In Search of Lasting Results: Military War Termination Doctrine

A Monograph
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Abstract

IN SEARCH OF LASTING RESULTS: MILITARY WAR TERMINATION DOCTRINE
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In the current war on terrorism, the President of the United States has specifically identified two former wartime enemies of the United States as members of an evil axis. The regimes ruling these two states (North Korea and Iraq) are the same ones that existed when the United States fought conventional wars against them. The primary research question asks, Did doctrine address at the time, or has it evolved to address, the issues of war termination which have created a 50+ year armistice in Korea and a 10+ year undeclared war against Iraq?

The monograph distinguishes war termination from the broader term of conflict termination to avoid discussing certain forms of international conflict beyond the scope of military doctrine. The method of evaluation uses the war termination issues identified among the three levels of examining the causes of war proposed by Kenneth Waltz, as well as several considerations dealing with military force, surrender, and negotiation identified in previous literature.

War termination issues identified by the research methodology in the Korean War include the importance of clear guidance on war objectives between the civilian political leadership and the commander in the theater of war; the influence of domestic elections; the effect of announced negotiations on public opinion and troop morale; the importance of established diplomatic communication channels between belligerents; the difficulty of negotiating with communist officials and the loss of initiative on the battlefield that accompanied truce talks; the difference in war objectives between the United States and other members of the UN command; and the impact of ambiguous foreign policy on US decision making. War termination issues identified during Operation DESERT STORM include the inadequate advice to the civilian leadership by military commanders concerning the capability of military force to achieve war objectives; the influence of limited support in the US Senate for the war; the hastening of war termination based upon the perceived impact of public opinion; the unpreparedness of military leaders to negotiate with the Iraqis despite overwhelming battlefield superiority and the resultant errors at the cease-fire talks; the lack of support among all coalition allies for certain US war objectives; and the lack of an overall US strategic vision for the region that resulted in an unwillingness to pursue stated war objectives.

The US military doctrine that existed at the time of the Korean War and Operation DESERT STORM did not address war termination beyond outside of the concept of occupation of conquered territory. The current doctrine as stated in Joint Publication 3-0 and US Army Field Manual 3-0 has expanded greatly since 1991. JP 3-0 addresses the issues identified by the research methodology, with the significant exception of the role and responsibilities of the joint force commander and his subordinate commanders as negotiators during war termination. FM 3-0 does not address the majority of the issues identified. The monograph offers proposed deletions and additions to the appropriate sections of JP 3-0 and FM 3-0 to address the issues identified by the research methodology. These changes emphasize the role of the joint force commander as a negotiator, the distinction between war termination and conflict termination, and the role of US Army forces in maintaining leverage on the enemy to facilitate the rapid conclusion of negotiations on favorable terms. Finally, the monograph presents several recommendations for further research.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Statement of Problem Background and Significance

On 29 January 2002, President George W. Bush named the three states of Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, as “an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world.”1 The United States has already fought conventional wars against the latter two nations. The two scenarios that dominated US Army force structure analysis in the last decade were major theater wars against a resurgent Iraq or against Iran in Southwest Asia and against North Korea in Northeast Asia. Saddam Hussein, the same leader defeated by the US-led coalition in 1991, is still the authoritarian leader of Iraq. Kim Il-Sung, the North Korean communist who directed the attack against South Korea in the summer of 1950, died in 1994, but his son Kim Jong-Il continues the policies that threaten South Korea and the US forces stationed there. In Operation DESERT STORM, the United States Third Army and coalition forces defeated the majority of the Iraqi army in Kuwait and southern Iraq in late February 1991. American troops might have marched on Baghdad, in conjunction with an internal rebellion, to topple the Hussein regime. On 19 October 1950, the US Eighth Army captured the North Korean capital of Pyongyang and Kim Il-Sung’s army stood on the verge of catastrophic defeat. The US Army staff had already prepared plans for a military occupation of North Korea for General MacArthur’s review.2 Iraq and North Korea have emerged again as potential targets of US military action in the war against terrorism. An examination of the terminations of the previous wars against these two states and their influence on joint and US Army war termination doctrine will certainly yield productive ideas that could benefit future planners and leaders in the armed forces of the United States.

In Every War Must End, Fred Iklé wrote that, “In part, governments tend to lose sight of the ending of wars and the nation’s interest that lie beyond it, precisely because fighting a war is

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an effort of such vast magnitude. Thus it can happen that military men, while skillfully planning their intricate operations and coordinating complicated maneuvers, remain curiously blind in failing to perceive that it is the outcome of the war, not the outcome of the campaigns within it, that determines how well their plan serve the nation’s interests.”

In the conclusion to their study entitled *And the Clock Were Striking Thirteen: The Termination of War*, James Foster and Gary Brewer state, “The final and most important area of further research relates to the development of military doctrines and strategies that, while aiming primarily at deterrence, also offer the possibility of ending war within the limits of reasonable objectives and at acceptable costs.” The United States has traditionally viewed the termination of war and conflict as an issue for consideration after the achievement of decisive military victory. Too often, political interests call for “all-out war,” “unconditional surrender,” or “complete victory” to serve partisan political ends.”

The subject of how to end wars has received substantial consideration from social scientists, primarily focusing on how public and foreign policies might eliminate the “root” causes of conflict between nations, states, and peoples. The literature addressing the termination of active military conflicts is also extensive. Much of this work concerns the historical examination of past wars and classifying how they ended. The United States currently finds itself engaged in a war against terrorism, as well as a continued force presence in Europe, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Japan, and South Korea resulting from the outcome of previous conventional wars in those regions. Clearly, the termination of war in the past has significantly influenced the deployment and operations of the United States military in the present. Yet Joint Publication 3.0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, devotes approximately three and one-half pages to the two

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subjects of “the strategic goal and termination of operations” and “termination planning,” while US Army Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*, has three paragraphs addressing “conflict termination.” These capstone doctrinal publications discuss “lasting solutions” and “lasting strategic results” as the ultimate result of the successful termination of military operations. This monograph will examine the doctrine in these two publications in the context of the issues generated by the termination of the Korean War and Operation DESERT STORM.

**Research Questions**

The primary research question is, Did doctrine address at the time, or has it evolved to address, the issues of war termination which have created a 50+ year armistice in Korea and a 10+ year undeclared war against Iraq?

The secondary questions are as follows; the researcher has placed these questions concerning the content of doctrine as secondary questions in order to avoid bias in answering the tertiary and quaternary questions.

1. What did doctrine state concerning war termination during the Korean War?
2. What did doctrine state concerning war termination during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM?
3. What does current doctrine state concerning war termination?

The tertiary research questions are:

1. What issues emerged during war termination in Korea that resulted in the current armistice and the suspended peace negotiations that have lasted for over fifty years?
2. Did military operations achieve the non-negotiable war objectives and set favorable conditions for the negotiation of other war objectives in the Korean War?
3. What issues emerged concerning war termination in Operation DESERT STORM that resulted in United Nations Security Council sanctions, the no-fly zones over Iraq, and the
incomplete inspection program to verify the elimination of weapons of mass destruction production facilities in Iraq over the past decade?

4. Did military operations achieve the non-negotiable war objectives and set favorable conditions for the negotiation of other war objectives in Operation DESERT STORM.

The quaternary research questions are:

1. What were the war objectives during the Korean War?
2. Which of these war objectives were not negotiable?
3. What were the war objectives in Operation DESERT STORM?
4. Which of these war objectives were not negotiable?

Assumptions


Definition of Key Terms

The literature uses the terms “war termination” and “conflict termination” interchangeably. War is a specific type of violent conflict between two or more parties. Nations can have conflicts with each other that do not involve active, armed hostilities. Trade embargoes, retaliatory tariff barriers, the withdrawal of ambassadors, or sanction enforcement fall into this category. This monograph defines war termination as the cessation of active armed hostilities between two or more warring parties. This definition deals with war termination as an act. Termination is also a phase in the war. It begins when the outcome of the war is reasonably clear,
i.e. when it would be clear to an objective, informed observer which side will succeed and which side will fail to achieve its war objectives and ends when the opposing sides cease hostilities. After war termination, intermittent armed conflict may still continue. This distinction is important, as occasional violent confrontations have continued between the United Nations Command and North Korea since the 1953 armistice, as well as between the United States and Iraq since the 1991 cease-fire agreement. Conflict resolution, another term often used in the literature, is the group of processes that remove tensions between states or maintain them at levels consistent with the continued peaceful pursuit by states of their individual and collective goals.

War termination suggests a problem in the application of military force, while conflict termination and resolution are often problems of negotiation. The literature often uses war termination and conflict termination interchangeably. FM 3-0, for example, uses the terms conflict termination and war termination within its pages, but defines conflict termination as, “the point at which the principal means of conflict shifts from the use or threat of force to other means of persuasion.” This monograph uses the term war termination to avoid discussing certain kinds of conflicts beyond the scope of military doctrine.

**Limitations and Delimitations**

Limitations are weaknesses imposed by constraints or restrictions beyond the control of the researcher. Delimitations are constraints imposed by the researcher on the scope or content of

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the study so that research is feasible. The delimitation of this monograph is limiting the current war termination doctrine considered to that in FM 3-0 and JP 3-0.

Criteria

The research will identify the criteria for answering the primary research question (the issues of war termination identified in the Korean War and Operation DESERT STORM). The following questions are additional criteria to evaluate the validity of war termination doctrine and will serve as a bridge to the conclusions of the monograph.

1. If surrender of the enemy is the war objective, does the doctrine address means by which the United States might force its enemies to surrender and how to employ these means? Does the doctrine offer guidance on how to achieve a surrender of the enemy other than through defeating his armed forces in the field?\(^{11}\)

2. If surrender is not achievable or is not the war objective, does the doctrine consider planning for what sort of bargain to strike with the enemy to terminate the war? Does it consider dividing war objectives within a non-surrender scenario into negotiable and non-negotiable categories?\(^ {12}\) Does it offer guidance on how to use the military and other instruments of national power to achieve the non-negotiable objectives and support the successful negotiation of the other objectives? Does the doctrine address how military power can support these aims without necessarily achieving dominance on the battlefield?\(^ {13}\)

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\(^{11}\) Iklé, 17.

\(^{12}\) Foster and Brewer, 26.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Patterns

Michael I. Handel proposed five groupings to classify the literature on war termination:

1. “Normative” studies of war termination and peace; political theory; philosophy; religion; pacifism; and so on.
2. Economic theories of war termination and the maintenance of peace.
3. International law.
4. Diplomatic history.
5. Theory of international relations.

Fred Iklé composed one of the classic works in the first category, *Every War Must End*, during the time the United States sought to find an exit from the war in Vietnam. He makes a fundamental observation concerning war termination. “If the decision to end a war were simply to spring from a rational calculation about gains and losses for the nation as a whole, it should be no harder to get out of a war than to get into one.” Iklé is pessimistic about the ability of politicians and soldiers to end the fighting they start.

It is difficult to simply reduce the study of war termination to a detailed study of decision making. Decisions are certainly very relevant, but they are only part of the context and content of a war and its termination. The complete array of circumstances surrounding a war is present even if the decision makers are unaware of all of those circumstances. Yet a significant group of writers have approached war termination in the context of rational decision making. In a work in the diplomatic history category, Paul Pillar examined the endings of 142 wars between 1800 and

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15 Iklé, 16.
16 Ibid., 106.
1980 and found that 68 percent of wars between states end through negotiation. He proposed that war termination was a bargaining process between two or more belligerent parties. Pillar specifically asserts that military decision makers are rational bargainers during war termination. He notes that, “Wielding the military instrument advantageously thus does not mean simply maximizing this or minimizing that, but rather determining which parts of the enemy’s decision calculus are most readily changed, and then carefully choosing the course of action best suited to change them.”

The military literature on war termination falls in Handel’s last category of international relations theory. Several common themes emerge from an examination this body of writing. The first common observation in the literature is that the military must seek (and even demand) clear guidance on war objectives from civilian leaders that they can translate into military objectives at the strategic and operational levels of war. General Matthew Ridgway stated, “It is clear now, or should be clear, that best results flow from intimate day-to-day collaboration among military and civilian leaders, wherein the civilian leaders propose the ends that must be achieved and the military leaders supply their estimate of how much can be attained by military means and how those means may be best employed.”

Another author identified three critical pieces of guidance necessary during a dispute that may result in hostilities. These included a clear statement by the political authorities of the desired situation in the post-hostility and settlement phases, a clear set of political objectives that when achieved will allow this desired vision to become reality; and a set of military objectives that will, when achieved, allow or cause these political objectives to happen.” A more pessimistic assessment asserted that, “The burden will remain with the

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19 Pillar, 194-195.
military commanders to translate vague political objectives into a military strategy with workable end states and hope that the planning is as close to the actual anticipated events as possible.”

As discussed previously in this chapter, some authors, to include military ones, have tried to reduce the study of war termination to one of decision making. An example is a proposed step-by-step analytical process that involves questions like, “What are both sides’ objectives?” Decision makers will rarely answer such a question accurately. The environment of a war contains a constellation of circumstances that no one can completely fathom. The termination war is a process with imperfect knowledge as a condition. Unanticipated outcomes are often its result. Several officers noted that current doctrine does not emphasize the need for the Joint Staff to facilitate discussion between the President, the Secretary of Defense, and operational military commanders on war termination criteria, nor does it require the formulation and issuance of specific guidance to military commanders. This suggests a group of rational individuals calculating war termination criteria based on knowledge of the situation at the time and refining those criteria as more information becomes available. But this information is imperfect and certainly cannot account for various unpredictable factors impacting upon war termination. Chance is present in the conduct of war termination as well as in the conduct of war.

The second observation is that planning for war termination must begin concurrently with planning for the war itself and should continue throughout the process. Paul Pillar’s idea of military decision makers as rational bargainers seeking a course of action to change the enemy’s decision calculus on continuing a war is an apt description of the military planner. One author suggested that, “War termination is too fundamental an issue to be subordinated as a lesser

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23 Clarke, 26.
included component of some other aspect of the campaign planning process.”

Another writer emphasized the same point, noting the devising the plan for war termination and post-conflict activities is not only an integral element of operational design once war begins, but also a principal consideration in thinking about and designing operations prior to the onset of war.

The third observation is that war termination planning, from the start, must be an interagency process involving various executive agencies of the federal government, and not simply the Department of Defense. “The current system falls short in providing the best system for clarity and unity of effort. There is no State Department equivalent to the joint force commander and his staff for coordination. Especially in a crisis situation, there needs to be designated State department contacts responsible for working with the joint force commander and his staff for developing a clear end state and post-hostility efforts.”

Another writer stated that, “By analyzing the following questions it should become clear that there is a missing link between military operational planning and the interagency process.”

A final common observation is that while military war termination doctrine has improved, especially since Operation DESERT STORM, it is still inadequate. An officer noted that, “Current joint publications also address the substance (as opposed to the process) of war termination. Extant joint publications, however, offer no mechanism or process for ensuring the integration of the nation diverse national interests during the difficult transition from peace to war.”

Another writer stated that, “Based upon the US military’s experiences in Desert Storm, Provide Comfort, Somalia, and Bosnia, the doctrine for war termination has evolved and

\[\text{References}\]


continues to do so. . . . these joint publications offer some insight into what must be planned regarding end state but do not provide significant detail."30

**Gaps**

There is almost no literature examining the process of war termination in authoritarian states. In the two wars examined in this monograph, the United States and its coalition partners fought against authoritarian regimes. The authoritarian regime continues to represent the most probable foe of the United States in a future war. A thorough examination of North Korean, Chinese, and Iraqi records could yield important new perspectives on war termination.

**Ideas Worth Pursuing**

Military doctrine has a base in theory. The subset of the literature dealing with the theory of international relations provides the basis for military war termination doctrine. Specifically, the theory should offer the individual a way to think about the process of war termination as it occurred in a set of historical case studies of war termination like the ones examined in this monograph. This way of thinking will enable the researcher to identify the fundamental components of an otherwise complex and indiscernible process. In his 1959 work *Man, the State, and War*, Kenneth Waltz proposed a theory of what causes wars between states. The theory proposed that the causes of war emerged from three levels. These are the level of individual human nature, the level of the structure of each state involved in the war, and the level of the nature of the international system of states.31 Waltz proposed a theory of why nations go to war, but is also useful for considering how they terminate war. The researcher can employ the three levels to identify those factors that influenced the ending of a war and the issues emerging from those factors that doctrine should address to guide military leaders in the process of war termination in the future. First, the researcher can examine the influence and impact of specific

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political and military leaders. Second, the researcher can examine the influence of domestic structure and politics on a belligerent, to include public opinion as well as the position of specific interest groups. And last, the researcher can focus on the interaction between two or more states in the international system, to include their perceptions of each other, problems of communication, and power relations. The research methodology in chapter three will employ this idea to answer two of the tertiary research questions that are subjective in nature and deal with the issues emerging from the process of war termination.

The purpose of this chapter is to establish a methodology for answering the primary research question, Did doctrine address at the time, or has it evolved to address, the issues of war termination which have created an armistice on the Korean Peninsula lasting over 50 years and an undeclared war against Iraq lasting more than 10 years? The steps of the research methodology are:

2. Determine the war objectives in the Korean War and in Operation DESERT STORM.
3. Determine which of these war objectives were negotiable.
4. Determine if military operations achieved the non-negotiable war objectives and set favorable conditions for the negotiation of other war objectives during the Korean War.
5. Determine if military operations achieved the non-negotiable war objectives and set favorable conditions for the negotiation of other war objectives in Operation DESERT STORM.
6. Identify what issues emerged during the war termination process in Korea that have resulted in the current armistice without a formal peace treaty and a continuing US military presence on the Korean Peninsula.
7. Identify what issues emerged during the war termination process in Operation DESERT STORM that have resulted in continuing United Nations sanctions, the no-fly zones over Iraq, and a continuing US military presence in the region.
8. Identify what existing doctrine stated concerning the war termination process during the Korean War.
9. Identify what existing doctrine stated concerning the war termination process during Operation DESERT STORM.
10. Identify what current US Army and joint doctrine states concerning the war termination process.

**Establish a method of evaluation**

The monograph will use the issues raised by war termination in the Korean War and Operation DESERT STORM to answer the primary research question. In addition, the monograph will use the following questions, previously mentioned in chapter one, as criteria to measure the validity of the doctrine.

If surrender of the enemy is the war objective, does the doctrine address means by which the United States might force its enemies to surrender and how to employ these means? Does the doctrine offer guidance on how to achieve a surrender of the enemy other than through defeating his armed forces in the field?

If surrender is not achievable or is not the war objective, does the doctrine consider planning for what sort of bargain to strike with the enemy to terminate the war? Does it consider dividing war objectives within a non-surrender scenario into negotiable and non-negotiable categories?

Does it offer guidance on how to use the military and other instruments of national power to achieve the non-negotiable objectives and support the successful negotiation of the other objectives? Does the doctrine address how military power can support these aims without necessarily achieving dominance on the battlefield?

**Determine the war objectives in the Korean War and in Operation DESERT STORM**

The United States used armed force in Korea and in Operation DESERT STORM as the leader of a coalition operating to implement United Nations resolutions. In both cases, the coalition sought to repel armed aggression against one state by a neighboring state. The Korean
War occurred in the first years of the Cold War, while DESERT STORM occurred at the end of the Cold War.

The specific political objectives for the war in Korea were the following: (1) repel North Korean aggression against South Korea and (2) achieve the complete independence and unity of Korea. United Nations Security Council Resolutions of 25 and 27 June 1950 supported the first aim, while United Nations General Assembly Resolutions dated 14 November 1947, 12 December 1948, 21 October 1949, and 7 October 1950 supported the second one. US President Harry Truman commented that,

Communism was acting in Korea just as Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese had acted ten, fifteen, and twenty years earlier. I felt certain that if South Korea was allowed to fall Communist leaders would be emboldened to override nations closer to our own shores. If the Communists were permitted to force their way into the Republic of Korea without opposition from the free world, no small nation would have the courage to resist threats and aggression by stronger Communist neighbors. If this was [sic] allowed to go unchallenged it would mean a third world war, just as similar incidents had brought on the second world war. It was also clear to me that the foundations and the principles of the United Nations were at stake unless this unprovoked attack on Korea could be stopped.

The United States did not adopt the second aim until after the landings at Inchon and the subsequent collapse of North Korean resistance. The National Security Council further stated that, “If the Soviet Union or the Chinese Communists should announce in advance their intention to reoccupy North Korea . . . action north of the 38th parallel should not be initiated or continued.”

The specific military tasks for the Korean War changed as the conflict progressed. Initially, United Nations forces acted in support of the UN resolutions of 25 and 27 June 1950,
calling upon member governments to furnish “such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be
necessary to repel the armed attacks and to restore international peace and security in the area.”37

After the successful landings at Inchon in September 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed
General MacArthur that his military aim was now the destruction of the North Korean armed
forces. The Joint Chiefs placed restrictions on using non-Korean troops near the Chinese and
Soviet borders, as well as restrictions that limited the use of air and naval power to the Korean
Peninsula. The directive specifically authorized United Nations forces to cross the 38th parallel.
It also directed MacArthur to begin planning for an occupation of North Korea.38

After the massive Chinese intervention in November 1950, the United Nations reverted to
the single objective of repelling aggression against South Korea. The reunification of Korea,
called for by non-binding General Assembly resolutions, disappeared from the agenda. All
further operations on the peninsula occurred with the ultimate intent to prevent the expansion of
the conflict into a third world war.39

The specific political objectives for Operation DESERT STORM were: (1) Effect and
immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait; (2) Restore
the legitimate government of Kuwait; (3) Protect the lives of American citizens abroad; and (4)
Promote the security and stability of the Persian Gulf.40 Samuel P. Huntington commented that,
“At stake was whether the bulk of the world’s largest oil reserves would be controlled by Saudi
and emirate governments dependent on Western military power for their security or by
independent anti-Western regimes which would be able and willing to use the oil weapon against
the West.”41 President George H. W. Bush’s explicit call on 15 February 1991 for the military

37 MacArthur, 355.
38 MacArthur, 358.
Internet; accessed 2 January 2002.
41 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order (New
and people of Iraq to overthrow Saddam Hussein unofficially added the overthrow of the Iraqi dictator to the political aims of the war.\textsuperscript{42} In addition, if Iraq destroyed the Kuwaiti oil fields, removal of the Hussein regime would become an explicit aim of the United States.\textsuperscript{43}

The specific military objectives for Operation DESERT STORM were (1) defend Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council States from attack; (2) preclude the launch of Iraqi ballistic missiles against neighboring states and friendly forces; (3) destroy Iraq’s chemical, biological, and nuclear capabilities; (4) destroy Iraq’s command, control, and communications capabilities; (5) Eliminate the Republican Guards as an effective fighting force; and (6) Conduct operations designed to drive Iraq’s forces from Kuwait, break the will of Iraqi forces, discourage Iraqi use of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, encourage defection of Iraqi forces, and weaken Iraqi popular support for the current government.\textsuperscript{44}

\textbf{Determine which of these war objectives were negotiable}

The political objectives in Korea were straightforward, namely to repel North Korean aggression and to achieve the complete unity and independence of Korea. The United States and the United Nations never considered the first aim as negotiable. United Nations forces did not consider entry into truce talks with the North Koreans and Chinese until the airing of an UN-sponsored radio broadcast, entitled “The Price of Peace,” on 23 June 1951. In this broadcast, Jacob Malik, Soviet delegate to the UN Security Council, stated that his government in Moscow favored negotiations to end the fighting at an early date.\textsuperscript{45} However, the reunification and independence of Korea remained a negotiable issue, as it had been before the war, primarily due to the potential of global conflict with the Soviet Union if UN forces attempted to occupy North

\textsuperscript{42} Roger Hilsman, \textit{George Bush vs. Saddam Hussein} (Novato, California: Lyford Books, 1992), 118.
\textsuperscript{43} NSD 54.
\textsuperscript{44} NSD 54.
\textsuperscript{45} Schnabel, 402.
Korea. The changed nature of the conflict following the Chinese intervention rendered the task of destroying the North Korean armed forces irrelevant. In fact, UN forces had largely accomplished this objective already. When the United States Eighth Army entered Kaesong in the western peninsula and the South Korean advanced northward to the east, formal resistance almost dissolved. Within a week, despite small pockets of violent resistance here and there, there no longer existed an organized North Korean front. Only remnants of the North Korean Army fled to the Yalu.

In Operation DESERT STORM, President Bush directed that, “Military operations will come to an end only when I have determined that the objectives . . . have been met,” referring to the four political objectives described previously, which did not include the overthrow of Hussein’s government. President Bush also directed the specific military tasks to achieve the political objectives. He did not intend to negotiate with the Iraqis concerning the political objectives of the war. The United States and coalition forces would achieve them by force of arms.

**Determine if military operations achieved the non-negotiable war objectives and set favorable conditions for the negotiation of other war objectives during the Korean War**

In Korea, the political objectives were unambiguous. United Nations forces would repel North Korean aggression against South Korea. By 24 June 1951, the line of contact was north of the 38th parallel except in the extreme western portion of the Korean Peninsula. Military operations conducted by the United Nations forces had achieved the non-negotiable political objective of the war. However, military action did not contribute to the achievement of the

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46 NSC 81/1, 1.
48 NSD 54.
50 Schnabel, 401-402.
complete unity and independence of Korea. The Soviet Union and China preserved North Korea, just as the United Nations had preserved South Korea. The North Korean armed forces, devastated in October 1950, have today grown to almost ten times the size of the force that crossed the 38th parallel on 25 June 1950.51 Ever since the Korean War, the two rival governments on the Korean Peninsula have continued a struggle short of general war, but deadly nonetheless. Almost half a century later, there is still no peace. Over the years, North Korea has been far more belligerent and remains a reclusive state committed to failed communist economic policies and to forcible reunification.52 The Korean Demilitarized Zone is the sole remaining outpost of the Cold War.

Determine if military operations achieved the non-negotiable war objectives and set favorable conditions for the negotiation of other war objectives in Operation DESERT STORM

Unlike the Korean War, Operation DESERT STORM did not occur on the larger stage of the Cold War confrontation between the free world and communism. Saddam Hussein had no ideological benefactor to preserve him in 1991, as Kim Il-Sung had in 1950. Did the United States and its coalition allies achieve the political objectives set forth by President Bush? Iraq withdrew completely and unconditionally from Kuwait. Coalition forces restored the Kuwaiti government to power. The loss of life among US and coalition forces was minimal. Did the outcome of the war promote stability and security in the Persian Gulf? To answer that question, one must carefully consider if United States and coalition forces accomplished the military tasks contributing to the political objectives of the war.

There is no question that the coalition defended Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council States from attack. The coalition was unsuccessful in preventing the firing of Iraqi

51 Schnabel, 37.
ballistic missiles, but did shoot some of them down after launch. By the end of the ground war, Iraq had launched 72 Scud missiles at coalition forces and neighboring states.\textsuperscript{53}

United Nations authorities conducted intrusive and highly comprehensive inspections of Iraq following Operation DESERT STORM. These inspectors concluded that, (1) Iraq could have hidden chemical agents and precursors, as well as equipment for chemical production and weaponization; (2) biological agents, weapons, and production equipment could be hidden; (3) there could be undeclared missiles and missile production equipment hidden from inspection teams; and (4) Iraqi scientists and infrastructure remained after the UN inspection process ended, leaving Iraq capable of regenerating its weapons programs.\textsuperscript{54} Coalition air strikes failed to destroy the Al Muthanna complex, Iraq’s principal chemical weapons production facility.\textsuperscript{55}

The destruction of Iraqi command, control, and communications was incomplete. The Iraqi command extracted over one-half of the Republican Guard and some other units from Kuwait and then quickly organized units to suppress uprisings against Saddam Hussein. The coalition rendered the Iraqi command incapable of waging a coherent defense, but Saddam Hussein survived the war with his political and security apparatus intact.\textsuperscript{56}

Was the Iraqi Republican Guard destroyed? It withdrew from Kuwait with great loss, but some combat capability (four and one-half of the eight divisions) remained.\textsuperscript{57} As many as one-third of its T-72 tanks withdrew to defensive positions inside Iraq. Despite 41 days of almost continuous aerial bombardment, the Republican Guard remained a cohesive and viable military force. It later helped to fight a vicious battle against insurgents in northern and southern Iraq.\textsuperscript{58} The majority of the vehicles destroyed during the Iraqi retreat along the main highway from

\textsuperscript{54} Kathleen C. Bailey, \textit{The UN Inspections in Iraq} (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1995), 2.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., 6.
\textsuperscript{57} US News and World Report, 405.
Kuwait City to Basra were trucks, cars, and buses. Iraqi armored units left the road and completed their escape through the desert.\textsuperscript{59} Field Manual 101-5-1 defines destruction as, “A tactical task to physically render an enemy force combat ineffective unless it is reconstituted.”\textsuperscript{60} Coalition forces probably rendered the Republican Guard combat ineffective for conventional warfare, but these same units proved sufficient to crush the unorganized insurgent forces that rebelled against Hussein following the war.\textsuperscript{61} But “from a regime stability and internal security perspective, their loyalty and reliability are their reason for existence.”\textsuperscript{62} Considering its ability to threaten Iraq’s neighbors, the coalition forces destroyed the Republican Guard. Considering its ability to keep the Hussein regime in power, they did not.

The coalition’s military operation drove the Iraqis from Kuwait. In fact, the Iraqis announced a general withdrawal from Kuwait 39 hours after the ground war began.\textsuperscript{63} The expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait was so rapid that an official US Army military history publication called the DESERT STORM campaign “the fastest and most complete victory in American military history.”\textsuperscript{64}

Popular support for the Hussein regime weakened, as evidenced by uprisings in Iraq following the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The will of Iraq to fight was broken. After the war, the 513th Military Intelligence Brigade issued a report based upon the interrogation of captured Iraqi general officers. The report concluded:

In summary, our prisoners describe an Iraqi army whose composition closely fits the picture developed by all-source intelligence, but whose size and morale have eroded steadily until it became literally combat ineffective. Notwithstanding the extensive stocks of ammunition in the possession of Iraqi units and the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{59} Ibid., 314-315.
\item \textsuperscript{60} United States Army, FM 101-5-1, \textit{Operational Terms and Graphics} (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1997), 1-51.
\item \textsuperscript{61} Scales, 316.
\item \textsuperscript{63} Gordon and Trainor, 369.
\item \textsuperscript{64} Frank N. Schubert and Theresa L. Kraus, eds., \textit{The Whirlwind War} (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, US Army, 1995), 201.
\end{itemize}
advantages inherent in the defense, this was a defeated force that lived in dread of the prospect of combat with the VII and XVIII Corps.\textsuperscript{65}

Coalition forces counted approximately 60,000 Iraqi prisoners.\textsuperscript{66} Coalition operations discouraged Iraqi use of chemical weapons, as well as any biological or nuclear ones that the regime possessed. The air campaign during Operation DESERT STORM encouraged the defection of many Iraqi soldiers. The Iraqi government had implemented a policy granting its troops a week of leave from the Kuwait every 28 days. Many of these soldiers took leave, but never returned to their units.\textsuperscript{67}

National Security Directive 54 specified that if Hussein destroyed Kuwait’s oil fields, the United States would make it an explicit objective to replace the Hussein regime. Withdrawing Iraqi forces set fire to numerous Kuwaiti oil wells. The directive also specified a military task to conduct operations to decrease popular support for the Hussein regime. President Bush publicly called for the Iraqi armed forces and people to rise up against Hussein. But when they did, the United States did not support the uprising. Saddam Hussein remains in power to this day. A continued US and coalition force presence in the region, rather than Operation DESERT STORM, has served to promote stability and security in the Persian Gulf. The chief threat to this security and stability remains Iraq’s capability to launch missiles carrying weapons of mass destruction at its neighbors and Saddam Hussein’s willingness to use that capability. The United States and coalition forces did not destroy this capability during Operation DESERT STORM.

\textbf{Identify what issues emerged during the war termination process in Korea that have resulted in the current armistice without a formal peace treaty and a continuing US military presence on the Korean Peninsula}

A four kilometer-wide demilitarized zone still divides the Korean Peninsula from coast to coast. North Korea remains a reclusive nation hostile to both its southern neighbor and the United States. The North Koreans abandoned the formal peace negotiations, begun after the 1953

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext{65}{Gordon and Trainor, 354.}\footnotetext{66}{Schubert and Kraus, 201.}
\end{footnotes}
armistice, in the 1990s. What issues emerged during war termination that have contributed to this continuing stalemate and a divided Korea?

Considering international relations on the three levels previously described, the following issues emerged during the termination of the Korean War. The first issue was the importance of clear guidance on war objectives between the civilian leadership of the United States and its field commander in the theater of war. The second issue was the impact of the November 1950 midterm congressional elections on President Truman. The third issue was the understandable desire of the American public to end a war once negotiations have started and its effect on subsequent military operations and troop morale. The fourth issue was the importance of established, official channels of diplomatic communication between the belligerents. The fifth issue was the unanticipated difficulty of negotiating an armistice with the communist forces and the loss of initiative once the UN entered into talks with them. The sixth issue was the difference in war objectives between the United States and the other UN member states providing forces to the United Nations command. A seventh and final issue is the impact ofambiguous foreign policy on US decision making in East Asia.

Examining international relations on the personal level, the communication between the President and the military commander in theater is critical. The President, as Commander-in-Chief, should clearly set the war objective. Truman, however, chose to allow General MacArthur to set the war objective despite credible reports that the Chinese had committed themselves to the preservation of North Korea. By early October 1950, United Nations had achieved the war objective of repelling North Korean aggression. As recommended in NSC 81/1, Truman now considered the possibility of reunifying Korea if it did not increase the possibility of a general war with the Soviet Union or China.68 However, the guidance issued to General MacArthur by Truman through the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 9 October 1950 left the decision of reunification up

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67 Gordon and Trainor, 351.
68 NSC 81/1, 1.
to MacArthur. “Hereafter, in the event of the open or covert employment anywhere in Korea of major Chinese Communist units, without prior announcement, you should continue the action as long as, in your judgment, action by forces now under your control offers a reasonable chance of success. In any case you will obtain authorization from Washington prior to taking any military action against objectives in Chinese territory.”69 On 6 November 1950, MacArthur reported that, “Men and material in large force are pouring across all bridges over the Yalu from Manchuria. This movement not only jeopardizes but threatens the ultimate destruction of the forces under my command.”70 That same day, MacArthur had also stated in a special communiqué that,

The Korean War was brought to a practical end with the closing of the trap on enemy elements north of Pyongyang and the seizure of the east coastal area, resulting in raising the number of enemy prisoners of war in our hands to well over 135,000 which, with other losses mounting to over 200,000, brought enemy casualties to above 335,000, representing a fair estimate of North Korean total military strength. The defeat of the North Koreans and destruction of their armies is thereby decisive.71

MacArthur requested permission to bomb the bridges over the Yalu River to stop Chinese reinforcement. On 6 November 1950, the Central Intelligence Agency provided President Truman with an estimate of the situation, reporting that as many as 200,000 Chinese troops had entered Korea and that these troops were capable of stopping the UN advance. The report concluded that the Chinese knew what risks they were taking by doing this and were prepared for a general war.72

At this point, no one in Washington wanted to cross General MacArthur. He cabled the Joint Chiefs on 9 November 1950 and stated that giving up any part of North Korea to Chinese forces would represent the greatest defeat of the free world in recent memory.73 Though the National Security Council wanted to pursue a negotiated settlement at this point, a meeting that

69 Truman, 362.
70 Ibid., 375.
71 MacArthur, 368.
72 Truman, 376-377.
same day, which Truman was unable to attend, recommended no change to General MacArthur’s
classified directive and that he should be free to do what he could in a military way without
bombing Manchuria.74 With full clearance from Washington, MacArthur launched his final
offensive on 24 November 1950. The Chinese counterattacked on 27 November and eventually
drove UN forces out of North Korea.

By late April 1951, UN forces had driven the Chinese forces back and again approached
the 38th parallel. The new commander of UN forces, General Matthew Ridgway, considered two
actions necessary. First, he requested a summarized clarification of the many directives issued by
the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the preceding months or deriving from policies enunciated by the
President or the Secretary of Defense. Second, he made his wishes unmistakably clear to the new
Eight Army commander, General Van Fleet, concerning the tactical latitude his army had to
operate. This indicates that to Ridgway, the objectives of the war were unclear at the time he
assumed command.75 Once Washington directed him to respond favorably to Jacob Malik’s 23
June 1951 suggestion of negotiations, Ridgway thought “peace might be just around the corner,”
and that he should do all possible “to keep our losses at a justified minimum.”76

Domestic politics and public opinion also influenced the war termination process. First,
the United States had mid-term congressional elections on 6 November 1950. President
Truman’s domestic legislative agenda suffered a severe blow with the Republican gain of 5 seats
in the Senate and 28 seats in the House. Truman was worried about expanding McCarthyism
calling his administration soft on communism. The Republican gains in Congress did not help
him with that issue, either. “Strategic vision, decisive leadership, and a resolute decision to face
up to CCF intervention and the MacArthur problem were not forthcoming from the White House
during this crucial week.”77

74 Blair, 402.
75 Ridgway, The Korean War, 164.
76 Ibid., 183.
77 Blair, 402.
Second, despite a vocal segment of the American population that wanted complete victory over communism, the majority of Americans wanted peace in Korea. Dwight Eisenhower announced his intention to visit Korea if elected during the closing days of the 1952 presidential campaign; one reporter thought it sealed the outcome of the election, such was the concern for the seemingly interminable truce talks among the electorate. Why should soldiers continue to die on the front lines due to stubborn negotiators? “Men die to make others free, or to protect their homeland. They do not willingly die for a piece of real estate ten thousand miles from home, which they know their government will eventually surrender. Nor do the generals appointed over them, nor the governments they elect, willingly spend them so.” This thinking was also present among the ground forces in Korea, “as ground commanders of all ranks hesitated to fight for ground that an early armistice might require them to relinquish.”

The termination of the Korean War raised four important issues at the level of the international system. The first issue is the important role of official diplomatic communication channels between the belligerents during war termination. Without such official channels, the sides are left to guess each other’s intent. This becomes especially dangerous when a demonstrated capability of the opponent is ignored. In October and November of 1950, neither the United States nor the United Nations had recognized the new communist government in China. Thus, when President Truman and his advisers, as well as General MacArthur, attempted to determine the intent of the Chinese armies entering North Korea, there were no channels of diplomatic communication. The Indian ambassador to China, Mr. Panikkar, did provide an unofficial channel of communication, but the United States considered him to be in the

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79 Blair, 904.  
81 Fehrenbach, 365-366.  
83 Ibid., 243.
communist camp and not an impartial observer. General MacArthur announced on 1 October 1950 that South Korean troops were crossing the 38th parallel and that the North Koreans should surrender. The next day, Chou En-lai notified Panikkar that if US troops entered North Korea, China would intervene in the war. On 7 October 1950, the first US troops crossed into North Korea. Three days later, a Chinese foreign affairs spokesman warned that, “The Chinese people cannot stand by idly with regard to . . . the invasion of Korea by the United States and its accomplices and to the dangerous trend toward extending the war.” Six days later, on 16 October 1950, the first Chinese Communist forces entered North Korea. A Chinese ambassador at Lake Success or in Washington might have influenced UN and US actions to a greater degree.

The second issue at the international level was the unexpected difficulty of negotiating with the communist side and the loss of initiative by UN forces once they entered into talks. Bernard Brodie stated that the suspension of UN offensive operations in June 1951 lost an opportunity to terminate the war more rapidly. “The reason for continuing the extraordinarily successful enterprise that the UN offensive had become had nothing to do with the acquisition of more real estate. Its purpose should have been to continue maximum pressure on the disintegrating Chinese armies as a means of getting them not only to request but actually to conclude an armistice.” Another view suggests that if the Chinese had been faced with the loss of substantial amounts of North Korean territory, they might not have entered into truce talks. The talks lasted until late July 1953 without appreciable changes in the line of contact on the ground, as the communist negotiators continued to implement the strategic plans of Peking and Moscow through psychological methods. Concerning the difficulty of negotiating with the communists, General Matthew Ridgway stated, “That the United Nations made serious mistakes

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84 Truman, 362.
85 Alan S. Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1968), 93-94.
in the negotiations cannot be denied . . . By now, I assume, our officials both civil and military, certainly those who might have to endure the most intolerable tirades of lies and vituperation at conference tables, are forewarned and mentally prepared.”

The foremost difficulty in negotiating with the Chinese and North Koreans was their failure to place any importance on the Western standards of professional diplomatic behavior. The UN negotiators were perplexed by the extreme rigidity of the communist side.

From the American and UN point of view, the sole purpose of the meetings at Kaesong (initial site of the truce talks) was to end the bloodshed, and to create some sort of machinery to supervise such an armistice. This done, an entirely separate body would sift the political and territorial questions posed by the Korean situation, in an atmosphere of peace.

Americans, even the knowledgeable Dean Acheson, had once again tried to separate peace and war into neat compartments, to their sorrow.

In retrospect, the Korean War truce talks “were an exercise in the diplomacy of stalemate.”

The third issue at the international system level was the difference in views on how the war should end between the United States, the Republic of Korea, and other members of the United Nations. President Syngman Rhee of the Republic of Korea was completely opposed to negotiation. He told his General Paik Sun Yup, “The Americans want an armistice. One million Chinese troops on the peninsula, and they want an armistice. It’s ridiculous. Our goal is reunification. If we seek an armistice now, we accede to national division. I categorically oppose a truce.” While Rhee directed General Yup to cooperate with the United States during the talks, there can be no doubt that the United States was sharply divided from its Korean ally on the value of an armistice. President Truman noted how frightened the European allies were of Korea expanding into a general war. In the event of an expansion of the conflict to include the Soviet

88 Ridgway, The Korean War, 198-199.
90 Fehrenbach, 341.
92 Paik Sun Yup, From Pusan to Panmunjom (Dulles, Virginia: Brassey’s 1992), 165.
Union, Western Europe might immediately become a battleground. British Prime Minister Clement Atlee contacted Truman on 30 November 1950, requesting a meeting in Washington to discuss future action in Korea following the Chinese intervention. Atlee’s questions to Truman were absolutely to the point.

What, Atlee asked, were the Communists likely to demand as the price for a cease-fire? There was a danger that if we showed a spirit of accommodation the price would go up. But he thought we ought to discuss just how far we are prepared to go, what kinds of things we wanted to negotiate, and where we should stand firm. Whatever decision we reached, he said, was apt to be distasteful, but we had to bear in mind that the West could not be given up, that it was still the vital point in our line against Communism.93

Perhaps these questions should have been asked on 2 October 1950. General Matthew Ridgway asked, “Was it really a choice between an armistice and a third world war?” regarding the termination of the Korean War.94 America’s European allies seemed to answer yes. On 1 February 1951, the UN General Assembly named Communist China as an aggressor, but passed a resolution calling for the creation of an independent and unified Korea by peaceful means, in effect abandoning the resolution of 7 October 1950. All of the United States’ European allies supported the measure.95

Finally, US policy in East Asia remained ambiguous throughout the conflict. The United States did not regard Korea as a strategic priority. Prior to the North Korean invasion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered Korea of “little strategic interest” to the United States.96 After Mao defeated the Nationalists on the Chinese mainland, the United States hoped to steer him away from Moscow. This policy of promoting dissent between the communists in Peking and Moscow continued after the Chinese intervention in Korea. In addition, the Truman administration saw US security interests in Asia as a series of offshore island nations extending from New Zealand to

93 Truman, 395-397.
94 Ridgway, The Korean War, 236.
95 Fehrenbach, 337.
96 Truman, 325.
By the end of May 1951, the United States committed itself to getting its troops out of Korea for use elsewhere, particularly Europe. The Soviets were the real threat throughout the globe. Fighting their Chinese and North Korea proxies along the 38th Parallel simply drained US strength without effectively supporting a global containment strategy.

Identify what issues emerged during the war termination process in Operation DESERT STORM that have resulted in continuing United Nations sanctions, the no-fly zones over Iraq, and a continuing US military presence in the region

American and British aircraft still patrol no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq. United Nations sanctions remain in place against Saddam Hussein’s government for failure to comply with Security Council resolutions regarding elimination of weapons of mass destruction. United States troops and aircraft have occupied bases in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia since 1990. What issues emerged during the war termination process which have contributed to this continuing standoff between the United States and Iraq in the Persian Gulf?

Considering international relations on the three levels previously described, the following issues emerged during the termination of Operation DESERT STORM. First, US military leaders did not adequately advise the civilian leadership on the capability of military power, specifically air strikes, to achieve the national war objective of destroying Iraq’s nuclear and biological weapons capability. Second, the United States Senate only narrowly passed a measure authorizing President Bush to use force against Iraq. Third, the perceived impact of public opinion influenced the prosecution of military tasks and hastened the decision to end the fighting. Fourth, military leaders were unprepared to negotiate with the Iraqis despite having overwhelming superiority on the battlefield and made significant mistakes in the cease-fire talks. Fifth, coalition allies did not agree to or support all war objectives of the United States.

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97 Blair, 905.
98 Ibid., 202, 909.
sixth, the United States had no overarching strategic vision for the region following the war, resulting in the unwillingness to support stated war objectives.

At the first level of international relations analysis, US military leaders presented an unrealistic appraisal of the capability of US military power to destroy Iraqi nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons capability. General Schwarzkopf stated that Hussein’s “nuclear, biological, and chemical military capabilities have been destroyed.”100 This was simply not the case. The damage done by the air campaign against Iraqi production facilities for weapons of mass destruction did not meet the expectations of planners and intelligence officials.101 The basic issue with trying to destroy Iraq’s chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and production facilities was that no one outside of the Hussein regime knew where all of them were located.102 Without locations to target, the destruction of these assets would have to wait until after the war.

A United Nations weapons inspector commented:

The initial strategy of the ceasefire was premised on the belief that Iraq would give up its weapons of mass destruction if given the proper incentives and if threatened appropriately. The carrot was lifting the oil embargo upon compliance; the stick was the threat of renewed military action; and the compliance bar was set at the complete elimination of Iraq’s banned weapons. In other words, the aim was to make the costs of non-compliance too high to consider.

This was an eminently reasonable strategy to adopt in 1991. However, Saddam decided that the cost, most of which falls on the Iraqi population for whom he has such contempt, was bearable.103

Ground forces might have remained in southern Iraq for an indefinite period to ensure Hussein’s compliance with the UN inspectors. They did not, allowing Iraq to take the necessary measures to conceal, move, or otherwise prevent destruction of a significant portion of its nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons capability. Perhaps military objectives could not achieve the

101 Gordon and Trainor, 317.
102 Bailey, 107.
stated political objective of promoting security and stability in the Persian Gulf. A United Nations weapons inspector commented,

No Security Council member seems willing to admit the obvious. The threat to international peace and security comes not from the dual-purpose equipment and materials in Iraq, or even from its military capabilities. It comes from the ambitions of the regime, embodied in the person of Saddam Hussein. The threat to international peace and security will not be removed until the regime’s ambitions have been removed or changed.104

Perhaps the only way to promote stability and security in the Persian Gulf was a continued large US military presence in the region after the war, given the reluctance of the Bush administration to use military power to remove Saddam Hussein.

At the level of second level of domestic politics and public opinion, the lack of strong support for the war in the United States Senate encouraged its early termination and the redeployment of troops. On 12 January 1991, the US Congress approved a resolution authorizing President Bush to employ military force against Iraq in support of United Nations Security Council resolutions. The vote passed 250 to 183 in the House of Representatives, but the margin in the Senate was a narrow 52 to 47.105 This was the smallest margin ever in the Senate on a vote for war. President George Bush noted that the Democratic Party leadership in both houses of Congress had voted against the resolution; he felt the weight of impeachment lifted from his shoulders106 Colin Powell noted that the joint resolution of Congress required President Bush to satisfy that body that he had exhausted all methods to obtain Iraqi compliance with 12 UN Security Council resolutions before going to war.107 Clearly, support for the war was conditional and not unanimous. With an overwhelming victory over Iraqi forces in Kuwait with fewer than 400 casualties among the US forces, the Bush administration wanted to avoid any further loss of life and get the troops home.108

104 Trevan, 389.
105 Gordon and Trainor, 205.
106 Bush and Scowcroft, 446.
In addition, the United States military allowed media reports of perceived massive and wanton destruction of Iraqi forces to influence the decision to terminate the conflict. National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft noted that the President, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and himself had all become very concerned about press reports concerning a “highway of death” from Kuwait City to Basra.\footnote{Bush and Scowcroft, 485.} Colin Powell said that he discussed the issue with General Schwarzkopf on 27 February 991 and they mutually agreed that press reports made it appear that the coalition forces had engaged in “slaughter for slaughter’s sake.”\footnote{Powell, 505.} General Schwarzkopf, however, offered a different interpretation of the discussion. Recollecting how Powell informed him about nervousness in the White Hose about the destruction between Kuwait City and Basra, Schwarzkopf noted that, “He (Powell) and I both knew that wasn’t the case. Though many Iraqis in the convoy had died, most had jumped out of their vehicles and run away. I felt irritated – Washington was ready to overreact, as usual, to the slightest ripple in public opinion.”\footnote{Schwarzkopf and Petre, 468.} Yet Schwarzkopf later agreed with the President’s decision to end the fighting. He elected not to resist General Powell’s views and ask President Bush to wait until his subordinate commanders reported accomplishment of their missions.\footnote{Gordon and Trainor, 439.}

At the level of the system of interstate relations, three issues emerged from war termination. First, US military leaders lost military leverage over the Iraqis during the cease-fire negotiations at Safwan, despite the overwhelming military superiority of coalition forces. This primarily resulted from lack of preparations for the meeting with the Iraqi generals at Safwan. When General Powell informed General Schwarzkopf that President Bush would ask for a meeting between Iraqi and US military leaders to negotiate the military details of a cease-fire, the latter general noted, “That caught me by surprise – it had never crossed my mind that I’d have to sit down opposite Iraqi generals – and we spent a couple of minutes discussing how this might be
arranged.” An senior official in the Bush administration said that Schwarzkopf went into Safwan uninstructed on how and what to negotiate. “He should have had instructions. But everything was moving so fast the process broke down.” The cost of the failure to prepare for Safwan was enormous for the future of the region. Schwarzkopf could have given ambiguous answers and avoided offering the Iraqis any assurance that the coalition forces would withdraw from Iraq or refrain from interfering with the flights of Iraqi helicopters. With two US Army corps within Iraqi territory, complete air superiority, and an Iraqi army severely depleted by fighting, the United States would never find itself in a stronger position to demand compete and immediate compliance with the UN Security Council resolutions, especially concerning weapons of mass destruction. Yet General Schwarzkopf and American leadership in Washington let the opportunity slip away.

Second, various coalition allies did not agree to or support certain war objectives of the United States. General Schwarzkopf noted that the reluctance of Arab members of the coalition to attack another Islamic country. He specifically commented that the only member of the coalition that would have supported military action to overthrow Saddam Hussein was Great Britain. President Bush and his National Security Adviser considered demanding Saddam Hussein’s presence at Safwan, but realized that if he refused, they would have to either continue the fighting or back down from the demand. The latter would send a signal of weakness, while the former would split the Arab states from the coalition.

Finally, the United States was hampered in the process of war termination by a lack of vision. No plan existed for a Persian Gulf region without Saddam Hussein in the post-Cold War world. In October 1989, the Bush Administration adopted National Security Directive 26. This document codified a Persian Gulf policy that assumed Iraqi and Saudi Arabian protection of US

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113 Schwarzkopf and Petre, 470.
114 Gordon and Trainor, 444.
115 Ibid., 448.
116 Schwarzkopf and Petre, 498.
interests in the region. “As a result of the tacit alliance between Baghdad and Washington against Iran and the growing distance between Baghdad and Moscow, NSD 26 directed the national security bureaucracy to strengthen Iraq to ensure that it would be a force for regional stability and a deterrent against Soviet and Iranian aggression.”118 One author has argued that, “The underlying premise is that the war in fact did end in a sloppy and ‘unclean way.’ However, it was perhaps the only realistic way it could have ended. Scenarios that would have ended in ‘total’ victory probably would have created an even worse political situation in the region.”119 George Bush and Brent Scowcroft felt that breaking up Iraq would pose its own problems of instability. They focused on the long-term balance of power at the head of the Persian Gulf.120 Even with the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the continued belligerence of Saddam Hussein against his neighbors, the United States continued to view the containment of Iranian power as the most important component of Persian Gulf stability.

**Identify what existing doctrine stated concerning the war termination process during the Korean War**

No official joint doctrine existed during the Korean War. The capstone Army doctrine publication, FM 100-5, *Field Service Regulations, Operations*, did not address war termination. At that time, the US termination policy for war was unconditional surrender. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did issue planning guidance for the postwar European theater in September 1944.121 Occupation of North Korea was envisioned and planned for, but the Chinese intervention quickly ended the UN presence in the communist state.122 The next edition of FM 100-5, published on 27 September 1954, did not mention war termination, either. Chapter 2 of FM 100-15, *Field Service

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117 Bush and Scowcroft, 490.
120 Bush and Scowcroft, 488.
Regulations, Larger Units, published on 28 June 1950, discussed campaign planning. However, it did not list war termination as an element of the campaign plan.\textsuperscript{123} FM 100-15 also stated that “The object of war is to impose the will of one or more nations upon that of another nation or group of nations. Its accomplishment requires the destruction of the enemy’s will to fight, which normally requires the decisive defeat of his armed forces.”\textsuperscript{124} In the final paragraph of the chapter on campaign planning, FM 100-15 stated that,

> The planning of a campaign and the exercise of high command are concerned fundamentally with strategic matters. They also are weighted with political and other matters. These matters are not the specific subject of this manual but considerations arising from them influence the decisions of the commander. Among the more significant of these matters are national policy, public information, psychological warfare, military government and civil affairs.\textsuperscript{125}

The only real source of documented war termination guidance for Korean War planners was historical documentation of the process at the end of the Second World War. The subject did not yet warrant mention as a specific consideration of campaign planning or military doctrine.

Identify what existing doctrine stated concerning the war termination process during Operation DESERT STORM

The 1986 edition of FM 100-5, Operations, does not mention war termination. The preliminary draft of FM 100-7, The Army in Theater Operations, dated 31 August 1990, did not mention war termination, either. No new concepts concerning war termination had emerged in US Army doctrine since the Korean War, except for discussion of post-conflict activities by civil affairs and psychological operations units in FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations.\textsuperscript{126} The Joint Doctrine Master Plan, approved in February 1988, had not yet produced official joint doctrine on the subject. The first edition of JP 3-0 did not appear until 1993.

\textsuperscript{122} Schnabel, 219.  
\textsuperscript{123} United States Army, FM 100-15, Field Service Regulations, Larger Units (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 28 June 1950), 19.  
\textsuperscript{124} FM 100-15, 19-20.  
\textsuperscript{125} FM 100-15, 22.  
\textsuperscript{126} Kenneth McCreedy, Winning the Peace: Postconflict Operations (Monograph, School for Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1994), 38.
Identify what current US Army and joint doctrine states concerning the war termination process

Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, discusses war termination in two chapters. In Chapter 1 (The Strategic Context), the section title is “The Strategic Goal and Termination of Operations.” The section opens with a discussion of termination criteria and the importance of the dominance of US forces at the closing stages of a war to achieve the necessary military leverage for a lasting solution. The termination of operations is an essential link between national security strategy, national military strategy, and end state conditions. Next, the section moves to political considerations for war termination. The discussion centers on imposed versus negotiated settlements. Negotiating power in armed conflict springs from military success and military potential. Truces and armistices, means of communication with the enemy, national will, freedom of action, and the need to plan for termination of operations from the outset close out the discussion of political considerations.

Under military considerations, the chapter discusses military victory in the strategic context and the difference in military objectives for imposed versus negotiated settlements. Commanders must understand the political goal and military objectives associated with termination. The final paragraph discusses political exploitation of completed military action and the military role in a transition to peace. The latter involves consideration for military government, civil affairs, and humanitarian assistance and requires coordination and planning at the national and theater levels between political, diplomatic, and military leaders.

In Chapter 3, Planning Joint Operations, JP 3-0 again addresses termination. Knowing when to terminate military operations and how to preserve gains is a component of strategy and operational art. The joint force commander must know how the President intends to terminate operations before the commitment of forces. The nature of the particular war (value-based or interest-based) often determines whether an imposed or negotiated termination ends the fighting. The underlying causes of a particular war must influence the understanding of the conditions
necessary to terminate that war. National, allied, and coalition leaders ideally seek the advice of military commanders on the decision to end combat operations. The transition of primacy from military to other agencies in achieving final strategic goals involves the joint force commander. Military operations normally conclude with the achievement of strategic military objectives. The joint force commander strives to terminate combat operations on terms favorable to the United States and its allies or coalition partners. Hasty or ill-conceived termination actions can result in further fighting later. The balance between rapid victory and termination of truly advantageous terms is delicate.

The joint force commander and his subordinates translate national political goals into strategy and operational design. They advise national leaders on adversary intent, objectives, strategy, and the chances of success in achieving desired goals. The commanders also consider the nature and type of conflict, the military objectives, plans and operations that most directly influence the opponent’s judgment of cost and risk, and the impact on alliance and coalition warfare when planning joint operations. Proper planning and execution should result in military leverage over the adversary at the point of war termination. Wars are successful only when strategic goals are attained and endure.

Postconflict activities are a military operation other than war and include all actions that ensure that the United States achieves and sustains its political objectives. Part of this effort must ensure that the threat does not resurrect itself and the conditions that cause the war do not occur again. Joint force commanders cooperate with other agencies in the Department of Defense and elsewhere to meet the requirements of humanitarian assistance. The joint force commander may transfer control of other authorities and redeploy his forces. He should plan for this well in advance to expedite transition and redeployment.

Field Manual 3-0, Operations, discusses conflict termination at the close of Chapter Six (Conducting Full Spectrum Operations) in three paragraphs. Conflict termination is the point when the principal means of conflict shifts from the threat or use of military force to other means
Conflict termination can occur with the surrender of, withdrawal by, or negotiations with the enemy. Commanders and staffs plan for conflict termination as part of campaign planning. The desired end state drives the conditions of conflict termination. Regardless of the nature of the termination, conflict often persists in less violent forms. Conflict termination is the military contribution to broader success criteria. The end state at both joint and Army levels evolves with the policy governing the conflict. Effective campaign plans account not only for military objectives, but also specific end states that support national policy. Campaign plans also distinguish between the military and other elements of national power.

Postconflict activities begin with conflict termination and end with the redeployment of the last US soldier. Army forces are vital to this period. They conduct stability and support operations as sequels to decisive operations that sustain the results achieved by the campaign. The threat should not resurrect itself, nor should the conditions recur that originally resulted in the conflict. These postconflict stability and support operations by Army forces transform temporary battlefield success into lasting strategic results.

Using the ten-step research methodology, the monograph has now answered the secondary, tertiary, and quaternary research questions. The methodology has established a method of evaluation that uses the issues raised in the termination of war in Korea and DESERT STORM, as well as additional considerations suggested by previous literature (step 1). It has also identified the war objectives and their negotiability in both wars (steps 2 and 3). The monograph examined whether military operations achieved the non-negotiable objectives and contributed to the achievement of the negotiable ones (steps 4 and 5). The research methodology identified issues that emerged during war termination based upon Kenneth Waltz’s three levels of the causes of war (steps 6 and 7). Finally, the monograph examined the content of war termination doctrine during the Korean War, Operation DESERT STORM, and today (steps 8, 9, and 10). In chapter four, the monograph will analyze the results of steps six through ten to determine if
doctrine addressed, or has evolved to address, the issues of war termination identified during the Korean War and DESERT STORM.
Primary Research Question

The answer to the primary research question is that the available doctrine at the time of the Korean War and DESERT STORM did not address the identified issues of war termination. The current joint doctrine in JP 3-0 addresses the majority of the issues. The one significant shortcoming is the failure to discuss the role and responsibilities of the joint force commander and his subordinate commanders as negotiators during war termination. FM 3-0 does not address the majority of the issues of war termination the monograph identified. A more detailed examination of the answer to the primary research question appears in the following paragraphs.

The research methodology identified seven issues resulting from war termination in Korea. The first issue was the importance of clear guidance on war objectives between the civilian leadership of the United States and its field commander in the theater of war. This is a concept identified in the literature and doctrine has addressed it. JP 3-0 recommends that before the nation commits forces, the joint force commander must know how the President and the Secretary of Defense intend to terminate the operation and ensure that the results endure. The joint force commander must then incorporate this termination guidance into his operational design. FM 3-0 notes that as the government refines the policy governing a conflict, so must military leaders refine the end state at both the US Army and joint levels. Following the undeniable evidence of a large Chinese intervention in early November 1950, President Truman and his advisers agreed that a united Korea was no longer possible given the resources available. They did not direct General MacArthur to adopt this end state.

JP 3-0 also states that joint force commanders must understand the overall political goal and military objectives for termination and request clarification from higher authority when
General Ridgway did this upon assuming command from General MacArthur in April 1951, primarily due to the ambiguity of guidance sent to MacArthur by leaders in Washington afraid to challenge his assessment of the situation. General MacArthur did not agree with the intent of the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to take all measures necessary to prevent an expansion of the conflict beyond Korea. He vehemently opposed a negotiated settlement as appeasement. He pressed Truman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to strive for complete victory and reunification of Korea by military force. They failed, by their own admission, to clarify their guidance to MacArthur and fulfill their responsibility to designate the objectives of the war. JP 3-0 notes that ideally, national, allied, and coalition political leaders will seek the advice of senior military leaders concerning when and how to terminate the war. In defense of President Truman and others, they did seek MacArthur’s advice on how to terminate the war in Korea. The fault lay in their permission to allow him to implement his plan even though they disagreed with it.

The second issue was the impact of the November 1950 mid-term congressional elections on President Truman. Joint doctrine does not address consideration of the impact of elections on war termination. The constitutional authority of the President of the United States as commander-in-chief is inviolable. However, evidence suggests that the American public expects favorable war results within three to six months of entering a conflict and becomes increasingly hostile to the President’s party when a year goes by without success. The Republican Party made major gains in the congressional elections of 1942, 1950, and 1966, as well as winning presidential elections in 1952 and 1968.

128 FM 3-0, 6-21.
129 JP 3-0, 10 September 2001, I-11,12.
130 Blair, 402.
The third issue was the understandable desire of the American public to end a war once negotiations have started and its effect on subsequent military operations and troop morale. Joint doctrine states that the issue of termination centers on national will and freedom of action. It also notes that once an opponent’s strategic objective shifts from maintaining or expanding gains to reducing losses, the prospects for the United States negotiating a favorable termination improve. The same reasoning applies when applied to the opponent negotiating with the United States. The loss of national will hinders the freedom of action of US forces in the field as the strategic objective shifts to limiting casualties and terminating the war through negotiation.

The fourth issue was the importance of established, official channels of diplomatic communication between the belligerents. The joint doctrine addresses this issue directly. The joint force commander, even if seeking an imposed solution through military force, needs a means to communicate with the enemy. The joint doctrine states that the declaration of intentions, requirements, and minor concessions may speed termination, as an opponent considers the value of further resistance in the context of his diminishing military leverage on the battlefield. This is an uncertain proposition. The commander must carefully choose his words concerning intent to avoid ceding initiative to the enemy. When General Ridgway radioed the commander of communist forces in Korea on 30 June 1951 to inform him that the UN forces had come to understand that the communists wished to negotiate an armistice, UN forces held the initiative over badly mauled Chinese units. The respite gained from the initial meetings at Kaesong and the suspension of the UN advance allowed the Chinese to rebuild their force and construct defenses in depth. When UN forces, finally aware of communist stalling tactics at the negotiating table, launched limited attacks in late August 1951, the price of ground was significantly more costly than two months earlier.

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133 JP 3-0, 10 September 2001, I-11.
134 Fehrenbach, 348.
135 Blair, 948.
The fifth issue was the unanticipated difficulty of negotiating an armistice with the communist forces and the loss of initiative once the UN entered into talks with them. The joint doctrine discusses negotiations and armistices, but it does consider the fact that military leaders may be the ones doing the negotiating and that conducting negotiations successfully requires intensive preparation.\textsuperscript{136} US Army doctrine reflects the lessons of the stalemate and demilitarized zone in Korea, noting that regardless of how a war ends, confrontation often continues in a persistent, though less violent, form.\textsuperscript{137}

The sixth issue was the difference in war objectives between the United States and the various other UN member states providing forces to the United Nations command. JP 3-0 addresses this issue directly, advising the joint force commanders to consider the impact on alliance and coalition warfare when planning operations.\textsuperscript{138} General MacArthur knew that the United Kingdom wanted to stop the advance in the neck of the Korean peninsula between Pyongyang and Wonsan. After a brief consideration of the British position, he criticized his ally in messages to Washington, accusing London of appeasement in its recognition of Mao’s government in Peking and asserting that Great Britain had lost the respect of Asian peoples.\textsuperscript{139}

A seventh and final issue is the impact of ambiguous foreign policy on US decision making in East Asia. Joint doctrine does not address the formulation of foreign policy, but it does advise that the termination of operations is an essential link between the national security strategy, national military strategy, and the end state conditions for the war. It also requires the joint force commander to understand the overall political goal for termination.\textsuperscript{140} The doctrine also directs the joint force commander to consider the political exploitation of completed military action and to understand how the underlying causes of a particular war influence the conditions

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{136} JP 3-0, 10 September 2001, I-11. \textsuperscript{137} United States Army, FM 3-0, \textit{Operations} (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1 June 2001), 6-21. \textsuperscript{138} JP 3-0, 10 September 2001, III-25. \textsuperscript{139} Blair, 400. \textsuperscript{140} JP 3-0, 10 September 2001, II-10, 11}
necessary for war termination.\textsuperscript{141} FM 3-0 states that an effective campaign plan must consider not only military objectives, but also end states that support national policy.\textsuperscript{142} In Korea, the restoration of the pre-war border of South Korea and expulsion of the North Korean People’s Army supported the national military strategy by releasing forces for employment in Europe, regarded as the critical theater in the national security strategy’s global containment of communism expansionism. An ongoing conflict with Chinese forces in Asia, whether in the Korean Peninsula or not, did not support the US national strategy.

The research methodology identified six issues in the termination of Operation DESERT STORM. First, US military leaders did not adequately advise the civilian leadership on the capability of military power to achieve national war objectives. Specifically, air power alone could not destroy Iraq’s storage and production capability for weapons of mass destruction. The joint doctrine addresses this directly. It states that military strategic advice to political authorities regarding national military objectives should provide feasible and acceptable solutions with estimates of time, costs, and military forces required.\textsuperscript{143} Joint commanders provide critical information to political decision makers on the chances of success in obtaining desired goals.\textsuperscript{144} US Army doctrine states that campaign plans must carefully distinguish between the military and other instruments of national power. Coalition aircraft certainly could not attack the unknown locations of extensive components of Iraq’s weapons programs. The UN inspection personnel arriving later could not benefit from the leverage of coalition troops in southern Iraq to force Iraqi cooperation. They had already redeployed. Brent Scowcroft commented on the need to destroy the Republican Guard, stating that President Bush saw the dangers of an Iraqi escape from Kuwait before the coalition could destroy its army. It would remain as a menace to the region. The United States could not afford multiple massive deployments to the Persian Gulf. The

\textsuperscript{141} Ibid., II-12, III-24.
\textsuperscript{142} FM 3-0, 6-21.
\textsuperscript{143} JP 3-0, 10 September 2001, I-11.
\textsuperscript{144} Ibid., III-24, 25.
coalition must destroy the Iraqi army while deployed to the region.\textsuperscript{145} One asks why President Bush did not apply this same logic to Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. Following the defeat of Iraq’s forces in the field, the military element of national power could have destroyed Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction more effectively and more rapidly than the diplomatic and economic instruments the United States chose for the task. FM 3-0 states that, “Army forces are the decisive forces for sustained land combat, war termination, and postwar stability.”\textsuperscript{146} It also notes that stability and support operations conducted by US Army forces ensure that a threat does not resurrect itself and that the circumstances that caused the war do not recur.\textsuperscript{147} As the United States considers military action against Iraq following the terrorist attacks in September 2001, these doctrinal statements clearly address a shortcoming the termination of Operation DESERT STORM.

Second, the United States Senate only narrowly passed a measure authorizing President Bush to use force against Iraq. Joint doctrine does not address the authority of the President of the United States to commit American military units for combat. But the lack of support in the Senate certainly caught the attention of President Bush and perhaps influenced his decision to terminate the war as rapidly as possible, even without achieving the military objectives. President Bush noted that extending the ground war into an occupation of Iraq would have incurred “incalculable human and political costs.”\textsuperscript{148}

Third, the perceived impact of public opinion influenced the prosecution of military tasks and hastened the decision to end the fighting. The joint doctrine directly addresses this concept. Decision makers must carefully balance the desire for a quick victory with achieving the designated military objectives that support war termination on favorable terms.\textsuperscript{149} Sudden swings in public opinion are a reality of the role of media in American society. General Powell did not

\textsuperscript{145} Bush and Scowcroft, 477-478.
\textsuperscript{146} FM 3-0, 1-11.
\textsuperscript{147} Ibid., 6-21.
\textsuperscript{148} Bush and Scowcroft, 489.
wait for accurate assessments from the commanders in the field. He used the press reports as justification to terminate the fighting.

Fourth, military leaders were unprepared to negotiate with the Iraqis despite having overwhelming superiority on the battlefield and made significant mistakes in the cease-fire talks. The joint doctrine addresses negotiation, armistices, and truces, but it does not consider the role of the joint force commander and his immediate subordinates as negotiators. General Schwarzkopf admitted that he had never imagined sitting down at a table with Iraqi generals for a parley. Nor did his State Department advisers prepare him for such a role. Gordon Brown, his chief foreign policy expert, stated that US Central Command had no plan for war termination. Joint doctrine notes that an ill-conceived war termination process can result in related disputes and further conflict. That is exactly the situation between the United States and Iraq today.

Fifth, coalition allies did not agree to or support all war objectives of the United States. Joint doctrine addresses the need to consider coalition partners and allies in both planning and conducting war termination. President Bush, his advisers, and his military commanders were cognizant of the limits of the coalition and made its preservation an explicit aim. Bush and Scowcroft considered the coalition, operating under a United Nations mandate, an important precedent for response to international aggression in the post-Cold War world.

And sixth, the United States had no overarching strategic vision for the region following the war, resulting in the unwillingness to support stated war objectives. The joint doctrine addresses the role of war termination as a link between national security strategy, military strategy, and end state. FM 3-0 also emphasizes that effective campaign plans specify end states that support national policy. US strategic policy, as described in NSD 26, required Iraq as a
buffer against the threat of Iran to stability in the Persian Gulf. Without the time and diplomatic ability to establish a new policy following Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, the United States remained unwilling to actively force a regime change. President Bush directed the removal of the Hussein government if it destroyed the Kuwaiti oil fields. He openly called on the people and army of Iraq to overthrow Saddam Hussein. Yet he did nothing when both of these events occurred. The United States ended the war in a manner to support the national security strategy at the time, not a national security strategy of the future.

In addition to the issues identified above, the research methodology developed several additional criteria to evaluate the validity of war termination doctrine at the joint and US Army levels. The monograph presented these criteria as six questions. The first one asks, If surrender of the enemy is the war objective, does the doctrine address means by which the United States might force its enemies to surrender and how to employ these means? Both the joint and US Army doctrine answer this question in detail. JP 3-0 identifies imposed settlements that require domination of the enemy’s military strength or overthrow of his political regime. However, the word “surrender” appears only once in the entire publication. US Army doctrine is much more direct. FM 3-0 states that warfighting is the US Army’s principal focus. War termination may take several forms, the first of which is surrender. One of the US Army’s mission essential tasks is to dominate land operations. Domination creates a certainty in the minds of enemy commanders that they have two options if they engage US Army ground forces in close combat – destruction or surrender.

The second question asks, Does the doctrine offer guidance on how to achieve a surrender of the enemy other than through defeating his armed forces in the field? JP 3-0 states that joint forces can impose settlements on the enemy by overthrowing his political regime. FM 3-0 states that land operations seize the enemy’s territory and resources, destroy his armed forces,

155 Ibid., III-12.
156 FM 3-0, 1-6.
and eliminate the enemy government’s means of controlling the population. The destruction of the enemy armed forces enables the other two actions.

The third question asks, If surrender is not achievable or is not the war objective, does the doctrine consider planning for what sort of bargain to strike with the enemy to terminate the war? JP 3-0 discusses political considerations related to the strategic goal and termination of operations. It identifies the second means of achieving objectives by force as seeking concessions through coordinated military and negotiating action. It further addresses the need to plan for war termination from the beginning of operations and how the plan should coordinate the application of all elements of national power to cause the enemy to shift his objectives from maintaining or extending gains to reducing losses and negotiating a settlement. US Army doctrine in FM 3-0 identifies negotiations as a form of war termination and that the campaign plan should consider war termination requirements. There is no specific guidance on negotiating with the enemy.

The fourth question asks, Does it consider dividing war objectives within a non-surrender scenario into negotiable and non-negotiable categories? Both joint and US Army assume that the nation’s political leaders will do this when formulating the overall political goal of the war and the associated objectives. JP 3-0 discusses war termination design in relation to the nature of war, noting that interest-based wars, such as ones over territorial disputes or economic advantage, lend themselves to negotiated solution more readily than values-based wars.\textsuperscript{157} It also notes that military and negotiating actions work together when seeking a negotiated conclusion to the war. FM 3-0 states that the end state for the war will evolve concurrently with the policy governing it. If the United States abandons the war termination objective of an imposed settlement and moves to negotiation, this should prompt a reevaluation of the original objectives and end state in terms of what the nation will negotiate. This reevaluation occurred in Korea.

\textsuperscript{157} JP 3-0, 10 September 2001, III-24.
The fifth question asks, Does it offer guidance on how to use the military and other instruments of national power to achieve the non-negotiable objectives and support the successful negotiation of the other objectives? JP 3-0 discusses the need to coordinate military action with the diplomatic, economic, and informational elements of national power to shift enemy war objectives. It also identifies how military success and military potential create negotiating power in armed conflict. JP 3-0 also advises the joint force commander to recognize the achievement of military strategic goals allow transition to other elements of national power to achieve broader goals. FM 3-0 defines strategy as “the art and science of developing and employing armed forces and other instruments of national power in a synchronized fashion to secure national or multinational objectives.” It also notes that effective campaign plans carefully distinguish between the military and other elements of national power, suggesting that military power is not the only resource available to accomplish campaign objectives.

The sixth question asks, Does the doctrine address how military power can support these aims without necessarily achieving dominance on the battlefield? Both JP 3-0 and FM 3-0 consider the dominance of US forces on the battlefield as an essential condition of effective war termination. JP 3-0 states US forces must dominate in the final stages of armed conflict to achieve the necessary leverage to develop effective termination criteria and impose a lasting solution. FM 3-0 states that US Army forces provide the credible land power necessary to preclude and deter conflict, or to win decisively if deterrence fails. The threat or use of US Army forces is the ultimate means of imposing the national will and achieving a lasting outcome.

Unexpected Results of Research

The doctrine on war termination in the joint and US Army capstone publications occupies only a small space in each one. However, the sentences take on a new significance when the reader is familiar with the war termination process in Korea and Operation DESERT STORM.

\[158\) FM 3-0, 2-2.\]
Sensitivity of Answer to Assumptions Made

The monograph assumes that US military leaders had no joint doctrine, in official or draft form, available for review during Operation DESERT STORM. If General Schwarzkopf and his subordinate commanders did have some form of draft joint war termination doctrine available to them, it could change the answer to the first half of the primary research question if that draft doctrine addressed any of the war termination issues the monograph identified in Operation DESERT STORM.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommended Changes and Additions to Current Doctrine

The purpose of this chapter is to present recommended changes to the war termination doctrine Joint Publication 3-0 and Field Manual 3-0 and to identify topics related to the monograph that merit further research.

The key shortcoming of Joint Publication 3-0 is the failure to recognize the role of the joint force commander and his subordinate commanders as negotiators during the termination of military operations in war. Additional shortcomings include the use of the term “conflict termination” instead of “war termination,” the failure to note the potential of a truce to result in regeneration of enemy capability, and the failure to emphasize the importance of communication between military commanders and the nation’s civilian leadership to decide if military operations have achieved war objectives. US military forces operate in a joint environment. Joint doctrine is the primary source for guidance on war termination; US Army doctrine need only supplement the joint publications as required to clarify specific army roles and missions during war termination. The current army doctrine focuses on stability and support operations after war has ended. It does not emphasize the unique capability of army forces to maintain leverage on the opponent to facilitate a rapid conclusion to negotiations to achieve war objectives.

The following paragraphs contain the proposed doctrine for chapters 1 and 3 of Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations. These paragraphs reflect changes based upon the analysis in this monograph. They include recognition that planners must develop war termination criteria as they plan an operation, but that dominant forces provide leverage to implement the plan. They also acknowledge that historically, the more common form of war termination is by negotiation. While the truce is a tool for the joint force commander, it also an opportunity for the enemy to recover his strength. The changes also address the importance of clear communication
between military and civilian leadership so the latter can make decisions based upon the best available knowledge of the situation. An essential addition is the role of the joint force commander (JFC) in preparing for and conducting negotiations with an enemy from a different culture. The proposed doctrine eliminates the use of the term “national command authority” in accordance with current guidance. Due to personal relationships or the domestic and international situation, the national leadership may not always provide clear guidance on war termination. The joint force commander must ask for it when necessary. The changes also replace the term “conflict” with “war” to clarify the particular type of conflict that military doctrine addresses.

The Strategic Goal and Termination of Operations (in JP 3-0, Chapter I)

Properly conceived termination criteria are key to ensuring that victories achieved with military forces endure. To facilitate implementation of effective termination criteria, US forces must be dominant in the final stages of an armed conflict by achieving the leverage sufficient to impose a lasting solution.

The design and implementation of leverage and the ability to know how and when to terminate operations are involved in operational art and are discussed in Chapter III, “Planning Joint Operations.” Because the nature of the termination will shape the futures of the contesting nations or groups, it is fundamentally important to understand that termination of operations is an essential link between national security strategy, NMS, and end state conditions — the desired outcome. This principle holds true for both war and MOOTW.

Political Considerations:

There are two general means for obtaining objectives by force. The first seeks domination of the opponent’s military strength or overthrow of the opponent’s political regime — an imposed settlement. The second seeks concession through coordinated military and negotiating actions.

Historically, the negotiated settlement occurs more often than the imposed solution. Negotiating power in armed conflict springs from two sources: military success and military potential. Military success provides military, geographic, political, psychological, or economic advantage and sets the stage for negotiations. Military potential establishes the threat of further advantage accruing to the possessor, which forces the opposing nation or group to consider a negotiated conclusion. Negotiating an advantageous conclusion to operations requires time and power and the demonstrated will to use both. In addition to imposed and negotiated termination, there may be an armistice or truce, which is a negotiated intermission in operations, not a peace. In effect, it is a device to buy time pending negotiation of a permanent settlement or resumption of operations. A nation or group needs to consider the advantages accruing to a truce and the prospects for its supervision. A truce can allow a weakened enemy to rebuild his strength and reduce the subsequent leverage of US joint forces should hostilities begin again.

Even when pursuing an imposed termination, the government requires some means of communication with the opponent(s). Declarations of intentions, requirements, and minor concessions may speed conflict termination, as the enemy considers the advantages of early termination versus extended resistance in the light of fading leverage.

The issue of termination centers on national will and freedom of action. Once the opponent’s strategic objective shifts from maintaining or extending gains to reducing losses, the possibilities for negotiating an advantageous termination improve. Military, economic, diplomatic, and informational efforts need to be coordinated toward causing that shift and, once made, toward exploiting it. Termination of operations should be considered from the outset of planning and should be refined as operations move toward advantageous termination.

Military Considerations:

In its strategic context, military victory is measured in the achievement of the overall political goal and associated termination objectives. Operational and tactical victory is measured by its contribution to strategic success. Military objectives may differ significantly for a
negotiated settlement than for an imposed one. Military strategic advice to political authorities regarding national military objectives for termination should be reviewed for military feasibility, adequacy, and acceptability as well as estimates of the time, costs, and military forces required to achieve the objectives. Implementing military commanders need to understand the overall political goal and military objectives for termination and should request clarification from higher authority when required. Military commanders must communicate accurate and timely reports to the President and Secretary of Defense as termination operations commence to enable them to decide if their objectives have been met.

Another military consideration is the follow-up political exploitation of completed military action and the military role in the transition to peace. This exploitation includes matters such as military government, civil affairs (CA), and FHA, and requires early planning, liaison, and coordination both at the national level and in the theater among diplomatic, military, and political leadership. Joint force commanders and their subordinate commanders must prepare for potential roles as negotiators to support this political exploitation. Considerations for successful conduct of negotiations include where negotiations will occur, when they will begin, who will conduct them, what will be negotiated and what results will be achieved, and how the negotiations will be made to occur. In addition, they should not assume that an enemy will negotiate in the manner of a diplomat from a Western, democratic nation.

Termination (in JP 3-0, Chapter III)

Knowing when to terminate military operations and how to preserve achieved advantages is a component of strategy and operational art. Before forces are committed, JFCs must ask how the President and Secretary of Defense intend to terminate the operation and ensure its outcomes endure, and then determine how to implement that strategic design at the operational level. In war, termination design is driven in part by the nature of the war itself. Wars over territorial disputes or economic advantage tend to be interest-based and lend themselves to negotiation,
persuasion, and coercion. Wars fought in the name of ideology, ethnicity, or religious or cultural primacy tend to be value-based and reflect demands that are seldom negotiable. Often, wars are a result of both value- and interest-based differences.

The underlying causes of a particular war – such as cultural, religious, territorial, or hegemonic – must influence the understanding of conditions necessary for termination of hostilities and resolution of conflict. Ideally, national and allied or coalition decision makers will seek the advice of senior military leaders concerning how and when to end combat operations. Passing the lead from the military to other agencies to achieve final strategic goals following conflict usually requires the participation of JFCs.

Military operations typically conclude with attainment of the strategic ends for which the President and Secretary of Defense committed forces. In some cases, these goals will be military strategic goals that, once achieved, allow transition to other instruments of national power and agencies as the means to achieve broader goals. The end of World War II and the transition from war to other means to achieve a free and independent Europe is an example.

Commanders strive to end combat operations on terms favorable to the United States and its allies or coalition partners. The basic element of this goal is gaining control over the adversary in the final stages of combat. When friendly forces can freely impose their will on the adversary, the opponent may have to accept defeat, terminate active hostilities, or revert to other types of conflict such as geopolitical actions or guerrilla warfare. Nonetheless, a hasty or ill-designed end to the operation may bring with it the possibility that related disputes will arise, leading to further conflict. There is a delicate balance between the desire for quick victory and termination on truly favorable terms.

JFCs and their subordinate commanders consider the conditions necessary to bring operations to a favorable end. They translate the President’s political goals into strategy and operational design. They provide decision makers with critical information on adversary intent,
objectives, strategy, and chances of success in obtaining desired goals. JFCs and subordinate commanders consider the nature and type of war, the objective of military force, the plans and operations that will most affect the adversary’s judgment of cost and risk, and the impact on alliance and coalition warfare.

If the conditions have been properly set and met for ending the war, the necessary leverage should exist to prevent the adversary from renewing hostilities. Moreover, the strategic goals for which the United States fought should be secured by the leverage that US and multinational forces have gained and can maintain. Wars are fought for political goals. Wars are successful only when political goals are achieved and these goals endure.

A period of postwar activities exists from the immediate end of the war to the redeployment of the last US Service member. A variety of MOOTW occur during this period. These operations involve all instruments of national power and include those actions which ensure that political objectives are achieved and sustained. Part of this effort may be to ensure the threat (military and/or political) does not resurrect itself. The effort focuses on ensuring that the results achieved endure and the conditions that resulted in the war do not recur.

Even as forces transition from combat operations to postwar activities, requirements for humanitarian assistance will emerge. Working with DOD and other USG agencies, as well as nongovernmental and international organizations, JFCs prepare to meet the requirements of humanitarian support, including the provisioning of food and shelter and the protection of various groups against the depredations of opposing groups.

During postwar operations, JFCs may transfer control to other authorities and redeploy forces. JFCs should identify postwar requirements as early as possible so as to facilitate transition and to permit the simultaneous redeployment of forces no longer required.

The following paragraphs contain the proposed doctrine for chapter 6 of US Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations. Again, “war” replaces “conflict” in the vocabulary of military doctrine. The changes include recognition of war termination as both a phase in the fighting and a specific
act. They also recognize the essential role of US Army forces in maintaining leverage on the opponent to ensure rapid and successful negotiations.

**Paragraph 6-87, FM 3-0:** War termination describes a phase in war. War termination begins when one side has achieved its war objectives or one or both sides decide that the cost of the war outweighs any potential future gains accrued by continuing it. War termination also describes a specific act that marks the cessation of hostilities and the end of the phase of war termination. War termination may take several forms: for example, the adversary may surrender, withdraw, or negotiate an end to the conflict. Commanders and staffs consider war termination requirements when developing campaign plans. If the end state is a situation that promotes economic growth, for example, commanders consider the effects of destroying the economic infra-structure. Regardless of how the war ends, it often changes into less violent, but persistent, forms of confrontation.

**Paragraph 6-88, FM 3-0:** War termination is more than the achievement of a military end state: it is the military contribution to broader success criteria. As the policy governing the war evolves, so does the end state at both joint and Army levels. Effective campaign plans account for more than military objectives; they specify end states that support national policy. They are also careful to distinguish between the military and other instruments of national power. Army forces are decisive in negotiated war termination situations through their capability to maintain leverage over the opponent and facilitate the rapid conclusion of negotiations on favorable terms.

**Paragraph 6-89, FM 3-0:** A period of postwar activities exists between the end of a conflict and redeployment of the last US soldier. Army forces are vital in this period. As a sequel to decisive major operations, Army forces conduct stability operations and support operations to sustain the results achieved by the campaign. These operations ensure that the threat does not resurrect itself and that the conditions that generated the war do not recur. Postwar stability operations and support operations – conducted by Army forces and coupled with other elements of national power – transform temporary battlefield successes into lasting strategic results.
Recommendations for Further Research

1. Are we following the doctrine for war termination in the new war against terrorism?

2. Can we really expect military war termination doctrine to significantly improve the process? Several of the issues in war termination identified in this monograph, such as the outcome of congressional elections and the lack of vision in foreign policy, are beyond the control of the military. Can the joint force commander realistically expect to always receive war termination guidance from the political leaders?

3. The doctrine in FM 3-0 is pessimistic. Specifically, it states that confrontation will often persist, in less violent form, after a war is over. Does this reflect an army bias against wars that are not pursued until the enemy is utterly vanquished and defeated, like Germany and Japan? Is this the army looking on the results of Korea and DESERT STORM with a sort of loathing?

4. Some of the literature by military authors cites the lack of mention of war termination in JP 5-0 and the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES). JP 5-0 and JOPES describe planning processes. Is there anything in JP 5-0 or JOPES that precludes the campaign planner from considering war termination in the plan? Or rather, is the problem that planners simply do not consider war termination because they are unaware that they should? JOPES and JP 5-0 are not intended to be foolproof checklists that keep a planner from making mistakes. Some skill and wisdom is still required. The problem may not lie in the lack of “war termination” being on a list of items to consider in JOPES or JP 5-0, but rather that the planners have not read and thought through the doctrine in JP 3-0.

5. Is this an accurate statement? “But the most compelling question is strategic: must limited wars end through negotiations or concessions, or should not war aims, however limited, be gained by unambiguous competence, by the limited war equivalent of unconditional surrender? That question remains unanswered some fifty years after the Korean War.”161

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