals. For successful accomplishment, these units, agencies, and individuals must be properly organized, trained, and equipped. The main issues with roles and responsibilities that concern JFCOM and SOCOM are the deficiency in HQ staff structures to meet the responsibilities for PR planning, training, and C2; and shortfalls in theater staff proponency, advocacy, and expertise for CSAR. SOCOM and JFCOM PR agencies cited examples of the issue.

Like the Theater Combatant Commands, HQ SOCOM has only one person assigned full-time to staff PR and CSAR issues. Within SOCOM, the critical mass of manpower and resources is found within HQ AFSOC, the U.S. Air Force Component of SOCOM. The SOCOM PR POC has concentrated on representing SOCOM at HHQ events, and updating PR-related documentation. SOCOM recently published its first-ever PR directive, SOCOM Directive 525-21.

The AFSOC PR representatives identified a number of issues affecting SOCOM's ability to fulfill its roles and responsibilities:

- No progress is being made in the Theaters on developing PR offices on the Combatant Commanders' staffs. PR Councils show little change in the status of organizations and programs.
- The priority and visibility apparent at the SECDEF level is not reaching down to the force-provider level. There is no emphasis to organize, train, or equip.
- The U.S. Air Force needs a single POC for all CSAR assets (similar in function to the now-defunct HQ Air Rescue Service).

JFCOM J-3/5 advocated the requirement for a senior point of contact within the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Commander of SOCPAC stated his policy with respect to personnel recovery:

- PR is a Service/Component responsibility.
- Components within the Theater will share resources to meet surge requirements.
- Components will relax the parochial protection of tactical control (TACON) over assets.
- A UAR capability will not be pursued until everyone in the Theater has CSEL.

The biggest issue facing SOCPAC was the impact of the pending replacement of a squadron of Air Force MH-53 Pave Low helicopters by a company of Army MH-47 Chinook helicopters. Some of the concerns included the change in the chain of command, the geographic separation of the Chinook company from supporting and supported units, the differences in training and mission qualifications of the aircrews, and the cost of flying the forces to a common training area. Regarding the MH-53/MH-47 swap, the SOCPAC PR Council Chairman stated that funding was not sufficient to fulfill all of the current PR roles and responsibilities.

The 2001 meeting was only the third annual meeting of the SOCPAC PR Council. Like many of the less mature PR Councils within DoD, SOCPAC's agenda is dominated by basic issues of funding and training at the Component and Joint level. The Council did not identify any coalition personnel recovery issues for action.

## **10. Impact on National Will and Morale**

The SOCPAC Commander noted that there is significant risk involved in any attempt by the U.S. to recover an untrained/unequipped survivor from a high-threat environment. Coalition isolated personnel are more likely than U.S. isolated personnel to be ill-trained or ill-equipped. However, there is the potential for political backlash if the U.S. were not to attempt the recovery. The Commander feels the political fallout generated by U.S. losses sustained during a CSAR effort for a coalition isolated person could be severe.

HQ ASOC is the force provider of ground forces to SOCOM. Regarding Coalition CSAR and PR forces, SF personnel would clearly prefer support from U.S. recovery helicopters. SF personnel indicated they would be comfortable with British UAR teams, but would not be comfortable with recovery forces from any Balkan Nation. In general, SF personnel would be comfortable with any traditional U.S. Ally, but are not confident of any non-traditional Coalition partner. ASOC PR representatives identified Britain and Australia as the only two Allies having an effective SOF capability.

The SFG supporting SOUTHCOM does not consider the PR plan to be a "credible insurance policy." SFG personnel supporting SOUTHCOM pointed out that other countries experience the same difficulties while operating jointly that the U.S. Services do, which inhibits their ability to operate in a Coalition environment. Brazil is the only country in South/Central America where SF does not routinely operate.

## **D. PROGRAMS AND RESULTS**

### **1. Interoperability**

In preparing for integration into the Expeditionary Air Force, AFSOC recently formed a dedicated PR branch within its HQ/XO Directorate. This is an interesting (and welcome) development since SOF has historically considered PR a "collateral" rather than a primary mission. Formation of this dedicated branch may indicate increased attention by AFSOC to the recovery function. AFSOC will provide a special operations liaison element (SOLE) as part of the AOC for an AEF. Currently, there are two SOLEs

identified at HQ AFSOC, Hurlburt Field, and one deployed permanently in SWA. SOLE personnel are training with TBMCS. A section of the SOLE staff is identified to augment the JSRC, RCC, or PRCC.

## **2. Training**

SOCOM uses an AFSOC organization, the 6<sup>th</sup> Special Operations Squadron (6 SOS), located at Hurlburt AFB, Florida, as a means for training our coalition partners to conduct SAR. The 6 SOS is a combat advisory unit activated for the purpose of advising and training foreign aviation units to employ and sustain their own assets in both peace and war, and, when necessary, to integrate those assets into joint, multi-national operations. It supports the theater combatant commanders in three interrelated areas: foreign internal defense (FID), unconventional warfare (UW), and coalition support. The mission area also encompasses collateral activities such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

Aviation-FID training and advice include airpower doctrine development, force planning, and operational support as well as tactical employment in such mission areas as airlift, fighter operations, forward air control (FAC), search and rescue (SAR), special tactics (ST), and gunship operations. This assistance includes both rotary and fixed-wing aircraft. Assistance in aviation support operations includes aircraft maintenance, supply, logistics, airbase ground defense, munitions, ground safety, command and control, communications, intelligence, and risk management. Operations associated with aviation-FID include support for counterinsurgency and counter drug operations. Additionally, the aviation-FID squadron supports the following special operations missions and collateral activities: Unconventional Warfare (UW); Coalition Support; and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief.

Title 10, Section 2011, of U.S. Code permits SOCOM to train with foreign countries if it is necessary to train for its wartime mission: “The training benefit derived by the foreign country must be incidental and unavoidable.” This permits the 6 SOS to train for its mission in contradiction to the Foreign Assistance Act, that requires all traditional security assistance (such as training) to be funded under the Foreign Military Sales program. The fact that only SOCOM can do this via Title 10 presents a dilemma. SOF can conduct training with Coalition partners outside of a JCS-sponsored exercise using O&M funds, but SOF is not welcome in many countries, because of the perceived insurgency threat that they represent. Other means of training with Coalition partners include Exchange Officers, Joint-Combined Exchange Training (JCET), and JCS

Exercises. JCET requires each country to train to its own Mission Essential Task List (METL). The DoD does not currently have any dedicated PR forces trained specifically to “engage” coalition forces in a training or advisory role. If the DoD opted to pursue this course of action, designated Rescue Squadrons (RQS) could adopt the same training program used by the 6 SOS to train newly-assigned personnel. Engagement could include exchange visits, and combined training exercises, either JCETs or JCS-sponsored.

Training opportunities typically originate at the request of the Foreign Area Officer (FAO), the military assistant to the Diplomat or the Ambassador assigned to a Host Nation. Also, the missions trained to by the 6 SOS are tied to specific Theater Engagement Strategies, which are controlled by the Combatant Commanders. There must be an identified training requirement from the respective Theater Combatant Commander or Theater SOC. However, the deployments are not guided by any National strategy or plan. The 6 SOS is currently supporting Peru and Ecuador, which is not where U.S. priorities are currently focused.

The 6 SOS is divided into four flights, each flight being responsible for supporting a geographic Theater: CENTCOM, EUCOM, PACOM, and SOUTHCOM. Three of the flights have personnel with second language skills. The SOUTHCOM flight has Spanish-speaking personnel; the PACOM flight has Korean-speaking personnel, and the CENTCOM flight has Arabic speaking personnel. The prerequisite language training is the longest and most expensive part of the training needed by 6 SOS personnel. 6 SOS has identified the fact that highly-trained people are key to the process, as well as technology. As an example of the importance of the human element, 6 SOS personnel cited the practice of tailoring the training curriculum for the Host Nation. Aircrew Coordination Training (ACT) is not taught in CENTCOM because of the relationship between Arabic officers and enlisted personnel. The concept of officer and enlisted aircrew being equals is foreign to them, so ACT would be inappropriate.

The flights perform the unit’s mission by deploying Operational Aviation Detachments (OADs) to the Host Nations to perform training/advisory/assessment visits. Prior to each deployment, 6 SOS intelligence specialists review published intelligence on the country the team is deploying to. 6 SOS has found the DIA information to be of little use. Problems include: unreliable sources, out-dated information, and one-dimensional data on OB only, with no information on intent, capability, preparation, training, maintenance, logistics, etc. Because a majority of 6 SOS personnel come from other units within AFSOC, their experience base lies primarily in helicopter and C-130 aircraft. Most of their FID missions involve training for special operations, SAR, CSAR, vertical

lift, and airlift missions. 6 SOS has personnel qualified in various foreign and non-DoD aircraft, including: Puma, Super Puma, MI-17, UH-1H/N, and Bell 212/412. Several of the helicopter pilots assigned to 6 SOS have both CSAR and SOF experience.

When foreign countries integrate forces into a Coalition operation that is supported by 6 SOS, the 6 SOS CC envisions key positions on foreign assets and platforms being filled by U.S. (6 SOS) personnel. For example, if a foreign country provided a helicopter to a Coalition operation for a CSAR mission, the Aircraft Commander and Pararescue Specialist would be U.S. personnel, assigned or attached to the OAD from 6 SOS.



**APPENDIX H**  
**BIBLIOGRAPHY**



## **APPENDIX H**

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# REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

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<b>14. ABSTRACT</b> This paper provides an analysis to the Defense POW/MIA Office (DPMO) on policy to improve a Combatant Commander-in-Chief's ability to conduct Personnel Recovery (PR) in a coalition environment. The report is based on information collected through surveys and interviews of experts within the U.S. and Partner Nation PR communities. Key premises that focused the scope of the study include: a focus on coalition-unique issues to the exclusion of the common Joint and Service issues, such as manpower, funding, training, and Joint doctrine deficiencies; a hypothesis that interoperability is a key factor; and a hypothesis that Alliances and Coalitions are the same. The report finds that Allies and Coalition Partners are not yet ready to participate in combined PR operations, and that Coalition Partners rely on the U.S. for PR support. The lack of combined training exercises is the primary challenge to improving PR support to combined operations. The report also finds that current DoD PR policy is not perfectly aligned with today's coalition environment. The report includes recommendations that DoD increase and improve PR training in combined exercises, and DPMO update DoD PR policy to enable DoD to provide better PR support in a coalition environment.					
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