FACING THE HYDRA:
MAINTAINING STRATEGIC BALANCE
WHILE PURSUING A GLOBAL WAR
AGAINST TERRORISM

Conrad C. Crane

May 2002
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<td>Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave., Carlisle, PA 17013-5244.</td>
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<td>Approved for public release, distribution unlimited</td>
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FOREWORD

As the global war on terrorism continues, members of Congress and media pundits are starting to say that American military forces are being stretched too thin by far-flung commitments. While Bush administration officials dispute this, they have expressed desires to reduce peacekeeping commitments and reexamine the number of overseas stations and deployments.

Dr. Conrad Crane analyzes the impact of the war on terrorism and the requirements of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review on the many essential missions conducted by the U.S. Armed Forces. Focusing primarily on the Army, he highlights the requirements associated with combat operations against terrorists, accelerating transformation and the new emphasis on homeland security and force protection. At the same time, he points out that the Army and the other Services must remain involved worldwide in day-to-day assurance, dissuasion, and deterrence activities; execution of peace operations and other smaller-scale contingencies; and remaining ready for other major combat operations.

Dr. Crane asserts that these obligations require the Army to reshape and expand its force structure. Failure to do so places critical missions at risk around the world, and could lead to replacement of operational “victory” in the war on terrorism with strategic failure as regional instability increases.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish this study as a contribution to the defeat of global terrorism.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

CONRAD C. CRANE joined the Strategic Studies Institute in September 2000 after 26 years of military service that concluded with 9 years as Professor of History at the U.S. Military Academy. He has written or edited books on the Civil War, World War I, World War II, and Korea, and published articles on military issues in such journals as The Journal of Strategic Studies, The Journal of Military History, The Historian, and Aerospace Historian, as well as in a number of collections and reference books. He holds a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy along with an M.A. and Ph.D. from Stanford University. He is also a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the U.S. Army War College.
SUMMARY

Arguments to maintain strategic balance while fighting the global war on terrorism usually fall on receptive ears in the Pentagon. Although some are ready to disengage internationally to focus on fighting terrorists, most clearly see the value of continuing activities that deter crises and assist tremendously in the resolution of conflict when deterrence fails. Fewer seem to realize that maintaining strategic balance will require more than just better guidance, planning, and training. Increased force structure—accompanied by revisions in the makeup of that structure and by reallocation between the Active and Reserve Components—will be required to enable the Services to win both operational and strategic victory in the war on terrorism, while also keeping the peace in other parts of the world.

Following the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report told the Army and the other services to focus their efforts on conducting major combat operations, strengthening homeland security and force protection, and accelerating transformation. However, the Army must simultaneously continue its operations along three other axes. It must remain committed to day-to-day assurance, dissuasion, and deterrence activities around the world; sustain its capability to execute peace operations and other smaller-scale contingencies (SSCs); and remain ready to conduct other major combat operations. If the Army fails in these critical missions, operational “victory” in the war on terrorism will be replaced by strategic failure as regional instability increases around the world.

To meet its concurrent obligations, the Army will have to reshape and expand its force structure. Several factors—including an increase in the number of SSCs, which highlighted shortfalls in the Active Component’s combat
support and combat service support force structure—were stretching the Army operationally even before September 11. The new demands of homeland security, force protection, and transformation acceleration will only exacerbate the situation. Peace operations resulting from the war will also require heavy engagement of Army forces, no matter how involved they have been in combat operations thus far. Although the Active Component may be the first priority for expansion and reshaping, the Reserve Components will also need to be reconfigured to provide better support for homeland security; their roles in SSCs and warfighting missions will have to be reexamined in light of the new geostrategic environment. These changes will require a reevaluation of Total Force policies that have been in existence since the 1970s. To protect against overcommitment of ground forces, further expansion of the war against terrorism must be minimized, at least until adequate forces are built up.

The Army must adapt to the changed circumstances of September 11, but it cannot allow a focus on the battles against terrorism to allow it to lose its perspective on the broader strategic issues in play, particularly world-wide engagement and transformation. The Army’s long-term vision remains viable, and the course to reach it must be maintained.
The post-September 11 world may have added certain missions to our national security agenda, but it hasn’t taken any away.

Michael O’Hanlon

While the opening quote adequately captures the increased burden currently being placed on U.S. military forces, Michael O’Hanlon does not have it completely right. The terrorist attacks against New York and Washington did not add mission areas to the security agenda; they just expanded and reprioritized existing ones. That result is evident in the recent Department of Defense (DoD) Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report, which “places new emphasis on the unique operational demands associated with the defense of the United States and restores the defense of the United States as the Department’s primary mission.” The report also places high priority on the ability to conduct major combat operations today and on transforming the military services for the future. While the QDR and recent military actions have put the focus clearly on homeland security, the global war on terrorism, and transformation, nothing has decreased the importance of the Army’s other pre-September 11 missions of peacekeeping, engagement, and deterrence.

The dominant National Military Strategy paradigm of the 1990s—“shape, respond, prepare”—has been replaced in the QDR Report by a more specific and somewhat narrower strategic framework: assuring allies, dissuading military competition, deterring threats and coercion, and decisively defeating adversaries. Along with its sister
Services, the Army is currently concentrating on decisively defeating adversaries and even more narrowly on actions to combat terrorists and those who support them. President George W. Bush and his cabinet have been clear that this will be a long struggle, however, and the Army must not neglect its many other important missions during that time. Victory over terrorism will be meaningless if it is not accompanied by the preservation and spread of peace, security, democracy, and free market ideas that those other military missions support. Leaders must maintain a broad strategic perspective and remain cognizant of the impact of operations in the current war on how the Armed Services execute their other responsibilities to protect the national interests.

The QDR Report provides only limited specific guidance on these other priorities, but they are essential for global strategic success. Many in Congress have been frustrated by the document’s absence of detailed recommendations, and Army and Marine Corps planners have complained about “a lack of emphasis—specificity—about the value of land forces.” Critical operational goals listed for military transformation emphasize the application of “high volume precision strike” in great depth, and the most extensive future missions envisioned for ground forces appear to be defending bases of operations and the homeland. The QDR Report deals primarily with issues concerning deterrence and warfighting, mentions what the old framework called “engagement” activities just within the context of security cooperation, and only tangentially discusses smaller-scale contingencies (SSCs) as part of a new force-sizing construct. The words “peacekeeping” or “peace operations” do not appear in the document. It is up to the senior Army leaders to make the case for landpower as part of a balanced joint force, and to point out the value of peace operations and engagement activities in preventing and deterring conflict.

U.S. needs and interests require a broad and balanced strategy that looks beyond the text of the QDR and current operations in Afghanistan. O’Hanlon is correct that none of
the tasks which had strained military force structures before September 11 have gone away. When the terrorists attacked, the 10th Mountain Division was already planning for deployments to Kosovo and Egypt. Soon it had elements in five additional nations, including Afghanistan. The few troops left behind at Fort Drum, New York, were scrambling to maintain base security and retain combat readiness for other missions. National Guard troops have been deployed domestically and around the world to augment security forces for significantly-expanded force protection requirements, while at the same time preparing for scheduled deployments to Bosnia and Kuwait. The Army is not the only service feeling the strain. Combat air patrols over American cities are exhausting airmen and equipment, while the additional duties assumed by the Coast Guard have stretched that organization to its limits and beyond.

The Army will understandably place high priority on contributing to winning the war against terrorism, including augmenting homeland security and accelerating transformation. However, the Service must simultaneously conduct operations along three other axes. It must continue its involvement in day-to-day assurance, dissuasion, and deterrence activities around the world (previously known as shaping and engagement); sustain its capability to conduct peace operations and other smaller-scale contingencies; and remain ready to conduct major combat operations. The Army was already stretched by its operational tempo before September 11; the new demands will only exacerbate that situation. They must not be used as an excuse to divert the Service from accomplishing its other essential missions. Maintaining a balance to perform all these tasks with acceptable risk will require reallocating assets between the Active (AC) and Reserve Components (RC), as well as creating additional force structure. It also should prompt a reexamination of Total Force policies.
MAINTAINING BALANCE FOR STANDARD MISSIONS

If we want to decrease the number of contingencies to which the US is asked to send troops, we must aggressively pursue engagement as a means of preventing such conflicts before they happen.

Rep. Ike Skelton

Assuring and Deterring.

Before examining the Army missions most expanded and reprioritized by the QDR and the war on terrorism, it is necessary to analyze the other important tasks that still must be performed. The first of these involves normal peacetime assurance, dissuasion, and deterrence missions. Deterrence is very much a function of warfighting capabilities, which will be discussed later, while assurance and dissuasion have been heavily emphasized as part of engagement tasks described in recent versions of American National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy.

The Joint Strategic Planning System still requires regional Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) to develop a Theater Engagement Plan (TEP) to link regional activities with national strategic objectives. Essential mission categories addressed in the TEP include operations, combined exercises, security assistance, combined training and education, military contacts, humanitarian assistance, and monitoring treaty obligations.

The Army must not allow an increased emphasis on force protection and other operations against terrorism to deflect it from supporting the CINCs in their efforts to remain engaged overseas. Through its 150,000 forward-stationed and deployed soldiers, the Army provides over 60 percent of America’s forces committed to the CINCs’ assurance, dissuasion, and deterrence efforts. Often such involvement can shape the regional environment to prevent...
conflicts or facilitate responses when they occur. The U.S. ability to conduct current operations against Afghanistan was aided considerably by 82nd Airborne Division and 10th Mountain Division exercises with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in 1997 and 1998.11

Though the Bush administration showed an early predilection to reduce forward military presence, it found disengagement difficult, and “today the US global military presence is perhaps more pervasive than ever.”12 Army forces were deployed in 150 countries in Fiscal Year 2000, and the pace has not slackened. The QDR Report advocates even more overseas basing of troops to speed their employment, facilitate security cooperation, maintain “favorable regional balances,” and strengthen the nation’s “forward deterrent posture.” It recognizes the need for “steady-state levels of air, land, and naval presence in critical regions around the world.”13 To support operations in Afghanistan, the United States is creating an infrastructure of new bases and political agreements that will ensure an expanded American presence in Central Asia for many years.14 The coalitions forming to combat different aspects of terrorism include a number of new partners and will provide even more opportunities for military-to-military contacts along with other assurance and security cooperation activities.15 These will remain an especially important responsibility for Army forces.

Neglect of this mission area will have serious implications for the conduct of the National Security Strategy envisioned by the QDR Report. Problems will fester and lead to crises that could have been prevented or defused in their early stages. The chance to gain or maintain forward bases essential for rapid response will be lost. U.S. leverage to influence regional governments and their militaries will be lessened. Without an active American presence, coalitions will be weakened and allies will feel insecure. All of these repercussions will encourage military competition and embolden potential adversaries.
Smaller-Scale Contingencies.

An important theme in Bush’s political campaign was that he would avoid his predecessor’s error of bogging down the American military in humanitarian interventions and peacekeeping. However, before the end of his first year in office, he had confirmed the vital importance of U.S. involvement in the Balkans, and even deployed more troops to Macedonia. Despite his professed aversion to nation-building, he has also committed the United States to financial support for the massive effort to rebuild Afghanistan. Even before that announcement, Army Special Forces soldiers had already started the process in Kandahar, assisting residents with food and water supplies, working to restore schools and police services, and making recommendations that they knew would shape future government policy. Reporters have noted that soldiers are performing “the most public of the diplomatic missions in the former combat zone . . . taking up the delicate task of helping reconstruct a civic fabric.” Among the first U.S. soldiers into liberated Mazar-I-Sharif was a civil affairs detachment that immediately began revitalizing the local hospital, and the 10th Mountain Division helped build a new one there. The President has also announced that the United States would help establish and train the Afghan army and police force, which will assuredly require more military commitments.

If the war on terrorism spreads to other theaters, there will be even more opportunities for the United States, and especially its Army, to stabilize and rebuild countries and societies that have spawned terrorism or been exploited by its practitioners. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has expressed his willingness to deploy American armed forces to “15 more countries” if that is what it takes to combat terror. Such actions usually have long-term military implications. Historically, the Army has been America’s primary tool to achieve any lasting impact from major military deployments. The recent record highlights that,
when ground troops leave too quickly, as in Haiti or Somalia, the situation soon reverts to the conditions that initially required the intervention. In Bosnia and Kosovo, stability and meaningful change are only possible if ground troops remain.21

Consequently, one result of the global war on terrorism will undoubtedly be to increase American involvement in peace operations such as those in the Balkans. At the same time, there is no sign that current peacekeeping missions can go away without adverse strategic impacts. Understanding this reality, the QDR Report states that “these long-standing commitments will, in effect, become part of the U.S. forward deterrent posture.”22 Unless soldiers continue to perform security and nation-building tasks in the Balkans, the recent increases in ethnic violence can easily escalate again into full-scale war.23 The Bush administration has reassured NATO allies that the United States will not prematurely pull out of these Balkan missions, although Rumsfeld has proposed reductions of all peacekeepers in Bosnia “because the police work there has begun to strain armies needed to fight terrorism.”24 He would also like to withdraw American troops from the multinational observer force in the Sinai Peninsula.25 These peace operations remain very important for regional stability. Even while the Army initiates new operations against terrorism, it should be wary of any calls to endanger these peacekeeping missions to provide resources for the new war.

Even before September 11, however, Army force structure was under severe strains from the demands of peace operations. SSCs are particularly hard on certain active duty “high demand/low density” units in the Quartermaster and Transportation branches. Recent deployments have revealed additional significant shortfalls in Civil Affairs personnel and intelligence capabilities. Extensions of the Balkan missions have highlighted more inadequacies in the total available number of a variety of other combat support (CS) and combat service support
CSS) units that are distributed between AC and RC. Excessive deployments for SSCs have also had a severe impact on Reserve and National Guard units not accustomed to such use. In addition, their availability for support functions and active duty rotations will be severely curtailed by the demands of force protection and homeland security.

Future Army missions like those in Bosnia and Kosovo should not be accepted lightly. However, there will be times—even in the midst of the war against terrorism—when national interests will require humanitarian assistance, nation-building, and secure peace operations that only American military forces can provide. Effective and efficient “peace-building” efforts must remain an important element of any national security strategy. The current situation in Afghanistan highlights again that post-conflict societies can become breeding grounds for crime and terrorism if some sort of order is not imposed. Influential members of Congress have already called for American peacekeepers there, and major newspapers—irrespective of their political inclinations—are advocating a significant U.S. role in nation-building. One project they have proposed is the reconstruction of Afghanistan’s “ring road,” which is so vital to the restoration of trade. This task, especially in such a precarious security environment, is perfectly suited to the capabilities of the U.S. Army and its engineers.

To prevent peacekeeping assignments from dragging on and tying up scarce assets, the Army and supporting agencies must become better at nation-building. Though the Bush administration, as well as the Army leadership, remain reluctant to accept such a mission, long-term solutions to create a more stable world will require the United States to perform it. Only the Army—not the Air Force, Navy, or Marines—can really do it in an environment of questionable security. Success in stabilization operations and strategic success in the war against terrorism will be closely linked because of the cause-effect relationship that
exists between them. The Army should be daunted by—and prepare for—the responsibilities it might assume to help stabilize and rebuild Afghanistan and other countries after bin Laden and his supporters are rooted out. This effort should be accompanied by the development of appropriate doctrine for such peace-building missions. Though the U.S. burden in these operations can be lessened by relying as much as possible on allied participation, there is no substitute for the presence of ground forces from the most powerful nation in the world to reassure friends, sustain coalitions, and deter potential adversaries. If stability in a region such as the Balkans is determined to be a vital American interest, then it cannot be allowed to return to chaos because of the distractions of the war on terrorism.

Months before September 11, the Center for Army Analysis predicted the United States would face a future of 25 to 30 ongoing SSCs each month. Though it discusses SSCs only briefly, the QDR Report does state “DoD will ensure that it has sufficient numbers of specialized forces and capabilities to ensure that it does not overstretch elements of the force when it is involved in smaller-scale contingencies.” Achieving this goal will require modifying the AC Army force structure, and will almost certainly involve increasing its size. In a recent speech, Rumsfeld admitted that the existence of low-density, high-demand assets that have been so overworked by SSCs signified that “our priorities were wrong, and we didn’t buy enough of what we need.” He advocated adding them as part of his transformation efforts. There is no reason still to have such force shortfalls, and they must be addressed.

**Major Combat Operations.**

The Army must also retain its ability to deter and fight other wars besides the global war on terrorism. Cross-border wars of aggression are not the most likely type of conflict predicted for the future, but they are certainly not impossible and clearly require forces ready to fight them. In
fact, it is precisely because U.S. forces are so ready to fight them that they are so unlikely. Even in the war on terrorism, where major ground forces have initially had only limited utility, they will still be essential if operations expand to take on other states that support terrorism and are more robust than Afghanistan. The most powerful military force on the planet remains a joint force based around a heavy corps, and these units must not be allowed to atrophy. Cross border incursions remain a threat in Asia and the Middle East. The Bush administration’s stern warning to Iraq not to take advantage of America’s concentration on terrorism would not be an effective deterrent without the joint force, including landpower, to back it up.

The primary focus of the QDR Report is on dissuading and deterring potential adversaries from threatening the interests of America and its allies, and on winning wars if deterrence fails. The document’s new force-sizing paradigm still envisions swiftly defeating attacks in two theaters of operation in overlapping timeframes, but only one of those campaigns will involve a decisive defeat including the occupation of territory or a possible regime change. Combined with the perception of some Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) officials that the campaign in Afghanistan was won by airpower and allies, this new force-sizing construct has the potential to bring calls for a reduction of heavy land combat forces. Critics may accept the need to keep such forces for the decisive defeat, but will argue for Army force structure cuts in the allocation for the second conflict. However, the larger Army that fought and won Operation DESERT STORM is already long gone. The current active force is probably too small to fight a major land war against a state like Iraq without even more coalition landpower augmentation than was received in the Gulf War. Additionally, adequate funding must be found to modernize the legacy forces which will have to fight near- and mid-term wars. And the paradox of deterrence is that the weaker a nation’s armed forces are perceived to be, the
more likely it is to have to employ them. In the long-run, taking risk in this mission area has the most significant impact on the ability of the United States to protect its interests and achieve the goals outlined in the QDR Report.

MEETING EXPANDED REQUIREMENTS

The war on terrorism has more targets than the United States has resources to fight at once.

*Florida Times-Union editorial* [33]

**Winning the War against Terrorism.**

The most important current mission for the Army is to make the maximum possible contribution to winning the war against terrorism. So far it has performed superbly as part of a joint force in varied operations in distant theaters. Special Forces have received widespread acclaim for their courage and ingenuity in Afghanistan; they will garner even more accolades for their subsequent deployment to the Philippines. Troops from the 10th Mountain Division and 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) have established and garrisoned new bases in numerous locations in Central Asia. They have begun assuring and training new allies while detaining and deterring old adversaries. III Corps soldiers from Fort Hood, Texas, have been deployed for long-term assignments, primarily to handle detainees, to Afghanistan, Kuwait, Turkey, and Cuba. Military police units in Guantanamo Bay have been augmented by reservists for a mission the Corps Commander predicts will last “for a long time, maybe forever.” [34]

Many commentators and administration spokesmen have described a new method of warfare involving Special Forces, airpower, and indigenous allies. This approach had great initial operational success in Afghanistan, and might be appropriate for the next stages of the war when applied in similar circumstances in the Philippines, Yemen, or Somalia. However, operations against those nations
described as an “axis of evil” by Bush—Iran, Iraq, and North Korea—will undoubtedly require much more extensive forces. The Army has already found it is running short of Special Forces soldiers just to meet current requirements. Wherever the next operations are conducted, they are certain to place a heavy load on the Army, if not for significant combat operations, then certainly for peace operations, assurance, and deterrence. Performing all these missions well will be essential for strategic victory, and they will not be easy or short in duration. Major General Richard Cody, commander of the 101st Airborne, has described his unit’s mission in Afghanistan as a “marathon,” a revealing term that describes projections of both the level of effort and time required. Strategic rationale may or may not exist for spreading the war beyond Afghanistan. Until adequate forces are available, though, the spread of the war on terrorism should be limited or at least carefully controlled.

**Homeland Security and the Total Force.**

Not all key operations in the war against terrorism will be conducted overseas. The greatest challenge that the QDR Report poses for the Army’s maintenance of strategic balance is in the document’s emphasis on homeland and base security, and RC responsibilities for them. There appears to be much confusion, and reluctance by both active and reserve leaders, about assuming the military role in this important mission. There have been disputes over a new headquarters to control homeland defense forces. Secretary of the Army Thomas White, Interim DoD Executive Agent for Homeland Security, stated that he expected the armed services to “work themselves out of a job” as civilian agencies build up their own capabilities. Lieutenant General Russell Davis, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, warned that reconfiguring his forces to perform Homeland Security would endanger the Total Force standard and reduce the strategic reserve.
This multifaceted mission is not one that the Army, or its RC, can—or should—avoid. Failure will leave the homeland and bases vulnerable to terrorists, and threaten the nation's ability to support and sustain every other mission. Some of the impact of new requirements on the RC is already apparent. Sixteen percent of Virginia’s National Guard has been called to active duty for up to 2 years. They are flying combat air patrols and guarding airports, nuclear power plants, and federal installations. Base security requirements have increased worldwide. Over 1,000 Illinois National Guardsmen have been activated for at least 9 months to protect U.S. installations in Europe. Other Guardsmen are manning entry gates at posts throughout the continental United States. By the end of January 2002, over 80,000 RC troops had been called to duty, and more were slated to be deployed to augment civilian agencies securing U.S. borders. This is only the beginning of a long-term commitment to homeland defense, which only adds to the existing responsibilities for consequence management. If these missions remain with the RC, that will seriously compromise their ability to support a major theater war. If more of the RC is committed to duties at home, deployment schedules for the Balkans could also be affected, increasing the burden on active forces for peacekeeping in Bosnia and Kosovo. The shortage of CS/CSS assets in the AC that was revealed by the demands of SSCs during the 1990s has been exacerbated even more by the new security situation. This has had a significant impact on the Army Reserve. The demands of homeland defense, as well as other missions for the war on terrorism, are now causing considerable strain for high demand Reservists like mortuary affairs units, chemical and biological defense specialists, truck companies, psychological operations detachments, intelligence experts, and civil affairs detachments. Lieutenant General Thomas Plewes, Chief of the Army Reserve, concedes that the active Army is too small and needs augmentation in these overworked specialties. Rumsfeld’s determination to increase the number of such units has been mentioned
earlier. The growing requirements for homeland security have also highlighted significant shortcomings in the structure and training of the RC. To meet the expectations of the QDR Report and the needs of the nation, the RC will need to be overhauled. A number of studies have advocated the creation of a major continental air defense system like the Nike Hercules batteries that spanned the nation in the 1960s, and which also included RC units. The QDR Report instructs DoD to bolster its ability to work with other homeland security organizations, and to “place new emphasis upon counter terrorism training across federal, state, and local first responders,” drawing on RC capabilities. National Guard leaders recognize that their organization will need to be reconfigured if they are given the homeland security mission, and will have to relinquish “units that are not as relevant.” Additionally, some hard choices will need to be made about who serves in those RC units most likely to be called up for homeland duties. A large number of citizen-soldiers today come from the public safety sector, and taking trained first responders away from local fire and police departments degrades their essential capability.

This process of realigning the RC will also necessitate a reexamination of Total Force policies initiated when General Creighton Abrams was Chief of Staff of the Army in 1973. He commanded a force undergoing a traumatic transition. Facing a significant drawdown and the shift to an all-volunteer armed force, Abrams’ primary goals were to establish an active force structure that maintained 16 division flags, while also increasing the readiness of the Reserve Components. He had extensive experience with the Reserves and wanted to tailor their responsibilities better to match capabilities. His subordinates later claimed that he also had a long-term vision to ensure that no president could ever again fight another Vietnam without mobilization, but that is not clear from available documents. Whatever his intent, Abrams and his staff began to integrate reserves into the force structure so that no major deployment would be
possible without them, not only ensuring that these units would be available in a major conflict, but also that any president desiring to employ large forces would have to garner the necessary political backing from a country unified enough to support the call up of the reserves necessary to sustain the operation.\textsuperscript{49}

One impact of this approach could be seen in the debates over the Reserve deployment for Operation DESERT STORM. However, Total Force policies did not limit presidential initiative during the rest of the 1990s, and instead have caused considerable strain in often-deployed reserve units. It is apparent from the documentary evidence that Abrams’ primary motivations for reorganizing Army force structure were to preserve divisions in the AC and assign optimum missions to the RC. The latter rationale is particularly applicable to current Homeland Security requirements. The increasing emphasis on rapid employment, forward basing, and transformational technology will reduce the utility of RC organizations in future major combat operations overseas, but will have less effect on their employment at home. Assigning such responsibilities to the RC will require analysis and adjustment of mobilization plans, but that does not mean the end of the Total Force. Many aspects of homeland security will require a full-time commitment best provided by active duty forces, so both components will have to remain integrated at home. And RC augmentation will still be viable for the later stages of extended major combat operations and SSCs.

Davis’ warnings mentioned earlier were in response to proposals by defense analysts like Daniel Gouré, who advocates that the Army must be able to win the first major theater war of the new force-sizing paradigm without having to rely on RC augmentation.\textsuperscript{50} This idea actually deserves serious consideration, and not just because of the responsibilities of homeland security. As mentioned above, emerging operational concepts like “Rapid Decisive Operations,” as well as the QDR Report itself, emphasize
the need for speedy response to crises with agile forces, many of them forward-deployed. Waiting for RC reinforcement will make that ideal impossible to achieve. Even before the emergence of these new concepts, it would have been extremely difficult for some RC units to meet planners’ mobilization expectations. It might still be possible to rely on RC augmentation for the later stages of major contingencies, especially for follow-on combat forces, but some CS/CSS shifts to the AC are undoubtedly necessary.

**Transforming the Force.**

While the Army must continue to emphasize the importance of a balanced joint force ready to fight and deter wars today, it must also simultaneously maintain its focus on long-term transformation. The evolving requirements of the war against terrorism will highlight even more the necessity for lighter, smarter, and more agile forces. As originally conceived, transformation was to prepare the Army for future wars. Transformation now needs to be shaped by the new geostrategic focus on terrorism and then accelerated to allow the new capabilities to bring increased levels of effectiveness to the war against terror.

There are signs that this acceleration has already begun. The Army leadership has shifted spending priorities, announced a plan to streamline its headquarters, and moved up the fielding date for the Objective Force. Secretary of the Army Thomas E. White wrote in a memo accompanying the annual Program Objective Memorandum to OSD that the Army was transitioning “to a force postured to fight a global war on terrorism.” Planners are also considering increasing the number of Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs) to be fielded, even at the cost of delaying the modernization of current heavy forces.

The QDR Report provides additional impetus to this drive for reform. It announces, “Transformation is at the heart” of the new defense strategy. Though the operational
goals described in the report are vague concerning the contributions of landpower, the Army is directed to accelerate the introduction of its IBCTs, as well as to enhance ground force capabilities in the Persian Gulf. The report recognizes that additional funding will be required to meet these objectives because of the markedly-increased requirements already resulting from the war against terrorism.\textsuperscript{53} Rumsfeld has even made military transformation a higher budget priority with its own separate Program Decision Memorandum (PDM). However, the Army may have its work cut out for it to take advantage of this PDM, since it emphasizes new technologies for stand-off precision attack, missile defense, and information operations.\textsuperscript{54} But the Service must stay the course and achieve its goals. Otherwise it risks being unprepared for future threats, losing its advantage on the battlefield, and becoming less relevant to the protection of the nation and its interests.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Recommendations.

1. The Army must not allow the demands of homeland security, force protection, and the war on terrorism to detract from the other global missions that deter new crises and facilitate response when deterrence fails.

2. The Army should embrace homeland security and peace operations—including some nation-building—as important Service missions, and prepare for increased amounts of these tasks, especially in peacekeeping, as the war on terror continues.

3. Until adequate forces are available, the spread of the war should be minimized as much as possible to avoid overcommitment, especially by accumulation of post-conflict responsibilities.
4. The Army needs to increase its active force structure—and probably its total force structure—to meet expanding mission requirements.

5. The Army needs to reexamine Total Force policies and restructure the RC to provide better support for the Army’s homeland security, SSC, and warfighting missions.

6. Army transformation should be accelerated to prepare the force better for the next phases of the current war and future threats.

Conclusions.

The war against terrorism is only one of many essential missions the Army must perform. It must be very forthright with Congress and the Bush administration about the additional forces needed to conduct its myriad of important duties. The Army Staff should immediately develop plans and gather support to begin the process of expanding and restructuring the Total Force. Recruiting, training, and equipping new soldiers and units will take years. While large scale Army Reserve and Army National Guard mobilization and some limited economy of force efforts might suffice in the short term to meet Army requirements, these arrangements cannot be maintained for a long period without debilitating the force and raising the risk for long-term missions.

In summary, maintaining strategic balance will require more than just better guidance, planning, and training. Increased force structure—accompanied by revisions in the makeup of that structure and by reallocation between the AC and RC—will be necessary to enhance the Army’s ability to fight the war against terrorism while also keeping the peace in other areas. The simultaneous and ongoing demands for homeland security, anti-terrorist strikes, peace operations, and deterring war will require more land forces, especially in the AC, and mostly in the areas of CS, CSS, and Special Operations Forces. Increasing
intelligence assets will be especially crucial. Forces will need to be reapportioned between the AC and RC. RC units will have to be reconfigured to handle new and existing long-term requirements. At the same time, the Army cannot become so focused on current operations that the momentum and direction of transformation are lost. The world changed on September 11, 2001, and the Army must adjust accordingly. But its long-term vision remains viable, and the course to reach it must be maintained.

ENDNOTES


3. QDR Report, pp. 11-13. The old paradigm was broader in its emphasis on varied engagement activities and training.


46. QDR Report, p. 19.


49. Interview of Lieutenant General Donald Coles by Lieutenant Colonels Albin G. Wheeler and Ronald E. Craven; and Interview of General James G. Kalergis by Lieutenant Colonel Tom Lightner, both in “The General Creighton Abrams Story” files, *The Papers of Creighton Abrams*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army Military History Institute (USAMHI); Lewis Sorley, *Thunderbolt: General Creighton Abrams and The Army of His Times*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992, pp. 350-368. Sorley is convinced that Abrams intended from the start to limit presidential power, but that objective is not mentioned in contemporary documents or interviews in the Abrams Papers at USAMHI. That motivation was not mentioned by any of his subordinates until the 1980s.


55. However, it will be difficult to expand SOF very quickly because of the time and effort required to develop and train such soldiers. In the meantime, SOF missions will have to be carefully controlled, or ways must be found to utilize regular forces instead.