MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

THE MARINE CORPS COMBAT OBSERVER PROGRAM:

“MESSENGERS OF WARFIGHTING IN THE 21ST CENTURY”

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

By

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**Abstract** (maximum 200 words)

This paper supports the development and design of a Marine Corps Combat Observer Program (MCCOP). The MCCOP is designed to deploy teams of officers and staff non-commissioned officers (SNCOs) to regional areas in which armed conflict is occurring. In concept, the officer/SNCO teams will deploy to observe combat operations at the tactical level (brigade and below) in order to record, evaluate, and document current tactics, techniques, procedures, and methods within respective geographic regions. Upon completion the teams will return to the continental United States (CONUS) for duty at Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) Quantico, VA. Their experience, lessons learned from evaluating tactics, techniques, and procedures will be evaluated, refined, and assessed. In concept, their experiences will be shared and processed through a variety of education, training, and combat development venues. From PME lectures at Marine Corps University (MCU) and further experimentation by the Warfighting Lab to the Warfighting Doctrine and Integration Division (WDID), the MCCOP program is designed to create a dedicated linkage between the battlefield, the classroom, and the combat development process. The program labors to record in peacetime or in wartime, the combat applications from a variety of nations and regions engaged in armed conflict.
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Executive Summary

Title: The Marine Corps Combat Observer Program: Messengers of Warfighting in the 21st Century

Author: Major Kelly P. Alexander

Thesis: In order to remain a relevant and evolving Warfighting organization during the 21st century, the United States Marine Corps needs to adopt a dedicated Combat Observer Program which links battlefield lessons learned with professional military education (PME) and ultimately combat development. This program is a catalyst for change and a response to the paradigm shift in America’s new global war on terror and beyond.

Discussion: This paper supports the development and design of a Marine Corps Combat Observer Program (MCCOP). The MCCOP is designed to deploy teams of officers and staff non-commissioned officers (SNCOs) to regional areas in which armed conflict is occurring. It is designed to support the National Security Strategy, the National Military Strategy, and the combatant commander in chiefs’ (CinCs) theater engagement plans (TEP). Operating within a framework similar to the successful architecture of the Department of State’s Security Assistance Program, (a Congressionally mandated program) responsible for engaging and training foreign countries, MCCOP will benefit the host nation, the United States Marine Corps, and the regional combatant commanders. The program labors to record in peacetime or in wartime, the combat applications from a variety of nations and regions engaged in armed conflict.

In concept, the officer/SNCO teams will deploy to observe combat operations at the tactical level (brigade and below) in order to record, evaluate, and document current tactics, techniques, procedures, and methods within respective geographic regions. Upon completion the teams will return to the continental United States (CONUS) for duty at Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) Quantico, VA. Their experience, lessons learned from evaluating tactics, techniques, and procedures will be evaluated, refined, and assessed. In concept, their experiences will be shared and processed through a variety of education, training, and combat development venues. From PME lectures at Marine Corps University (MCU) and further experimentation by the Warfighting Lab to the Warfighting Doctrine and Integration Division (WDID), the MCCOP program is designed to create a dedicated linkage between the battlefield, the classroom, and the combat development process so that the Marine Corps can refine and further develop tactics, techniques, procedures, and methods that may improve doctrine and potentially develop new combat systems.

Recommendations: This paper will be submitted to Commanding General (CG) MCCDC as a universal needs statement (UNS). A UNS, under the revised United States Marine Corps combat development process, provides the institution with a mechanism and an avenue to express ideas, recommend changes, and present possible solutions dedicated to the evolution of warfighting during the 21st century.
"I repeat: those who would make great sacrifices to win, . . . follow me."

--- Dan Gable

Preface

In 1998, I reported to Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) Quantico, Virginia, for duty as a Special Operations Officer at Coalition and Special Warfare (CSW). Functioning as a Center within MCCDC’s Training and Education Command (TECom), CSW’s mission classifies its functions in three areas: security assistance (SA), The Marine Expeditionary Unit (special operations capable) {MEU (SOC)} Predeployment Training Program, and Counterdrug.

While security assistance encompasses several programs, equipment (MarCorSysCom) and training pipelines as well as schools, CSW functions as the Marine Corps proponent for international engagement and training. SA provides Marine Corps training and education to allies and emerging foreign countries for the purposes of international engagement and enlargement as outlined in our current National Security Strategy. International students attending Marine Corps schools such as The Basic School (TBS), Amphibious Warfare School (AWS), and the Command and Staff College are beneficiaries of SA programs in action.

Participation in each of these three programs at CSW (MEU(SOC), security assistance, and Counterdrug) enabled me to absorb a myriad of different concepts, cultures, and commitments in a joint and combined environment over a period of about three years. Previous tours and deployments with 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, 1st Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO), 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion
(LAR), as well as an instructor tour at MCCDC (Officer Candidates School and TBS), combined to help me develop new perspectives, opinions, and ideas. Though I do not consider my experiences to be any more or less discernable than any of my peers, I feel compelled to offer my professional opinion as a disciple of our warrior ethos and an officer of Marines.

The intention of this masters paper is to introduce, and in a sense reinvigorate, a catalyst for gauging and evolving Marine Corps warfighting capabilities in the 21st century. In order to remain a relevant and evolving warfighting organization in the new millennium, the United States Marine Corps needs to adopt a dedicated combat observer program that links battlefield lessons learned with PME and ultimately combat development. This paper will introduce and propose the Marine Corps Combat Observer Program (MCCOP).

**Historical Background: A Focus on the Past to Empower the Future**

“The only thing new in the world is the history you don’t know.”

--- Harry S. Truman

The purpose of providing historical background with regard to the evolution of military observers is to illustrate two points. First, American history reveals that military observers have had a rich tradition of participation during times of prolonged peace and in the initial stages of conflict since the early days of this country. In particular, this section describes early relationships between the observers, the War Department, and the

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unsuccessful attempts to institutionalize the link between the battlefield information recorded and the combat development process. Secondly, by indentifying past contributions of military observers, this section extrapolates lessons learned from history and highlights the need for a comprehensive program which would link combat observation to PME and ultimately to the combat development process itself. From this historical base, and understanding of the role of the military observer and his potential impact on warfighting, emerges the thesis in this study—that the Marine Corps needs to create a dedicated combat observer program that learns from the past, embraces the present, and empowers the future.

The U.S. Army had an established military observer program that was initiated through the War Department beginning as early as 1815. Each new war of the 19th century seemed a test to validate or invalidate the principles of Jomini within the Napoleonic precepts of war. The institution of military observers was designed to collect information from these wars, and apply the lessons learned toward this country’s own military evolution. In a compendium of records annotating their experiences, Major Thomas Grodecki reviewed official U.S. Army records of 30,000 West Point graduates from 1815 to 1975 and documents that, “... of the 30,000 officers, 2,000 can be classified as having been military observers.” Upon further scrutiny, however, I have determined that a distinction must be made between military observers and combat observers. Within my own context, I define “military observers” as those who are detailed to observe foreign governments and/or armies during periods of peacetime and war. The

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4 Ibid, p.1
term “combat observer,” on the other hand, refers to observers who assimilate this information exclusively from battlefields during a time of crisis or war. While both the military observer and the combat observer may monitor training, study military institutions, doctrine, and even record specific tactics, techniques, and procedures, the distinct advantage belongs to the combat observer, who assesses first-hand the execution of military and political policies on the battlefield.

U.S. combat observers were present during the Crimean War and actions were documented in detail. Although the after-action reports (AARs) were published by order of Congress in 1860, the lessons learned had little impact on tactical adjustments during the U.S. Civil War.\(^5\) Institutional change, influenced by the records and recommendations of combat observers, did not occur until the turn of the century, when the U.S. Army began to organize a dedicated program designed to both educate and modernize the U.S. Army.

In his report published in 1878, The Armies of Asia and Europe, Brevet Major General Emory Upton described the evolving character of warfare, weapons, and troop employment, and the disparity among training, technology and doctrine. As a military observer, Upton recommended several changes not only in military policy but in military strategy as well. According to one historian, “many of his recommendations also appear in his unfinished 1881 manuscript The Military Policy of the United States. When Elihu Root became Secretary of War on August 1, 1899, he used Upton’s manuscript, his

\(^5\) Grodecki, p.1
knowledge of current business practices, the report of the Dodge Commission, and other sources as the basis for the reform of the War Department and the Army.  

The advent of the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905, provided another laboratory for observing and recording combat in its modern form. For the first time an army of Asia (Japan) was pitted against an army of Europe (Russia) in modern, pitched battle. The U.S. Army, under the direction of Secretary of War Root, revived a combat observer program geared to record the on-going Russo-Japanese War. Chanley Mohney in his dissertation on US Army observers during the Russo Japanese War opined that:

The Russo-Japanese War was the first major conflict of the 20th century and the first to occur after the Army began its reform efforts. At this time very few active-duty US Army officers had ever commanded more than a regiment in combat or peacetime. However, though they lacked higher military education and many had just served on the frontier, US officers had a high degree of professionalism, intellectual vitality, and knowledge of modern military science. The Russo-Japanese War offered an opportunity for the Army to learn first-hand what modern war had become and make changes to meet the challenges of the new century.

The U.S. War Department sent twelve official observers to the war to observe the Imperial Japanese forces. The delegation of combat observers consisted of both U.S. Army and Navy officers and included a variety of observers who could address several branches or military occupational specialties (MOS). The observations resulted in several after-action reports containing not only objective and factual recordings of modern war and its systems, but also recommendations for change and improvement as well. The observations and information gained and recorded during the Russo-Japanese

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8 Ibid, p. 2.
War were published in 1907, in a four-volume history, by the U.S. Army’s Second (Military Information) Division and was entitled Epitome on the Russo-Japanese War. ⁹

The reports were not compiled in a standard format such as the Marine Corps lessons learned (MCLLs) format but captured the observer’s own method of recording the actions. According to Mohney, “most of the published official reports included a general narrative describing the battles and movements of the Japanese Imperial Army. But these reports also described details such as field hospitals, the post office, entrenching tools, rifles, machine guns, knapsacks, mess tins, food and cooking arrangements, packsaddles, clothing, tenting, and more.” ¹⁰

Of all the observers, however, a Lieutenant Colonel McClernand provided the most useful report because, besides simply recording his observations, he also offered solutions and recommended changes. “McClerndand’s report closely mirrored Upton’s report thirty years earlier, in which the latter had devoted some 100 pages to changes that needed to be made in the American Army if the U.S. was to become a realistic force in war with a first-class power.” ¹¹ The published reports, however, were not capitalized on and did not provide the obvious catalyst for change demanded by the systems shaping the art of 20th century warfare.

Interestingly enough, in close contact with foreign governments, U.S. Ambassadors and the Secretary of War negotiated the participation of military observers through the posts of Defense Attaches (such as Captain John J. Pershing, military attaché to Tokyo). These negotiations were initiated simultaneously with the host nation during

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¹⁰ Mohney, p. 2-3.
¹¹ Ibid, p. 4.
the opening months of the war. Japan, for its part had participated in observing German
tactical and operational prowess during the Franco-Prussian in 1870 and, as a result, had
assimilated the structure and organization of the German General Staff model for
planning and execution.

The advent of World War I, in August 1914, positioned the United States in a
unique environment. The national intent to remain neutral in the emerging European war
did not prevent U.S. military professionals from initiating a program to send combat
observers to record the latest modern war first-hand, as the War Department sent
observers to view the operations on both sides. Despite the top-down interest, however,
there seems to have been little guidance to standardize any reports or to communicate any
desired endstate as to what their combat observations were designed to accomplish for
the institution. For example, Major Alex Vohr, in his Master of Military Studies paper,
highlights that:

Reviewing some of the original orders issued to observers sent to Europe, there
seems to have been little in the way of guidance provided by the War Department
regarding what information would be of use to the US Army. The content of the reports
appears mainly to be driven by those issues the observer was either drawn to by his own
interest or background or by the focus and issues foremost at the time for the army he
was observing. . . . This lack of guidance in itself was a shortfall in the US efforts to gain
knowledge on the war and a timeless lesson learned for future employment of officers on
similar missions.\textsuperscript{12}

The observers appear to have had relatively unlimited access in observing both
warring sides and their reports followed a logical reporting path. The reports were first
routed through their respective Military Attaches in the U.S. Embassies, from there to the
War Department, and finally to the Army War College. Not surprisingly, “as the war
progressed and out of the interest of security, many of the battlefield observers, especially those in Germany and Austria, were subjected to censorship by the army they were serving alongside.” The author goes on to suggest that the reports provided by U.S. observers during their 2 ½ years of collective observation of no less than four major European armies are best analyzed in a chronological context. The tracing of observation reports throughout each officer’s tour of duty reveals the transformation of tactics, techniques and procedures clearly paralleling the maturation of the warfighting capabilities of the combatants.

One observer worth noting during World War I was Colonel Joseph E. Kuhn, USA, who had been an observer as a captain during the Russo-Japanese War. By 1914, he was the U.S. Military Attaché to Berlin, which is significant in that it indicated that the War Department recognized the utility of observing combat operations of other nations and the potential value of providing that information back to the U.S. Army for follow-on action. Disappointingly, Kuhn’s reports, although widely read and published as articles (he observed actions on the Somme), failed institutionally for two reasons. First, “the report accurately expressed the results of the British and French efforts at the Somme, but failed to offer solutions.” Secondly, the War Department failed to recognize, apply, or initiate any changes with respect to doctrine, methods, tactics, or techniques. The tragedy of this combat observation program was its failure to have institutional impact despite its obvious potential utility.

12 Major Alex Vohr, American Observers on the Battlefields of the Western Front and the Tactical Evolution of the American Expeditionary Forces in World War I, (Quantico, VA: Command and Staff College, 2001), p.15,16.
13 Vohr, p. 17.
14 Ibid, p. 32.
Consequently, the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) entered a 2 ½ year-old World War without application of the knowledge gained or lessons learned. As a result, the Marines of the 5th and 6th Marine Regiments crossed the wheatfield at Belleau Wood in 1918 in a manner reminiscent of an earlier era and paid a high price for it. As Vohr puts it, “The Marines attacked in waves of four ranks, little different from an American Civil War assault. To the German defenders it was like a flashback to 1916, when they had mowed down British infantry at the Somme.”\textsuperscript{15} Undoubtedly, Colonel Kuhn’s experiences, his observations, and narratives—if acted upon—clearly could have not only altered tactics and modified doctrine, but could have been instrumental in the development and refinement of combat systems, and possibly have expedited Allied victory.

In conclusion, the institution of U.S. combat observers throughout WWI identified the importance of watching and recording war. What the institution failed to achieve was the formal integration of lessons learned into a timely and accurate education and combat development process.

\textsuperscript{15} Vohr, p. 36.
Marine Corps Contributions: Combat Observation and the Combat Development Process, 1907-1942.

“Peace does not often reign everywhere in Europe, and never throughout the whole world. A State that has been at peace for many years should try to attract some experienced officers—only those of course who have distinguished themselves. Alternatively, some of its own officers should be sent to observe operations and learn what war is like.”

----Carl von Clausewitz

Interestingly, it was the United States Marine Corps which succeeded in integrating the observer-to-development process during the interwar years. Most notably, Marines such as Pete Ellis, Evans Carlson, and Victor Krulak were instrumental in the evolution of amphibious warfare doctrine a direct result of their observations and lessons learned.

For example, LtCol Pete Ellis became a subject matter expert in the Far East. His assignments in the Philippines and Guam and his numerous trips throughout the region, to include Japan and China, encouraged Ellis to observe and record a plethora of information. From the information he gathered between 1907 and 1921, including the personal reconnaissance of strategic islands such as Guam, Saipan, and Eniwetok, Ellis determined that the Japanese would become a dominant threat to U.S. interests in the region and predicted both the initiation of hostilities by Japan and a subsequent campaign

by the U.S. to retake the Japanese-mandated islands in the Pacific. Through direct
observation, Ellis recorded and applied his information by writing his famous *Advanced
Base Operations in Micronesia*, which one historian has characterized thus: "Part of a
secret operation plan [War Plan Orange], it is one of the most amazingly prophetic
documents in military history."\(^{17}\)

Ellis' ability to connect the vital links between what he observed and how the
Marine Corps should fight is attributable in part to the fact that he was an instructor at the
Naval War College. Having recently returned from duty in the Philippines, he had a
large impact on the future leaders of the U.S. Naval Service. "As a very junior captain
between 1911 and 1913 he taught officers who became admirals and generals and later
helped set the navy's course for victory in World War II."\(^{18}\) The important point is that
Ellis provided a clear example of applying field observations to professional military
education (as an instructor) and acted to produce a study: *Advance Base Operations in
Micronesia*. This document in turn became the Marine Corps’ catalyst for change in the
1920's and 1930's and directly influenced the future doctrine and combat development of
amphibious warfare and, as a result of experimentation at places such as Quantico, and
landing exercises at Culebra, Puerto Rico, the Marine Corps published its emerging new
docine in 1935, entitled the *Tentative Landing Operations Manual*.

While Ellis' observations were not primarily the result of combat, by identifying
the Japanese as a threat and predicting the future role of the Marine Corps in amphibious
operations, he established a framework within which combat observers such as Evans

\(^{17}\) John J. Reber, “Pete Ellis: Amphibious Warfare Prophet,” *Proceedings* vol. 103/11/897, (Washington,

\(^{18}\) Ibid, p. 56.
Carlson, Victor Krulak, and Samuel Griffith would later operate. All three officers were
detailed as combat observers to China in 1937-38 to observe the Sino-Japanese war.
Their experiences directly influenced Marine Corps organization, doctrine and combat
development. Evans Carlson with the formation of the Marine Raiders, attributed his
combat observation experiences this way:

To the layman it will be of interest to learn that the technique employed by the
raiders derived largely from the experience gained by the Chinese in fighting their insular
enemy, as well as from the Japanese themselves . . . when I was afforded the opportunity
to organize a battalion for raiding operations I drew heavily on the observations of my
experience of those days in China.¹⁹

Additionally, Marines conducted combat observation of the British Royal Marine
Commandos. "In January 1942 Marine Captains Samuel B. Griffith and Wallace M.
Greene reported on the British commando operations they had been sent to observe,
arguing for the use of lightly equipped, amphibious units in hit and run attacks."²⁰ As a
result, the raider battalions were patterned after the British commandos and tempered by
the lessons learned by Carlson in China.

Similarly, then 1st Lieutenant Victor Krulak's account of Japanese amphibious
landings on the Yangtze River highlighted the use of combined arms, surprise, and night
operations. His report, dated 1937, revealed a keen interest especially in observing and
recording the types of boats used in the operation, and he documented and recorded
several landings with a special emphasis and photographs of Japanese landing craft. His
report begins; "Information concerning the tactics, execution, logistics and success of the
landing operations has been collected from persons on one or the other combatant sides

¹⁹ LtCol. Evans Carlson, Reports from Observations with the Chinese Red Army 1937-1938, Historical
Amphibious File (HAF) PC3030, US Marine Corps Archives.
and has been considerably discounted as such. The resultant descriptions are, in many cases, a composite of two or more accounts. Data on boats and boat equipment was collected from direct observation. The contribution of Krulak’s report and observations directly contributed to the future development of bow-ramped landing craft, later known as the Higgins boat. The linkage in this case highlights the contributions of the Marine combat observer and his impact on future combat development.

As a result, while the Marine Corps was ardently working to find the “right” landing craft for amphibious operations, instructors were sharing the Japanese experiences with Marine students at Quantico. Significantly, Marine Corps Archives contain several lectures given on Japanese activities during the interwar years. For example, on 25 April 1938, Captain C.C. Brown conducted a lecture entitled “Japanese Naval-Land Operations, Shanghai, 1932-1937, and a Critical Analysis Thereof.” The lecture describes the several amphibious landings conducted to subdue Shanghai, which included night landings, demonstrations, use of combined arms, naval gunfire, and close air support. The lecture also described the tenacity of the Japanese forces and their commitment to success on the battlefield.

The experience gained by Marine combat observers in the Far East during the interwar period not only helped in the development of Marine Corps doctrine but also provided a keen insight into a foreign military power and revalidated the Mahanian concept of forward bases with the Corbettian tenets of amphibious employment. As part

20 Dr. Phyllis Zimmerman, “Carlson's Raiders,” lecture at Ball State University 10 APR 1992, HAF 279, USMC Archives.
of a synchronized effort, the combat observations of the interwar years directly prepared
the Marine Corps to face the encroaching Japanese Imperial forces in the Pacific.

Similarly, in 1940-41, as war became imminent, the Marine Corps also sent
aviators to England to train with Royal Air Force pilots. The result of these combat
observations and, some may argue, “combat experience” was directly responsible for
developing and refining Marine Aviation tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for
night operations. 24

The ability and foresight of the Marine Corps to “adapt, improvise and overcome”
was derived from its realization that in order to survive as a fighting force, it would have
to pursue the development of amphibious doctrine and amphibious operations as a future
mission—rather than resign itself to shipboard security and police actions highlighted by
its involvement in “small wars” such as the Banana Wars in Central America, Haiti, and
the Dominican Republic.

In summary, Marine Corps combat observation during the interwar years provides
an excellent example of successful integration and linkage from field observations to
institutional, organizational, and doctrinal changes that in turn fueled the combat
development process.

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22 Capt. Brown lecture on Japanese Naval Land Operations, Shanghai, 1932-1937 and a Critical Analysis
Thereof, 1938, HAF Box 5, Folder 6, USMC Archives.
23 Brown, p. 2-10.
24 Keith A. Milks, “RAF Taught Marines Night-Flying Skills,” Marine Corps Times, 15 October 2001,
p.58.
The Current Situation: Identifying the Need for Combat Observers

“There are two basic military functions: waging war and preparing for war. Any military activities that do not contribute to the conduct of a present war are justifiable only if they contribute to preparedness for a possible future one. Clearly, we cannot afford to separate conduct and preparation. They must be intimately related because failure in preparation leads to disaster on the battlefield.”

---MCDP-1 Warfighting

The purpose of this section is to highlight the role of combat observers since World War II (WW II), recognize the role of covert operators as de facto combat observers, and further illustrate the need for a dedicated Marine Corps combat observer program today.

The advent of WW II, followed by the Cold War, led to the establishment and growth of such organizations as the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the later establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), that directly and perhaps inadvertently assumed the role of combat observers for the U.S. Military largely for the next 50 years, a situation which has continued into the 21st century. On the other hand, the rise of the United Nations and its “peacekeeping” missions, for its part, has contributed much to the maintenance of peace but little to the development of warfighting through observation of combat.

The United Nations Military Observers (UNMO), since they were first deployed to the Balkans in 1947, have been primarily, and correctly, used worldwide to “monitor or supervise cease-fires, truces, or armistice agreements in conflict areas.”26 The Cold War paradigm produced the latest and most current version of the combat observer, that of the “case worker,” “field operative,” and “special forces operator.” These programs were designed to perform a myriad of functions from training and advising to collecting and reporting. One problem that arises with covert programs is the clearance level associated with them and the subsequent timely dissemination of information to conventional forces. The criticism is directed not at the dissemination of tactical information or intelligence but at the lack of institutional organization and foresight in promulgating such information for future consumption in the form of lessons learned, professional military education for the force, and the development/improvement of combat systems and doctrine.

Classified operations and information are valuable and appropriate. Unfortunately, while information is readily disseminated to those with a “need to know” at the immediate tactical level, security considerations restrict the comprehensive application of such information in the realm of combat development. The release authority or “declassification” lag of sensitive information that is made available for consumption in the wake of such covert operations is determined by two factors: the

original level of classification and a declassification date as determined by the
originator.\textsuperscript{27}

In essence, Cold War covert collectors were in many cases \textit{de facto} combat
observers whose lessons learned were disseminated only on a strict need to know basis,
and which were harbored only within those narrow programs or communities (Special
Operations Forces (SOF), CIA, etc.). At the same time, the Cold War ushered in a
cover method of combat observation that unintentionally denied conventional forces the
essential and timely information that could have assisted or redirected combat
development timelines. Without defined and dedicated combat observers and an
institutional program in place to connect the dots from observation through combat
development, the process of reporting on combat will struggle to provide coherent
direction in a timely fashion.

As an example, the Marine Corps published \textit{Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM)
31-3: Lessons Learned from the Iran–Iraq War} in late 1990.\textsuperscript{28} The document was
extremely useful but had been published and disseminated in extremis during the days of
Desert Shield. Thankfully, Saddam Hussein permitted the buildup of U.S. and Coalition
forces for a period of about 5 months—time enough to adjust, prepare, and incorporate
those lessons learned into our own course of action. Had a combat observer program
been in place prior to the Gulf War—having already observed and recorded the Iran-Iraq
War, and having disseminated such information to our schools and integrated appropriate

\textsuperscript{27} \textit{Personal Interview} with Mr. Gayland Lyles, CIA Chair, Command and Staff College, 27 Feb. 2002,
Quantico, VA.

\textsuperscript{28} Dr. Stephen C. Pelletier and LTC Douglas V. Johnson II, \textit{Lessons Learned: The Iran–Iraq War Vol. I},
(Washington, DC: Headquarters United States Marine Corps, December 1990). This publication was a
verbatim duplication of a general study generated by the US Army War College.
changes in TTPs, doctrine, or combat development—the results may have provided even more of a significant impact in a more timely manner.

In the shadow of the post-Cold War world, the Marine Corps has responded by developing future warfighting capabilities through simulation and training. The establishment of the Commandant’s Warfighting Lab, initiated by then Commandant General Charles Krulak, provided a unique framework for testing new ideas and equipment through a dedicated and funded program. Several warfighting experiments were conducted by the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab in the mid to late 90’s. Dubbed “Sea Dragon” and later “Hunter Warrior,” they subsequently evolved to produce additional initiatives such as “Urban Warrior” and “Capable Warrior.” Both initial experiments were designed to integrate resident and future technology with current TTPs and Standard Operating Procedures (SOP’s) for the purpose of developing new or at least improved methods that would enhance the Marine Corps’ warfighting capabilities and doctrine in the 21st Century.

“Hunter Warrior” experimented with the employment of small teams “infesting” the battlefield with enhanced capabilities to observe, report, adjust and employ an arsenal of supporting arms, while “Urban Warrior and Capable Warrior” served to validate methods of operating in military operations in urban terrain (MOUT) and to experiment with emerging technology. 29 Although the visionary approach by the Marine Corps attempted to take warfighting “to the next level,” it perhaps missed a key ingredient found in the annals of the Marine Corps Archives, namely that interwar development was a result of not only “great ideas,” but also of combat observers who applied their
experiences to professional military education, combat development, and the warfighting 
process. The missing link today remains the critical and most relevant piece—the combat 
observer.

The need for such a program today appears even more relevant since the events of 
11 September 2001. As with the onset of Desert Shield and Desert Storm, we find 
ourselves thirsting for knowledge of how the enemy fights, what the terrain is like, and 
how the particular environment will affect men, machines, and communications.

In October 2001, the Marine Corps University received a lecture on Afghanistan 
from retired Marine Corps Colonel Andrew “Nick” Pratt. His firsthand experiences and 
analysis were invaluable and touched on both existing opportunities and shortfalls in the 
Marine Corps’ warfighting and combat development process. In anticipation of Marine 
Corps involvement in Afghanistan, Colonel Pratt was commissioned by the Commandant 
of the Marine Corps to conduct a series of presentations on Afghanistan’s society, climate 
and terrain, the Mujahideen, and basic information of the Central Asian region for 
Marines throughout the Corps. Colonel Pratt’s comments, based on his previous 
experience as a Mujahideen adviser during the Soviet-Afghan War, were extremely 
informative and deemed highly valuable to all Marines.\textsuperscript{30} The timing of his lecture 
emphasized a particular phenomenon: that in times of crisis the race for information and 
intelligence is at a premium, but that the onus for quick change and adaptation falls not 
on the institution, but on individual Marine commanders for implementation and 
initiation. The timing of Colonel Pratt’s presentation exemplified the scramble of senior

\textsuperscript{29} Headquarters Marine Corps Programs and Resource Dept., \textit{Concepts and Issues 1998}, (Washington DC, 
leadership to provide relevant information to future users in the absence of a dedicated combat observer program.

More recently, the Marine Corps is attempting to fill this void with the *ad hoc* deployment of a combat assessment team (MCCDC Assessment Branch) to Afghanistan. Initiated by CG MCCDC, the team, comprised of approximately 30 members from a variety of military occupational specialties, reflects the spirit of the MCCOP program in that it seeks to observe, report, and record combat operations. However, it fails to realize the dedicated intent of a full-time program capable of global combat observation in a sustained and institutionalized fashion.

**Introducing a Marine Corps Combat Observer Program (MCCOP) and**

**Shaping the 21st Century: Engagement, Education and Evolution.**

> “During times of peace, the most important task of any military is to prepare for war . . .. As a nation’s expeditionary force in readiness, the Marine Corps must maintain itself for immediate employment in ‘any clime and place’ and in any type of conflict. All peacetime activities should focus on achieving combat readiness.”

--- *MCDP-1 Warfighting*

This section will continue to develop the assumption that the role of the combat observer is relevant today and will introduce a proposal for a Marine Corps Combat Observer Program (MCCOP). In concept, MCCOP has the potential to create a dedicated and comprehensive system that synergizes the trinity of observation (engagement), professional military schooling based on lessons learned (education), and the

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30 *Lecture by Colonel Nick Pratt, USMC (ret.), Command and Staff College, Quantico, VA, 7 October 2001.*
transformation of these lessons learned into current combat development (evolution) applications. The intent here is to present the potential benefits of establishing an MCCOP program with regards to current events.

In concept, the MCCOP program envisions several officer/SNCO teams forward deployed to observe combat operations at the tactical level (brigade and below) in order to record and document current tactics, techniques, procedures, and methods within respective geographic regions where conflict is/or has been occurring.

In general terms, the intent is to deploy four-man teams consisting of two officers and two SNCOs, with one pair (1 officer and 1 SNCO) observing staff actions at the brigade-level, and the other pair observing combat actions at the battalion-level and below. In order to ensure peculiar stresses and difficulties identified during the course of extended operations, MCCOP team members would deploy in-country for a period of at least 90 days. The concept intends to capture the functioning of both the host nation headquarter staffs and its subordinate maneuver units. While one MCCOP section may watch the planning and organization of the mission from the brigade command post, the other team may be involved in recording the execution of that mission firsthand, and go with the host nation main effort (lead company). Team members are expected to live in the field under the same conditions as their host nation peers in order to record as part of this program the environmental conditions and the effects of weather on weapons systems, communications gear and, combat troops—whether observing combat operations at 10,000 feet, under triple canopy jungle, or in a windswept desert.

31 MCDP-1 Warfighting, p. 53.
Upon completion of their combat observation mission, the teams would return to Quantico, for duty at MCCDC where their experiences, lessons learned, and information will be evaluated, refined, and assessed. This can be done best at MCCDC where there is a concentration of education, training, and combat development venues. The team’s findings would be presented as PME lectures at Marine Corps University, analyzed for further experimentation with the Warfighting Lab, and scrutinized for the possible development of emerging concepts and doctrine by the Warfighting Doctrine and Integration Division (WDID). The MCCOP program is designed to create a firm linkage between the battlefield, the classroom, and the combat development process.

The contribution of a combat observer program is especially pertinent today for two reasons. First, the program provides a conduit to gain and maintain resident warfighting knowledge by observing conflict in many climates and geographic locations. For example, MCCOP service in the Kashmir would serve to identify tactical TTPs and methods that are either successful or detrimental to fighting at high altitude (in many cases above 10,000 feet) and in cold weather. Secondly, this would simultaneously engage both Pakistan and India. The relationships formed with both Pakistani and Indian commanders and their units would potentially contribute to both the regional CinC’s TEP and the National Military Strategy (NMS), with particular attention on the tenet of “preparing now.”

Similarly, MCCOP involvement in the Republic of the Philippines presents itself as a prime candidate for such observation as the Philippine Marine Corps is currently directly engaged in combat operations against Islamic fundamentalists in that country’s southern region. In particular, operations against the splinter Al-Qaeda group, known as
Abu Sayef, affects future U.S. and Coalition operations in their war on global terrorism. The awareness and experience gained by MCCOP teams operating in the terrain, climate, and most importantly the Philippine jungle, are benefits clearly found outside of any history book or jungle warfare school. The benefits associated with this immersion into a cultural extreme cannot be fully measured.

Similarly, Russia’s war with Chechnya, the war in Bosnia, and Ethiopia’s war with Eritrea, serve as recent reminders that mid-intensity conflict, although less common than low-intensity clashes (such as those in Sri Lanka, Palestine, and Colombia), combine to provide a rich environment of opportunities for Marine Corps combat observation. The experience and knowledge gained by watching and recording combat operations as a MCCOP observer is a significant factor in preparing for operations in these and similar regions. Firsthand knowledge gained now would certainly contribute to adjusting or adopting successful warfighting doctrine in the future.

Finally, the information and experience accumulated by the Marine observers during their deployment would be invaluable. Working with the host nation military units in a combat environment builds credibility and respect at the very basic levels of military relationships. From warfighting TTPs, to engaging the host nation and “preparing now” the future battlefield, MCCOP creates a third opportunity: a conduit for identifying future technological and equipment needs germane to particular environmental or seasonal anomalies.

While training exercises and Marine Corps schools provide keen insight into unit capabilities and limitations, they rarely duplicate in duration (longer than 3 weeks) and severity (absence of immediate emergency medical facilities, logistical resupply) the
extent to which a unit in combat will be required to perform. MCCOP, by assuming a 90 day commitment in-country, would be privy to peculiar stresses and difficulties identified during the course of extended operations. If the Marine Corps establishes a global combat observer program, it could potentially acquire keen insight at the tactical-level and throughout the spectrum of conflict. Unparalleled in any other U.S. military Service, this Marine Corps program would be organized and focused to engage, educate, and evolve.


“I have a yardstick by which I test every major problem—and that yardstick is: Is it good for America?”

--- Dwight D. Eisenhower

The purpose of this section is to briefly describe how the MCCOP program could use the current framework of SA as a vehicle to initiate and pursue a dedicated combat observer program for the Marine Corps.

Briefly, SA training (SAT) is a Department of State (DoS) program that provides the vehicle with which to sell both military equipment and training to foreign governments. The program works in tandem with the Department of Defense (DoD) in order to ensure that National Security objectives and National Military objectives are in agreement. While military responsibility and focus is expressed through the regional

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combatant commanders in the form of theater engagement plans, SA is the program that often propels and sustains military-to-military contact with the individual host nations.

The Joint Security Assistance Training (JSAT) regulation of 5 July 2000 provides overarching guidance and intent for security assistance training by DoD. Specifically, the JSAT “prescribes policies, responsibilities, procedures, and administration for the education and training of international military students….”33 MCCOP is not SA, but in using portions of the SA framework, specifically referencing Chapters 13 of the JSAT “Security Assistance Teams” and Chapter 14 “Exchange Training”, in tandem, a logical formula for implementation emerges.

The development of MCCOP through the existing parameters of SA is best visualized as a program employed similar to a Mobile Training Team (MTT)—a small team deployed for a finite period of time for a specific purpose—but funded on the basis of conducting a reciprocal agreement (similar to exchange training) between the Marine Corps and the host nation. In this manner, the Marine Corps is enabled to conduct combat observation in exchange for Security Assistance training.

Implementation of MCCOP is probably best captured by using the existing parameters of exchange programs:

Unit exchanges are authorized by the addition to the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) Chapter 2C and section 30A (Exchange Training and Related Support). Under section 30A the President may provide training and related support to military and civilian defense personnel of a friendly foreign country or international organization. Such training and support will be provided by a Secretary of a Military Department (MilDep) . . . Under the agreement, the recipient foreign country will provide, on a reciprocal basis comparable training and related support [author’s italics]. Prior to entering into any agreement, the initiating authority will seek the recommendations of the regional unified commander in whose area the foreign nation is located. Generally, the

33 Joint Security Assistance Training (JSAT), Secretary of the Navy Instruction (SECNAVINST) 4950.4A, June 2000, p.i.
Secretary of a MilDep or designee is the approving authority for the exchange of units. Exchange programs of significant political and military importance or operationally sensitive exchanges will be approved by the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) 34

As SA compensation to the host nation for permitting Combat Observer participation under the parameters of Exchange Training (already referenced), the U.S. will credit the host nation’s SA account with equivalent and reciprocal cost benefits. For instance, as a result of permitting a four-man MCCOP team to observe combat operations in the Philippines at a US cost of $72,000 (four-man team, Temporary Additional Duty (TAD), hostile fire, imminent danger, per diem, for 3 months), the Philippine Marine Corps would be credited in like fashion toward their SA training and education cases currently scheduled with the U.S. Marine Corps. The host nation then, by design, would be presented an added benefit for allowing USMC combat observers in-country, increasing the likelihood that a host nation would participate in the MCCOP. The host nation would provide basic amenities for our Marines—messing, billeting, logistics, medical/dental treatment, and security—and we would provide an attractive means of creating additional Marine Corps training and education opportunities. Items of concern such as medical treatment and carrying weapons in a foreign country are annotated in the JSAT and are explicitly addressed.

The details of each particular exchange are documented in a memorandum of agreement (MOA) in which the rights and liabilities of each party are annotated. The MOA is signed by each country (U.S.-host nation) and acts as the base document for the implementation of the exchange. In the case of MCCOP, the MOA would specifically describe the unique nature of the agreement and state specific reciprocal SA training and

34 JSAT, p. 196.
education cases to be programmed for the host nation. This document would then arbitrate the cost analysis for desired host nation training with the Marine Corps, and would subsequently be scheduled at the Security Assistance Training Program Management Review (SATPMR), an annual conference hosted within respective CinC regional areas. As an example, an MCCOP team of four Marines deployed in-country for a period of 90 days would cost approximately $72,000, while the cost to send one international student to The Basic School is approximately $25,000. Therefore in exchange for one MCCOP team, the Republic of the Philippines would be credited the equivalent in education and training through SA, a sum of $72,000. In short, by permitting MCCOP, they would be awarded a credit of $72,000 (MCCOP deployment costs) with which to purchase additional training and education.

As per the JSAT, the Commanding General TECOM (CSW) is responsible for managing SA for the Marine Corps. The MOA drawn up there will define in detail the size of the MCCOP team, its purpose, duration in country, administrative and operational control, logistical support, status of forces agreements, etc. The MOA, a standard format found in the JSAT, will specifically address the above criteria defined in 14 separate articles. Special situations will be provided as appendices. MCCOP would require a separate appendix that would include Rules of Engagement (ROE), reporting procedures, host nation security responsibilities, and other combat-specific concerns to both USMC and host nation personnel.

35 “CG MCCDC will review the request, and if approved, will negotiate an international agreement with the appropriate embassy personnel in Washington DC. One agreement with a foreign country may be negotiated to cover a series of exchanges. U.S. Marine Corps signature will take place at Headquarters Marine Corps. Either the Commandant of the Marine Corps or the Assistant Commandant of the Marine
Security assistance is an effective tool by which to manage regional and global military engagement. The overall organizational precepts of DoD security assistance provide a framework with appropriate checks and balances, standards, ways and means in a strategic context, which makes it an excellent and already existing vehicle for MCCOP implementation.

MCCOP Implementation: Using the MTT Model

“Our business, like any other is to be learned by constant practice and experience; and our experience is to be had in war, not at reviews.”

---Sir John Moore.

Security assistance training teams are found under different names: mobile training teams (MTT), extended training support specialists (ETSS), and technical assistance field teams (TAFT). The team acronyms are derived from the level of technical support required to the host nation and the duration of the training. Since the MCCOP is envisioned as of relatively short duration in-country, the parameters for deployment (less than 180 days) would suggest that the MTT model be adopted. The MTT model described in the JSAT states that, “MTT’s will be requested only when no

Corps will sign the negotiated memorandum for the Marine Corps on behalf of the Secretary of the Navy. Each agreement will be reviewed annually and updated as required.” ISAT, p. 204.

other training is available to accommodate a particular training requirement."^{37} This sentence implies that if normal avenues for training the host nation within scheduled and programmed courses are unable to effectively accommodate the specific training requirements, then an MTT can be deployed. Clearly, observation of combat operations is not intended to be an MTT in the sense of providing training to a host country; however, it does strive to accommodate a particular requirement to fulfill a specifically defined situation.^{38}

MCCOP team members are purely observers and not advisors. MCCOP members are not special operations forces (SOF). They are not intended to advise, train, or fight. Rules of engagement (ROE) would presumably mirror regional CinC and DoD directives authorizing self-defense as a normal facet of force protection. However, legal processing of such requirements would be subject to scrutiny similar to that for MTTs—that based on the threat within the host nation, are authorized to carry weapons.^{39}

Another dynamic of deploying MTTs and, consequently a consideration for MCCOP teams, deployed to various regions, is its language capabilities. While language-qualified team members are ideal, global conflict knows no language parameters, training pipelines, or specified durations. Therefore, in order to implement combat observers in a timely fashion, foreign language proficiency should not be a current requirement. At one end of the spectrum, with respect to Latin American commitments, the U.S. has the luxury of a large Hispanic population and uniformed Spanish speakers are relatively easy to find. Therefore, Marines selected to support

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^{37} JSAT, p. 171.
^{38} MTTs “will not be used as an integral part of the armed forces of the country being served,” JSAT, p.171.
various commitments in the SouthCom area of responsibility are easily obtained from within our own force structure.

CentCom commitments, however, reveal quite the opposite language situation. Few Marines speak Arabic, Urdu, or Farsi, and even fewer, the languages of the Central Asian states. The point of the matter is simply a recognition that until a dedicated language requirement exists for all Marine officers, the institution is left with shortages and will have to rely on a few near-term “work-arounds.” As a viable option, the details of the MOA may specify a need for host nation interpreters, in order to facilitate detailed and thorough combat observation and recording. While a team member’s ability to learn and speak a foreign language would greatly assist his ability to ascertain an additional depth in his combat observation, the object of his observation presently outweighs this attractive but time-consuming benefit, and combat observers can carry out their mission using only English.

In summary, an MCCOP team should be deployed similar to a MTT but with the dedicated focus toward observing the host nation’s military units during conflict vice the training focus of traditional MTTs.

Team Selection

“I will prepare and someday my chance will come.”

---Abraham Lincoln

Prospective MCCOP team members would conduct predeployment training, call-up, organization and deployment with and from MCCDC-TECOM’s

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39 ISAT, p. 197.
Coalition and Special Warfare Center at Quantico, and the deployment of an MCCOP team will closely mirror that of a deploying MTT. By using the MTT model, MCCOP supports the argument for using an existing framework from which to institute the program.

On order of the Commandant of the Marine Corps, CG TECOM (CSW) will generate an official classified Naval message calling for volunteers for MCCOP service to a specific region or country in order to observe and report combat operations. A classified message infers that the correspondence is sensitive in nature and that individuals involved with the program must possess a minimum “SECRET” clearance.

The selection of an MCCOP team would be generated from CG MCCDC with CSW as the leading proponent. The justification for using CSW as the primary conduit for MCCOP selection and predeployment training is that it supports the concept of using existing capabilities to implement MCCOP. CSW already routinely assembles and trains MTTs that support SA and Counterdrug initiatives worldwide. CSW’s role in the MEU(SOC) program also enables it to establish points of contact throughout the Marine Corps from schools to the Operating Forces. Input from the operating forces would provide recommendations for potential team members. The intent of seeking the Operating Forces support is based on the assumption that the commands are in daily contact with the individual Marines and can therefore provide the most timely and relevant personnel recommendations.

Upon being recommended or nominated, each team member would be interviewed by a board of Marine officers and SNCOs assembled from MCCDC that

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Anderson, p. 22.
would consist of representatives from various organizations that would be impacted by the observation and recordings of the prospective Marine combat observers. The intent is to have representation from the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, WDID, and TECOM, (to include MCU and CSW). Eventually, the board should consist of former combat observers who have participated in the program recently. One discriminating factor evaluated by the board should be the Marine’s ability to write and communicate, since that is key in maximizing the benefit of personal observations. The Director CSW will forward the board’s recommendation to CG TECOM for recommended duty and subsequent permanent change of station (PCS) assignment to MCCDC where the tour of duty shall be for a period of not less than 36 months. The primary justification for a three-year tour of duty is that the physical presence of MCCOP Marines aboard Quantico following their tour will enrich the combat development and professional military education process for an entire tour of duty. This is significantly different from MTT’s that assemble for temporary duties and then usually disband and return to their parent units once the mission has been completed.

CSW via MCCDC and TECOM will conduct direct liaison authority with MMOA [officer assignments] and MMEA [enlisted assignments] to coordinate this special program. While the potential for creating a combat observer MOS is an option, at a minimum, a database should be organized by Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&RA) to track MCCOP participants. The impact on total force structure (TFS), although potentially varied, will require a minimum of four majors, four captains, four gunnery sergeants and four master sergeants/ first sergeants. The amount of officers and Staff NCOs recommended for this program is a minimum of 16 (eight officers and eight
MCCOP is designed to accommodate a post Operating Forces tour to insure team members are current and familiar with USMC operational capabilities, limitations, concepts and issues. The MCCOP team would deploy as a four-man team consisting of: one major, one captain, one first/master sergeant, and one gunnery sergeant. While this number may ebb and flow depending on CG MCCDC and CMC guidance, as previously stated, a minimum of eight officers and eight SNCOs should be dedicated in planning to observe four simultaneous conflicts around the world.

The specific rank structure is recommended to reflect both expected and proven experience as well as professional subject matter expertise in their specific MOS. While the term combat observer implies MOS’s of primarily a combat arms nature, specifically targeted areas of interest may require that specialty MOS’s be employed. For example, if the conflict to be observed involves the use of chemical weapons, or the concern is combat service support and medical treatment at high altitudes, then surely the program would adjust to special situations and higher headquarters’ intent. In an effort to prevent further impact on the TFS, one option may include providing specialty training for team members from respective subject matter experts (SME) during their predeployment training phase. The team selection process envisions prospective MCCOP team members to be scrutinized at three levels. First they must have the endorsement of their command.
Secondly, they must be interviewed and recommended by the MCCOP selection board. Finally they must successfully complete predeployment training.

Team Requirements and Pre-deployment Training

“For of those to whom much is given, much is required.”

--- John F. Kennedy

Since the purpose of this program is to observe combat operations, the individual team members must be able to function in austere and dangerous environments. Therefore, current health and physical fitness standards must be verified. Team members would be expected to be physically and mentally qualified with a minimum 1st class physical fitness test (PFT) and a General Competency Test (GCT) of 110. Medical and dental screening would be similar to jump/dive school screening physicals. Past injuries may prove to be discriminating factors and thus current health screening is mandatory.

A current U.S. diplomatic passport and U.S. Government credit card will also be required prior to reporting. While this requirement is not standard for traditional MTTs, the nature of the combat observer’s mission and his proximity to ongoing combat operations drives the recommendation that a diplomatic passport be issued vice an official passport. The unique specifications documented in the MOA, the close working relationship between the defense attaché and the MCCOP team, highlighting the incumbent DoS-DoD working relationship required for this program, strengthens the case for diplomatic passport authority. The possession of a diplomatic passport elevates the international understanding of the MCCOP team member as a significant member of the

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41 Anderson, p. 87.
U.S. government operating in an official capacity, and provides an additional level of personal security.

Once identified, team members will have 90 days in which to report to CG MCCDC Quantico, for PCS as part of the MCCOP program. Ninety days will allow the Marine and his family minimal but adequate time to prepare, move and acclimate to Quantico prior to the deployment. Upon reporting to CG MCCDC, MCCOP team members would assemble for predeployment training at CSW. The newly assembled team would undergo one week of orientation training in which they would become familiar with the selected region and country. Week two would constitute a predeployment site survey (PDSS) in-country, in which the team members, accompanied by a CSW regional officer, would be introduced to the U.S. Embassy country team and their host nation unit sponsors. The PDSS will commence and conclude with briefs to the U.S. Ambassador and his country team, and will also include specific briefings from the defense attache (DATT). The PDSS is designed to give all four team members a base of situational awareness and an appreciation for terrain, weather, and specifically the host nation military unit with which they will deploy. US Embassy expectations, as well as restrictions and constraints not included in the MOA, will also be addressed during the PDSS, which is expected to last 7 to 9 days.

Upon return to CONUS, the team will report to MCCDC for follow-on training. The predeployment training package, managed by CSW, will consist of a 4 week package designed to provide team members with rudimentary skills required to help them survive in high-threat environments. This training will reinforce the team members’
skills, increase situational awareness and enhance their force protection abilities. The package is designed as follows:

(1) One week shooting course: High Risk Personnel (HRP), Quantico, VA. HRP consists of live fire training scenarios for personnel who deploy to high-threat areas. The course focuses on handgun employment, near and far engagements, and reacting to ambush as well as night firing techniques. Students will fire approximately 3,000 rounds of small arms ammunition.

(2) Evasive Driving Course (Bill Scott Raceway) BSR, Winchester, VA. This course lasts 1 week and enables the student to conduct evasive driving at high rates of speed, conduct counter surveillance maneuvers in a vehicle, bomb searches and similar related driving “survival techniques” such as “J-TURNS” and “threshold breaking.” The result is a responsive, alert and capable team member.

(3) Crucible Security Systems, Fredericksburg, VA. This is a self-defense course organized by former Marines and special operations personnel. It is similar to the new (2000) USMC close-combat course of instruction and lasts 1 week. It provides the team member with resident and refreshing close combat skills in a period of one week, with an emphasis on quick decisive response and mental alertness.

(4) Weapons Orientation Course- MCCDC-Quantico, VA. This course is designed to refresh the team members with U.S. and foreign weapons indigenous to their region. This course lasts 1 week and includes field firing, assembly/disassembly, weapons function and employment, and field craft skills specific to the region. This course is designed to provide and refresh basic knowledge, capabilities, limitations, care and maintenance of the weapons he will be required to report on. The intent of this course
is to understand the weapons systems team members will be evaluating during their combat observation. It is therefore important for him to be able to articulate how, when, and why the weapons were effective/ineffective with respect to combat conditions. As an example, if the MCCOP team member records several weapons malfunctions by the host nation during cold weather operations, he may be able to determine, as a result of his training, that it was neglect of applying cold weather lubricant and not a flaw in the particular weapon which caused the malfunction.

(5) Administration and logistics, MCCDC Quantico. The final phase will include administrative concerns such as pay and allowances, fitness reports, administrative control (ADCON)/operational control (OPCON) relationships, record books, official combat observation reporting requirements/formats, and final country briefs. As part of this final phase of predeployment training team members will receive several hours of combat aidman (first aid) training to ensure they are familiar with basic life saving steps and have had practical application with administering intravenous lactated ringers (I.V.s).

Although the deployment of the MCCOP teams is of a relatively short duration (90 days), it is imperative that the individual team members have updated their records of emergency data (RED), initiated powers of attorney and updated their wills. Because the potential of injury or death is higher in this program, all administrative affairs must be deliberately placed in order.

Finally, the MCCOP team will deploy at or about 30 days after conducting the PDSS. TECOM (CSW) will maintain ADCON, while OPCON will be the function of the unified combatant commander (regional CinC) through the USMC component, with a supporting function from the DoS in the form of the DATT in-country. The DATT will
maintain situational awareness of operational control through frequent communication and liaison with the host nation military and target unit to which the MCCOP team is assigned. In short, the team leader will be required to maintain communications with the U.S. Embassy or an appointed representative during combat observation missions. By using a specified reporting chain the status of MCCOP team members will be monitored, while an established reporting and communications plan will allow the DATT to pass pertinent information to the team on such issues as force protection or specifications for emergency evacuation (which may addressed in the MOA as part a host nation responsibility). On the other hand, such a communications plan will allow the team to issue routine information, such as position reports or situation reports, and promote general situational awareness.

**MCCOP Deployment: Complementing the Role of the Defense Attaché Through Regional Combat Observation.**

“We must stay abreast of the process of change for the belligerent who first exploits a development in the art and science of war gains a significant advantage. If we are ignorant of the changing face of war, we will find ourselves unequal to its challenges.”

--- MCDP-1 Warfighting

The purpose of this section is to present MCCOP as complementary program which supports not only the Marine Corps, but also promotes the situational awareness and fosters bi-lateral engagement between the DATT and the host nation(s) under his cognizance.

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42 MCDP-1 Warfighting, p. 17.
A quick glimpse at the past roles and missions of defense attachés reveals that their original purpose was primarily an observation and intelligence gathering function, with significant emphasis on observing combat operations. Over time, the military attaché became less of a combat observer and more of an intelligence gatherer and military diplomat. According to one scholar:

Attaches in war and peace provided their home governments with the broadest form of strategic intelligence. Though their reports during wartime treated both the strategic and tactical performance of the armies under observation, . . . they enabled their armies to form complete pictures of the structure, equipment, personnel, and behavior of foreign militaries over time.\textsuperscript{43}

When the United States first sent its military attaches abroad in 1889, they performed several functions ranging from combat observations to intelligence gathering and fostering military-to-military relationships.\textsuperscript{44} When conflict arose, attaches often employed the services of additional observers or Service-specific observers tasked with observing combat operations. While the historical contributions and involvement of military combat observers was discussed previously, it is important to mention here the relationship between the defense attaché and the combat observer. Situationally dependant, the role and mission may be one in the same when addressing small-scale incidents and conflicts. However, today the defense attaché is responsible for a myriad of military-to-military requirements spanning the spectrum from engagement to intelligence.

In the wake of the Cold War, U.S. attachés continue to seek a balance between providing information and the recent National Security Strategy of engagement. In short, the attaché’s plate today is already full. While he continues to play a critical role, his

future contributions may be directed more toward engagement and concerted efforts to build military–to-military relationships designed to facilitate future coalitions and to promote regional stability. However, prudent and pragmatic advocates of “warfighting” recognize that direct and dedicated combat observation of countries in conflict is a full time duty in itself.

The opportunities to enhance the critical role of defense attachés at U.S. diplomatic missions around the world, especially at locations where conflict has broken out, are essential to the evolution of warfighting. The Marine Corps, with its forward presence and professionalism, in the form of our Marine Security Guard Detachments (MSG Dets), established and respected at embassies and consulates worldwide, promote the reputation of Marines and would assist in the establishment of MCCOP.

Both downsizing within our own DoD and the advent of new independent countries such as the Central Asian states have left defense attachés offices undermanned and many times overtasked—as some DATT’s are responsible for more than one country! I believe the DATT would welcome a program such as MCCOP because although such a program would assume a substantial amount of risk to U.S. personnel, the benefits of detailed information and grass roots engagement, as well as timely and accurate host nation assessment, would greatly outweigh the associated costs and risks. Similarly, the DATT could assist in facilitating the assignment of the MCCOP teams to their host nation units and, more importantly, in securing the initial MOA between the U.S. and the host nation, that would legally enable the participation of MCCOP teams.

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44 O’Connor, p. 425,426.
In accordance with the MOA, the MCCOP team leader would use a communications and reporting chain rearward through the DATT and extend the courtesy of host nation censorship regarding security concerns. The opportunity for the host nation unit to screen the MCCOP reports to insure that their own operational security is not compromised is extremely important and further promotes the trust between MCCOP and the host nation unit, not to mention between the DATT and the host nation. The support role of the DATT is envisioned to remain a military-diplomatic one, with most logistical and security requirements to be levied on the host nation. The exception with security support required from the DATT would potentially be that of contingency extraction of the MCCOP team in extremis. Logistically, the team would depend on the host nation unit for basic sustenance, but technical support (extra radios, batteries, night vision devices) would be pre-staged with the DATT—with temporary custody performed by the MSG Det. resident at the particular embassy or consulate.

Intelligence sharing would be a functional relationship between the MCCOP team and the DATT, and would in part satisfy the attaché’s charter to gather current and accurate information. The reporting sequence and procedures would follow general lines of command and control extending from the MCCOP team in the field to the DATT, the CinC and the respective Marine Forces (MarFor) component commander. In-calls, country team briefs, and out-calls with the Ambassador and his representatives would also follow ingress and egress protocol.

In conclusion, the role of the defense attaché has changed. Currently, the shortfall described between DATT responsibilities and their ability to observe host nation combat
operations highlights the need for a concept like MCCOP, in which dedicated military
observers carry out this mission with the defense attaché in a supporting role.

MCCOP AND MCCDC: Ushers of Future Warfighting.

“Doctrine establishes a particular way of thinking about war and a way of
fighting.”

---MCDP-1 Warfighting

The predeployment training package, the actual deployment, and the initial return
requirements previously listed for an MCCOP mission will require a period of roughly
twelve months out of a 3-year PCS tour. For the remaining 2 years, MCCOP returnees
would be assigned to CG MCCDC and then to CG TECOM for service in MCU as
instructors, where they would serve to motivate, teach and enrich the professional
development of students, peers, and superiors alike.

This section traces the linkage and process between the combat observer and
combat development once the team has completed its mission. Specifically, it describes
in detail how the process works and what entities are responsible for developing data into
document or “good ideas,” and applying this to functional areas within the Marine Corps
Combat Development Command. Additionally, this section will briefly highlight a
Marine Corps historical case and compare it to our current combat development process.
The comparison will trace this process beginning with the combat observation of Marines
like then 1st Lt. Victor Krulak and culminate in the combat development of the Higgins
boat.

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45 MCDP-1 Warfighting, p. 56.
The return of Marines from observing combat operations will immediately generate a thirst for knowledge from Marine Corps PME institutions. The focus in the initial phase, upon the return of the observers, will be to assimilate and promulgate their experiences within the Marine Corps University and in support of Training and Education Command. For a period of approximately 3 months, MCCOP team members will conduct presentations and lectures to selected commands, schools and organizations determined by the CG TECOM, in order to share their recent experiences with the Marine Corps. Three months is recommended in order to provide team members with time to take leave, organize formal presentations, and travel to Marine installations to share their experiences.

Following the lecture circuit, the team will present their findings to CG MCCDC and a board of MCCDC representatives in order to determine appropriate action for integrating lessons learned into the Marine Corps combat development process.

The MCCOP reports will be integrated within the standing structure of the Marine Corps combat development process by submitting a universal needs statement (UNS) to CG MCCDC. The submission of a UNS—a narrative of lessons learned formulated with conclusions and recommendations—will formally initiate the process as prescribed by CMC/CG MCCDC. The UNS then undergoes initial review by the Assessment Branch, which within the framework of a DOTMLPF (doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, people and facilities) structure, reviews the UNS and endorses the proposal for further study.

The next step involves the Studies and Analysis Division (S&A), which conducts analysis of the UNS and compares it with “respect to future capabilities described in
planning, analysis and implementation documents under their configuration management such as the USMC vision roadmap or mission area analysis (MAA).”  

Once blessed by S&A, the information is then forwarded for detailed scrutiny by an Assessment Branch DOTMLPF Working Group (DWG), which breaks the UNS into the DOTMLPF components. According to standing guidance, “This process helps frame the contents of the UNS in preparation for development of proposed solution courses of action (COAs) by the DWG.”  

The COA development and solution process also involves the originator of the UNS (that is, the MCCOP authors) as part of the DWG.

In the fourth step, the DWG conducts a final detailed and specific study that recommends further changes in any of the DOTMLPF categories. The recommendations may encompass doctrinal changes, materiel purchases, personnel increases or reductions, etc. The fifth and final step of this process is the formal submission of a solution planning directive (SDP) to the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps (ACMC) for validation and funding.

The DWG would enable the critical synthesis of the UNS from MCCOP’s observations and push it through detailed scrutiny by MCCDC organizations in order to determine the specific relevance and possible contributions of each entity in the combat development process associated with the combat observations. These organizations may include, but are not limited to, the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab for future experimentation, the Office of Science and Innovation (to catalogue specific items of

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47 Ibid.

48 Ibid.
interest, capabilities, and weapons systems), Warfighting Doctrine and Integration
Division (to determine the application and or changes to particular tactics, techniques, and procedures which may require an adjustment to current doctrine), and may also include the Studies and Analysis Division for consideration of additional research requirements (to determine if additional observation and information is required to make the proposed changes). Finally, the Marine Corps Systems Command (MarCorSysCom) would be involved in order to provide situational awareness and recommendations for future equipment development and purchasing. The integration of MarCorSysCom into the MCCOP loop is important for an additional reason. Based on the combat observations of host nation militaries, recommendations for future foreign military sales (FMS) could also be adjusted and pursued. MCCOP involvement in the combat development process enables team members to participate in the DWG as the authors of the original documentation (UNS) and in the subsequent evaluation process which follows.

This process resembles a less formal but institutionalized combat development process similar to that of the interwar years, which began with the publication of Pete Ellis’s *Advance Base Operations in Micronesia* (an initiating document compared to a UNS). Following in the spirit of combat observation, the Japanese amphibious landings on the Yangtze River, as observed in 1937-38 by then 1st Lt. Krulak, represent a likeness to the current MCCOP concept. Krulak’s reports, which included photographs and specific details_measurements of over seven different types of amphibious craft, were submitted and used by the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico.
Similar reports were then shared as PME to students, as evidenced by Captain C. C. Brown’s 25 April 1938 lecture to Marine Corps Schools at Quantico. This fact illustrates the linkage between information acquired through combat observation and the application of lessons learned in the education of Marines.

Furthermore, the extensive experimentation with landing craft both at Quantico and during Fleet exercises at Culebra resemble the likes of today’s Warfighting Lab, which intended to verify the tenets described in Ellis’ *Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia*. Follow-on actions focused to transform the assimilated information and lessons learned into a useable document for amphibious doctrine (similar to present-day WDID) in the form of the *Tentative Manual for Landing Operations*. Finally, the culmination of the Marine Corps experimentation and doctrine development was realized in the materiel development of a combat system—the Higgins boat (representative of outside contractor support and the modern day functions of MarCorSysCom).

The association of this historical case to the current process is designed to emphasize the existence of a systematic approach to combat development, and the focused initiative of individuals, dedicated to education and the evolution of warfighting. The endstate of MCCOP is the refinement of raw battlefield data, shared in the confines of the schoolhouse and evaluated and scrutinized by an institution known for its innovation and dedication toward improving the warfighter.

**Conclusion**

“. . . the road to transformation begins with a strong program of education and leader development. This will provide the underpinning for experimentation with new
In the course of this paper, I have attempted to show two things: that there exists both an historical precedent and a present need for the observation and reporting of war in the 21st Century. Based on archival documents that chronicled past Marine Corps efforts, and weighing the effects of post Cold War shortfalls, I have identified a plan to reintroduce and implement a combat observer program. In particular, one possible avenue of approach, as I have suggested, is through the framework of security assistance. Based on the MTT model, MCCOP could be nurtured and molded into a unique and effective program, benefiting both the host nation and the United States Marine Corps.

Presently, conflict around the world continues to go unrecorded and unincorporated into either a consistent and dedicated professional military education or combat development program. This phenomenon exposes a critical vulnerability in our warfighting ethos. If improvement through technology continues to drive the train of combat development and experimentation and exercises substitute the recording of actual combat, then the cost in lives may prove to be a consequential alternative.

The advent of a combat observer program is able, by its very nature, to maintain a pulse on host nations and conflicts worldwide. The benefits of host nation engagement, contributions to regional security, and the concerted effort to learn from others in conflict support the argument for such a program. Through a focused combat observer program, the U.S. is less likely to be deceived, surprised, or exploited by the employment of new ideas, equipment, and doctrine that will lead a transformed US military fully prepared for emerging threats.”

---General Henry H. Shelton

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weapons systems and/or the combinations of tactics, techniques, procedures, and methods that are currently being successfully “tested” or employed in unobserved conflicts around the world.

This proposal comes at a time when the execution of the global war on terror is still in its infancy. The President of the United States has declared that the war will be protracted and that conceivably it will be executed in many a clime and place in an effort to “eliminate international terror organizations and those countries who support them.”

The introduction of MCCOP, in support of national policy is especially applicable in a war that will be fought in several environments, and will support the present, as well as future, wars. An established combat observer program, such as MCCOP would be, would provide a baseline organization with established standards, minimal footprints, and a template from which to “surge” or enable additional observation/assessment teams to conduct specific missions as future requirements arise.

Ultimately, an MCCOP program is designed to watch and learn across the spectrum of warfare wherever and whenever it occurs. In concert with diplomatic efforts and anticipated future military action, MCCOP will enable and encourage both engagement and enlargement, and will become a transformational bridge between our old National Military Strategy tenets of “Shape, Respond and Prepare Now” and whatever future derivation may evolve. MCCOP is a harbinger for the future of Marine Corps combat development and the future of Marine Corps warfighting, as it is intended to

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create a dedicated linkage between the battlefield, the classroom and the combat development process. Experience is the best teacher. Pertinent in peace or war, the Marine Corps should aggressively embrace a Marine Corps Combat Observer Program, as it typifies a Marine Corps tradition founded in the interwar years, hallmarked by Marines such as Pete Ellis, Evans Carlson, and Victor Krulak—a tradition based on the premise that ideas and innovations are vital to the survival of both our Corps and our country. Indeed, we would become the “Messengers of Warfighting in the 21st Century.”

WORKS CITED


Joint Security Assistance Training (JSAT), Secretary of the Navy Instruction (SECNAVINST) 4950.4A, June 2000.


Pratt, Colonel Andrew “Nick” USMC (retired). Lecture on his experiences during the Soviet-Afghan War to Command and Staff College, Quantico, VA, 7 October 2001.


Dr. Phyllis Zimmerman, lecture on Carlson's Raiders. Ball State University, 10 April 1992, Historical Amphibious File (HAF) 279. US Marine Corps Archives.


**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


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Pratt, Colonel Nick USMC (retired). Lecture on his experiences during the Soviet-Afghan War to Command and Staff College, Quantico, VA, 7 October 2001.


US Marine Corps Archives. LtCol. Evans Carlson’s, Reports from observations with the Chinese Red Army 1937-1938, Historical Amphibious File (HAF) PC3030.


US Marine Corps Archives. Dr. Phyllis Zimmerman’s, lecture on Carlson’s Raiders. Ball State University, 10 April 1992, Historical Amphibious File (HAF) 279.

The Concept Based Requirements Process (CBRP) is the primary means of entry into the CBRP, the UNS acts as a “work request” for current and future capabilities. The UNS identifies operational enhancement opportunities and deficiencies in capabilities. Opportunities include new capabilities, improvements to existing capabilities, and elimination of redundant or unneeded capabilities. “Universal” highlights the form’s common use for capturing both current needs and future needs developed through analysis, assessment, and experimentation with future warfighting concepts.

### UNS Routing and Status

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<td>Assessment Br and DWG conduct DOTES Categorization</td>
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The completed Universal Need Statement is the most important information component in the Concept Based Requirements Process (CBRP). As the primary means of entry into the CBRP, the UNS acts as a “work request” for current and future capabilities. The UNS identifies operational enhancement opportunities and deficiencies in capabilities. Opportunities include new capabilities, improvements to existing capabilities, and elimination of redundant or unneeded capabilities. “Universal” highlights its common use by any Marine Corps organization to capture both current and future needs developed through analysis, assessment, and experimentation with future warfighting concepts.

### The Concept Based Requirements Process Process UNS

The assets for resolving UNS needs are segmented into five components: Doctrine, Organization, Training & Education, Equipment, and Support & Facilities. Referred to as the pillars of DOTES, each of these components is “task organized” by DOTES categories. It is essential that the UNS be framed in this same context. Therefore during “DOTES Categorization”, MCCDC Assessment Branch breaks out the components of the UNS deficiency or opportunity using DOTES. In this way, the UNS is readied for further assessment and discussion by the DOTES WG.

**Purpose of UNS**

The completed Universal Need Statement is the most important information component in the Concept Based Requirements Process (CBRP). As the primary means of entry into the CBRP, the UNS acts as a “work request” for current and future capabilities. The UNS identifies operational enhancement opportunities and deficiencies in capabilities. Opportunities include new capabilities, improvements to existing capabilities, and elimination of redundant or unneeded capabilities. “Universal” highlights its common use by any Marine Corps organization to capture both current and future needs developed through analysis, assessment, and experimentation with future warfighting concepts.
PURPOSE
The completed Universal Need Statement is the most important information component in the Concept Based Requirements Process (CBRP). As the primary means of entry into the CBRP, the UNS acts as a "work request" for current and future capabilities. The UNS identifies operational enhancement opportunities and deficiencies in capabilities. Opportunities include new capabilities, improvements to existing capabilities, and elimination of redundant or unneeded capabilities. "Universal" highlights its common use by any Marine Corps organization to capture both current needs and future needs developed through analysis, assessment, and experimentation with future warfighting concepts.

Originator

Name (Last, First, Initial)  
Alexander, Kelly P.

Rank/Grade Major

Phone 703-784-3330

FAX 703-784-2534

E-mail alexanderkp@tecom.usmc.mil

RUC 30010

Type of Need (select one that best describes the need)

ADD a new capability that does not exist

IMPROVE or FIX an existing capability

REMOVE an existing capability

Description of Need
Describe the nature of the need and the cause (if known). Explain how the need was identified (operational deployment, training exercise, experimentation, formal study, mission area analysis, observed operating deficiencies).

In order to remain a relevant and evolving Warfighting organization during the 21st Century, the United States Marine Corps needs to adopt a dedicated combat observer program that links battlefield lessons learned with Professional Military Education and ultimately combat development. This program is a catalyst for change and a response to the paradigm shift in America’s new global War on Terror and beyond. This need was identified from a combination of researching formal studies, mission area analyses, observed operating deficiencies and operational deployments.

When Needed

URGENT  6 Months  1 Year  2 Years  5 Years  10 Years  Other (date) TBD

Rationale Describe why the need requires resolution in timeframe selected (e.g., safety issues, Congressional mandate, etc.)

This UNS supports the development and design of a Marine Corps Combat Observer Program (MCCOP). The MCCOP is designed to deploy teams of Officers and Staff Non-Commissioned Officers (SNCOs) to regional areas in which armed conflict is occurring. It is designed to support the National Security Strategy, the National Military Strategy and the Combatant CINCs’ Theater Engagement Plan (TEP). Operating within a framework similar to the successful architecture of the Department of State’s Security Assistance Program, (a Congressionally mandated program) responsible for engaging and training foreign countries, MCCOP will benefit the host nation, the United States Marine Corps and the regional Combatant Commanders. The program labors to record in peacetime or in wartime, the combat applications from a variety of nations and regions engaged in armed conflict.

In concept, the Officer/SNCO teams will deploy to observe combat operations at the tactical level (Brigade and below) in order to record, evaluate and document current tactics, techniques, procedures and methods within respective geographic regions. Upon completion the teams will return to the continental United States (CONUS) for duty at Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) Quantico, Virginia. Their experience, lessons learned from evaluating tactics, techniques, and procedures, will be evaluated, refined, and assessed. In concept, their experiences will be shared and processed through a variety of education, training, and combat development venues. From Professional Military Educational (PME) lectures at Marine Corps University, and further experimentation by the Warfighting Lab to the
Enclosure (1)
UNIVERSAL NEED STATEMENT (UNS) cont’d.

Warfighting Doctrine and Integration Division (WDID), the MCCOP program is designed to create a dedicated linkage between the battlefield, the classroom, and the combat development process so that the Marine Corps can refine and further develop tactics, techniques, procedures and methods that may improve doctrine and potentially develop new combat systems. This program may also have merit as the Marine Corps begins to commit forces to the US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) arena and become eligible for their dedicated (MFP 11) funding. Such a program initiated by the Marine Corps, shared with SOCOM, and developed by MCCDC could have long-range positive and transformational implications for our Corps and our nation.

Part 1a of 5 - Originator’s Request

Describe mission or task to be accomplished that is related to the need.


How does the need improve your ability to perform the mission or task?

1. This program will provide the Marine Corps relevant and updated validation of current combat tactics, techniques, procedures (TTPs), and methods being used around the world. It also provides an opportunity to experiment and refine doctrine based on first-hand combat observation as seen by Marine Officers and SNCOs—vice second-hand information or experimentation through purely exercise or simulated means. This program reflects a dedicated vehicle that intends to observe and record conflict, wherever and whenever it is occurring. This concept is one recommendation to aid in the evolution and transformation of Marine Corps Warfighting capabilities in the 21st Century.

If the need is not satisfied, how will it effect your ability to perform the mission or task?

If this need is not satisfied, it allows combat around the world to go unrecorded. Consequently it allows future and emerging threats to perfect their TTPs and methods without our knowledge. We will then fail to understand their centers of gravity, while they analyze our critical vulnerabilities and therefore adversely affect our Marines on the ground, in the air, or at sea. It is incumbent upon the Marine Corps to pursue a combat observer program in order to permit comprehensive combat development.

Approval Authority (General Officer level)

Office (symbol) Commanding General, Marine Corps University

Mailing Address 2076 South Street
Quantico, VA 22134-5096

Name of Approval Authority (Last, First, Initial) Hendrickson, Leif H.

Rank/Grade BGen

Phone 703-784-2105

FAX 703-784-2793

E-mail hendricksonlh@tecom.usmc.mil

Date Received

Date Fw’d to Assessment Br, MCCDC

Approval Authority Comments (optional)

UNIVERSAL NEED STATEMENT (UNS) Parts 1b & 1c of 5 - Originator’s Request

MCCDC 1001 (Rev 1-01, 26 Dec 2000) Part 1 – Page 3 of 4
Part 1b of 5 – MCCDC Assessment Branch Review

**Advocate Involvement:**

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**UNS Review**

Review programs and initiatives currently in the Combat Development Tracking System (CDTS) to determine if the UNS is a new initiative, related to current CDTS initiatives, or redundant (already addressed by CDTS initiative(s)). When appropriate, review should include S&T initiatives.

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**Part 1c of 5 – Advocate Endorsement**

**For use by Lead Advocate**

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**Advocate Decision to Continue UNS Processing**

CONCUR as written. The UNS is approved for further processing by MCCDC.

CONCUR as modified by comments. The UNS, as modified by Advocate comments, is approved for further processing by MCCDC.

NON-CONCUR. Rationale is provided in Advocate comments. The UNS shall be returned to Originator and a copy forwarded to MCCDC Assessments Branch.

OTHER. Explained in Advocate comments.

Comments shall address Part 1b review. Modifying comments may address the description of need, the requested timeframe, the mission/task, and benefits and risk. Comments shall include policy implications, relative prioritization of the UNS, and dissenting comments from any supporting Advocates.
### MCCDC S&A Division POC

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### Review of UNS with respect to its relationship to the USMC Vision Roadmap

Comment whether the UNS topic is related to any of the topics & pacing items in the Vision Roadmap. If found, describe specifics of the relationship, to include a comparison of the timeframe requested in the UNS and that described in the Roadmap.

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### Review of UNS with respect to MAA

Comment whether the UNS topic is related to a Mission Area Analysis. If found, describe specifics of the relationship, to include a comparison of related needs and the timeframe requested in the UNS and that described in the MAA.

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**UNIVERSAL NEED STATEMENT (UNS)**

**Parts 3 of 5 - DOTES Categorization**

**PURPOSE**

The assets for resolving UNS needs are segmented into five components: Doctrine, Organization, Training & Education, Equipment, and Support & Facilities. Referred to as the pillars of DOTES, each of these components are “assigned” to organizations for need resolution as part of the CBRP.

Because the solution resources are “task organized” by DOTES categories, it is essential that the UNS be framed in this same context. Therefore during “DOTES Categorization”, MCCDC Assessment Branch breaks out the components of the UNS deficiency or opportunity using DOTES. In this way, the UNS is readied for further processing by the DWG within the CBRP.

**MCCDC Assessment Branch POC**

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<td>E difficult to operate</td>
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<td>E needs increased capability</td>
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<td>E quantity incorrect</td>
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<tr>
<td>E distribution incorrect</td>
<td>E not interoperable with Joint</td>
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<tr>
<td>E capability deficient</td>
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<tr>
<td>E needs modification</td>
<td>E UNSAFE</td>
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<td>Other (explain)</td>
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**Support & Facilities Component**

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<td>S involves OOL services</td>
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<td>S involves MCOS services</td>
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<td>S capability deficient</td>
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<td>S needs increased capability</td>
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<td>S involves SAFETY</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other (explain)</td>
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</table>

**Summary**

Restate the need in terms of its DOTES components.

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**MCCDC 1001 (Rev 1-01, 26 Dec 2000)**
PURPOSE
MCCDC Assessment Branch develops Solution Course(s) of Action (COA) for UNS with the help of DOTES SMEs via DWG (that may include the UNS Originator). Each UNS will include a Non-materiel COA #1 in fulfillment of both DoD 5000 and SECNAVINST 5000 guidance. Each COA will present an integrated approach addressing all pertinent pillars of DOTES. Page 7 of Part 4 provides the recommended Solution COA and rationale for its selection. A Part 4a in created for each COA associated with the need. Only one Part 4b is used.

MCCDC Assessment Branch POC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Action Officer</th>
<th>Name of Branch Head</th>
<th>Date UNS Received</th>
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COA #1 – Non-materiel

COA #1 Summary

Describe the extent to which the COA resolves the need. Comment on resource availability and feasibility (personnel, materiel, funding). Comment on COA acceptability (is the cost affordable? Is it worth the cost in terms of possible losses?) Describe potential losses in terms of time, materiel, political implications, and impact of incorrect perceptions.

DOT_S Contribution to Solution COA

DOT_S Component contributions to the Solution COA shall describe the nature of their contribution, the degree of resolution it offers, and identify the specific portion of Part 3's DOTES Categorization that it addresses. Estimate of Supportability shall describe anticipated resources required (personnel, time, funding) and the availability of those resources in the required timeframe described in Part 1c. Resources unavailable shall be adequately described to enable the Solution COA decision-maker to take necessary action if selected to secure necessary support.

Doctrine

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Description

Estimate of Supportability

Organization

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Description

Estimate of Supportability

MCCDC 1001 (Rev 1-01, 26 Dec 2000)
### COA #1 – Non-materiel

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COA #2

COA #2 Summary

Describe the extent to which the COA resolves the need. Comment on resource availability and feasibility (personnel, materiel, funding). Comment on COA acceptability (Is the cost affordable? Is it worth the cost in terms of possible losses?) Describe potential losses in terms of time, materiel, political implications, and impact of incorrect perceptions.

DOTES Contribution to Solution COA

DOTES Component contributions to the Solution COA shall describe the nature of their contribution, the degree of resolution it offers, and identify the specific portion of Part 3’s DOTES Categorization that it addresses. Estimate of Supportability shall describe anticipated resources required (personnel, time, funding) and the availability of those resources in the required timeframe described in Part 1c. Resources unavailable shall be adequately described to enable the Solution COA decision-maker to take necessary action if selected to secure necessary support.

Doctrine

Description

Estimate of Supportability

Organization

Description

Estimate of Supportability
COA #2

### Training & Education

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**Description**

**Estimate of Supportability**

### Equipment

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**Description**

**Estimate of Supportability**
COA #3

**COA #3 Summary**

Describe the extent to which the COA resolves the need. Comment on resource availability and feasibility (personnel, materiel, funding). Comment on COA acceptability (Is the cost affordable? Is it worth the cost in terms of possible losses?) Describe potential losses in terms of time, materiel, political implications, and impact of incorrect perceptions.

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**Description**

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**Estimate of Supportability**

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## COA #3

### Training & Education

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**Description**

**Estimate of Supportability**
**UNIVERSAL NEED STATEMENT (UNS)**

**Parts 4b of 5 - Solution COA Recommendation**

---

**Solution COA Recommendation to lead advocate**

For use by DCG for Combat Development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COA Selected</th>
<th>As written</th>
<th>As modified</th>
<th>Date</th>
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Rationale (and modification if required):

Title:
The Solution Planning Directive documents the results of the Solution COA selection process. Processed by the appropriate Decision Authority, the SPD provides specific and integrated tasking for the components of DOTES based on the approved COA. In addition, issues identified in the COA Estimates of Supportability are resolved to the extent required for resolution of the UNS.

**Decision Authority**
- MROC
- MRB
- Advocate
- Other

**Solution COA Decision**
- CONCUR. Recommended Solution COA is approved for further processing by MCCDC.
- NON-CONCUR. Rationale is provided in comments. The UNS shall be returned to the Lead Advocate and a copy forwarded to MCCDC Assessment Branch.
- CONCUR as modified by comments. Modified Solution COA is approved for further processing by MCCDC.
- OTHER. Explained in comments.

**Doctrine**
- Specific Tasking

**Resolution to Supportability Issue(s)**

**Organization**
- Specific Tasking

**Resolution to Supportability Issue(s)**
Solution COA Decision

### Training & Education

<table>
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### Equipment

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