Can the Army Reserve Overcome its Growing Company Grade Officer Shortage?

A Monograph
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Abstract


From at least 1995 until 2001 the Army Reserve Troop Program Unit (TPU) shortage of Army Promotion List (APL) company grade officers has increased. It will continue to increase under the existing status quo. Several factors contribute to this shortage. Among the most significant of these include accessioning too few lieutenants in recent years, creating some adverse impacts that increased attrition while implementing the Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act (ROPMA), and having to rely on a much smaller manpower pool for potential TPU assignments.

There is no easy, short-term solution to fix this problem. No one policy, action, or office can overcome it alone. Rather, this shortage can only be mitigated and eventually overcome by a combination of carefully thought out policies and actions.

The Army Reserve can overcome its growing company grade officer shortage if it works with the Army to develop a strategic plan and implement measures to mitigate it. This plan needs input from a Blue Ribbon panel convened to assess the full impact of recent trends on company grade officers in the Army’s reserve components (RCs). The Army must also reassess the status of its policies related to the RCs in the five years since ROPMA took effect, focusing particularly on the detrimental effects it has had on company grade officers. Both new and revised policies are needed to fully implement all aspects of ROPMA and also provide timely support to human resource managers.

The recommendations in this monograph serve as a guide on how to obtain and/or retain sufficient lieutenants and captains for TPU service. These recommendations are divided into four general areas that include finding alternate ways to accession sufficient lieutenants, modifying the promotion board process, using selective continuation (SELCON) for captains, and aggressively recruiting captains for unit vacancies. The Army Reserve can no longer rely on the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) to meet its lieutenant requirements. To compensate, the Army Reserve must maximize participation in state and federal Officer Candidate School (OCS) programs, increase the number of direct appointments, and look for innovative new ways to annually accession a sufficient number of lieutenants. Modifications to promotion board policy include verifying the baccalaureate degree requirement during a post-board check, promoting all fully qualified lieutenants to captain, decreasing the time in grade for promotion to captain, using the below zone authority for major promotions, and decentralizing position vacancy board promotions to captain. The Army Reserve must also do a better job recruiting individual ready reserve (IRR) captains for TPU service. Overall, these specific recommendations are cost effective, compatible with the active Army and Army National Guard, and provide an adequate quantity and quality of TPU company grade officers for the Army Reserve.

This monograph stresses that company grade officer leadership is essential to building and sustaining quality soldiers and ready units. It also points out that sustaining the near and long-term viability of the Army Reserve TPU company grade officer population is in the best interest of the Army and Nation. It concludes that if the Army Reserve desires to remain a relevant and ready component of the Army then it must overcome this shortage. It also warns that a delay in implementing these measures will cause this shortage to increase and, within two years, start to spread into the TPU field grade ranks.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This monograph is for those military professionals who are willing to step up and devote the mental and physical energy needed to improve the Army Reserve’s company grade officer shortage. This problem is going to require thoughtful, perceptive analysis and actions, as well as renewed emphasis and innovation over many years before it can be solved. Every Army Reserve leader is capable of making a positive impact in the recruitment, retention, and professional development of company grade officers. The future of the Army Reserve depends on it. I challenge you to make a difference.

Several people assisted me in this effort. Special thanks are due to a couple of people in particular. Ms. Jeaneane Oelke from the Personnel Proponency Office, Army Reserve Personnel Command in St. Louis provided me with an enormous amount of data that enabled me to research and tell this story. Jeaneane is the consummate professional who is always looking after the best interests of the Army Reserve. I also feel privileged and honored to have worked with her in an earlier assignment where she taught me much about the various (and often arcane) automated personnel management systems used in the Army Reserve. LTC Frank Barth also deserves special recognition and thanks. As my monograph director and seminar leader, he provided thoughtful assistance and feedback throughout this endeavor, while also stressing the need to balance family and professional responsibilities.

Last, but certainly not least, I am greatly indebted to my family for their support and encouragement throughout the research and writing of this monograph. My wife and best friend Paige was always there with an encouraging word to keep me focused, while also being a wonderful mom to Sarah and our new baby Hannah.
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1LT</td>
<td>first lieutenant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2LT</td>
<td>second lieutenant</td>
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<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>active component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACC</td>
<td>Army Competitive Category</td>
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<tr>
<td>AGR</td>
<td>Active Guard/Reserve</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMEDD</td>
<td>Army Medical Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>APFT</td>
<td>Army physical fitness test</td>
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<tr>
<td>APL</td>
<td>Army Promotion List</td>
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<tr>
<td>APPD</td>
<td>AMEDD Personnel Proponency Directorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARNG</td>
<td>Army National Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR</td>
<td>Army regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR-PERSCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Army Reserve Personnel Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASA (M&amp;RA)</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFYTD</td>
<td>consolidated fiscal year to date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td>Continental United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>captain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCSPER</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>DODD</td>
<td>Department of Defense directive</td>
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<tr>
<td>DODI</td>
<td>Department of Defense instruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOPMA</td>
<td>Defense Officer Personnel Management Act</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>direct reporting command</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>echelon above corps</td>
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<td>EAD</td>
<td>echelon above division</td>
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<tr>
<td>FEMA</td>
<td>Federal Emergency Management Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>FORSCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Army Forces Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>FY</td>
<td>fiscal year</td>
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<tr>
<td>G1</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff, G1 (Personnel)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HR</td>
<td>human resource</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMA</td>
<td>Individual Mobilization Augmentee</td>
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<tr>
<td>ING</td>
<td>Inactive National Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRR</td>
<td>Individual Ready Reserve</td>
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<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>information technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>JAG</td>
<td>Judge Advocate General</td>
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<tr>
<td>LT</td>
<td>lieutenant</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>major</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSO</td>
<td>military service obligation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDAA</td>
<td>National Defense Authorization Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAC</td>
<td>officer advanced course</td>
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<tr>
<td>OBC</td>
<td>officer basic course</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCAR</td>
<td>Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve</td>
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<td>OCS</td>
<td>officer candidate school</td>
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<td>OMPF</td>
<td>Official Military Personnel File</td>
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<td>PERDIV</td>
<td>Personnel Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>PERMS</td>
<td>Personnel Electronic Records Management System</td>
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<tr>
<td>PERSCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Total Army Personnel Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>PERSSSO</td>
<td>personnel systems staff officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>PMO</td>
<td>personnel management officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>POI</td>
<td>program of instruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>PVB</td>
<td>position vacancy board</td>
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<tr>
<td>PYG</td>
<td>promotion year group</td>
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<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>reserve component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCCPDS</td>
<td>Reserve Components Common Personnel Data System</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDF</td>
<td>Reserve Forces Duty</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROPA</td>
<td>Reserve Officer Personnel Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROPMA</td>
<td>Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROTC</td>
<td>Reserve Officers’ Training Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSC</td>
<td>Regional Support Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSG</td>
<td>Regional Support Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SELCON</td>
<td>selective continuation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SELRES</td>
<td>Selected Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACP</td>
<td>Total Army Commissioning Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAPDB-R</td>
<td>Total Army Personnel Database - Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIG</td>
<td>time in grade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIS</td>
<td>time in service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPU</td>
<td>Troop Program Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USACAPOC</td>
<td>United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAR</td>
<td>United States Army Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USARC</td>
<td>United States Army Reserve Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VERRP</td>
<td>voluntary early release and retirement program</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT

People are the heart and soul of any organization. They are central to everything we do in the United States Army. Good leadership, particularly that provided by company grade officers, is essential to building and sustaining quality soldiers and ready units. The Army Vision declares people as the engine behind our capabilities, and the soldier as the centerpiece of our formation. However, this engine has started to sputter and the formation’s started to crumble in United States Army Reserve units over the last decade as the shortage of company grade officers – lieutenants and captains – continues to increase.

Sustaining the long-term health and vitality of the Army Reserve Troop Program Unit (TPU) company grade officer population is in the best interest of the Army and Nation. In the recently released Objective Force White Paper, General Shinseki, the Army Chief of Staff, declares that “the success of Army Transformation and the realization of the Objective Force will ultimately depend on our people.” This White Paper goes on to say that “the Objective Force will require higher levels of integration between the active and reserve components to the point of truly being The Army, not three separate components.” Objective Force capabilities will also be distributed between the active and reserve components in a way that necessitates continued integration so that the Objective Force can achieve strategic responsiveness and dominance across the spectrum.

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4 Ibid., page 18.
of military operations and simultaneously provide for homeland security.\(^5\) Company grade officer leadership is a vital aspect in attaining higher levels of integration and maintaining peak unit readiness. The Army can not afford to overlook this problem in the Army Reserve. At just over five and a half percent of the total Army budget, the Army Reserve accounts for over twenty-nine percent of the Army’s total personnel strength.\(^6\) If the current Army Reserve company grade officer shortage persists, then it increases the risk and overall ability of the Army to achieve its Objective Force.

In the nearer term, the Army Reserve remains in the midst of a chronic and increasing TPU company grade officer shortage at a time when it is simultaneously being called upon to perform more missions in support of the National Military Strategy. The magnitude of the Army Reserve company grade officer shortage is disconcerting to say the least. Figure 1 provides a snapshot of the current authorizations and on-hand strength in all Army Reserve units, which collectively hereafter are simply referred to as TPU.\(^7\) It is important to note that this snapshot is based only on total authorizations and total on-hand strength. Therefore, these percentages portray the best condition possible. Two aspects are readily apparent in Figure 1. The first is a real problem and the second is not, even though it is often mistaken as one. First, the grand total indicates a severe shortfall in captain on-hand strength, which is at best only fifty-eight percent of authorized strength. Second, it appears that overall TPU authorizations do not have a pyramid-shaped base of sufficient lieutenant authorizations. Or stated differently, the total TPU lieutenant authorizations appear to be too low to sustain the large number of captain authorizations. This might be true in a relatively closed personnel management system like the active Army where

\(^{5}\) Ibid.
\(^{7}\) The author compiled this figure from two data sources. The first source being from the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPE) Report 46 dated 30 September 2001 and the second is from the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve (OCAR) Personnel Division (PERDIV) TPU MS database dated January 2001.
basic branch officers almost always enter the system as newly commissioned lieutenants. However, the Army Reserve TPU personnel management system is relatively open. It is designed to draw officers from a variety of outside sources (like the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), Army National Guard (ARNG), and active Army) at different points in their career.

![TPU Officers](image)

**Figure 1. TPU Authorized and On-hand Strength**

Figure 1 also shows the overall lieutenant on-hand strength as 143 percent, which is slightly higher than total authorizations. However, this masks an actual shortage of over two thousand lieutenant vacancies. These lieutenant vacancies are due to lieutenants working in higher-grade positions and also by geographic constraints. Geographic constraints are unique to the reserve components and exist when a position remains vacant because no soldier lives near or is willing to travel to this unit to fill a vacancy.
Army Reserve TPU company grade officer attrition is also a significant contributor to this chronic shortage. Figure 2 provides a snapshot of the lieutenant and captain attrition rates in TPU over the last seven fiscal years, along with the corresponding active component (AC) captain attrition rate that has gained so much recent publicity. Both Army Reserve lieutenant and captain attrition rates are disturbingly high when compared to the AC. Army Reserve lieutenant attrition has been particularly high in recent years.

![Rate of Company Grade Officer Attrition](image)

**Figure 2. Recent Active and Reserve Company Grade Officer Attrition**

The Army Reserve’s TPU shortage is a result of a combination of several factors. The most significant of these includes accessioning too few lieutenants in recent years, creating some adverse impacts that caused an increase in attrition while implementing new legislation like the Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act (ROPMA), and having to rely on a smaller
manpower pool from the IRR and AC populations for potential TPU assignments. The Army Reserve’s company grade officer shortage even mirrors the active Army’s shortage to an extent. However, the Army Reserve’s shortage is much more severe and requires similar, yet unique, measures to overcome it. No new measures are in place now or forthcoming in the near term to remedy this situation.

General Shinseki has repeatedly said, “if you don’t like change, you’re going to like irrelevance even less.” The imperative for change is overwhelming when it comes to the need to overhaul all of the human resource life cycle management models, policies, and programs affecting Army Reserve lieutenants and captains. Historical data over the last decade clearly identifies the overall TPU shortage of company grade officers and also shows how this trend is increasing. If the Army Reserve desires to remain a relevant and ready component of the Army, it must form a strategic plan and implement comprehensive measures to reduce this TPU shortage.

The focus of this monograph is on TPU lieutenants and captains in the Army Promotion List (APL) category. The APL category consists of all officers in the basic branches plus the Judge Advocate General (JAG) Corps branch. The active Army rough equivalent to APL is the Army Competitive Category, or ACC. This APL focus is for two reasons. First, because APL officers are less likely to be accessioned by a direct commissioning program, unlike many of the Army Reserve’s Army Medical Department (AMEDD) officers and chaplains. The second and most important reason is that APL problems do not seem to be widely recognized, understood, or being worked across the Army. This is in sharp contrast to the AMEDD community who seems to have recognized and started working in great detail to alleviate AMEDD shortages years ago. Recent

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9 Note that the ACC does not include the JAG Corps.
success from AMEDD efforts to overcome their officer shortages might even be masking APL shortages to an extent, when the TPU company grade population is only examined as a whole. This lack of understanding problems is related to the fact that the APL community has no central advocate or collective voice representing it, whereas the AMEDD Personnel Proponency Directorate (APPD) has proven itself a most capable advocate across all Army components of the AMEDD community.

The TPU company grade officer shortage will continue to increase under the existing status quo. Figure 3 depicts the average total strength of company grade officers in TPU over time.\textsuperscript{10} Over the last seven years this trend has been almost completely negative for captains. In the last three years the trend for lieutenants has also turned negative. This negative trend for lieutenants would have happened much earlier were it not for an intensive management effort by the Army Reserve Personnel Command (AR-PERSCOM) to assign IRR lieutenants with service obligations to TPU. That pool of obligated IRR lieutenants has been exhausted in recent years. No new sources of company grade officers exist to fill the growing number of TPU vacancies in the Army Reserve. Every year these shortages will continue to increase in the TPU company grade ranks. Within two years these shortages will start to reverberate into the field grade ranks and create additional officer shortages. The continued growth of this TPU officer shortage is unavoidable unless the Army formulates a strategic plan that incorporates new and innovative plans, policies, and procedures to overcome it.

\textsuperscript{10} The summaries in this figure are based on an OCAR PERDIV database file provided to the author on 14 December 2001. Note that they differ slightly from Figure 1 because they are based on the yearly average, not a specific date.
### TPU Lieutenant and Captain Strength Trends

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<th>Year</th>
<th>LT Average Strength</th>
<th>LT Authorizations</th>
<th>LT Percent Assigned</th>
<th>CPT Average Strength</th>
<th>CPT Authorizations</th>
<th>CPT Percent Assigned</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>8093</td>
<td>6040</td>
<td>134.0%</td>
<td>10786</td>
<td>14050</td>
<td>76.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>6900</td>
<td>4922</td>
<td>140.2%</td>
<td>10812</td>
<td>14629</td>
<td>73.9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>6492</td>
<td>4539</td>
<td>143.0%</td>
<td>10376</td>
<td>14473</td>
<td>71.7%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>7201</td>
<td>4335</td>
<td>166.1%</td>
<td>9099</td>
<td>14489</td>
<td>62.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>8058</td>
<td>4242</td>
<td>190.0%</td>
<td>8984</td>
<td>14237</td>
<td>63.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>7605</td>
<td>4234</td>
<td>179.6%</td>
<td>9408</td>
<td>13953</td>
<td>67.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>6621</td>
<td>4333</td>
<td>152.8%</td>
<td>8754</td>
<td>13902</td>
<td>62.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 3. Recent TPU Lieutenant and Captain Strength Trends**

The Army Reserve can overcome its company grade officer shortage if it works with the Army in developing a strategic plan and corresponding policy measures to reduce it. The time is ideal to implement such a plan, as the Secretary of the Army begins realigning and reorganizing all the various staffs of the active and reserve components under one integrated Army staff. Under this initiative all the active Army, Army Reserve and Army National Guard (ARNG) personnel staffs will be integrated under one human resource (HR) staff called the Army G1. This Army G1 staff is ideally suited to develop and implement an integrated plan to overcome this Army Reserve TPU shortage. Any realistic plan needs to be relatively simple to implement, cost effective, and compatible with the ARNG and active Army. Most importantly, it must provide an adequate quantity and quality of company grade officers to sustain those critical TPU leadership positions in the Army Reserve.

Past performance and future success in overcoming this TPU shortage depends on identifying and measuring several factors. Some essential factors include: measuring the total number of annual lieutenant accessions from all sources (e.g., the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC), Officer Candidate Schools, and direct appointment commissions) against projected requirements; achieving a ninety percent or higher education qualification rate for all TPU lieutenants appearing...

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before the captain APL mandatory promotion board, or eliminating the need to show proof of a baccalaureate degree during this board; implementing selective continuation for fully qualified TPU captains passed over for promotion to major; and decentralizing the position vacancy board for promotions to captain.

The recommendations section of this monograph details several measures, that if enacted, will alleviate and, over time, overcome this problem. The hardest part of this problem is gaining and attaining the necessary momentum to take action. There is no easy solution to fix this TPU shortage. No one policy, action, or office will fix this problem. Rather, this shortage can only be mitigated and eventually overcome by a combination of carefully thought out polices and actions.

Several key players and crucial agencies must work together to solve this crisis. The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, or ASA (M&RA), and the Army G1 must both be willing to encourage and support new and innovative policy initiatives. The Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve (OCAR) Personnel Division (PERDIV) will have a vital role in solving this problem as it is disbanded and reorganized within the Army G1 staff. It is also critical that the US Army Cadet Command, US Army Reserve Command (USARC) Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER), and AR-PERSCOM all work together with the Army G1 to fully diagnose this problem and implement a variety of measures to overcome it. Otherwise the Army will have an epiphany that it has lost the Army Reserve officers it needs to achieve its Objective Force.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS

This last decade has been a turbulent time for the Army Reserve for which several events have served to shape the current TPU shortage of company grade officers. Foremost was the active Army drawdown of the 1990s that caused a wave of changes to ripple through the Army Reserve as well. Initially, this caused the size of the company grade officer population in the IRR to increase. However, this increase has since passed from a combination of these officers resigning after completing their eight-year mandatory service obligation (MSO) or being discharged for twice failing to be selected for promotion. The overall size of Army Reserve Selected Reserve (SELRES) assigned strength, which includes the TPU, Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA), and Active/Guard Reserve (AGR) programs, has also decreased from a high water mark of 309,681 in 1991 to 206,892 total soldiers in 2000.12 New legislation in the 1990s also changed the way in which officers were promoted and managed. In the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 Congress included a provision specifying that after 30 September 1995 all reserve component officers must possess a baccalaureate degree before they could be promoted to the rank of captain (O-3) or above.13 The most significant legislation was the Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act (ROPMA) that went into effect on 1 October 1996. This ended an implementation delay of almost two years from the 5 October 1994 date when the President signed this legislation into law as Title XVI of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 1995.14 During the drawdown the Army also decided to significantly

reduce the size of the ROTC program, because a smaller Army would need less officers. Any single one of these events alone could have triggered a shortage of TPU company grade officers. Together, these events have caused chronic shortages that continue to grow unabated.

**Reserve Officer Populations – Examining the Parts as well as the Whole**

The Army Reserve will never completely understand and diagnose the TPU company grade officer shortage until it overhauls the manner in which it looks at officer populations. One can only determine the most rudimentary of observations when viewing the whole TPU officer population by overall grade authorizations and assigned strength by rank, as depicted earlier in Figure 1. The active Army manages officers by year groups that are based on the fiscal year in which an officer was commissioned. This greatly facilitates analysis and management of the overall officer population, where a shortage or excess of officers in a particular year group can easily be identified. The Army Reserve officer population is a much more diverse group than its active Army counterpart. Using a Reserve officer’s commissioning date is almost useless in identifying a particular cohort of officers within the same population. This is largely due to Reserve officers being promoted at earlier or later times, which depends on other factors like the amount of time spent on active duty and any break(s) in service. However, Reserve officer cohorts can easily be identified by using an officer’s current rank and date of rank, and comparing that information to the primary zone of consideration for the next mandatory promotion board. These cohorts have become know as promotion year groups.\(^{16}\)

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\(^{15}\) U.S. Army Cadet Command. *College ROTC: The Way Ahead*. (Fort Monroe, VA, 4 April 2001) p. 12. The 1988 Cadet Command mission of 8,200 commissions was reduced to only 4,500 by 1993. Steps to reduce this number were so successful that they outpaced the objective. The Army’s requirement for ROTC lieutenants was reduced to a low of 3,800 in 1998 and then moved up to 3,900 for years 2001 to 2004.

\(^{16}\) The author’s initial term “cohort” evolved into “promotion year group” while performing a series of analysis and studies when assigned to the Personnel Proponency Office (PPO), AR-PERSCOM, St. Louis, Missouri during 1997 to 2000. This work also received much interest and support from the Army Reserve AMEDD community. Promotion year group is not an official Army term; it is something the author and other members of PPO derived.
A promotion year group is a homogeneous set of officers of the same rank who will all be considered in the primary zone for the same mandatory promotion board. Promotion year groups are labeled in a similar manner as active Army year groups, except they are calculated by subtracting the current year from the total number of years service a due-course Reserve officer would have attained. These years of service are based solely on the officer’s current rank and date of rank, so actual years of service will vary somewhat depending on factors like the amount of active duty service, delaying a promotion, and/or receiving an early promotion via a position vacancy board. For example, a recently released captain leaving the active Army after four years of active duty will be in the same promotion year group as a recently promoted career Army Reserve captain who has seven years of service. All due-course Reserve officers are eligible for promotion at about seven years of total service. Because both of these officers will be considered for promotion to major by the same mandatory promotion board, they are in the same promotion year group.

There are distinct advantages to arraying officers in this manner, so much so that this should be adopted as a standard business practice across the entire Army Reserve. The current TPU company grade officer shortage is easily more visible when the captain and lieutenant populations are viewed in their respective APL promotion year groups. Arraying officers by their promotion year groups allows one to quickly determine the size of each particular promotion year group of officers. It is also useful for comparing the on-hand strength of all officers with the total authorizations for that grade so that one can gauge the health of officer populations. For instance, an authorization space can be created in the form of a simple graphical shape, like a rectangle or triangle, by multiplying the total number of authorizations by the number of years an officer spends in a particular grade. Determining the particular shape of this authorization space requires careful consideration. It must be based on the unique manner in which that personnel system operates, taking into account how officers migrate in and out of this system. Superimposing this
authorization space over the promotion year group of a particular officer population provides an incredible visual image that also conveys a tremendous amount of information.

In Figure 4 the APL captain population in TPU is arrayed by promotion year groups. As an illustration, promotion year group 1992 (PYG 1992) consists of 767 captains, all of which have approximately ten years service. Additionally, PYG 1992 must complete about three more years service before consideration by the major APL mandatory promotion board that will convene in the year 2005. The shaded rectangle spanning the seven promotion year groups 1995 to 1989 graphically represents all captain authorizations. Minimally, the Army Reserve needs 1,251 captains in each of these seven promotion year groups to completely and evenly fill all 8,754 authorizations. With 1,246 officers, PYG 1989 is the only PYG that comes close to this ideal number of officers. All other PYGs fall significantly below the shaded rectangle representing this ideal number. Moreover, all officers in PYGs 1988 and earlier are no longer assets for continued service in captain positions. These officers will either move up or out of these positions because they have already been recommended for promotion or are in the process of being discharged for being twice passed over for promotion to major. The overall captain shortage is significantly greater when you exclude the imminent loss of all 1,101 officers in PYGs 1988 and earlier.

17 The author manipulated data from a 2 November 2001 query of the Total Army Personnel Database – Reserve (TAPDB-R) to create this figure. Ms. Jeaneane Oelke, of the Personnel Proponent Office (PPO), Army Reserve Personnel Command (AR-PERSCOM), St. Louis, Missouri provided this query.

18 A rectangle is used here as an authorization space for illustration purposes only. The exact shape of this authorization space needs to be based on a detailed analysis of officer migration and flow patterns, taking into account such things as attrition and geographic constraints. A typical active component authorization space resembles a trapezoid that starts out with higher numbers of recently commissioned officers in younger year groups and is reduced over time.

19 Promotion Year Group (PYG) 1995 is so small because the results of the most recent CPT APL promotion board that convened in November 2001 have not been released. This board considered all first lieutenants in PYG 1996, shown in Figure 5.
Figure 4. APL Captains in TPU Arrayed in Promotion Year Groups

The APL lieutenant population in TPU is arrayed by PYG in Figure 5. This is a somewhat unique situation because both first lieutenants (1LTs) and second lieutenants (2LTs) must be represented against total lieutenant authorizations. This requires that a rank identifier be used along with each PYG. For instance, there is a 2LT PYG 1999 as well as a 1LT PYG 1999. To continue similar to the earlier illustration, 2LT PYG 2001 consists of 214 2LTs, all of which have approximately one year of service. Additionally, 2LT PYG 2001 has about one more year of service before consideration by the first lieutenant administrative promotion board. The shaded rectangle spanning the seven promotion year groups 2001 to 1995 graphically represents all

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20 The author manipulated data from a 2 November 2001 query of the Total Army Personnel Database – Reserve (TAPDB-R) to create this figure. The Personnel Proponency Office (PPO), Army Reserve Personnel Command (AR-PERSCOM), St. Louis, Missouri provided this query.
lieutenant authorizations. Minimally, the Army Reserve needs 619 lieutenants in each of these seven promotion year groups to evenly fill its 4,333 total authorizations. With a total of 706 officers,

![Image of APL LTs in TPU Arrayed in Promotion Year Groups]

*Figure 5. APL Lieutenants in TPU Arrayed in Promotion Year Groups*

the combined strength of 2LT PYG 1996 and 1LT PYG 1996 is the only combined PYG that meets or exceeds this ideal number of officers. All other PYGs fall significantly below this shaded rectangle. Moreover, all officers in 2LT PYGs 1998 or earlier, as well as all officers in 1LT PYGs 1994 and earlier, are no longer assets for continued service in lieutenant positions. These officers will move either up or out of these positions because they have already been recommended for promotion or are in the process of being discharged for being twice passed over for promotion to the higher grade.
A cursory look at TPU LT PYGs in Figure 5 indicates a looming shortage of lieutenants. If you look back at Figure 1 it depicts the overall lieutenant on-hand strength as 143 percent of authorizations, which looks pretty good on the whole despite the large number of vacancies caused by lieutenants being assigned to higher-graded positions or due to geographic constraints. However, Figure 5 presents a very different situation. Clearly, a lieutenant shortage looms in the near future as a result of two factors. First of all, there are hardly any new lieutenants entering the system. A typical PYG starts out with a relatively large number of lieutenants and undergoes attrition over time. For the last several years TPU 2LT PYGs have progressively started out with a much lower number of 2LT accessions. Over time, as normal attrition occurs in these PGYs, it will result in even lower numbers of lieutenants in TPU. Even very nominal attrition is these PYGs is intolerable when initial accessions start out far lower than the ideal number desired. The second factor that adds to this looming shortage is the imminent loss of more senior-ranking lieutenants. For instance, lieutenant losses are surely going to occur as all 211 officers in 2LT PYGs 1998 or earlier and the 421 officers in 1LT PYGs 1994 or earlier are forced up or out by the promotion system. The combination of these two factors is going to cause tremendous lieutenant shortages in TPU over the next several years unless new or existing sources of lieutenant accessions can quickly be found to offset it.

**Lieutenant Accession Sources**

There are three sources of lieutenants for the Army Reserve. These include the ROTC, Office Candidate School (OCS) programs, and direct commissions. Of these three, ROTC has historically been by far the greatest source of Army Reserve lieutenants. The Army Reserve also obtains some lieutenants for TPU assignment from the IRR. However, in recent years the diminishing size of the IRR has become less of a source of lieutenants, especially those with an obligation to serve in a TPU.
Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) Accessions

The ROTC, once the greatest source of the Army Reserve’s newly commissioned lieutenants, is no longer a significant source. In the last decade the reserve components (RCs), a term that encompasses both the Army Reserve and ARNG, have seen ROTC lieutenant accessions take a wild swing from an excess of too many lieutenants in the early 1990s to far too few over the last five years. As late as June 1995 the Army Reserve was still extremely concerned with the unanticipated resource requirements caused by years of “overproduction” of Reserve Forces Duty (RFD) lieutenants from ROTC, compounded by the vast numbers of other lieutenants that were migrating to the RCs after obtaining early releases from active duty obligations.\(^2^1\) Figure 6 depicts how total ROTC accessions were split between the active Army and RCs from 1991 to 2001.\(^2^2\) Note that this figure does not include a small number of lieutenants each year (approximately one hundred in recent years) who were granted an educational delay to pursue additional schooling before entering active duty. The Army Reserve has not found another viable source of lieutenants to offset its serious shortfalls in ROTC accessions over the last five years.


\(^{22}\) The data used in this figure is a compilation of information from multiple sources. The first source is from the U.S. Army Cadet Command. *College ROTC: The Way Ahead*. (Fort Monroe, VA, 4 April 2001), pages 12, 17-18. The second source is a compilation of information from the Personnel Proponency Office and Officer Personnel Management Directorate at AR-PERSCOM.
Figure 6. ROTC Production in Fiscal Years 1991 to 2001

ROTC lieutenant/accessions for the RCs must be steady and predictable for the Army Reserve to sustain a viable company grade officer TPU population. Cadet Command has not made its mission since 1989, and projections out to 2004 indicate that they will still be 200 commissionees short of its active Army mission of 3,900.\textsuperscript{23} Given this and the Army G1 accession policies that “ensure the active Army does not lack for second lieutenants” has caused, and will continue to cause, tremendous annual shortages in the number of lieutenants commissioned as RFD.\textsuperscript{24} As Figure 7 depicts, the last five years (fiscal years 1997 to 2001) have been particularly

\textsuperscript{23} College ROTC: The Way Ahead, p. 17.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid.
bleak for the RCs.\textsuperscript{25} In these years the amount of ROTC RFD production has averaged only 462 lieutenants, or just over twelve percent of the total production. That’s incredible when you look back to fiscal year 1991 when the RFD production alone accounted for 4,226 lieutenants, or sixty-one percent of that year’s total ROTC production. Since 1997 the Army Reserve has only received about one-third of the total ROTC RFD lieutenant production. The other two-thirds goes to the ARNG. This split, as seen in the last two columns of Figure 7, has been based on the total number of lieutenant authorizations in the Army Reserve and ARNG.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Total Commissioned</th>
<th>Active Duty</th>
<th>Ed Delay</th>
<th>Reserve Duty</th>
<th>% Reserve Duty</th>
<th>ARNG</th>
<th>USAR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>6977</td>
<td>2353</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>4226</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>5583</td>
<td>2876</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>2362</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>4661</td>
<td>3086</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>1365</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>4024</td>
<td>3251</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>554</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>4172</td>
<td>3292</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>758</td>
<td>18%</td>
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<td>723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>4508</td>
<td>2848</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>1520</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>797</td>
<td>723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>4271</td>
<td>3413</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>725</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>3812</td>
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<td>93</td>
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<td>12%</td>
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<td>101</td>
<td>406</td>
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<td>260</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>3427</td>
<td>3100</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>153</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>3469</td>
<td>2874</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>491</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 7. Recent ROTC Lieutenant Production**

One might think that the Army Reserve one-third share of the ROTC RFD graduating class should be more, because the ARNG has fifty-four more lieutenant accession sources in its state/territory Officer Candidate Schools. However, the ARNG does such a good job recruiting RFD cadets for service in the ARNG that the split could not be changed very much and still honor cadet preferences. The majority of ROTC RFD cadets have an ARNG letter of acceptance (to fill an ARNG LT unit vacancy related to a specific branch) and preference statement requesting ARNG service during the ROTC RFD Selection and Branching Board. This board stresses the importance of honoring cadet preferences, especially when they are to fill a specific unit vacancy.

\textsuperscript{25} The data used in this figure is a compilation of information from multiple sources. The first source is from the U.S. Army Cadet Command. *College ROTC: The Way Ahead.* (Fort Monroe, VA, 4 April 2001), p. 18. The second source is a compilation of information from the Personnel Proponency Office and Officer Personnel Management Directorate at AR-PERSCOM. The author also used AR-PERSCOM RC numbers in some instances when they differed slightly from Cadet Command.
This split will remain as it is now unless the Army Reserve decides to increase its recruiting effort on ROTC RFD cadets.

**Officer Candidate School (OCS) Accession Programs**

State ARNG Officer Candidate School (OCS) programs and the federal OCS program are not a significant source of lieutenants for the Army Reserve. In the past the role of these OCS programs as a commissioning source did not need to be very big. Other production and non-production sources of lieutenants like ROTC and IRR transfers, respectively, served to provide an ample number of APL lieutenants for TPU service. Historically, the Army Reserve has been allocated fifteen federal OCS and fifty state ARNG OCS accession requirements. These accession requirements have served mostly as a planning factor for personnel managers overseeing these OCS training seats. Throughout a typical fiscal year these training seats are filled as local commanders identify a unit vacancy that cannot be filled by normal means and forward OCS applications from interested candidates through the Regional Support Command (RSC) to AR-PERSCOM for board approval. Each year the Army Reserve does not fully utilize the small number of state and federal OCS slots it is allocated. For instance, during fiscal years 1996 to 1999 the Army Reserve only utilized an average of ten of fifteen federal OCS and nineteen of fifty state OCS allocations. There is no indication that either of these OCS programs is actively managed at the Army Reserve level to increase participation. Interest and participation is completely decentralized. An unfillable lieutenant vacancy must also exist before a soldier may be slotted against this position and request to go to OCS to fill it. Lastly, individual units may or may not encourage a qualified enlisted soldier to apply for OCS.

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26 *Lieutenant Strength and Requirements Study*. p. 87.
28 Personal e-mail correspondence between the author and LTC Ernie Huse, Chief, Personnel Systems Staff Officer (PERSSO) at OCAR PERDIV, dated 14 September 1999.
The Direct Appointment Commissioning Program

The third source of Army Reserve lieutenant production is by a direct appointment, or commission. The Army Reserve uses direct appointments extensively to accession officers for the AMEDD branches. However, direct appointments are much less common for APL officers. For instance, a fiscal year 2000 summary of the Army Reserve Selective Reserve company grade officer population shows over twenty-four percent as having an AMEDD direct appointment source of commission, compared to only eight percent for all other types of direct appointments.\textsuperscript{30}

The Army Reserve also does not actively manage APL direct appointments to increase production. In the past this program probably received little attention outside the AMEDD community because of the large number of ROTC accessions and active duty transfers during the drawdown.

In general, direct appointments are not widely used in either the Army Reserve or ARNG when compared to some of the other services’ Reserve components. For instance, direct appointments only account for twelve percent and eleven and a half percent, respectively, of the total Army Reserve and ARNG officer populations.\textsuperscript{31} This contrasts with over thirty-one percent in both the US Naval Reserve and US Air Force Reserve.\textsuperscript{32}

Recent Legislation and Its Implementation

The NDAA for Fiscal Year 1994 included a provision that could possibly effect Army Reserve lieutenants. It specified that after 30 September 1995 all reserve component officers must possess a baccalaureate degree before they could be promoted to the rank of captain (O-3)

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Ibid.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
or above. This legislation was later modified slightly to change the requirement from graduation from “an accredited educational institution” to graduation from “a qualifying educational institution” in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 1995. This law also made five specific exceptions to the baccalaureate degree requirement. Foremost was the grandfather clause exempting any current officer appointed to the grade of captain or higher before 1 October 1995. Another exception was for AMEDD officers for whom a baccalaureate degree was not a condition of original appointment or assignment. The exceptions meant that lieutenants in the APL promotion category were the primary focus of this legislation. However, the overall impact of this requirement should have been minimal because at the end of FY 1993 eighty-nine percent of all Army Reserve officers possessed a college degree.

As mentioned earlier, ROPMA was also passed as part of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 1995 and became effective on 1 October 1996. This ended an implementation delay of almost two years from the 5 October 1994 date when President Clinton signed this legislation into law. ROPMA was the newest and most comprehensive reserve officer management statute passed since the Reserve Officer Personnel Act (ROPA) of 1954. ROPMA serves to standardize the statutes for appointment, promotion, and separation for all reserve officers in all of the services’ reserve components. Among the key provisions of ROPMA included: moving from a “fully qualified” to “best qualified” selection criteria for captain and higher promotion boards; granting authorization for each Service to convene selective continuation boards based on the needs of the

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36 Ibid.  
39 Currie and Crossland, p. 572.
Service; and eliminating the time in service (TIS) requirement so that time in grade (TIG) was the only factor used to determine promotion eligibility.\textsuperscript{40} To a significant extent, ROPMA parallels the 1980 Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) which standardized these same statutes for all officers in the services’ active components.\textsuperscript{41}

The Congressional statement of purpose for ROPMA was “to revise the basic statutory authorities governing the organization and administration of the reserve components of the Armed Forces in order to recognize the realities of reserve component partnership in the Total Force and to better prepare the American citizen-soldier, sailor, airman, and Marine in time of peace for duties in war.”\textsuperscript{42} To a large extent ROPMA is serving its intended purpose, even though it has not yet been utilized to its fullest extent by the Army. Despite its lengthy implementation delay, the Army failed to take a close look at the implications of this new legislation. This resulted in an almost complete absence of the necessary Army regulatory and policy measures needed to support ROPMA when it took effect. Even after five years under ROPMA the Army Reserve is still trying to overcome the unintended consequences it caused.

Implementing the Baccalaureate Degree Requirement.

The single biggest impact and decline on Army Reserve company grade officer strength over the last five years was most likely caused by the way the baccalaureate degree requirement was implemented for lieutenants appearing before the CPT APL mandatory promotion board. In the Army this has been strictly interpreted to mean that each officer must provide proof of a baccalaureate degree, in the form of a transcript or diploma, not later than the day before a

\textsuperscript{40} Office of the Chief, Army Reserve. Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act (ROPMA) Chain Teaching Program of Instruction (POI) PowerPoint Presentation and accompanying script. 5 February 1997.
\textsuperscript{42} Notes on Section 10001, Title 10, Public Law 103-337. Available from http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/10001_notes.html; Internet; accessed 16 November 2001.
The vast majority of all Army Reserve TPU APL officers possess a baccalaureate degree. However, there has been a tremendous problem informing these officers that they need to provide the selection board a transcript or diploma as proof of their degree. If an officer fails to provide a transcript or diploma then that officer is considered not educationally qualified and has absolutely no chance of being selected for promotion, no matter how well he or she may have performed. The net effect of implementing this change has been a sharp decline in the number of officers determined to be educationally qualified for promotion by the CPT APL promotion board. Figure 8 shows the historically high education qualification rates for TPU and IRR lieutenants during fiscal years 1994 to 1996, before implementation, and how these rates sharply declined in 1997 and thereafter. This problem has caused the CPT APL promotion board to become a career choke point where the Army Reserve is losing many quality officers.

A random survey of the fiscal year 1998 CPT APL board revealed that in virtually all instances Army Reserve lieutenants being considered by these boards possessed a baccalaureate degree but failed to provide proof to the board.\textsuperscript{46} Interestingly enough, well over half of the officers that the board found not educationally qualified did have a baccalaureate degree or higher annotated in the civilian education field of their Total Army Personnel Database – Reserve (TAPDB-R) file.\textsuperscript{47} The source of commission field in TAPDB-R, as well as phone contacts with a number of officers, confirmed that US Military Academy graduates were also considered not educationally qualified by this board, even though completion of a baccalaureate degree is a

\textsuperscript{46}Whitlock. “Promotion to Captain: Failure to Show Proof of a Baccalaureate Degree Means Pass Over.”

\textsuperscript{47}Ibid.
prerequisite for commissioning. However, these two data fields are not considered a trusted source, so they cannot be used as proof of a degree at a promotion board.

The problem is not that Army Reserve lieutenants do not have baccalaureate degrees, it is that promotion boards cannot confirm they have degrees. Three factors seem to contribute to this implementation problem.

First of all, the Office of Promotions, Reserve Components, Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM) was slow to incorporate these changes. For instance, the promotion consideration memorandum mailed to each APL lieutenant under consideration for the CPT APL board is poorly written. As late as the fiscal year 2000 board, fully three years into implementation, this memorandum still erroneously mentions ROPMA as only requiring proof of military education for promotion. It also fails to mention that a transcript or diploma, indicating completion of a baccalaureate, is the only acceptable form of proof for this promotion board. It does request that TPU lieutenants visit their administrative support section as soon as possible to verify and update items like military and civilian education on their DA Form 2-1, Personnel Qualification Record, so that the administrative section can forward their DA Form 2-1 to the board. However, this is misleading because the board does not consider civilian education annotated on the DA Form 2-1 as proof of a baccalaureate degree. If a TPU lieutenant were to follow the instructions in this memorandum, then that officer would certainly be passed over for promotion for not being seen as educationally qualified.

The field cannot clearly interpret the promotion board results PERSCOM releases either. As late as 1999 the education qualification percentages in the statistical review section

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48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid. p.2.
accompanying each promotion list released were still misleading. Among other things, these statistical reviews indicate the number and percent of officers educationally qualified in each promotion zone. However, the footnote on each summary defines qualified as being only those soldiers that have met the military education requirements for promotion. It mentions nothing about civilian education, which for the past three years is the overwhelming reason why most of these officers were passed over for promotion. The true problem is disguised in these results.

A better analysis of these results is needed to reveal the real problem. For example, only fifty-eight percent of the TPU lieutenants (1,010 of 1,733 total) considered by this board were determined to be educationally qualified. This board was prohibited from recommending forty-two percent (723) of these TPU lieutenants for promotion, irrespective of any documented good performance in their promotion consideration file. Of those officers prohibited from selection, thirty-three percent (573) were not determined to be educationally qualified because they lacked proof of civilian education only, another seven percent (124) lacked proof of both civilian and military education, and the remaining two percent (26) lacked proof of military education only.

As one former officer, who worked in the DA Secretariat in St. Louis for over five years, recently said in a monograph, “there is ‘no formal Army training program’ associated with the skill sets required to work in the DA Secretariat, yet the importance of a well-trained support staff for RC Selection Boards is paramount to the success of any selection boards missions.” In this case, the slow degree in which PERSCOM is incorporating legislative changes into revised

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55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 This summary data was compiled by the Personnel Proponency Office, AR-PERSCOM and provided to the author on 21 November 2001.
business processes has resulted in an inability to effectively communicate this new requirement to lieutenants being considered by the CPT APL board or publish meaningful results that conveyed the actual problem.

The second factor contributing to the low number of lieutenants being seen as educationally qualified at the CPT APL board is the confusion that exists in the field between AR-PERSCOM and the Office of Promotions, Reserve Components, PERSCOM, both of which are located in St. Louis. For example, a career manager at AR-PERSCOM may screen the Personnel Electronic Records Management System (PERMS) files of officers in the population he/she manages and ask these officers to send in a transcript or diploma to be added to their Official Military Personnel File (OMPF). Officers who respond to these requests often think that both St. Louis-based organizations (assuming that they even recognize a difference between the two) now have proof of this baccalaureate degree, when in fact it only resides at AR-PERSCOM. Additionally, it often takes about eight to ten months or more after AR-PERSCOM receives an official document before it is added to an officer’s OMPF on PERMS. Later on, these officers may ignore a similar request from a promotion board, thinking that they had already fulfilled this requirement.

The third factor can be attributed to a general lack of understanding when ROPMA was first implemented, especially those aspects of it related to the new best qualified versus fully qualified selection criteria being used at promotion boards. Both junior and senior leaders in the Army Reserve seemed to lack a full understanding of the implications of ROPMA when it was first implemented. For instance, it may have initially been very tempting for a personnel management officer (PMO) to attribute low promotion selection rates to officers not being the

60 This is the author’s informed, professional observation based on the seven years experience since ROPMA was passed, coupled with first-hand knowledge and experience when assigned to TPU and while working in this area at AR-PERSCOM.
best qualified for promotion. A PMO at AR-PERSCOM often gets phone inquires from passed over officers when results are released. A PMO can quickly view that officer’s PERMS record at his or her desktop computer but has no way of knowing the actual “ground truth” information from the promotion board, unless that PMO schedules an appointment at PERSCOM to view that officer’s promotion consideration file. Oftentimes a PMO might subjectively conclude that a passed over officer was fully but not best qualified for promotion, when in fact that officer was actually passed over because he/she was not determined educationally qualified by the board. 61 In a similar situation, a passed over TPU lieutenant might get the same wrong answer from a company commander or staff officer in his/her unit. 62

Changing the Time in Grade (TIG) Requirements for Lieutenant Promotions. ROPMA changed the maximum TIG for promotion from second lieutenant to first lieutenant from three to two years, and from first lieutenant to captain from four to five years. 63 Overall, the time it takes to make captain remains seven years, provided promotions take place at maximum TIG. However, those officers caught in the transition ended up serving eight years to make captain. This affected nearly 5,000 officers in the RCs. 64 It had a detrimental effect on the morale of many first lieutenants. Once again, the Army was not successful in implementing this new policy. No Army proposal was put forward during the two-year delay in implementing ROPMA that would alleviate this problem. ROPMA only specifies the minimum and maximum TIG for each rank. The Army could have elected to temporarily adjust the promotion zone away from the five-year maximum TIG so that no lieutenant would be forced to serve eight years before making

61 While working at AR-PERSCOM the author observed this happening on several occasions.
62 While assigned to a TPU the author witnessed several incidents where junior and senior officers lacked a fundamental understanding of ROPMA. This included a visiting PMO from AR-PERSCOM (then named ARPERCEN) in 1997 that had great difficulty understanding and presenting a ROPMA chain teaching brief to all TPU officers.
63 Army Regulation 135-155. p. 9.
captain. It did not do this. Only recently, almost four additional years after the first promotion board convened under this new law, has the Army started contacting affected officers and providing them a chance to adjust their dates of rank to an earlier date.\(^\text{65}\) However, the damage toll from this oversight passed many years ago.

The 1996 Captain APL Promotion Board: A Case Study in What not to Do

The following incident provides a vivid example of the many problems the Army encountered while implementing ROPMA. The November 1996 CPT APL mandatory promotion board, the first of these boards convened since ROPMA took effect on 1 October 1996, was a case study in unfortunate timing and unpreparedness. Three management errors that adversely affected these lieutenants stand out in particular.

First of all, the Army used the same primary zone for promotion from the previous year’s board.\(^\text{66}\) The reason for this was obvious. As discussed, ROPMA had changed the maximum TIG for promotion to captain from four to five years, and the Army had not proactively decided to modify its promotion zone for this board to prevent first lieutenants caught in this transition from having to serve a total of eight years before promotion.

Second, even though the Army convened this board on 12 November 1996, it used pre-ROPMA eligibility criteria during selection.\(^\text{67}\) In doing this, the board ended up selecting a number of lieutenants for promotion who did not have a baccalaureate degree, a clear violation of ROPMA.\(^\text{68}\) The Army then requested a waiver through the Office of the Secretary of Defense up to the President to promote these officers without a degree (or most likely proof of a degree). This request was disapproved. The Army then had to go back and review and remove these

\(^{65}\) Three Army Messages relate to this effort to adjust captain dates of rank in the reserve components. See ArmyLINK News messages titled “Army will adjust dates of rank for some RC captains,” “Reserve captains may be eligible for back pay,” and “More RC Captains Eligible for Back Pay.” Available at https://www.dtic.mil/armylink/news/, Internet; accessed 1 November 2001.


\(^{67}\) Frank A. Edens. “Reserve Promotion Lists.” (The Officer, July 1998) p. 34.

\(^{68}\) Ibid.
officers from the promotion list before it could be approved and released.\[^{69}\] All told, this process took more than eighteen months before the results of this board were released in June 1998.\[^{70}\]

The third management problem was probably the most demoralizing for officers considered by the 1997 CPT APL board. In July 1998, one month afterward, the results of the subsequent year’s board (1997 CPT APL) were released.\[^{71}\] This caused some officers who were passed over by the first board to receive a second pass over, all within one month. These officers had no feedback from the first board before the second board convened, adjourned, and released its results. This resulted in these officers having no time, knowledge, or opportunity to fix an error or omission from the first board before being considered by this subsequent board. Additionally, because the 1996 CPT APL list was delayed so long in administrative processing, it took until 12 June 1998 for the President to approve it. The 1997 CPT APL list was approved only two weeks later on 25 June 1998. The earliest date of rank under ROPMA is the date the President approves the promotion list.\[^{72}\] This resulted in compressing these two groups of officers together. Normally, about a year separates the earliest dates of rank possible between two consecutive promotion boards. At best, only two weeks now separates these two groups of officers.\[^{73}\] The net effect was combining these two PYGs into one. Needless to say, the morale and retention of these officers was adversely effected.

**Up or Out Versus Selective Continuation (SELCON)**

The active Army has been using SELCON for many years now. It serves a dual purpose for both the officer and the Army. SELCON provides selected officers the ability for continued

\[^{69}\] Ibid.
\[^{70}\] Secretary of the Army Memorandum for Brigadier General John D. Havens. Subject: Memorandum of Instructions for the Fiscal Year 1997 Reserve Component Captain, Army Promotion List Selection Board
\[^{72}\] Army Regulation 135-155. p. 22.
\[^{73}\] See ArmyLINK News message titled “More RC Captains Eligible for Back Pay and Diane Tsimkles. “Reserve Captains Could Change DOR,” Army Times, 22 May 2000), p. The Army is attempting to adjust the dates of ranks of these officers.
service in his/her current grade while simultaneously enabling the Army to mitigate the effects of its captain shortage.

ROPMA also provides for continuation boards, just like DOPMA does with the active Army. ROPMA permits captains to serve up to twenty years of commissioned service before discharge or retirement. However, it originally specified that “upon application” a twice passed-over reserve officer may, subject to the needs of the service, be considered for continuation by a selection board. The Army interpreted this to mean that an officer must first specifically request continuation before being considered by a continuation board. This was a subtle twist that was different from DOPMA, where active officers could automatically be considered for SELCON without requesting it. The implications of accommodating this new requirement only seemed to complicate the long-established promotion board process already in place for the Reserve Components. This may be the primary factor attributable to the decision, or rather indecision, not hold any selective continuation boards to date. However, the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2000 amended this earlier provision, which now makes it the sole prerogative of the Secretary to convene continuation boards as needed to meet the needs of the Army.

While the Army decided to forgo continuation boards for the RCs, the shortage of company grade officers continued to grow. Official reports indicate that during fiscal years 1999 to 2001 a grand total of 9,828 Army Reserve company grade officers were separated as a result of promotion non-selection. According to AR-PERSCOM, 16,100 company grade officers have been separated, or are pending separation, for twice failing to be selected for promotion as of the

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75 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
78 This information was extracted from the CSRES-110 Consolidated Fiscal Year to Date (CFYTD) Report as of 30 Sep for fiscal years 1999 to 2001.
end of calendar year 2000. That’s more than a division’s worth of soldiers, all company grade officers, lost to the Army Reserve alone.\(^79\)

### Position Vacancy Board (PVB) Promotions

ROPMA allows both the ARNG and Army Reserve to conduct position vacancy boards (PVBs) to promote officers to fill specific SELRES unit vacancies. An officer can be considered by a PVB when he/she has completed the minimum TIG, but not on or after consideration by a mandatory promotion that looks to promote at maximum TIG.\(^80\) PVBs are essentially what below the zone promotions are in the context of a mandatory promotion board.\(^81\) The ARNG takes full advantage of PVBs to fill their vacancies, whereas the Army Reserve does not. These boards may be used as often as required to fill specific captain up to colonel vacancies, a purpose that the mandatory promotion board may not accomplish. The Army Reserve started convening two PVBs a year beginning in 2001, which was up from only one annual PVB in earlier years.\(^82\)

However, the volume of applicants for Army Reserve PVBs is insignificant. For instance, during 1998 and 1999, across the entire Army Reserve, an average of only twelve first lieutenants were considered for promotion to captain by a PVB.\(^83\) In the four PVBs that convened during 2000 and 2001 the range of total officers considered for promotion to all ranks, captain up to colonel, spanned a low of thirty-eight to a high of 102.\(^84\) That is remarkably low considering at the same time OCAR PERDIV showed forty-one percent (3,395 of 8,329) of the TPU lieutenant population serving in a captain position.\(^85\)

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\(^79\) AR-PERSCOM PowerPoint untitled presentation briefed to LTG Maude, the DA DCSPER in March 2001. This briefing was provided to the author by MAJ Francisco Espaillat, who briefed LTG Maude.

\(^80\) Army Regulation 135-155. p. 7.

\(^81\) ROPMA allows for below zone promotions but it is Army policy not to use this authority.

\(^82\) Army Reserve Personnel Command Information Paper (ARPC-PSV-B), Subject: Position Vacancy Boards, dated 5 May 2000.

\(^83\) This information is from a May 2000 interview with the author and Jim Baynham, the AR-PERSCOM point of contact for Position Vacancy Boards.

\(^84\) Interview with the author and Jim Baynham, 14 March 2002.

\(^85\) OCAR PERDIV PowerPoint presentation titled “Shortage of Company Grade Officers in USAR.” October 1999. Slide 13.
The Army Reserve probably does not have more officers apply for promotion via PVB because the process is perceived to be so centralized, long, drawn out, and bureaucratic that it is not worth the effort. As directed by ROPMA, each promotion recommendation list, be it to captain or colonel, must be approved by the President. This requirement adds a lengthy period of time to the approval process of each PVB. It seems that the same measures intended to protect the integrity of the Army Reserve PVB selection process from cronyism, inequality, and unfairness, currently prevent using it to its full potential.

On the other hand, the ARNG maximizes the use of PVBs under the Federal recognition system established under Title 32, US Code to meet specific position requirements with the fifty-four states and territories. This decentralized PVB process, conducted as frequent as every month in some states, seems to more than adequately meet the needs of local commanders in quickly filling unit vacancies with qualified officers. It is often said that the PVB is the board of first choice among ARNG officers, whereas the mandatory board is the board of last resort. The exact opposite is true for the Army Reserve.

Company Grade Officer Migration

The migration of company grade officers to Army Reserve TPU has decreased appreciably since the end of the active component drawdown. This decrease is a result of the end of the active Army drawdown, having to rely on a much smaller manpower pool for potential TPU assignments, and also the increased need to recruit officers from these sources because they have no obligation to serve.

Migration sources for TPU lieutenants and captains primarily include the IRR and active Army. The Army Reserve benefited a great deal from the active Army drawdown as a wave of

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87 Jim Baynham interview on 14 March 2002.
company grade officers joined TPU, largely as a condition for early release from active duty under one of the many early out incentives being offered. Figure 9 depicts this trend. The left side of Figure 9 shows the number of lieutenants joining TPU each year directly from the active Army. The right side shows the same information for captains. This trend is especially visible in fiscal year 1993 when active Army accessions to TPU peaked. Initially, this large number of company grade officers entering TPU from the active Army drawdown, along with a corresponding sharp increase in the number of new ROTC lieutenants being accessioned as RFD during these same years, created an overabundance of lieutenants for the Army Reserve. However, as the drawdown concluded so too did the large number of company grade officers entering TPU directly from active duty. Since 1997, the number of officers migrating from these sources to serve in TPU has remained low.

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89 Category G of the Voluntary Early Release and Retirement Program (VERRP) was a particularly popular program for active Army lieutenants and captains.
90 This figure was constructed based on Army Reserve accessions contained in the 30 September CSRES-100 Consolidated Fiscal Year to Date (CFYTD) Reports for years 1991 to 1998. The format of this report changed in 1999, which precluded including this same information for fiscal years 1999-2001.
Figure 9. Company Grade Officer Migration into TPU

The number of active Army company grade officers entering the IRR also increased sharply during the active Army drawdown. However, this trend also decreased as the drawdown was completed. The active Army migration during these years is depicted in Figure 10.\(^\text{92}\) This large influx of company grade officers created a large manpower pool that, if recruited, had great potential for continued service in TPU.

\(^{92}\) This figure was constructed based on Army Reserve accessions contained in the 30 September “CSRES-100 Consolidated Fiscal Year to Date (CFYTD) Report, USAR Strength, Accessions, and Losses” for years 1991 to 1998. Reports were provided by Jeanane Oelke, Personnel Proponency Office, AR-PERSCOM, St. Louis, Missouri.
The Army Reserve now has to rely on a much smaller manpower pool for potential TPU assignments as the number of APL company grade officers in the IRR continues to decline. This trend is apparent in Figure 11. There are myriad reasons for this decline. The large increase in the size of the IRR, caused by the active Army drawdown, has been reduced by natural attrition. Many of these officers simply decided to resign after completing the remainder of their eight-year military service obligation in the IRR.

The shortage of active Army captains has also effectively decreased the size of the IRR.

Active duty service obligations are now being strictly enforced. With the exception of the Army

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93 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. “DCSPER Report 46, Strength of the Army (U) Part III Strength – Reserve Components – USAR.” Washington, D.C. This figure was compiled from the 31 December monthly reports for years 1993 to 2000.
National Guard Combat Reform Initiative, no early out programs are being offered to ACC lieutenants. Additionally, more captains are being retained on active duty as virtually all officers twice passed over for promotion are offered selective continuation. Active Army lieutenants are also being promoted earlier to captain, after only three and a half years service. Most active duty service obligations exceed three and a half years, so future lieutenant gains to the IRR will be rare. In 1997 the Army initiated a recall to active duty program that remains in effect today. This program has also resulted in a relatively small number of captains returning to active duty.

Lastly, of those company grade officers that do leave active duty, fewer will have any continued service obligation. The combined effect of these policies will cause a continued decrease in the size of the IRR company grade officer population.

IRR company grade officer attrition in the last several years has been disproportionately higher due to the large number of officers being separated after twice being passed over for promotion. As discussed earlier, failing to be seen as educationally qualified at the captain APL promotion board has caused much of this lieutenant attrition. It is easy to see this trend if one looks back to Figure 8. Before the baccalaureate degree requirement was implemented at this board the IRR education qualification rates, averaging 88 percent, were very similar to that of TPU. Since implementation, this rate has dropped to an average of only thirty-seven percent. Again, the vast majority of these officers possess a baccalaureate degree, they just did not know what documentation proof the board needed to verify it. The net effect of this change is increased IRR APL lieutenant attrition as these twice passed over officers are separated. Recent efforts on the part of personnel managers at AR-PERSCOM have significantly improved this situation, causing IRR education qualification rates to increase from twenty-two to sixty percent.
The Army Reserve has an increased need to recruit more TPU company grade officers at a time when fewer of them exist in the IRR. Of those officers, even fewer have a SELRES service obligation. For instance, a recent snapshot shows only forty-seven of the 10,118 total APL captains and 464 of 4,849 lieutenants in the IRR as having any type of SELRES obligation. Additionally, many IRR officers have only a limited utility for continued service. Most IRR officers are at or near their maximum time in grade. When these officers are recruited to join

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94 The author manipulated data from a 2 November 2001 query of the Total Army Personnel Database – Reserve (TAPDB-R) to obtain these data. The Personnel Proponency Office (PPO), Army Reserve Personnel Command (AR-PERSCOM), St. Louis, Missouri provided this query. These obligated officers probably all live outside a fifty-mile radius of the nearest TPU, or otherwise they would have been voluntarily, or involuntarily, assigned to a TPU. A number of other reasons may also exist that prevent assignment, like parenthood or civilian employer conflicts. Lastly, some captains may have recently completed their unit obligation yet remained coded as obligated.
TPU they are often at risk of being passed over for promotion because of their previous, often lengthy, amount of time spent in the IRR without any performance evaluations. This seniority is clearly evident in the IRR captain APL population arrayed by PYG in Figure 12. The current promotion system will certainly result in the separation, and rarely the promotion, of a large number of these senior IRR captains. For example, the IRR selection rate at the major APL promotion board over the last four years has averaged less than twenty-nine percent.\(^95\)

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\(^95\) This statistic was compiled by the author from the major APL promotion board results memorandum released by the Office of Promotions, Reserve Components, Total Army Personnel Command for calendar years 1998 to 2001.
The combination of accessioning too few lieutenants since 1997, creating some adverse impacts that sharply increased attrition while implementing new legislation, and having to rely on a smaller manpower pool from the IRR and active Army have caused the Army Reserve to have a severe shortage of company grade officers in TPU. If left unchecked, this trend of diminishing company grade officer strength will continue to increase. No new measures are in place or forthcoming in the near term to remedy this situation. Time is of the essence. If the Army truly needs the Army Reserve to achieve its Objective Force, then it must act now to restore TPU company grade officer leadership.
RECOMMENDATIONS

Develop a Strategic Plan

The Army Reserve APL TPU company grade officer population is on a disastrous course under the current status quo. The Army must develop a strategic plan that provides the Army Reserve with an adequate quantity and quality of company grade officers it needs to sustain the company grade officer leadership so vital to TPU. This plan needs to be based on an Army Reserve human resource vision that is shared by the Army and other critical agencies within the Army Reserve. This plan needs to be relatively simple to implement, cost effective, and compatible with the ARNG and active Army. It must also provide the Army Reserve with an adequate quantity and quality of company grade officers for TPU. Lastly, it must be implemented quickly before the Army Reserve suffers irreparable damage to its company grade officer corps.

Before the Army can develop a strategic plan, it must first assess the full impact of recent trends in the company grade officer populations of both of its RCs. To do this, it should convene a Blue Ribbon panel, similar to the Army Training and Leader Development Panel Officer Study, that is focused on studying company grade officers in the RCs. This earlier study surveyed the attitudes of 13,500 leaders. However, only 1,058 of these interviews or surveys were of reserve component personnel. This is an insignificant basis for further analysis when one considers that fifty-four percent of the Army’s units reside in its RCs. If the Army decides against forming another Blue Ribbon panel, then the Army Reserve should unilaterally form its own panel to

study this problem. This assessment needs to be completed quickly, as valuable time will be lost formulating and implementing a plan if it is not.

The Army Reserve must also bring together several key organizations to study and assess the current situation. Army Reserve officers working in the Assistant Secretary of the Army (M&RA) and newly reorganized Army G1 are crucial to solving this problem. They form the hub where new policy and regulatory guidance will be formulated, modified, approved, and implemented. These officers must be willing to take the lead in communicating and working with the ASA (M&RA), the Army G1, and OCAR to bring about change through new and innovative policy initiatives. It is also vital that other agencies such as Cadet Command, the USARC DCSPER, and AR-PERSCOM all work together and with the Army G1 to implement new measures to overcome this shortage.

The Army must also reassess the status of its policies related to the RCs in the five years since ROPMA took effect, focusing on the detrimental effects it has had on company grade officers. Initially, the Army RCs failed to take a close look at the implications of ROPMA and was slow to enact new policy. The RCs have paid a high price in company grade officer losses as a result. It is also crucial that the Army formulate and expedite approval of new policies that pertain to or are allowed by ROPMA. Human resource managers have operated in a virtual policy vacuum since ROPMA was implemented. For instance, it took over five years after implementation before the first Army Regulation, AR 135-155, Promotion of Commissioned Officers and Warrant Officers Other Than General Officers, incorporating ROPMA provisions was approved and published. Human resource managers in the RCs are still forced to rely on an outdated 1987 Army regulation governing officer separations that has little applicability under

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Timelines like this for putting out new policy are too slow. New policy must be timely or it serves no useful purpose. Current and meaningful policy provides the basis for widespread understanding. It is essential for sustaining a viable APL company grade officer population in TPU.

The Army Reserve TPU will not remain viable, despite new policies, unless additional company grade officers are accessioned. The Army Reserve needs to conduct a comprehensive study to determine recent officer migration patterns, develop a company grade officer flow management plan, and base accession requirements on it. Accession requirements should be developed for both lieutenants and captains. The number of officers required from each accession source must be based on realistic, programmed expectations that are monitored and reassessed on a continuous basis. Shortfalls must be identified early and promptly acted upon in the same year so that other sources can be boosted to compensate for less than anticipated production. The initial goal should be to quickly fill all TPU company grade officer authorizations, and over time shape these populations into viable PYGs that are capable of sustaining the company and field grade officer ranks.

The construct of a strategic plan outlined in this section is simple. It would be relatively easy to implement within one year. The remaining sections of this monograph provide specific recommendations on how to obtain and/or retain sufficient lieutenants and captains for TPU service. The criteria used for these recommendations are that they must be cost effective, compatible with the active Army and ARNG, and provide an adequate quantity and quality of TPU company grade officers. Cost effective means that the Army and Army Reserve can reasonably afford the costs associated with implementing a recommendation. Recommendations are considered to be compatible with the active Army and ARNG if they do not cause or exacerbate the company grade officer shortage in those components. For instance, a

recommendation to sharply increase the number of Army Reserve ROTC RFD lieutenants, at the expense of providing far fewer than needed to the AC or ARNG, is not compatible. The last criterion is self-descriptive. Any recommendation, or set of recommendations, must provide an adequate quantity and quality of company grade officers to sustain the Army Reserve. For instance, it is not feasible to continue accessioning Army Reserve ROTC RFD lieutenants at current levels because, despite the high quality produced, these levels alone are insufficient to provide the quantity of officers needed to sustain TPU. Conversely, sharply increasing the number of direct appointments might provide vast quantities of company grade officers but may also risk lowering the overall quality of officers accessioned. Overall, the specific recommendations outlined in this monograph must strike a positive balance between these criteria or they are not feasible nor worth implementing.

Find Ways to Accession Additional Lieutenants.

Lieutenant accession requirements must be mapped to accession sources that are reasonably capable of producing the sufficient number of officers desired. Any realistic plan must also take into account the diminished role of ROTC RFD as an accession source for new Army Reserve lieutenants. The Army Reserve must explore other sources of lieutenants from both production and non-production sources to obtain at least 619 annual TPU accessions.\textsuperscript{101} It is important to note here that geographic constraints, an excessive number of lieutenants working in captain vacancies, and a continuation of high attrition rates may force the Army Reserve to accession hundreds more than 619 lieutenants just to sustain the TPU company grade ranks at current levels.

The Army Reserve needs to plan ROTC RFD accessions that are based on the average number of lieutenants obtained in recent years. Over the last four years this number has averaged

\textsuperscript{101} This number is based on Figure 5 and is for illustration purposes only. The actual number may need to be modified each year, based on authorization changes and the numerous migration variables that effect it, such as attrition and geographic constraints.
just over 130 lieutenants. The Army Reserve is seeking a legislative change to increase the number of ROTC RFD scholarships it can fund. Eventually, it plans to fund up to 200 ROTC RFD scholarships for service in TPU. However, the lower recent average needs to be used for planning purposes until the law is changed and new scholarships start producing additional lieutenants.

Maximize Federal and State OCS Participation

The Army Reserve must also maximize use of federal and state OCS programs. The current quota of fifteen federal and fifty state OCS slots is greatly underutilized. Commanders at all levels need to encourage quality enlisted soldiers to pursue a commission through an OCS program. The Army Reserve also needs to work with the National Guard Bureau to increase participation in state OCS programs. Initially, the USARC should mission each of the ten Regional Support Commands (RSCs) it controls in the Continental United States for eight to ten OCS candidates per year to spur participation. This would easily serve to fill the sixty-five total OCS slots. The intent of this mission is to stress leader involvement and participation in selecting quality enlisted soldiers for commissioning, not as a means to force leaders to nominate unworthy candidates just to meet a mission. Within a year, the Army Reserve must begin to fully utilize these sixty-five OCS slots and then pursue additional slots.

As mentioned previously, the Army Reserve minimally needs to accession 619 APL lieutenants into TPU each year to sustain its company grade officer ranks. These new accessions must be from a combination of ROTC, OCS, the IRR, and direct appointments. Currently, the two lieutenant production sources (ROTC and OCS) only account for a maximum of 195 annual

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102 Personal e-mail correspondence with MAJ Scott Paradis, Personnel Resources Officer, Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, dated 14 November 2001.
103 The US Army Reserve Command (USARC) has command and control authority over the ten US-based Regional Support Commands (RSCs). Each RSC is aligned with one of the ten Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) regions of the contiguous United States. With few exceptions, RSCs provide support to all units located within their geographic area of responsibility. See the Appendix for the names and locations of each RSC.
lieutenant accessions for the Army Reserve. This means that at least 424 additional accessions are required from other non-production sources like the IRR and direct appointments.

Recruit Specific IRR Lieutenants

Unlike past years, little capacity exists in the IRR lieutenant manpower pool to realize a thousand or more involuntary assignments to TPU each year. As can be seen in Figure 13, few of the remaining IRR lieutenants have any remaining SELRES service obligation. Also, most of

![Obligation Status of APL LTs in the IRR](image)

**Figure 13. The Obligation Status of IRR Lieutenants**

the obligated IRR lieutenants in the youngest PYGs are recent ROTC graduates already destined for TPU service after attending an officer basic course (OBC). Most of the remaining IRR

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104 The number 195 is the sum of the four-year average of just over 130 LTs for the Army Reserve from ROTC RFD and complete utilization of the fifteen federal and fifty state OCS allocations (130 + 15 + 50 = 195).
liutenants in PYGs 1995 and earlier are very senior in grade and/or already passed over for promotion. These officers have little or no utility for long term TPU service.

Obtaining IRR lieutenants for TPU duty will require that the Army Reserve recruit, not force, these officers into joining unit. This recruiting must also be targeted on specific PYGs so that it maximizes the utility of each assignment. For instance, PYGs 1997 and 1998 in Figure 13 offer the best opportunity for continued service in TPU. Recruiting just over twenty percent of the 867 lieutenants in these PYGs will produce 175 lieutenants for TPU service. Each year this IRR recruiting goal must be reassessed based on a similar process just described, while taking into account the many changes that continue to occur in the IRR lieutenant population. However, recruiting 175 IRR lieutenants for TPU this year further reduces the accession deficit from 424 down to only 249 APL lieutenants. These remaining lieutenants must come from some type of APL direct appointment program.

Expand APL Direct Appointments

The Army Reserve needs to develop a recruiting program to sharply increase the number of APL direct appointments to offset lower accessions from traditional production sources. As described earlier, the high percentage of direct appointments in other sister reserve components provides a good example for the Army Reserve to follow. The Army Reserve’s direct appointment program needs to produce at least 249 APL lieutenants annually to achieve the overall 619 minimum lieutenant accessions required from all production and non-production sources. This program needs to remain in place permanently, or until traditional production sources like ROTC and OCS can produce an adequate number of APL lieutenants to sustain the Army Reserve.

Direct appointments can serve to enhance the Army Reserve’s core competencies of combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS). Unlike the combat arms, many of these same skills are abundant in the civilian business community. For instance, there are a large number of
civilian occupations capable of providing the Army Reserve ample specialists in the field of engineering, logistics, transportation, military police, finance, public affairs, civil affairs, and even psychological operations.\footnote{Some of these branches and functional areas are not available upon initial appointment/accession. However, the Army Reserve should still target and pursue candidates with these skills in the civilian work force, with a future guarantee that these new officers will be trained/assigned to these non-accession areas as soon as possible.} The Army Reserve needs to target these sectors in the civilian work force, conduct focused advertising, and provide incentives to join. Advertising and incentives need to be focused on the specific regions in the United States where the most severe TPU shortages exist. Direct appointments may also save money, because it costs much less to send a direct appointment officer to an officer basic course than it does to fund a ROTC scholarship. Conversely, direct appointments may not initially provide as high a quality lieutenant as ROTC or OCS does. Direct appointment officers may lack many of the pre-commissioning skills learned in a ROTC or OCS program. However, over time this initial lack of pre-commissioning training will be overcome as these officers complete OBC and gain operational experience in a TPU.

**Encourage and Support Innovation**

New and innovative thinking is required to find ways to accession additional APL lieutenants for the Army Reserve. For instance, a possible new program, tentatively named the Total Army Commissioning Program (TACP), is an initiative currently being studied that might increase the number of Army Reserve lieutenants commissioned each year.\footnote{Personal e-mail correspondence from CPT Kelly Broome, Assistant Professor of Military Science, University of Pittsburgh ROTC, with attachments: Total Army Commission Program (TACP) Executive Summary, PowerPoint presentation, and POI, dated 31 December 2001.} A captain serving as an assistant professor of military science in ROTC proposed it. TACP is basically a variant of ROTC’s Green to Gold program that is conducted in the traditional manner a TPU trains. TACP proposes to use the Cadet Command program of instruction (POI) and facilities, along with instructors from Army Reserve Institutional Training Divisions, to train qualified enlisted
members to become commissioned officers. The entire ROTC POI for TACP would be taught one weekend a month over a period of eleven months. This is very similar to the way in which a TPU conducts drill weekends. In 2002 a test of TACP was proposed using the University of Pittsburgh ROTC battalion and the 8th Brigade of the 80th Division (Institutional Training). However, it is unfortunate that even this one test appears to be in jeopardy this year because a decision to execute will most likely be postponed for the incoming Chief of the Army Reserve, who takes over in May 2002. If TACP were eventually approved and expanded to twenty-five ROTC battalions it alone could produce annual accessions of 200-400 lieutenants. This is just one example of the innovative thinking needed to accession more lieutenants. Timely and decisive decisions are critical for these types of programs to succeed and make a difference. TACP has the potential to quickly increase ROTC-quality lieutenant production at a reasonable cost while utilizing existing Army manpower. Innovative proposals like this might later even be expanded as a way of providing pre-commissioning training to direct appointment candidates.

**Modifications to the Promotion Board Process**

It is imperative that the Army immediately makes changes to the RCs mandatory promotion board process. Critical changes needed right now include moving the baccalaureate degree verification to a post-board check, implementing a fully qualified criteria for mandatory APL promotions to captain, and reducing the TIG for promotion to captain. The Army Reserve also needs to quickly increase and decentralize the number of PVBs for promotions to captain. Finally, within the next two years the RCs need to start using the below zone promotion authority provided by ROPMA at the major APL mandatory promotion board.

**Verify the Baccalaureate Degree during Post-Board Checks**

The Army and Department of Defense (DOD) must allow the RCs to make a logical distinction between selection for promotion and the actual promotion when applying the

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107 Ibid.
baccalaureate degree requirement. Verifying the baccalaureate degree needs to be moved to a post-board check, like so many other checks that are now in place, before orders are published promoting an officer. For instance, a TPU lieutenant can not be promoted unless this officer’s commander verifies, among other things, that the officer occupies a valid captain position, is not under suspension of favorable actions, and has recently passed the Army physical fitness test (APFT). Adding proof of baccalaureate degree to these checks (if proof does not already exist in the OMPF) does not significantly increase the existing workload. However, it does have the potential to realize hundreds more selections and eventual APL captain promotions. It is important to note here that the active Army handled the baccalaureate degree completion requirement at captain promotion boards with ease. For instance, the memorandum of instruction for the fiscal year 2000 CPT ACC promotion board stated that the board would not view the lack of a baccalaureate degree as a criterion for non-selection.\(^{108}\) It is imperative that the RCs also have commensurate authority to do this at the captain APL promotion board.

To implement this change, the Army must first ask DOD to change DOD directive (DODD) 1310.2, which is much more restrictive than ROPMA requires.\(^{109}\) DODD 1310.2 specifies that an officer without a baccalaureate degree “shall be considered by the promotion board…but shall not be selected by that board for promotion…unless the officer meets the educational requirement…“\(^{110}\) However, ROPMA only specifies that a lieutenant can not be appointed (actually promoted) to captain without a baccalaureate degree. DODD 1310.2 needs to be revised so that it allows both consideration and selection, but prohibits the actual promotion of any lieutenant who does not possess a baccalaureate degree.

If DOD is unwilling to change DODD 1310.2 then the Army needs to work to raise education qualification rates at the CPT APL board back up to the near ninety percent pre-ROPMA levels.

\(^{110}\) Ibid.
This requires actions from both the Office of Promotions, Reserve Components and all officers considered by this board. The Office of Promotions must send these officers a clearly worded notification memorandum that states the military and civilian education required for qualification, as well as acceptable forms of proof for each. Officers also have an inherent obligation to respond accordingly to this memorandum. Additionally, the Army must also create one trusted database that provides, among other things, education confirmation across all Army components, from entrance upon commissioning through the duration of an officer’s career.111

Promote all Fully Qualified Lieutenants
The Army must also follow the AC lead and start using fully qualified, versus best qualified, criteria during the CPT APL promotion board. Since the end of the drawdown in the mid-1990s the AC select rate for captain has averaged nearly ninety-nine percent.112 All AC first lieutenants deemed fully qualified have been promoted.

Before ROPMA, every fully qualified Reserve officer could be recommended for promotion to the rank of captain up to lieutenant colonel. No selection limits were placed on these boards. Under ROPMA, however, only the best qualified officers can be recommended for promotion. This best qualified criteria has basically been implemented by placing a limit, or cap, on the maximum number of officers that can be recommended for promotion. Figure 14 depicts the percent of this promotion cap achieved at CPT APL promotion boards from 1997 to 2000, along with the overall percent of lieutenants that were seen as educationally qualified by these same boards. For example, the 2000 CPT APL promotion board selected 2,207 lieutenants from a 2,300 selection cap, which means the board attained ninety-six percent utilization of this cap. However, this same board only determined sixty-seven percent (2,605 of 3,907 total considered) of all lieutenants considered to be educationally qualified. The trend here is clear when looking

111 See the Appendix of this monograph for additional recommendations to improve this process and the overall HR management process.
Figure 14. Percent of CPT APL Promotion Board Cap Attained

across all four years in Figure 14. At each successive CPT APL promotion board the percent of these caps attained continues to rise at a comparably much higher rate than the overall percent education qualification rate. If these caps are not removed, they will certainly restrict the number of promotions as more lieutenants are determined to be educationally qualified. This may already have happened in 2001.  

Furthermore, these restrictions will be even more severe if promotion caps are not removed before APL captains, passed over for promotion to major, are offered SELCON.

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113 The 2001 CPT APL promotion board results have not been released yet.
The Army needs to convene fully qualified CPT APL promotion boards for the foreseeable future; at least until captain shortages are reduced or eliminated. The means removing all caps from these boards so that all officers deemed fully qualified can be recommended for promotion.

If the Army should decide not to hold fully qualified CPT APL boards then it must reevaluate the method used to calculate these promotion caps. It is difficult to understand why CPT APL board caps are so low when thousands of captain vacancies exist in TPU and M-Day units. For example, why was a promotion cap of only 2,300 applied to the 2000 CPT APL board at a time when the Army Reserve alone had 5,607 captain vacancies?\textsuperscript{114}

Decrease the TIG for Promotion to Captain

It is time for the RCs to move away from promoting lieutenants to captain after serving the maximum five years TIG. Currently, Army Reserve officers attain seven years time in service (TIS) before they are promoted to captain. This compares to AC officers who only spend three and a half years TIS before being promoted to captain. The Army G1 is even looking to reduce this pin-on point another six months to only three years TIS.\textsuperscript{115} The Army needs to start promoting first lieutenants in the RCs after four years TIG. This would reduce overall TIS from seven to six years, which is still almost twice the amount of time it takes an AC officer to make captain. Additionally, making this change will not cause a drop in the education qualification rates of these boards. For instance, completion of an OBC is the only military education required for this board, which was an earlier prerequisite for promotion to first lieutenant. And as described earlier, almost all officers already posses the required baccalaureate degree.

No change in law is required to implement this recommendation. ROPMA already provides for this in specifying a two-year minimum to five-year maximum TIG range. Current Army policy is the only thing preventing accelerated promotions to captain. The Secretary of the Army

\textsuperscript{114} These Army Reserve vacancies are from the AR-PERSCOM PowerPoint untitled presentation briefed to LTG Maude, the DA DCSPER in March 2001.

\textsuperscript{115} Tice. “More Troops, Captains on LeMoyne’s List.” (Army Times, 1 April 2002) p. 32.
alone can direct this based on recommendations from the RCs. There needs to be better equity between the TIS policies of company grade officers in the AC and RCs. Reducing the first lieutenant TIG by a year also serves to recognize and acknowledge the increased value, use, and role of Army Reserve company grade officers in real-world missions.

Decentralize and Increase the use of Captain Position Vacancy Boards (PVBs)

The Army Reserve needs to decentralize PVB promotions to captain down to its Regional Support Commands (RSCs) and also increase the use of these boards. By design, the RSCs are more capable and responsive to the needs of the units they support than AR-PERSCOM.116 The Army Reserve needs to take full advantage of this capability by streamlining the PVB process for promotions to captain at the RSC level. Critical to streamlining this process is initially reducing the amount of time it takes for Presidential approval of these promotion lists, and eventually doing away with this requirement altogether. There is a disparity in the approval process between the AC and RCs. While Congress has authorized the active services to eliminate captains boards altogether, the Army Reserve is still required by ROPMA to have every captain promotion list approved by the President. Currently, this approval process takes from five to six months for every PVB.117 This is a long process and a high level of approval required to promote a first lieutenant to captain. Ideally, the approval level for captain PVBs should be lowered to the Secretary of the Army and take no longer than a month to process. While the Army Reserve works to streamline the PVB approval, AR-PERSCOM needs to concurrently work to certify each RSC on how to properly conduct captain PVBs. Once an RSC is certified, then it may conduct captain PVBs quarterly or at whatever frequency desired to support their units.

The Army should also grant a special exception to the Army Reserve PVB process when a first lieutenant seeking a PVB promotion is currently serving in that captain position. This exception would allow the RSC commander, or first general officer in the chain of command, to

116 See the Appendix of this monograph for the names and locations of each RSC.
117 Interview with the author and Jim Baynham, 14 March 2002.
set aside the requirement to perform an exhaustive search of the IRR for any captain willing to fill this position. When a first lieutenant is already serving in this captain position, it is an unnecessary waste of time and resources to conduct an IRR search. It might also result in an unfair action where this first lieutenant is removed from this position so that an IRR captain, not even assigned to the unit, can step in to fill this vacancy. The end result of this action might be a less qualified officer filling this vacancy, instead of a better qualified lieutenant, already working in this position, being promoted.

Decentralizing and increasing the number of PVBs benefits the Army Reserve as well as its junior officers. For the Army Reserve, it decreases the number of captain vacancies at a much faster rate than the annual CPT APL board is capable of providing, while also ensuring that every promotion recommendation results in a captain vacancy being filled. It is also a great way of building morale and increasing the retention of junior officers. A PVB promotion rewards those lieutenants who aspire for increased responsibility.

As discussed earlier, OCAR PERDIV recently reported forty-one percent (3,395) of the TPU lieutenant population serving in a captain position. Decentralized PVBs have the potential to exponentially increase the current average of twelve captain promotions per year up to 400 or 500 each year.

Use Below Zone Authority at the Major APL Promotion Board

The Secretary of the Army needs to authorize the RCs to use the below zone promotion authority provided in ROPMA. This provides an incentive for hard-working captains to continue serving. This authority is distinctly different from PVB promotions because it is not based solely on filling a higher-grade vacancy; it rewards superior performance. Using this below zone promotion authority also reinforces the concept of a meritocracy, on which the Army RCs promotion system is supposedly based. The Army Reserve needs to survey its captains on this
issue during the Blue Ribbon panel. It might find that there is a strong positive correlation between deciding to use the below zone promotion authority and improved captain retention.

**Start Convening Continuation Boards for Captains**

The active Army has been using SELCON for many years now. SELCON “is a method for providing experienced and capable officers of a specific grade and skill to meet the needs of the Army.” It serves a dual purpose for both the officer and the Army. Right now SELCON is providing selected captains the ability for continued service while also enabling the Army to mitigate the effects of its captain shortage.

From October 1996 to present, the Army Reserve has missed the opportunity to use a similar tool called continuation boards that is provided for in ROPMA. It is critical that the Army Reserve request and be granted authority to convene captain APL continuation boards immediately. Additionally, the Army Reserve should unilaterally be allowed to conduct continuation boards for its officers after each mandatory MAJ APL promotion board, even if the ARNG decides not to request this authority.

The Army Reserve captain APL shortage can be alleviated somewhat by using SELCON to retain all fully qualified APL captains in TPU that were passed over for promotion to major. The majority of these captains were passed over because they lacked the military or civilian education required for promotion to major. For instance, over the last two years the education qualification rate for first time considered TPU captains appearing before the 2000 and 2001 MAJ APL promotion boards has averaged only seventy-two percent. That amounts to a combined total of 586 APL captains serving in TPU that were not educationally qualified for promotion at these

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119 This information was obtained from the statistics provided in U.S. Total Army Personnel Command Memorandum. Subject: Promotion List for Major, Army Promotion List (APL), U.S. Army Reserve Components. 24 July 2000 and U.S. Total Army Personnel Command Memorandum. Subject: Promotion List for Major, Army Promotion List (APL), U.S. Army Reserve Components. 12 July 2001.
two boards. Lack of military education (e.g., not completing an officer advanced course) is the reason over eighty-five percent of these officers were not seen as educationally qualified. All of these captains face separation unless a selective continuation board retains them. Each year a continuation board should have screened these officers and offered SELCON to all of them who were deemed fully qualified for continued service as a captain.

The opportunity to alleviate the captain APL shortage in TPU diminishes as each additional year passes without a continuation board. As time passes these officers resign or are separated. Currently, there are 305 APL captains in TPU that are potential SELCON candidates. The potential exists here to capitalize on SELCON and allow all of these fully qualified captains to continue serving in TPU.

Continuation boards for the IRR could also be used as a mechanism to fill TPU captain shortages if the Army decided to make SELCON contingent upon SELRES service. For example, a continuation board might decide to offer continuation to a fully qualified captain in the IRR that was twice passed over for promotion to major. However, this SELCON offer would be contingent upon this officer agreeing to be assigned to a SELRES position in TPU, IMA, or even the AGR program. If this captain did not obtain a SELRES assignment after a specified period of time, or failed to adequately participate while serving in a SELRES assignment, then the SELCON offer would automatically be revoked. Figure 15 depicts the promotion status of all APL captains in the IRR by PYG. As you can see in this figure, there are a total of 2,323 APL captains in PYGs 1988 and 1987 that are ideal candidates for SELCON contingent upon some type of SELRES service. Instituting this type of SELCON in the IRR has the potential to

120 Ibid.
121 This information is based on analysis provided by the PPO, AR-PERSCOM. Additionally, the competing demands of a civilian career as a primary source of income and an Army Reserve career can often conflict, causing captains to make tough career choices like forgoing an OAC.
122 This information is based on a 2 November 2001 query of the TAPDB-R. The PPO, AR-PERSCOM provided this query.
123 Ibid.
annually provide up to 1,000 APL captains for SELRES service. Even marginal levels of participation by IRR captains will help alleviate TPU shortages.\textsuperscript{124}

![Graph showing Promotion Status of APL CPTs in the IRR](image)

**Figure 15. Promotion Status of APL CPTs in the IRR**

As discussed earlier, it is equally important to connect any decision to start using SELCON to a corresponding decision to hold fully qualified, not best qualified, promotion boards for captain APL. If the Army fails to do this, then it will create a new problem of not having sufficient promotion opportunity for first lieutenants going before the CPT APL promotion board. For instance, if the Army RCs start using SELCON for twice passed over captains at the MAJ APL board then it must also make the CPT APL promotion board a fully qualified board (e.g., have no maximum number of officers to be promoted cap applied to it). Under ROPMA, promotion

\textsuperscript{124} In Figure 15 a “Blank” promotion status means this field in TAPDB-R was blank. This is indicative of the data quality problems encountered when soldiers migrate between the various Army components, each of which has separate management databases.
opportunity is determined as the difference between total authorizations and total on-hand strength, without regard to geographic constraints or vacancies that are unique to either the Army Reserve or ARNG. So, for every SELCON captain retained, there is one less first lieutenant promotion opportunity. Not making the CPT APL board a fully qualified promotion board will virtually eliminate all promotion opportunity for APL first lieutenants.

A decision to start using SELCON has many benefits. It is cost effective, provides quality officers, and is compatible with the AC and ARNG. Implementing SELCON is cost effective because, for every captain retained, there is a decreasing need to recruit a new captain or increase lieutenant accessions to compensate for captain losses. The continuation board also ensures that only quality officers, fully qualified at their current rank, are offered SELCON. It is compatible with the other components because the ARNG can also use SELCON, and in no way does a SELCON policy in the RCs effect AC captains.

It is critical that some type of APL captain SELCON policy be implemented immediately, with or without SELRES service as a condition. A tremendous number of Army Reserve captains have been discharged since ROPMA was first implemented. Many of them had potential for continued service. Given the current fifty-eight percent captain on-hand strength in TPU, it is necessary to offer some type of SELCON.

**Aggressively Recruit Captains for Unit Vacancies**

The Army Reserve has an increased need to recruit more captains for TPU at a time when less of them remain in the IRR. This requires recruiting a greater percent of this population than in the previous decade. The Army Reserve also needs to target IRR captains in specific PYGs that have potential for continued service before the major APL promotion board convenes, as seen in Figures 12 and 15.

Currently, AR-PERSCOM recruits almost all IRR officers for TPU vacancies. Significant TPU captain vacancies still exist even though AR-PERSCOM achieves its recruiting mission
each year. There are some drawbacks to conducting centralized recruiting at AR-PERSCOM. Foremost is the fact that a personnel manager at AR-PERSCOM is not a member of the TPU he/she is trying to recruit officers to join. This is an unavoidable impersonal aspect of centralized recruiting. The Army Reserve needs to conduct more decentralized recruiting to increase the percentage of TPU assignments made from the IRR captain population. Successful decentralized recruiting requires a personal touch where a peer or near peer officer from the TPU serves as the recruiter.

Decentralized recruiting also requires better information technology (IT) support that is accessible from any computer connected to the Internet. For example, TPU commanders and staff need a web-based recruiting tool that they can use from home or their civilian workplace to contact prospective officers. This tool should provide multiple search capabilities that are based on things like a soldier’s branch, specialty, and home address. It should provide authorized users sufficient contact information to reach soldiers by phone, mail, or e-mail either at home or work. Conversely, it should also allow IRR soldiers access to opt out of future contacts, provided these soldiers have no remaining SELRES service obligation. Decentralized recruiting will work provided TPU commanders and staffs have sufficient IT tools to support it.

The Army Reserve also needs to start the recruiting process immediately when a company grade officer leaves the active Army. This means the Army Reserve needs immediate visibility on every company grade officer leaving the active Army. All of these officers should be contacted quickly by mail, e-mail, and/or telephone and welcomed to the Army Reserve. More emphasis needs to be focused on recruiting all newly assigned IRR officers for TPU duty. This also requires that an expedited transfer of the OMPF/PERMS record and electronic data occur from the active Army to AR-PERSCOM. Ideally, the OMPF/PERMS record and electronic data file for each soldier should be available one business day after a soldier departs the active Army. Seamless connectivity also entails establishing a trusted database that provides critical
information, like the highest level of civilian education, military schooling, etc. that alone can serve as verification during a subsequent promotion board.

The Army reserve should also contact all active Army SELCON captains and recruit them for TPU duty. These contacts need to explain the advantages of starting a civilian career now while continuing to serve the Nation in the Army Reserve. This contact should point out the value of possibly retiring as a lieutenant colonel or higher in the Army Reserve, and compare that to 20-year retirement pay as a captain, attainable only if the Army decides to grant multiple three-year active duty continuations. The intent of these contacts is not to draw needed captains away from continued active Army service under SELCON, but to provide these officers with information they can use to make informed career decisions.

Inform and Educate Leaders

The Army Reserve’s Twice the Citizen web portal, www.2xCitizen.usar.army.mil, and new self-service personal web portal called My2xCitizen are a great start at providing unfiltered information directly to soldiers. It needs to be expanded in several areas. For example, command issues need to be electronically posted and available for selected leaders. Command information also needs to be regularly pushed out to the field via this portal.

The portal needs to be able to recognize a user and automatically forward him/her relevant and timely information. For instance, a captain logging on to the Portal might be informed that he/she is only a two years away from being considered by the major board and has not completed the requisite civilian and/or military education required for this board.

The legacy systems at AR-PERSCOM must also be revised to better support these web initiatives or they are of limited utility. For instance, the time it takes for an official document to be posted on a soldier’s OPMF needs to be reduced from eight to ten months or more to less than one month. Otherwise, continuing to conduct business as usual with these legacy systems while
providing greater web access for soldiers will significantly increase inquires that require valuable employee time and resources to answer.

Soldiers and unit administrators also need to be able to view the ground truth information from a promotion board from this portal. It is critical for these people to know the military and civilian education qualification status determined by the board.

Informed and educated leaders are a combat multiplier for the Army Reserve. From the civilian workplace or home, the 2xCitizen portal is capable of overcoming much of the information deficit so often associated with the Army Reserve’s geographically dispersed citizen-soldiers.

The construct of a strategic plan outlined in this chapter is simple. The specific recommendations on how to obtain and/or retain sufficient lieutenants and captains for TPU service are also straightforward. They are cost effective, compatible with the Army and ARNG, and provide an adequate quantity and quality of TPU company grade officers. The Army and Army Reserve can reasonably afford the costs associated with implementing any or all of these recommendations. These recommendations are also compatible with the Army and ARNG because none of them cause or exacerbate the existing company grade officer shortage in those components. Most importantly, these recommendations provide for an adequate quantity and quality of company grade officers to sustain the Army Reserve.
CONCLUSION

Since 1995 the Army Reserve APL officer shortage in TPU has increased. It will continue to increase at a rapid pace under the existing status quo. This shortage is a result of a combination of several factors. The most significant of these include accessioning too few lieutenants in recent years, creating some adverse impacts that increased attrition while implementing ROPMA, and having to rely on a much smaller manpower pool for potential TPU assignments. As a result, a lieutenant shortage is imminent in the next couple of years, in addition to existing shortages already caused by lieutenants working in higher-grade positions and inherent geographic constraints. Additionally, the chronic APL captain shortage will also continue to increase.

No new sources of company grade officers exist to fill the growing number of TPU vacancies in the Army Reserve. ROTC RFD lieutenant production has been insufficient for the Army Reserve over the last five years, and will continue to be so for the foreseeable future. The strength of the IRR continues to diminish, causing the Army Reserve to rely on a much smaller and unobligated manpower pool for potential TPU assignments.

There is no easy, short-term solution to fix this company grade APL shortage in TPU. No one policy, action, or office will fix this problem. Rather, this shortage can only be mitigated and eventually overcome by a combination of carefully thought out policies and actions.

The Army Reserve can overcome its growing company grade officer shortage if it works with the Army now to develop a strategic plan and implement measures to reduce it. This plan needs input from a Blue Ribbon panel convened to assess the full impact of recent trends on company grade officers in the RCs. Lastly, the Army must reassess the status of its policies related to the RCs in the five years since ROPMA took effect, focusing in particular on the detrimental effects it has had on company grade officers. Both new and revised polices are needed to fully implement all aspects of ROPMA and also provide timely support to HR managers.
The Army Reserve needs to start looking at officer populations by promotion year groups (PYGs) to better assess the health of its company grade officers. It must also study the migration patterns of these officers into and out of TPU so that it can determine the number of annual accessions needed to sustain the TPU company grade officer population. Using PYGs and migration analysis will better enable the Army Reserve to determine annual lieutenant accession needs and captain recruiting requirements.

The specific recommendations in this monograph serve as a guide on how to obtain and/or retain sufficient lieutenants and captains for TPU service. They are cost effective, compatible with the active Army and ARNG, and provide an adequate quantity and quality of TPU company grade officers for the Army Reserve.

Company grade officer leadership is essential to building and sustaining quality soldiers and ready units. Sustaining the near and long-term viability of the Army Reserve TPU company grade officer population is in the best interest of the Army and Nation. If the Army Reserve desires to remain a relevant and ready component of the Army then it must overcome this shortage. If measures are not taken soon, this shortage will continue to increase and, within two years, spread into the TPU field grade ranks.
APPENDIX

Army Reserve Component Categories and Management Responsibilities

The two reserve components of the Army are the Army Reserve and Army National Guard (ARNG). All Reserve component manpower is assigned to one of three categories: the Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve and the Retired Reserve. The Ready Reserve is comprised of soldiers organized in units or as individuals. The Ready Reserve Consists of three Reserve component subcategories: the Selected Reserve (SELRES), the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), and the Inactive National Guard (ING). Furthermore, the SELRES consists of three subcategories: units, Individual Mobilization Augumentees (IMAs), and Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) soldiers. The Army has both ARNG and Army Reserve units in SELRES. In the ARNG units are traditionally referred to as M-Day. Units in the Army Reserve are commonly referred to as Troop Program Units (TPUs). The acronym TPU is most often used when referring to the collective total of Army Reserve units. See Figure 16 for a diagram of where TPU exists in the Reserve Component Categories. The focus of this monograph on the Army Reserve’s TPU.

The Army Reserve and ARNG have separate Ready Reserve management responsibilities. The ARNG and Army Reserve both have AGR programs. The Army Reserve is solely responsible for managing the TPU, IRR, and IMA programs, as well as its own AGR force. The Army Reserve is also responsible for managing the Army’s Standby Reserve and Retired Reserve populations. The ARNG is responsible for managing its M-Day units, the ING, and the ARNG AGR program. For more information on the organization or management of the Reserve Components see the Department of Defense’s Reserve Components of the Armed Forces Handbook or The Army War College’s How the Army Runs Handbook.125

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Reserve Component Categories

Total Reserve Manpower

- Ready Reserve
- Standby Reserve
- Retired Reserve

Selected Reserve (SELRES)
- Individual Ready Reserve (IRR)
- Inactive National Guard (ING)

Units
- Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA)
- Active Guard/Reserve (AGR)

- ARNG M-Day
- Army Reserve Troop Program Unit (TPU)

TPU is the Focus of this Monograph

Figure 16. Reserve Component Categories
Army Reserve Strength by Category

Figure 17 depicts the strength of each of the categories that the Army Reserve is responsible for managing.

![Army Reserve Strength](image)

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<td>Individual Ready Reserve</td>
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Source: Reserve Components Common Personnel Data System (RCCPDS) Strength Summary Report as of 28 Feb 02

Figure 17. Strength of the Army Reserve
The Army Reserve Regional Support Command (RSC) Structure

The US Army Reserve Command (USARC) was established as a major subordinate command of Forces Command (FORSCOM) on 18 October 1991. The USARC commands and controls all Army Reserve TPUs assigned to FORSCOM. The USARC commands and controls assigned units through RSCs, direct reporting commands (DRCs), and echelon above division/echelon above corps (EAD/EAC) commands.126

With few exceptions, an RSC exercises command and control of each assigned TPU within its geographic area of responsibility. The RSC helps prepare these units to perform their wartime mission and also ensures that these units are ready for mobilization. RSCs also provide effective peacetime functional support to USARC DRCs within their region so that they can concentrate on their wartime mission.

Figure 18 depicts the Army Reserve RSCs. The USARC exercises command and control over all ten of the RSCs based in the Continental US (CONUS) and also the 65th RSC located in Puerto Rico. The exploded view in Figure 18 shows how each RSC in CONUS is aligned with one of the ten Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) regions of the United States. With few exceptions, RSCs provide support to all units located within their geographic area of responsibility. The USARC does not command and control the 9th RSC in Hawaii or 7th ARCOM in Germany. The USARC also does not command or control any of the Army Reserve special operations units. These units are under the command and control of the US Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, or USACAPOC.

Additionally, three regional support groups (RSGs), not depicted in Figure 18, support the 81st, 88th, and 90th RSCs because of their large unit populations.

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Figure 18. Army Reserve Regional Support Commands
Additional Recommendations

The following recommendations, although related to the company grade officer shortage, are more IT and knowledge management issues. They are included in the appendix because of the importance to improve these areas while simultaneously working the bigger issues discussed in the body of this monograph. The Army Reserve’s geographic dispersion, coupled with the civilian career demands of its citizen-soldiers, requires that it stay on the cutting edge of technology in delivering timely and relevant information to soldiers.

Make better use of IT during the Promotion Board Process. Technology has improved so much that it would be rather simple and inexpensive to tailor the promotion board notification and non-selection memoranda specifically to each officer. For instance, the promotion board notification memorandum should specify a preliminary civilian and military education status of each officer. It should also warn unqualified officers what education documents were missing that this preliminary determination is based upon. When the results of each board are released, the promotion non-selection memorandum sent to each officer should specifically mention the reason for non-selection. For instance, it should indicate if the officer was not qualified for lack of civilian and/or military education, or was fully qualified but not among the best qualified officers. Simply providing this information before and after each board can save an enormous amount of time and resources. It ensures that each officer understands his/her preliminary education status before the board convenes. This serves to minimize the number of special selection boards PERSCOM needs to convene as a result of a material omission in the promotion consideration file at the earlier promotion board. If the officer was aware of his/her status before a board convened and did not provide the necessary documents, then it can be argued that a material omission did not occur.

Add Official Documents from a Promotion Board to the OMPF. The PERSCOM Office of Promotions and AR-PERSCOM should work together to eliminate the need for soldiers to
send multiple copies of the same official documents to each of these activities. Each year this generates a tremendous volume of correspondence from soldiers that could be eliminated altogether. Official documents sent to a promotion board should also be immediately added to that soldier’s OMPF managed by AR-PERSCOM. If these documents reach a soldier’s OPMF within a reasonable amount of time then they will not have to be sent to the next PERSCOM promotion board considering this officer, whether it be one year or many years later.
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