

# **Preparation of Leaders to Make Decisions in Peacekeeping Operations**

**A Monograph  
by  
MAJ Michael F. Pappal  
United States Army**



**School of Advanced Military Studies  
United States Army Command and General Staff College  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas  
AY 01-02**

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

MAJ Michael F. Pappal

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Approved by:

\_\_\_\_\_  
Gregory Fontenot, COL(ret)

Monograph Director

\_\_\_\_\_  
Robert H. Berlin, Ph.D.

Professor and Director  
Academic Affairs,  
School of Advanced  
Military Studies

\_\_\_\_\_  
Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

Director, Graduate Degree  
Program

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## **Abstract**

PREPARATION OF LEADERS TO MAKE DECISIONS IN A PEACEKEEPING ENVIRONMENT by MAJ Michael F. Pappal, United States Army, 81 pages.

The transformation of the United States Army to the concepts of the Objective Force brings to question many of the Army's current operational policies and methods. One such area is the way in which the Army prepares for operations. Current unit preparation for an operation uses alert, train, and deploy as a model with a focus on combat operations and preparation for other aspects of the spectrum occurring after alerted for that specific mission. Objective force concepts use a 'Train, Alert, and Deploy' model under the precept that units remain prepared to operate on a moments notice in any environment on the full spectrum of operations.

Decision-making is central to the United States Army leader. The essence of effective leadership is to make and communicate sound decisions. It is essential for the Army to produce leaders that can make effective decisions in a timely manner by using naturalistic decision-making processes such as Recognition Primed Decision-making (RPD) instead of the timely analytical method of the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP). However, this type of decision-making requires a substantial investment in time for the decision-maker to accumulate an adequate base of knowledge to utilize.

This monograph examines how well the Army currently prepares its officers for decision-making for one aspect of the full spectrum, peacekeeping by utilizing original survey data of United States Army majors. Areas investigated include personal confidence in decision-making of various types, amount of training and education received in peace operations, and assessments of Army preparations of leaders from lieutenant through major, etc. Conclusions from this data indicate that current Army policies and practices do not prepare army officers adequately for decision-making in peace operations. The surveyed majors assessed that the Army adequately prepares leaders for decision-making in combat operations but not in peace operations. Officers receive insignificant amounts of training and education in peace operations unless alerted for a mission. Moreover, the further that the environment of the decision diverges from the combat tactical, the less prepared those soldiers are to make an effective decision.

The monograph concludes with the recommendation that the Army must not lose its focus on combat operations but it must integrate peace operations fully into that training because all operations have some form of peace operations in them. To do this the Army may have to start education in full spectrum operations earlier in an officer's career instead of a concentration of training for combat operations. Leaders may have to be more proficient in decision-making before assuming key positions such as platoon leader and company commander. Revitalization of self-development programs with leader involvement will maximize learning in all areas of the spectrum. Combat training centers (CTCs) and other training venues should fully incorporate and add rigor to the peace operation aspects of the training. The current operational environment requires adaptable, flexible, and resilient leaders capable of effective decision-making. The ideas presented are a start point for further study for producing the knowledge that this officer needs on today's field of operation.

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# I. INTRODUCTION

*“Making decisions is the essence of leadership.”*

Dwight D. Eisenhower<sup>1</sup>

*“There is no studying on the battlefield. It is then simply a case of doing what is possible, to make use of what one knows and, in order to make a little possible, one must know much.”*

Marshal Foch.<sup>2</sup>

Decision-making is central to the United States Army leader. An Army leader who is incapable of making a timely decision or uses poor judgment in his choices is a leader who puts his mission and soldiers in jeopardy. The essence of effective leadership is to make and communicate sound decisions. Effective leaders apply analysis and synthesis as required by the situation rather than applying templates to problem solving. The requirement for leaders to make and communicate sound decisions is not new to the Army. The Army has focused with great success on developing effective combat leaders. This paper will examine the function of leaders on the spectrum of conflict other than combat.

Future organizations and missions of the Army will require leaders to make decisions in a full spectrum<sup>3</sup> of differing types of operations. Peacekeeping is one of the operations that the Army

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<sup>1</sup> Edgar Puryear, *American Generalship: Character is Everything: The Art of Command* (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 2000), 44.

<sup>2</sup> Major Edwin F. Harding, ed. *Infantry in Battle* (Washington, DC: The Infantry Journal Incorporated, 1939), 137.

<sup>3</sup> US Army Training and Doctrine Command. *FM 3-0, Operations* (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 2001), 1-15. FM 3-0 defines full spectrum operations as operations across the spectrum of conflict. They include offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations in any environment and in any combination. The spectrum of conflict can range from fighting and winning wars, to deterring war and resolving conflict, to promoting peace. See Appendix 1 for a diagram of the range of Army operations.

currently conducts that falls within this spectrum. However, the Army has not traditionally prepared its leaders to conduct this type of operation until an impending mission requires it. Peacetime training concentrates on preparation for combat execution. Doctrinal guidance to commanders is to focus time and resources on training combat tasks unless directed otherwise. Based upon emerging diverse threats and emerging mission requirements deviation from this may be required but this diversion of focus to non-combat related tasks is to be temporary in nature and done only when preparing for anticipated missions.<sup>4</sup> The reality is that it is not possible to anticipate many of these missions.

The central question examined in this monograph is whether current peacetime combat focused training prepares leaders to conduct full spectrum operations. Current operational and political environments indicate that operations focused on peacekeeping will continue to be a likely mission for the Army. Therefore, examination of this component within the range of full spectrum operations answers the question.

The responsibility of military leaders is to make the necessary decisions to accomplish the mission. Because the spectrum of Army operations is more comprehensive than just combat missions, it is incumbent upon Army leaders to make sound decisions in all types of situations. Leaders make two primary types of decisions. The first type of decision is those decisions made to address situations that require immediate resolution. The leader must draw upon what he knows of the situation, his knowledge, and his past experiences in order to reach a solution. The second type is decisions made in situations that do not require immediate resolution. This type of decision has the necessary time available for the decision-maker to review and research the situation before final disposition. The leader has the opportunity to fill in gaps in the known

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<sup>4</sup> US Army Training and Doctrine Command, *FM 3-0, Operations*, 1-17, specifically states this. FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*, p.86 also states that the training focus should be fighting and winning in combat and specific peacekeeping training occurs after units have been identified for a mission.

situation, his knowledge, and his experiences. Both types of decisions, in an operational setting, may involve decision-making under stress.

The ability to make effective decisions under stress comes from the decision-makers knowledge. The decision-maker gains knowledge from interpreting and understanding information and data gleaned from personal experiences whether real or simulated, in training or actual operations, from watching others, from sharing stories, from reading, etc.<sup>5</sup> By far the best method is participation in an actual operation. Clausewitz knew this when he wrote that only combat experience lubricates the friction of battle and that “peacetime maneuvers are a feeble substitute for the real thing.”<sup>6</sup> Later he stated that in order to build spirit (an understanding of what an army can and cannot accomplish) an army requires “victorious wars” or if not available, “frequent exertions of the army to the utmost limits of its strength.”<sup>7</sup> The United States does not go to war for the convenience of training its army. However, it spends a great deal of time, money, and other resources to give its soldiers experiences that closely relate to combat conditions. These experiences provide a base of knowledge that leaders use when actual combat conditions exist.

United State’s law, Title 10, Chapter 307, *The Army*, dictates four missions for the Army the primary mission being the preservation of peace and security, and providing for the defense, of the United States.<sup>8</sup> Therefore, maintaining an emphasis on combat scenarios is critical for training units. Proficiency in peacetime equals success in battle. Today’s environment is not the same as it was twenty years ago. In the current operational environment, the threat of full-scale

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<sup>5</sup> They key is the difference between knowledge and data. A person can know a piece of data but have no understanding of what it means. Knowledge incorporates the understanding. This brings up the dichotomy of Army *Lessons Learned* actually being *Lessons Identified*. If the institution truly learned them, they would not consistently reoccur.

<sup>6</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, New Jersey: University Press, 1976), 122.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid, 189

<sup>8</sup> See Appendix 10 for full language of the Title 10 missions.

war is low, while the necessity to conduct peacekeeping operations is high. The United States Army must not lose its focus on combat operations or hazard the possibility of losing the skills that give it an edge over potential future foes. However, can the Army afford to disregard the skills necessary to conduct operations that are not combat related while maintaining this combat focus?

The Army must train for the worst case, war, and the most likely case, peace operations. Current training policies espouse that the inherent flexibility required of soldiers in combat operations enable those soldier to execute peace operations. This policy assumes that it is relatively easy for soldiers and units to transition from a combat orientation to a peacekeeping orientation when required. An infantry platoon would see little difference in the tactics they use to conduct a patrol and logisticians will deliver supplies in convoys using similar methods in either environment. Differences between the two include the rules of engagement, the threat environment of the area, and the purpose of the mission. In fact, Army doctrine states that units only require four to six weeks of specialized training to prepare for a peace operation because of the similarities in many of the corresponding skills that the unit's soldiers possess for combat operations.<sup>9</sup>

Does this correlation and transition also apply to the decision-making skills of the associated leaders? FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*, states that "leader development is the single most important factor in achieving success" and that peace operations require skill, imagination, flexibility, adaptability, and patience, as well as knowledge of the country.<sup>10</sup> Is it possible in four to six weeks to build these skills in Army leaders? The environment in which a leader will make decisions in a peace operation is not the same environment the leader prepared for in combat training. Instead of deciding how to best use men and weapons against an enemy, a leader in a

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<sup>9</sup> US Army Training and Doctrine Command, *FM 100-23 Peace Operations*, (Washington DC: Department of the Army, December 1994), 86-87.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid*, 87-88.

peacekeeping environment negotiates with local civilian political leaders, deals in political and diplomatic affairs, conducts information operations in the local population, and safeguards his men and civilians while maintaining an impartial stance.<sup>11</sup> This is new territory that combat training does not provide a large amount of knowledge and experience to utilize in decision-making. For the junior leader the effects of a poor decision in combat operations has tactical consequences in the immediate vicinity; the same decision in a peace operation has potential operational and even strategic consequences that can have a long-term detrimental affect on the mission at local, regional, or national levels.<sup>12</sup>

Leaders require a base of knowledge gleaned from actual operations, practical experience, training, and education to make sound decisions in a peacekeeping operation for the operation to be successful. This is particularly true during the initial entry phase of an operation. Actions during this phase produce initial impressions within the local populace and political leadership that establish the base conditions which either support or hinder mission accomplishment. This period is also when Army leaders have the least amount of knowledge available for their decision-making. Poor decisions, particularly during this period, may have lasting negative consequences and effects. Because of a combat orientation in training and the potential for short notice deployment for peacekeeping, leaders in the initial entry force have little or no time to gain experience in peacekeeping decision-making before the commencement of the operation. These leaders will gain experience and adapt to the conditions of the peacekeeping mission, which should to better decisions over time. Follow-on forces will not have the same difficulty because they generally have more warning and time to conduct specific training for the mission based

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<sup>11</sup> USAREUR Headquarters, *USAREUR HQ AAR: Operation Joint Endeavor, volume 1*, (Center for Army Lessons Learned: May 1997), 24, 26. The lessons learned section of the AAR also stated that senior and junior leaders require adequate training in these areas. It hints that there was not adequate training but does not come out and say so. This AAR did not address decision-making in a peacekeeping environment at all.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid*, 142. The USAREUR IFOR AAR also found the junior leaders' ability to respond correctly in these situations would determine the success or failure of the mission and that it was important for the team leader *to have the ability to understand* his role in enforcing the peace accord.

upon the lessons and information disseminated from the previous force.

The United States Army's current training procedures aim to produce leaders who are adaptable and able to react and make decisions quickly as situations develop in combat. Is the Army doing enough or does it need to do more to ensure that it has leaders that are just as adaptable and able to make decisions as situations develop in the initial stages of a peacekeeping mission? This is but one segment of the full spectrum of operational response required of the Objective Force. As the scope of possible types of operations increase, the necessity for our leaders to have a broad range of knowledge, experiences, and training with which to make effective decisions in a multitude of situations also increase. Training policies and methodologies must do the utmost to fully prepare leaders for decision-making anywhere on the spectrum.

## **II. DECISION-MAKING METHODS AND THEORIES**

An understanding of what constitutes a decision, the methods of decision-making, and decision-making theory are essential for an appreciation of how to prepare leaders for effective decision-making. Decision-making methods generally fall into one of two categories: analytical decision-making or naturalistic and heuristic decision-making. The analytical models use comparison of multiple potential solutions to get to the optimal solution. The naturalistic and heuristic models use pattern recognition based upon knowledge and experience to arrive at a satisfactory solution. Each method has its strengths and weaknesses and each has a differing level of utility based upon the type of decision. Circumstances and the methods of operation also dictate the method in which the decision-maker arrives at his decision.

### **Term and concept definition**

Many of the terms used in this paper have differing common usage definitions. To facilitate clarity definitions of key terms follow. The first of these are combat operations and peacekeeping

operations. Army and Joint Forces doctrine does not define the term combat operation. However, a working definition results from using the second part of the Joint Forces definition for *operation* as a foundation and limiting the scope of the first part of the definition.<sup>13</sup> The resultant definition of a combat operation is the process of carrying on the military action of combat, including movement, supply, attack, defense, and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign to achieve strategic or tactical objectives.

The second term is peacekeeping operations. According to Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, a peacekeeping operation is a military operation undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease fire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. Peacekeeping along with peace enforcement make up the broader category of peace operations.<sup>14</sup> Both combat operations and peace operations aim to achieve a settlement in support of national policies. However, the means and methods used to do this are drastically different. Combat operations compel the enemy primarily with the use of physical force. Peace operations use persuasion with an underlying threat of physical force to influence protagonists.

Decision is the third term that requires definition for clarity in the argument. A decision is a point in time where reasonable options exist to execute a task in more than one way. The Army has produced decision-making tools that include the Military Decision-Making Process that have stood the test of time. However, comparison of multiple courses of action does not have to occur for a decision because a single acceptable course of action may stand out to the decision maker.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Operational Plans and Joint Force Development Directorate, *Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 12 April 2001), 317. 1) The military action or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission. 2) The process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defense, and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid*, 311.

<sup>15</sup> Gary Klein, *Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions* (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1998), 16.

Decisions have a certain taxonomy. The term *Coup d'oeil*, as used by Clausewitz, implies two types of decision that a leader must have proficiency. *Coup d'oeil* refers to “any sound decision taken in the midst of action ... [through] the quick recognition of a truth that a mind would ordinarily miss or perceive only after long study and reflection.”<sup>16</sup> The first type of decision that Clausewitz expressly describes in *coup d'oeil* is a decision conducted under stress. For Clausewitz: stress equates to time. A decision under stress occurs when the decision maker must make the decision now (‘midst of action’) with what he knows (‘quick recognition of the truth’). He must use the information, knowledge and experience that he already has to arrive at his decision.

Clausewitz hints at the second type of decision in his definition of *Coup d'oeil* when he specifically references the time to “perceive only after long study and reflection.” This is a decision made with no major time constraint or, in other words, without stress. This type of decision allows the decision-maker the time and ability to ponder and reflect upon multiple solutions to the problem and weigh the potential effects. Because time is available, the decision-maker can gather additional information and draw from the skills and experiences of other people to arrive at his final decision. The ability to make stressed decisions separates the true expert of execution from those who are proficient only with time and research.

Clausewitz’s definition of *Coup d'oeil* provided for decisions under stress and decisions not under stress. His definitions use time as a delineator between the two decision types. However, Clausewitz did not address the element of risk. When the element of risk combines with the element of time, decisions actually fall into four categories based upon low to high risk and low to high time (Table 1).

A critical aspect of battle command is to know which decisions belong in each of the four categories allowing the decision-maker to execute the most effective, timely decisions possible.

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<sup>16</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, 102.

FM 3-0, *Operations*, states that “effective decision-making combines judgment with information as an element of combat power: it requires knowing, if to decide, when to decide, and what to decide.”<sup>17</sup> In effect, the decision-maker must categorize his decisions knowing which decisions he must act upon now with what he knows and which can wait until later. It is the low-time, high-risk decisions that Clausewitz addressed with the term *Coup d’oeil*. Military leaders must prepare themselves for this the decision category that no matter where the operation falls within the full spectrum of military operations.

<p>Risk State:  <b>HIGH</b></p>	<p>A stressed decision that relies upon current knowledge and experience</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Stressed</li> <li>• Experience Based</li> </ul> <p>(Provide meal with 3 minute notice for visiting dignitary who arrives after dining hours)</p>	<p>A stressed decision that relies on knowledge and experience but allows the decision-maker to use knowledge and experience from outside sources and there are consequences to the decision.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Analytical Based</li> <li>• Low Stress</li> </ul> <p>(Plan next week’s menu for dignitary visit)</p>
<p>Risk State:  <b>LOW</b></p>	<p>An unstressed decision that relies upon current knowledge and experience</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Experience Based</li> <li>• Unstressed</li> </ul> <p>(Provide meal with 30 minute notice for visitors during dining hours)</p>	<p>An unstressed decision that allows the decision-maker to get the necessary knowledge and experience to make the decision but the consequences of the decision is minimal.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Analytical Based</li> <li>• Unstressed</li> </ul> <p>(Plan next week’s menu)</p>
<p>Time:  <b>LOW</b></p>		<p>Time:  <b>HIGH</b></p>

**Table 1: Categories of Decision-Making.**

### **Analytical Models – Military Decision-Making Process**

The Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) is often the first notion that enters the mind of a soldier during a discussion of the topic of decision-making. The MDMP is a very good example of an analytical decision making process. The analytical model is the first of the two primary decision-making models. Analytical methods such as the MDMP are formal problem

<sup>17</sup> US Army Training and Doctrine Command, *FM 3-0, Operations*, 5-2.

solving techniques. The decision maker uses an analytical decision-making process to reach logical decisions based upon a thorough analysis of the mission and situation. The MDMP as well as other analytical decision-making models use the same basic problem solving methodology. There are four basic steps in analytic models: define the problem and gather facts, develop possible problem solutions, decide on a solution, and implement the solution. This type of decision-making tool relies on producing multiple courses of action and then deciding upon the one that best accomplishes the mission or solves the problem. The use of a full analytical decision-making technique results in a detailed, deliberate, sequential, and time-consuming methodology.<sup>18</sup>

The Army identifies three advantages in using the analytical approach of the MDMP for decision-making. The first is that it attempts to identify the best solution by using the formal comparison of multiple friendly and enemy courses of action. The second is that it produces a solution with a great deal of integration, coordination, and synchronization while minimizing the risk of overlooking a key aspect of the problem. Finally, it results in a detailed operations order or operations plan. The disadvantage is that it is a time-consuming process.<sup>19</sup>

### **Naturalistic Models – Recognition Primed Decision-Making**

The second type of decision-making model is naturalistic or heuristic model. Experience has much to do with this method of decision-making. There are three key steps inherent in heuristic decision-making: experience the situation in a changing context, recognize the pattern of the problem from personal knowledge and experience, and implement a solution. Although this is a commonly used decision-making approach, heuristic/naturalistic models for decision-making have only recently come into prominence in the literature.

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<sup>18</sup> US Army Training and Doctrine Command, *FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations*, (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 1997), 5-1.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.* 5-1.

A leader in the research and publication of heuristic/naturalistic decision-making is Gary Klein, a cognitive psychologist, chairman, and chief scientist of a think tank that specializes in the study of decision-making. Klein used leaders of firefighting organizations as his primary research pool. In his studies, Klein concluded that people did not use an analytical decision-making model when they made decisions in a time sensitive and stressful situation. Instead, they relied upon heuristic/naturalistic methods. Klein calls this approach mental simulation.

Clausewitz would call it *Coup d'oeil*.

From his research, Klein developed the Recognition Primed Decision-making process or RPD. In Recognition Primed Decision-making, people who must make decisions in time sensitive and stressful situations do not rely upon analytical analysis of the problem but instead rely upon personal knowledge and experience to quickly interpret a situation and immediately identify a reasonable response to it. Multiple courses of action are not required because the first course of action, although not necessarily the best, is feasible, acceptable, and suitable based upon recognition of a specific or an extrapolated pattern from the decision-makers knowledge and past experiences.<sup>20</sup>

A summary of RPD demonstrates the advantages and disadvantages of this decision-making model. RPD decisions take less time because the decision-maker focuses on the sequential evaluation of courses of action until he finds a workable one. Evaluation of each course of action requires less time because instead of a formal analysis and comparison, the decision-maker imagines how it will work (a mental wargame). The decision also takes less time because the course of action used is usually the first one considered due to the decision-maker's recognition of a pattern based on his knowledge. The mental wargame allows the decision-maker to spot potential weaknesses in the course of action early in the decision-making process allowing adjustments to the course of action to make it stronger and more viable. There are three main

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<sup>20</sup> Gary Klein, *Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions*, 17.

disadvantages of this process. The decision-maker requires a large pool of personal knowledge and experience and to make effective decisions in this manner. The analysis and decision on a course of action rests on one person and since the emphasis is on execution of the course of action, full integration, coordination, and synchronization occur after the fact. RPD is not a group or consensus method. Finally, although the solution is workable, it is probably not the optimal and depending on the experience level of the decision-maker may not even be one of the best solutions.<sup>21</sup>

### **Comparing the Models and Importance of RPD for Stressed Decisions**

It is important to remember that that both the analytical and the heuristic methods have an appropriate place in the world of decision-making. Analytical decision-making is strongest in situations that are unfamiliar to the decision-maker and/or there is sufficient time to apply a full, in-depth analysis to the problem to find the best answer to address it. Heuristic decision-making, as exemplified by the Recognition Primed Decision-making model, addresses situations where time is not available and a solution is required for immediate implementation. One is not necessarily better the other and the choice of which process or even a combination of processes to use should result from the situation presented to the decision-maker.

Of the two types of decision-making, the analytical process is easier to train the inexperienced to execute.<sup>22</sup> The United States Army dedicates large amounts of training time in its professional schools to teach officers and noncommissioned officers the Military Decision-

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<sup>21</sup> Ibid, 30.

<sup>22</sup> Army doctrine (*FM 22-100, Army Leadership*, August 1999, 5-3 to 5-4) lists the two types of decision-making processes as Troop Leading Procedures followed at company and below level and the Military Decision-Making Process at battalion and above. Both are analytical. Paragraphs 5-16 and 5-25 go on to say that there is another decision-making method based upon using experience and intuition but that but that you “should not be fooled into relying on this because it may just hide a lack of competence or someone too lazy to do the homework needed for a reasoned, thought-out decision.” In fact, the presence of competence in the profession of arms is what allows this kind of decision-making to occur.

Making Process.<sup>23</sup> The Military Decision-Making Process is a great equalizer. It affords a common method for solving problems and making decisions by individuals possessing knowledge and experience from the novice through the expert. Its use should produce optimal solutions to the problem or, at worst, produce plans that should not fail.

However, many of the decisions required on the field of battle or field of peace must be accomplished quickly under stressful conditions. In this environment, the RPD model of decision-making provides the best method of operation. However, an inexperienced and ignorant decision-maker probably will not make the most effective decisions using this model and will often produce plans that fail. The best RPD decision-makers possess a vast array of knowledge and experience from which to draw courses of action. The drawback is the amount of time required to acquire the requisite knowledge and experience to conduct effective decision-making in this manner.

### **Consequences of Decision-Making**

Dietrich Dorner, director of the Cognitive Anthropology Project at the Max Planck Institute in Berlin and authority on cognitive behavior, conducted a series of experiments to determine how people plan and make decisions. Dorner devised simulations of complex interrelating systems and had people manage them. For example, one such simulation required the management of an eco-economic system in a fictional African tribal region. Another involved the political-economic workings of an English town. Dorner argued that planning and decision-making processes might go awry if decision-makers do not pay enough attention to the possible

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<sup>23</sup> Much of the training in pre-commissioning courses, the Officer Basic Course, the Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course, the Officer Advanced Course, CAS3, the Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course, the Command and General Staff College, the Sergeants Major Academy, and to a lesser degree the School for Advanced Military Studies all teach the MDMP as the core to decision-making and structure much of their course instruction around the process. Author's observation made through attendance to most of these school's and through discussion with people who attended the others.

side effects and long-term repercussions of their decisions.<sup>24</sup>

Dorner found that effective decision-makers, those that achieved a positive result in his simulations, started by making few decisions. However, as the simulation developed, the number of decisions they made increased. Conversely, ineffective decision-makers made more decisions early in the simulation and made fewer decisions later in the simulation.<sup>25</sup> The effective decision-makers tested hypotheses to confirm their experiences while the ineffective decision makers assumed their hypothesis were accurate.<sup>26</sup> The effective decision-makers thought of the simulation as a complex system while the ineffective decision-makers thought of the simulation as a simple system and generally focused on an area that with which they were already familiar.<sup>27</sup> Finally, the effective decision-makers self organized and critically evaluated themselves afterwards while their opposite numbers tended to only recapitulate their behavior during the simulation.<sup>28</sup>

A possible interpretation of Dorner's results is that effective decisions come from established experiential data. According to Dorner, the effective decision-makers understood that they needed an experiential database in order to formulate an acceptable course of action. Effective decision-makers observed the system to determine how it operated. They manipulated variables and observed the immediate changes to the system and the resulting interaction with the other seemingly unrelated variables in the system. Additionally they continued to conduct critical examines of these actions after completion of the simulation. In other words, they learned from the experience instead of just being a part of an event. The ineffective decision-makers never

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<sup>24</sup> Dietrich Dorner, *The Logic of Failure: Why Things Go Wrong and What We Can Do to Make Them Right* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1996), 2.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid, 21.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid, 24.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid, 23.


<sup>28</sup> Ibid, 26. It is the dynamic of critical evaluation versus recapitulation of behavior that determines whether a unit in an After Action Review learned anything from the activity being reviewed or is just going through the motions.

established in-depth knowledge of systems. Because they operated with inadequate information, they made decisions that caused the system to swing to wild extremes, which eventually overwhelmed the decision-maker. The effective decision-makers translated their experience of the simulation into knowledge that they then used in later decisions. Conversely, the ineffective decision-makers lived in the here and now, and did not translate their experience into knowledge and eventually became paralyzed in their decision-making.

Unfortunately, soldiers do not have the option to learn the intricacies of the complex conflict system during the throes of an operation. Additionally, soldiers may not have the ability to test hypothesis during the operation but must do so in training before execution. The necessity to learn the system once execution begins may result in death and mission failure. It is in training that soldiers form their decision-making database. Failure to develop an adequate knowledge base can result in bad decisions with unforeseen consequences. A single critical decision at the beginning of an operation has the ability to start the pendulum swinging within the system. Once this occurs, the focus of the operation may change from evolving the system to the desired end state to bringing the system back to a state of control or equilibrium.

## The OODA Loop

John R. Boyd demonstrated the power of making sound decisions in a timely manner in his theory of decision-making. Boyd contends that human behavior follows a specific decision-making cycle. The four steps of the cycle consist of observation, orientation, decision, and action (Figure 1). The side in a conflict that executes this decision-making process more rapidly and more effectively gains an advantage over



**Figure 1: Boyd's OODA Loop**

his opponent because the opponent will constantly react to his actions. These continued reactions eventually result in poor decisions followed by paralysis of the entire opposition decision-making process. The common expression of the successful execution of this procedure is getting inside the enemy's decision cycle.<sup>29</sup>

The critical step in the observation, orientation, decision, and action cycle (OODA) is orientation. In this step analysis and synthesis of the observations occur. The process consists of taking many different disparate nuggets of data and information and translating them into a mental picture which the decision-maker can then use to make a decision. Boyd refers to this as "examining of the world from a number of perspectives so that we can generate mental images or impressions that correspond to the world."<sup>30</sup>

The OODA loop gains its power from the ability of a leader to form mental constructs. Timeliness and accuracy of decisions and actions relate directly to the decision-maker's ability to orient and reorient to rapidly changing and uncertain situations. Personal experiences, education, and training (aka knowledge) empower the leader to form these mental constructs.<sup>31</sup> Boyd's theory emphasizes the importance of the ability of leaders to think. By-the-book answers to specific well known situations are not good enough. It is the ability to think that allows a leader to take the knowledge from personal experiences, education, and training and adapt it to the imperfect information of the present situation to arrive at a timely, sound, and workable solution to that situation.

## Summary

The ability to make sound decisions under stress is the hallmark of the true military

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<sup>29</sup> Philip S. Meilinger, ed. *The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory* (Maxwell AFB, Air University Press, 1997), 366.

<sup>30</sup> John R. Boyd, *A Discourse on Winning and Losing* (Special Collections, Fort Leavenworth Combined Arms Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS), 10.

<sup>31</sup> Philip S. Meilinger, *The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory*, 388.

professional. In order to make the most effective decisions a leader must understand the decision-making processes. Because of the nature of military work, the Army must focus on the low-time/high-risk area of decision-making (upper left quadrant of Table 1). In the other quadrants, time compensates for an ill prepared decision-maker because additional resources can buttress him or a poor decision will have little impact on the operation. However, low-time/high-risk decisions depend entirely on the individual leader. He has to draw from his personal experiences and knowledge to make the decision. These decisions are such that they may have an immediate affect on the success of the mission, the lives of the soldiers or, particularly in peacekeeping operations, the civilian conditions and national strategy. For this reason, it is imperative that leaders have the requisite base of knowledge to make decisions in this environment.

The decision-making method best suited for low-time/high-risk decisions is a naturalistic/heuristic method exemplified by the Recognition Primed Decision-making process. Quickness in the choice of a workable solution to a problem is the critical component. A key aspect of this decision-making method is pattern recognition. It requires a large personal database of knowledge for the decision-maker to be fully effective in identifying patterns in a situation and adapting an appropriate solution to it.

Clausewitz starts to address this when he describes the *sense of locality* as the ability to “quickly and accurately grasp the topology of any area.”

Things are perceived, of course, partly by the naked eye and partly by the mind, which fills the gaps with guesswork based on learning and experience, and thus constructs a whole out of the fragments that the eye can see; but if the whole is to be vividly present to the mind, imprinted like a picture, like a map, upon the brain, without fading or blurring in detail, *it can only be achieved by the mental gift that we call imagination.*<sup>32</sup>

In his explanation of a sense of locality, he specifically talks about knowing the terrain.

However, in this instance Clausewitz does not take the concept far enough. The topology of the

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<sup>32</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, 109-110. Italics are the original author's.

battlefield is not just the simple system composed of the terrain. The topology is a complex system that includes the terrain, the disposition of forces, the potential interactions of weapon systems, the weather, the moral of the soldiers, the capabilities of forces, etc. It is the *sense of locality* (mental picture) combined with *coup d'oeil* (the idea of rapid and accurate decision) that enables leaders to operate effectively in the low time/high risk area of the top-left quadrant of Table 1.

The concepts of *sense of locality* and *coup d'oeil* are essential for the successful execution of the orientation step of the OODA loop. It is evident that a decision-maker in combat operations who makes the enemy consistently react to his actions in order to force poor decisions by the enemy decision-maker is a good thing that leads to the eventual disintegration of his forces. To effectively accomplish this the friendly decision-maker requires the broadest knowledge base with which to operate. Although not as evident, this process is just as important in a peacekeeping operation. In most situations, there will not be an enemy but there will be an opponent. In negotiations, the decision-maker is looking for an advantage in the verbal exchange with which to exert his influence or will. In situations such as control of a mob or a riot, the decision-maker uses these processes to stay ahead of the crisis and bring it back under control. In daily operations, the decision-maker looks for indicators and patterns to spot potential flare-ups and hotspots in order to take an appropriate action before a potential incident occurs. The ability to understand the situation (orientation) is the essential ingredient that a decision-maker must have in order to harness the power of the OODA loop. The linkage between the *sense of locality*, *coup d'oeil*, and Recognition Primed Decision-making provides the basis for the successful execution of the OODA loop.

### III. SURVEY OF PREPARATION OF ARMY OFFICERS TO CONDUCT DECISION-MAKING

#### Methodology

This monograph used information to evaluate training, education, and decision-making from a survey of United States Army majors. The survey<sup>33</sup> used a stratified sample of United States Army majors attending the United States Army Command and General Staff Officer Course at Fort Leavenworth during FY2001-2002. This class included 873 United States Army majors of whom 330 (38%) participated in a peacekeeping operation and 371 (42%) participated in a combat operation so far in their career.<sup>34</sup> A survey sample of 100 of these officers produced sixty-nine usable surveys. The sample maintained basic proportionality with the general population with twenty-nine respondents (42%) having peacekeeping experience and thirty-four respondents (49%) having combat experience. Additionally, seventeen respondents (25%) had both peacekeeping and combat experience while twenty-one respondents (30%) had no operational experience. The survey sample contained a range of peacekeeping experiences. Respondents participated as lieutenants, captains, and majors from 1990 through 2000. Their experiences ran the gamut from initial entry operations through steady-state operations in various locations including Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Sinai, etc. Because of the limited sample size relative to the Army as a whole, the results of the analysis are not conclusive; however, the generalizations produced in the analysis are indicators to the potential need for further in-depth study.

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<sup>33</sup> Survey coordinated with the Development and Assessment Division (DAD), LTC Robin Gaslin, of the United States Army Command and General Staff College. Instruments issued to 100 CGSOC students on 18 January 2002 and 72 surveys returned on 7 February 2001 of which three were discarded because they were outside the scope of the target population. CGSC survey control number: 02-015.

<sup>34</sup> Population figures based on data obtained from the CGSC student division.

The survey focused on determining if there are relationships between levels of training and education and with personal perceptions of an individual's ability to make decisions in a peacekeeping operation. Questions aimed at determining the training and education level of an officer, previous operational experience in peacekeeping, and the officer's assessment of his ability to make decisions.

Respondents answered inquiries on a number of key aspects relating to three central questions.<sup>35</sup>

1. Primary: Does United States Army training prepare leaders for decision-making in a peacekeeping operation?
2. Supporting: Does United States Army training prepare leaders for decision-making in a combat operation?
3. Supporting: In a peacekeeping operation, are there significant amounts of decisions that are not related to combat tactical training?

Three sections of the survey provided data to support these questions. The demographics section determined the individual's operational experience and verified that the respondent fit within the scope of the target population. The training section determined the level of peacekeeping training and education of the respondent. This provided the foundation from which to test the hypothesis. The assessment of training and education was not strictly quantitative, but involved qualitative assessments by the respondent.<sup>36</sup> The decision-making section of the survey provided the major pieces of information for this study. Questions determined the respondent's confidence level in making decisions in three areas. The first was their confidence level in making tactical decisions, the second was their confidence level in making decisions related to a peacekeeping operation before their participation in a peacekeeping operation, and the third was

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<sup>35</sup> See Appendix 5 for survey questions and how they relate to the master questions (Appendix 3)

<sup>36</sup> Appendix 6 shows how qualitative data from respondents turned into a numerical value for use when conducting comparisons.

their present confidence level in making decisions if they had to deploy to a peacekeeping operation today.

There were two primary areas of concern regarding the internal validity of this research methodology. Respondents analyzed and assessed their own levels of ability. This may have skewed results and show higher levels of confidence in decision-making relative to levels of training and education since generally people find it hard to portray themselves in a less than positive manner. To mitigate this possibility, respondents remained anonymous. Also, respondents could surmise that this was a study of training and decision-making in peacekeeping operations. To limit the influence of personal bias and personal opinions, the structure of the survey questions did not allow the so respondent to determine whether the hypothesis focused on the failure or on the success of Army training, education, and decision-making.

The second concern to internal validity was the influence of institutional biases, recent news, small group discussions at the Command and General Staff College, and an abundance of other surveys in the population which could affect these survey responses. Anonymity, as well as a plea to United States Army values and the good of the service mitigated this to some degree, but an assessment of the overall impact of these influences is impossible to ascertain.<sup>37</sup>


## **Analysis of Data**

United States Army doctrine and training methodology stresses that training for combat operations prepares soldiers and leaders for peacekeeping operations. The survey group answered questions that required them to assess their ability to participate as a fully productive member of a chain of command or supporting staff in a combat operation and in a peacekeeping operation. Evaluation of survey data relied upon the primary assumption that experience gained through training and education provide confidence in a soldier to perform in a given situation.

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<sup>37</sup> See Appendix 5 for cover letter to the survey.

Overall, 82% of the majors expressed confidence in their preparation for combat operation but only 63% were confident in their preparation for a peacekeeping operation (Figure 2, Comparison A). A similar comparison of soldiers with combat experience and of soldiers with peacekeeping experience resulted in relatively equal confidence levels with 85% confident in their abilities for participation in combat operations and 79% confident in their peacekeeping abilities (Figure 2, Comparison D). Significant differences arose from those soldiers lacking operational experience. Of this group, 78% were confident that they could work in a combat operation at their current level of preparation. One-half of these rated themselves as ‘highly confident.’ In contrast, only 50% of the group with no operational peacekeeping experience were confident of their preparation to work in a peacekeeping operation and only one in ten of this 50% assessed themselves as being ‘highly confident’ (Figure 2, Comparison C).



**Figure 2: Comparing perceived ability to perform in combat and peacekeeping operations.**

Analysis of this data resulted in four generalizations. Majors in the survey group had less confidence in their ability to conduct peacekeeping operations than they had in conducting combat operations (Figure 2, Comparison A). Operational experience provided almost the same

level of confidence in the soldiers who conducted combat operations as those that conducted peacekeeping operations (Figure 2, Comparison D). The amount of confident individuals produced by training and education but with no combat experience was equal to those with operational combat experience (Figure 2, Comparison E) but training and education alone produced less confidence in individuals that conducted peacekeeping operations than those with peacekeeping operational experience (Figure 2, Comparison F). Finally, operational peacekeeping experience increased leaders' confidence in their ability to conduct combat operations but participation in a combat operation did not increase leaders' perceived ability to work in a peacekeeping operation (Figure 2, Comparison B).


An additional subject area of investigation determined whether a relationship existed between the amount of training and education that a leader received in peacekeeping and the confidence that he had in his ability to make sound decisions. Quantity of peacekeeping training generated a numerical representation of that training to provide a common reference for comparison. This value represented peacekeeping-oriented training events conducted during home station training, combat training center training, mission readiness exercises, officer professional development sessions, etc. Quantity of training was the primary measurement; however, the value incorporated the aspect of quality of training by weighting specific types of training venues. For example, a combat training center rotation with a heavy emphasis on peacekeeping operations had more weight than a home station situational exercise lane or an officer professional development class.<sup>38</sup> The respondent's assessment of how much exposure to peace operations he received in the officer education system and in other educational experiences (such as individual reading) provided the basis of determination of a numerical educational value. The survey also measured the leader's confidence in his decision-making in a peacekeeping environment. This produced a composite rating based on the individual's personal assessment of his ability to make

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<sup>38</sup> See Appendix 6 for evaluation and decision criteria.

decisions of various natures in a peacekeeping environment. The four varieties of decisions used in the composite rating included the leader's ability to make decisions that affect the lives of soldiers, decisions that affect the lives of civilians, and decisions that had an impact on the operational or strategic objectives of a peacekeeping operation.

The data showed a low correlation between an individual's training and education with his confidence in making decisions in a peacekeeping environment



**Figure 3: Increase in decision-making confidence as training and education increase.**


(Figure 3). Obviously many other factors influence a soldier's confidence in his ability to make sound decisions other than just training and education. Nonetheless, despite a low correlation, the general result suggested that more education and training led to increased confidence in a person's ability to make sound decisions (Figure 3).<sup>39</sup>

The trend of confidence in decision-making increasing on the basis of training and education can be identified by analyzing the data in the categories of those with peacekeeping experience, those with combat experience and those without combat experience, and those with experience in both peacekeeping and combat with two exceptions. First, those individuals that had no operational peacekeeping experience showed a decrease in decision-making confidence as training and education increased. Second, those respondents with no operational experience, peacekeeping or combat, showed relatively no change as training and education increased (Figure 4, Line B). This could be because they did not have an operational or realistic context in which to apply their knowledge. A lack of context results in increased anxiety in decision-making because the decision maker understands much more but, more importantly, he also understands how much

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<sup>39</sup> See Appendix 7 for additional charts.

he does not know. In other words, he has the pieces of the puzzle but does not have a picture to guide how to put them together. The Army mitigated this problem for combat operations by providing the most realistic and rigorous training environment possible at the combat training centers. This provided a context for decision-makers to confirm their abilities in decision-making for a combat environment.



**Figure 4: Compare decision-making confidence before a peacekeeping operation with those that have no peacekeeping**

Data developed from the surveys supports the argument that knowing more without a solid context leads to anxiety in decision-making. The data set used in the above analysis included all of the majors in the survey population. Of this sample, the majors that participated in a peacekeeping operation also assessed their training, education, and decision-making confidence before they deployed to their first peacekeeping operation. An evaluation of the data for this group showed the same decrease in decision-making confidence as training and education increased (Figure 4, Line A). The graphical representation of the data for the group with no operational peacekeeping experience and the group before their operational peacekeeping experience were very similar (Figure 4). The primary difference in the two graphs was the pre-deployment decision-making confidence levels. Because this was an assessment of past levels of confidence, it is highly probable that the individual remembered his experiences as being more positive than they actually were. Applying knowledge gained from training and education to a real peacekeeping experience took away the uncertainty of using that knowledge.

In the survey, the respondents answered questions on how well the United States Army prepares majors, captains, and lieutenants to make decisions in differing conditions. They evaluated four different types of decisions: tactical combat decisions, tactical peacekeeping decisions, non-tactical peacekeeping decisions, and peacekeeping decisions with an operational or


strategic impact. Tactical combat decisions are the standard decisions associated with fighting in combat. Tactical decisions in a peacekeeping environment relate directly to tactical combat type decisions, but made in a peacekeeping environment. Non-tactical peacekeeping decisions occur in a peacekeeping environment but the decisions are unique to peacekeeping, such as: mob control, riot control, negotiating with civil and military leaders, interacting with NGOs, etc. Peacekeeping decisions of an operational nature are those that can have an impact on the operational or strategic success or failure of the overall mission.

Use of a five-point scale ranging from 'does not fully prepare' through 'fully prepares' characterized training and education preparation for decision-making. Leaders rated as 'fully prepared' or 'mostly prepared' should be able to execute sound decision-making in a mission with little or no additional training, education, or experience. Those rated as 'somewhat prepared' to make decisions may require some additional training, education, or time to gain experience. They would require a transition period in which to adjust to the new situation, or in other words, gain their sea legs. Those that are 'minimally prepared' or 'not prepared' require extensive training and education in order to be an effective decision-maker under the given conditions.

The judgments of the respondents with either a combat deployment or a peacekeeping deployment provided the primary data set used to determine how well the Army prepares majors, captains, and lieutenants to make decisions. These respondents constituted the best-qualified group to assess preparation of leaders for decision-making because they possess a relevant context to use for comparison. Combat tactical decision-making, as assessed by majors with combat experience, provided the base set of data for all future evaluations of this information. The Army rated high, greater than 85% prepared, in its preparation of majors, captains, and lieutenants to conduct tactical decision-making in a combat environment. This verified the Army's current model of alert, train, and deploy. Using the Objective Force model of train, alert,

and deploy, 80% of the surveyed majors felt adequately prepared; however, adequate preparation for decision-making of captains dropped to 65% and that of lieutenants to 35% (Figure 5).


A comparison of the preparation for decision-making in a peacekeeping environment with the preparation for decision-making in a combat operation yielded the following results. The



**Figure 5: Preparation of Army officers for tactical combat decision-making.**

assessments by the majors with peacekeeping experience provided the basis to analyze how well the Army prepares officers for decision-making in a peacekeeping environment. Overall, the assessments of decision-making preparation were much lower for decisions in peacekeeping operations.


A comparison of preparation for tactical decision-making in combat and tactical decision-making in peacekeeping showed a marked decrease within the peacekeeping category. This was surprising because tactical decisions in combat and tactical decisions in peacekeeping are essentially the same. The difference in the information may be attributable to new and uncertain conditions in which the peacekeeping decision-making would take place (Figure 6).<sup>40</sup>




**Figure 6: Decrease in preparation in combat tactical and peacekeeping tactical decision-making.**

<sup>40</sup> Arthur S. Collins, Jr., *Common Sense Training*, (Novato, CA: The Presidio Press, 1978), 59. MG Arthur Collins (ret) refers to the unease of officers taking command for the first time due to the unknowns of the new situation.

More significant were the differences shown when comparing how well the Army prepares its leaders for making decisions that are not relatable to combat operations. The final two decision categories demonstrated this. The first were those peacekeeping decisions unrelated to a traditional tactical task. In this category, majors with peacekeeping experience felt that the vast majority of captains and lieutenants are not prepared to deploy and make sound decisions without additional training and education (Figure 6). In fact, significant numbers of majors believed that captains (41%) and lieutenants (69%) would require extensive additional training and education before they could make sound decisions. In the last category, respondents rated the Army's preparation of officers to make decisions that with an operational or strategic impact as very low. Of the surveyed majors with peacekeeping experience, only 41% and 27% believed that captains and lieutenants, respectively, were at least somewhat prepared to make this type of decision (Figures 7 and 8).



**Figure 7: Army preparation of officers for nontactical peacekeeping decision-making.**



**Figure 8: Army preparation of officers for decision-making with operational/strategic impact.**

The survey data suggests that the further the conditions in which the decision-making takes place diverges from a tactical combat environment, the less prepared our officers are to make sound, effective decisions in that divergent environment. Pre-deployment training and initial operational experience can mitigate this to some degree. However, time to do this is not available under the Objective Force precept of train, alert, and deploy. In critical operations where tactical

decisions can have operational and strategic impact, can the United States Army afford to have unprepared leaders conducting on the job training as they muddle through their initial decisions?

The last area of interest investigated where officers gained their training and education.

According to the survey responses, the primary source of education for peacekeeping came from attendance at the Army

Command and General Staff Officer Course and through personal development by reading books and professional publications (Figure 9).

	None	Minimal	Some	A lot
Officer Basic Course	64%	30%	6%	0%
Officer Advanced Course/Career Course	49%	33%	18%	0%
CGSOC	6%	25%	57%	16%
Other Service School	82%	14%	3%	1%
College	81%	13%	6%	0%
Professional Articles/Publications	18%	32%	46%	6%
Books	19%	42%	37%	3%
Civilian Experience	84%	10%	6%	0%
Other	96%	2%	1%	1%

**Figure 9: Sources of peacekeeping education.**

Of course, this cross

section of officers attended their Officer Basic Courses as lieutenants before the fall of the Berlin Wall, and their Officer Career Course as peacekeeping began to take a prominent role in national policy so instruction in peacekeeping subjects would have been low. Current instruction at these schools may address peacekeeping to a greater degree. Survey results showed the Command and General Staff Officer Course as the primary institutional source of peacekeeping education in the Army but, currently only 50% of Army majors attend this school. This must be a consideration when applying the data in Figure 9 to the entire spectrum of Army majors. The institution of the Intermediate Level Education (ILE) program, in place of the Command and General Staff Officers Course model will give all majors an equivalent education. However, it is unknown if course changes will maintain the same level of peacekeeping related materials in the curriculum as are currently there. Of further significance is that the primary educational experience in

peacekeeping operations did not occur until fourteen years into the officers' careers even though approximately 38% of the sample conducted peacekeeping operations earlier in their careers.<sup>41</sup>

Training Category	# of PK Training Events	# of Times Trained							
		0 Times Trained	1 Time Trained	2 Times Trained	3 Times Trained	4 Times Trained	5 Times Trained	6 Times Trained	>6 Times Trained
Mission Readiness Exercise	50%	9%	14%	12%	6%	3%	2%	5%	
Home Station Training Exercise	52%	6%	14%	6%	6%	5%	0%	11%	
CTC Rotation with PK Emphasis	73%	14%	9%	2%	0%	0%	0%	3%	
CTC Rotation with PK Involved	64%	20%	9%	5%	0%	2%	0%	2%	
Officer Professional Development	47%	14%	12%	5%	6%	5%	2%	11%	
Mentoring Session	73%	11%	6%	5%	2%	2%	0%	3%	
Other	No Answers Given in Other								

**Figure 10: Assessment of how many times officers took part in training events.**

Throughout a career, the surveyed officers received little peacekeeping related training. The survey group identified the amount of times they participated training that included peacekeeping. Out of the seven categories of training (Figure 10), the two types most leaders participated in were home station training, 52%, and officer professional development, 53%. However, almost 50% of the officers in the survey sample never trained using one of these methods. Even the relatively resource free mentoring session and the officer professional development class do not seem to be used to their fullest as a training tool for officers. Officer professional development (OPD) was the training category that had the largest combined number of training events in it for the survey group. However, the large number of officers who had no peacekeeping training using an OPD methodology indicates a failure to use relatively resource free training methods to build basic peacekeeping skills within the officer corps. Most disturbing was the fact that 21% of the majors indicated that so far in their careers, they never participated in a training event concerning peacekeeping operations.

<sup>41</sup> This percentage based upon the amount of CGSOC students who had already participated in a peacekeeping operation as stated in the beginning of this chapter.

Training Category	Entire Group				With Peacekeeping				Without Peacekeeping			
	Total # of Events	Avg Event per Man per Year	Total # Events w/o OCs	Avg Event per Man per Year	Total # of Events	Avg Event per Man per Year	Total # Events w/o OCs	Avg Event per Man per Year	Total # of Events	Avg Events per Man per Year	Total # Events w/o OCs	Avg Event per Man per Year
Mission Readiness Exercise	106	0.12	93	0.10	65	0.21	75	0.19	23	0.04	18	0.04
Home Station Training Exercise	166	0.18	143	0.16	114	0.28	99	0.25	54	0.10	44	0.09
CTC Rotation with PK Emphasis	91	0.10	24	0.03	38	0.09	18	0.05	53	0.10	6	0.01
CTC Rotation with PK Involved	96	0.10	44	0.05	34	0.08	29	0.07	62	0.12	15	0.03
Officer Professional Development	191	0.20	153	0.17	129	0.32	109	0.28	52	0.10	44	0.09
Mentoring Session	63	0.07	33	0.04	34	0.08	14	0.04	29	0.06	19	0.04
Other	5	0.01	5	0.01	0	0.00	0	0.00	5	0.01	5	0.01
<b>Totals</b>	<b>712</b>	<b>0.77</b>	<b>495</b>	<b>0.55</b>	<b>434</b>	<b>1.07</b>	<b>344</b>	<b>0.87</b>	<b>278</b>	<b>0.53</b>	<b>151</b>	<b>0.30</b>

**Figure 11: Analysis of training peacekeeping training events over a career.**

Even though peacekeeping operations became more prevalent during the last twenty years, an assessment of training events over an officer's career shows that there was minimal preparation for the individual over the long term. The average number of training events per major over their career (average 14.05 years in service) came out to one training event in every one and one-half years (Figure 11). By removing the inflated number of training events reported by the two former combat training center observer controllers<sup>42</sup>, the result was approximately one training event in every two years for each officer.

Further analysis also showed that officers that deployed to a peacekeeping operation executed the majority of the training events conducted. This indicated a surge in training when an individual or unit prepared for deployment to a specific operation. Officers who executed a peacekeeping operation had three times more training as those that did not deploy to a peace operation<sup>43</sup>. This equates to approximately one training event per year of service for those officers that deployed to a peacekeeping operation but only one event every three years for those that did not deploy (Figure 11).

<sup>42</sup> Observer controller training events are extremely high because of the nature of their job is conducting training with units on a daily basis. Keeping the large concentrations of training accumulated by these two officers skews the overall data of the main body of Army officers.

<sup>43</sup> This value computed without the two observer controllers included. If you include the OCs, the result is twice as much training for those that deployed to a peacekeeping operation.

All of this analysis is meaningless if the decisions that officers make in peacekeeping operations are no different from those they make in combat operations. The former peacekeepers in the survey group assessed how many of their decisions seemed similar to those made in a combat environment (Figure 12). Although not conclusive, the analysis suggests that a large portion of their decisions did not directly relate to combat decisions.

**The amount of decisions in a peacekeeping operation that were directly related to a corresponding tactical task.**



### Summary of the Analysis

The United States Army does not instill the same confidence in its officers to make decisions in a peacekeeping operation as it does for a combat operation. Majors are less confident in their ability to be a productive member in a chain of command or a staff in a peacekeeping operation than they are for a combat operation (Figure 2, Comparison A). Majors have about the same confidence levels in their ability for combat whether they have combat experience or not (Figure 2, Comparison E) indicating that the combat focused training methodology is effective for preparation for combat operations. However, officers without operational peacekeeping experience do not have the equivalent level of confidence as those who do have experience (Figure 2, Comparison F). Participation in a peacekeeping operation increases an officer's overall confidence in his abilities to participate in a combat environment more than combat experience prepare him to participate in a peacekeeping environment (Figure 2, Comparison B).

**Figure 12: Former peacekeeper assessment of the amount of decisions in**

Training and education increase an officer's confidence to make sound decisions but correlations between the two are low (Figure 3). Many other factors also influence this. The increase is true for officers with combat experience, without combat experience, and with peacekeeping experience. However, those without peacekeeping experience show a decrease in

confidence as training and education increase (Figure 4). A lack of actual experience or realistic and rigorous training with which to put the individual's knowledge into context is likely the main factor for this.

Majors feel that the Army prepares officers adequately for combat operations under an alert, train, and deploy model. The assessment of the preparation for decision-making in a peacekeeping operation is well below that of combat operations (Figure 5). This is true even for related tactical decisions between the two types of operations (Figure 6). The further that the conditions diverge from a combat environment, the less the Army prepares its officers to conduct sound decision-making (Figures 6, 7, 8). Additionally, the assessment of Army preparation for decision-making when applied against the train, alert, and deploy model indicates that only majors and captains are ready for deployment to a combat operation without additional training. Under this model, lieutenants require additional training before any deployment and captains and majors require some type of pre-deployment training before a peacekeeping operation (Figure 5).

The assessment of Army education shows that the Command and General Staff Officer's Course and personal development through professional publications and books are the only substantial sources of peacekeeping education and knowledge for this group of majors (Figure 9). The analysis of training shows that training surges for those activated to deploy to a peacekeeping operation (Figure 11). Throughout a career, training to prepare leaders to make decisions in a peacekeeping operation is minimal.

#### **IV. DECISION MAKING OF LEADERS IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS**

The following four vignettes demonstrate some of the decision-making issues that arise in a peacekeeping operation with inadequately prepared leaders. The first vignette illustrates what may happen when training experiences do not translate into useable knowledge for application

and modification to changing conditions. The second shows what can happen if a unit fully focused for combat operations does not conduct adequate peacekeeping training before a peace operation. The third example shows some methods used by a unit to mitigate the effects of the insufficient knowledge base of its junior leaders and the final vignette demonstrates the effect that tactical decisions may have on operational objectives.

## **Drill Execution versus Knowledge Application**

Soldiers may not have the time to assimilate and translate a two-week peacekeeping training regimen conducted just before a deployment. The soldiers only learn a drill that applies to a specific set of circumstances because the training never results in a gain of knowledge. Consequently, they may not be able to adapt that training to actual conditions during execution of a mission. The following vignette is an example of executing a drill versus applying knowledge to a new situation.

During the fall of 1996, 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion, 18<sup>th</sup> Infantry as part of SFOR conducted a relief of 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade, 1<sup>st</sup> Armored Division, part of IFOR, in the Brcko region of Bosnia.<sup>44</sup> Part of the relief consisted of transferring operation of the Checkpoint A2 from elements of 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion, 5<sup>th</sup> Cavalry. Checkpoint A2 is located on the Inter Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) separating the Bosnian-Serbs from Bosnian-Muslims on the primary thoroughfare from Croatia to Tuzla to Sarajevo, highway 1-8 or more commonly known to United States soldiers as Route Arizona.

As part of deployment, United States Army units conduct peacekeeping training at United States Army's premier training area in Europe, the Combined Maneuver Training Center at Hohenfels, Germany. Part of this training consisted of how to operate a checkpoint.<sup>45</sup> The training ensured that units could execute checkpoint operations, focusing on checkpoint setup,

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<sup>44</sup> Events as witnessed by the author.

<sup>45</sup> USAREUR Headquarters, *USAREUR HQ AAR: Operation Joint Endeavor, volume 1*, 142-3. The training consisted of five STX lanes: operate a checkpoint, ROE, mine awareness, negotiations, and patrolling.

security, vehicular searches, and personnel searches. The training took place with a minimal amount of traffic transiting the simulated checkpoint and with multiple disruptive and potentially threatening actions by local population portrayed by role players.<sup>46</sup>

Based on his pre-deployment training the new leader of the checkpoint decided to execute the operation just as he learned. However, the specific conditions prevalent at Checkpoint A2 were not the same as those in training. The traffic on MSR Arizona was many magnitudes higher and issues with the population transiting through the checkpoint had significantly grown in the year since its establishment. The result of inappropriate and unnecessary rigid vehicle checks caused traffic to back up for more than four kilometers in both directions. This took an afternoon to unravel and then only after an officer who was experienced with the operation assisted. Instead of facilitating the safe freedom of movement between the entities, the checkpoint instead inhibited the movement.

Although a traffic jam may seem to be a trivial matter, the underlying principle is not. A decision by a junior leader based on minimal experience gained in minimal and drill oriented training caused an unnecessary negative situation. When the situation continued to diverge from his minimal experience base because of his decision, the checkpoint leader proved unable to reach a new solution. His paralysis or ability to think beyond the basics resulted in a small problem localized at Checkpoint A2 turning into the large one affecting traffic five to ten kilometers away.

## **Transition of Focus**

A total focus on heavy combat training with little to no peacekeeping training may lead to inappropriate actions on the part of soldiers. An investigation of A Company, 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion, 504<sup>th</sup> Parachute Infantry discovered multiple instances of actions that violated the principles of restraint

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<sup>46</sup> The author participated in this training before his individual deployment in June 1996.

and legitimacy<sup>47</sup> for peace operations. During the summer of 1999, A Company was part of the force conducting peacekeeping duties in Kosovo. In the process of executing their duties, members of the unit participated in the intimidation, abuse, and beating of the local Albanian population. Some specific examples of the abuses included interrogations while using a hammer on the suspects knees, head butting a deaf-mute because he would not move out of the way fast enough, threatening detainees with knives, and thrusting rifles into detainees heads and bodies. Additional examples include punching civilians in the stomach under orders from officers, holding weapons to civilian's heads and threatening to shoot, and purposeful grabbing of female private parts beyond that needed for a proper search.<sup>48</sup> The protection of these civilians was one of their most important missions.

The Army investigation concluded that these abuses resulted because of a number of related reasons, one of them being training and a second being the perceived mind set of the leadership. The unit did not conduct peacekeeping training in the two months that they had between notification of the operation and deployment, nor did they participate in a Mission Readiness Exercise at the Joint Readiness Training Center. What training they did execute concentrated on high intensity operations and those associated combat tasks that the unit expected to perform. Thus, the unit was not ready to conduct a peace operation upon their arrival to Kosovo. A perception that the chain of command was pro-Serb also affected the action of these soldiers. The investigation also recommended that leaders and soldiers at all levels use back briefs to ensure that everyone understands the assigned and implied tasks of the peacekeeping operation. It also identified the need for better training in crowd control, search techniques, use of force, and rules of engagement.<sup>49</sup> Reports state that the inadequacy of peacekeeping training caused the soldiers

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<sup>47</sup> US Army Training and Doctrine Command, *FM 100-23, Peace Operations*, 15-19. The principles are: objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy.

<sup>48</sup> Joe Burlas, "Report Finds Incidents of Misconduct toward Kosovars," United States Army Public Affairs Release, 29 September 2000, 1.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid*, 2.

to “experience difficulties tempering their combat mentality for adapting and transitioning” to combat to peacekeeping duties.<sup>50</sup> Although only eleven soldiers received punishment for specific abuses, this mindset pervaded the unit. The investigating officer concluded that the misbehavior and abuses contributed to “perpetuating a volatile situation,” which led to further trouble.<sup>51</sup> In fact, if circumstances allowed this to continue the situation could very well have caused the population to turn against their protectors.

## **Mitigating Insufficient Knowledge**

An armor battalion recently returned from Bosnia used a few different techniques to mitigate the effects of insufficient leader training for peacekeeping operations. The battalion operated in a mountainous area that limited the communications ranges of their radios necessitating decentralized operations. To facilitate the decentralized operations of leaders with limited knowledge, the battalion conducted detailed MDMP planning at all levels, followed by in-depth back briefs to the Battalion Commander, and extensive rehearsals. The main product resulting from the planning was an execution/decision matrix<sup>52</sup>. This tool contained execution instructions for the most likely situation as well as the most dangerous situation. Soldiers down to section level used the matrixes. A soldier could look at the matrix to determine what to do in a given situation. However, if the soldier could think of a better solution then he was free to use it.<sup>53</sup>

The matrixes became less detailed as the soldiers developed their knowledge through the conduct of operations and therefore less control was necessary. It took approximately two months for the soldiers to make the full transition to peacekeeping operations. The battalion

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<sup>50</sup> Associated Press, “U.S. Unit Lacked Training for Kosovo,” (Washington, 18 September 2000), 2. The article shows the material in quotes as coming directly out of the Army investigative report.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid, 2. The article shows the material in quotes as coming directly out of the Army investigative report.

<sup>52</sup> See example in Appendix 8.

<sup>53</sup> MAJ Kevin Dunlop, interview by author, Fort Stewart, GA, 1 February 2002. MAJ Dunlop was the S3 of the battalion and has extensive experience in peacekeeping operations at battalion and below. He conducted the initial entry into Bosnia as a Tank Company Commander in December 1995 (to May 1996) as well as the SFOR rotation (September 2000 to March 2001).

conducted platoon and company situational training lanes, participated in division exercises, and conducted officer professional development classes on the area of operations, and the history of the area in preparation for the operation. They also participated in a mission readiness exercise (MRE) at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) with limited gains in knowledge at the platoon and company level because the focus was on the conduct of drills and not on leader development. The greatest source of learning was during the period following the unit's redeployment capstone exercise on the transfer of authority (TOA). Watching the unit they were to relieve conduct real operations was the best situational training that the leaders of the unit conducted.<sup>54</sup>

This unit did not have any crisis arise due to poor decision-making. However, the vignette illustrates the elementary state of knowledge that soldiers begin peacekeeping operations with and what a battalion did to mitigate it. Even though this unit conducted a significant amount of peacekeeping training just before their deployment, it still took up to two months of on-the-job training to incorporate the information from that intensive training period into operational knowledge for use in decision-making. Because the leaders did not have this operational knowledge base to make RPD decisions, there was a reliance on analytical methods of decision-making to anticipate future situations and posit possible solutions for that future. This approach can work when the primary planner possesses a solid foundation of knowledge to use in his analysis. However, the system breaks down if the planner (defacto decision-maker) does not anticipate events correctly and the executers do not know how to respond to the unanticipated situation.

### **Tactical Decision with Operational Effect**

On April 24 1998, a riot raged in the Bosnian town of Dvar which SFOR peacekeepers brought under control but not before the organizers of the riot achieved their basic objectives.

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<sup>54</sup> Ibid. These are Major Dunlop's assessments.

The riot of Bosnian-Croats was not spontaneous but organized from impassioned citizens and augmented from external forces to achieve political aims. The Croats accomplished all of these objectives except for killing someone or having one of the rioters killed and martyred by SFOR. The formation of the mob achieved surprise and the mob organizers assembled superior numbers in time and space before security forces could take preventative measures.<sup>55</sup> They beat the Serb mayor, burned the city hall, burned the international complex, and drove the international community out of the city. They also burned the housing reclaimed for repatriated Serb families, which convinced the returning Serb families they did not want to return yet. Overall, they significantly set back the return to normalcy for this region.<sup>56</sup>

The original population of Dvar was predominately Bosnian-Serb (about 17,000) but during the prosecution of the Bosnian War the town's population became Bosnian-Croat.<sup>57</sup> The SFOR mission at the time of the incident was the resettlement of the original inhabitants back to their homes. In April, the town's demographic consisted of an elderly Bosnian-Serb couple with approximately 100 additional families in the outskirts of the city and approximately 7,000 Bosnian-Croats hostile to the resettlement plan because it would mean the loss of their current living arrangements. The town police chief, deputy mayor, and the regional police chief were Bosnian-Croat but because of absentee voting rules, the mayor of this Croat town was a Serb. This was the operational environment of MAJ Howard Combs and Charles Company, 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion, Royal Canadian Regiment.

On the morning of 16 April, neighbors discovered the murdered remains of the Serb couple. Major Combs reacted quickly to verify and secure the crime scene and ensure control of the

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<sup>55</sup> This is an example of the OODA loop used in the protagonists favor in a peacekeeping operation.

<sup>56</sup> Swain, Richard, Draft chapter of an unpublished work tentatively title *Leadership in Peace Operations*, manuscript received from Major Howard Combs (see next note).

<sup>57</sup> MAJ Howard Combs, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 22 March 2002. All further details concerning the Dvar riot are attributable to Major Combs unless otherwise noted. Although Major Combs is a Canadian military officer the illustration is really about a former US military officer and the effects of his decisions. Major Combs believes that the Canadian forces also do not do enough to prepare their leaders for peacekeeping operations and admits that he missed the signs pointing to the eventual riot.

situation. The beginnings of a crowd was already forming as police marked the area off with crime tape and the bodies of the victims were brought outside and covered with a tarp. The emphasis of the police investigation centered on posting the crime scene tape, minimal real police work occurred.<sup>58</sup> This was the situation when the Special Envoy of the High Representative arrived. He brought the training and background of a former United States military officer along with him. Major Combs attributes the subsequent actions of the Special Envoy as precipitating the riot eight days later.

The Special Envoy's actions may be appropriate when dealing with a military organization but perhaps they were not the best actions to take in this potentially explosive civil environment. He introduced himself to the public scene by "loudly and blusteringly" demanding "What's going on here? What's happening?" while chewing on a large cigar. He then tore the tarp off the victims and examined them as he publicly and loudly stated that he was "going to fire everybody" and then he promptly fired the police chief. For the next ninety minutes, he continued with the public theatrics as he and his assistants inadvertently destroyed the crime scene while the rain continued to fall on the uncovered victims. By early evening, an ambulance arrived and transported the bodies to Sarajevo and the Special Envoy and his retinue departed.

Major Combs attributes the actions and decisions of the Special Envoy for escalating a tense situation into a riot. The public and inflammatory demonstration assisted in raising the passions of the local citizens. This produced a highly charged environment that supported the formation of a mob by external agitators. Additionally, the public and off-hand sacking of the Bosnian-Croat deputy mayor and police chief, and regional police chief but not the Bosnian-Serb mayor created a perception of choosing sides and a loss of neutrality of SFOR forces. These individuals probably did warrant firing, but the choice of method escalated a bad situation. The immediate problem should have been to deescalate the situation and then resolve the long-term obstacles to

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<sup>58</sup> The primary force responsible for maintaining law and order in the area was the local police.

the larger problem of resettlement. Dvar was making progress, although slowly, to the conditions of normalcy envisioned by the Dayton Accords. It took the tactical decisions of only one individual to destroy those gains already made toward the operational objective.

## V. IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

On 12 October 1999, Army Chief of Staff, General Eric K. Shinseki, unveiled his vision<sup>59</sup> for the future of the United States Army. In his vision, the pre-conflict paradigm of alert, train, and deploy becomes train, alert, and deploy.<sup>60</sup> At first glance, this small juxtaposition of words may look superficial but this simple change in wording has a significant import to the way in which the Army mans its units and prepares its soldiers for their responsibilities. It is a vision that fundamentally changes not only the way that the Army looks but also the way that it thinks, fights, and prepares for operations. Train, alert, and deploy is a return to the classic model, a return that requires broad based training since operational conditions are more varied than at any time since World War II.

In the *United States Army White Paper: Concepts for the Objective Force*, the Chief of Staff of the Army makes repeated references to the range or spectrum of Army operations and to the importance of leaders and soldiers as the key to success in these operations. In a paper that is twenty-three pages long there are twenty-four references to the spectrum of Army operations. The paper defines the full range of operations when it uses the following terms and phrases: major theater of war, counter terrorism, offense, defense, homeland security, stability, peacekeeping, war fighting, forced entry, combined arms, air-ground operations, and day and night operations. Additionally it lists open, close, complex, urban, and all other terrain, small scale contingency, interagency, support, mounted, dismounted, vertical, organic combined arms

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<sup>59</sup> GEN Eric K. Shinseki, (CSA), *United States Army White Paper: Concepts for the Objective Force* (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 1999), ii.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid*, 12.

at lowest level, light, heavy, and lower echelons doing things that higher echelons normally do e.g. battalions doing things brigades would otherwise execute. This is a large cross section of activities for leaders to have an adequate skill level and base of knowledge on which to make decisions. Accordingly, the *White Paper* cites the importance of leaders in the successful implementation of operations an additional twenty-four times.<sup>61</sup> Many of the items in this list are already occurring in the field today. Operation Joint Endeavor (IFOR) AAR findings indicate the surprise of leaders at the increased range of responsibilities inherent in this mission. Brigade Commanders felt like Division Commanders, Task Force Commanders had an integral part in international politics, and Lieutenants had to interpret international treaties to the Former Warring Factions in Bosnia. The conclusion from this was that the Army required younger generalists.<sup>62</sup>

Based on the return to the paradigm of train, alert, and deploy the United States Army no longer has the benefit of four to six weeks to conduct transition training from a combat focus to a peacekeeping focus.<sup>63</sup> Leaders must “arrive immediately capable of conducting simultaneous, distributed” operations.<sup>64</sup> All leaders must be prepared to operate in all environments with a greatly expanded range of operations and skill to some minimum standard.

The minimum standard of preparation that results in successful Army operations is sound and timely decision-making from its leaders. The naturalistic decision-making method of Recognition Primed Decision-making is a critical skill for staying ahead of a protagonist and to anticipating and recognizing events and situations and making decisions that are of a high risk/low time nature. RPD decision-making requires an appropriate broad base of knowledge for effective utilization. The research for this monograph indicates that Army leaders are not prepared for and do not possess adequate knowledge for peacekeeping. In short, the Army does not currently prepare its leaders for adequately full spectrum operations.

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<sup>61</sup> Ibid, ii-21.

<sup>62</sup> USAREUR Headquarters, *USAREUR HQ AAR: Operation Joint Endeavor, volume 1, xiv.*

<sup>63</sup> US Army Training and Doctrine Command, *FM 100-23, Peace Operations*, 87

<sup>64</sup> GEN Eric K. Shinseki, (CSA), *United States Army White Paper: Concepts for the Objective Force*, iv.

The argument presented here is not to refocus United States Army training from combat missions to peacekeeping missions nor is it to constitute a separate peacekeeping force. What must happen is to increase peacekeeping skills within the officer corps while maintaining the focus of winning wars. The breadth of the knowledge base of Army leaders must expand to encompass all aspects of the battlefield. The goal is not to add more to a full plate but to make better use of time and resources available in an integrated approach. This will require substantial changes in the way in which the Army does business. Already there is concern over a loss of tactical skills in junior officers<sup>65</sup> that will compound as they move up the ranks. Since time is a critical resource, leaders must find creative ways to use the available time to prepare decision-makers for full spectrum operations, including peacekeeping.

A logical first step is to understand the inseparable link between peace operations and combat operations. Army leaders must view peace operations as a part of a whole and not as a separate activity that occurs only when ordered and then is considered a distracter. The Army knows how to put the right emphasis in training to solve discrete problems including this one. For example, in the late 1980s, the Army made a concerted effort to increase the consciousness of safety and risk management in training. By the early 1990s, the Army established the goal that risk management integrates into all Army processes, both on and off duty, for the individual and the unit.<sup>66</sup> Because of command emphasis from the highest level, leaders at all other levels ensured that they analyzed and addressed safety and risk management in everything they did. All briefings contained risk analysis, five paragraph operations orders for a time included paragraph six-risk, tools developed to assist and document analysis, safety officer became more than a title

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<sup>65</sup> Maren Leed, *Keeping the Warfighting Edge: An Empirical Analysis of Army Officer's Tactical Experience over the 1990s*, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Graduate School, 2000). Leeds' study of armor and infantry Lieutenants documents the decrease in junior leader tactical proficiency over the 1990s. Some of the issues attributed to this degradation include: less time in position, less field training time, less proficient trainers, and compressed training that does not allow assimilation of the experience.

<sup>66</sup> US Army Training and Doctrine Command, *FM 100-14, Risk Management*, (Washington DC: Department of the Army, April 1998), iii. The introduction of this manual explains the thought process and concept for instilling a safety consciousness within the Army. Specific examples listed are from the author's experience during that period.

and additional duty, slogans developed, and even red dots on watches reminded the wearer to think safety. The effort did result in better safety records but more importantly, it inculcated the matter of addressing risk into the entire force.<sup>67</sup> Today there is no separate paragraph for risk or safety. Plans address these elements throughout because these items became an integral and inseparable part of the whole. Risk addressed in operations is second nature to contemporary leaders.

A similar conversion must occur with respect to peace operations. Peace operations are not separable from the battlefield<sup>68</sup> but are an integral aspect of operations that in some cases become the dominant aspect. Consideration of the elements of peace operations must become second nature. The Army made a start in this direction with the addition of a *C* (Civil) to its mission analysis mnemonic METT-TC (Mission, Equipment, Troops, Terrain, Time, Civil) but this in itself is not sufficient. All operations orders must address peacekeeping aspects of the battlefield. Commanders and Operations Officers have to integrate and synchronize peace operations. They must ensure that the staff members whose primary focus is peacekeeping tasks are integral parts of the battle staff at all times and not just for a peace operation. By including peacekeeping aspects into combat training, the Army will build the requisite knowledge base for these and full spectrum operations in all of its leaders not just a select few without losing its primary focus of winning wars.

## **Institutional Training**

The three pillars of leader development, institutional training, self development, and operational assignments, remains a viable model for producing effective leaders. The activities conducted within each pillar to prepare soldiers for their responsibilities must change in order to

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<sup>67</sup> Ibid, iii. Some might saw that the process went too far and caused a risk averse force but addressing risk should make a leader more willing to accept risk because he understands the possible consequences of it.

<sup>68</sup> Desert Storm was a generally sterile battlefield in regard to peace operations. Unless a war is in a desert or high mountain area this will not be the case.

build better and broader decision-making skills. In the view of the surveyed majors, Army educational institutions, except for the Command and General Staff Officer Course,<sup>69</sup> are insignificant in the preparation of leaders for decision-making in a peace operation. A base knowledge set received as part of officer education (versus officer training which is what mainly occurs at basic and advanced officer courses) will provide the brand new lieutenant and the partly seasoned captain with a more significant knowledge base which he can then apply during training at his unit.

Specific education of officers may have to begin earlier than the Officer Basic Course. Current commissioning policies require all cadets to complete an undergraduate degree of any variety before commissioning occurs. Perhaps the Army should revise this policy to a system where specific degree disciplines match certain branches. An additional option to improving the basic knowledge of incoming officers might be to complete a masters program before entering the active force. The right education at the beginning of a career provides the initial foundation of knowledge that the Army can then build upon to develop effective decision-makers.

## **Self Development**

The pillar of self-development needs little change. In fact, this method of officer development only requires command emphasis to revitalize it as a viable learning experience. Until CGSOC, reading books and articles on peacekeeping operations was the primary source of information for the survey group, even then, 37% of the officers received minimal education value from this, 42% received some value, and less than 5% gained a lot of benefit (Figure 9).<sup>70</sup>

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<sup>69</sup> The following is an anonymous comment attached to one of the CGSOC surveys: “Although I lack PKO experience, I feel that I can still make sound decisions by learning, accessing, and responding on ‘the fly’ as I have had to do in other environments in the past. This is obviously not the ‘preferred’ technique as I would want to have a sound knowledge base on PKO before conducting PKO. Unfortunately, a number of my CGSOC classmates and I have not found much in the way of PKO TTPs/T&OEs to assist us with PKO requirements at CGSOC. I am told by my peers with PKO experience that there is not a whole lot out there on PKO and units ‘borrow’ SOPs/TTP from other units that have PKO experience.”

<sup>70</sup> Percentages listed here are an average of the values for professional articles and books listed in figure 9.

The belief that self-development is an individual matter is a fallacy. It is this belief that makes this pillar very weak. Self-development is in fact a group effort if the individual is to maximize the learning. Leaders must assist the individual with what subject areas to work on and discipline them to execute their personal development program to increase the effectiveness. Most professional development programs that do exist consist of reading professional books, articles, and doctrine. But, it is not the process of reading where the true learning takes place. Real learning occurs with synthesis. Although the individual can do this alone, it is not the best method. Full synthesis results from discussion of the read material and associated concepts either in a small group moderated by the individual's leader, by informal discussion with peers, or by discussion with a mentor.<sup>71</sup> Once viable programs begin, leaders can guide soldiers into a variety of subject areas that can and should include peace operations.

## **Operational Assignments**

The primary method of leader development is on-the-job training and the best experience is operational experience. This remains true because the best way to learn is by doing. The survey data indicated that participation in a peacekeeping operation not only increased the decision-making confidence in peacekeeping but also increased it for combat operations. As practicable, unit commanders conducting a peace operation must do their best to rotate the maximum number of soldiers to the operation not as primary staff or commanders but in a secondary staff role where they can gain experience but not let their inexperience hinder the mission.<sup>72</sup> However, this

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<sup>71</sup> Assisting the mentored with the synthesis of information into knowledge that can then be used is one of the key functions of a mentor. However, until the Army can overcome its inability to develop mentors there will be little impact.

<sup>72</sup> COL (ret) Greg Fontenoit, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 15 March 2002. 1<sup>st</sup> BDE, 1<sup>st</sup> AD did this during their year as part of IFOR in Bosnia (Dec95-Dec96). Two of the brigade's battalions deployed as part of the mission and one remained in Germany. Once the situation stabilized, the Brigade Commander rotated staff officers from this battalion and the rear detachment officers from the deployed battalions for two to three month stints as an assistant S3 on the brigade or battalion staffs. This maximized the experience gained within the brigade, built a bond between the deployed and stay behind units, and eased later transitions as duty positions changed. (Author was the BDE Ass't S3/Plans during this period).

cannot become a management numbers game where everybody has to check the block on his or her Officer Record Brief. The Army should be careful in rotating officers in and out of a peacekeeping operation in mass just to maximize experience and manage numbers on the books. The rapid rotation of commanders during the Vietnam War got every body the experience ribbon but proved less than satisfactory on the ground. Combat units rarely enjoyed benefit of experience of their commanders, because once a commander had experience, they were rotated. The Army must seek to maximize operational participation without impinging on the mission.

If operational experience is not available then the next best thing is rigorous training. Survey information indicated that Army leaders lack confidence in peacekeeping decision-making, which may be because of insufficient rigor in this aspect of training. The Combat Training Center (CTC) program creates the most realistic environment for tactical units to train for war. The rigor imposed on the training unit is the critical component that makes the conduct of CTC training so successful as demonstrated in Operation Desert Storm. All three of the CTCs incorporate some variety of peace operations into the training scenario. At the National Training Center (NTC), units contend with terrorist activities, media queries, anti-United States demonstrations, etc as they conduct RSOI operations preparatory to combat training. However, many commanders treat this aspect of the training as a minor sideshow, a distraction, or just ignore the events.<sup>73</sup> If equipment draw goes slow, these events are the first thing to drop from the schedule because they do not constitute war fighting. Even when done to the fullest, only a small fraction of the training brigade's soldiers accrue any experience from it.

There is a need for rigorous peacekeeping training short of an operational deployment. The rudiments for effort already exist at the CTCs. The issue is the mindset of the leaders and trainers. Even in an actual combat operation, a leader cannot ignore those aspects that have more of a

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<sup>73</sup> Observed while an observer controller/trainer at the NTC from July 1997 through June 2000.

peacekeeping focus than battle focus.<sup>74</sup> The standards for peacekeeping events must be as rigorous as any other training event with realistic changes to the scenario situation as appropriate or inappropriate responses to events occur. There is much more to the battlefield environment than combatant operations. Most battlefields are not sterile simple systems but are very complex systems containing local populations, both friendly and unfriendly, international media, government and non-government organizations and eventually, the combat has to come to an end. Perhaps by changing the name of the combat training centers to full spectrum training centers the training focus will encompass the entire complex battlefield.

The Army also needs to increase the rigor for peacekeeping operations in the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP), an equivalent program to the CTCs. Corps and division commanders execute combat operations in simulation in this program. Higher headquarters operations orders usually consist of operational phases to deploy and stage, conduct a combat operation, transition to peace operations, and redeploy. The orders do not publish the transition to peace and redeploy phases since the simulation cannot replicate these activities. Because of this most units do minimal or no planning for these phases and concentrate solely on the combat portion of the operation.<sup>75</sup> Division and Corps Commander decision-making driven by the combat simulation is the correct focus of the BCTP program but units will accrue more benefit as an organization if they do not ignore the post combat portions of the operation. Functional division and corps staffs plan the next fight concurrent with the execution of the present fight. The combat phase of the exercise should conclude with the issue of a fully developed plan for the next phase, in this case a peace operation. Although execution of the plan would not occur, observer controllers and higher headquarters could evaluate its suitability and provide feedback to

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<sup>74</sup> Aspects of peace operations exist in combat operations to some degree depending on the nature of the operation and the operational environment. FM 3-0 recognizes this (see diagram of full spectrum operations, Appendix A)

<sup>75</sup> Observation of SAMS students who attended BCTP exercises from September 2001 through March 2002.

the unit. This would not only provide the unit staffs experience in planning a peace operation under rigorous and changing conditions but would also fully exercise the current operations-future operations functions of the staff.

Unit Officer Professional Development programs do little to train officers for peace operations. Survey data indicated that on average each officer participated in just two sessions devoted to peace operations in their fourteen-year careers. An OPD program can have large gains in skills and knowledge with little resources expended. A unit that dedicates an hour a week for short to the point classes can cover up to fifty-two topics in a year. If just 10% of these classes taught aspects of peacekeeping operations, officers would increase their exposure rate from two sessions in fourteen years to seventy sessions in fourteen years. Even knowing that many of the seventy sessions would fall off the calendar because of training events and deployments, the results would still be better than twice in fourteen years. Thus, a simple but broad OPD program can have tremendous impact on the preparation of officers for full spectrum operations.<sup>76</sup>

### **Other Areas for Examination**

The Army understands these issues discussed in this monograph and is currently in the process of addressing the dynamics of training for full spectrum operations. One of the revitalization methods is through the reintroduction and emphasis of the *Warrior Ethos*.<sup>77</sup> Warrior Ethos stresses personal determination, loyalty to your buddies and country, and an emphasis on fighting and combat. The concept is sound and the Army needs it but it is too narrow. Should it be a *Soldier Ethos*? Connotations of a warrior include a fierce individual who fights battles for his people and for personal glory. On the other hand, a soldier is a disciplined member of an organized unit that fights fiercely when called upon but also accomplishes any

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<sup>76</sup> Unit leaders that believe in training their subordinate leaders will make time in a schedule to do this. My personal experience in why OPD programs are not effective is a lack of creativity in determining topics and lack of skills in potential topic areas of the trainer.

<sup>77</sup> See Appendix 9 for the complete aspects of Warrior Ethos.

other mission that arises. Roman soldiers consistently defeated and subjugated the European and Middle East warriors on the field of battle, built the empire, and maintained peace in the conquered lands. What the Army truly need is the Soldier Ethos because our nation requires soldiers that are equally effective across the full spectrum of operations.

Another consideration for study by the Army is to determine when a leader possesses sufficient skills and knowledge to be an effective decision-maker. Survey data indicate that preparation of lieutenants is not adequate for peacekeeping operations. Additionally, the Army has concerns about the level of expertise of lieutenants in combat operations.<sup>78</sup> Peace operations are a part of full spectrum operations that Objective Force units must be ready to execute on a moments notice. Can a brand new lieutenant immediately hold the position of platoon leader when the menu that he has to manage includes but is not limited to operations across the full spectrum, decentralized execution, task organization at the lowest levels, increased technology and lower units conducting functions currently done one to two levels higher? Perhaps it is time for the Army to review personnel and career progression paradigms.

Increasingly, critical decisions and missions are falling on the Army's least experienced leaders for execution. Perhaps lieutenants should learn the skills of a platoon leader through an apprenticeship program as an additional officer in a platoon or as an enlisted soldier. Alternatively, perhaps officers become platoon leaders and company commanders much later in their careers in order to gain the necessary skills and knowledge to be the most effective in those critical positions. The goal should be platoon leaders and company commanders who do not need to learn their duties on-the-job and should therefore be more effective in his decision-making thereby increasing the overall effectiveness and lethality of the Army.

The United States Army must look at the way that it develops leaders for decision-making in combat operations and in peace operations. This research effort suggests that soldiers are not

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<sup>78</sup> Maren Leed, *Keeping the Warfighting Edge: An Empirical Analysis of Army Officer's Tactical Experience over the 1990s*.

confident with the current preparation that the Army provides for peace operations. Although the focus must remain on combat, leaders cannot ignore other aspects of the battlefield. The Army must find ways to integrate operations training to ensure we have leaders that are effective in any environment. Execution of full spectrum operations with little or no notice may require the Army to change officer education requirements and programs, revitalize officer personal development programs, and add rigor to all aspects of the training environment. Winning war must continue to be the primary mission of the Army but training for combat must not exclude all of the other aspects of the battlefield.

# APPENDIX 1: THE RANGE OF ARMY OPERATIONS




Figure 13. The Range of US Army Operations<sup>79</sup>




Figure 14. Full Spectrum Operations<sup>80</sup>

<sup>79</sup> US Army Training and Doctrine Command. *FM 3-0, Operations, 1-15.*

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid*, 1-16.

## APPENDIX 2: THE MILITARY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS MODEL OF ANALYTICAL DECISION-MAKING




Figure 15. The United States Army Military Decision-Making Process<sup>81</sup>

<sup>81</sup> US Army Training and Doctrine Command, *FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations*, 5-2.

## APPENDIX 3: MASTER QUESTIONS TO TEST THE HYPOTHESIS

1. Primary Question: Does United States Army training prepare leaders for decision-making in a peacekeeping operation?

### Elements of the Question

- a. Amount of training
  - b. Self assessment of decision-making ability in peacekeeping
  - c. Assessment of peers and subordinates in peacekeeping decision-making
2. Supporting Question: Does United States Army training prepare leaders for decision-making in a combat operation?


### Elements of the Question

- a. Self-assessment of training readiness
  - b. Self assessment of decision-making ability in tactical combat operations
  - c. Assessment of peers and subordinates in tactical combat decision-making
3. Supporting Question: In a peacekeeping operation, are there a significant amount of decisions that are not directly related to combat tactical training?

### Elements of the Question

- a. Peacekeeping experience
  - b. Assessment of peacekeeping versus tactical decisions
4. Analysis to check above questions:
    - a. Determine if above questions are influenced or stratify by branch: combat, combat service, combat service support.
    - b. Determine if there is a difference for question#1 depending on the time period of the operation executed.
    - c. Determine if there is a difference in the ability to make decisions between people with and without peacekeeping experience and with combat experience.

## APPENDIX 4: PLANNED SURVEY DATA ANALYSIS



## APPENDIX 5: SURVEY WITH CROSSWALK OF INDIVIDUAL QUESTIONS WITH MASTER QUESTIONS

UNITED STATES ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE  
SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES  
Survey of United States Army Peacekeeping Training

Dear fellow officer,

You have just been handed this packet and you are now thinking, “not another survey.” I know; I was in your position last year. I need your help because you have the necessary information to answer some questions that will then help the Army become a better and more able organization.

We all know that the Army is in the process of transforming into the Objective Force. What is not necessarily figured out yet is how that transformation will take place, and how it will look at the end. I am attempting, with your help, to try to determine some recommendations for transformation in the area of training by looking at how the Army transformed from a cold war combat focus to a peacekeeping focus.

Some of the questions require a hard appraisal of the Army, your former units, fellow soldiers, and yourself. Please be honest in your answers. Nothing you say can come directly back to you because your answers are 100% anonymous. There are no names or student numbers involved. However, indirect affects could occur because of inaccurate assessment from bad information.

The questionnaire should take approximately 30 minutes to complete.

**Principle Purpose:** To provide raw data for a SAMS Monograph, to be submitted in part completion of the requirements for an MMAS degree course.

**Routine Use:** The survey is anonymous. The results will be used solely by the author to support his hypothesis. Data will be presented in appendices to the monograph.

**Disclosure:** Providing information on this survey is voluntary, some of the questions are of a very personal nature. If you feel at all uneasy about answering any question, do not give a response and move on to the next question. All information provided will be treated as confidential.

Please give your answers some thought. Thank you for your help and time.

MAJ Mike Pappal  
Armor, SAMS

Encl  
Survey (4 pages)

**Demographics**

1. Time in Service: \_\_\_\_\_ Establishes Population
2. Branch: \_\_\_\_\_ Master Question 4A
3. Have you ever been part of a combat operation? Yes / No Master Question 4C
4. Have you ever been part of a peacekeeping operation? Yes / No Master Question 3A and 4B
5. If yes to above:
  - a. Which operation(s)? \_\_\_\_\_
  - b. Date Deployed? \_\_\_\_\_ Date Redeployed? \_\_\_\_\_
  - c. What was your rank when you deployed to the first operation? 2LT 1LT CPT MAJ
  - d. What position/job did you hold the majority of the deployment?  
\_\_\_\_\_

**Training**

Training Categories	6. Approximately, how many times in your career did you participate in peacekeeping related training in the following categories? (Answer with a number for each category in the column)	7. Approximately, how many times before deploying to your first peacekeeping operation did you participate in peacekeeping related training in the following categories? (Answer with a number for each category in the column. If No peacekeeping operation mark box (a) and go to question 8.)
(a) No Peacekeeping Operation		
(b) Mission Readiness Exercise(s)	<span style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">Master Question 1A</span>	
(c) Home Station Training Exercise(s) with peacekeeping involved		
(d) NTC, JRTC, or CMTC rotation(s) with a major emphasis on peacekeeping		
(e) NTC, JRTC, or CMTC rotation(s) with some peacekeeping involved		
(f) Officer Professional Development class(es) focused on peacekeeping		
(g) Mentoring Session(s) focused on peacekeeping		
(h) Other (Please Specify)		

8. Of training you listed in question #6 (your career), approximately, how much concerned peacekeeping operations that do not have a corresponding tactical task? For example, negotiation, compliance inspection, mediation, and provide humanitarian assistance have no traditional tactical combat tasks associated with them but patrol a street and conduct convoy operations do. (Circle one)

Master Question 1A

- 0-10%    11-25%    26-40%    41-60%    61-75%    75-90%    90-100%

9. Of training you listed in question #7 (before deployment), approximately, how much concerned peacekeeping operations that did not have a corresponding tactical task? (Circle one)

0-10%    11-25%    26-40%    41-60%    61-75%    75-90%    90-100%    NA

Master  
Question  
1A

10. Currently in your career, how much education and training in peacekeeping have you had from the following sources? (circle one for each area)

Use the following scale: (1) None or did not attend

(2) Minimal

(3) Some

(4) A lot

None/  
Did not attend

Minimal

Some

A lot

Master  
Question  
1A

- |                                       |     |     |     |     |
|---------------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| a. Officer Basic Course               | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| b. Officer Career Course/ CAS3        | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| c. CGSOC                              | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| d. Other Service School               | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| e. College                            | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| f. Professional Articles/Publications | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| g. Books                              | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| h. Civilian Professional Experience   | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| i. Other: (Please Specify): _____     |     |     |     |     |

11. Before your first peacekeeping operation, how much education and training in peacekeeping did you receive from the following sources? (circle one for each area. If you have not been on a peacekeeping operation check here \_\_\_\_\_ and go to question # 12)

Use the following scale: (1) None or did not attend

(2) Minimal

(3) Some

(4) A lot

None/  
Did not attend

Minimal

Some

A lot

Master  
Question  
1A

- |                                       |     |     |     |     |
|---------------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| a. Officer Basic Course               | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| b. Officer Career Course/ CAS3        | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| c. CGSOC                              | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| d. Other Service School               | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| e. College                            | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| f. Professional Articles/Publications | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| g. Books                              | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| h. Civilian Professional Experience   | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| i. Other: (Please Specify): _____     |     |     |     |     |

Master  
Question  
2A

12. I can deploy to a combat operation tomorrow as a fully productive member of the chain of command or supporting staff and execute missions with little guidance. (Circle one)

(1) Strongly agree    (2) Agree    (3) Neither agree or disagree    (4) Disagree    (5) Strongly disagree

13. I can deploy to a peacekeeping operation tomorrow as a fully productive member of the chain of command or supporting staff and execute missions with little guidance. (Circle one)

(1) Strongly agree    (2) Agree    (3) Neither agree or disagree    (4) Disagree    (5) Strongly disagree

Master  
Question  
1A

**Decision-Making**

14. I am confident that I can make sound life-and-death tactical decisions in a combat environment. (Circle one)

Master Question 2B

- (1) Strongly agree (2) Agree (3) Neither agree or disagree (4) Disagree (5) Strongly disagree

15. I am confident that I can make sound tactical decisions that affect the lives of my soldiers in a peacekeeping environment. (Circle one)

Master Question 1B

- (1) Strongly agree (2) Agree (3) Neither agree or disagree (4) Disagree (5) Strongly disagree

16. I am confident that I can make sound decisions that affect the lives the local population in a peacekeeping environment. (Circle one)

Master Question 1B

- (1) Strongly agree (2) Agree (3) Neither agree or disagree (4) Disagree (5) Strongly disagree

17. I am confident that I can make sound decisions that have operational or strategic impact on the long-term success of a peacekeeping operation. (Circle one)

Master Question 1B (variation on survey question 22)

- (1) Strongly agree (2) Agree (3) Neither agree or disagree (4) Disagree (5) Strongly disagree

18. When I participated in a peacekeeping operation, the percentage of decisions I made that were directly related to traditional combat tactical tasks was approximately \_\_\_\_\_. (Circle one)

Master Question 3B

- 0%/NA 1-10% 11-25% 26-40% 41-60% 61-75% 75-90% 90-100%

19. When I participated in a peacekeeping operation, I \_\_\_\_\_ made decisions of an operational and/or strategic nature that had an impact on the long-term objectives of the operation. (Circle one to fill in the blank)

Differentiate survey question 23

- (1) Never (2) Rarely (3) Sometimes (4) Often (5) NA

20. When I participated in a peacekeeping operation, I felt confident in my ability to make sound decisions of a traditional tactical nature. (Circle one)

Master Question 1B

- (1) Strongly agree (2) Agree (3) Neither agree (4) Disagree (5) Strongly disagree (6) NA or disagree

21. When I participated in a peacekeeping operation, I felt confident in my ability to make sound decisions in situations that are not related to traditional combat tasks. (Circle one)

Master Question 1B (variation of survey Q-20)

- (1) Strongly agree (2) Agree (3) Neither agree (4) Disagree (5) Strongly disagree (6) NA or disagree

22. When I participated in a peacekeeping operation, I felt confident in my ability to make sound decisions in situations could have an operational or strategic impact on the operation's objectives. (Circle one)

Master Question 1B (variation of survey Q-20)

- (1) Strongly agree (2) Agree (3) Neither agree (4) Disagree (5) Strongly disagree (6) NA or disagree

23. When I participated in a peacekeeping operation, the amount of decisions I made that were not directly related to a traditional combat task or were of an operational or strategic nature was \_\_\_\_\_. (Circle one)

Check for survey question 18

- 0%/NA 1-10% 11-25% 26-40% 41-60% 61-75% 75-90% 90-100%

24. How well do you think the Army prepares its officers for decision-making in the following categories?  
 (Circle one) Use the following scale:

- (1) Does not prepare
- (2) Minimal preparation
- (3) Somewhat prepares
- (4) Mostly prepares
- (5) Fully prepares

Does not prepare  
 Minimal Preparation  
 Somewhat prepares  
 Mostly prepares  
 Fully prepares

Master question						
2C	a. Majors making tactical combat decisions	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
1C	b. Majors making traditional tactical decisions in a peacekeeping environment	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
1C	c. Majors making non-tactical peacekeeping decisions in a peacekeeping environment	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
1C	d. Majors making peace-keeping decisions of an operational nature	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
2C	e. Captains making combat tactical decisions	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
1C	f. Captains making traditional tactical decisions in a peacekeeping environment	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
1C	g. Captains making non-tactical peace-keeping decisions in a peacekeeping environment	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
1C	h. Captains making peace-keeping decisions of an operational nature	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
2C	i. Lieutenants making combat tactical decisions	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
1C	j. Lieutenants making traditional tactical decisions in a peacekeeping environment	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
1C	k. Lieutenants making non-tactical peace-keeping decisions in a peacekeeping environment	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
1C	l. Lieutenants making peace-keeping decisions of an operational nature	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)

Thank you for taking the time and thought to answer these questions. If you wish to clarify any of your answers or provide any additional related information, please use this area to do so.

## APPENDIX 6: SURVEY CATEGORY DECISION MATRIXES

### Peacekeeping Education

Scoring Education Subcategory	0	1	2	3	4
(A) Basic Course	No Answer	Minimal	Some	A Lot	X
(B) Advanced Course	No Answer	Minimal	Some	A Lot	X
(C) CGSOC	No Answer	Minimal	Some	A Lot	X
(D) Other Service School	No Answer	Minimal	Some	A Lot	Devoted
(E) Civilian Degree Relating to Peacekeeping	No Answer	X	Some Courses	X	Directly Related
(F) Civilian Experience Relating to Peacekeeping	No Answer	X	Some Relation	Directly Related	X
(G) Reading Articles	No Answer	Few	Some	A Lot	X
(H) Reading Books	No Answer	Few	Some	A Lot	X
(I) Other	No Answer	Assessment			

Scoring: Add the scores of rows A through I. Divide based on level of military education at time of first peacekeeping deployment: five if O-4, four if O-3, and three if O-1 or O-2. Round to nearest whole number. Education experience values are then determined: zero equals no education, one equals minimal education, two equals some education, and three or more equals a lot of education.

## Peacekeeping Training

Scoring Training Subcategory	0	1	2	3	4
(L) Mission Readiness Exercise	None	1	2-3	4-5	6+
(M) Home Station Training	None	1	2-4	5-8	9+
(N) CTC Rotation with Peacekeeping Emphasis	None	X	1	2	3
(O) CTC Rotation with Some Peacekeeping Involved	None	1	2-3	4-5	6+
(P) Officer Professional Development	None	1-3	4-6	7-12	13+
(Q) Mentoring Session	None	1-3	4-6	7-12	13+
(R) Other	None	Assessment			

Scoring: Add the scores of rows L through R and divide by six. Round to nearest whole number. Training experience values are then determined: zero equals no training, one equals minimal training, two equals some training, and three or more equals a lot of training.

Overall preparation for peacekeeping operations equals the raw, unrounded scores from education and training divided by two and rounded. Training/education experience values are then determined: zero equals no training, one equals minimal training, two equals some training, and three or more equals a lot of training

The percentage of training concerning non-tactical aspects of peacekeeping operations provides an assessment of building experience outside of combat tasks. Assessment rule is as follows:


1-10%	No significant non-tactical training conducted
11-25%	Minimal new peacekeeping experiences
26-40%	Some new peacekeeping experiences
41-60%	Some new peacekeeping experiences
61-75%	Significant new peacekeeping experiences
75-90%	Significant new peacekeeping experiences
91-100%	Significant new peacekeeping experiences

An answer of 'no opinion' on any of the questions dealing with confidence of decision-making will assess as an answer of no confidence. A leader that cannot assess himself indicates that he does not have the necessary confidence.


# APPENDIX 7: ADDITIONAL SURVEY DATA CHARTS

## Q24 - Assessment of Army preparation of leaders


Based on current training methodology 'somewhat' may be good enough but in the Objective Force methodology 'mostly' is required.




MAJ's making tactical PKO decisions





MAJ's making tactical decisions



MAJ's making operational PKO decisions





MAJ's making nontactical PKO decisions




## Q24 - Assessment of Army preparation of leaders



Based on current training methodology 'somewhat' may be good enough but in the Objective Force methodology 'mostly' is required.



CPTs making tactical PKO decisions



CPTs making operational PKO decisions




CPTs making tactical decisions


CPTs making non-tactical PKO decisions

**Q24 - Assessment of Army preparation of leaders**


Based on current training methodology 'somewhat' may be good enough but in the Objective Force methodology 'mostly' is required.




LTs making tactical PKO decisions



LTs making tactical decisions



LTs making operational PKO decisions




LTs making non-tactical PKO decisions

- Does not prepare
- Minimally prepares
- Somewhat prepares
- Mostly prepares
- Fully prepares


- Does not prepare
- Minimally prepares
- Somewhat prepares
- Mostly prepares
- Fully prepares

# MA.Is Confidence in DM


Q14: DM Confidence: Tactical/CBT




Q16: DM Confidence: nontactical/PKO (Lives of Civilians)











Q15: DM Confidence: Tactical/PKO (Lives of Soldiers)






Q17: DM Confidence: Operational or Strategic Impact/PKO






# T&E vs DM Confidence



# Breakout Training and Education (PKO and CBT Experience)




# Breakout Training and Education (No PKO or CBT Experience)



## APPENDIX 8: EXECUTION/DECISION MATRIX EXAMPLE<sup>82</sup>

MISSION: TF 1-64 MAINTAINS SECURE ENVIRONMENT AND ENSURES FOM THROUGH DISCRETE PRESENCE THAT ALLOWS FOR SAFE VISIT BY SAREJEVO PDSS 191100 SEP.

	Phase I: Prep 1030-1100		Phase II: Entry 1100-1130		Phase III: Visit 1130-1600		Phase IV: Exit 1600-1630	
	ML: No opposition to movement develops	MD: Strong opposition to movement develops	ML: No opposition to movement develops	MD: Strong opposition to movement develops	ML: No threat to visit	MD: Groups of mil age men move from Brat or Sreb to access/attack visitors	ML: No opposition to movement develops	MD: Strong opposition to movement develops
INDICATORS	Na	Roadblocks, debris or crowds of mil age men vic U13 or along OREGON	na	Roadblocks, debris or crowds of mil age men vic U13 or along OREGON	na	Large numbers of vehicles moving in groups from BRAT or SREB towards POTOCARI	Na	Roadblocks, debris or crowds of mil age men along OREGON
Wolverine Blue 4 until 1400 then Wolverine 35 C2: 85.600 Wintrepreter	T: Secure ICTY site P: Facilitate investigation	T: B/P stop buses P: Allow Brat Police to clear obstruction	T: Secure ICTY site P: Facilitate investigation	T: B/P stop buses P: Allow BRAT Police to clear obstruction	T: Secure ICTY site P: Facilitate investigation	n/c	n/c	n/c
Wolverine White 1 and Wolverine 6 C2: 85.600 Wintrepreter	T: R/S Patrol in BRAT P: Determine risk to DPRES	T: Liaise w/LP or IPTF P: Ensure FOM and law and order	T: R/S Patrol in BRAT P: Determine risk to DPRES	T: Liaise w/LP or IPTF P: Ensure FOM and law and order	T: R/S Patrol in BRAT P: Determine risk to visit	T: B/P to reinforce Barbarian Blue 1 at CP 639900 P: Provide safe environment	T: R/S Patrol in BRAT P: Determine risk to DPRES	T: BPT block buses P: Allow time for BRAT police to open route and ensure law and order
Barbarian Blue 1 C2: One radio on 85.600 All others 43.550 Wintrepreter	T: Set CP 639900 P: Show presence IOT provide safe environment	T: BPT block buses P: IOT allow time for LP and IPTF to open route and provide law and order	T: Set CP 639900 P: Show presence IOT provide safe environment	T: BPT block buses P: IOT allow time for LP and IPTF to open route and provide law and order	T: Set CP 639900 P: Show presence IOT provide safe environment	T: B/P to establish hasty TCP CP 639900 P: Prevent attack on DPRES T: B/P to extract PDSS P: Protect PDSS	T: Set CP 639900 P: Show presence IOT provide safe environment	T: B/P to establish hasty TCP CP 639900 and block buses P: Allow time for BRAT police to open route and ensure law and order
Phantom 11 C2: 85.600	T: Observe in BRAT P: Determine risk to DPRES	n/c	n/c	n/c	n/c	n/c	n/c	n/c
Barbarian Red 1 C2: 43.550 Wintrepreter	T: R/S in SREB P: Maintain safe environment	T: Reserve P: Respond to tactical emergencies	n/c	n/c	n/c	n/c	n/c	n/c



<sup>82</sup> MAJ Kevin Dunlop, interview by author, Fort Stewart, GA, 1 February 2002.

## APPENDIX 9: WARRIOR ETHOS

# Warrior Ethos<sup>83</sup>

The Warrior Ethos is the sum of the distinguishing characteristics that describe what it means to be a Soldier --- a Soldier committed to and prepared to close with and kill or capture the enemy. The Warrior Ethos is:

- The self discipline to harden one's body and soul through demanding physical training and exertion.
- The belief that one's word is one's bond, and that trust binds men together to risk life and limb.
- The mental toughness to endure, without complaint, the extremes of weather, and the lack of sleep and food.
- The embodiment "to guard my post until properly relieved".
- The iron will, determination, and confidence to overcome all odds, even in seemingly hopeless situations.
- The relentless desire to be the best, to be a winner, but never at the expense of one's comrades or unit.
- The uncompromising commitment to be technically and tactically competent; to achieve and exceed demanding standards; to be combat ready.
- The inherent selflessness to give your last ounce of water to your men and your buddy; to replace "me" with "we".
- The unqualified willingness to sacrifice oneself for the mission, the unit, or a comrade.
- The ability to overcome the horrors of battle --- death, wounds, fear --- to cross "the killing ground" under fire, even as the lone survivor: Follow me!
- To never give up, to never give in, to never be satisfied with anything short of victory.
- To always put the mission, the unit, and the country first and oneself second.

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<sup>83</sup> Internet, <http://www-benning.army.mil/11th/2-11INF/Welcome%20Packet/Warrior%20Ethos.htm>, United States Army Infantry Officer Basic Course, Fort Benning, GA.

## APPENDIX 10: THE ARMY'S NATIONAL MISSIONS (TITLE 10)

### Title 10, Chapter 307,

#### Sec. 3062. - Policy; composition; organized peace establishment <sup>84</sup>

(a) It is the intent of Congress to provide an Army that is capable, in conjunction with the other armed forces, of -

- (1) preserving the peace and security, and providing for the defense, of the United States, the Territories, Commonwealths, and possessions, and any areas occupied by the United States;
- (2) supporting the national policies;
- (3) implementing the national objectives; and
- (4) overcoming any nations responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security of the United States.

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<sup>84</sup> Title 10 law located at internet: <http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10>.

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