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**Is the Military on Track to Achieve Joint Objectives as Outlined in the 1986 Goldwater-
Nichols Act?**

A Look at Joint Officer Management Policies 1986-2001

by

J. Richard Jordan III

Major, U.S. Army

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or Department of the Navy.

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Abstract

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Abstract

Fifteen years have passed since the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act (GNA) was enacted to move the Armed Forces to a higher level of jointness, yet one still hears questions among military leaders regarding whether or not joint policies and systems are in opposition to or in agreement with Service desires or possibly just somewhere in-between. Today a strong perception exists that time spent away from one's Service, especially working in a joint billet, is potentially detrimental to an officer's successful career. Often joint billets compete for the same time in an officer's career timeline with Service billets that are considered critical for selection to the next higher rank. This paper analyzes two aspects of joint officer management. Firstly, it looks at the policies and programs in place as of 2001 concerning training, educating and assigning officers who serve in joint assignments. Secondly, it seeks to determine if these policies have placed officers with sufficient joint experience in the most senior billets in today's military and if these policies bode well for increasing joint education and experience amongst senior leaders who will fill these positions over the next decade. In order to accomplish this the paper analyzes the joint education and experiences of the current commanders in chief (CINCs) and senior Service chiefs as well as all of the CINCs of US Central Command (CINCCENTs) from 1986 until present. The paper concludes that although the military has taken steps to reach a state of jointness in response to the GNA, individual Service career progression perspectives still carry a significant amount of weight within the military and continue to bring a significant force to bear against joint initiatives involving joint officer management. Recommended solutions focus upon developing systems which will place joint perspectives over Service perspectives and are aimed at creating some sort of well defined and respected career path for JSOs that is not only good for the joint officer corps but for the Services as well.

Introduction

Since the end of World War II both the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government have, at various times, attempted to create legislation which would force the individual military Services to work together in a joint environment so that the whole military might be more effective than the sum of its parts. Although the military has continued to take steps to reach a state of jointness in response to the legislation, individual Service perspectives still carry a significant amount of weight within the military and bring a significant force to bear against joint initiatives. Today this discrepancy between joint and Service interests is clearly demonstrated in the area of joint officer career management policies and procedures. In short, the problem considered by the Professional Military Education Panel in 1987 of “creating acceptance that the [Joint Specialty Officer] career path was good for both Service and officer corps”¹ still exists today.

Fifteen years have passed since the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act (GNA) was enacted to move the Armed Forces to a higher level of jointness. Yet one still hears questions among military leaders regarding whether or not joint policies and systems are in opposition to or in agreement with Service desires or possibly somewhere in-between. Today a strong perception exists that time spent away from one’s Service, especially working in a joint billet, is potentially detrimental to an officer’s successful career. Joint billets compete for the same time in an officer’s career timeline with Service billets that are considered critical for selection to the next higher rank.² As the military continues its increased emphasis on improving jointness amongst the Services, officers understand the requirement to and utility of obtaining a joint education and experience, but they are forced to walk a tightrope between competing joint and Service requirements as they attempt to progress along successful career paths.³

In order to ascertain how effectively the military has been at adopting a joint framework and overcoming individual Service parochialism with regards to officer education, training and assignments since the GNA was enacted, this paper will analyze two aspects of joint officer management. Firstly, it will look at the policies and programs in place as of 2001 concerning training, educating and assigning officers who serve in joint assignments. This aspect of joint officer management has continued to receive low grades concerning its implementation, to include somewhere “between a B and C” in 1996 from the then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).^{4,5} Secondly, this paper will seek to determine if these policies have placed officers with sufficient joint experience in the most senior billets in today’s military and if the policies bode well for increasing joint education and experience amongst senior leaders who will fill these positions in the future.

This paper will focus upon the joint education and experience of the current commanders in chief (CINCs) and senior Service chiefs as well as all of the CINCs of US Central Command (CINCCENTs) from 1986 until present. While there are certainly many other areas of research which would help in this analysis, this paper is not large enough to provide such a comprehensive view. The CINCs and Service chiefs of 2001 represent a sample of the status of today’s military joint officer management environment, although it is important to note that this generation of leaders is the first that has experienced the requirements of GNA joint officer management policies. The military in which they advanced contained newly created joint education curricula and assignment waivers designed to assist in the transition from a pre- to post-GNA environment. These waivers effectively “grand-fathered” the senior officers who were so senior that they did not have time before their selection to senior assignments to alter their career paths in order to meet GNA

requirements. Thus, this analysis will only provide an initial set of data dealing with how well the military is meeting the initial GNA intent with regards to senior leadership.

In an attempt to provide an analysis of joint officer management trends which have occurred since the GNA was enacted, the paper will analyze the joint education and experiences of the CINCCENTs from 1986 to the present and determine whether current CINCs have more or less joint experience than their predecessors. This paper focuses on data for previous CINCCENTs since this geographical unified command came into existence in 1983, just before the GNA was enacted, and its development should have paralleled the military's GNA implementation initiatives. Furthermore, CENTCOM has received much Department of Defense (DoD) emphasis during Desert Storm and as part of the National Military Strategy which has tended to focus on a two major theaters of war concept with one of the two possible conflicts arising in CENTCOM's area of responsibility. Because of this emphasis and relative importance over the majority of the other geographical unified commands, DoD theoretically should have tried to follow GNA intent and ensure that each successive CINCCENT had significantly greater amounts of joint education and experience. Since there have been six CINCCENTs since 1986 to the present, there should be clear trends established showing an ever increasing emphasis on joint education and experience since the GNA was enacted.

Background

At the conclusion of World War II there was a clear need to unify the efforts of the individual military departments: the Army, Navy, Marines and the newly created Air Force. All had been instrumental in conducting successful operations in the Pacific Theater, yet there were clearly three distinct efforts, aerial, ground, and naval, led by the senior Service

chiefs in which each individual Service took the lead and the others were in support. The resulting legislation enacted in the National Security Act of 1947 and its amendment in 1949 attempted to ensure inter-Service cooperation. More recently, and partially in response to poor joint force performances during operations such as Desert One/Operation Eagle Claw (the 1979 Iran Hostage Crisis) and Operation Urgent Fury (the 1983 Invasion of Grenada), Congress enacted the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act (GNA) of 1986.

GNA was based upon congressional “dissatisfaction with the lack of unified direction and action of the United States armed forces.”⁶ Among other things, GNA attempted to improve joint officer management policies⁷ in its Title IV which directed that “the Secretary [of Defense], with the advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall establish career guidelines for officers with the joint specialty. Guidelines shall include guidelines for selection, military education, training, types of duty assignments, and such other matters as the Secretary considers appropriate.”^{8, 9} The GNA dictates joint education requirements for officers at various stages of their careers, time of service in a joint duty assignment required for promotion, and the minimum promotion rates for joint officers.¹⁰

In order to manage and train joint officers, the military set up the Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Program, Joint Duty Assignments (JDAs) and the Joint Specialty Officer (JSO) skill identifier. The JPME curricula provide future senior military leaders of all Services instruction concerning the concepts and procedures of jointness.¹¹ Officers who have the potential and have “education and/or experience in joint matters”¹² receive a JSO identifier. Officers normally gain experience in joint matters while assigned to a position classified as a Joint Duty Assignment (JDA). The military Services must track JSOs and annually report to the President and to Congress on current numbers of JDA positions and

JSOs.¹³ These reports provide a check government officials can use to ensure that DoD is placing a priority on promoting and assigning joint officers over their Service counterparts.

The objective of these joint officer management policies and systems is to create senior leaders who can lead the military in a joint operating environment. As stated in Joint Publication 1, the capstone publication of U.S. military joint doctrine,

At the highest professional levels, senior leaders develop joint warfighting core competencies that are the capstone to American military power.... The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the other members of the JCS, and the combatant commanders have unique responsibilities for planning and directing the employment of the Armed Forces of the United States. This is their core competency. The combination of joint professional military education, as well as progressive and sequential assignments toward higher levels of joint operations, supports the development and continuous revitalization of this core competency.¹⁴

These joint officer management policies dictate that senior leaders must have a standardized minimal level of joint education and time spent in joint assignments in order to be qualified senior joint leaders.

Facts

GNA requires the Secretary of Defense to, “establish policies, procedures, and practices for the effective management of officers of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps on the active-duty list who are particularly educated, trained in, and oriented toward, joint matters.”¹⁵ Title IV of the GNA established a system for joint officer management with the intent to enhance the quality, assignment stability and experience of officers in joint assignments.¹⁶ The CJCS and Joint Staff have responded by directing joint officer management policies in a series of CJCS Instructions (CJCSIs) and Manuals (CJCSMs) to include CJCSM 1600.01 Joint Manpower Program Procedures, CJCSI 13310.01A Manpower and Personal Actions Involving General and Flag Officers, and CJCSI 1330.02A Review of

Promotion Selection Board Results by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Furthermore, the Joint Staff has programs such as the Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE) to cyclically reaffirm accreditation of each JPME school by evaluating curricula and graduation requirements.¹⁷ These documents and programs are designed to implement and run the systems which govern joint education, training and assignments for officers.

JPME is the system that educates and enhances the quality of joint officers in all Services and has generally been acknowledged as being the most successfully implemented aspect of Title IV.¹⁸ Currently the JPME system is broken down into five elements: “preparatory JPME taught at precommissioning and primary schools, JPME Phase I taught at service intermediate and senior-level schools, JPME Phase II taught at the Joint Forces Staff College, the separate JPME programs at the National War College (NWC) and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF), and the CAPSTONE course for [General and Flag Officers (GOs/FOs)].”¹⁹ This education system is designed to give the officer an ever-expanding joint education proportionate to the level of joint expertise he or she might be called upon to use in a joint billet.

After the GNA was enacted the Joint Staff created a special JSO designator to assign officers to a joint career track early in their careers. Upon completion of JPME Phase I an officer has the basic joint knowledge to serve in a lower level joint staff billet but, in order to receive a JSO skill identifier, should complete JPME Phase II or attend the NWC or ICAF prior to serving in a JDA.^{20, 21} Each military department manages the selection and assignments of its own JSOs. Final approval of the selections rests with the Secretary of Defense with the advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.²² In addition to completing JPME, a JSO must also complete an assignment in a billet designated as a JDA

which involves integrating at least two of the three military departments.²³ As of 2001, in order for an officer to be promoted to a Flag or General Officer rank, General and Flag officers are required to be serving in a minimal 2-year JDA assignment or they must have completed a 3-year tour in a JDA as a mid-grade officer. The Secretary of Defense must approve all exceptions to this rule by signing a waiver submitted by an officer's parent Service.²⁴

In order to ascertain the effect of Title IV on joint officers, this paper will consider the joint education and assignment history of three categories of senior military leaders. The analysis will focus on the senior-level education and assignment history of those officers prior to selection to their senior billet. The first category involves the nine Unified Combatant Commanders in Chief (CINCs) in command as of January 1, 2002. These unified commands all have missions and responsibilities involving jointness. The second category focuses on the current Service chiefs who must focus both on joint as well as Service concerns. As members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), they offer advice to the CJCS, Secretary of Defense and the President. As chiefs of their Services, they work under the direction of the secretary of their military department to organize, train and equip their forces for combat operations.²⁵ Thus, the Service chiefs have divided interests between joint and Service matters. The final analytical category takes a look across time at the CINCCENTs from 1986 until the present in order to determine if any trends concerning joint officer management have appeared since the GNA became law.

Summaries of the senior-level education and experience for the three categories of senior leaders, current CINCs, current Service chiefs and CINCCENTs (1986-present), are listed respectively in Tables 1, 2 and 3 in Appendix A. The data in the tables is taken from the detailed information found in Appendix B that is, in turn, based upon available

biographies of each individual senior leader. The biographies came from one of two sources, either directly from the senior leader's parent Service (from the World Wide Web or directly from the Service's General or Flag Officer Management Office) or from an internet site established by that senior leader's office. In some cases, the senior leader's office internet site merely linked to the leader's parent Service internet site. If biographies were available from both sources, they are both represented in information found in Appendix B.

The data in Appendix A is presented in a manner which attempts to show aspects of two joint officer management issues. Firstly, each table lists any primary senior-level education that officer may have received, usually at the rank of O5 or above. Since none of the officers in this study attended his senior-level schooling prior to the implementation of the JPME program, the data in Appendix A will set the senior-level education baseline against which all future senior leaders may be measured. Secondly, the tables break down the individuals' assignment histories into four broad mutually exclusive categories in an attempt to show how much time each officer has spent working in billets which were: 1) on a joint staff or as part of a organization whose principle focus was on joint aspects; 2) closely tied to that leader's parent Service headquarters in or around Washington DC; 3) assignments within that leader's Service but away from Washington DC; or 4) miscellaneous in nature and usually involve Service specific education and training. If an officer received "joint credit" or "joint equivalency" for an assignment due to waivers designed to ease the transition from pre- to post-GNA conditions, the assignment is labeled as such in Appendix B and is placed in the appropriate category.

Analysis

Although all of the senior leaders in this study met or exceeded GNA joint education and experience requirements with or without waivers, it is interesting to note that there has been no apparent trend, even a slight one, over the last fifteen years to select senior leadership that has had increasingly more joint experience than the previous generations of senior leaders. There seems to have been little or no increase in the amount of time spent in a joint billet required to be successfully appointed to a senior leadership position in the military. Likewise, there has been very little shift in the number of years spent working within one's own Service, whether in or outside of Washington DC, to time spent in joint assignments. With regards to joint education, these pre-JPME officers have not established an ideal example as to how senior leader aspirants might successfully include senior-level school education required by the GNA into their career paths.

Joint experience doesn't appear to be as important as the language found in Joint Publication 1 indicates. While most of these officers have spent two or more tours in joint assignments, a few have managed to stay primarily within jobs either on Capitol Hill or within their own service in the Pentagon and have made it to the top. It appears that it is possible for an officer to attain the highest rank and be assigned as a senior leader with minimal joint experience. Many of the prior jobs which individual resumes indicate are "joint equivalent jobs" are concerned with positions involving agencies in Washington DC such as serving as a Staff Officer for a Congressional Action Team or as the Associate Director of Central Intelligence for Military Support in the Office of the Director of the CIA. While these positions are valid and worthwhile and involve aspects of integrating Service interests, they appear to offer little experience as to how a Joint Task Force or a Unified Command should integrate joint forces and how they should operate. These few officers'

career paths do not appear to follow “progressive and sequential assignments toward higher levels of joint operations,”²⁶ as indicated in Joint Publication 1.

Fortunately for the joint community and the writers of Joint Publication 1, senior leaders who have merely met minimal joint experience requirements are the exception rather than the rule. Of the current nine CINCs, five have spent more than three years working in joint assignments and of those, three have had five or more years of joint experience.

Surprisingly, the Service chiefs who devote a great deal of time and effort toward their own Services have, on average, more joint experience than their current CINC counterparts. Even looking at the past six CINCCENTs, three of the six met or exceeded the minimal criteria of two year’s time spent in a joint assignment. Furthermore, two of the three did so prior to 1991, well before the initial GNA effects had time to impact senior leader assignments.

Although some senior leaders make it to the top with little joint experience, fourteen of the eighteen leaders in this study arrived in their senior leadership roles with more than the minimal 2-years of joint experience, and the eighteen senior leaders considered in this paper have, on average, served in two joint assignments prior to assuming their senior leadership positions. It is interesting to note, however, that five of these officers did not attain their joint experience until they were an O8 or above.

Regardless of how much time these senior leaders have actually spent in JDAs, current rules concerning minimum time for an assignment to a JDA probably do not offer enough joint experience for future senior leaders. Considering the length of an average CINC or senior Service chief’s career, a two-year minimum tour in a JDA represents a very small portion of that officer’s career. Spending two years in a JDA represents less than 7 percent of a successful officer’s 30+ year career, and this percentage decreases significantly with every waiver approved by the Secretary of Defense. Even if one argues that the first 15

years of an officer's career are best spent learning the trade of his or her Service, and therefore should be excluded from such calculations, a two-year JDA tour still represents less than 15 percent of the next 15 years of that officer's career before he or she is selected to be a CINC or Service chief at, on average, the 30 year mark.

Turning attention away from time spent in joint assignments and toward how much time these officers have spent in Service assignments, it seems that the Services still maintain a great deal of influence over joint officer management and prefer to tightly control their officers. This influence is understandably due to the fact that Services nominate their officers for promotions, and clearly those nominations will be based upon Service qualifications and not joint skills. This indicates, however, that there is no joint culture permeating the officer promotion system that can ensure the Services are nominating officers who will not only be good leaders within that Service, but will also be good joint leaders in the future.

The fact that fifteen of the eighteen officers in this study spent more time working for their Service in and around Washington DC than they did in joint assignments is one indicator that Service assignments take precedence over joint assignments for an officer to have a successful career. On average, the current Service chiefs have spent one and a half years working in and around their Service headquarters for every year they worked in a JDA. Likewise, the current CINCs have spent two years and the past CINCCENTs have spent over two and a half years in assignments connected to their Service headquarters for every year spent in joint related assignments. Only three officers in this study managed to spend more time in joint assignments than they had spent working for their Service headquarters prior to appointment to their senior position.

Another indicator that joint perspectives take a back seat to Service officer management policies is that there exists no single agency that manages all joint officers. Each of the detailed biographies with individual assignment histories obtained for this paper came not from a joint officer management office, but from that officer's parent Service. Some of the CINC Unified Command internet sites contained an abbreviated biography which lacked detailed assignment histories, but many of them merely linked directly into the CINC's parent Service biography web page. The fact that these personnel records are segregated amongst the Services means that there is no way, aside from examining the annual overall joint promotion and assignment statistics that the Secretary of Defense reports to Congress,²⁷ to compare and contrast all JSOs without first going to each Service to extract the information. While it is probable that today's senior leaders know well enough the biographies of tomorrow's senior leaders and apply this knowledge when providing input for the selection of their replacements, it is highly doubtful that such familiarity exists among those responsible for selecting the lower echelons of officers for promotion and assignment. Even if there were, since the promotion system is compartmentalized amongst the Services, there is no way to ensure a uniform quality of JSOs across the military. The Joint Staff can quantitatively but not qualitatively monitor individual Service JSO promotion statistics provided by the Services to ensure compliance with GNA legislation. Unless laws are changed, however, the Services will ultimately determine the qualities of officers as they enter into the joint officer arena.

A third indication that jointness is not as prestigious as having served well in one's Service can be seen on the biographies available to the general public through the various CINC and Service chief internet sites. The biographies tend to be written so that prior duties as a commander in the officer's parent Service receive top billing over previous joint

experience. Commands of Service units dominate the biographies, as do accomplishments within that officer's Service, such as "being closely involved with building the US Air Force of the 21st Century,"²⁸ although the current jobs the CINCs hold obviously should require an extensive knowledge of joint capabilities and joint experience as well. One possible reason for the lack of emphasis on prior joint experience might be that there are very few joint commands and many joint staff billets, and it is far more prestigious to list commands one has held than it is to list work on any staff, joint or otherwise. Another reason is that these officers have simply spent a great deal more time working for their Service than they have in JDAs, and therefore lack joint assignments which they can place in the spotlight on their biographies. While there is no doubt that an officer must start learning his or her trade in one of the Services and that the officer should perform well and exhibit the potential for increased responsibility in that Service, both of the reasons listed above strongly imply that jointness is not as prestigious as contributing to one's Service, even when citing one's credentials for the most senior joint billets.

Turning toward the last part of this analysis involving changes in officer joint education over the last fifteen years, there are no trends, at least among the senior leadership in this study, that indicate whether or not GNA has improved joint education for the military's senior leaders. This, as has been noted, is due to the fact that these officers had already completed their senior Service schooling prior to the initial JPME changes to the senior school curricula. There are, however, some interesting trends amongst officers from the same Service, and these trends may offer a valid means to test whether or not joint education requirements will effect changes to a career paths of successful future senior leaders.

Each Service has its own personality derived from its Service culture,²⁹ and it is these cultures which seem to have helped shape the senior level education each of these eighteen officers sought and received. The Navy has generally preferred its leaders spend more time “at sea” or in some operational assignment rather than spending time enriching their personal education. Of the three Navy leaders examined in this paper, only one attended a senior Service school and that was his Service’s own school. The Air Force tends to fall at the other end of the spectrum, especially since it relies so much upon technology and the knowledge of how to best use it. All five Air Force leaders attended one of the National Defense University senior schools, which are focused on joint and interagency perspectives and not on any one particular Service. One of the five also attended the Air War College. Although the Marines are part of the Navy, they have a very different culture focused on self sufficiency and joint operations; e.g., the Navy transports the Marines, but the Marines have their own integrated air and ground forces for operations ashore. Of the five Marine leaders, four attended the National War College and one attended the Air War College. It is interesting that none of them attended their parent Service’s Naval War College. Last but not least, the Army leaders round out the statistics with four of the five leaders attending their Service’s own senior school and the fifth attending the National War College. Apparently Army leaders are most comfortable learning within their own ranks.

If the Service trends outlined above continue past the conclusion of the post-GNA educational grace period that looms on the horizon for future generations of senior military leaders, there are some startling and interesting possibilities. Firstly, if Navy officers don’t start to attend JPME Phase I schools, there will be few CINCs from that Service since they would lack JPME required for senior promotions or assignments. Secondly, although Army officers would still be eligible for such senior positions, they would be at a distinct

educational disadvantage if most of them received their joint education only through their Service's school system, since that education would recognizably have a high Army bias. Lastly, if senior joint assignments were only based upon an officer's joint education, the Air Force and Marine officers would stand to gain the majority of those positions over their Army and Navy brethren. While it is unlikely that these trends will continue if GNA education rules are enforced, it should be interesting to see which senior Service school future leaders will attend and whether or not the majority of successful senior officers attend their own Service's school, a sister Service's school or a school within the National Defense University.

Conclusions

By analyzing the assignment histories of the current CINCs, Service chiefs and the CINCCENTs from 1986 to present it is clear that Service perspectives continue to influence joint officer management policies. There has been little or no change in the number of years successful senior leaders have spent in joint assignments, and there has not been much change in the amount of time those officers have spent working for their Service either near or outside Washington DC. Finally, although the officers in this study could not have realistically received JPME Phase I educations, they provide some disturbing joint educational stereotypes which may not bode well for future senior leaders if left unchanged.

While these trends may change over the next decade as the first generation of post-GNA leaders rises to senior military leadership positions, one would assume that there would have been at least some small indication over the past fifteen years of the increased emphasis on jointness amongst the senior leaders chosen. Presumably this emphasis would have resulted in the selection of senior leadership with increasingly greater amounts of joint

experience from 1986 on. This brings up some interesting hypotheses which might explain the lack of even a slight increase. Firstly, it is possible that a significant change cannot happen gradually and must “bubble-up” through the system. If this is true, then the next few generations of senior leaders whose careers should have been influenced by the full impact of GNA initiatives should reach senior leadership positions with a great deal of joint educational background. Likewise, they should have had more than one or two previous joint assignments. Secondly, and at the other end of the spectrum, is a possible explanation that the changes to Title IV officer management requirements and policies might have been merely “window dressing”, putting down in writing minimal requirements for joint education and assignment that most senior officers were meeting in the first place. If this is the case, we should see little change, and future senior leaders will have similar assignment histories and senior level educations as the leaders profiled in this paper.

While the real reason for a lack of increase in joint experience amongst these senior leaders from 1986 to present probably won't become clear until at least a decade or more from now, it probably lies between the two extreme hypotheses outlined above. Considering the fact, however, that individual Services manage their own selection of JSOs, and have a strong influence over which senior leaders are nominated to Congress for promotion, it is likely that the true reason lies closer to the second hypothesis.

If left unchanged, each individual officer will have to manage his or her own career and ensure they receive the proper level of joint education and assignments. Most officers, however, can't directly control their careers and are subject to the whims of assignment officers and local Service officer retention and utilization policies. With an increased awareness of jointness, more leaders may try to fill more than two JDAs, but they will still have to repeatedly make their parent Service happy in order to get promoted as they rotate

from JDA to Service billet and back again. In the end, it appears that without changes to the joint officer management policies and systems, Service perspectives will continue to control officer promotions and assignments, and the onus to gain joint experience will remain on each individual leader. As one appointee to the recent Hart-Rudman Commission has said, “Until Service perspectives are minimized, there will be little incentive for officers to do what is necessary to gain joint experience.”³⁰ Without change jointness will remain a second priority to Service initiatives at least in the realm of, “creating acceptance that the JSO career path [is] good for both Service and officer corps”³¹

Recommendations

As the military moves forward toward its goal to create a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) using networked systems of sensors and shooters, the line between the Services will become blurred as Army, Navy and Air Force assets work in concert to identify, track and destroy targets. If this RMA does happen, the military will need leaders with common joint educational backgrounds and significant joint experiences so that they can command across the spectrum of Service operations.

In order to ensure jointness takes priority over Service desires where joint officer management policies are concerned, the Department of Defense should implement one or more of the recommendations outlined below. The recommendations are presented in the order of least to most impact upon the military. For example, the third recommendation would essentially require the overhaul of the entire military organizational structure.

- 1) Create new department or office external to the Services, possibly under the Office of the Secretary of Defense or Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that has overall responsibility for selecting, managing, assigning, and making promotion recommendations

for all JSOs. The JSO management process could be based upon continuous input from the Services throughout a JSO's career, or could be limited to input from the Services up to the point when the officer is designated a JSO. The new department or office would screen all officers during the middle years of a typical successful senior officer career path, from the fifteen to twenty-year mark, and determine which officers have the desire and potential to be JSOs. If the Services began to "hoard" the best officers for positions within their own Service, this new office would have the authority to designate some of those officers as JSOs. The office would also have oversight concerning all JPME programs.

2) Create a separate and distinct JSO career path for leaders who serve in critical joint billets.³² A distinct JSO career path would remove the existing conflict between requirements to work at critical assignments within one's Service and in JDAs. There would come a point and time within an officer's career, approximately at the fifteen-year mark, where the officer would either choose to stay focused on one Service or switch to learning and practicing jointness. If selected as a JSO, that officer would serve primarily in JDAs for the remainder of his or her career. All officers would receive a preliminary and Phase I JPME education but further joint education would be limited only to JSOs or JSO selects.

3) Restructure JDAs so that they are primarily located in the Joint Staff, unified commands, sub-unified commands and permanent standing JTF headquarters. Services would move standing Service headquarters billets for operational level units such as Corps, Numbered Air Forces, and Numbered Fleet headquarters, to include General Officer or Flag Officer (GO/FO) billets, under unified commands as JDAs in standing JTF headquarters.³³ Only JSO qualified officers could fill O7 and above JDAs while 75 percent of O6, 50 percent of O5 and 25 percent of O4 JDAs would have to be filled by JSOs or JSO selects. These percentages would provide a JSO population with minimal attrition rates during a typical

career progression. Also, the rising percentages would also allow non-JSO officers to fill JDAs during their careers, potentially leaving their assignments with the desire to compete for a JSO designator. Assuming that this restructuring would also include the creation of a joint agency that would assume current Service responsibilities to equip their Service, and would do so in such a manner that the equipment was jointly compatible, the Services would maintain enough GO/FO billets to oversee their remaining Title X administrative and training functions.³⁴ These billets would be classified as Service Duty Assignments (SDAs) and would not require JSO qualified GO/FOs. Service chief positions could be classified either as SDAs or JDAs, but this would depend heavily on whether or not the Service chief role in this restructured military was to deal primarily with intra-Service concerns or joint issues. This restructuring would require rewriting the National Security Act of 1947. If Service chief positions become focused only on intra-service issues, the positions would be SDAs filled from the pool of successful Service garrison and base commanders, training commanders, etc. If the Service chief positions become part of a joint staff focused on joint issues, the positions would be JDAs and would be filled from the rolls of successful CINCs or sub-unified commanders.

The result of following the recommendations above will most likely lead to the rise of joint initiatives over the individual Service interests. If only recommendations one and two are enacted, jointness may not overcome Service perspectives, but JSOs would probably become more successful in senior level careers than their non-JSO counterparts. This may eventually cause jointness to outshine Service parochialism. If all three recommendations are implemented, having quality officers in both JDAs and SDAs will be essential for the military to operate smoothly. In accordance with the intents of the congressionally mandated

legislation involving the Department of Defense from 1947 on, Services would completely fill a supporting role, while joint organizations would assume the supported role. Those officers desiring to become operational level warfighters would compete for a JSO designator. Officers desiring to learn specific Service skills, learn them well, and then plow that expertise back into their Service would compete for SDAs. The majority of officers, those who want to retire at the twenty-year mark, would not necessarily have to compete for a JSO designator and could fill both SDAs and lower level JDAs during their careers. In the end, jointness will permeate the military, and joint considerations will outweigh all others.

Appendix A: Summary of Assignment Histories for CINCs and Service chiefs in position as of January 1, 2002 and for CINCCENTs from 1986 to Present

Table 1: Unified Command CINC joint and Service experience prior to assignment as CINC for CINCs in command as of January 1st, 2002

Unified Command	Parent Military Department	Senior Schools(s) attended, Graduation Year (Rank when in school)	# yrs prior joint time*	# yrs w/ own Service in/near DC**	# yrs w/ own Service outside DC	Misc Time***	Total yrs of service prior to CINC
USEUCOM	USAF	National War College, 1984 (O6)	6.0 [†]	7.5	13.5	7.5	34.5
USPACOM	USN	None (although was a Fellow at Naval War College for a year)	4.0	9.5	13.5	3.5	30.5
USJFCOM	USA	Army War College, 1987 (O5)	2.5	None	21.0	8.0	31.5
USSOUTHCOM [‡]	USMC	National War College, 1986 (O5)	5.0	8.5	16.5	3.0	33.0
USCENTCOM	USA	Army War College, 1985 (O5)	1.0	6.0	21.5	5.0	33.5
USSPACECOM	USAF	National War College, 1987 (O6)	2.5	9.5	13.5	6.0	31.5
USSOCOM	USAF	Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1986 (O6)	5.0	2.0	19.5	6.0	32.5
USTRANSCOM	USAF	Air War College, 1982 (O5) National War College, 1984 (O5)	1.5	8.5	23.5	1.5	35.0
USSTRATCOM	USN	None	3.5	4.5	17.0	7.5	32.5
AVERAGES			3.4	6.2	17.7	5.3	32.7

* Time working w/ Joint Staff, Unified/ Sub Unified Command or JTF. See Appendix B to see what assignments receive joint credit according to the individual CINCs and Services

** Assignments are primarily with the headquarters of individual CINC's Service

*** Time primarily includes assignments at professional schooling/training to include pilot instruction

[†] All years are rounded off to nearest half year equivalent

[‡] Using data for previous CINC SOUTHCOM since as of January 1st, 2002 there is an acting CINC

Appendix A: Summary of Assignment Histories for CINCs and Service chiefs in position as of January 1, 2002 and for CINCCENTs from 1986 to Present

Table 2: Service chief joint and Service experience prior to assignment as JCS member for Service chiefs holding the position as of January 1, 2002

Joint Chief of Staff Position	Parent Military Department	Senior Schools(s) attended, Graduation Year (Rank when in school))	# yrs prior joint time*	# yrs w/ own Service in/near DC**	# yrs w/ own Service outside DC	Misc Time***	Total yrs of service prior to JCS
Chief of Staff of the Army	USA	National War College, 1986 (O5)	2.0 [†]	6.0	19.0	6.5	33.5
Chief of Naval Operations	USN	Naval War College, 1986 (O5)	5.0	3.5	21.0	2.5	32.0
Chief of Staff of the Air Force	USAF	National War College, 1982 (O5)	4.0	7.0	21.0	3.0	35.0
Marine Corps Commandant	USMC	National War College, 1985 (O5)	5.0	8.0	12.0	7.0	32.0
AVERAGES			4.0	6.1	18.2	4.8	33.1

* Time working w/ Joint Staff, Unified/ Sub Unified Command or JTF. See Appendix B to see what assignments receive joint credit according to the individual Service chiefs and Services

** Assignments are primarily with the headquarters of individual Service chief's Service

*** Time primarily includes assignments at professional schooling/training to include pilot instruction

[†] All years are rounded off to nearest half year equivalent

Appendix A: Summary of Assignment Histories for CINCs and Service chiefs in position as of January 1, 2002 and for CINCCENTs from 1986 to Present

Table 3: CINCCENTCOM joint and Service experience prior to assignment as CINC for CINCs from 1986 to January 1, 2002

Dates of assignment to CENTCOM	Parent Military Department	Senior Schools(s) attended, Graduation Year (Rank when in school)	# yrs prior joint time*	# yrs w/ own Service in/near DC**	# yrs w/ own Service outside DC	Misc Time***	Total yrs of service prior to CINC
Jul 2000 – Present	USA	Army War College, 1985 (O5)	1.0 [†]	6.0	21.5	5.0	33.5
Aug 1997 – Jul 2000	USMC [‡]	National War College, Year/Rank not listed	5.0	7.0	19.0	1.0	32.0
Aug 1994 – Aug 1997	USA	Army War College, 1978 (O5)	1.5	11.0	18.0	1.0	31.5
Aug 1991 – Aug 1994	USMC [‡]	National War College, Year/Rank not listed	1.5	8.0	22.0	2.5	34.0
Nov 1988 – Aug 1991	USA	Army War College, 1973 (O5)	2.5	6.5	18.5	7.5	35.0
Nov 1985 – Nov 1991	USMC [‡]	Air War College, 1971 (O5)	6.0	10.5	15.0	1.5	33.0
AVERAGES			2.9	8.2	19.0	3.1	33.2

* Time working w/ Joint Staff, Unified/ Sub Unified Command or JTF. See Appendix B to see what assignments receive joint credit according to the individual CINCs and Services

** Assignments are primarily with the headquarters of individual CINC's Service

*** Time primarily includes assignments at professional schooling/training

[†] All years are rounded off to nearest half year equivalent except as noted in Appendix B for USMC CINCs

[‡] USMC biographies are rather vague and do not list specific dates for each assignment. As a result, some time which might have been classified as "Miscellaneous Time" has been added on to another category.

Appendix B: Assignment Histories for CINCs and Service chiefs in position as of January 1st, 2002 and for CINCCENTs from 1986 to Present

CINCEUCOM	Parent Service	USAF	# Yrs in service prior to current assignment	34.5
Senior Schools(s) attended	National War College (O6) JFK School of Government, Harvard (O7)			
# yrs prior service time working w/ Joint Staff, Unified/ Sub Unified Command or JTF (Rank when in position)	2.0 yrs Cdr Alaskan Command, Alaskan North American Aerospace Defense Command Region, 11 th Air Force and JTF Alaska (O9) 4.0 yrs Vice CJCS (O10)			6.0 yrs TOTAL
# yrs prior service time with own service in/near DC (Rank when in position)	3.0 yrs Tactical fighter requirements officer, ODCS, Research and Development, HQ USAF (O4/5) 1.5 yrs Special Assistant, ODCS, Research/ Development/Acquisition, HQ USAF (O6) 1.5 yrs Dir Tactical Programs, Office Asst Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition 0.5 yrs Dir Opntl Reqts, ODCS Plans and Ops, HQ USAF (O8) 1.0 yr DCS Plans and Ops, HQ USAF (O9)			7.5 yrs TOTAL
# yrs prior service time with own service outside Pentagon (Rank when in position)	1.5 yrs F-105 Combat Crew member, 67 th and 12 th Tactical Fighter Sqdrn (O2/3) 1.0 yr Instr Pilot, 66 th Fighter Wpns Sqdrn (O3) 1.5 yrs Project officer, Tactical Air Cmnd (O3) 2.0 yrs Asst Ops Ofer, 335 th Tactical Fighter Sqdrn then Chief, Standardization and Evaluation Div, 4 th Tactical Fighter Wing (O4) 3.0 yrs Special Asst then XO to Commander, HQ Tactical Air Cmnd (O5/6) 1.0 yr Cdr 56 th Tactical Training Wing (O6) 3.0 yrs Asst DCS for Ops then DCS Requirements, HQ Tactical Air Cmnd (O7) 0.5 yrs Cdr, HQ Air Combat Command (O10)			13.5 yrs TOTAL
Notes	Served one year as Pilot, Takhli Royal Thai AFB, Thailand (O3) Attended Army Command and General Staff College (O4)			

All years rounded to nearest 0.5 year

Biography obtained from USEUCOM web site <www.eucom.mil/Directorates/ECCC/bio.htm> [12/18/01]

Appendix B: Assignment Histories for CINCs and Service chiefs in position as of January 1st, 2002 and for CINCCENTs from 1986 to Present

CINCPAC Parent Service	USN	# Yrs in service prior to assignment	30.5
Senior Schools(s) attended	None		
# yrs prior service time working w/ Joint Staff, Unified/ Sub Unified Command or JTF (Rank when in position)	2.0 yrs Deputy Dir for Assessment/ Dep Sir for Force Structure & Resources, J-8, Joint Staff (O7) 2.0 yrs Dir Joint Staff (O9)		4.0 yrs TOTAL
# yrs prior service time with own service in/near DC (Rank when in position)	1.5 yrs Office of CNO (O-3) 1.0 yr White House Fellow, Dept of Housing and Urban Development (O-3) 1.5 yrs Office of Program Appraisal, Plans and Policy Analyst (O-5) 2.5 yrs National Security Council Staff Member for W. Europe (O-5) 1.5 yrs Office of CNO, Strategic Studies Group CNO Fellow and OP-090-EA (O5/6) 0.5 yrs Dir Assessment Div, N81, Office of CNO (O8) 1.0 yr Associate Dir of Central Intel for Military Support, Office of Dir CIA (O9)		9.5 yrs TOTAL
# yrs prior service time with own service outside Pentagon (Rank when in position)	2.5 yrs DDG 19/DDG 6 (O1/O3) 3.0 yrs XO, DDG 15 (O4) 2.5 yrs CO, DDG 21 (O5) 1.5 yrs Staff CINCPACFLT (O6) 1.5 yrs CO, Naval Station, Pearl Harbor (O6) 1.0 yr DCS for Management/IG, CINCPACFLT (O7) 1.5 yrs Cdr, Cruiser Destroyer Group FIVE (O8)		13.5 yrs TOTAL
Notes	Attended Oxford University (Rhodes Scholar) (O2/3)		

All years rounded to nearest 0.5 year

Items in **bold** identified as a Joint Duty Assignment on individual's biography

Sources: Biographies obtained from [In E-mail from Aaron Crane <P00F2@bupers.navy.mil> "No Subject" to Alice Juda <judaa@nwc.navy.mil>] 1/8/02, and from USPACOM web page <www.pacom.mil/leadership/j0/j0bio.htm> [12/18/01]

Appendix B: Assignment Histories for CINCs and Service chiefs in position as of January 1st, 2002 and for CINCCENTs from 1986 to Present

CINCFJCOM	Parent Service	USA	# Yrs in service prior to assignment	31.5
Senior Schools(s) attended			Army War College (O5)	
# yrs prior service time working w/ Joint Staff, Unified/ Sub Unified Command or JTF (Rank when in position)			2.5 yrs Dir Strategic Plans, Policies and Assessments, J-5/7, SOCOM (O7/8)	2.5 yrs TOTAL
# yrs prior service time with own service in/near DC (Rank when in position)			None	0.0 yrs TOTAL
# yrs prior service time with own service outside Pentagon (Rank when in position)			0.5 yrs LNO, 82 nd Abn Div (O1) 1.0 yr various, 101 st Abn Div, Vietnam (O1/O2) 1.0 yr Cdr, HHC, 2-325 th Inf Bn (O2/3) 2.0 yrs Cdr, Army San Antonio District Recruiting Cmnd (O3) 2.0 yrs Cdr HHC and A Co, Asst S3, 2-75 th Ranger Bn (O3) 2.0 yrs various, Army Personnel Center (O4) 2.0 yrs Cdr, 2-508 th /3-504 th Inf Bn (O5) 1.5 yrs Cdr 1-75 th Ranger Bn (O5/6) 3.0 yrs D Cdr/Cdr 75 th Ranger Rgt (O6) 2.0 yrs ADC(M), 7 th Inf Div (O6/7) 2.0 yrs Cdr 101 st Abn Div (O8) 2.0 yrs Cdr, XVIII Abn Corps (O9)	21.0 yrs TOTAL
Notes			2.0 yrs Exchange Officer and Co Cdr, 3rd Bn, British Parachute Regt (O4)	

All years rounded to nearest 0.5 year

Items in **bold** identified as a Joint Duty Assignment on individual's biography

Sources: : Biographies obtained from US Army GOMO site <<https://akocomm.us.army.mil/gomo/>> [18 December 2001] and from USJFCOM web page

<<http://www.jfcom.mil/About/kernan.htm>> [18 December 2001]

Appendix B: Assignment Histories for CINCs and Service chiefs in position as of January 1st, 2002 and for CINCCENTs from 1986 to Present

CINCSOUTH	Parent Service	USMC	# Yrs in service prior to assignment	33.0
Senior Schools(s) attended		National War College (O5) Harvard University for the Senior Executives in National and International Security Program (Rank ?)		
# yrs prior service time working w/ Joint Staff, Unified/ Sub Unified Command or JTF (Rank when in position)		2.0 yrs Chief, Ground Forces Branch and XO, Asst CoS, C/J/G3 UN Command/CFC/USFK (O5) 2.0 yrs Deputy Cdr/CoS, US forces, Japan (O8) 1.0 yr Dir for Opns (J-3), Joint Staff (O9)		5.0 yrs TOTAL
# yrs prior service time with own service in/near DC (Rank when in position)		2.5 yrs Camp David Security Detachment Cdr, White House Social Aide, Plt Ldr Guard Co and Special Ceremonial Plt (O2/3) 3.0 yrs Asst Majors' Monitor, HQ USMC (O3) 3.0 yrs Cdr, Marine Barracks, DC (O5/6)		8.5 yrs TOTAL
# yrs prior service time with own service outside Pentagon (Rank when in position)		0.5 yr LNO to 82 nd Abn Div (O1) 1.0 yr various 2 nd Bn, 5 th Marines, Vietnam (O1/2) 1.0 Ops Officer/XO, Security Element, Marine Aircraft Grp 15 (O3) 3.0 yrs Ops Officer, 2-5 Marine Bn; XO 3-5 Marine Bn; Div Staff Secretary (O3/4) 3.0 yrs Cdr, Marine Recruiting Station, Buffalo (O4/5) 2.0 yrs Cdr 2 nd Bn, 1 st Marines (O5) 1.0 yr CoS/ADC, 2 nd Marine Div (O6) 2.0 yrs President USMC University/CG, USMC Schools/USMC Combat Development Cmnd (O7) 3.0 yrs Cdr, USMARFOR, Atlantic/Europe/South (O9)		16.5 yrs TOTAL
Notes		Attended Army Infantry Officer Advanced Course (O3) Served as Deputy Cdr, MARFOR, Somalia, (3 months) (O7) Served as Deputy Cdr, JTF-Somalia (6 months) (O7)		

All years rounded to nearest 0.5 year

Items in **bold** identified as a Joint Duty Assignment on individual's biography

Sources: Biography obtained from <www.dtic.mil/jcs/core/vcjs.html> [1/4/2002]

Data is for last CINCSOUTHCOM since as of 1/1/2002 there is only an acting CINC who is currently the Deputy CINC

Appendix B: Assignment Histories for CINCs and Service chiefs in position as of January 1st, 2002 and for CINCCENTs from 1986 to Present

CINCCENT	Parent Service	USA	# Yrs in service prior to assignment	33.5
Senior Schools(s) attended		Army War College (O5)		
# yrs prior service time working w/ Joint Staff, Unified/ Sub Unified Command or JTF (Rank when in position)		1.0 yr Asst CoS, C-3/J-3/G-3 UN Command/CFC/USFK (O8)		
# yrs prior service time with own service in/near DC (Rank when in position)		1.5 yrs IG/Investigator, US Army IG Agency (O4) 2.5 yrs in office CSA as Staff Officer, Congr Action Team and Exec Asst (O4/5) 2.0 yrs Dir, Louisiana Mnvr TF, Office of CSA (O7/8)		
# yrs prior service time with own service outside Pentagon (Rank when in position)		0.5 yrs Asst Co XO, A/4 FA Bn 1.0 yr LNO/Asst S-3, 2-4 FA Bn, Vietnam (O1/2) 1.0 yr Cdr D Btry, 1 st Tng Bde (O2/3) 3.5 yrs various, 2 ACR (O3) 3.0 yrs Cdr, 2 nd Bn, 78 th FA (O5) 2.0 yrs Depty Asst CoS, G-3, III Corps (O5) 3.0 yrs Cdr DIVARTY then CoS, 1 st Cav Div (O5/6) 1.5 yrs ADC(M), 1 st Cav Div (O6) 1.0 yr Asst Cmndnt, Army FA School (O6/7) 2.0 yrs Cdr, 2 nd If Div (O8) 3.0 yrs Cdr, 3 rd US Army (O9)		
Notes		Student Armed Forces Staff College (O4) Participated in Operation Desert Shield/Storm as ADC(M), 1 st Cav Div (O6)		

All years rounded to nearest 0.5 year

Items in **bold** identified as a Joint Duty Assignment on individual's biography

Sources: Biographies obtained from US Army GOMO site <<https://akocomm.us.army.mil/gomo/>> [18 December 2001] and CENTCOM web site

<www.centcom.mil/new_site/web/About/biographies/bio_cccc.htm> [18 December 2001]

Appendix B: Assignment Histories for CINCs and Service chiefs in position as of January 1st, 2002 and for CINCCENTs from 1986 to Present

CINCSPACE	Parent Service	USAF	# Yrs in service prior to assignment	31.5
Senior Schools(s) attended		National War College (O6)		
# yrs prior service time working w/ Joint Staff, Unified/ Sub Unified Command or JTF (Rank when in position)		1.5 yrs Dir Force Structure, Resources & Assessment (J-8), Joint Staff (O8) 1.0 yr Cdr US Forces Japan and 5 th AF (O9)		2.5 yrs TOTAL
# yrs prior service time with own service in/near DC (Rank when in position)		1.5 yrs Action Officer, Dir of Opns then Chief XO Committee, USAF Budget Issues Team, Directorate of Plans, Congressional and External Affairs Division, HQ USAF (O3/4) 2.0 yrs Xo to CoS, USAF (O5/6) 3.0 yrs Dir, Directorate of Programs and Evaluation, HQ USAF (O6/7/8) 1.0 yr DCS Plans and Ops, HQ USAF (O8/9) 2.0 yrs Vice CoS, HQ USAF (O9/10)		9.5 yrs TOTAL
# yrs prior service time with own service outside Pentagon (Rank when in position)		1.0 yr FAC, 20 th Tactical Air Spt Sqdrn, Vietnam (O2) 3.5 yrs various, 71 st Flying Tng Wing (O2/3) 1.0 yr Resource Mngr, Air Staff Tng Program, UASF Personnel Ctr (O3) 1.0 yr Flt Cdr and Instr Pilot, 525 th Tactical Fighter Sqdrn (O3) 2.0 yrs Aide to Cdr USAF Europe and Cdr Allied Air Forces Central Europe (O4/5) 1.5 yrs Cdr, 10 th Tactical Fighter Sqdrn then Asst Depty Cdr for Ops, 50 th Tactical Fighter Wing (O5) 2.5 yrs Vice Cdr then Cdr 363 rd Tactical Fighter Wing (O6) 0.5 yrs DCS for Inspection Safety & Security, Tactical Air Command (O6) 0.5 yrs Cdr, Air Combat Command (O10)		13.5 yrs TOTAL
Notes				

All years rounded to nearest 0.5 year

Items in **bold** identified as a Joint Duty Assignment on individual's biography

Sources: Biography obtained from SPACECOM web site link to < www.peterson.af.mil/./usspace/bio-eberhart.htm > [12/18/2001]

Appendix B: Assignment Histories for CINCs and Service chiefs in position as of January 1st, 2002 and for CINCCENTs from 1986 to Present

CINCSOC	Parent Service	USAF	# Yrs in service prior to assignment	32.5
Senior Schools(s) attended			National Security Management Course (correspondence) (O4) Industrial College of the Armed Forces (O6) Program for Senior Officials in National Security, JFK School, Harvard (O6) National and International Security Management Program, JFK School, Harvard (O8)	
# yrs prior service time working w/ Joint Staff, Unified/ Sub Unified Command or JTF (Rank when in position)			1.0 yr Joint Tng Exercise Officer, MAC Eur (O3) 2.0 yrs DCG, Joint Special Ops Cmnd (O6/7) 2.0 yrs Cdr SOCPAC (O7/8)	5.0 yrs TOTAL
# yrs prior service time with own service in/near DC (Rank when in position)			1.0 yr Deputy Chief, Airlift and Tng Div, Directorate of Operational Reqts, DCS for Research, Development and Acquisition, HQ USAF (O6) 1.0 yr Chief Airlift and Tng Div, Directorate of Strategic, Special Ops Forces and Airlift, Military Deputy for Acquisition, Office of Asst Sec of Air Force (O6)	2.0 yrs TOTAL
# yrs prior service time with own service outside Pentagon (Rank when in position)			3.0 yrs C-130E Pilot, 347 th and 772 nd Tactical Airlift Sqdrns (O1/2/3) 1.0 yr Aircraft Cdr, Instructor Pilot, Standardization and Evaluation Pilot, 16 th Spec Ops Sqdrn (O3) 2.0 yrs Air Ops Staff Ofcr, HQ USAF Europe (O3) 4.5 yrs Chief, Space Shuttle Flight Ops Branch then Deputy Dir for Policy Planning then XO to Cdr, Space Div Los Angeles Air Force Station (O3/4/5) 2.0 yrs Cdr, 21 st Tactical Airlift Sqdrn (O5) 3.0 yrs Vice Cdr then Cdr 1550 th Combat Crew Trng Wing (O6) 2.0 yrs Cdr, 1 st Special Ops Wing 1.0 yr Cdr, USAF SOC (O8) 1.0 yr Vice Cdr, USAF Europe (O8/9)	19.5 yrs TOTAL
Notes				

All years rounded to nearest 0.5 year

Items in **bold** identified as a Joint Duty Assignment on individual's biography

Sources: Biography obtained from SOCOM web site with link to <www.af.mil/news/biographies/holland_cr.htm> [12/19/2001]

Appendix B: Assignment Histories for CINCs and Service chiefs in position as of January 1st, 2002 and for CINCCENTs from 1986 to Present

CINCTRANS	Parent Service	USAF	# Yrs in service prior to assignment	35.0
Senior Schools(s) attended		Air War College (O5) National War College (O5) Program for Senior Executives, JFK School, Harvard (O7)		
# yrs prior service time working w/ Joint Staff, Unified/ Sub Unified Command or JTF (Rank when in position)		1.5 yrs Director of Ops & Log, USTRANSCOM (O7/8)		1.5 yrs TOTAL
# yrs prior service time with own service in/near DC (Rank when in position)		0.5 yrs Deputy Chief of Plans, Directorate of Logistics, HQ USAF (O5/6) 1.0 yr Chief Logistics Budget Integration Office Directorate of Logistics, HQ USAF (O6) 1.5 yrs Chief, Resources Division, Directorate of Programs and Resources, HQ USAF (O6) 2.5 yrs Director of Programs and Evaluations, HQ USAF (O8) 1.5 yrs Deputy Chief of Staff for Installations and Logistics, HQ USAF (O9) 1.5 yrs Vice Chief of Staff, HQ USAF (O9/10)		8.5 yrs TOTAL
# yrs prior service time with own service outside Pentagon (Rank when in position)		0.5 yrs Asst Ops Officer, 4449 th Combat Training Sdrn (O1/2) 0.5 yrs Cdr, HQ's Sqdrn, 4442 nd Combat Crew Tng Wing (O2) 1.0 yr Pilot, 62 nd Tactical Airlift Sqdrn (O2) 1.0 yrs Aircraft Cdr, 50 th Tactical Airlift Sqdrn (O2/3) 3.5 yrs Instructor Pilot, 62 nd Tactical Airlift Sqdrn (O3) 2.5 yrs Exchange officer and Aircraft Commander, 1137 th USAF Special Activity Office (O3) 3.0 yrs C-141 and C-5 Aircraft Maintenance Officer, Travis AFB (O3/4) 1.5 yrs Instructor Pilot, 41 st Tactical Airlift Sqdrn (O4) 1.0 yr Operations Officer, 41 st Tactical Airlift Sqdrn (O4/5) 1.5 yrs Commander, 317 th Organizational Maintenance Sqdrn (O5) 2.0 yrs Deputy Cdr for Operations, 317 th Tactical Airlift Wing (O6) 1.0 yr Commander, 435 th Tactical Airlift Wing (O6) 1.0 yr Commander, 437 th Military Airlift Wing (O6) 0.5 yrs Asst Deputy Chief of Staff for Force Applications, Office of the DCS for Ops and Transportation, HQ MAC (O6/7) 1.5 yrs Commander, Airlift Control Center, HQ MAC then Tanker airlift Control Center, HQ Air Mobility Command (O7) 1.5 yrs Commander 21sdt Air Force (O8/9)		23.5 yrs TOTAL
Notes				

All years rounded to nearest 0.5 year

Items in **bold** identified as a Joint Duty Assignment on individual's biography

Sources: Biographies obtained from TRANSCOM web site with link to www.af.mil/news/biographies/handy_jw.html on 12/19/2001 and from [In E-mail from Edward Willett <WillettEJ@hqmc.usmc.mil> "Bios" to Joseph Jordan <jordanj@nwc.navy.mil>] 1/30/02 (which requested that all information regarding to specific assignments and time spent in assignments not be released to the general public)

Appendix B: Assignment Histories for CINCs and Service chiefs in position as of January 1st, 2002 and for CINCCENTs from 1986 to Present

CINCSTRAT	Parent Service	USN	# Yrs in service prior to assignment	32.5
Senior Schools(s) attended			Senior Officer Program in National Security Strategy, Harvard (O6)	
# yrs prior service time working w/ Joint Staff, Unified/ Sub Unified Command or JTF (Rank when in position)			1.0 yr Deputy Cdr and CoS, JTF FIVE, CINCPAC (O6) 2.5 yrs Cdr USNavy Europe and Allied Forces Southern Europe (to include 0.5 yrs as Commander JTF Nobil Anvil) (O9/10)	3.5 yrs TOTAL
# yrs prior service time with own service in/near DC (Rank when in position)			2.0 yrs Congressional Committee LNO, Navy Office of Legislative Affairs (O4/5) 0.5 yrs F/A-18 Program Coordinator, Office Deputy CNO (Air Warfare) (O5) 2.0 yrs Deputy CNO for Plans, Policy and Operations, Office of the CNO (N3/N5) (O7/8/9)	4.5 yrs TOTAL
# yrs prior service time with own service outside Pentagon (Rank when in position)			2.5 yrs Pilot and Training Officer, Fighter Sqdrn 92, USS Constellation (O3) 3.0 yrs Experimental Test Pilot, Naval Air test Center (O3/4) 2.0 yrs Pilot and Special Project Officer, Fighter Squadron 1, USS Ranger (O4) 2.0 yrs Cdr Strike/Fighter Sqdrn 131, USS Coral Sea (O5) 1.0 yr XO USS Carl Vinson (O6) 1.0 yr Cdr USS LaSalle (O6) 2.5 yrs Cdr USS Abraham Lincoln (O6) 1.5 yrs Inspector General/Director of Operations (N3), CINCLANTFLT (O6/7) 1.5 yrs Cdr Carrier Group FIVE/ Battle Force SEVENTH Fleet (O7)	17.0 yrs TOTAL
Notes			Participated in Desert Storm as Cdr USS Lincoln	

All years rounded to nearest 0.5 year

Items in **bold** identified as a Joint Duty Assignment on individual's biography

Sources: Biography obtained from STRATCOM web site www.stratcom.af.mil/news/bios/ellis.htm on 12/18/2001

Appendix B: Assignment Histories for CINCs and Service chiefs in position as of January 1st, 2002 and for CINCCENTs from 1986 to Present

Chief of Staff of the Army	Parent Service	USA # Yrs in service prior to current assignment	33.5
Senior Schools(s) attended	National War College (O5)		
# yrs prior service time working w/ Joint Staff, Unified/ Sub Unified Command or JTF (Rank when in position)	2.0 yrs Deputy Chief of Staff, Administration and Logistics, Allied Land Forces Southern Europe (O6/O7)		2.0 yrs TOTAL
# yrs prior service time with own service in/near DC (Rank when in position)	1.0 yr Force Integration Staff Officer, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, US Army (O5) 1.5 yr Chief, Institutional Training Divisions, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, US Army (O6) 1.0 yr Director of Training, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, US Army (O7) 2.0 yrs Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff then Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, US Army (O8/O9) 0.5 yrs Vice Chief of Staff, US Army (O10)		6.0 yrs TOTAL
# yrs prior service time with own service outside Pentagon (Rank when in position)	0.5 yrs Forward Observer, B Battery, 2 nd Bn 9th Artillery, Vietnam (O1) 1.0 yr Assistant Secretary then Secretary to the General Staff, Schofield Barracks (O2/O3) 0.5 yrs Assistant S-1, Base Defense Command, XXIV Corps, Vietnam (O3) 0.5 yrs Commander, A Troop, 3 rd Squadron, 5 th Cavalry, 9 th Inf Div, Vietnam (O3) 3.5 yrs Personnel Staff Officer, U.S. Army Pacific (O3) 2.0 yrs Instructor, US Military Academy (O4) 1.0 yr Adjutant then Executive Officer, 1 st Squadron, 3 rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (O4) 2.0 yrs Commander, 3 rd Squadron, 7 th Cavalry Regiment (O5) 1.0 yr Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, 3 rd Infantry Division (O5) 2.0 yrs Commander 2 nd Brigade, 3 rd Infantry Division (O6) 1.0 yr Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, VII Corps (O6) 1.0 yr Assistant Division Commander, 3 rd Infantry Division (O7) 1.5 yrs Commanding General, 1 st Cavalry Division (O8) 1.5 yrs Commander in Chief, US Army Europe and VIIth Army (O9/O10)		19.0 yrs TOTAL
Notes			

All years rounded to nearest 0.5 year

Items in **bold** identified as a Joint Duty Assignment on individual's biography

Sources: Biography obtained from US Army GOMO site <<https://akocomm.us.army.mil/gomo/>> [30 January 2002]

Appendix B: Assignment Histories for CINCs and Service chiefs in position as of January 1st, 2002 and for CINCCENTs from 1986 to Present

Chief of Naval Operations	Parent Service	USN # Yrs in service prior to current assignment	32.0
Senior Schools(s) attended	Naval War College (O5)		
# yrs prior service time working w/ Joint Staff, Unified/ Sub Unified Command or JTF (Rank when in position)	1.0 yr Chief PACOM Branch, J-3, Office of Joint Chiefs of Staff (O6) 2.0 yrs Director, Plans & Policy, J-5, and Director, Program Analysis and Financial Management, J-8, USTRANSCOM (O7) 1.0 yr Director for Operations, J-3, Joint Staff (O9) 1.0 yr Director, Joint Staff (O9)		5.0 yrs TOTAL
# yrs prior service time with own service in/near DC (Rank when in position)	1.0 yr Administrative Assistant, Office of CNO (O3) 1.5 yrs Administrative Assistant and Aide to DCNO, Surface Warfare (O4) 1.0 yr Administrative Assistant to VCNO (O4)		3.5 yrs TOTAL
# yrs prior service time with own service outside Pentagon (Rank when in position)	2.0 yrs Main Propulsion Assistant/Engineer Officer, USS Weeks (O1/O2) 1.5 yrs Engineer Officer, USS Gearing (O2/O3) 2.0 yrs Commanding Officer, USS Grand Rapids (O3/O4) 1.0 yrs Commanding Officer, USS McCloy (O4/O5) 1.5 yrs Force ASW Officer, Staff, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet (O5) 2.0 yrs Commanding Officer, USS Spruance (O5) 2.0 yrs Commanding Officer, Fleet Anti-Submarine Training Center Atlantic (O5/O6) 2.0 yrs Commander, Destroyer Squadron ONE SEVEN (O6) 0.5 yrs Commander, Destroyer Squadron FIVE (O6) 1.0 yr Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group THREE (O7/O8) 1.5 yrs Deputy and Chief of Staff, Commander in Chief, US Atlantic Fleet (O8) 2.0 yrs Commander, SECOND Fleet/ Commander Striking Fleet Atlantic (O8/O9) 1.0 yr Commander in Chief, US Atlantic Fleet (O10)		21.0 yrs TOTAL
Notes			

All years rounded to nearest 0.5 year

Items in **bold** identified as a Joint Duty Assignment on individual's biography

Sources: Biographies obtained [In E-mail from Aaron Crane <P00F2@bupers.navy.mil> "Bio" to Julie Zecher <zecherj@nwc.navy.mil>] 1/30/02 and from <http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/people/flags/clark_v/clarkbio.html> [30 January 2002]

Appendix B: Assignment Histories for CINCs and Service chiefs in position as of January 1st, 2002 and for CINCCENTs from 1986 to Present

Chief of Staff of the Air Force	Parent Service	USAF	# Yrs in service prior to current assignment	35.0
Senior Schools(s) attended	National War College (O5)			
# yrs prior service time working w/ Joint Staff, Unified/ Sub Unified Command or JTF (Rank when in position)	2.0 yrs Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs, Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate, Joint Staff (O7/O8) 2.0 yrs Commander 9 th Air Force and U.S. Central Command Air Forces (O8/O9)			4.0 yrs TOTAL
# yrs prior service time with own service in/near DC (Rank when in position)	3.0 yrs Staff Officer for Operations and Readiness, Tactical Division Headquarters, USAF (O4) 2.0 yrs Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (O8) 0.5 yrs Special Assistant to the USAF Chief of Staff for Roles and Missions (O8) 1.5 yrs Deputy Chief of Staff fro Air and Space Operations, Headquarters USAF (O9)			7.0 yrs TOTAL
# yrs prior service time with own service outside Pentagon (Rank when in position)	1.0 yr C-7 Pilot, 459 th Tactical Airlift Squadron, Vietnam (O1/O2) 1.0 yr Instructor Pilot, Weapons Officer and Fast Forward Air Controller, 555 th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Thailand (O3) 4.0 yrs Instructor Pilot, Flight Examiner and Evaluation Chief, 81 st Tactical Fighter Wing, England (O3) 3.0 yrs Flight Instructor then Flight Commander, USAF Fighter Weapons School (O3) 1.5 yrs Chief of Safety, 474 th Tactical Fighter Wing (O5) 0.5 yrs Commander, 430 th Tactical Fighter Squadron (O5) 3.0 yrs Special Assistant and Executive Officer to the Commander, Tactical Air Command (O5/O6) 1.5 yrs Vice Commander then Commander, 33 rd Tactical Fighter Wing (O6) 2.0 yrs Commander, 57 th Fighter Weapons Wing (O6/O7) 2.0 yrs Commander US Air Forces in Europe and Commander Allied Air Forces Central Europe (O10) 1.5 yrs Commander, Air Combat command (O10)			21.0 yrs TOTAL
Notes				

All years rounded to nearest 0.5 year

Sources: Biography obtained from http://www.af.mil/news/biographies/jumper_jp.html on 1/30/02

Appendix B: Assignment Histories for CINCs and Service chiefs in position as of January 1st, 2002 and for CINCCENTs from 1986 to Present

Commandant of the Marine Corps	Parent Service USMC	# Yrs in service prior to current assignment	32.0
Senior Schools(s) attended	National War College (O5)		
# yrs prior service time working w/ Joint Staff, Unified/ Sub Unified Command or JTF (Rank when in position)	2.0 yrs Deputy Director, J-3, USEUCOM and then Chief of Staff, Joint Task Force Provide Promise (O7) 3.0 yrs Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (O9)		5.0 yrs TOTAL
# yrs prior service time with own service in/near DC (Rank when in position)	3.5 yrs Officer Assignments Section, Headquarters, USMC (O3/O4) 2.0 yrs Marine Corps Liaison Officer to the US Senate (O4/O5) 1.5 yrs Senior Aide to Commandant of the Marine Corps (O5/O6) 0.5 yrs Military Secretary to Commandant of the Marine Corps (O6) 0.5 yrs Director Expeditionary Warfare Division, Office of the CNO then Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Policies and Operations, Headquarters USMC (O8/O9)		8.0 yrs TOTAL
# yrs prior service time with own service outside Pentagon (Rank when in position)	1.0 yr Platoon and Company Commander, Company G, 2 nd Bn 3 rd Marines, Vietnam (O1/O2) 1.5 yrs Company Commander, Camp Pendleton (O2) 3.0 yrs Company Commander, Marine Barracks, Washington DC (O2/O3) 1.0 yr Company Commander, Company H, 2 nd Battalion, 9 th Marines (O3) 2.0 yrs Commander, 3 rd Battalion, 9 th Marines (O5) 2.0 yrs Commanding Officer, 24 th Marine Expeditionary Unit (O6/O7) 1.5 yr Commanding General, 2 nd Marine Division, Marine Forces Atlantic (O8)		12.0 yrs TOTAL
Notes	Participated in Operation Provide Comfort during assignment as CO, 24 th MEU		

All years rounded to nearest 0.5 year

Items in **bold** identified as a Joint Duty Assignment on individual's biography

Sources: Biography obtained from <<http://www.usmc.mil/genbios2.nsf/>>[1/30/02]

Appendix B: Assignment Histories for CINCs and Service chiefs in position as of January 1st, 2002 and for CINCCENTs from 1986 to Present

CINCCENT	(Jul 2000 – Present)	Parent Service USA	# Yrs in service prior to assignment	33.5
Senior Schools(s) attended	Army War College (O5)			
# yrs prior service time working w/ Joint Staff, Unified/ Sub Unified Command or JTF (Rank when in position)	1.0 yr Asst CoS, C-3/J-3/G-3 UN Command/CFC/USFK (O8)			1.0 yrs TOTAL
# yrs prior service time with own service in/near DC (Rank when in position)	1.5 yrs IG/Investigator, US Army IG Agency (O4) 2.5 yrs in office CSA as Staff Officer, Congr Action Team and Exec Asst (O4/5) 2.0 yrs Dir, Louisiana Mnvr TF, Office of CSA (O7/8)			6.0 yrs TOTAL
# yrs prior service time with own service outside Pentagon (Rank when in position)	0.5 yrs Asst Co XO, A/4 FA Bn 1.0 yr LNO/Asst S-3, 2-4 FA Bn, Vietnam (O1/2) 1.0 yr Cdr D Btry, 1 st Tng Bde (O2/3) 3.5 yrs various, 2 ACR (O3) 3.0 yrs Cdr, 2 nd Bn, 78 th FA (O5) 2.0 yrs Depty Asst CoS, G-3, III Corps (O5) 3.0 yrs Cdr DIVARTY then CoS, 1 st Cav Div (O5/6) 1.5 yrs ADC(M), 1 st Cav Div (O6) 1.0 yr Asst Cmndnt, Army FA School (O6/7) 2.0 yrs Cdr, 2 nd If Div (O8) 3.0 yrs Cdr, 3 rd US Army (O9)			21.5 yrs TOTAL
Notes	Student Armed Forces Staff College (O4) Participated in Operation Desert Shield/Storm as ADC(M), 1 st Cav Div (O6)			

All years rounded to nearest 0.5 year

Items in **bold** identified as a Joint Duty Assignment on individual's biography

Sources: Biographies obtained from US Army GOMO site <<https://akocomm.us.army.mil/gomo/>> [18 December 2001] and CENTCOM web site <www.centcom.mil/new_site/web/About/biographies/bio_cccc.htm> [18 December 2001]

Appendix B: Assignment Histories for CINCs and Service chiefs in position as of January 1st, 2002 and for CINCCENTs from 1986 to Present

CINCCENT	(Aug 1997- Jul 2000)	Parent Service USMC	# Yrs in service prior to assignment	32.0
Senior Schools(s) attended	National War College			
# yrs prior service time working w/ Joint Staff, Unified/ Sub Unified Command or JTF (Rank when in position)	2.0 yrs Deputy Director of Operations, USEUCOM (O7) 1.0 yr Chief of Staff and Deputy Commanding General of Combined Task Force PROVIDE COMFORT and Military Coordinator for Operation PROVIDE HOPE 1.0 yr Director of Operations for Unified Task Force Somalia during Operations RESTORE HOPE and Assistant to the US Special Envoy to Somalia during Operation CONTINUE HOPE 1.0 yr Deputy Commander in Chief, USCENTCOM			5.0 yrs TOTAL
# yrs prior service time with own service in/near DC (Rank when in position)	4.0 yrs Retention and Release Officer and Plans Officer, Officer Assignment Branch, Manpower Department, Headquarters, USMC 2.0 yrs Head of Special Operations and Terrorism Counteraction Section and Head, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Concepts and Capabilities Branch, Operations Division, Headquarters, USMC 1.0 yr Fellow, Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group			7.0 yrs TOTAL
# yrs prior service time with own service outside Pentagon (Rank when in position)	2.0 yrs Platoon Commander, Company Executive Officer and then Company Commander 1 st Battalion, 6 th Marines then Company Commander in the 1 st Infantry Training Regiment 3.0 yrs Infantry Battalion Advisor in Vietnam then Tactics Instructor, Platoon Commander and Company Executive Officer at The Basic School 1.0 yr Company Commander, 1 st Battalion 5 th Marines, Vietnam then Company Commander and Guard Officer on Okinawa 3.0 yrs Company Commander, 1 st Battalion, 8 th Marines then Aide to the Commanding General, 2d Marine Division, then Officer in Charge of the Infantry Training Center 3.0 yrs Operations Officer, 3 rd Battalion, 2d Marines then Executive Officer, 1 st Battalion, 8 th Marines, then Executive Officer, 8 th Marines then Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 8 th Marines 2.0 yrs Operations and Tactics Instructor, Marine Corps Command and Staff College 2.0 yrs Regimental Commander, 9 th Marines and Commanding Officer, 31 st Marine Expeditionary Unit 1.0 yr Deputy Commanding General, USMC Combat Development Command 2.0 yrs Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force			19.0 yrs TOTAL
Notes	31 st Marine Expeditionary Unit was deployed twice to the Philippines to conduct emergency security operations and disaster relief operations. As CG, I MEF, served as Commander of Combined Task Force for Operation UNITED SHIELD			

All years rounded to nearest 1.0 year since biography did not list months when assignments began or ended

Sources: Biography obtained from US Marine Corps Retired GOMO [In E-mail from Edward Willett <WillettEJ@hqmc.usmc.mil> "Bios" to Joseph Jordan <jordanj@nwc.navy.mil>] 1/30/02

Appendix B: Assignment Histories for CINCs and Service chiefs in position as of January 1st, 2002 and for CINCCENTs from 1986 to Present

CINCCENT	(Aug 1994 -Aug 1997)	Parent Service USA	# Yrs in service prior to assignment	31.5
Senior Schools(s) attended	Army War College (O5)			
# yrs prior service time working w/ Joint Staff, Unified/ Sub Unified Command or JTF (Rank when in position)	1.5 yrs Senior Aide to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC (O5)			1.5 yrs TOTAL
# yrs prior service time with own service in/near DC (Rank when in position)	3.0 yrs Assignment Officer, Field Artillery Branch, Officer Personnel Directorate, United States Army Military Personnel Center, Alexandria, Virginia (O4/O5) 2.0 yrs Chief, Army Initiatives Group, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, United States Army, Washington, DC (O5/O6) 2.5 yrs Executive to the Chief of Staff, United States Army, Washington, DC (O6/O7) 2.0 yrs Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, United States Army/Army Senior Member, United Nations Military Committee (O9) 1.5 yrs Vice Chief of Staff, Office of the Chief of Staff, United States Army (O10)			11.0 yrs TOTAL
# yrs prior service time with own service outside Pentagon (Rank when in position)	1.0 yr Fire Direction Officer, later Executive Officer, Battery A, 1st Howitzer Battalion, 83d Artillery and Battery A, 1st Battalion, 36th Field Artillery, (O1/O2) 0.5 yrs Assistant Communications Officer, Headquarters VII Corps Artillery then Reconnaissance & Survey Officer, later Asst S-3, 2d Howitzer Battalion, 35th Artillery, (O2) 2.0 yrs Aide-de-Camp to the Commanding General, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) (O2/O3) 1.0 yr Commander, Headquarters Company, I Field Force Vietnam, then Commander, Battery B, 4th Battalion, 42d Field Artillery, Vietnam (O3) 2.0 yrs Operations Officer, Emergency Operations Center, Plans and Operations Division, Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Training, Fifth United States Army (O3/O4) 1.0 yrs Assistant S-3, 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, Vietnam then S-3, 1st Battalion, 21st Field Artillery, Vietnam (O4) 2.0 yrs Commander, 2d Battalion, 11th Field Artillery (O5) 1.5 yrs Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 Operations/Director of Plans and Training, I Corps (O6) 2.0 yrs Commander, 9th Infantry Division Artillery (O6) 2.0 yrs Assistant Division Commander (Operations), 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) (O7) 1.0 yr Deputy Commandant, United States Army Command and General Staff College (O7) 2.0 yrs Commanding General, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) (O8)			18.0 yrs TOTAL
Notes	Participated in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, Saudi Arabia as Commanding General, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)			

All years rounded to nearest 0.5 year

Items in **bold** identified as a Joint Duty Assignment on individual's biography

Sources: Biography obtained from US Army General Officer Management Office [In E-mail from Carmen Rosa <carmen.rosa@us.army.mil> "Request for Bio" to Joseph Jordan <jordanj@nwc.navy.mil>] 1/30/02

Appendix B: Assignment Histories for CINCs and Service chiefs in position as of January 1st, 2002 and for CINCCENTs from 1986 to Present

CINCCENT	(Aug 1991 -Aug 1994)	Parent Service USMC	# Yrs in service prior to assignment	34.0
Senior Schools(s) attended	National War College (O5)			
# yrs prior service time working w/ Joint Staff, Unified/ Sub Unified Command or JTF (Rank when in position)	1.5 yrs Chief of Staff, United States Central Command (O8)			1.5 yrs TOTAL
# yrs prior service time with own service in/near DC (Rank when in position)	3.0 yrs Operations and then Special Assistant to the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, to Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, D.C. 2.0 yrs Personnel Management Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, D.C 2.0 yrs Director, Facilities and Services Division, Installations and Logistics Department, Headquarters Marine Corps (O7) 1.0 yr Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Policies and Operations, Headquarters Marine Corps (O8/O9)			8.0 yrs TOTAL
# yrs prior service time with own service outside Pentagon (Rank when in position)	8.0 yrs Platoon commander, 5th Marines then in 1st Battalion, 1st Marines and then on Okinawa as a battalion staff officer, then Platoon commander and guard company commander, Marine Barracks, then Assistant Manpower, Personnel and Administration Officer , Marine Corps Base, Camp Lejeune then Commander Company M, 3d Battalion, 2d Marines 2d Marine Division and then battalion and brigade advisor to the Vietnamese Marines 1.0 yr Executive Officer of the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines 3.0 yrs Instructor at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College 2.0 yrs Commander, 3d Battalion, 1st Marines (O5) 2.0 yrs Commander 1 st Marine Regiment (O6) 1.5 yrs Commander 31 st Marine Amphibious Unit, USS Belleau Wood (O6) 2.0 yrs Assistant Chief of Staff, Manpower, Personnel and Administration , Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego (O6/O7) 1.0 yr Assistant Division Commander, 2d Marine Division (O7) 1.5 yrs Commanding General, Marine Corps Recruit Depot/Commanding General, Eastern Recruiting Region (O7/O8)			22.0 yrs TOTAL
Notes				

Most years rounded to nearest 1.0 year since biography did not list many months when assignments began or ended

Sources: Biography obtained from US Marine Corps Retired GOMO [In E-mail from Edward Willett <WillettEJ@hqmc.usmc.mil> “Bios” to Joseph Jordan <jordanj@nwc.navy.mil>] 1/30/02

Appendix B: Assignment Histories for CINCs and Service chiefs in position as of January 1st, 2002 and for CINCCENTs from 1986 to Present

CINCCENT	(Nov 1988 -Aug 1991)	Parent Service USA	# Yrs in service prior to assignment	35.0
Senior Schools(s) attended	Army War College (O5)			
# yrs prior service time working w/ Joint Staff, Unified/ Sub Unified Command or JTF (Rank when in position)	2.0 yrs	Deputy Director for Plans, United States Pacific Command (O6/O7)		2.5 yrs TOTAL
# yrs prior service time with own service in/near DC (Rank when in position)	1.0 yr	Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans/Army Senior Member, Military Staff Committee, United Nations, Washington, DC (O3)		6.5 yrs TOTAL
	2.0 yrs	Chief, Professional Development Section, Infantry Branch, Officer Personnel Directorate, Office of Personnel Operations (O5)		
	1.5 yrs	Military Assistant, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management) (O5)		
	1.0 yr	Director, Military Personnel Management, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, United States Army (O8)		
	1.0 yr	Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, United States Army (O8)		
# yrs prior service time with own service outside Pentagon (Rank when in position)	2.0 yrs	Platoon Leader and later Executive Officer, Company E, and later Assistant S-3 (Air), 2d Airborne Battle Group, 187th Infantry, Fort Campbell, Kentucky (O1/O2)		18.5 yrs TOTAL
	1.0 yr	Platoon Leader, Company D, later Liaison Officer, later Reconnaissance Platoon Leader and later Liaison Officer, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 2d Battle Group, 6th Infantry, United States Army Europe (O2)		
	1.0 yr	Aide-de-Camp to the Commanding General, Berlin Command (O2)		
	1.0 yr	Instructor, Department of Mechanics, United States Military Academy (O3)		
	1.0 yr	Airborne Task Force Advisor, Airborne Brigade, Vietnam (O3/O4)		
	0.5 yrs	Senior Staff Advisor/G-5 (Civil Affairs) Advisor, Airborne Division Vietnam (O4)		
	2.0 yrs	Associate Professor, Department of Mechanics, United States Military Academy (O4)		
	0.5 yrs	Executive Officer to the Chief of Staff, Headquarters, US Army, Vietnam (O5)		
	0.5 yrs	Commander, 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry, Vietnam (O5)		
	2.0 yrs	Deputy Commander, 172d Infantry Brigade, Fort Richardson, Alaska (O5/O6)		
	2.0 yrs	Commander, 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, Washington (O6)		
	2.0 yrs	Assistant Division Commander, 8th Infantry Division (Mechanized) (O7)		
	2.0 yrs	Commanding General, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) (O8)		
	1.0 yr	Commanding General, I Corps, Fort Lewis, Washington (O9)		
Notes	Served as Deputy Director, Operation URGENT FURY, Grenada in October 1983 as an O8			

All years rounded to nearest 0.5 year

Items in **bold** identified as a Joint Duty Assignment on individual's biography

Sources: Biography obtained from US Army General Officer Management Office [In E-mail from Carmen Rosa <carmen.rosa@us.army.mil> "Request for Bio" to Joseph Jordan <jordanj@nwc.navy.mil>] 1/30/02

Appendix B: Assignment Histories for CINCs and Service chiefs in position as of January 1st, 2002 and for CINCCENTs from 1986 to Present

CINCCENT	(Nov 1985 -Nov 1988)	Parent Service USMC	# Yrs in service prior to assignment	33.0
Senior Schools(s) attended	Air War College (O5)			
# yrs prior service time working w/ Joint Staff, Unified/ Sub Unified Command or JTF (Rank when in position)	2.0 yrs Aide-de-camp to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earle Wheeler (O5) 2.0 yrs Assistant Director of Operations for the United States European Command, where he was actively involved in a series of crisis ranging from Iran to Africa (O7) 2.0 yrs Vice Director of the Joint Staff, during which he was sent to the island of Grenada as a representative of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during Operation Urgent Fury (O8)			6.0 yrs TOTAL
# yrs prior service time with own service in/near DC (Rank when in position)	4.0 yrs Marine Barracks, Washington, D.C., and then as a White House Aide under President Eisenhower (O3) 3.0 yrs Planning and Programming, Headquarters Marine Corps (O5/O6) 2.0 yrs Deputy Chief of Staff for Reserve Affairs, Headquarters Marine Corps (O8) 1.5 yrs Deputy Chief of Staff for Installations and Logistics and Quartermaster General and then as Chief of Staff, Headquarters Marine Corps (O9)			10.5 yrs TOTAL
# yrs prior service time with own service outside Pentagon (Rank when in position)	3.0 yrs Served in all three active Marine Divisions, including the First Marine Division in Korea (O1/O2) 4.0 yrs Served in newly formed U.S. Naval Mission to the Republic of Haiti, during the Presidency of "Papa Doc" Duvalier 2.0 yrs Returned to the infantry, deploying with a battalion from the 2d Marine Division for the Cuban missile crisis 1.0 yr Participated in combat operations and was an advisor to the Vietnamese Joint General Staff (O4) 2.0 yrs Commanded an infantry battalion at Camp Lejuene (O5) 1.0 yr Commanded an infantry battalion in Okinawa (O5) 1.0 yr Plans Officer for the Ninth Marine Amphibious Brigade, assisting in the defense of Hue against the 1972 North Vietnamese offensive (O5) 3.0 yrs Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations, then the Chief of Staff, and, finally, Deputy Commander, Fleet Marine Force Atlantic in Norfolk, Virginia (Here he was deeply involved in NATO planning for Marine forces) (O6/O7)			15.0 yrs TOTAL
Notes				

Most years rounded to nearest 1.0 year since biography did not list many months when assignments began or ended

Sources: Biography obtained from US Marine Corps Retired GOMO [In E-mail from Edward Willett <WillettEJ@hqmc.usmc.mil> "Bios" to Joseph Jordan <jordanj@nwc.navy.mil>] 1/30/02

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End Notes

- ¹ PME Panel was Chartered by Chairman Aspen and led by Senator Skelton. See Michael D. Palatas, ed., Professional Military Education for the 21st Century Warrior: Conference Proceedings 15-16 January 1998, (Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey California: 1998), pages 1-20.
- ² See the following: Douglas C. Lovelace Jr., Unification of the United States Armed Forces: Implementing the 1986 Department of Defense Reorganization Act (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College: 1996), pages ii, 26; Peter W. Chiarelli, "Beyond Goldwater-Nichols," Joint Force Quarterly, 2 (Autumn 1993), pages 77-78; Stephen J. McHugh, Joint Officer Management, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College: 1995), page 56; James R. Russell, Joint Specialty: Impact on Officer Management and Development, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College: 1988), page 19; and James R. Locher III "Has it Worked? The Goldwater Nichols Reorganization Act," Naval War College Review, Volume LIV, Number 4 (Autumn 2001), page 112.
- ³ James R. Locher III "Has it Worked? The Goldwater Nichols Reorganization Act," Naval War College Review, Volume LIV, Number 4 (Autumn 2001), page 112.
- ⁴ John M. Shalikashvili "Goldwater-Nichols Ten Years from Now," in Dennis J. Quinn, ed., The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act: A Ten-Year Retrospective, (National Defense University Press: Washington DC, November 1999), page 69.
- ⁵ See also James R. Locher III "Has it Worked? The Goldwater Nichols Reorganization Act," Naval War College Review, Volume LIV, Number 4 (Autumn 2001), page 112 who says the following, "The bottom-line grade for Goldwater-Nichols's objectives of improving joint officer management is a C+"
- ⁶ Kenneth M. Crowe, Goldwater-Nichols Act: Time for Reform, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2000), page 4.
- ⁷ Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Conference Report 99-824, page 3 and, Douglas C. Lovelace Jr., Unification of the United States Armed Forces: Implementing the 1986 Department of Defense Reorganization Act, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1996), page 15.
- ⁸ Congress, House, Committee of Conference on Report (H.R. 99-824). Conference Report on H.R. 3622, 99th Congress, 2nd Session, 12 September 1986, Title IV, Section 401, Chapter 38, Section 661(e).
- ⁹ Arthur A. Strange III, Continued Pitfalls with Implementation of Title IV, Goldwater-Nichols Act, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2001), page 2 which also summarizes Congress, Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986: Title IV, Chapter 38, Section 661.
- ¹⁰ Congress, House, Committee of Conference on Report (H.R. 99-824). Conference Report on H.R. 3622, 99th Congress, 2nd Session, 12 September 1986, Title IV, Sections 401-406.
- ¹¹ National Defense University Joint Forces Staff College, The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 2000, JFSC Pub 1, (Norfolk, VA: 2000), pages 1-56.
- ¹² Joint Chiefs of Staff, Officer Professional Military Education Policy. CJCSI 1800.01A, (Washington, DC: 1 December 2001), page A-C-1 and Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Manpower Program Procedures. CJCSM 1600.01, (Washington, DC: 30 April 1998), page H-1.
- ¹³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Manpower Program Procedures. CJCSM 1600.01, (Washington, DC: 30 April 1998), page H-2.
- ¹⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Pub 1, (Washington, DC: November 2000), page III-2.
- ¹⁵ Congress, House, Committee of Conference on Report (H.R. 99-824). Conference Report on H.R. 3622, 99th Congress, 2nd Session, 12 September 1986, Title IV, Section 401, Chapter 38, Section 661(a).
- ¹⁶ Arthur A. Strange III, Continued Pitfalls with Implementation of Title IV, Goldwater-Nichols Act, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2001), page 4.
- ¹⁷ Memorandum, The Joint Staff. 30 May 2001, "2001-2005 Schedule, Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE)," Washington, DC.
- ¹⁸ John M. Shalikashvili "Goldwater-Nichols Ten Years from Now," in Dennis J. Quinn, ed., The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act: A Ten-Year Retrospective, (National Defense University Press: Washington DC, November 1999), page 70.
- ¹⁹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Officer Professional Military Education Policy. CJCSI 1800.01A, (Washington, DC: 1 December 2001), page A-B-5.

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- ²⁰ Ibid. page A-B-5.
- ²¹ JPME Phase II is a twelve-week school and an officer may attend the school while concurrently assigned to a JDA.
- ²² Arthur A. Strange III, Continued Pitfalls with Implementation of Title IV, Goldwater-Nichols Act. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2001), page 6.
- ²³ Currently there are approximately 9,000 billets designated as JDAs within the military. Of all the JDAs the Secretary of Defense designates at least 800 positions as critical which law directs be filled 100 percent of the time JSO officers. See Congress, House, Committee of Conference on Report (H.R. 99-824). Conference Report on H.R. 3622, 99th Congress, 2nd Session, 12 September 1986, Title IV and National Defense University Joint Forces Staff College, The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 2000, JFSC Pub 1, (Norfolk, VA: 2000), pages 1-53, 1-54.
- ²⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Manpower and Personal Actions Involving General and Flag Officers. CJCSI 13310.01A (Change 1), (Washington, DC: 15 March 1999), page A-10.
- ²⁵ National Defense University Joint Forces Staff College, The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 2000, JFSC Pub 1, (Norfolk, VA: 2000), pages 1-20 through 1-25.
- ²⁶ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Pub 1, (Washington, DC: 14 November 2000), page III-2.
- ²⁷ The requirement for this report and other vague guidelines for analysis of joint officer statistics are outlined in Congress, House, Committee of Conference on Report (H.R. 99-824). Conference Report on H.R. 3622, 99th Congress, 2nd Session, 12 September 1986, Title IV, Chapter 38, Section 665.
- ²⁸ "General Joseph W. Ralston Biography." <<http://www.eucom.mil/Directorates/ECCC/bio.htm>> [12/18/01]
- ²⁹ For more on Service cultures and personalities see Carl. H. Builder, The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis, (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), pages 1-31.
- ³⁰ Paul Byron Pattack, Secretary of Defense appointed Consultant to Hart-Rudman Commission, telephone conversation with author, 13 January 2002.
- ³¹ Michael D. Palatas, ed., Professional Military Education for the 21st Century Warrior: Conference Proceedings 15-16 January 1998, (Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey California: 1998), pages 1-20.
- ³² Peter W. Chiarelli, "Beyond Goldwater-Nichols," Joint Force Quarterly, 2 (Autumn 1993), pages 71-81
- ³³ See the concepts outlined for ground forces in Douglas A. MacGregor, Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century, (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997) and in his essay "Command and Control for Joint Strategic Action," in Digital War: A View from the Front Lines, ed. Robert L. Bateman III (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1999), pages 171-196.
- ³⁴ William A. Owens, "Making the Joint Journey," Joint Force Quarterly, (Spring 1999), page 94.