The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP IN THE TRANSFORMATION AGE

BY

COLONEL WILLIAM G. KIDD
United States Army

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for Public Release.
Distribution is Unlimited.

USAWC CLASS OF 2002

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050
STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP IN THE TRANSFORMATION AGE

by

Colonel William G. Kidd
United States Army

Colonel Gregg F. Martin
Project Advisor

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for public release.
Distribution is unlimited.
ABSTRACT

AUTHOR:  Colonel William G. Kidd

TITLE:  Strategic Leadership in the Transformation Age

FORMAT:  Strategy Research Project

DATE:  09 April 2002  PAGES: 42  CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The purpose of my Strategic Research Project is to examine The Army's ongoing Transformation and the changing strategic environment, identify the skills, knowledge and attributes strategic leaders will need to possess, and what methods we should use to develop the leaders successfully. Using the Army Training and Leader Development Panel (Officer) (ALTDP) recommendations as a starting point, the paper looks into the Army's view of future war, and determines that the present skill sets are enduring and should be retained. This paper describes how The Army is addressing the ATLDP identified disconnects in five strategic baseline skills and offers six more skill sets developed by the Strategic Leader Task Force that strategic leaders need in Contemporary Operating Environment. These Additional skill sets identified for the Transformation age include: 1.) Self-awareness, 2.) Adaptability, 3.) Global Astuteness, 4.) Strategic Warfighting Mastery, 5.) Cognitive Complexity, and 6.) Interpersonal Maturity. Finally, the paper gives some recommendations for the officer education system.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................................ iii

PREFACE ........................................................................................................................................ vii

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS ............................................................................................................. ix

STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP IN THE TRANSFORMATION AGE ......................................................... 1

PURPOSE ........................................................................................................................................ 1

METHODOLOGY .............................................................................................................................. 2

FINDINGS OF THE ARMY TRAINING AND LEADERSHIP PANEL (ATLDP) ............................ 2

WHAT DOES STRATEGIC LEADER MEAN? .................................................................................. 2

A WIDENING OF THE STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP BAND ............................................................ 5

WHAT IS THE CONTEMPORARY OPERATING ENVIRONMENT (COE), AND HOW
DOES IT CHANGE LEADERSHIP? .................................................................................................. 6

WHAT ARE THE CURRENT SKILL SETS THAT APPLY NOW, THAT WE ARE NOT
DOING WELL OR NOT AT ALL? ......................................................................................................... 8

21ST CENTURY STRATEGIC LEADER SKILL SETS ................................................................. 10

TRANSFORMING THE ARMY'S TRAINING AND LEADER DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM ................. 18

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE OFFICER EDUCATION SYSTEM ........................................... 19

CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................................................... 21

ENDNOTES ..................................................................................................................................... 23

BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................................... 27
I would like to thank Colonel Gregg F. Martin for serving as my project advisor. A dedicated leader and scholar, he helped me to gain a deeper understanding of my responsibility to the profession of arms. I also want to thank Dr Leonard Wong for his leadership of the Strategic Leader Task Force. The Army is well served by this great American.
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

FIGURE 1 DOCTRINAL LEADERSHIP FRAMEWORK OF SKILLS ........................................... 3
FIGURE 2 CURRENT VIEWS: FM 22-100 ........................................................................ 5
FIGURE 3. THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS .................................................................... 11
FIGURE 4. LEVELS OF CHANGE .................................................................................. 14
... Today, we are experiencing an even faster rate of technological change and, like our predecessors in the interwar period, our goal is to harness this change, encourage innovation, and transform ourselves to become a more capable military, ready to meet our nation’s future national security requirements.”

— GEN Hugh Shelton, 1

The world has changed rapidly in the past decade. Even more so since 11 September 2001. The Army has embarked on Transformation to turn itself into a flexible, adaptive and strategically responsive force that will serve the needs of the nation in the 21st century. The documents published on transformation all agree that the environment in which we will operate in the near future will require new knowledge, skills and attributes in Army leaders, particularly at the strategic level. What is lacking is something that lays out what those new skill sets should be and how we develop them. For the leaders in the Army today, we are faced with leading the way to the objective force with a legacy leader toolbox.

The Army is working hard to figure this out, but it will take a good bit of time for the institution to sort out its way ahead. And we are fresh out of time. When we started transformation, we were planning to use the era of peace and prosperity to transform. September 11th made the future occur seven months ago. What can we do right now to prepare ourselves for transformation and the new environment we must serve in? Are all of our skills obsolete? What do we throw away? How do we develop leaders during this time of great change.

PURPOSE

The purpose of my Strategic Research Project is to examine The Army’s Transformation and the changing strategic environment, identify the skills, knowledge and attributes strategic leaders will need to possess; and what methods we should use to develop the leaders successfully. Using the Army Training and Leader Development (ALTD) Panel (Officer) recommendations as a starting point, the paper will look into the Army’s view of future war and recent national security events to determine if the present skill sets should be retained or discarded and what skills need to be added for the Transformation age. The project will review our ongoing development of systems and programs and provide some recommendations to help achieve The Army’s Vision.
METHODOLOGY

I am participating in the Strategic Leader Task Force (SLTF), an Army directed study here at the Army War College that tries to identify strategic leader skill sets. Much of the information and insights I will present in this paper are a direct result of the work and information gathered by the Task Force. The SLTF Charter from the Army Chief of Staff mirrors my paper’s Task and Purpose.²

FINDINGS OF THE ARMY TRAINING AND LEADERSHIP PANEL (ATLDP)

In June 2000, the Army initiated The Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) to take a hard look at how we are developing leaders for the 21st Century and the Army’s Transformation. The Panel surveyed some 14,000 officers, NCOs and civilians, who gave some clear feedback that The Army had much work to do if it wanted to achieve The Army vision of a trained and ready force able to respond to 21st Century challenges. The survey results told The Army that it needed to adjust its culture, reestablish its cornerstones in training, transform leader development and management, and provide feedback to the force to help it grow and improve. The panel produced 84 Recommendations in 7 major categories which The Army used as a basis for leading its commands and agencies into implement sweeping changes in how it sees leadership and develops leaders.³

The ALTDP was not focused specifically on strategic leadership, but did point to several requirements for future leaders, including the need to be adaptive and self aware as well as the need to be lifelong learners. Other shortfalls that have impact on strategic leader development will be discussed later in this paper.

The Army has initiated huge efforts to correct its cultural azimuth and implement as many of the ALTDP’s recommendations as possible. As part of the ongoing effort the Army War College was tasked to form a Strategic Leader Task Force (SLTF) to help define the competencies of the contemporary strategic leader and to recommend how to develop those competencies.⁴ This paper tries to capture the work of the SLTF and provide some thoughts on the way ahead.

WHAT DOES STRATEGIC LEADER MEAN?

To determine what competencies are needed by a strategic leader, we need to define what a strategic leader is. Since this is a paper concerned with Army strategic leadership, the first place to look is our common operating picture for leadership, FM 22-100, ARMY LEADERSHIP. FM 22-100 defines the strategic leader, describes the environment in which the
strategic leader works in and lists skills, actions and attributes inherent to that level of leadership. It defines the strategic leader this way:

"Strategic leaders are the Army's highest level thinkers, war fighters, and political-military experts. Some work in an institutional setting in the United States; others work in strategic regions around the world. They simultaneously sustain the Army's culture, envision the future, convey that vision to a wide audience, and personally lead change. Strategic leaders look at the environment outside the Army to understand the context for the institution's future role. They also use the knowledge of the current force to anchor their vision in reality."

FM 22-100 identifies 41 skills and actions by level, figure 1 shows how the skills interact with the levels of leadership in a conceptual framework:

![Diagram of doctrinal leadership framework of skills]

**Figure 1: Doctrinal Leadership Framework of Skills**

The FM 22-100 definition has two problem areas when we hold it up to the light of the Contemporary Operating Environment. First, it paints a picture of a strategic leader as a multi-starred Flag Officer in charge of huge organizations. Second, it is a very Army-centric view of the strategic environment. The reality today is that leaders at significantly lower levels of

3
command and staff work in the strategic environment with significant impact. Today, we see these leaders serving in important strategic roles and environments far removed from the Army's structure.

To normalize the definition and allow it to be used across the full spectrum of operations, the Strategic Leader Task Force defined the strategic leader in three discreet areas:

1. A leader who works outside the organization in the interagency, coalition, joint, or congressional environment. Focus is on the tools available to the leader to wage war (i.e., political, economic, information, and military). Strategic refers to the necessity of working with more than just Army assets.

2. A leader who wages war at a level higher than operational or tactical. Focus is on a large region, theater, organization, or functional area of responsibility. Strategic refers to a more complex level of waging war or leading an organization.

3. A leader who can see systems operating in a situation, can envision long-term effects, is able to operate in a complex, ambiguous environment, and understands institutions. Focus is on the thinking or cognitive process. Strategic refers to the ability to view the world and make decisions from multiple perspectives and frames of reference.⁶

The SLTF then took the standing strategic Skill Sets from FM 22-100 and divided them by area. We established a baseline of skill sets that had to be achieved to some degree to enable the development of the other skill sets. Figure 2 gives a compilation of those skill sets:
Knowledge of the political, economic, informational, and elements of national power
Quick information processing ability
Highly developed interpersonal skills
Future focus
Strategic systems thinkers
Value-based leadership skills
Adept at reading other people
Understanding of symbolic communication
Understand the importance of dialogue, active listening, personal biases
Strong negotiating skills
In international forums, firmness and respect
Ability to reach consensus and sustain coalitions
Ability to use peer leadership rather than strict position authority
Ability to design and communicate compelling visions
Open to new experiences and to comments from others
Reflective, thoughtful, and unafraid to rethink past experiences and to learn from them
Ability to see patterns
Strategic art
Ability to leverage technology
Ability to cultivate a challenging, supportive, and respectful culture
Ability to manage joint, multinational, and interagency relationships
Mentoring and coaching ability
Understand how to create a learning organization

Baseline

Environment

Level

Cognitive

FIGURE 2 CURRENT VIEWS: FM 22-100

A WIDENING OF THE STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP BAND

In recognition of the shift to distributed warfare and a more integrated leadership environment, we need to change the level of strategic leader. At the fore of The Army's transformation are brigades, not corps. This, coupled with the interconnectivity of every action taken in the global environment, drives strategic impact toward much lower levels of leadership. Looking at the apex of leader development, the Army's concept for the IBCTs and strategic staff work, we need to view the strategic leadership level as starting with colonels instead of generals.

The response the SLTF received when we briefed this shift to Mr. John Gingrich, Strategic Communications Director for The Army Chief of Staff's Office was that the conventional thinking within The Army made a clear distinction between strategic leaders and strategic leadership environments. The informal data he had compiled from the general officer development seminars was that true strategic leaders were positional, such as theater CINC's or the Chief of Staff. His data indicated that the Army leadership felt that a senior Army officer may
move in and out of positions of strategic leadership through the remainder of his or her career, but it is based on the job, not the individual or number of stars. This view is shared by most of the Army leadership, with the exception that few if any Major Generals or below felt that they were strategic leaders.  

Almost all of the Army leadership does agree that the impact of commanders and senior staff officers in influencing the strategic environment is increasing. The very nature of the contemporary strategic environment, with its flat hierarchical structure, distributive operations and interconnectivity of system within systems place colonels in the driver seat in the Transformation Army. Examples of this include Army operations in Afghanistan, where the strategic leaders are in CONUS, the warfighting staff (colonels) is in Kuwait, and the austere operational units are in Afghanistan, with more US media on the ground than headquarters.

By widening the strategic leadership band to include colonels, we present an exciting opportunity to the Army. In December 2001, we had 299 generals in the active Army. At the same time, we had 3,500 colonels on active duty. By developing colonels as strategic leaders we increase our strategic capability dramatically. The empowerment that such a move gives to The Army in the global, distributed environment is almost beyond measure. But such a move goes beyond “goodness”; it will be an absolute necessity in the Transformation Age where every action, decision or policy has strategic second and third order effects.

Regardless of the education and developmental opportunities, many leaders will not become strategic leaders, either by choice or circumstances. The needs of the Army and the critical importance of good leadership at all levels may place some leaders in direct leadership at the tactical realm their entire careers. Others will not make the conceptual shift out of the direct/tactical leadership no matter what development is afforded them. Certainly, the shift to strategic leadership involves a clash of cultures where we value and are selected for higher level assignments by employing direct leadership. We cannot control the human dimension of leadership and the broad needs of national service. What our effort should focus on is developing an officer corps that can think and function in the contemporary operating environment at all levels, often simultaneously.

**WHAT IS THE CONTEMPORARY OPERATING ENVIRONMENT (COE), AND HOW DOES IT CHANGE LEADERSHIP?**

We could devote this entire paper to the challenges strategic leaders face in the COE and still not scratch the surface of this important issue. US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) says that COE is characterized by a wider spectrum of operations, with significantly increased unpredictability, many more variables, and a complex range of operating
environments where activities and decisions are connected in a global web that generates second and third order effects that bridge the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. The information age technologies speed the process of adaptation and change to where they become the only two constants in the environment.  

The strategic leader will also face adversaries that are watching, learning and adapting, trying to marginalize our precision strengths while denying us easy access. They will equate winning to not losing, and since many are not nation states, the destruction of communities and populace is meaningless to them, and in fact may be tactical objectives in their view. Today, these threats are modernizing in light of 20th Century lessons and observe our capabilities on their own version of distance learning – US Television and the Internet. They will adjust when threatened and will counter our security efforts by pursuing asymmetric strategies to attack with sufficient mass and technology to inflict highly visible and embarrassing losses or situations.

Three aspects of the COE have significant implications for Army leaders:

1. The United States will continue to have global interests and be engaged with a variety of regional actors. The joint force must be prepared to "win" across the full range of military operations in any part of the world, to operate with multinational forces, and to coordinate military operations, as necessary, with government agencies and international organizations.

2. Potential adversaries will have access to the global commercial industrial base and much of the same technology as the US military. We will not necessarily sustain a wide technological advantage over our adversaries in all areas. Our advantage must, therefore, come from improvements to doctrine, organizations, training, leaders, education, and people that enable us to take advantage of technology to achieve superior warfighting effectiveness.

3. As our capabilities evolve, we should expect potential adversaries to adapt and make use of asymmetric approaches that avoid US strengths and exploit potential vulnerabilities. The psychological impact of asymmetric warfare such as attacks against US citizens and territory might far outweigh the actual physical damage inflicted. The strategic significance of land forces will lie in their ability not only to fight and win our nation's wars, but also to provide the National Command Authorities a
range of options and solutions for influencing the global environment to the advantage of our country.  

The COE makes one huge change: *The dynamic environment as we transform will increase the requirement for conceptual thinking.* The more open doctrine that we will operate with will require greater adaptability and cognitive skill on the part of the leadership. Dominant battlespace will demand shared understanding of warfighting. Operations will have increased tempo, stimulating the need for preexisting knowledge and mental agility. Battlespace will be discontinuous, forcing non-linear, dynamic visualization and systems recognition. The threat of asymmetry defines an environment where leaders must view situations from multiple perspectives. Finally, broad operational spectrums call for innovation and analytical reasoning on the part of those who lead. The old templates of two up and one back will not make it in the COE; constructs will have to be fabricated by the leader constantly, and highly conceptual thinking processes will be the only templates.  

What hasn't changed? *Leadership in the American way of war is strictly values based.* Because of this, the base skills and actions that build leader competencies are enduring. They transcend the ages, but must be added to in terms of breadth, depth and intensity.  

WHAT ARE THE CURRENT SKILL SETS THAT APPLY NOW, THAT WE ARE NOT DOING WELL OR NOT AT ALL?  

In figure 2, we outlined some baseline skills from FM 22-100. When we compare these to the ATLDP findings, we see that there are some severe disconnects between "...what we as an Army believe and what we do in practice." These disconnects cut across the five baseline skill sets and are worth briefly identifying, along with how The Army is addressing them.  

1. Value based leadership skills. The importance of the role of strategic leaders as the keepers of our values cannot be stressed enough. The ATLDP findings pointed to a failure in leadership to balance the Army Culture between the practices of the force and the values, ethics and the need to develop its future leadership. Micromanagement, lack of commitment to our subordinates, inattention to well-being needs of the force and diminished contact with and development of subordinates are clear indictments of poor values-to-leadership linkage.  

The Army is absolutely committed to the rebalancing of its culture. In June, 2001 it published FM 1. The Army, as its capstone doctrinal manual to explain to the force
This document provides the basis for transforming our culture into the values based profession we have always aspired to. Significant efforts are presently underway to reeducate The Army and develop those not yet joined on classic professionalism, ethics and value based leadership. Leadership development is getting top priority in the Army, pre-commissioning institutions, service schools, and pre command courses.

2. Adept at reading people. In Dr. Leonard Wong's *Generations Apart: Xers and Boomers in the Officer Corps*, we see a clear lack of understanding in the Army's leadership and the subordinates it leads. The diminished contact between leaders and subordinates has caused physical communication skills to atrophy. We just don't know how to dialog with people, and don't spend enough time with them to build their confidence. The Army recognizes this as a major issue and has implemented changes in leader education to develop this skill. In the War College for example, a very useful situational course that develops communication skills is the Negotiations Course. Sadly, it is only offered in limited classes, so all students cannot take advantage of it.

3. Highly developed interpersonal skills. We are a less social profession, that has developed a workaholic culture that does not take the time to develop the much needed skills that help us deal with people. There is no easy solution to this shortcoming in the near term, but the Army recognizes that it can develop interpersonal skills in the leaders that are at the early stages of development. Situational based education has been the best way to develop these skills and the Army (except for the Army War College) has implemented some pilot programs to raise the competency of the Army.

4. Mentoring Ability. By far the loudest cry from the ATDLP surveys was the lack of development of subordinates by their leaders. The need to develop future leaders is a clear responsibility of leaders within the profession, and the Army has fallen short in making the institution aware of what that responsibility is. Much work has been done in this area, with an Army-wide pamphlet under development that establishes a common vocabulary, serves as a reference on the concept and tries to stimulate thought and discussion on the subject of mentoring. Mentor programs are now imbedded in the institutional base, and leaders are slowly waking up to the professional responsibility for the development of leaders. Key to our requirements for strategic leaders is that the
competencies of strategic leadership are developed across the continuum of service, so that teachers, battalion commanders and peers have a role in shaping the Army of the future.

5. Knowledge of Political, Economic, Informational and Military elements of National Power. The ATLDP points to a gap in Army leaders and the skills needed for full spectrum operations. The classic quote often used today is CSA Shinseki's observation that he was ill-prepared for the multifaceted role he took on as a strategic leader in the Balkans, which shows that we need to balance our traditional view of warfighting with forms of maneuver needed in the global context. The Army has seen the requirement for this knowledge in a big way and has stressed the need for adaptability and life-long learning be imbedded into our professional culture.\(^{20}\)

A note of caution based on history is in order. The Army’s need for measurable accomplishment has always it to look at programs and regulation to solve its ills. Later in this paper we will see some examples of this occurring today, possibly for the good, but we must remember that it is the culture that drives the Army, not a four hour block of instruction. All of these things are clearly known to be needed by Army leaders, but not done. Only when we make these skills of value to the leader in a personal way will they become practice.

But they must be done and done now. As stated in the introduction, The Army had built a glide path for transformation that used decades to develop the force. September 11th, 2001 moved that line to the left by twenty years. The skill sets in the baseline must be imbedded into leaders now to enable them to achieve competency in the skill sets of the COE. What are those skill sets and where/when/how are they developed?

**21st Century Strategic Leader Skill Sets**

The SLTF conducted an in depth review of strategic leader skill sets, beginning with FM 22-100. The ATLDP study has clearly identified “Adaptive”, and “Self Aware” as two required competencies needed by the 21st Century strategic Leader.\(^{21}\) Additionally, we queried some of the leading leadership experts associated with the Army. Finally, the Task Force members built compendiums of military, business and academic writings. Some of the literature included: *The Leader of the Future* (Drucker Foundation); *Strategic Leadership* (Finkelstein and Hambrick); *The 21st Century Executive* (Rob Silzer, editor); *The US Army War College Strategic Leadership Primer; Building Leaders: How Successful Companies Develop the Next Generation* (Jay A. Conger and Beth Benjamin), and *Striking a Balance in Leader*
Development; a Case for Conceptual Competence, (Kluever, Lynch, Mathis, Owens and Spears).

To provide a construct for determination of when and where the strategic skill sets should be developed, The SLTF used the three pillared leader development model, and we added a developmental timeline that marks the normal AR 600-3 type of officer development over a period from pre-commissioning to general officer. Key to all discussions is the understanding that the development of strategic leaders is truly a lifelong learning process that never ends for the leader as knowledge skills and attributes required will be dynamic. The task force then applied the three discreet areas used earlier to normalize the skills sets from FM 22-100. The result is Figure 3, a chart that show where skills are most likely to be developed over a career:

**FIGURE 3. THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS**

As Figure 3 shows, strategic leader’s develop continuously from the very beginning of an officer’s career, but especially during the Field Grade years. What is also clear is that the officer’s greatest influence on the development of emerging strategic leaders occurs during this critical period.

Using the question “A Strategic Leader is?”, we found that the strategic leadership skills needed in the transformation age fit six competencies:

1. Self-aware - Having the ability to assess one’s strengths and weaknesses, correct the weaknesses, and develop a self-confidence based on self-assessment. Self-aware leaders know what they don’t know, and are true learning experts. Lifelong learning is second nature to them, and they are empowered by interpersonal maturity to develop as they lead.
The best development of self awareness begins early in the institutional base with the pre-commissioning program. Lifelong learning and remediation must be seen by the leader as a normal necessity, not as an embarrassment. Absolutely key to this skill is the use of self assessment tools, including 360 degree feedback surveys. If we have imbedded lifelong learning into our culture, self assessment will be continuous, and will require some portability of self assessment tools throughout the officer’s career. Other institutional education includes classes on psychology, and initial exposure of simulations and distributed learning. The leader experiences coaching and mentoring for the first time, and it becomes ingrained in his self-identity.

Operational assignments also lend themselves to developing self-awareness, though the competency imbedded in the institutional base enables the leader to continue to learn and grow while serving. Job variety and higher levels of responsibility will drive the need for new skills that can be effectively mastered by the reachback provided by distributed leaning in the Army. Self awareness in assignments is dependent on leader coaching and mentoring as well as 360-degree feedback from after action reviews, evaluations, and personal assessments.

Self awareness can be accomplished in the self development pillar, only if the leader gets feedback from the other two pillars. The lifelong development plan that the leader uses personally should include follow-ups from gaps identified at schools and other feedback mechanisms in the operational pillar. There is great deal that can be learned from self analysis. One of the authors of the upcoming edition of FM 22-100 suggests that a daily journal that analyzes what happened, how you reacted, what lessons could be learned about yourself and how to apply those lessons would be an excellent form of developing self-awareness. Purely as an unscientific data point, I can validate that many strategic leaders do this. I spent a tour as an executive officer to two senior leaders overseas and observed them and many of the other senior Army leaders as they came through our command. They all seem to have some sort of diary that they kept, not full of data and dates, but impressions and analysis.

2. Adaptive - This refers to officers having the ability to adjust or innovate based on current or potential changes in the environment; to envision the need for change.
and communicate this vision; one who is innovative and displays initiative with prudent risk taking. This leader exploits information-age situational understanding and is an agent of change. The strategic leader must have ability to recognize changes to the environment, assess against that environment to determine what is new and what to learn to be effective and the learning process that follows. The COE demands strategic leaders who can influence people by providing purpose, direction and motivation while operating in a complex, dynamic environment of uncertainty and ambiguity to accomplish the mission and improve the organization.

The institutional pillar provides the foundation for adaptability by using situational based learning to develop internal processes for adaptability. The feedback from these experiences must be fed into the leader’s learning plan for further development.

Adaptability is developed primarily in the operational pillar, through unit and leader training and operational experiences. Examples of these include the IBCT nested leadership training program at Fort Lewis, Washington, and other vignette-based training that denies the leader the use of templating his or her response. Leaders drive the development of adaptability, so the need for close coaching and mentoring is essential.

Self development of adaptability can be accomplished in a number of ways, but the Army sees web-based simulations much like the web games that are so popular in the civilian sector, as well as case studies on distance education, that can give feedback on outcomes from decisions made.

A comment from other readings on adaptability helps clarify this concept. While The Army has rightfully put much value on adaptability, many behaviorists see adaptability as the antithesis of creativity. In short, true transformation of an organization to be dominant in the global environment demands discontinuous change. The stable gradual adaptation The Army is comfortable with will never make it in the fast paced global continuum we now face. The tactical change that we train for in units (“be quick witted or be dead!”) really only optimizes the existing organizational capabilities. Discontinuous change, which requires true creative thinking, is an abrupt, non-linear and profound shift in the organizational environment. This kind of creative, out of the box thinking is not about changes in azimuths, as we associate with adaptability, but the invention of whole new
capabilities and processes to put the organization ahead of the wave. Figure 4 shows the difference graphically.

FIGURE 4. LEVELS OF CHANGE

3. Globally astute – The strategic leader must be wise in the matters of the world and able to understand the interactions of the geopolitical and cultural factors while executing a national security strategy. We envision a leader who is intelligent, perceptive, clever, and incisive, uses good judgment, wise, and is shrewd in matters of the world. These matters will span the full spectrum of the strategic environment, beyond factors that directly affect or are influenced by the organization itself and because of the leader’s global astuteness, he will be better able to influence people, providing purpose, direction and motivation. This leader must have the knowledge and experience that will allow him/her to see beyond the organization—to see how this organization can exact influence on the global environment and how the global environment will exact influence on the organization. Global is defined as environmental, multi-regional, interagency, political, informational, joint, and cultural wisdom necessary to lead in the future. Must be astute in more than just the organization, to include all that is outside the organization that the organization affects or is affected by.
Development of this skill set in the Institutional Pillar evolves around classical, Liberal Arts pursuits, including basic science in the precommissioning phase. Study in foreign languages, international relations regional studies and culture are important subjects to develop this competency. The institutional pillar lends itself to this type of broadening, and has the ability to be tailored to the individual leader's needs. The baseline skills the institutions produce are also continued in the lifelong learning process.

Operational assignments can continue to increase the leader's scope of understanding by offering foreign service tours, fellowships, training with industry, and interagency assignments which provide broadening opportunities in addition to higher level staffs and command assignments.

Individual learning in this skill demands a willingness to explore areas outside the leader's experience. The study of other disciplines, advanced degrees and the use of seminars and short visits to gain outside knowledge are all individual actions for the strategic leader as he deepens his professional expertise.

4. A strategic war fighter – The strategic leader, already having a level of tactical competence, is now able to wage war at the strategic level to include theater strategy, campaign strategy, joint operations, and use of all elements of national power in the execution of a national security strategy. This leader understands theater strategy, campaign strategy, joint operations, and the use of the military in executing a national security strategy. The strategic leader also understands the national security process to include using all the elements of power. Specifically, a strategic warfighter must understand the national military strategy in the following contexts: how political objectives and constraints influence military objectives, concepts, and resources; how military objectives, concepts, and resources affect the national and theatre strategic and operational levels of war; how (and why) the theater level of war becomes the focus of unified, joint, interagency, international, and multinational force structuring and planning during war, and how to apply military force during military operations other than war.

The institutional pillar provides the understanding of strategic art beginning with CGSC, but more heavily in Senior Service College. Some initial enablers in the basic and career courses can be introduced by courses in military
history, National Security Strategy and Joint/Combined Simulations. The Senior Service College is the place where the experienced leader encounters active education on the strategic environment and processes while given a chance to exercise in realistic strategic roles, while being coached by experts.

In the operational pillar, assignments in strategic environments are essential to develop future leadership. Here, more than anywhere else, the responsibility of the strategic leader to teach the profession to his subordinates becomes critical. The leader’s strategic responsibility is that they gain competency in all three roles described in the *Strategic Art: the New Discipline for Strategic Leaders*, written by the then Commandant of the Army War College, Lieutenant General (Ret.) Richard A. Chilcoat. General Chilcoat offers that the complete strategist must be a strategic leader, strategic practitioner and a strategic theorist. Many of the skill sets and competencies that define these roles can be developed through schooling, but cannot be mastered without significant interaction between an expert learner and a master strategist.

Working in the strategic environment usually brings on an insatiable thirst within the officer for more knowledge through self-development. The Transformed Army will provide the reachback capability and situational forums that will allow leaders to enhance their knowledge while serving in fast paced, global environments.

5. Cognitively complex – Strategic leadership in the COE demands the ability to scan the environment for new data patterns to reinterpret, challenge, synthesize, and organize the information using complex mental processes to proactively and reactively address opportunities. Critical thinking and systems understanding allow the leader to examine elements in totality versus one at a time and remap the cognitive operational space. Cognitively complex leaders are future thinkers who can see second and third orders effects in the midst of ambiguity.

The development of cognitive processes begins at the earliest stages of institutional learning. Creative thinking, which is taught at the Army War College, should be taught in pre commissioning and the Basic Course. The use of simulations, much as described in adaptive development above, is useful, but must be tied to some one-on-one coaching to tailor the processes. Situational exercises, whether hands-on or web-based, are the means to achieve cognitive
competency. This should be nearly 100% active learning. Enabling courses such as philosophy, history quantitative analysis and systems analysis should be embedded either during pre-commissioning or in elective courses in the Institutional base.

Cognitive complexity continues to be developed in the operational pillar with raters serving as mentors though situational vignettes. The Army is coming to grips now with how to provide a totally ambiguous environment at the Combat Training Centers, which will build the cognitive capability on the warfighting side. At each level of service the leader will experience a wider web of complexity that will require good coaching to assist the emerging leader in looking deeper, with greater understanding.27

Leaders can self-develop cognitive complexity though analysis of organizational case studies, development of personal problem solving methodologies and critical thinking exercises. Writing for publication is recognized to be an excellent method to apply critical thinking to an issue -- and you will get feedback!

6. Interpersonally mature – Absolutely critical to strategic leaders is ability to transform direct interpersonal leadership skills to the institutional level through coaching, mentoring, negotiating, empowering, building consensus, and developing future leaders. They must be experts in the human dimension of leadership, who can shift from one level of leadership to another in the flat COE structures.

All three pillars contribute equally to this skill set, but it emerges later in leader’s career. It is a capstone type competency that never quite culminates since the strategic leader is a lifelong learner. Here the leader takes on the role of the organizational mentor, educating the subordinates in the profession, and the skills needed for its leadership. With this teaching comes interpersonal enrichment in the form of dialog and negotiating skills, exposure to new ideas and processes, and the bonding of critical thinking to vision-based decision making.

To develop the six skill sets described here requires some significant transformation of leader development in the Army. Changes of this magnitude are difficult, but The Army has
moved decisively on many of the ATLDP and subsequent findings in the area of leader development.

TRANSFORMING THE ARMY'S TRAINING AND LEADER DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM

Starting with the naming of the Army G3 as the single Army Staff proponent for training and leader development, work is ongoing to link fully training and leader development, policy and resourcing. All parts of the Officer Education System (OES) are being examined in detail to determine Objective Force sufficiency and what synergies can be accomplished. The presence of the IBCT and research results of significant potential will provide rapid exploitation for the whole Army.\(^{28}\)

Recognizing the immediate need to develop objective force capabilities in OES, The Army has focused its efforts there. It has built a credible developmental roadmap of leader development from pre-commissioning through intermediate level (Majors), identifying where each OES level meets Army needs and where they don't, potential fixes to the shortfalls and the benefits of each course or program to the Army.\(^{29}\)

Exciting new programs are already underway that fix some of the ills identified by ATLDP. The Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLIC) is the first of these to actually put officers though in pilot programs. BOLIC is a single all-branch course that increases self-awareness and confidence, fosters teambuilding and cohesion skills, and builds solid fieldcraft and leadership competency in all Army lieutenants. A key feature is extensive and continuous feedback on leadership performance.\(^{30}\)

Several other OES changes are in the making, including tailoring CAS3 to individual unit of assignment, specific staff officer courses timed to meet unit needs and an Advanced Operations and Warfighting Course at the major level. The Army is paying attention to Functional Area requirements as well, with credentialing education being planned for 2003 fielding.

A major boon to lifelong learning is the serious Army-wide effort to mature Advanced Distributed Learning (ADL). The move to "schoolhouses without walls" is taking advantage of the best available learning models and state of the art infrastructure to provide specific job related training and reachback for continuous opportunities to learn, grow and achieve.\(^{31}\)

For strategic leadership development, The Army has made some effort to identify points of bridging and where strategic education should be infused. Following many of the recommendations in the widely read and discussed Parameters article, "Transforming Strategic Leader Education for the 21st Century Army", it has looked for places in OES to sew the seeds
for future strategic leadership. These include the baseline enabling competencies for strategic leader development as well as many of the beginnings of the six strategic competencies discussed earlier. Courses on strategic thought and leadership are in the early stages of development for CGSC. Clearly, the opportunities to develop strategic leaders via distance education are immense. The Army Research Lab (ARL) has shown that the strategic skill sets can be sharpened by medium to high synthetic environments, particularly in cognitive task analysis and electronic tactical decision gaming. The important aspect of all these efforts is that The Army is viewing leadership development as a linked continuum, and has plans to educate leaders full spectrum.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE OFFICER EDUCATION SYSTEM

“Transforming Strategic Leader Education for the 21st Century Army” lays out some well thought out observations and recommendations that are articulated to a level I cannot achieve here. As stated earlier, the Army is implementing some of the OES “nesting “ outlined in the article, such as broadening the scenarios to get the strategic context and some strategy courses at CGSC. The combination of this article and the activities of the SLTF motivated me to do a bit more research on some of the aspects of the OES that might be useful to OES decision makers:

1. All three of the education based pre-commissioning programs are in the midst of a major reformation that will incorporate the development of needed leadership skills, attributes and competencies. USMA has increased emphasis on the development of cognitive skills and implemented a mentoring program that encourages lifelong learning and feedback. ROTC is in the midst of a new Military Science Program, designed by Old Dominion University, that mirrors the ATLDP recommendations: OCS, as part of the Infantry School, is transforming into an objective force program using the synergy of other on-site OES courses.

My recommendation is to gain synergy by establishing a single pre-commissioning MACOM by combining all three of the programs under the control of the present USMA Commandant. The opportunity to leverage resources, eliminate redundant manpower and to provide access to the tremendous capability of the USMA faculty would save money and improve our overall pre-commissioning competency. Most importantly, it would give The Army the ability to shape its future consistently.
2. While the need for broadened educational experience for strategic leaders is clear, the opportunities for advanced civil schooling has decreased dramatically in the last two decades. When The Army increased to 18 active divisions with a modest increase in endstrength, other interesting trends effected the officer corps. To husband resources, opportunities for advanced education shifted from individual initiative to a strictly Army needs based system which cut the number of these programs in half. In 1974, there were 15,000 validated graduate degree requirements in the Army. In 2002, there are 3,205 graduate degree requirements. Even taking into account that the officer corps is half the size of its 1974 predecessor, officers are still less likely to receive advanced civil schooling than thirty years ago. The good news is that 68% of the Army officers from major through colonel have graduate degrees, but half of those are done off duty with shared expense to the officer, and are more a testament to the Officer Corps' dedication to self-development than to a plan by The Army.

A more telling fact is that while an increasing number of the enlisted force (24%) has some college education, The Army’s officers have not kept pace with society overall and certainly not the needs of the COE. The bottom line is that The Army is not nurturing broad-based education to its leadership. We must use the full range of the Civilian Education Program, including advanced degrees, training with industry, and fellowships to build the globally astute strategic leaders needed for the COE.

3. Another educational experience that has fallen by the wayside is faculty/instructor duty. The cornerstone of development prior to World War II, teaching builds communication skills, allows an unvarnished exchange of ideas, and challenges the leader to develop his own conceptual skills while leading others to knowledge. Teaching assignments are now a rare thing for officers. The emphasis on the tactical realm in the 1980's and 90's changed the culture of The Army so that great value was placed on repetitive field assignments. The benefit of teaching assignments in developing the total leader cannot be overstated.

A quick review of The Army’s serving general officers shows both the importance of teaching in leader development and the decline of it as a valued assignment. In 2002, 77% of the four-star generals on active duty had been instructors at a service school, USMA or college ROTC. The percentages declined by year group and grade, with lieutenant generals at 51%, major generals at 42%
and brigadier generals who had taught at 37% of the total serving. Clearly, as in the case of advanced civil schooling, we are dumbing down, and ATLDP reflects this. To regain the benefit of this educational opportunity, The Army will need to change the value of teaching within its culture.

4. At the high end of leader education are the Senior Service Colleges. They too must change to fit the needs of the transformational environment. The Army War College for instance, is evolving its curriculum toward a university-type of environment. Maybe an admirable goal, but care must be taken not to lose sight of the product the institution is charged to produce. When the recent Senior Service College Symposium revealed that the Army War College has the least amount of hours dedicated to leadership, I sense we are not where we should be in a culture that demands so much from its strategic leaders.

CONCLUSIONS
Caught in a seam of planned change and the urgency of a new war to defend the homeland, The Army must accelerate its force transformation in a cloud of ambiguity. The ATLDP study gave the Chief of Staff Army a clear mandate to make sweeping changes in leader development to shape it for the next 25 years. In this paper, we saw the outline of the leader development system of the future. The ATLDP findings indicated that our value-based competencies were still valid, but perceived by the force as not universally practiced. The Contemporary Operating Environment identified several new skill sets just for the strategic leader and we briefly described what they entailed and where the development would best be done. Finally we were able to peer into the near future to see the considerable plan to harness the institutional base in the effort to develop leading edge competencies.

Several items are yet to be closed with. The Army is yet to actually settle on what are the skill sets for strategic leaders, and with the rewrite of FM 22-100, may not see closure on them for years to come. The disagreement within the Army over what level of the rank structure strategic leadership can be found will resolve itself as the move through Transformation flattens command structures. TRADOC has done a great job in laying all its OES pieces out on the table and for the first time in the command’s history, has a clear map of the linkages of each course or program. Still, little is planned in the required broadening of strategic leaders with outside experiences to get the total global understanding they need. If there is a single challenge for the Army, it is the shift to a learning organization.
The first steps that a leader must take in development in the 21st Century is to be Adaptive and Self Aware. Maybe that is all that The Army needs to do to Transform; simply be ready for change and know where the changes must take place.

WORD COUNT = 7499
ENDNOTES

1 Henry H. Shelton, “Professional Education: The Key to Transformation,” *Parameters*, no. 31(Autumn, 2001): 4


4 Shinseki, “Charter Guidance-USAWC Student Studies on Strategic Leader Skill Sets and Future War, Future Battlefield”


10 Ibid.


12 Shinseki, “Army Training and Leader Development Panel(Officer) Recommendations and Ongoing Actions.”


17 Rogers, “Officer Education System Transformation.”


20 Rogers, “Officer Education System Transformation”


22 Wong, “Strategic Leader Task Force Mission Analysis”.

23 Christopher Toomey <ToomeyC@lewis.army.mil> “Competencies”, electronic mail message to William Kidd, <william.kidd@carlisle.army.mil> 12 March 2002.


27 Rogers, “Officer Education System Transformation”

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid.


32 Jeffrey D. McCausland and Gregg F. Martin, Transforming Strategic Leader Education for the 21st Century Army” Parameters, No. 31(Autumn 2000): 17-33


35 Rogers, “Officer Education System Transformation.”


37 Elizabeth R. Griffin, <Elizabeth.Griffin@hoffman.army.mil> "Grad Ed RFIs from LTC Shoop”, electronic mail message to William Kidd, <william.kidd@carlisle.army.mil> 11 March 2002.

38 Ibid.


BIBLIOGRAPHY


Drucker, Peter F. "Managing Knowledge Means Managing Oneself." Leader to Leader no. 16 (Spring 2000): 8-10.


Griffin, Elizabeth R <Elizabeth.Griffin@hoffman.army.mil>. "Grad Ed RFIs from LTC Shoop", electronic mail message to William Kidd, <william.kidd@carlisle.army.mil> 11 March 2002.


Shelton, Henry H. "Professional Education: The Key to Transformation", Parameters 31(Autumn,2001)


