THE IMPLICATIONS OF RUSSIAN FEDERATION MEMBERSHIP IN NATO

by

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June 2002

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Co-advisor: Mikhail Tsypkin

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The long-term stability and security of North America, Europe, and Russia remain unresolved. To date, the best and most successful security institution in Europe has been NATO. If not today, then sometime in the near future Russian membership in NATO must be addressed. If Russia were to join, then these implications could be a planning guide to ease the entry of Russia into NATO.
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ABSTRACT

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The long-term stability and security of North America, Europe, and Russia remain unresolved. To date, the best and most successful security institution in Europe has been NATO. If not today, then sometime in the near future Russian membership in NATO must be addressed. If Russia were to join, then these implications could be a planning guide to ease the entry of Russia into NATO.
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<td>AFSOUTH</td>
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<td>AWACS</td>
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<td>CFE</td>
<td>Conventional Forces Europe</td>
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<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
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<td>CPD</td>
<td>Congress of People’s Deputies</td>
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<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>GLCM</td>
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<td>IFOR</td>
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<td>Integrated Military Structure or International Military Staff</td>
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<td>MAP</td>
<td>Membership Action Plan</td>
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<td>NSWP</td>
<td>Non Soviet Warsaw Pact</td>
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<td>NAC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Council</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<td>NACC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Cooperation Council</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NRC</td>
<td>NATO-Russia Council</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<td>PFP</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace</td>
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<td>PJC</td>
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<td>SCO</td>
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<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>United Nations Protection Force</td>
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<td>WEU</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Due to the recent creation of the new NATO-Russia Council on May 28, 2002, driven by the alliance in the war against terrorism spurred by the September 11, 2001 attacks, it is necessary to explore the implications of possible Russian membership in NATO. Although the creation of this new institution (that replaces the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council that was established in 1997) does not indicate the immediate entry or pursuit of a “Membership Action Plan” by Russia into NATO, it does signal the end of nearly a half-century of confrontation between NATO and Russia. It also symbolizes the entrance of a new era of security cooperation, post-Cold War but also post-September 11.

After briefly examining the origins of NATO and its past enlargements as well as past NATO-Russian relations, the critical geostrategic, political, organizational, regional, and military implications are analyzed. The questions that determine these essential implications are: a) Will US/Russian power dominate the alliance? b) Will US and Russia dictate policy to the other great powers in the alliance, such as Great Britain, France, and Germany? (Would this blow NATO apart and eliminate the strategic balance in Europe?) c) What are possible reactions from China? d) How are the former Soviet republics in Central Asia, Ukraine, and the Baltic states affected?

Additionally, if Russia were to fully join NATO, the current command structure would require reform. Bringing the Russian military into NATO’s Integrated Military Structure (IMS) requires not only the reform of the Russian military; it requires the reorganization of the IMS itself.

The long-term stability and security of North America, Europe, and Russia are still unresolved. To date, the best security institution in Europe has been NATO. If not today, then sometime in the near future Russian membership in NATO must be addressed. If Russia were to join, then these implications could be a planning guide to ease the entry of Russia into NATO. It would not be easy.
I. INTRODUCTION

Two events stand out in the last 15 years that shape the current state of international relations. First, the end of the Cold War (1989-1991) brought instability and uncertainty to the formerly fixed and familiar bipolar world wrought by the struggle between communism and capitalism represented, respectively, by the Soviet Union and the United States. Liberated—or abandoned, depending on one’s perspective—by the Superpowers’ truce and relative disengagement, lesser nations were now able—or forced, again depending on one’s perspective—to guard their own interests, and nationalism and ethnic tensions flourished, followed by transnational terrorism and criminal activity. Second, the events of September 11, 2001 served as a reminder of the ever-present threat of terrorism, and highlighted for the former Cold War foes the importance of both regional security organizations and inter-organizational communication. Consequently, interdependence and cooperation have emerged as the dominant means by which international relations and security are strengthened.

Arguably, the most politically prominent and surely the most militarily powerful representation of interdependence is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Regarded by some as a relic of the Cold War, NATO persists in playing a persuasive and influential role, not only in the North Atlantic region, but in Eurasia and Central Asia as well. Given that among its original aims was to unite and galvanize its members against the spread of communism, until recently it would have been laughable to suggest that NATO might one day admit into membership the very nation that commanded the helm of that threat. However, with the current “War on Terrorism” astride the international landscape and setting the stage for this thesis, the prospect of Russian membership in NATO is no longer a ridiculous notion. Indeed, on May 14, 2002 at a meeting of the foreign ministers of NATO and Russia in Reykjavik, Iceland, NATO approved a “landmark agreement accepting Russia, the former enemy it was formed to fight, into a new partnership with the allies on terrorism, arms control and international crisis management in a post-Sept. 11 world.”

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Inclusion in this partnership does not make Russia a member of the alliance. In fact, its 19 nations, including the US, retain “full control over membership in the alliance and over core military decisions and the use of allied troops to defend member nations.” However, the creation of the NATO-Russia Council (as the new body will be called), does signal the end of nearly a half-century of confrontation between Russia and the West. It is also in many ways a “crowning achievement for Russian President Vladimir Putin, who has pushed a policy of rapprochement with the West that has had as one of its ultimate goals Russia’s integration into Western military structures.”

Certainly, the fact that Russia can truly sit in a body with the other 19 members of NATO, all as individual nation-states and not as a “bloc” against Russia, illustrates that a new era of security cooperation has begun. While it is probably premature to say that Russian membership in NATO is inevitable, clearly it is no longer unthinkable.

Direct cooperation between the United States and Russia has also apparently yielded a historic nuclear arms cut between the two nations. “The United States and Russia announced unexpectedly on May 13 (2002) that Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin would indeed have an arms control agreement to sign when the two hold summit talks in Moscow and St. Petersburg later this month.” While this and any nuclear arms reduction treaty would require the ratification of the US Senate and the Russian Duma, it is expected to pass both, and demonstrates that the spirit of security cooperation has never been better between the West and Russia.

Although the possibility of Russian membership in NATO is but a recent development, cooperation between the two entities is not something new. In fact, precedent for robust cooperation between Russia and NATO has been in place for over a decade. Since the explosion of the Balkan wars in the 1990s, Russia and NATO have worked together in the Implementation and Stabilization Force (IFOR/SFOR) in Bosnia and in the Kosovo Force (KFOR) in Kosovo.

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2 Ibid.
One needs only to look at relatively recent news headlines to see that uncharted territory is being forged elsewhere in of the post-Cold War era. In an interview shortly after the 11 September 2001 attacks, former Russian Prime Minister Sergei V. Stepashin, speaking on US-Russian cooperation in the war against terrorism, said “There is a historic precedent for this. In 1941, we fought together against fascism, and I don’t see any obstacles to returning to that old scheme of cooperation.” Furthermore, in the New York Times of October 8, 2001, one of the main headlines was “2nd Wave of Troops Arrives in Uzbekistan”—meaning more US military personnel and equipment arriving at a former Soviet air base in Uzbekistan. Likewise, on November 12, 2001, the London Times reported that “Putin Places Russian Forces On Alert to Rescue US Aircrew.”

It bears mention that Russian desires to become closer to the West have historical foundations. Early in the 18th century, Peter the Great was calling for Russia to reform itself—socially, economically and politically—by looking to the West. As part of this crusade, according to Jean Rousset de Missy, c.1730, he ordered citizens to adopt western styles of dress and coif, and imposed a tax on those who did not comply. In addition, he “…established Russia’s naval forces, reorganized the army according to European models, streamlined the government, and mobilized Russia’s financial and human resources.” An enduring symbol of this effort is the city of St. Petersburg, which he had built entirely facing the west as an embodiment of his “Windows to the West” campaign. In light of the emphasis he has placed on normalizing relations with the West, it should be noted that current President Putin is also a native of St. Petersburg.

Meanwhile, contemporary collaboration between Russia, NATO and the US must force policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic to realize that Russian membership in NATO could occur in the not too distant future. In fact, the acceleration of NATO-Russian cooperation since last September 11th suggests that the shared threat of terrorism could ultimately be the catalyst for the complete political, economic, and military integration of Russian into the West and its security institutions.

5 http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/sep2001/nf20010921_9366.htm
6 http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/petergreat.html
It is perhaps an oversimplification, but nevertheless accurate, to suggest that this unity in the face of terrorism is, at least in part, a case of “us verses them.” A notable example of this phenomenon lies in the history of Great Britain. At the time of that nation’s inception, it was the common threat of an “other” which drew the ordinarily contentious Welsh, Scottish, and English together. “The sense of a common identity here did not come into being, then, because of an integration and homogenisation of disparate cultures. Instead, Britishness was superimposed over an array of internal differences in response to contact with the Other, and above all in response to conflict with the Other (emphasis added).”\(^8\) This is not to argue that a new nation will be formed with the integration of Russia into NATO and the West, but to illustrate that it is often a common foe, rather than mutual friendship that brings unity and alliance.

Having established that Russian membership in NATO is a possibility, this thesis will examine the major implications of that possibility becoming a reality. In order to structure the argument, some assumptions must be made.

The first assumption is that the character of NATO has not essentially changed, but in fact remains a collective defense organization as envisioned with the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington in April 1949. In particular, Article 5 of the Treaty, which is often quoted as defining the nature of the organization because it states what is meant by collective defense and gives the alliance its backbone, would remain unchanged in either content or interpretation:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all, and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually, and in concert with the other Parties, such actions as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore the maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.\(^9\)


Likewise, the provisions for collective security embedded in Articles 3 and 4 would not change. Collective security, itself may be defined as “an effort by states to manage security challenges by organizing power on the basis of all-against-one crisis management. The goal is to create an international environment in which stability emerges through cooperation rather than competition. Violators of norms and principles will be punished through collective action.”10 Article 3 adds that, “…the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.”11

Additional assumptions apply as well. First, it is assumed that the Russian military has not fundamentally reformed, but remains a conscription-based force and is largely organized like it was during the Soviet period. It is further assumed that Russia would be invited to join NATO as a strategic necessity—not unlike Portugal in 1949, Greece and Turkey in 1952, or West Germany in 1954-55—and that the threat of terrorism would be the impetus for both the offer and acceptance of that invitation. Finally, it is assumed that Russia would participate fully in alliance institutions, (i.e. in the integrated military structure) and that other current applicant countries have already joined NATO, including the Baltic nations and Romania, for example.

A. HYPOTHESIS

This thesis assumes that Russia is a de facto member, or is about to become a member of NATO since, considering the steps taken by the two entities since the September 11th hijackings (discussed above) this scenario is no longer so farfetched. It is reasonable to assume that additional catastrophes on the scale of September 11th could be launched, particularly in light of the war being waged by the Bush Administration in Afghanistan and beyond. Such attacks on the US and/or its major allies and friends—including Russia—could bring the newest NATO conferee immediately into the Alliance for common defense.

This thesis explores the critical geostrategic, regional, political, organizational and military implications of such an entry into NATO. As indicated, it assumes that Russia and NATO have recently formed a new strategic partnership, which followed earlier meetings between institutions of NATO and Russian officials, as reported below:

The NATO PA-Russian Federal Assembly Joint Monitoring Group (JMG) will hold its fifth meeting on 28 Feb-1 Mar 2002 at SHAPE (Mons) and NATO Headquarters, Brussels. The Group will be briefed by NATO and Russian officials and military officers on the state of NATO-Russia relations, the implications of September 11 and co-operation against terrorism, the work and future of the PJC, co-operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo and other areas of practical co-operation. Particular attention will be paid to the work currently in progress in the creation of a new council bringing together NATO member states and Russia to identify and pursue opportunities for joint action at 20.12

Additionally, an international conference was held in St. Petersburg on 22 February 2002 entitled, “Russia-NATO Strategic Partnership: not whether but when?” High level participants from NATO and Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries addressed the conference, which focused on the state of NATO-Russia relations in the political and military spheres and prospects for further development. Other issues included:

The challenges in establishing a political dialogue between NATO and Russia and the question of Russian membership in NATO (emphasis added,) NATO-Russia cooperation in the anti-terrorist campaign and public opinion on NATO-Russia relations in Russia and Western Europe. Participants also discussed freedom of the press in Russia, the evolution in NATO's strategy, the role of the military in NATO's decision making process and the impact of NATO enlargement on the internal processes of the Alliance.13

B. METHODOLOGY

The methodology used will be policy analysis. The aim is to devise a blueprint for future policymakers to use if and when Russia seeks to join the Atlantic Alliance, and to

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12 “NATO and Russian Parliamentarians to discuss the new NATO-Russia relationship” NATO Parliamentary Assembly Press Communiqué-27 Feb 02, accessed from www.nato.int.

13 Ibid.
inspire creative thought and debate regarding how the United States and its allies can prepare for the time when Russia is a member of that alliance.

The techniques employed in pursuit of these goals will be locating and dissecting pertinent scholarly writings, and interviewing former and current NATO military authorities and experts in the field of NATO and Russian relations. These authorities and/or experts are: Dr. Rainer Vadim Grenewitz of the Marshall Center in Garmisch, Germany; COL Jeff Johnson, USAF, former planner and staff officer on the US delegation to NATO’s Military Committee; current staff officer on the US delegation to NATO’s Military Committee, COL Thomas J. McKinley; Dr. Valeriy Yarynich, former colonel in the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces; MAJ Igor Bulgakov, Ukrainian Armed Forces; and Mr. Thomas-Durell Young, Senior Lecturer, Center for Civil Military Relations (CCMR) and former Research Professor at the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College.

This thesis consists of five chapters, including an introduction and conclusion. Among the information to be presented is a brief history and analysis of NATO and its enlargement, followed by a tour of NATO-Russia relations covering, among other things, essential background information about the Soviet/NATO era. The next section will discuss Russia’s current view of its relationship with NATO in light of—and in spite of—the creation of a new NATO-Russian Council in May 2002.

The heart of the thesis will identify the most critical implications of Russian membership in NATO and what they might mean for the future. While the geostrategic, political, organizational, regional, and military implications will be examined, a special segment will be included on how a new NATO command structure might look and the implications for any such reform. The conclusion will summarize the previous chapters and present those recommendations, if any, that might facilitate the preparation of both parties for Russia’s eventual membership of Russia into NATO.
II. NATO AND ITS ENLARGEMENT: A SHORT HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

A. THE ORIGINS OF NATO

Any thorough analysis of the implications of Russian membership in NATO must examine the origins of the Alliance itself, which was largely formed to counteract Soviet influence and aggression in Western Europe. Although there is no language in the North Atlantic Treaty that targets the Soviet Union as the enemy (indeed, in the Brussels Treaty of March 1948, the “precursor” of the North Atlantic Treaty, the only enemy listed was a re-militarized Germany bringing the 5 countries of the UK, France, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg together in the Western Union), it is well understood that the creation of the Alliance was an “effort to bring political stability to a continent threatened by Soviet expansion.”

While defense against the threatening policies and growing military capacity of the Soviet Union drew the signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty together, one of the preeminent purposes behind the alliance was to tie North America to European security.

This process began with the original 1948 Brussels Treaty, demonstrating European solidarity in order to commit the US to Europe, but proved no easy task due to US resistance to forging long term agreements. Though victorious in World War II, the US had quickly demobilized its troops in Europe in 1946 and appeared hesitant to assume the onus of global leadership. Likewise, although the US was part of the Grand Alliance (along with the UK and Soviet Union) that defeated a Nazi Germany, the tradition of not joining permanent military alliances remained strong.

This tradition can be traced to George Washington’s words in his “Farewell Address” to the American people in 1796, excerpted below and on the following page:

The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign Nations, is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little Political connection as possible. -- So far as we have already formed engagements, let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. --

Here let us stop. -- Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none, or a very remote relation. -- Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. -- Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships, or enmities.

Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? -- Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground? -- Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor, or caprice? 15

Washington’s words, which led to a tradition of isolationism in American history, were not the only ones used in resistance to the United States’ potential involvement in an entangling military alliance. Hesitation also came from the military establishment, which, according to one NATO historian, was concerned that, “Military assistance could mean depleting stocks at a time when the defense budget was under tight constraints…” and doubted that, “even after combining their resources Western Europe could resist a Soviet invasion.” 16 Another group, the so-called “internationalists” who envisioned a new world with the advent of the United Nations, felt that, “…a military alliance would represent a return to the discredited concept of the balance of power that had been responsible for so much misery in the first half of the twentieth century.” 17

All of these concerns ultimately influenced the shaping of NATO. The military eventually supported the alliance after the Joint Chiefs of Staff realized that a military assistance program would modernize their own weaponry. They were further satisfied by the dissociation of the treaty commitments from automatic military assistance (recall that Article 5 in NATO mentions “taking … such action as it deems necessary” and not “all the military and other aid and assistance in their power” 18 from the Brussels Treaty). The isolationists also were more or less satisfied with the wording of Article 5 as opposed to Article IV of the original 1948 Brussels Treaty. The concerns of the internationalists were soothed with references to the UN Charter that were incorporated into many articles

16 Kaplan, Lawrence S., The Long Entanglement, NATO’s First Fifty Years, pp. 3-4.
17 Ibid. p. 4.
18 The Brussels Treaty of 1948 can be found at: http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b480317a.htm.
of the treaty. In fact, according to one NATO historian, “The treaty was made to appear as if NATO was to be just another regional organization that would fit under Article 53 in Chapter VIII of the charter.” However, that particular article in fact never mentioned in the treaty at all. This omission was crucial because regional organizations had to report to the UN Security Council and the Soviet Union was a permanent member of that body. The question of compatibility was successfully evaded when the UN issue arose in the Senate hearings on ratification of the treaty in April and May 1949.

These complicated origins set the tone for the Alliance and consensus, negotiation, and compromise became its operating principals. These principals have stood as the cornerstones of NATO operation and enlargement since 1949.

B. THE ENLARGEMENT OF NATO

Determining the physical limits and political character in terms of NATO enlargement have historically been thorny, and it would be so in the case of Russia today. Although Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty defines the geographic territory protected by NATO, since the beginning of the Washington Treaty, signed in 1949, there have often been controversies regarding admitting certain nations to the alliance. This applies even for some of the original twelve members, which included Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

One of the most controversial countries to be admitted among the original twelve was Portugal. Under Salazar Portugal was not democratic country, and its regime, therefore, did not fit with the language within the preamble of the Washington Treaty, which states that the parties to the treaty are “…determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.” Despite this conflict, Portugal was admitted to the Alliance because of the properties it controlled in the Atlantic Ocean—

19 Kaplan, The Long Entanglement, NATO’s First Fifty Years, p. 4.
20 Ibid. p. 4.
namely the Azores, which were “vital bases for American ships and planes carrying military supplies to Europe.”22

Another controversial original member was Italy, regarding which there were two primary issues. The first of these was the inauspicious fact that Italy had been one of the Axis powers up until 1943. The second conflict related to Italy’s location in the Mediterranean, which was not even close to the “North Atlantic” area. The US fought for Italy’s admission to the Alliance, in part because of concern for its instability and vulnerability to communist subversion. Washington further argued that Italian membership in the Alliance would strengthen France’s flank. The Western Union members, however, were not enthusiastic about Italian membership and it ultimately required a concession to France—the inclusion of the Algerian departments—before that country would agree to Italy’s membership.23

The admission of new members would prove no less complicated, despite the fact that the expansion of the Alliance was anticipated and addressed by the framers of the treaty. Specifically, Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that, “The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty.”24

The initial expansions of the alliance in 1952 and 1955 reflected the impact of the Korean War and the Mediterranean business leftover from 1949, and ultimately turned the alliance into a true military organization. According to one historian:

Fearing that the Korean War was a consequence of the temptations that a divided nation offered to aggressors, divided Germany became the focus of NATO’s attention. A paper organization developed into a military organization centered in Paris and with its forces deployed along the Iron Curtain, particularly along the inner German border.25

22 Kaplan, The Long Entanglement, NATO’s First Fifty Years, p. 5.
23 Ibid. p. 31.
25 Kaplan, The Long Entanglement, NATO’s First Fifty Years, p. 30.
Evidence of this trend can be seen in the addition of Greece and Turkey. Clearly, neither of these countries can be identified as Atlantic powers, yet, their membership in the Alliance was necessary to “contain” the Soviet Union. They were, likewise, important to the new command of General Eisenhower as contributors of new troops and sentinels of the NATO’s southern flank. Moreover, they were vitally important to the security and dominance of the US Navy’s Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean.

Next, came the “German Question.” Given Germany’s recent history, its accession to NATO in 1954-55 was not easy for the Europeans to accept. From the American point of view, it was illogical to not have a German component to NATO. In the face of the Cold War and the Soviet menace, which had brought all the allies together to form NATO to begin with, the old problems of denazification and demilitarization seemed irrelevant—at least to Americans, as is discussed below:

Manpower was needed, and the Germans could provide it; space for maneuvers, for bases, for deployment of troops was all the more vital, and that space was in the Federal Republic of Germany. Rear bases in France or the United Kingdom may have been important, but German soil would be the front line of any assault from the east. Not only was it illogical to omit the German component to NATO, it was also unfair. Why should Americans—and Europeans—labor to defend a West that includes Germany without the Germans participating in the common defense?26

Europeans members, however, did not share this attitude. With less than 10 years having passed since the end of Nazi Germany, memories were very fresh, and there were fears of what a revived Germany might do. France, in particular, objected to Germany’s inclusion to the Alliance and delayed its entry as long as possible. The initial result of this delay was the idea of the European Defense Community (EDC). This would create a European force under a European minister of defense. The EDC, however, never came to fruition with its complicated terms and protocols that put many restrictions on how a German army would be organized and operate. The collapse of the EDC, after the French National Assembly scuttled it, propelled the European allies to accept the Federal Republic of Germany—with some restrictions on the production of nuclear weapons and

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provisions regarding troop participation—into the Western Union, and as the fifteenth member of NATO.\textsuperscript{27}

The next expansion occurred with the acceptance of Spain in 1982. Although this did not add troops to the forward lines between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, according to the paragraph below, it did give strategic depth to NATO and a much-needed boost in the psychological morale of the alliance:

NATO planners viewed Spain’s relatively secure landmass as a potentially major strategic asset, forming a marshaling area and a redoubt from which air and sea attacks could be launched against Warsaw Pact forces. In a crisis, it would be highly valuable as a transit center and a supply depot for reinforcement from the United States. The Spanish navy and air force, operating from bases located in the Balearic Islands and southern Spain, afforded NATO a stronger position in the western Mediterranean. The Canary Islands bases would be important for safeguarding shipping lanes, particularly for oil tankers bound for the North Atlantic and the North Sea. Moreover, the addition of a new and important West European country imparted a useful psychological boost to NATO, helping to demonstrate the restored vitality of the alliance.\textsuperscript{28}

The accession of Spain can be thought of as part of that nation’s “post-Franco ‘return to Europe.’”\textsuperscript{29} It was also, in reality, the last expansion against a Soviet threat.

The next expansion, and perhaps better termed as the first enlargement, happened nearly ten years after the end of the Cold War with the admittance of three former Soviet satellites, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, in 1999. As mentioned earlier in this paper, the inclusion of these former Warsaw Pact nations into the alliance less than 10 years after the end of the Cold War was extraordinary, but reflected NATO’s “basic goal of enhancing security and extending stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area, complementing broader trends towards integration, notably the enlargement of the EU and WEU and the strengthening of the OSCE. It threatens no one.”\textsuperscript{30} This is to say that the addition of these three countries was neither inevitable nor easy.

\textsuperscript{27} Kaplan, Lawrence S., The Long Entanglement, NATO’s First Fifty Years, p. 61.


\textsuperscript{29} Yost, David S., NATO Transformed, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, D.C., 1998, p. 32.

\textsuperscript{30} NATO Handbook, p. 81.
The debate on the enlargement of NATO began almost as soon as the Berlin Wall began to crumble. Although caught by surprise with the events of November 1989, NATO finally did declare at their London summit in July 1990 that: “The Atlantic Community must reach out to the countries which were our adversaries in the Cold War, and extend to them the hand of friendship.”\(^{31}\)

The initial steps toward opening the alliance to new members began with the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). In October 1991, then Secretary of State James Baker and then German foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher proposed this structure that was:

intended to develop a more institutional relationship of “consultation and cooperation.” It would focus on security and related issues, including defense planning, conceptual approaches to arms control, democratic concepts of civilian-military relations, civil-military coordination of air traffic control, military-civilian defense conversion, scientific and environmental issues, and dissemination of information about NATO in Central and Eastern Europe.\(^{32}\)

In November 1991 the NATO Rome summit formally proposed the NACC. Shortly thereafter, the Soviet Union dissolved (officially on December 21, 1991.) Subsequently, the new Russian President, Boris Yeltsin, raised the prospect of Russia joining NATO.

This was not the first time that Soviet or Russian authorities had approached the subject of Russian membership in the Alliance. The first such proposal was made on March 31, 1954—barely a year after Stalin’s death—but was not regarded as serious. In fact, it was—in both design and effect—a strategic and rhetorical maneuver that confirmed the Soviet assertion that NATO was an anti-Soviet entity and justified the creation of a similar Soviet entity. This according to the report excerpted below:

At that time Moscow decided to establish a new (military) structure called upon to strengthen its control over the countries of Eastern Europe, and was in need of a suitable ground for this. At the same time the Federal Republic of Germany was preparing to join the North Atlantic Alliance. Moscow was actively objecting against it, asserting, that this action was aimed to support and even strengthen the aggressive anti-Soviet potential


\(^{32}\) Ibid. p. 14.
of then Western Germany. Moscow’s considerations were based on the idea, that its suggestion to become a member of the Alliance would be rejected. Then, in Moscow’s opinion, the entire world would realise against whom NATO was aimed, and the Soviet Union would have every right to take retaliatory measures. That was exactly what happened: on May 9, 1955 the FRG became a NATO member, and on May 14, as if in response to it, the Warsaw Treaty Organization was established.33

While the creation of the NACC did not mean that the expansion of the alliance was inevitable, cooperation in peacekeeping did give the NACC the potential to become a real “operational” organization. This step could give future NATO aspirants the ability to build interoperability with NATO. Ultimately it was real-world activity that brought NACC members Poland, the Czech Republic, Russia, and Ukraine into peacekeeping in Croatia and Bosnia with their NATO “partners” within the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR). Additionally, a Russian-US rescue exercise was held in the Laptev Sea in April 1993 among other naval and military exercises in that time period.34

The next stab at creating “associate” membership for nations that wanted to join NATO was the Partnership for Peace (PFP). Originating in March-April of 1993 during SACEUR John Shalikashvili’s term, the PFP conferred upon certain nations an affiliate status, “in lieu of new NATO membership.”35 The first fully developed DOD paper on PFP, entitled “Agreement on a Euro-Atlantic Partnership for Peace,” was released on August 26 of that year. Initially drafted as, “Concept Paper: Charter of Association with NATO,” this paper seemed to give NATO a new raison d’etre: letting the new European security order define itself while answering Central European concerns without creating new dividing lines. Herein, the DOD was adamant that:

Enlargement would have to be raised at the end, not the beginning, of a process of achieving interoperability with NATO and meeting alliance political standards, and new members would have to be “contributors” rather than merely “consumers” of allied security. In the DOD view, a

PFP would also strike a better chord than simply an upgraded NACC “work plan.”

The Alliance at this point had to tread carefully, not wanting to antagonize the Russians while at the same time wanting to preserve a functioning alliance. Additionally, the former Soviet satellites had legitimate security concerns and the situation in the former Soviet Union was potentially destabilizing.

At first glance, PFP and NACC were similar in that membership in either did not confer membership in NATO itself. Eventually, however, PFP became more of a process or pathway to becoming a full member of NATO by virtue of its participants committing to the goals of “transparency in defense budgeting, civilization of the defense ministry, and interoperability.”

In December 1993, then Secretary of Defense Les Aspin described five advantages of PFP for both the NATO allies and partners:

First, it does not re-divide Europe.

Second, PFP sets up the right incentives. In the old, Cold War world, NATO was an alliance created in response to an external threat. In the new, post-Cold War world, NATO can be an alliance based on shared values of democracy and the free market. PFP rewards those who move in that direction.

Third, PFP requires that partners make a real contribution. It doesn’t just ask what NATO can do for its new partners, it asks what the new partners can do for NATO.

Fourth, it keeps NATO at the center of European security concerns and thereby keeps American involvement at the center of Europe.

Finally, it puts the question of NATO membership for the partners where it belongs, at the end of the process rather than at the beginning. After we have some experience with the partnership process, it will be much clearer who among the eligible nations genuinely wants to buy into the NATO ideas of shared democratic values and cooperative security.

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36 Ibid. p. 28.
37 Ibid. p. 34.
38 Ibid. pp. 34-35.
After the NATO summit in Brussels in January 1994, in which PFP received formal sanction from the alliance, President Bill Clinton declared in Prague that “the question is no longer whether NATO will take on new members, but when and how.”

Although PFP was not a guarantor of eventual membership, it was a step in that direction. Still, the prospect of NATO membership for PFP members was a distant hope.

It took nearly three years, until December 1996, for the Clinton Administration to agree to extend formal invitations to enlarge NATO. Although there were many reasons for the delay, the main concern was the course of US-Russian relations and the potential Russian reaction to the “expansion” of an historical enemy. According to one study conducted at the Army War College:

> Washington’s aversion to new members was driven less by concern about the difficulties associated with incorporating them into the Alliance than with the view of the Clinton Administration at the time that political and economic reform in Russia, and not NATO enlargement, was key to the success of the Clinton security policy. Absent “backsliding” in Russia or the development of a “red-brown” coalition, senior administration officials were of the view that a strategic partnership between the United States and Russia was possible, and that it, in turn, could give life to a new European architecture that would include all states and would not result in new lines being drawn in Europe.

PFP, the new process in NATO, was not seen by the Clinton Administration as a way to address traditional security concerns. Instead, it was stressed by the administration that PFP was planned “as a way to reinforce the trends toward political and economic reform, enhance stability in the region, and build a collective security community among European states.” Additionally, in this natal period of the post-Cold War era, the Alliance wanted to stress its role as a political stabilizer and peacekeeper in Europe rather than just an organization of territorial defense as defined by Article 5. It was thought that the web of security institutions in Europe would foster a climate where war would become unlikely. As the Army War College study mentioned above indicates:

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39 Ibid. p. 38.
41 Ibid.
The combination of a new NATO, the PfP, the growth and enlargement of the European Union (EU) and the increased influence of the U.N. and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) would create, together with a new U.S. relationship with Russia, a zone of peace in which the thought of war among its constituent states would be unthinkable.  

Politics obviously play a role in such decisions as well. At the time in the US, the future re-election of Bill Clinton was not a foregone conclusion and US-Russian relations were erratic—especially after the December 1993 Duma elections when then President Yeltsin’s faction was dealt a blow as nationalists and other “less reform-minded factions gained the majority.” The reform process initiated by Yeltsin was in danger of faltering badly and at a May 1995 US-Russian summit, “it was agreed to delay NATO enlargement until after the Russian and US elections of 1996.”

Ultimately, there were several factors that finally encouraged the US to support NATO enlargement. Not the least important of these was Bill Clinton’s re-election to the Presidency of the United States. This stability combined with his positive working relationship with President Yeltsin, not to mention Yeltsin’s own re-election, set the stage for meaningful dialog on the alliance. Moreover, according to an article in August 1995 entitled, “Why NATO Should Grow,” by then Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, the architect of the “Russia first” policy, the case for enlargement was finally clear:

Increased domestic pressure for enlargement, brought on by Democrats worried about creeping U.S. isolationism and a new Republican congressional majority worried about the faltering progress of Russian reform, combined with the inexorable strains created by the enlargement process itself, accounts for the commitment to explicit steps toward NATO enlargement rather than any fundamental shift in the orientation of U.S. security policy.

The end result of all of this, of course, is well known. At the Madrid summit in July 1997, NATO formally invited the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland to begin

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42 Ibid. p. 3.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
accession negotiations. The entry of these three former Warsaw Pact nations into NATO in 1999—less than ten years after the Berlin Wall fell—is still an extraordinary event.

As with the first, future enlargements (including the invitation for accession that are expected to be extended to the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania at NATO’s Prague Summit in November 2002) may not be motivated by notions of collective security. As evidenced in the evolution and history of NATO, the bottom line instead will be strategic necessity.

As recently as April 2002, it was testified to Congress that decisions regarding NATO membership are based heavily on strategic issues and are not purely dependant upon whether a potential member meets NATO’s Membership Action Plan (MAP). According to Mr. Thomas S. Szayna in his testimony to the Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on International Relations of the US House of Representatives:

> Although a variety of mechanisms to improve the compatibility of the candidate forces with NATO is in place, the alliance has always emphasized that none of the goals in MAP or any other programs of cooperation should be considered as a list of criteria for membership. As NATO has stressed, invitations to join the alliance will be based strictly on a consensus alliance decision that bringing the given state into the alliance will contribute to security in Europe. In other words, strategic motivations, rather than any specific criteria, military or not, will guide NATO choices.46

In the post-Cold War, but pre-September 11 era, ideas of Russian accession into NATO were nothing but that: ideas. Although Russia flirted with the idea of membership in NATO in the immediate post-Cold War period as noted, there was no serious consideration of such a move. Those arguments made against membership for Russia, amongst others, form the basis of many of the implications discussed later in this thesis.

Although examining NATO’s past enlargements is a useful in contemplating possible membership for Russia, the past relationship between the two must be examined as well. The forty-year history of antagonism between Russia and NATO cannot be summarily brushed aside just because of September 11 or the warm friendship shared by

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US President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin. Although these factors are important and will probably contribute to the continuing positive relationship between Russia and NATO (and therefore, the US), hurdles remain in this rapprochement.
III. NATO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS: PAST AND PRESENT

From the long Cold War to the formation in May 2002 of the NATO-Russia Council, relations between Russia and NATO have progressed from one of relentless hostility to one of genuine partnership. Nevertheless, even with the creation of the new council, Lord Robertson, Secretary General of NATO, seems cautiously realistic about its purpose: “I am not an idealist about the NATO-Russia relationship. It will work only because it is in the common interests of all 20 countries involved.”47 More than 50 years of NATO existence does not necessarily mean that in just over the last 10 years, and more specifically since September 11, that relations between Russia and NATO will always be one of alliance and strategic partnership.

This chapter briefly examines the evolving relationship between NATO and the Soviet Union (and later Russia) from those early days of the Cold War to the creation of the NATO-Russia Council in May 2002. Several historical events serve as beacons that fittingly depict Soviet/Russian-NATO relations. Those events are: the various crises in Berlin in 1948, 1953, and 1958-62; the invasions of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968; the deployment of SS-20 intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM) in 1977 (and the consequent counter-deployment of Pershing II IRBM and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM); the new political thinking of Mikhail Gorbachev; the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Boris Yeltsin’s radical revolution and economic reforms after 1991; Russian cooperation and participation in NATO-led activities (such as Bosnia and PFP); the Kosovo crisis; and finally the aftermath of September 11.

NATO’s evolving strategies throughout its history generally reflect its relationship to Russia. These strategies logically complement the above mentioned historical events. Deterrence, nuclear and otherwise, played a role throughout the Cold War and even remains viable today, even though NATO-Russian relations have clearly progressed away from the threat of nuclear war. The strategies progressed from massive retaliation with nuclear weapons in the 1950s to the mid-1960s; to the use of

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47 Opening Remarks by the Secretary General of NATO, Lord Robertson, at the NATO-Russia Council Meeting at the level of Defense Ministers, Brussels, June 6, 2002, www.nato.int.
conventional fires backed up with nuclear weapons (usually referred to as “Flexible Response”) adopted in 1967; to negotiation and détente in the 1970s and early 1980s; to cooperation and participation in the 1990s (although there were significant deviations from cooperation in the 1990s—Kosovo, for example); and finally true partnership in the early 2000s.

NATO and Russia (then the Soviet Union) have been closely linked with one another from the beginning. This was not, obviously, an association of allies. During the Cold War, it was a relationship of, at worst, bitter enemies and, at best, strategic contestants. As noted earlier, the creation of NATO itself was in response to increasing Soviet threats to Western Europe in the late 1940s. While the Alliance sought to contain Communist aggression and expansion to the West, the Soviet Union sought to split and undermine the Alliance. (This is arguably one of the negative implications of potential Russian membership in NATO as espoused by German Defense Minister Volker Ruhe in September 1994-see the next chapter.)

The US policy of containment was directly related to the creation NATO’s policy of containment. In 1946, with the famous “Long Telegram,” George F. Kennan described the challenge of facing the Soviet Union and how to defeat it. According to Kennan, what was needed was “a policy of firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counter-force at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world.”

Interestingly enough, one of the few predictors of the downfall of the Soviet Union was Kennan himself back in 1946-47. Kennan believed that, in due time, several challengers for control in the Soviet Union might:

reach down into these politically immature and inexperienced masses in order to find support for their respective claims. If this were ever to happen, strange consequences could flow for the Communist Party: for the membership at large has been exercised only in the practices of iron discipline and obedience and not in the arts of compromise and accommodation . . . . If, consequently, anything were ever to occur to disrupt the unity and efficacy of the Party as a political instrument, Soviet

48 Yost, NATO Transformed, pp. 145-151.
Russia might be changed overnight from one of the strongest to one of the weakest and pitiable of national societies.\textsuperscript{50}

This document quite accurately forecasted what would take place after Mikhail Gorbachev came into power. Still, it was quite some time before the Soviet Union collapsed—just over 40 years after the creation of NATO.

The creation of the Warsaw Pact, meanwhile, in 1955 solidified the foundations of the bipolar world wrought by the Cold War between the East and West. Thus ensued a militarily and ideologically confrontational relationship between the West, as represented by the United States and NATO, and the Communist Bloc of the Soviet Union and her Warsaw Pact satellites of the East.

The various crises in Berlin clearly set a negative precedent for Soviet-NATO relations. Khrushchev himself initiated a new Berlin crisis (one cannot forget the famous blockade of Berlin in 1948 and the subsequent airlift) in late 1958:

On 10 November he announced that the Soviet Union intended to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany. Later in the month he said that they would do so within six months if a negotiated solution to the Berlin problem could not be found. Once a peace treaty had been made, East Germany would have sovereignty over Berlin. The allies then would have to make their arrangements for remaining in Berlin with a regime they did not recognize. The deadline was 27 May 1959.\textsuperscript{51}

Thus began a series of events in Berlin that brought the world direly close to nuclear annihilation. This plan would have meant that the Yalta agreements at the end of World War II were no longer valid (the Yalta agreements included a joint occupation of Berlin by the 4 wartime allies of the Soviet Union, the US, Britain, and France). The US and NATO vehemently protested this potential course of action and threatened a nuclear response:

For the moment NATO marched more resolutely together than before. The installation of IRBMs went ahead as General Norstad’s message of

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid. pp. 579-580.
\textsuperscript{51} Kaplan, Lawrence S., \textit{NATO and the United States}, p. 76.
firmness urging the use of nuclear weapons in case of aggression was recorded with approval.\textsuperscript{52}

The deadline passed without Soviet action. However, this was not the end of crisis in Berlin. Khrushchev again threatened to make separate peace with East Germany in the spring of 1960, even as a new summit meeting was planned in Paris at the same time. However, the U2 Francis Gary Powers incident derailed that summit meeting and caused Eisenhower a lot of embarrassment. Khrushchev took advantage of this incident and subsequently canceled his trip to Paris to protest the overflight and tried to destroy the credibility of US leadership of NATO. However, previous U2 flights had uncovered intelligence that the Soviets were constructing ICBM (inter-continental ballistic missiles) bases east of the Urals. This had the opposite effect of raising American credibility in Europe’s eyes, even prompting Charles de Gaulle to say to Eisenhower, “I do not know what Khrushchev is going to do nor what is going to happen, but whatever he does or whatever happens, I want you to know that I am with you to the end.”\textsuperscript{53}

In August 1961, Khrushchev again tested NATO under the leadership of the new president, John F. Kennedy: the infamous Berlin Wall was erected. Although it took some time for the wall to be built, the symbolic effect was immediate:

On 13 August just after midnight, East German troops installed roadblocks and barbed-wire barricades at most of the crossing points between East and West Berlin. This action was, inter alia, a symbolic challenge to the Yalta agreements. It may have reflected Khrushchev’s contempt for what he considered Kennedy’s immature behavior and a belief that he could challenge JFK’s leadership of the alliance in a manner he would not have dared to do under Eisenhower.\textsuperscript{54}

The US deployed nearly 50,000 additional troops to Europe by January 1962 in response to the construction of the wall, fearing that it was a prelude to aggressive action by the Soviet Union in Europe. However, once the shock of the wall wore off, the true purpose of the wall became clear:

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid. p. 77.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid. p. 78.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid. p. 81.
It was recognized on all sides that the walling off of the East was not the first step in a larger Soviet design but a defensive act to shore up a faltering East Germany. In 1962 over 150,000 East Germans had escaped to the West via Berlin, almost half of them under the age of 25 and many of them skilled workers.\footnote{55}

To go back to events in 1956, before the above-mentioned Berlin crisis, the Soviet Union had demonstrated its willingness to suppress its own allies without fear of aggressive action from NATO.

The Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956—occurring shortly after the formation of the Warsaw Pact and then comprised of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union—made it clear to the NATO allies that the Soviets would crush any opposition within its own camp. The terms of the Warsaw Pact stated that “relations among the signatories were based on total equality, mutual noninterference in internal affairs, and respect for national sovereignty and independence,” and that “the Warsaw Pact’s function was collective self-defense of the member states against external aggression.”\footnote{56} This, however, did not constrain the Soviet Union when it was threatened with anti- or non-Soviet ideology within its hegemony.

The Hungarian revolution in October 1956 was simply too much of a challenge for the Soviet Union to accept. The roots of the revolution can be traced to the “de-Stalinization” in Eastern Europe undertaken by Nikita S. Khrushchev. At the 20\textsuperscript{th} Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union earlier in 1956, Khrushchev “denounced the arbitrariness, excesses, and terror of the Joseph V. Stalin era.”\footnote{57} Khrushchev relaxed the controls that Stalin had implemented over Eastern Europe by allowing East European armies to reinstate their distinctive national practices and to reemphasize professional military opinions over political factors in the majority of areas. However, the Hungarian communist party lost control of the de-Stalinization process in their country and was subsequently invaded. According to one account:

\footnote{55} Ibid.\footnote{56} Soviet Union, A Country Study, Library of Congress, Headquarters, Department of the Army, DA Pam 550-95, 1989, p. 879.\footnote{57} Ibid.
Initial domestic liberalization acceptable to the Soviet Union quickly escalated to nonnegotiable issues like challenging the communist party’s exclusive hold on political power and establishing genuine national independence. Imre Nagy, the new communist party leader, withdrew Hungary from the Warsaw Pact and ended Hungary’s alliance with the Soviet Union. The Soviet army invaded with 200,000 troops, crushed the Hungarian Revolution, and brought Hungary back within limits tolerable to the Soviet Union. The five days of pitched battle left 25,000 Hungarians dead.58

Soviet-NATO relations turned icy following this invasion. NATO military strategy remained one of massive retaliation with nuclear weapons if Soviet (and/or Warsaw Pact) forces invaded NATO as defined by Article 6 of the Washington Treaty. While NATO was not prepared to intervene during this crisis (or during the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia), it was prepared to deter attacks against itself. Despite this deep freeze in relations in 1956, “there was a certain sensation of fluidity, in the West at least, regarding European political order and hope that Western policies of ‘negotiating from strength’ might somehow bring about a palpable relaxation in Soviet control over Eastern Europe and even German reunification.”59 Nevertheless, the events to come in November 1989 (the fall of the Berlin Wall) were still more than thirty years away and nowhere in serious consideration from any viewpoint in 1956.

As with the liberalizing that was smashed in Hungary in 1956, the Prague Spring of 1968 provoked the Soviet Union, along with other Warsaw Pact forces, to invade Czechoslovakia. Domestic liberalization, as practiced by the Czechoslovak communist regime of Alexander Dubcek, threatened “to generate popular demands for similar changes in the other East European countries and even parts of the Soviet Union.”60 This affected Czechoslovak foreign and defense policy as well, as had been the case in Hungary. Although Dubcek pledged to remain within the Warsaw Pact, again as with Hungary, the Soviet Union felt it necessary to stop the spread of liberalization and assert its right to “enforce the boundaries of ideological permissibility in Eastern Europe.”61

58 Ibid. p. 881.
59 Yost, NATO Transformed, p. 36.
61 Ibid.
The Soviet/Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia was neither as rapid nor as bloody as the 1956 invasion. Under the guise of “military exercises,” the invading forces steadily coerced Czechoslovakia and maneuvered into marshalling areas without alarming Western governments or NATO. Under the cover of these “exercises,” the Soviet Union was able to deploy forces along Czechoslovakia’s borders with Poland and East Germany. Finally, the invasion commenced, as is detailed below:

On August 20, a force consisting of twenty-three Soviet divisions invaded Czechoslovakia. Token NSWP (non-Soviet Warsaw Pact) contingents, including one Hungarian, two East German, and two Polish divisions, along with one Bulgarian brigade, also took part in the invasion. In the wake of the invasion, the Soviet Union installed a more compliant communist party leadership and concluded a status-of-forces agreement with Czechoslovakia, which established a permanent Soviet presence in that country for the first time. Five Soviet divisions remained in Czechoslovakia to protect the country from future “imperialist threats.”

Although it further damaged East-West relations, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia did not disrupt the advent of the new US—and subsequently, NATO—strategy of flexible response that had became official the year before and which had been in the process for at least 4 years. Developed during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations in the early to mid 1960s, flexible response was the product of the United States struggle to form a military strategy that would not automatically trigger nuclear war. The following serves as a definition of flexible response:

Flexibility of response was the key to change. It was to be the polar opposite of the rigid automatic doctrine of massive retaliation. Flexible response was intended to encompass a variety of responses to potential Soviet aggression, ranging from the most traditional conventional weapon to the most sophisticated strategic missile. The idea of graduated responses would raise the nuclear threshold to levels that would permit the enemy to back away from hostilities before the nuclear was employed.

Détente, along with the policy of flexible response, signaled the relaxation of tensions between the Soviet Union and the West. Again, though, any gains made as a result of liberalization were inevitably mitigated by Soviet aggression.

62 Ibid. p. 883.
Détente between East and West challenged Soviet control of Eastern Europe. First, détente caused a dilemma in Soviet-East German relations. East Germany’s leader in the early days of détente, Walter Ulbricht, opposed détente and normalization of relations with West Germany. This ran contrary to Soviet policy and he was eventually removed from power. Second, détente obscured the rigid bipolarity of the Cold War era, thereby exposing Eastern Europe to Western influence and loosening Soviet control over its allies, which showed the Eastern European nations that NATO and the West were not as threatening as the Soviet Union had led them to believe, as is shown below:

The relaxation of East-West tensions in the 1970s reduced the level of threat perceived by the NSWP countries, along with their perceived need for Soviet protection, and eroded Warsaw Pact alliance cohesion. After the West formally accepted the territorial status quo in Europe, the Soviet Union was unable to point to the danger of “imperialist” attempts to overturn East European communist party regimes to justify its demands for strict Warsaw Pact unity behind its leadership, as it had in earlier years.64

Similarly, it was conceivable that the West European countries in NATO might question whether or not the Soviet Union was truly an enemy. The French (under President Charles de Gaulle) rift with NATO in the 1960s is well known and certainly contributed to a “privileged” relationship between France and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the invasion of Czechoslovakia cooled Soviet-French relations considerably and never fully achieved Soviet desires to exacerbate intra-European rivalries. Despite the advances in trust made during periods of détente, the Soviet Union was fairly dependable to provide the glue for political unity in the Atlantic Alliance:

Soviet interventions—for instance, in East Germany in 1953, in Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and in Afghanistan in 1979—and Soviet-provoked crises (such as the Berlin and Cuban episodes) tended to reinforce consensus in NATO on the necessity for collective defense precautions. Soviet triumphs in military technology (the world’s first intercontinental ballistic missiles, for example) and periodic Soviet declarations, reaffirming profound ideological hostility, bolstered Western resolve.65

65 Yost, NATO Transformed, p. 32.
The deployment of SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) in 1977 by the Soviet Union along its western and southeastern borders marked the end of, at least the spirit of, détente. The United States and its NATO allies viewed this deployment with trepidation and regarded it as destabilizing to the nuclear balance of power in Europe. In late 1979, NATO decided to counter with the deployment of Pershing II IRBMs and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs)—both armed with nuclear warheads—while entering into arms negotiations with the Soviet Union to reduce the number of all medium range missiles (known as the “dual-track” approach).

These alarming events and the election of President Ronald Reagan in 1980 put NATO and the Soviet Union on a collision course again. In trying to control the setback, President Reagan proposed the “zero option” in November 1981 as the solution to the nuclear imbalance in Western Europe. Simply put, the zero option eliminated SS-20s and other missiles targeted against Western Europe in exchange for the “non-deployment” of counterbalancing NATO weapons. The Soviets refused to accept this and were adamant that British and French nuclear forces be counted in the determination of the balance of nuclear forces in Europe and in any agreement on reductions of nuclear forces.66

NATO-Soviet relations again turned antagonistic and, thus, ended the era of détente. Under the leadership of President Reagan, the United States pushed heavily for the deployment of the 572 cruise and Pershing II missiles in Western Europe, while negotiations for the “second” part of the dual-track approach were given lip service. However, in 1982, the US gained the initiative and, according to Kaplan:

appeared to revive détente by offering to engage in Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, that would begin with elimination of both cruise missiles and SS-20s. The Soviet adversary—and many in the West as well—did not consider this a serious proposal, as the Soviets had their weapons in place while the American concession applied to weapons not yet deployed. Over the course of three years, while the matter of missile deployment was debated in Europe, particularly in Britain and Germany, the Soviets conducted a concerted campaign against these nuclear weapons and sealed it by efforts to influence elections in both countries. In 1983 its representatives abandoned negotiations in Geneva.67
Meanwhile, as US and NATO strategies continued to emphasize negotiation and détente, a new battle doctrine was being developed by the United States Army to counter the large Soviet conventional threat facing Western Europe. The doctrine developed and finally published in the US Army’s Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, in May 1986 was called “Airland Battle,” and became the US Army’s basic fighting doctrine, stating:

It reflects the structure of modern warfare, the dynamics of combat power, and the application of the classical principles of war to contemporary battlefield requirements. It is called Airland Battle in recognition of the inherently three-dimensional nature of modern warfare. All ground actions above the level of the smallest engagements will be strongly affected by the supporting air operations of one or both combatants.\(^{68}\)

Airland Battle emphasized the offensive, rather than the defensive in Europe. This was something that had not been seen in countering Soviet threats to Western Europe during past doctrinal thinking. Airland Battle doctrine describes the Army’s approach to generating and applying combat power at the operational and tactical levels:

It is based on securing or retaining the initiative and exercising it aggressively to accomplish the mission. The object of all operations is to impose our will upon the enemy—to achieve our purposes. To do this we must throw the enemy off balance with a powerful blow from an unexpected direction, follow up rapidly to prevent his recovery and continue operations aggressively to achieve the higher commander’s goals. The best results are obtained when powerful blows are struck against critical units or areas whose loss will degrade the coherence of enemy operations in depth, and thus most rapidly and economically accomplish the mission. From the enemy’s point of view, these operations must be rapid, unpredictable, violent, and disorienting. The pace must be fast enough to prevent him from taking effective counteractions.\(^{69}\)

It was not until after the counterbalancing NATO deployments in late 1983 and the selection of Mikhail Gorbachev as general secretary in March 1985 that any progress was made. Additionally, coherent NATO doctrine, as described by the US Army’s development of Airland Battle, contributed to the deterrent effect and viability of NATO’s overall strategy of Flexible Response.

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Under the leadership of Gorbachev, optimism sprang forth in anticipation of a new détente and cooperation. It was under his leadership that arms negotiators returned to the bargaining table in Geneva. During a summit meeting with Reagan, Gorbachev spoke of more reductions in nuclear weaponry, including acceptance of on-site inspections as advocated in 1986 by the Stockholm Conference-and-Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE). Moreover, combined with the Reagan administration’s policy of “trust, but verify,” constructive work was beginning to take place between the East and the West:

A new spirit of glasnost and perestroika, openness and reconstruction, characterized Gorbachev’s approach to his nation—and apparently to the NATO alliance as well. At a meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland, the two leaders seemed to display a wish for a deeper détente than had been in place fifteen years before as well as a personal chemistry that warmed relations between the two countries.

Finally, by 1987 the intermediate-range nuclear forces treaty (INF) was signed, signaling final acceptance of the zero option. Pershing IIs and GLCMs targeted against the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were eliminated as well as the Soviet missiles targeted against Western Europe and Asia. The INF Treaty validated the dual-track decision of 1979 and “gave meaning to the START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) initiative of 1982 by setting up the machinery to remove both the Soviet and American theater nuclear weapons from Europe.”

The erosion of hostility between the Soviet Union and NATO was largely due to the new political thinking of Mikhail Gorbachev. It was his foresight, realistic and in the best interests of his nation to be sure, that enabled the Cold War barriers to be dismantled as well as the involvement of Moscow in the sincere process of disarmament. The events of November 1989 (the fall of the Berlin Wall) and of December 1991 (the disintegration of the Soviet Union) are well known. They symbolically and truly ended the Cold War.

It should not be taken lightly that a “hot” war was avoided between the NATO allies and the Soviet Union and her Warsaw Pact allies. Indeed, events such as the many

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71 Ibid. p. 119.
72 Ibid.
crises in Berlin in 1948, 1953, 1958-62, Cuba in 1962, Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, Poland in 1980-81, etc. indicate that the opportunity for war was clear and dangerous. Cooler heads did prevail, however, in the struggle between East and West. In the author’s notes from his book on a fictional Soviet invasion of Western Europe, writer Ralph Peters attempts to convey a message of how much the two adversaries have in common rather than in opposition:

This book does not presuppose that a war is either imminent or inevitable—indeed, the declarations of Mikhail Gorbachev offer grounds for careful optimism—and it should be clear from the events described in these pages that war is not becoming any more attractive an option for the solution of our problems as military technology improves . . . . If there is a conscious message between its covers, it is not that there will be a war with that differently uniformed collection of human beings east of the Great Wall of Europe, but that, should such a war occur, we will be opposed by other men of flesh and blood, with their own talents, ambitions, and dreams. Thankfully, I believe that the great majority of them resemble the great majority of us in their desire simply to get on with the business of living.73

Although NATO’s contribution is indisputable, it is inaccurate to attribute the demise of the Soviet Union and Communism in Europe to NATO alone. However, NATO did play a crucial role in the process of disintegrating Communism by deterring Soviet military solutions to the ideological conflict between East and West and, thus, moved the conflict into economic and social arenas. Without doubt, this “non-violent” competition “turned out to be ruinous for ‘real socialism’ in Europe.”74

Before turning to Russian-NATO relations after the Cold War, it bears mention that several “out of area” crises also strained Soviet-NATO relations. While true that the primary area of confrontation and competition was in Europe, the Third World was often a battleground between the superpowers and certainly affected Soviet-NATO relations. Several examples of this include the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, the deployment of Soviet-supported Cuban troops to Angola in the 1970s, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.


By the time of the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, Russian President Boris Yeltsin had initiated a series of economic and political reforms unheard of in Soviet/Russian history. His “radical revolution” and economic reforms destroyed the power of the Communist nomenclatura and began to build in Russia a state and society based on a new (a decidedly pro-Western) system of values. (In fact, the idea to join NATO was popular in the initial euphoria of a new nation among Russian radical democrats.)

For the new Russian Federation, the Yeltsin Administration set highly ambitious economic reform goals in 1992. These included:

strict limitation of government spending to cut inflation; redirection of state investment from the military-industrial complex and heavy industry toward consumer production; a new tax system to redistribute financial resources to more efficient sectors; cutting of government subsidies for enterprises and eliminating government price controls; and lifting of government control of foreign trade. Privatization of the major sectors of production, still virtually state monopolies in 1991, was another primary goal.

Plans for political reforms were as ambitious as the economic ones. Transitioning from the Soviet Union to its most powerful successor state, Russia, took time and the reforms that Yeltsin initiated were at times unpopular. Although Yeltsin convinced the legislature to grant him unprecedented special executive powers for one year in order to implement his economic reforms in October 1991, he and his reforms came under increasing attack from many fronts. Adversaries included former communist party members and officials, extreme nationalists, and others who wanted reform halted or slowed in Russia. The opposition primarily came from the bicameral parliament, whose upper house was the Congress of People’s Deputies (CPD) and lower house the Supreme Soviet. The 1978 constitution provided that the parliament was the supreme organ of power in Russia. When Russia added the office of president in 1991, the division of powers between the two branches became cloudy.

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75 Ibid.
76 Russia, A Country Study, p. lxviii.
77 Ibid. p. 388.
A constitutional crisis culminated in the dissolution of parliament by Yeltsin in late September 1993. The impasse in legislative-executive branch relations had put Yeltsin’s power in doubt. On September 27, 1993, the legislative building in Moscow (often called the White House) was occupied and an armed uprising began by pro-Communist radicalized leaders and hyper-nationalists. The White House was surrounded by troops and tanks. After a two-week standoff, military forces loyal to Yeltsin occupied the building and subdued unrest throughout the rest of the city.

By December 1993, Russia had a new constitution that had been voted on and approved by 58.4 percent of Russia’s registered voters. This constitution declared Russia a democratic, federative, law-based state with a republican form of government. Power is divided between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. Additionally:

- Diversity of ideologies and religions is sanctioned, and a state or compulsory ideology may not be adopted. The right to a multiparty political system is upheld. The content of laws must be made public before they take effect, and they must be formulated in accordance with international law and principles.

After the breakup of the Soviet Union and the consolidation of power in Russia under Boris Yeltsin, relations with NATO quickly accelerated into one of cooperation and participation. As noted in the section on NATO enlargement in this thesis, cooperation included membership by 1995 of the NACC and PFP for Russia. Although Russia objected to the enlargement of the alliance, specifically for Poland and other former Soviet satellite countries, relations between NATO and Russia remained one based on liaison, joint maneuvers, and exchange visits. Although, as mentioned earlier, Yeltsin raised the prospect of Russian membership in NATO, no progress was made in that direction because the Russians wanted the character of the alliance to change:

- The Russians might actively seek NATO membership with a view to subordinating the Alliance to the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe). Whenever Soviet and Russian leaders raised the possibility of joining NATO—for instance, Georgi Malenkov in March 1954, Boris Yeltsin in December 1991 and September 1993, and Ivan

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78 Ibid. p. 391.
79 Ibid.
Rybkin in October 1996—their objective appears to have been to deprive NATO of its essential role as an instrument of collective defense.80

Throughout the 1990s, NATO-Russian relations generally moved forward and in a positive direction. Russian support was critical for the NATO operations in Bosnia in 1995 and the Russians sent forces to participate in the Implementation Force (IFOR) and later Stabilization Force (SFOR). SFOR continues to operate with the participation of Russian troops working side by side with NATO troops. Cooperation and participation were not just buzzwords any longer. According to NATO:

> The participation of Russian troops along with contingents of Allied and other Partner countries in the NATO-led IFOR, and subsequently in the SFOR, reflects shared responsibility . . . It also provides a concrete demonstration of the fact that NATO and Russia can collaborate effectively in the construction of cooperative security in Europe and has assisted both parties in overcoming misconceptions about each other.81

Good relations between NATO and Russia led to the signing of the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the establishment of the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) in Paris in May 1997. By March 1998, Russia formally established a Mission to NATO to facilitate military and defense-related cooperation.82

However, the Kosovo crisis that culminated in NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia and Serbian units in March-June 1999 put Russian-NATO relations into a “mini-freeze.” Dr. Alexei G. Arbatov, deputy chair of the Duma Defense Committee, expresses his frustration over the NATO actions in Kosovo (after referring to positive trends between Russia and NATO):

> Kosovo reversed these trends. The war resulted in Russia’s experiencing an unprecedented surge of anti-American and anti-Western sentiments, and these sentiments had many ramifications. The Russian public became markedly disenchanted with the West. Moscow initiated a desperate search for other foreign partners and renewed its efforts to build up a defense capability against the United States (US) and its allies. The war in Yugoslavia did away with the remaining hopes for a genuine security partnership and military cooperation between Russia and NATO. Once

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80 Yost, NATO Transformed, p. 150.
81 NATO Handbook, p.98.
82 Ibid. p. 102.
again, Russia perceives NATO as its primary defense concern for the foreseeable future.\footnote{Arbatov, Alexei G, The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine: Lessons Learned from Kosovo and Chechnya, The Marshall Center Papers, No. 2, pp. 1-2.}

The Kosovo crisis dangerously put NATO and Russian forces on potentially adversarial paths—recalling the delicate situation after Russian paratroopers seized the airport at Pristina without prior coordination or cooperation with NATO forces. However, Russian participation in KFOR (Kosovo Force) at least brought the two entities back to work together and not fighting one another, diplomatically or militarily.

Nevertheless, Russian Federation Military Doctrine and Russia’s National Security Concept (approved respectively by Russian Federation Presidential Decree of 21 April 2000 and 10 January 2000) reflected anti-NATO and anti-US language. According to their Military Doctrine, one of the main external threats is the expansion of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of the Russian Federation’s military security. Although NATO is not mentioned specifically here, it is certainly implied.

From Russia’s National Security Concept, there is specific criticism of the US and NATO:

The second trend shows itself in attempts to create an international relations structure based on domination by developed Western countries in the international community, under US leadership and designed for unilateral solutions (above all via the use of military force) of key issues in world politics by circumventing the fundamental rules of international law.

The level and scope of military threats are growing. Elevated to the rank of strategic doctrine, NATO’s transition to the practice of using military force outside its zone of responsibility and without UN Security Council sanction could destabilize the entire global strategic situation. The growing technical advantage of a number of leading powers and their enhanced ability to create new weapons and military equipment could provoke a new phase of the arms race and radically alter the forms and methods of warfare.\footnote{Ibid. p. 45. (Condensed versions of these documents are found in Arbatov’s article).}

Recovering from this “mini-freeze” took some time. The warm friendship as noted elsewhere in this thesis between Presidents Bush and Putin has brought US/NATO
and Russian cooperation and partnership to new highs. Russian support after September 11 was crucial for the American-led war on terrorism initiated in October 2001.

The evolution of NATO-Russian relations has generally moved from poor to good. While there have been periodic cycles of cooperation and enmity between the two, upward and forward seem to be the overall direction. From the highly antagonistic days of the Cold War to the creation of the NATO-Russia Council in May 2002, Russian membership in NATO seems more an achievable goal than ever before. It is the implications of this possible action that remain to be dealt with.
IV. CRITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF RUSSIAN MEMBERSHIP IN NATO

As with previous enlargements of NATO—particularly that which added Germany in 1955—the enlargement of the Alliance to include Russia would likely be a controversial and complicated endeavor. To properly explore and prepare for that possibility, therefore, some critical implications must be examined. While this thesis can not address every potential angle of this scenario, certain essential considerations do stand out.

This chapter will first address the issues at the geostrategic and political level, which include, among other things:

a) Will the US and Russian power dominate the alliance—as the Soviet Union dominated the smaller, former communist block countries, such as Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and the Baltic states during the Cold War?

b) Will the US and Russia dictate policy to lesser but still great powers that are in the alliance, such as Great Britain, France and Germany and, as a result, “blow NATO apart” and eliminate the “strategic balance in Europe” as suggests one analyst?85

c) What will happen with China?

Next will be the issues at the regional level, which are, primarily:

a) What will happen to NATO’s relations with the former Soviet republics in Central Asia and Ukraine, and the Baltic States?

b) Will the Baltic nations feel betrayed since one of their primary motivations in joining NATO was to guarantee protection against a resurgent Russia?

c) It is significant that NATO has not fundamentally changed from a collective defense organization to one of collective security—there is nothing that addresses what happens when one member nation attacks another.

Finally, the paper will discuss the issues at the organizational and military level, such as:

a) What might the new NATO Command Structure look like?

b) Must that Command Structure fundamentally reform?

85 Yost, p. 147.
A. GEOSTRATEGIC AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

Primary among all the implications is the question of whether the US and Russia would dominate the alliance. While on the surface there would be no immediate threat or negative implication for the US if Russia were in the alliance, Russian membership would likely, “upset existing patterns of influence in the Alliance, and might subordinate the Europeans to a US-Russian dyad of power.”

This belief is based, in part, on the fact that dynamic and positive bilateral relations between the two countries have often been pursued without any formal role for NATO. While this refers primarily to Soviet-American arms control measures during the Cold War, it shows that since these two countries have bypassed their NATO or Warsaw Pact allies to accomplish their goals in the past, they would likely enact agreements between themselves independent of, or even within NATO operations. A good example of past superpower collaboration, possibly at the expense of European allies, was the INF Treaty. While the INF Treaty is viewed as very positive and vindicated the dual-track approach decided upon in 1979, there were questions raised, at the time, about the treaty. Mostly the worries were over the future of the alliance and how the INF Treaty could lead to its dissolution:

Would the new agreement become a symbol of superpower collaboration at the expense of the European allies? If so, longstanding suspicions of American commitment would rise again, to the detriment of the alliance’s solidarity.

While the alliance did not decouple, future American/Russian collaboration may come at the expense of European allies. Thus, shared US and Russian interests and the desire to maintain positive bilateral relations in the alliance might lead to a neglect of other member’s views, especially those of the smaller, or less geographically significant countries.

Moreover, according to Dr. Rainer Vadim Grenewitz of the Marshall Center in Germany, one can assume that Russia would insist that it be treated as a major power and would receive special treatment in many respects. For example, although in NATO the

86 Ibid. p. 149.
87 Kaplan, Lawrence S., The Long Entanglement, p. 166.
primary language is English, on many occasions French is used, because it is officially co-equal with English in the Alliance. Thus, it is likely that, at the NATO School at Oberammergau, where lectures that are delivered in English and translated (upon request) into French, Russia might insist as well that lectures as well as all published materials be translated into Russian.\textsuperscript{88}

As one of the two dominant members of the alliance, Russia would compete with the US for equal status in NATO. Despite the rule of consensus, the US is undoubtedly “rimus inter pares” (“the first among equals”). Thus, the US exercises greater influence than the other members do. Strongly held European views can sway the US position, but not often. Russia would compete with America to achieve and then maintain such a status. While it is true that the Russian economy grew by 5% in 1999 and 8% in 2000,\textsuperscript{89} Russia is extremely weak economically and therefore would attempt to overcome this inferior position. One way to overcome this position of weakness would be Russia’s insistence on holding senior commands in Western Europe as well as senior command positions in the East (i.e., the territory of Russia). One only need recall the controversy with France concerning the command of Allied Forces South Europe.\textsuperscript{90}

Another consideration is the concern the smaller NATO members might have regarding Russia’s membership in NATO in light of the fact that many joined NATO to get protection specifically against an unpredictable Russia. While it is unlikely that Russia would mount an invasion like the 1968 incursion into Czechoslovakia, its membership in NATO would not necessarily prevent Russia from attacking another member. It is important to recall the delicate Greek-Turkish relationship in NATO. Full-scale war between the two countries could twist apart the alliance since there is no provision (especially in Article 5) barring one member nation from attacking another member nation.

It is important to consider how the major NATO powers feel about the possibility of Russian membership in NATO. According to then German Defense Minister Volker

\textsuperscript{88} Email interview with Dr. Rainer Vadim Grenewitz of the Marshall Center in Germany on November 12, 2001.


\textsuperscript{90} Grenewitz interview, November 12, 2001.
Ruhe in September of 1994, “Russia just doesn’t qualify for various reasons to be integrated into the [NATO] structure, even if they [the Russians] work economic miracles . . . . Russia cannot be integrated, neither into the European Union nor into NATO . . . . It would be like the United Nations of Europe—it wouldn’t work.”

In the book, NATO Transformed, the author points out that the European Allies have three principal arguments against Russian membership:

NATO would lose its role as an instrument of collective defense and turn into an ineffective Kantian or Wilsonian collective security regime. This might mean the loss of the Alliance’s internal security functions, such as promoting a certain “denationalization” in defense planning, which are based on its collective defense purpose, and this could lead to the renationalization of defense policy within the Alliance, particularly on the part of major powers such as Germany.

Russian membership would upset existing patterns of influence in the Alliance and might subordinate the Europeans to a US-Russian dyad of power.

Assuming that NATO remains a collective defense organization, Russian membership would make the Alliance responsible for protecting Russia against China and other powers. This, from the European Allies’ point of view, is not a high priority.

According to Karl-Heinz Kamp, head of the International Planning Staff of the Konrad-Adenauer Foundation (a German public policy institute in St. Augustin and Berlin), the time is not right to bring Russia into the Alliance.

While the premise of this paper is that Russia is already a member, Kamp’s views provide intriguing insights. First, he notes that some politicians and editorial writers back the idea of Russian membership not only as a means to enlarge the Euro-Atlantic security space, but also as a possible solution to overcome current disagreements within NATO. For example, “With Russia in NATO, neither the Baltic membership nor the question of NATO’s military engagement in the Balkans, nor even Washington’s project of a missile defense would be dividing issues any longer.”

Other positive aspects of this hypothesis

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91 Yost, pp. 146-147.
92 Ibid. p. 149.
are that Russia could become firmly lashed to the “West” as has been accomplished with Germany since the end of World War II. Finally, the attacks of September 11, 2001 proved that Russia and the West are all in the same boat anyway.

To make his point, Kamp gives the following rebuttals:

Can Moscow really imagine a membership in an alliance where it could take the second rank at best—or more likely, rank fourth or fifth in political weight, military strength, and economic performance? Will it take seriously the interests of states such as Denmark, Luxembourg, Belgium or Portugal?

Can it really be taken for granted that all NATO member states, particularly Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic, would be prepared to accept the NATO membership of Russia?

Does Russia already meet all conditions and standards of a stable democracy? Are the principles required for NATO membership, such as civilian control over military forces or the protection of minorities, sufficiently fulfilled?

Can we stretch our imagination so far as to envisage NATO as a military alliance sharing a common border with China? These geographical dimensions not only exceed the imagination of today’s NATO military planners, but such an expanded NATO could turn popular predictions of a future China assuming the adversary’s role of the former Soviet Union into a self-fulfilling prophecy.  

It is necessary to mention British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s successful recent plan to bring Russia closer to NATO. His proposal was the creation of a new Russia-NATO Atlantic Council. In May 2002, his plan became reality with the creation of the NATO-Russia Council. Under his plan, the new council supplants the currently existing (and consultative only) Russia-NATO Permanent Joint Council. According to some accounts, the NATO-Russia Council will offer Russia an equal voice (de facto “veto”) in alliance decision-making on select security issues. The new council’s agenda will probably include terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and peacekeeping. Given the premise of this thesis, it would be easy to see the NATO-Russia Council leading to joint

94 Ibid.
peacekeeping missions and joint military exercises between Russia and NATO. Although the Alliance formally signed a new partnership agreement with Russia on 28 May 2002, the consequences of the new partnership are still unknown. The fact remains, however, that the British Prime Minister is in favor of further integration of Russia into NATO.

The Italian Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi, also seems ready to accept the handshake from Russia. According to a commentary by Franco Venturini, Russian President Vladimir Putin wanted to measure the pulse of dialogue with Italy during talks between the two in October 2001 in Moscow. While the implications of the new friendship are filled with uncertainty, they signal support from Rome for further integration of Russia into the economy and security of Europe. Implications noted from the Italians concern their position on missile defense, as Silvio Berlusconi communicated to President Bush after the G8 summit in Genoa (in July 2001). At that time, the Italian Prime Minister voiced support for the new defensive systems, but emphasized that unilateral decisions should be avoided and that “the fears of a Russia still wrapped up in its post-Communist transition need to be understood.” It seems plausible that Italy’s pro-Europeanism can be complemented with strong ties to both Washington and Moscow, not simply one or the other.

Portugal seems to have an even stronger conviction in support of Russian membership in NATO. President Jorge Sampaio said, during his visit to Moscow in late October 2001 that, “we cannot determine the end of this enlargement process, nor can we exclude from it any country from the outset.” The implications noted by President Sampaio included his belief that to think of peace and security in Europe without the Russians is impossible, and the fight against terrorism would be much more difficult without strong collaboration from Moscow.

Prime Minister Milos Zeman of the Czech Republic thinks that the main task of the North Atlantic Alliance is the campaign against terrorism, and that “thanks to its involvement in the global anti-terrorist coalition, Russia’s image is changing… we would

97 Ibid.
be able to look at Russia as an allied country.” However, he does not necessarily hold the majority view in his country. President Vaclav Havel’s view, at least as expressed a few years ago, is that “Russia is nonetheless a Eurasian superpower, so influential that it is hard to imagine it could become an intrinsic part of NATO without flooding the alliance with the busy agenda of Russian interests.”

The multitude of views from the European Allies is not surprising, given the diverse and violent history of that continent. However, rather than an emphasis on the negative implications of US and Russian dominance of the new NATO, there seems to be a trend toward support for tying Russia tighter into the web of security institutions of Europe—NATO included.

With NATO retaining collective defense after Russian accession to the alliance, NATO would become responsible for protecting Russia from China and other powers. China would naturally view the enlargement with a high degree of suspicion. The Chinese could view Russian membership in NATO as the end of multipolarity in the post-Cold War world and make the Chinese feel isolated. This could lead China to attempt to seek to form a bloc with India or Japan, not unlike the Soviet bloc during the Cold War, to counter this new “Grand Alliance” of European, Russian and North American powers. However, a Chinese alliance with India is highly unlikely and even more so remote with Japan. This is particularly true in the post-September 11 era.

While there are varying views on what Russian membership in NATO would mean for China, most believe that the Chinese reaction would be negative. Former US Secretary of State James A. Baker feels, however, that Chinese fears could be assuaged and that, realistically speaking, Beijing does not have a veto on NATO or US policy. In his analysis in The Washington Quarterly recently, he writes:

China might respond with concern to Russia’s eventual membership in NATO. To hardliners in Beijing, for instance, it might smack of a Washington-inspired effort to "encircle" China. I believe on balance, however, that those concerns can be satisfactorily addressed, not least by stressing to the Chinese that a democratic Russia firmly linked both economically and strategically to the West will represent a more stable

100 Yost, p. 150.
and responsible neighbor across the long Sino-Russian border. In any case, we cannot allow Beijing, for whatever reason, to have veto power over our policy toward Russia.\textsuperscript{101}

Having Russia in NATO might also end the era of China playing Moscow and the West against each other. One cannot forget the stunning visit of former President Richard M. Nixon to China in 1972, heralding in a new era of relations between the US and China. At that time, the US and China obviously used that warming of relations to throw the Soviet Union off balance to a degree.

More recently, with the allegedly accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the Kosovo air campaign in 1999, the Chinese were able to capitalize on anti-American feelings in Russia, and concluded a “Treaty on Good Neighborliness, Friendship, and Cooperation” with that country on July 16, 2001. That treaty came on the heels of another treaty, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO,) signed on June 14, 2001, which concerned security not only between Russia and China, but also four Central Asian states. At the time of the Friendship Treaty, (recall, this is pre-September 11) it was thought that, “The treaty should signal to the Western world that a major geopolitical shift may be taking place in the Eurasian balance of power, with serious implications for the United States and its alliances.”\textsuperscript{102} Though they would remain an eminently important consideration for Russia if it joins NATO, relations with the Chinese would seem to take a back seat to President Putin's desire for closer integration with the West.

According to Professor Yuriy Davydov, a NATO Research Fellow who completed a report in 2000 on the possibility of Russia joining NATO, China has grown used to gaining benefits from the contradictions between Russia and the West in recent years and would certainly be very wary of any Russia-NATO alliance. In his report, Davydov writes:

China will not be too excited about Russian membership in NATO. Peking usually frightened Moscow with a closer relationship with the West, and the West - with the possibility of coming together with


Moscow. In this manner, China hoped to gain certain benefits on both directions. China will lose this possibility as soon as Moscow joins NATO. However, it can do nothing to oppose their united efforts. Besides, after Russia joins NATO, the enlarged alliance comes closely to the Chinese borders. For Peking, this would bring a change in the whole geopolitical configuration in a region where its influence has not been questioned before. The reaction of PRC on the rapprochement between Russia and NATO and the participation of Moscow in the alliance's structures will probably be similar to that of Russia during the NATO eastward expansion.\textsuperscript{103}

On the other hand, Davydov notes that the Japanese reaction to Russian membership in NATO could be positive. He states that, “The reaction of Japan may be more favourable since a compromise between Russia and the West may be viewed as a precursor of a compromise between Moscow and Tokyo on the issue of the Kuril Islands.”\textsuperscript{104} In the paragraph below, he discusses what would be required for both Japan and China cooperation-wise:

Coming out to the borders of China and Japan will require some kind of cooperation between NATO and these two countries. It will probably be easier in the case of Japan since Russian membership in the alliance practically gives way to establishing a structure of security on the vast territory from Vancouver to Vladivostok. Bound with the US by the Mutual Security Treaty, Japan could become part of this new structure. The People's Republic of China is unlikely to join NATO, so some kind of security interaction between them will be needed to convince China of peaceful intentions of the alliance. At the same time, the issue of Taiwan and the perspectives and forms of its reunification with continental China will unavoidably come up during the process of such cooperation.\textsuperscript{105}

At best, China may view Russia in NATO as enhancing its own security, and possibly seek membership itself; at worst, they may view it neutrally. According to Bruce Russett and Allan Stam of Yale University, who almost have a Kantian or Wilsonian approach to international relations:


\textsuperscript{104} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{105} Ibid.
Any coming confrontation with China will be fundamentally different from the old ideological conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. During the Cold War, U.S.-Soviet ideological differences made conflict virtually inevitable, as the two systems not only differed in their domestic and world-views, but also were fundamentally opposed to the continued existence of the opposition. Leninist doctrine, which provided the theoretical underpinnings of the Soviet system, was based on a revolutionary world ideology despite its rejection of Leon Trotsky's overt call for world revolution. 106

Russett and Stam further argue that China has an orientation towards the world entirely different from that of the old Soviet Union:

The ideological foundations of the Chinese system do not carry those ambitions. Mao Zedong's ideological goals were fundamentally local; driven not by an ever-expanding world-wide urban revolution that could spread from one city to another like wildfire before a strong wind, but by his vision of a rural revolution. Moreover, today's Chinese leaders have largely abandoned Marxist economics, and in an attempt to modernize rapidly, vigorously embrace capitalism and more open markets. In China we are left not with an expansionist regime driven by an ideology fundamentally opposed to the continued existence of the West, but rather, we confront a growing power governed by what is essentially a variant of Asian authoritarianism. The Asian authoritarian model does pose an ideological challenge to Western liberalism, and to some provides an attractive organizing principle for the relationship between economics and politics. 107

Russett and Stam believe that China has three options in dealing with Russia in NATO. They are balancing, hiding, or bandwagoning.

How can China balance Russia in NATO? It is conceivable that one of the West’s main motivations for bringing Russia in NATO is to eliminate the possibility of Russia balancing against NATO. If Russia is in NATO, China’s logical ally to balance against NATO has already been taken—Russia. China might then want to ally with India or Japan. An alliance with India is highly unlikely given past regional rivalries between the two. “A Sino-Indian alliance would totally reverse those countries' traditional


107 Ibid.
geopolitical strategy without bringing China the advanced industrial and technological support it needs.”

Another option would be to ally with Japan. However, it is difficult to imagine that country, which is already highly integrated economically and institutionally with the West, throwing its weight to the Chinese side. If anything, Chinese economic and military growth could eventually bring the Japanese into a closer arrangement with NATO. With these options eliminated, the possibility of China balancing against NATO is unlikely to work.

The option of hiding exists, but would require China to adopt an isolationist policy, according to Russett and Stam who write:

A Chinese foreign policy stance of armed political, if not economic, isolationism would pose real difficulties for the United States and NATO. Moreover, in the short run this may be the most likely policy reaction to a broad expansion of NATO. Yet, this would not necessarily lead to very bad results. On the contrary, it solves the thorniest dilemmas of the coming global power transition. The new leaders in China face a series of political challenges and tradeoffs that they will be forced to confront in the near future. These choices will be impelled by the high and competing costs associated with military modernization, the economic and technical difficulties associated with rapid economic modernization, and the problems of maintaining an autarchic regime in the face of a growing middle class. In the emerging global economy with its constant competitive pressures, the challenge of attempting to grow the Chinese economy while simultaneously expanding its immediate military base may prove intractable. Unlike the current Russian leaders who have so far survived a near-stagnant economy, the legitimacy of the Chinese rulers depends almost entirely on their continued ability to deliver rapid growth.

The final option, according to these authors, is for China to bandwagon. This envisions China joining the Alliance as well, which would end NATO’s status as a European Alliance. Indeed, with China as a member, the whole scope would change, and NATO would become a Global Alliance. According to Russett and Stam:

If Russia is to be kept out of NATO for fear of antagonizing China, much the same logic would stop NATO expansion into Eastern Europe for fear
of antagonizing Russia. Rather, if a first round of NATO expansion is to occur, it should be as the first step toward one last big cycle of bandwagoning. NATO would then expand to include a democratizing Russia. Until China is also ready to join, it is important that NATO not gratuitously threaten Chinese security. The Chinese leaders should be encouraged to see their security vested in a policy of increasing political and economic openness.\footnote{Ibid.}

Moreover, during hearings of the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 23, 1997, Senator John Glenn, Democrat of Ohio, “speculated on whether NATO outreach would isolate China and raised the possibility of observer status for China in NATO.”\footnote{Solomon, Gerald B., The NATO Enlargement Debate, 1990-1997, p. 125.}

In a positive implication for Russia in NATO, both northern oceans would have a NATO state on each side, with a stable Europe as the cornerstone. Articles 5 and 6 of the NATO treaty exclude Asia from those regions in which an armed attack against any member “shall be considered an attack against them all.” While this could be amended, an amendment could be seen as a provocation to China. It is already understood that common action may occur elsewhere, outside the narrow boundaries of the North Atlantic Ocean, if unanimously approved as a Combined Joint Task Force operation.\footnote{Russett, Bruce & Stam, Allan, “Russia, NATO, and the Future of U.S.-Chinese Relations”}

A look at the map of Russia (Figure 1) shows the enormous expanse of Russia and its long border with Mongolia and China far from Europe. The government of Russia divides the country into seven districts, which are the Far East, Siberia, the Urals, Volga, the South, the Central, and the Northwest.\footnote{National Geographic, November 2001, p. 8.}

While the US has not viewed Russian membership in NATO as inherently negative, according to Robert E. Hunter:

A number of allied states, with Germany perhaps being most vocal, have argued that this would be impossible, given Russia’s inherent size, history, geographic spread across Eurasia, and complex of relationships that—particularly in Asia—will not necessarily be compatible with the interests of various allied countries.\footnote{Hunter, Robert E., “Solving Russia: Final Piece in NATO’s Puzzle” The Washington Quarterly, Winter 2000, 23:1, p. 121.}
It is not unfair to ask, given Russia’s geographic enormity, what European security has—if anything—to do with Vladivostok in the Far East, or the Kuril Islands dispute with Japan. (The latter, incidentally, would violate the principle for NATO membership that “external territorial disputes . . . must be settled by peaceful means in accordance with OSCE principles.”)*

Answering these, and other, questions is not easy, but it is useful to look at a few parallels for comparison.

While US territory has traditionally been immune to attack, the events of September 11, 2001 proved that it is no longer secure “hiding” behind two oceans.

Consider now, a statement made by NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson:

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*115 NATO Handbook, p. 82.
On the basis of this briefing, it has now been determined that the attack against the United States on 11 September was directed from abroad and shall therefore be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which states that an armed attack on one or more of the Allies in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all. 116

Although NATO did invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, European troops were not deployed to the American homeland. In fact, while some NATO AWACS (Airborne Early Warning and Control System) assets were sent to assist US combat air patrols on the Eastern seaboard of the United States, there has been little European involvement in American homeland defense. If the attacks had occurred in California—about as far as distant parts of Russia are from Europe—the reaction probably would have been the same. A security concern for Russia in its non-European parts would not necessarily mean a troop commitment by European Allies. Nonetheless, Russia is not as powerful as the United States and could need the additional help to secure its borders.

Insofar as territorial disputes are concerned, one only need look at the historical and ongoing disputes for islands in the Aegean Sea between Greece and Turkey, not to mention the Cyprus dilemma. These disputes, while straining internal NATO functions at times, do not prevent the alliance from completing its day to day business and upholding its overall effectiveness.

B. REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS

Having considered the geostrategic and political implications of Russian membership in NATO, let us now examine the regional issues.

The three regions of interest here are Ukraine, the former republics in Central Asia, and the former Baltic republics, all of which stand to have their relationships with NATO and Russia significantly changed by Russia’s membership in NATO.

Russian membership in NATO might bring Ukraine and Russia close together again. The current war on terrorism would only serve to better relations between the two

countries. Ukraine would benefit from increased integration of Russia and NATO and would feel less like a buffer zone between Russia and Western Europe.

Strategic partnership with Russia is one of the three key foreign policy objectives of Ukraine. According to Ukrainian President Kuchma, Ukraine wants to continue to integrate with Europe and develop a strategic partnership with Russia and the US.\textsuperscript{117} Admitting Russia in NATO might solve a few Russian-Ukrainian problems left over from the fall of the Soviet Union. Among these would be making the final agreements on control over weapons of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, ratifying an agreement on a free trade zone for CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States), and resolving the so-called problem of “compatriots” abroad (Ukrainians living in Russia or Russians living in Ukraine.)\textsuperscript{118} Conversely, Russian membership in NATO would make NATO support for Ukrainian independence (in the event of Russian efforts to dominate Ukraine) unlikely.

The Central Asian countries of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, & Tajikistan could all benefit from Russia in NATO as well. While they are not as ready to join NATO as Ukraine might be (after Russia), they would certainly benefit from having both the US and Russia as friends. There is some concern, however, regarding the Islamic fundamentalism of these areas, which is viewed as a threat to Russian security. Indeed, it was this concern—along with the current events—that has brought NATO and Russia together in this scenario. Therefore, in terms of current events, the challenge for Russia will be dealing with the American influence in nations which have traditionally been under Soviet or Russian influence.

Evidence of this challenge can be found in certain Russia’s reaction to the US-led war on terrorism. While Russia has strongly supported the US in this effort, it is wary of a prolonged US presence in Afghanistan. “During these past days,” said Olshansky (Dmitry Olshansky, top civilian advisor to the Soviet Union’s puppet government in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation), “I heard a new phrase: ‘the boots of American soldiers are tramping on former Soviet soil.’”\textsuperscript{119}

\textsuperscript{117} From FBIS, Document ID: CEP20011029000211, www.fbis.org
\textsuperscript{118} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{119} Montgomery, Dave. “Russia: Be wary of Taliban” Monterey County Herald, 15 November 2001.
Finally, there are the Baltic nations of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, who are all, as assumed in Chapter 1, members of NATO, and who all share the same concerns vis-à-vis Russia and NATO. From a security standpoint, these states have little to gain from Russia’s membership in NATO since it would effectively negate their entire purpose in joining the Alliance themselves, which was to protection from historically aggressive Russia. Although being part of the same Alliance would seem to make Russian aggression against the Baltic nations less likely, as pointed out before, there are no provisions in the agreement for preventing such an occurrence.

There is historic mistrust from all of the Baltic nations towards Russia. As one deputy member of the Latvian parliament pointed out recently:

Is it possible to trust a neighbor of this kind? Soviet Russia on 11 August 1920 promised that it would not have any claims over our country. A peace treaty sealed that promise. Nevertheless, 20 years later, [Soviet Russia] occupied our country. Taking into account this historic event, my party—a centrist party—always asks itself, ‘Where would we be safe?’ And the answer is under NATO’s protection.\[120\]

There is also genuine concern that the Baltic nations will be forgotten in the shuffle once Russia becomes a member of NATO. In light of the military strength, weaponry, and command of regional alliances within the nations of the former Soviet Union and the central Asian republics and the benefits it brings to the Alliance, the US would likely focus its attention on keeping Russia happy and in NATO. Thus, the fears, interests and priorities of the Baltic states likely would be over shadowed by the goals and objectives of their former tormentor.

Clearly, all the former republics of the Soviet Union have legitimate concerns with regard to Russian membership in NATO. From historic fear of Russia in the Baltics, to quiet support from Ukraine, to instability from Central Asia, Russia in NATO may be the best answer.

C. MILITARY/ORGANIZATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

Integration of Russia’s military forces into the Alliance would be a difficult task. What units to include, locations of commands, and command billeting are just a few of the implications that would require study.

Additionally, questions might be raised about certain individual Russian commanders and their participation in NATO. For instance, would the strategic necessity of having Russia in NATO obscure potential problems caused by Russian commanders who may be suspected of human rights violations in Chechnya? One only need recall the US difficulty in training anti-drug battalions in Colombia due to the requirement to train only units and personnel who are determined not to have committed human rights violations.

![NATO's Civil and Military Structure](After: www.nato.int)

There are several command arrangements that might work for Russia in NATO. One model of integration would be to phase in Russian participation in NATO’s Integrated Military Structure (IMS). The first phase would be formation of a NATO-
Russian Peacekeeping Brigade. Once command relationships had been worked out, then a second phase of an Allied Command Eurasia would be created, similar to Allied Command Europe (See Figure 2-Allied Command Eurasia would be in the red box).

According to ideas put forth by the Committee on Eastern Europe and Russia in NATO (CEERN), there are four possible models for Russian command integration:

The first would be like the German model (full integration of the national forces under NATO integrated command).

The second would be like France (no integration).

The third would be the model of most of the NATO European countries (commitment of most forces to NATO command in wartime; an important but limited NATO role in peacetime). This is a more likely choice, although it does not answer the fears of nations who see Russia as a potential threat.

The fourth is the American model (close integration with NATO of the US forces that are in Europe; having SACEUR serve also as a national commander; a looser commitment to NATO of the forces stationed inside the US and elsewhere). This is also a possibility for Russia.  

Getting the command structure right for NATO is another challenge that Russian membership would bring. Before discussing what a Russian command in NATO might look like though, a short review is needed of the challenges presented when the current NATO command structure was debated and developed.  

NATO recognized shortly after the Cold War ended that its command structure needed to be reformed to reflect the new security environment. Serious study of changing the command structure began in 1994 with the “NATO Adaption Long-Term Study (LTS).” An important part of this study was the work to reduce the size of the integrated command structure.

Immediately evident in the command structure reform was the inability of NATO members to find agreement on how to reorganize. Topping the difficulties in the reform of the command structure is how powerful national political interests and sensitivities can

121 http://fas.org/man/nato/ceern/beern06.htm
122 NATO’s command structure is described at: www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/index.htm#CH12.
be. However, this difficulty is congruent with routine Alliance decisions and operations.  

The challenge of reforming the command structure in NATO is similar to any new undertaking initiated by the Alliance, whether it is an operation like the air campaign in Kosovo or the debate on enlargement. “In short, reform efforts have pitted military rationales against national political agenda, the latter of which are based largely on the issues of prestige, historic animosities, and maintaining/improving a nation’s standing in the Alliance.” 

According to Thomas Young, three important “truisms” concerning the integrated command structure need to be recognized. First is the fact that the LTS was trying to reform a structure that was not “created” in one single act. Reforming a structure that has been continually evolving since its inception in 1951 proved to be difficult. Second, “in NATO (as in any coalition or alliance) there is an informal political “matrix” which must balance each nation’s tangibles (military capabilities) and intangibles (political ambitions) in order to produce consensus.” 

Therefore, any attempt to reform something as political sensitive and significant as which nation will host a headquarters, who will provide its commander and senior staff positions, etc., must be agreeable by all affected nations. Third, and clearly related to the first two points mentioned, this “matrix” that endeavors to balance nations’ ambitions is perceived without doubt as a zero-sum game. (The idea of “zero-sum” game would clearly be sensitive to the Russians as well).

One of the case studies that Young examines is the controversy over France and Allied Forces South (AFSOUTH). Since 1966 France has not participated in the integrated command structure of NATO (although it has maintained close ties with certain commands in NATO for wartime contingencies). Young goes on to point out:

Since the early 1990s, French policy toward NATO underwent a sea change as Paris struggled to come to terms with a situation where its

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124 Ibid. p. 2.

125 Ibid. p. 9.
distant relationship to NATO, which suited its national objectives nicely from 1967 to 1989, was no longer relevant. A key part of French policy toward reassessing its relationship toward the Alliance has been its stated desire to rejoin the integrated command structure, but only if certain key reforms were implemented. The most important changes upon which France has insisted are that the Alliance provides the military wherewithal to support the European Security and Defense Identity, as well as arrange for greater European leadership in the Alliance. (Emphasis added).

While discussions and negotiations have been ongoing between France and NATO since the early 1990s, French policy took a significant turn in Fall 1996, when President Jacques Chirac wrote to President William Clinton arguing that the Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern Region (CINCSOUTH) should be a European as part of the effort to reorganize the integrated command structure. A “European” officer quickly became a “French” general officer and an all but full blown diplomatic contretemps ensued, with Americans (and many Europeans) arguing that the United States was the only NATO power that had the ability to bring together what has been the most disparate and least integrated MSC in NATO.126

From the controversy over AFSOUTH, two deductions can be made that would affect any integration of the Russians into the command structure. First, the French inability to get the position of CINCSOUTH was not just the supposition that only Americans can handle that region. Rather, it was the French inexperience and inability to understand the “NATO staff culture” that greatly hindered their ability to coordinate and negotiate with other NATO staff officers. “Because France does not belong to NATO’s integrated military structure and the fact that NATO issues are strongly influenced by domestic political forces in France, junior French officials often have little or no ability to work NATO issues with their allied counterparts.”127 This same problem could hinder Russia’s ability to effectively fight for certain billets in any new NATO command structure.

Second, command billets are very important in the integrated command structure, irrespective of status or rank, and are hotly contested within NATO. Even something as

127 Ibid. p. 15.
seemingly benign as a one- or two-star flag position in a third level headquarters could be a “non-negotiable issue for a nation which sees that position as essential.”

Russian sensitivities would be just as valid and important as any other members in the Alliance. Command billeting in a new integrated military structure with Russian forces would be extremely important, politically as well as militarily.

The idea of an “Allied Command Eurasia” would not be the only command arrangement that NATO would need to consider. Indeed, Russian billeting in the rest of the Alliance’s structures would be critical to maintaining their support for the Alliance and effective integration of their military. The International Military Staff of NATO would need to be reformed as well to accommodate Russian integration. It is unimaginable that the Russian political and military elite would not demand key slots at every major staff position in NATO. Although they might recognize that American dominance of NATO will probably remain, they would want to be treated at least as equals to the Americans. The implications for traditional European Allies like the UK, Germany, etc. would be tremendous in their perceived losses to the Russians in a new command structure.

Undoubtedly the implications of Russian membership in NATO are immense and seem to be insurmountable. From the geostrategic issues such as the reaction of China to the regional ramifications for former Russian/Soviet territories to the nitty-gritty details of Russian integration within the Alliance, the process would be slow and agonizingly complex. However, the recent creation of the NATO-Russia Council is just one indication of how far cooperation and partnership have advanced since the end of the Cold War. If the member nations of NATO and Russia felt it was in their best strategic interest, then these obstacles would be overcome and Russian Federation membership in NATO would be reality.

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128 Ibid. p. 16.
V. CONCLUSION

The one certainty for the future of European security is that Russia cannot be ignored. The advances made in relations between Russia and NATO are extraordinary. The creation of the NATO-Russia Council, essentially giving Russia a voice in many important parts of the Alliance (although limited to be sure), is the most tangible evidence of this new partnership. Russian membership in NATO is just one of many options, albeit a controversial one. There are so many implications for this scenario that it is impossible to study them all. This thesis has tried to examine a few. Here are a few other implications that have been omitted but should be studied:

• What about Russia’s nuclear weapons? Do they get integrated into the NATO nuclear umbrella or provide quasi-protection like the independent nuclear forces of Britain and France?
• What happens with arms control agreements like START or CFE?
• Will Russia stop helping Iran acquire nuclear power? (According to the US State Department’s most recent report on global terrorism, Iran is the “most active state sponsor of terrorism.”129)

Additionally, there are some possible positive implications from a US point of view if Russia were in NATO. These include:

• The opportunity to strengthen Russia’s democratic and legal institutions.
• Ensure and encourage effective civilian command and control of the Russian armed forces.
• The foundation for true liberalization of the Russian economy.
• Improve respect for human rights throughout Russia.

Finally, there are some further positive and negative implications of closer NATO-Russian relations. Some negative implications are:

• For Russia, key members of the Russian elite (generals, industrialists, intelligence officials, etc.) distrust NATO and the US in particular;
• For Russia, a reluctance to accept Western concepts of military reform and transparency;

For Russia, suspicions about US and other NATO forces currently in Uzbekistan and elsewhere in Central Asia, considered Moscow’s sphere of influence.

For NATO, continuing concern about anti-democratic trends and Russian conduct in Chechnya;

For NATO, distrust of Russian aspirations for co-decision arrangements.

Some positive implications are:

For Russia, it makes Russia a partner of US and NATO;

For Russia, it serves Russian security interests, to the extent that terrorist organizations and others threaten Russia;

For NATO, Russian intelligence regarding terrorism, Afghanistan, etc.;

For NATO, possible Russian cooperation in non-proliferation regarding Iran, Iraq, North Korea, etc.;

For NATO, Russia’s oil and natural gas, at a time of increased uncertainty about the long-term reliability of Middle Eastern suppliers.

The long term stability and security of North America, Europe and Russia are still unresolved. To date, the strongest and most influential security institution in Europe has been NATO. It would stand to reason that, if not today, then sometime in the near future Russian membership in NATO must be addressed. If Russia were to join, then it and the other allies would need to overcome the obstacles and negative implications indicated in this thesis. It would not be easy.

There is a lot of hope today in Russia, including hope for democratization and a better life with fewer security concerns. NATO membership could further this hope. However, Russia has little tradition of democracy or capitalism. Alexander Chaika, a private farmer in the Timashevsk region of Russia, gives insight on why things are always difficult for Russia. He possesses “an almost genetic comprehension, based on centuries of wildly swinging fortunes, that things in Russia can easily go awry.” According to Mr. Chaika, “You put all this sweat and energy into this farm and then you worry that all of a sudden, one fine day, someone is going to come along and sweep it all

130 National Geographic, November 2001, p. 31.
away. I don’t think it’s going to happen, but you have to worry about it. In the depths of my soul, I worry about it.”¹³¹ This Russian outlook, although just the words of one man, does reflect the caution that Russians might possess as a whole towards any change, including membership in NATO.

The following excerpt, however, offers some encouraging words for Russian integration with the West, at whatever level:

The 21st Century won’t be easy for Russia, and it will need completely different allies from the military-political establishment’s “traditional” friends. Russia has no need for a museum of dictators that have outlived their day and whose only strategic service is to help fill the pockets of the arms-dealing intermediaries that graft themselves onto the military-industrial complex.

We need as allies strong democratic states ready to share with us the responsibility for our collective security. We need them today, just as 60 years ago the allies we needed were Great Britain and the United States.¹³²

¹³¹ Ibid.

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Email interview with Dr. Rainer Vadim Grenewitz from the Marshall Center in Garmisch, Germany. Interview conducted on 12 November 2001.

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