

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL Monterey, California



THESIS

**THE UKRAINIAN ARMED FORCES IN PEACEKEEPING:
NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE PROFESSIONALIZATION
OF PEACEKEEPING FORCES**

by

Igor G. Bulgakov

March 2002

Thesis Advisor:

Donald Abenheim

Thesis Co-Advisor:

Thomas Bruneau

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FORCES**

Igor G. Bulgakov
Major, Ukrainian Armed Forces
B.S., Kiev High Army Command Academy named after I. V. Frunze, 1986

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March 2002**

Author: Igor G. Bulgakov

Approved by: Donald Abenheim
Thesis Advisor

Thomas Bruneau
Thesis Co-Advisor

James J. Wirtz
Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs

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ABSTRACT

Rapid changes have characterized international relations since the end of the Cold War. Transitioning democracies have been the scene of often-violent change, enduring civil war, political and economic struggle, and ethnic strife. Transitioning nations increasingly need peacekeeping operations to maximize their chances for success. Historically however, peacekeeping operations created by the United Nations have been ad hoc “coalitions of the willing” and have not been conducive to establishing professional peacekeeping forces. This thesis proposes that the more professional the peacekeeping operation, the higher the chance of success for the peacekeeping mission.

The need for change to professional peacekeeping is particularly true for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The development of standing national forces designed and trained to act in crisis management and peacekeeping operations is critical for success. Using the Polish-Ukrainian Peacekeeping Battalion (UKRPOLBAT) as a model, a separate brigade within the Ukrainian Armed Forces should be established to specifically and only perform peacekeeping missions. Thus, this unit could be used as a springboard to begin the professionalization of peacekeeping not only in Ukraine, but also in Europe and the rest of the world.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Since the end of the Cold War, international relations have been characterized by hopes for peace and scourge of war. Nationalism, ethnic tensions, and liberalizing economies have become the norm. Democratizing countries have fallen into civil strife and war. Peacekeeping operations are increasingly needed in these unlucky nations, which often require an external force to establish peace and stability due to political struggle, civil war and other social problems.

This thesis argues that the general perception of modern peacekeeping should change from often unprofessional, poorly trained, and underpaid forces to elite, respected professionals. Since 1945, the United Nations has created ad hoc ‘coalitions of the willing’ to respond to peacekeeping needs as they arise. This policy has not been conducive to establishing professional peacekeeping forces. The need for change to professional peacekeeping is particularly true for the Ukrainian Armed Forces so they integrate into Euro-Atlantic structures.

The future requires the development of standing national forces designed and trained to act in crisis management and peacekeeping operations. These forces, designed from the onset to handle such situations, will improve the U.N.’s ability to carry out peacekeeping missions.

Using the Polish-Ukrainian Peacekeeping Battalion (UKRPOLBAT) as a model, a separate brigade within the Ukrainian Armed Forces should be established to specifically and only perform peacekeeping missions. Thus, this unit could be used as a springboard to begin the professionalization of peacekeeping not only in Ukraine, but also in Europe and the rest of the world.

This thesis proposes that the more professional the peacekeeping operation, the higher the chance of success for the peacekeeping mission. Professionalism alone in the peacekeeping forces is obviously not the only factor for a successful mission, as one must take into account the willingness of the belligerents to participate in the process of

mitigation, the political situation, etc. in the affected region. However, as will be considered in this thesis, the more professional the peacekeeping operation, the more likely the mission will be a success.

I. INTRODUCTION

Today's world is characterized by rapid changes in international relations. With the end of the Cold War, a new era of instability and uncertainty has replaced the bipolar world. Nationalism, ethnic tensions, and liberalizing economies have become the norm. This new era of instability, combined with the growth of interdependence and globalization, has increased the need for peacekeeping operations around the world. Peacekeeping operations are increasingly found in transitioning countries, which require an external force to establish peace and stability due to political struggle, civil war and other social problems.

The current method of addressing situations requiring peacekeeping forces (PKFs) has proven inadequate in the emerging security environment since 1991. Furthermore, the September 11, 2001 attacks on the U.S. have certainly worsened international relations and the world's attitude towards conducting peacekeeping operations. Given the end of the Cold War and the events of September 11, has the need for peacekeepers, not to mention professional peacekeepers, changed? If anything, this study suggests the need has increased. Based on this need for more professional peacekeeping in general, is it feasible to develop, possibly with foreign assistance, peacekeeping forces within the Ukrainian Armed Forces for regional and global peacekeeping operations?

This study argues that the general perception of modern peacekeeping should change from often unprofessional, poorly trained, and underpaid forces to elite, respectful professionals who represent their respective countries with dignity. The need for change is particularly true for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The ability of the United Nations (U.N.) to play a wider and more effective role in world security affairs depends upon the willingness of the nations of the world to reconsider their intended use of the U.N. as a peacekeeping tool and upon U.N. willingness to consider basic reforms in its internal structure and procedures. A definition of peacekeeping is presented by the former U.N. Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali:

Peacekeeping, an invention of the United Nations was born of necessity. Because of the Cold War, the vision of collective security embodied in the charter of the United Nations never came to be. The gap was filled by the pragmatic device of peacekeeping, a concept that entailed the deployment of military forces not to prosecute a war, but to help bring about peace.

The calming presence of United Nations peacekeepers, either unarmed observers or lightly armed forces, helped to contain numerous conflicts and created conditions for political talks to go forward.¹

Based on this definition, it is necessary to state the main principles of modern peacekeeping also given by Boutros Boutros-Ghali:

First, it is important from the outset to integrate the short – to medium-term “stabilizing actions” of the coalition force with the longer – term efforts of the United Nations to promote lasting reconciliation. In the context of internal conflicts, especially, lasting peace requires the institutionalization of effective channels through which parties can pursue their interests, so that they do not feel compelled to return to the battlefield.

Second, consultation between the multinational force and the U.N. throughout the intervention is critical to ensure a smooth transition.

Third, the transition to the United Nations operation should not occur until the conditions on the ground are conducive to a peacekeeping operation, where the consent and cooperation of the parties can be guaranteed.

Fourth, the peacekeepers should be endowed with the mandate and resources to ensure that there is no “vacuum” in the immediate aftermath of an intervention.

Finally, the primacy of the United Nations Security Council, which authorizes coalition forces as well as United Nations operations, is essential.²

Historically, however, the U.N. has resorted to creating ad hoc ‘coalitions of the willing’ to respond to situations that require peacekeeping as they arise. This has not been conducive to establishing and building professional peacekeeping forces within the

¹Cited in Barbara Benton, editor, Soldiers for Peace, pp. 2-3. Facts on File, Inc., N.Y., N.Y., 1996.

² Ibid. pp. 3-4.

United Nations. It must be mentioned that it is also the failure of collective security on a political level that has contributed to instability needing peacekeeping forces in the first place. However, the focus of this thesis is the need to professionalize peacekeeping.

The method of the 'coalition of the willing' has proven successful at times but has also exhibited a high percentage of failures. These failures include some embarrassing situations: the involvement of peacekeepers in smuggling in Bosnia and Eastern Slavonia, failure of the peacekeeping mission in Mozambique, and the inability to implement successful peacekeeping in Somalia in 1993:

ONUMOZ [United Nations Mission in Mozambique] was also not the model PKO. Many of the things that have gone wrong in other UN operations also went wrong in Mozambique. Timetables slipped, the local parties delayed compliance, budgets soared, parent UN agencies engaged in obstructionism, and UN resources on the ground were underutilized and worse. What did work was an unexpected mix of strong leadership, donor coordination, and aggressive diplomacy which provided the critical underpinning for continued forward movement throughout the process.³

Other examples include:

The failure of UN troops to prevent the genocide that claimed 800,000 lives in Rwanda in 1994, and the massacre the following year of 7,000 men and boys in the UN-declared safe haven of Srebrenica in Bosnia.

The report [Kofi Annan's report on March 7, 2000] said "the need for change has been rendered even more urgent by recent events in Sierra Leone," where more than 500 peacekeepers were taken hostage by the rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in May before being released in batches over the following weeks. The humiliation in Sierra Leone showed how far peacekeeping has moved from the traditional task of monitoring a ceasefire between regular armies with chains of command that responded to political instructions and pressure.⁴

These problems in peacekeeping occurred not the least because of professionalism among the troops sent to the various missions. Politics certainly played a major role in

³ Ambassador Dennis C. Jett, American Embassy, Maputo, Mozambique, Lessons Unlearned - Or Why Mozambique's Successful Peacekeeping Operation Might Not Be Replicated Elsewhere. <http://www.jha.ac/Ref/aar008.htm>.

⁴ R. Holloway, UN Calls for Radical Peacekeeping Reforms that Would End Zero-Growth Budget. Agence France Presse, August 23, 2000.

the failure of these missions. Nevertheless, this thesis focuses on the operational and tactical level where the structure of the peacekeeping forces can be changed to increase the likelihood of success. Therefore, all responsible states, particularly those with a history of providing peacekeeping forces that failed in their missions, must rethink their attitude toward the implementation and reorganization of their PKFs. Fortunately, much can be done to improve the U.N.'s ability to strengthen its contribution to international security.

A more effective and arguably necessary step for meeting the increasing demand for PKFs is the development of standing national forces designed and trained to act in crisis management and peacekeeping operations (PKOs). These forces, designed from the onset to handle such situations, will improve the U.N.'s ability to carry out PK missions when the need arises.⁵

Due to the numerous failures of peacekeeping operations, as described in Chapter II, one of the solutions to solve these problems would be the creation of new regional peacekeeping forces at the national level. It would be necessary to have the backing of a strong nation to initially support the PKOs with financial and logistic means. Consequently, there is a strong need for peacekeeping forces, structured as discussed in this thesis, to respond to any crisis in the world. This thesis further deals with civil-military relations aspects that might influence creation of professional peacekeeping forces as a part of Ukrainian Armed Forces. Furthermore, the question arises whether or not Ukraine is capable of building the appropriate peacekeeping forces on the national level as an integral part of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

One possibility is the creation of a separate peacekeeping brigade within the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF). This thesis examines in this idea in detail. Although the entire UAF would not need to be reconfigured for peacekeeping, a need does exist for a separate, professional group of peacekeeping soldiers. For example, the creation of a peacekeeping brigade would legitimize peacekeeping on an organizational level within the UAF and ensure that it would be given at least an equal status with the rest of the

⁵ A. Cowin, Expanded U.N. Peacekeeping: Costly and Risky with Few Rewards. www.jinsa.com.

armed forces as well as serve as the backbone of civil-military relations in Ukraine, a newly democratic state.

The reform process of the UAF must be framed socially and politically in accepted norms and practices. This thesis will address the issue of domestic political concerns and will seek to answer the question of who is willing to support the idea of professionalization in the PKFs. Furthermore, this thesis examines the structure of the Partnership for Peace (PfP)⁶ program and the issue of the allocation of national military resources. Additionally, this thesis will emphasize the constituency of the Ukrainian government, society, and economy (in civil-military terms) for the reform of peacekeeping in general.

Ukraine will be used as the case study for this thesis. The case study provides critical analysis of the Ukraine's current position and prospect for developing a competent PKF. Ukraine is well positioned to successfully develop a PKF because it can draw on the unique experience gained from the existing Ukrainian-Polish Peacekeeping Battalion (UKRPOLBAT) and previous participation in peacekeeping operations. However, Ukraine also suffers from a fundamental impediment or the lack of professionalism in the PKOs affecting the UAF. Ukraine is actively working to place itself on solid ground in the post-Cold War security environment, yet is so far financially unable to devote the necessary resources to develop professionalism in the military, especially in peacekeeping. Therefore, this thesis argues that foreign assistance is one of the essential ingredients for transforming peacekeeping operations in the UAF into a professional, competent military structure. While peacekeeping is only a part of the UAF, the UAF as a whole will also benefit from professionalization of their peacekeeping forces, further enabling the UAF to consistently generate effective peacekeeping troops.⁷

Additionally, this thesis touches upon the current security environment and some of the failures and successes of the U.N. As well as the opportunities for future remedies

⁶ The PfP was created in 1994 by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a means of normalizing relations between former adversaries in Europe-mainly the former Warsaw Pact nations and NATO countries. NATO Handbook, 1999, at www.nato.int.

⁷ S. Zgurets, Ukrainian Trident, Polish Eagle, or on Military Parallels from the Life of Strategic Friends, on www.day.kiev.ua.

to successfully and consistently meet the demands of peacekeeping. To emphasize, this thesis analyzes the previous and current Ukrainian experience in participating in the PFP program. The overwhelming lack of professionalism, including corruption expressed in having positions based on personal connections rather than the level of competence, indicates a necessity for foreign assistance and oversight in some cases in order to cultivate a new atmosphere within the UAF and PK units particularly.

Clearly, making the Ukraine's peacekeeping forces professional is beneficial not only to the nation, but also on the global scale in terms of security and stability. Moreover, this thesis will prove that it is more cost-effective to increase a peacekeeper's standard of living during pre-deployment training and during actual peacekeeping operations. Ukrainian peacekeeping forces could be used as a core component of a regionally based PKF for other countries.

A. HYPOTHESIS

Given that peacekeeping failures can partially be attributed to unprofessionalism in the armed forces that undertake these missions, this thesis proposes that the more professional the peacekeeping operation, the higher the chance of success for the peacekeeping mission. Professionalism alone in the peacekeeping forces is obviously not the only factor for a successful mission, as one must take into account the willingness of the belligerents to participate in the process of mitigation, the political situation, etc. in the affected region. However, as will be considered in this thesis, the more professional the peacekeeping operation, the more likely mission success.

What is professionalism and how does it apply to peacekeeping? To add to the short definition given earlier from Boutros Boutros-Ghali, peacekeeping is defined as "Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (ceasefire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement."⁸

⁸ Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Joint Pub 1-02) as of 10 June 1998, p. 339.

Therefore, professionalism in peacekeeping is very similar to how a professional military organization defines its professional ethos. It serves as a repository of its values. “Proper subordination to political authority, loyalty, duty, selfless service, courage, integrity, respect for human dignity, and a sense of justice”⁹ are all a part of a professional peacekeeper’s identity.

Countries that send forces and participate in peacekeeping missions, oftentimes going through democratic transition themselves, should take a more serious approach to the professionalization of their committed troops and the process of military reforms. This will have the dual effect of positively affecting the outcome of their peacekeeping missions and the process of democratization and progress of civil military relations within these countries as well.

The events of September 11, 2001 dramatically changed the international security scene. Transnational terrorism, extremists networks, and like organizations are now the military focus of strong powers led by the United States and other powerful countries. The need for peacekeeping though has not diminished. For example, in Afghanistan, with the fall of the Taliban regime, there is a great need for international peacekeepers to reinforce the transitioning period in that country.

Security-related changes around the globe have brought with them so-called “new security risks” or transnational threats. NATO defines these risks or threats as proliferation of chemical weapons and weapons of mass destruction, organized crime, floods of those seeking refuge from crises and catastrophes.¹⁰ States and international organizations have strengthened their capacity to react to such crises and dangers, and must further reinforce that capacity. There is both a growing need for cooperation of the closest kind on various levels as well as a growing need for more professional peacekeeping forces. Strong states would benefit from supporting regional PKFs by aiding in the development of competent forces. These forces would be able to respond to situations where strong states had no desire or ability to do so.

⁹ Field Manual 100-5, Operations, Published by the Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 14 June 1993, pp. 1-2.

¹⁰ NATO-Ukrainian Charter. www.nato.int.

All nations of the world share the important responsibility of peacekeeping. Sharing the burden of the common goal, or to keep peace and stability in the world, will be, and must be, implemented by other nations, not only by great powers. For example, NATO's PfP program demonstrates how nations can come together and share the burden of cooperation, stabilization, and democratization of the nations/partners of this program.

This thesis suggests that creating highly skilled and properly funded peacekeeping units within the Ukrainian Armed Forces will directly and positively impact the level of professionalism of the peacekeepers, making them more effective, professional, interoperable, and competent. It is logical that involving more countries in the peacekeeping process will enhance the international security and stability environment. Using the examples of existing multinational peacekeeping units, such as the Baltic battalion (BALTBAT) and the UKRPOLBAT, can help develop different approaches for the professionalization of peacekeeping forces. The involvement of nations within the region will improve the quality of each national armed force and at the same time will enhance regional stability and the international security environment.

B. METHODOLOGY

The methodology used will be the case study method. First, a survey of U.N. successes and failures will be presented. Then, the study of Ukrainian participation in the PfP program will be examined. Finally, the examples of UKRPOLBAT, BALTBAT, and some other joint peacekeeping units will be analyzed for further modeling a regional peacekeeping force (PKF). Techniques include interviewing Ukrainian military authorities involved in the process of peacekeeping, and civilian and military authorities from other countries in order to find a possible solution for the creation of professional peacekeeping forces and sharing the burden of peacekeeping.

The thesis will consist of five chapters, including an introduction and conclusion. There will be a short description of failures in peacekeeping operations with a brief analysis of the failures and successes. Then, the Ukrainian experience in peacekeeping will be discussed, including background, functions and possible problems inside the UKRPOLBAT, as well as the negative impact on the personnel after their participation in the peacekeeping missions. Next, the civil-military dimension of the creation of such

peacekeeping forces will be discussed, focusing on the Ukrainian role in peacekeeping. In the conclusion, the previous chapters will be summarized and a recommendation made on what should be done in order to improve the implementation of peacekeeping operations from the viewpoint of stabilizing the international security environment and democratic processes.

As indicated, peacekeeping operations have a “hit and miss” success record. By analyzing the successes and failures of various peacekeeping missions and possible future models for professional peacekeeping success, this thesis endeavors to map out at least one possible solution to the problem of failed peacekeeping.

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II. PEACEKEEPING FAILURES AND SUCCESSES: AN ANALYSIS

Prior to the events of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the security environment in the Europe and parts of the world had improved with NATO and European Union (EU) successes in regional peace and harmony. However, the events of September 11, 2001 notwithstanding, a stable security environment—envisioned in the concept of collective security—in Europe and in the world as a whole had obviously not yet been achieved before those attacks. Collective security itself may be defined as

an effort by states to manage security challenges by organizing power on the basis of all-against-one crisis management. The goal is to create an international environment in which stability emerges through cooperation rather than competition. Violators of norms and principles will be punished through collective action.¹¹

While it may be expected that NATO and the EU enjoy at least limited success in regional peace and harmony through peacekeeping and other operations, they are not the only organizations that are attempting to become interdependent to foster peace and economic prosperity. For example, some African nations have attempted to integrate on a regional basis with the establishment of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). While most countries in SADC face a formidable series of critical demographic, social, economic, agricultural, energy, technological and institutional transitions, the commitment to “build a new SADC plus the membership of the new majority-led South Africa provide a new basis and more opportunities for the SADC countries to better manage their multiple transitions and together move toward sustainable development.”¹² The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is another example of a regional group founded on economic and democratic values. Thus, cooperation among states and international organizations is increasing globally in both security and economic spheres as well as in sharing solutions to solve problems in transitioning democracies.

¹¹ Kay, Sean. NATO and the Future of European Security, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., New York, p. 4.

¹² <http://www.un.org/esa/earthsummit/sadc-cp.htm>

However, regardless of the progress of interdependence and the growth of regional cooperation throughout the world, the concept of collective security can fail and has in some disastrous cases such as the former Yugoslavia and Somalia. When U.N. peacekeepers have been sent in to perform their missions, they have a mixed record of success and failure. One of the main problems of failed peacekeeping operations lies in the high demand for experienced and professional peacekeepers.

The U.N.'s ability to play a wider and more effective role in world security affairs depends upon the willingness of the nations of the world to reconsider their intended use of the U.N. as a peacekeeping tool and upon U.N. willingness to consider basic reforms in its internal structure and procedures.¹³ Deploying professional peacekeepers is an important element of such basic reform. It follows that all responsible states, particularly those with a history of providing peacekeeping forces that failed, such as Pakistan, Denmark, the Netherlands, Ukraine, and France, should approach fundamental changes in the U.N. with great interest and support.

The failures that will be examined here are the U.N. peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the well-known failure in Somalia. The successes reviewed will be Cambodia and El Salvador.

Consider the following a definition of failure in peacekeeping:

Peacekeeping forces have at different times been criticized for lack of mandate, ill-preparedness, weak command and control structure, shortage of resources and equipment and acute ineffectiveness. In hotspots like Bosnia and Kosovo peacekeeping forces failed miserably to halt the situation from sliding into chaos. In East Timor they failed to act as a deterrent and in Sierra Leone the entire contingent was abducted and kept in captivity by the rebels. This does not paint a very flattering picture for the UN.¹⁴

In order to understand the reasons for the failed peacekeeping missions, it is helpful to examine the successes first. This is particularly important as the successes of

¹³ A. Cowin, Expanded U.N. Peacekeeping: Costly and Risky with Few Rewards, available on www.jinsa.com.

¹⁴ UN's Peacekeeping Woes. Financial Times Information, March 17, 2000.

Cambodia and El Salvador play an indirect role in the failures in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia.

As U.N. operations became more ambitious in Angola, El Salvador, Namibia, and Nicaragua in the 80s-90s some foreign policy experts acquired an exaggerated opinion of the U.N.'s abilities. This sentiment escalated after the Gulf War in which deliberations and debate at the U.N. figured prominently. As crises have arisen in Cambodia, Somalia and Yugoslavia, world leaders have consistently turned to the U.N. More recently, many countries, such as Canada, France, Belgium, have proposed to send in the U.N. to handle the coup in Haiti and the civil war in Mozambique. Commenting on these events, the Financial Times of London ran a headline calling the U.N. a "victim of its own success."¹⁵

The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was established to implement the 1991 Paris Accords, which were designed to end Cambodia's long-running conflict and restore a legitimate government with international assistance. UNTAC began in March 1992 and ended in September 1993, "amidst widespread praise and applause for a job well done."¹⁶

What did UNTAC do that was considered successful? UNTAC "organized an electoral process that inspired great public enthusiasm, produced an internationally recognized government and helped to end Cambodia's years of crippling isolation."¹⁷ Why was UNTAC successful though? What, for example, was different about UNTAC from the later mission in the Balkans, UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Force)?

UNTAC showed how dramatically a field operation's fate hinges upon the durability of its international backing. For UNTAC, the durable consensus forged in the Paris negotiations was an enormous asset. The accords were marred by numerous glitches and ambiguities, some of which came to light only during implementation, but their basic principles (halting the fighting and organizing elections to support the process of political transition) were clear and accepted by all the major powers. At times, it was difficult for UNTAC to reconcile its role as a partisan for the settlement with its need to remain impartial vis-à-vis the parties. Yet the durability of its international backing assured that it could count on unified

¹⁵ Cowin.

¹⁶ Durch, William J. (Editor). UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s. St. Martin's Press, New York, 1996, p. 135.

¹⁷ Ibid. p. 172.

outside support when crises arose. No Cambodian party could disown the process and count on the unwavering support of a patron.¹⁸

What really made UNTAC work though was the fact that it had a lot of support by the parties affected and the scale of the operation. (UNTAC's military component was comprised of 12 infantry battalions, 5 engineering battalions, and support units).¹⁹ It is even compared to the now NATO-led force in Bosnia in terms of scale and success:

Its large size and diverse functions were not a product of organizational hubris but a reflection of a negotiated peace settlement that sought to deal with a conflict comprehensively, in its military, social, and political dimensions. Future peace settlements of equal complexity that attempt to translate agreements crafted by diplomats into a durable measure of conflict resolution will generate operations on UNTAC's scale, or greater. One need only look at the NATO-led peace implementation operation in Bosnia circa 1996 for confirmation.²⁰

U.N. peacekeeping in El Salvador is also considered one of the more successful operations recently. What were the factors that contributed to the success in El Salvador?

Undoubtedly the groundwork laid by a serious process of negotiation greatly reduced the problems of implementation. That the negotiations directly and specifically addressed issues of human rights and political and military reform reduced the likelihood that these contentious issues would later threaten much-needed collaboration between the former disputants.

Related to this point, the early deployment of human rights workers created a local climate of confidence in the UN, in the accords, and about the seriousness of the signatories.

Finally, the relatively small size of the UN force in El Salvador actually worked to the advantage of the peace process. Unlike the UN operation in Cambodia, for instance, with its far larger and more cumbersome bureaucracy, ONUSAL did not experience major delays in deploying its workers, setting up its offices, acquiring the necessary equipment, or generally going about its business. As the peace process gathered momentum, ONUSAL was in a position to exploit the initial euphoria and the sense of urgent good will just as the parties were striving to cultivate

¹⁸ Ibid. p. 175.

¹⁹ Ibid. p. 144.

²⁰ Ibid. p. 175.

the fruit of their negotiations. ONUSAL's logistical efficiency enhanced the perception that the peace accords could work.²¹

With the successes of Cambodia and El Salvador, along with others such as Namibia, the U.N. was beginning to look like the organization that clearly had new clout and vigor in peacekeeping. Although the success in Namibia was not examined here, the notion that the U.N. was the “go to” organization to resolve regional conflicts began with Namibia:

Then, after a successful UN mission overseeing Namibia’s transition from South African rule in 1989, UN peacekeeping came to be seen as a kind of magic bullet for dealing with regional conflicts. Demands for UN operations began to multiply and from spring 1991 to fall 1993 the Security Council (on which the United States sits as a permanent member, with a veto) agreed to send UN operations into ever more complex and dangerous environments, including unfinished civil wars.²²

The most well known disasters in U.N. peacekeeping are the operations in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia. Somalia certainly represents the complete and utter failure of both U.N. peacekeeping and efforts by individual nation-states (notably the United States) to bring about peace and stability to Somalia. The first mission in Somalia, the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), began in September 1992 with the arrival of Pakistani troops in Mogadishu. The mission of UNOSOM was to monitor the implementation of the ceasefire between the warlords Aideed and Ali Mahdi and to get food provisions and supplies to the victims of the terrible famine.²³

UNOSOM, which became known as UNOSOM I later on, did not effectively separate warring factions nor was successful in delivering food and relief to the needy. The U.N. Security Council, on 3 December 1992, voted to authorize UN member states “to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.”²⁴ This was the beginning of the US-led effort called “Operation Restore Hope” (also known in U.N. circles as the Unified Task Force

²¹ Ibid. p. 97.

²² Ibid. p. 12.

²³ Ibid. p. 316.

²⁴ Ibid. p. 320.

or UNITAF). UNITAF began its operation on 9 December 1992 and handed over responsibility to the U.N. on 4 May 1993.²⁵

UNITAF is generally considered to have been a success. The mission was to establish a secure environment in order to deliver food to distribution centers, backed by the deterrent and occasional punishing force of US Marines. By March 1993, “UNITAF had established an environment in its area of operations in which relief could reach the needy, hunger diminished, and fighting subsided.”²⁶

However, with the US eager to turn over the operation to the U.N., UNOSOM II was put in charge of operations in Somalia by April 1993. This is the point that the situation there began to turn sour. The real change in policy in Somalia began with U.N. Resolution 837, which reaffirmed that:

the Secretary-General is authorized under Resolution 814 to take all necessary measures against those responsible for the armed attacks . . . [and] those responsible for publicly inciting such attacks . . . including . . . their arrest and detention for prosecution, trial, and punishment.²⁷

This particular paragraph put UNOSOM II on the path that led to the fateful firefight of 3 October 1993, the eventual US pullout from UNOSOM II, and an uproar in the US over the role of American forces in U.N. peace operations. The ambitiousness of the operations in Somalia were just too much for the U.N. to handle:

UNOSOM II was a quasi-enforcement operations assigned to an organization with no experience at doing law enforcement, let alone urban guerilla warfare. All the normal problems of command and control experienced by a peacekeeping operation in calmer circumstances (lack of doctrine, nonstandard equipment and operating procedures, national checks on contingents’ freedom to follow UN orders) were magnified by UNOSOM II’s ambitious mandate and dangerous operating environment. Although Boutros-Ghali’s deliberate delay of the UNITAF-UNOSOM transition contributed to UNOSOM’s subsequent difficulties, his fears for the UN’s ability to do the job were amply justified. The United States

²⁵ Ibid. p. 320.

²⁶ Ibid. p. 324.

²⁷ Ibid. p. 332.

worried about getting bogged down in this place: Why should it have expected the United Nations to do any better?²⁸

The U.N. took on a terribly difficult mission in Somalia. The leadership of UNOSOM II “misjudged the capacities of its adversaries and of its own forces, as well as the utility of US reinforcements. In every previous UN-commanded field operation, success has depended on a high degree of local support for what the UN was trying to do, because no such operation has ever been strong enough to impose its will(s).”²⁹

Some possible lessons learned from the Somalia mission, which had effect on UNPROFOR in Bosnia later to a degree, were the following:

- Do not intervene in unstable countries without serious and sustained major power attention and backup.

- Pick a politically savvy mission head to handle local politics and diplomacy.

- Develop agreement on means and ends among troop contributing countries prior to deployment and consult with them regularly over the course of the operation.

- Do not push local parties beyond the mission’s own capacity to defend itself or its capacity to sustain the push.

- If the situation is so egregious that general conflict suppression is called for, do not run the operation through the UN: deputize a major power to serve as leader of a coalition.³⁰

There are, of course, many other lessons learned from Somalia. For the purposes of professionalizing peacekeeping, the third lesson learned above on agreement for troop contributing countries to the mission is paramount. If the troop contributing countries cannot deploy professional peacekeeping troops, then the mission is already in chance of failure due to the inadequacies of peacekeeping’s ‘coalitions of the willing.’

²⁸ Ibid. p. 350.

²⁹ Ibid. p. 351.

³⁰ Ibid. p. 352.

The UN operations in the Balkans represent another terrible failure. The failures consisted of several different factors. One of these factors is the failure in peacekeeping command in the former Yugoslavia:

The Canadian Battalion in Croatia's Sector South, reinforced with two French companies, stopped and ultimately turned back a Croatian advance north of the Velebit Mountains in September 1993, but not before Croatia's so-called "special police" had razed the area around Medak, killing most of the inhabitants, all of the livestock and poisoning the wells. But these were the result of command decisions rather than an assumption of responsibility by a local commander under humanitarian law.³¹

The United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNPROFOR-BH) is a glaring example of what could go wrong in peacekeeping operations. The U.N. operations in all of Yugoslavia suffered many problems but the mission in Bosnia fairly reflects the problems in the rest of the Balkans.

UNPROFOR faced impossible odds in Bosnia. It was an improvised, last-resort operation, burdened by mandates that were at times inconsistent and well in excess of its resource base. It also was buffeted by sharp disagreements among its main sponsors on when and how to use force beyond self-defense. Ultimately, however, UNPROFOR could not surmount the rising resentment of the local Bosnian factions. UNPROFOR, neither loved nor feared by any of the parties, found itself handicapped in promoting dialogue and lacking the clout necessary to compel hostile parties to negotiate.

UNPROFOR never had the resources to implement the safe areas concept, which relied heavily on the "moral force" of Security Council edicts to protect their populations, particularly in the eastern enclaves. The UN's presence probably delayed the collapse of Srebrenica and Zepa for more than two years, but there was really no political will in the outside world to prevent their collapse when the Serbs decided to move. Moreover, the fixed-wing NATO air power available for use at Srebrenica in 1995 was of little use once the BSA (Bosnian Serb Army) changed tactics and moved infantry through the forest into the enclave. Without willingness on the part of major powers to airlift substantial numbers of troops into the enclaves and their commitment to keep them supplied by air, if necessary, the concept of "safe area" was always a misnomer.³²

³¹ MacInnis, John A. Peacekeeping and International Humanitarian Law, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 3, No. 3, Autumn 1996, pp. 92-94.

³² Ibid. pp. 250-251.

The intervention of NATO air power truly represented the failure of the peacekeeping mission. What were some of the lessons learned from the U.N. experience in Bosnia?

First, the cascading deployments of UN forces in the former Yugoslavia show both the danger and the utility of deploying such forces to support partial cease-fires in larger conflicts.

In Bosnia, where UNPROFOR helped to implement the federation arrangement, Muslim and Croat forces were freed for other fighting fronts at the Serbs' expense. Once again, UN presence tended to channel the conflict in certain directions, but in this case the cause of political settlement was probably helped rather than hurt.

Second, peace operations trying to remain neutral in a war zone are subject to manipulation by all local belligerents. Humanitarian intervention delivers relief goods that all sides want and value, and these are obvious targets of manipulation.

Third, *every* action taken by outsiders in a civil war situation affects the local balance of power. Humanitarian intervention in particular favors whatever faction is nearest to defeat when the intervention occurs and whatever faction can make greater use of time to summon other resources to its cause. It may be just one faction that benefits in this way, or it may be different ones at different times, but such an impact is unavoidable and sure to anger those factions who lose political-military leverage as a result.

Fourth, mandates that rely upon the consent of all parties cannot easily be reconciled with those that require a peace operation to become a partisan of one side or another. This was the central dilemma of the safe-area mission. Although it is conceivable that adequately equipped and trained UN forces could have maintained "safe areas" for segments of local populations caught up in conflict, UNPROFOR was never so endowed and in any event could not have performed that mission in a neutral fashion.³³

The experience in Bosnia clearly could have used more professional peacekeepers as this thesis proposes. The second and fourth lessons learned above certainly could have been dealt with in a more effective way had professional peacekeepers been deployed to Bosnia. While the mission was not a total disaster (although from many points of view, especially the victims of Srebrenica and other areas, the mission was a failure), it took the

³³ Ibid. pp. 253-254.

military and political power of NATO, not a formal U.N. military force, to enforce peace in Bosnia. Professional peacekeepers could certainly have made a difference.

What can the U.N. do to improve its peacekeeping record? The United Nations has outlined a \$22 million proposal to reinforce its peacekeeping operations with 250 more jobs. The plan “stems from a set of recommendations made by a panel of experts in August 2000, which said the U.N. could suffer from peacekeeping failures unless it created the equivalent of a ministry of defense. The plan has to be approved by the General Assembly.”³⁴

Calls for increasing the U.N.’s military strength grow louder each day. They come not only from academics but from politicians and policy makers. The U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, in his report to the ‘Millennium Summit’ in March 2000, said that besides “the need for change” and “clear, credible and achievable mandates”, it is essential to have a “firm commitment of troops.”³⁵

³⁴ Financial Times Information, U.N.’s Peacekeeping Woes, November 2, 2000.

³⁵ U.N. Millennium summit held in New York in March 2000.

III. UKRAINIAN-POLISH PEACEKEEPING BATTALION

Ukraine and Poland have come out from under the same overcoat, the Warsaw Pact. Now the Polish Army has been donning the NATO uniform for a little more than a year, while the Armed Forces of Ukraine are going their own way. As Ukrainian generals say, building the military has assumed clearly national features. However, recently Warsaw has been advising its strategic comrade, Kiev, more and more to pay attention at last to the Polish experience in defense reform, if only to avoid unnecessary pitfalls.³⁶

In concrete terms, the finest achievement was the 1996 decision to form a joint Polish-Ukrainian battalion. The unit with a total strength of 600 servicemen is based on the 24th Iron Division and the 14th brigade of the Polish army stationed in Przemysl. Each side maintains and trains its own half at home, only to join them during exercises. The unit was formed for the purpose of using it in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations.

A. BACKGROUND

Ukraine and Poland are the two largest countries in Central-Eastern Europe with a set of common fundamental interests. They share a long period of common history and common European culture, but still, their political situation as to the scale of cooperation with the European Union and the perspectives of their respective participation in the process of European integration differs profoundly. Poland is a candidate state on its way to full membership in the EU and Ukraine is not in spite of its *European Choice* pronounced officially at the Luxemburg meeting of the *EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council* (June 8-9th 1998). The so-called European Treaty, determines Poland has relations with the EU while the Ukrainian place in the process of European cooperation was determined by the decisions taken at the EU Helsinki summit (December 10-11th 1999) where the *EU Common Strategy on Ukraine* was adopted. Both Poland and Ukraine are not satisfied with the present state of affairs. Poland aims at full membership to be achieved as soon

³⁶ S. Zgurets, [Ukrainian Trident, Polish Eagle, or on Military Parallels from the Life of Strategic Friends](#), on www.day.kiev.ua

as possible and Ukraine has declared its will to become an associated member state of the European Union³⁷.

Ukrainian-Polish cooperation, relying on the unity of views on the principal issues of Europe's future, has become on our continent a factor of strategic importance. Intensive good neighborly relations between Ukraine and Poland belong to the important questions of modern Europe. They determine the scope and human potential of both countries, as well as an opportunity to expand the influence of an integrated Europe. It is, thus, owing to the Ukrainian-Polish strategic partnership, the building of the architecture of European relations in terms of security receives a self-sufficient value and new dimension. Ukraine supported Poland's decision to join NATO. Ukraine's pragmatic orientation toward cooperation with the North Atlantic alliance remains unchanged, as evidenced by the establishment of a special partnership between Ukraine and NATO, the Ukraine's participation in the Partnership for Peace Program, and by Ukrainian-Polish military cooperation, particularly within the framework of the Polish-Ukrainian Peacekeeping Battalion. Poland was and is an advocate of the Ukraine's aspiration for European integration.³⁸

B. THE ESTABLISHMENT AND THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE BATTALION IN THE PEACEKEEPING OPERATION IN KOSOVO

The initiative to create a joint military unit was taken by the defense ministers of Poland and Ukraine during their meeting in Solina, on 4-5 October 1995. The basis for the establishment and functioning of the UKRPOLBAT is the "Agreement between the Republic of Poland and Ukraine on the establishment of a joint military unit for participation in international peacekeeping and humanitarian operations under the aegis of international organizations", signed by the defense ministers of Poland and Ukraine on 26 November 1997.³⁹

The UKRPOLBAT came into being as a result of political decisions by the participating countries. It is a concrete, tangible outcome of the trans-border military

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ A. Zlenko and W. Bartoszewski, Ukraine and Poland at the Turn of the Millennium, on www.day.kiev.ua.

³⁹ The Presidential Chronicle - January 2001, www.bbn.gov.pl/eng/news/2001/prez-0101.html.

cooperation among Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine. There is a small Lithuanian platoon in the battalion. The initiative to create a joint military unit was taken by the defense ministers of Poland and Ukraine during their meeting in Solina on 4-5 October 1995.⁴⁰

UKRPOLBAT was the first combined unit ever to participate in peacekeeping missions with a mixed battalion staff from two countries with totally different backgrounds. While Poland is a member of NATO, Ukraine is not. Still, the two good neighbors manage to carry out an excellent, joint mission as part of KFOR.⁴¹ However, two years ago, there were Polish concerns when Ukraine did not ratify the agreement on the formation of this joint military unit. Due to legalities, this battalion was not sent to Kosovo initially as part of the NATO-led KFOR. Finally, however, Kiev and Warsaw announced that the joint battalion would go to Kosovo in July 2000.⁴²

NATO has recognized the progress achieved by Ukraine and its peacekeeping abilities. NATO views these activities as positive and looks forward to further steps by Ukraine “to develop its democratic institutions, to implement radical economic reforms, and to deepen the process of integration within the full range of European and Euro-Atlantic structures.” In addition, based on the NATO-Ukraine Charter, the two entities want “to further broaden and strengthen their cooperation and to develop a distinctive and effective partnership, which will promote further stability and common democratic values in Central and Eastern Europe.”⁴³

As per article 2, paragraph 1, of the Agreement, the battalion may be deployed for international peacekeeping missions mandated by the U.N. Security Council or organized by other organizations responsible for the management of peace and international security, according to Chapter III of the U.N. Charter which refers to regional peacekeeping initiatives, or within international forces formed out of consensus of the U.N. Security Council.⁴⁴

⁴⁰ A. Zlenko and W. Bartoszewski, Ukraine and Poland at the Turn of the Millennium, on www.day.kiev.ua.

⁴¹ Capt. Monica Blikes, Unique Battalion Mix by NATO and Non-NATO Country, on www.kforonline.com/news.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ NATO-Ukrainian Charter signed in Madrid on July 9, 1997, paragraph 1.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

The Polish component of the battalion was formed by 31 March 1998. A third preparatory exercise was carried out in Ukraine in September 1998.

The United Kingdom organizes and covers costs of language training in Poland and Ukraine. Canada has offered four personal computers to Poland and proposed to arrange training for the battalion's HQ officers. The United States provided for a language lab and offered funds for equipment acquisition and further training.

The idea to deploy UKRPOLBAT in the peacekeeping operation in Kosovo was put forward by the Minister of Defense of Ukraine, General Olekandr Kuzmuk in June 1999. During the meeting in Javoriv on 25-26 April 2000, an agreement was taken on the substance of the technical agreement between the defense ministries of Poland and Ukraine on the participation of national contingents in the international peacekeeping operation in Kosovo, the Federated Republic of Yugoslavia, within UKRPOLBAT. The heads of delegations on 9 June 2000 signed the technical agreement.

The deployment of the battalion to the mission area was undertaken by the national contingents. It was realized in two deployment phases in July 2000. The preparation group of 28 soldiers was sent to Kosovo on 28 June 2000. The main forces of UKRPOLBAT began their activities in the area of the KFOR mission since 15 July 2000.

The contingent was deployed in the eastern sector (American). Its zone of responsibility includes Strpce, Kacanika, and Uzewaca with the command headquarters in the town of Raka.

1. The Main Tasks of the Battalion

- Monitoring, verification and the implementation of the resolutions of the U.N. Security Plan and the OPLAN 10406 "JOINT GUARDIAN" in order to create conditions for normalization of the situation in Kosovo
- Supporting activities of the UNHCR designed to provide humanitarian assistance and support the return of refugees to Kosovo
- Ensuring law and order as well as establishing conditions for the take over of supervision of law and order by international organizations (OSCE and the U.N.) and the new local authorities

- Reinforcing the status and supporting organizations, the activities of which are directed at the provision of humanitarian aid and the democratization of life in Kosovo
- Undertaking patrol missions, demining, show of force as well as ensuring security in the zone of responsibility

2. Organizational Structure of the Battalion

The battalion numbers 859 soldiers. It consists of a Polish part, known as the Polish Military Contingent KFOR, drawn out of the 21 Mountain Infantry Brigade based in Rzeszow (562 soldiers) and the Ukrainian 208 Independent Special Battalion of the Western Command, Operational Area of Ukraine based in Javoriv (267 soldiers) as well as the Lithuanian operational platoon (30 soldiers).

During the last three years, the battalion has been preparing for peacekeeping operations in addition to conducting normal military field and staff exercises. The countries take great pride in sending only the best soldiers on these kinds of missions that KFOR represents. Both Ukraine and Poland are well aware of problems that might occur because of their different connections to NATO.

Both sides follow the same rules according to the NATO regulations, and most of the information that comes from NATO is for both nations to read. Information that is classified for NATO members only, as a result, is protected and kept inside of the unit.

3. Mission Implementation

The posts of the commander, deputy commander as well as the chief of staff of the battalion are staffed on the basis of a 2-year rotation by Polish and Ukrainian officers. Currently, the commander of the UKRPOLBAT is Lt.-Colonel Bogdan Tworowski. His deputy is the Ukrainian Lt.Col. Volodimir Shkurat.⁴⁵

The battalion, according to NATO's requirements, is self-sufficient both logistically and to some extent operationally. The headquarters (HQ) is organized along the NATO models. The operational companies are national, have similar strength and capabilities to fulfill their tasks alternatively. The HQ and other battalion's elements are bi-national. The battalion consists of two camps that are 20 kilometers, or approximately

⁴⁵ Ibid.

12 miles, away from each other, one on each side of the Polish/Ukrainian border. National elements, therefore, are stationed in home countries.

Compatibility of the equipment was not an issue since the elements of the battalion came from a similar defense technological culture.

UKRPOLBAT has accomplished several important missions in its relatively short period of existence.⁴⁶ For example, soldiers from UKRPOLBAT in KFOR have destroyed ammunition confiscated during a weapons cache discovery at the beginning of November 2000. “This is a great step forward in order to bring back normality to the province of Kosovo,” says COMKFOR Lt. Gen. Carlo Cabigiosu.

Additionally, at the beginning of November 2000, KFOR soldiers from the UKRPOLBAT escorted United Nations Mission in Kosovo (U.N.MIK) policemen who were searching for a weapons cache in the steep mountains north of Dac Mala close to the border of the Former Yugoslav Republic Of Macedonia (FYROM). They found three caves with weapons and ammunition, heavily booby-trapped and containing the second largest weapons cache confiscated by KFOR. Ten days later COMKFOR Lt. Gen. Carlo Cabigiosu personally inspected part of the confiscated weapons and ammunition find, laid out for display at Camp Bondsteel in Multinational Brigade West (MNB W).

At that period of time in late 2000, UKRPOLBAT (in KFOR) had confiscated enough weapons to equip between four or five infantry battalions. Furthermore, Lt. Gen. Carlo Cabigiosu emphasized that KFOR will continue to protect the citizens of Kosovo from illegal weapons and ammunition. He said, “This is one of the main activities that KFOR forces are conducting in the province in order to bring back normality to the society here. It is not normal to have this kind of equipment stored around in a normal country.”⁴⁷

The Polish-Ukrainian Battalion in the Multi National Brigade (MNB) East has been extremely busy since their arrival in Kosovo. Their area of responsibility (AOR) includes the border of the FYROM as well as some Serb enclaves where different kinds of conflicts occur from time to time. “We have had a lot of problems in the northern part

⁴⁶ All data is based on the News From KFOR, www.kforonline.com.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

of our AOR. This year two shepherds have been killed, one in June and one in October. Ukrainian soldiers have also been fired at by unknown shooters,” explained Lt. Col. Bogdan Tworkowski, the Polish Commanding Officer of the Battalion.

The high crime rates in Kosovo are partially explained by illegal activity along the borders and boundaries, which is also the case in the Polish-Ukrainian Battalion's area. The border between Kosovo and FYROM is heavily trafficked by big trailers transporting goods. “Criminals are charging taxes from the truck drivers who are waiting for days in order to cross the border. Our soldiers have taken care of drivers who have been wounded by knife cuts and gun shots, escaping from this kind of blackmail because they had no money to pay with,” said Lt. Col. Bogdan Tworkowski. Whenever necessary or required, the Polish/ Ukrainian Battalion escorts medical convoys to the field hospital at the American Camp Bondsteel in MNB East. They are also involved in the establishment of a new health center in one of the areas for which they are responsible.

As far as the language challenges are concerned between the UKRPOLBAT and the local population or even between the Polish and Ukrainian soldiers: “We have interpreters that make it possible for us to communicate with the local population. When it comes to the soldiers, the Ukrainians and Polish can understand each other perfectly well in their everyday communication. The languages are very similar,” explained the Ukrainian Deputy Commander of the Battalion, Lt. Col. Volodimir Shkurat.

Four days a week the battalion organizes the escorting of Kosovar Serbs through the surrounding Albanian areas, all the way to Serbia and FYROM. This freedom of movement makes it possible for the Serbs to visit family and old friends, a service that is highly appreciated. The transportation of material for the Polish Red Cross and other Non Governmental Organizations (NGO) also benefits from the protective escort service. Undoubtedly, the personnel of UKRPOLBAT are doing their duty accordingly. In February 2001 there was a planned rotation for part of the personnel of the Polish Military Contingent KFOR (32 professional soldiers).

The activities of the troops from the UKRPOLBAT have been well received by the local population, which reflects the fact that they enjoy security provided by the

battalion. The soldiers are regarded as defenders of freedom and peace, effectively and decisively responding to any sign of the violation of the law.⁴⁸

An excerpt from the speech given during the meeting of the Presidents of Poland, Aleksander Kwasniewski, and of Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma with troops from the Polish-Ukrainian Battalion in Kosovo can give a picture of implementation of the mission by the unit:

We have created joint battalions for peacekeeping missions in the entire world with Ukraine and Lithuania... The joint Polish-Ukrainian Battalion, which we created not long ago, is passing an exam in difficult, challenging conditions. It is passing an exam bravely and effectively. I know that your service is hard and often dangerous. I know that it is associated with many hardships, but I also know that your approach to responsibilities is the way it should be. Oblivious to difficulties you fulfill your tasks as best as possible. Cooperating together you provide an example to the young generation from Poland, Ukraine. You give an example to your nations on how we should build the present and the future. For this I am sincerely grateful to you, for this I thank commanders, Polish and Ukrainian soldiers, as well as Lithuanian soldiers and officers present here. I wish that your service would bring as much security and peace as possible here in Kosovo, as much satisfaction for you as possible, and for us Presidents of Ukraine and Poland all the more reason for a well-justified pride⁴⁹.

In addition to this speech, emphasizing the high estimation of the implementation of the job of all personnel of the UKR POLBAT, as specified by Secretary General of NATO, Lord Robertson at the Meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission in Defense Ministers Session:

At present 300 Ukrainian servicemen participate in K-FOR operations providing essential helicopter support in Kosovo. The Polish-Ukrainian battalion deployed for the first time is doing an outstanding job. This is a well-appreciated contribution to projecting stability in Europe and a visible example of how the practical cooperation between NATO and Ukraine has matured over time. Congratulations to these and all members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ www.nato.int/doku/speech/2000.

Amongst all the possible problems that can exist in the unit, such as language, financial, social, and welfare for the families, are interoperability and logistic support. Yet, both sides appreciated the support given by some NATO countries. For instance, the UK, US, and Canada have helped with English training courses and teaching materials. Also, the US assists with equipment, supplies, and language laboratories while the French provide some medical equipment for the battalion's medical section.

NATO has been encouraged by Ukraine's decision to carry forward reform of its armed forces and to share those plans with NATO. Many of the proposals on how best to support Ukraine's plans for reform and development of the UAF have been discussed in NATO. Civil and military authorities of NATO allies are prepared to share their experiences and stand ready to give their support to Ukraine and to its MOD.⁵¹

Ukraine and Poland will face new challenges in the coming years. Poland will become a member of the European Union and Ukraine will face the prospect of establishing good-neighborly relations with EU. We consider it an undeniable fact that Ukraine and Poland, while intensively cooperating in numerous spheres, have an opportunity to make a significant contribution in building a safe neighborhood between the European Union and countries that are not its members.⁵²

However, NATO membership has not diminished Poland's interest in the reliable and friendly relations it maintains with Ukraine, its neutral neighbor. "We always carefully watch developments in your country. And we have worried very seriously more than once about your independence. For there is no independent Poland without independent Ukraine," these words of Polish-born American political scientist Zbigniew Brzezinski were often repeated in the defense agency's strategic studies department. In practice, it is with Poland that Ukraine shows its most fruitful cross-border military cooperation. Meetings of defense ministers, general staff chiefs, and commanders of the two adjacent military districts of the Krakow-based district in Poland and Ukraine's Western Operational Command have become so usual that it is difficult to count them. Last year the two armies carried out 32 joint actions instead of the 43 planned, but they also conducted 12 unscheduled ones. "Fifty or so joint actions is a small figure for our

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid.

large armies. But in the future we should carry out operations more concrete than mere ritual shows,” the Warsaw spokesman said at NATO headquarters.⁵³

All of these experiences illustrate that the UAF and the Polish military could mobilize as many as 2,300 soldiers and would be outnumbered only by the British, French and possibly German contingents.⁵⁴ Of course, not only men but equipment count in that calculation. There are still efficient efforts by Warsaw and Kiev that may provide the opportunity to promote Polish-Ukrainian military cooperation as an important part of the European capability for *out of area operations* within the scope of the *Petersberg missions*. Therefore, it is the urgent task for our both governments to:

- Do their best to give the Polish-Ukrainian battalion a full operational capability as soon as possible
- Promote the Polish-Ukrainian military cooperation in the West showing Ukraine as a contributor to European security and Poland as a champion of effective cooperation on security issues within the region
- Include the Polish-Ukrainian battalion, using the precedents created by PfP, *Kirchberg Declaration*⁵⁵, IFOR, SFOR and KFOR, in the military operations of the EU should the European Union undertake any and exploit that fact politically
- Solve all the possible legal problems in Polish-Ukrainian relations constituting potential obstacles for the unit to react quickly in a crisis situation. The battalion having 744 soldiers will be noticeable among the contingents of other states only in the first stage of operation, when the concentration of forces is poor. Any political benefits will be therefore possible only if our two states are able to act quickly
- Create a sufficient financial reserve for such operations in the budgets of our respective defence ministries

C. RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVE

The successful strengthening of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture will not only depend on NATO's efforts but will require including Russia and Ukraine at the

⁵³ S. Zgurets, Ukrainian Trident, Polish Eagle, or On Military Parallels from the Life of Strategic Friends, on www.day.kiev.ua.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Declaration on the principles of the co-operation between the WEU and her associated members issued by the WEU Council on May 9th 1994. For details see: M. Kuberski, Ewolucja polityki europejskiej Francji w dziedzinie bezpieczeństwa, (Bezpieczeństwo Polski w zmieniającej si Europie. Europejska To samo w Dziedzinie Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony), No. 9, 1996, p. 60.

highest possible level⁵⁶ due to Ukraine's geopolitical position and Russia's potentials in terms of economy, military might and future democratic developments of these countries.

Bringing Europe more closely together cannot, and should not, exclude the continent's easternmost and by far largest country: Russia. It, too, is a part of Europe. How Russia will place itself in this new Europe is one of the most important questions to be faced in the years ahead.⁵⁷

The end of the Cold War radically changed the relations between NATO and the Soviet Union and its largest successor state. Before the Kosovo campaign, Russia had slowly increased cooperation with NATO. In 1991, the country joined the NACC and in 1994 the PfP. So-called "16+1" meetings were held at the Ministerial, Ambassadors' and experts' level. Progress was achieved in a number of areas, including cooperation in dealing with the consequences of natural disasters. NATO and Russia cooperation was crucial for reaching the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1996, NATO and Russia signed the "Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security", which established the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC).⁵⁸

NATO and Russia are working successfully together on the ground in Kosovo and Bosnia. However, close cooperation is needed across the full spectrum of issues of common concern from managing regional crises to preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction. It is welcomed that the new Russian government decided to reestablish ties with NATO, after it severed them as a result of the Kosovo campaign. Russia viewed NATO's action as interfering with the post-Cold War rules and the U.N. framework. It is hoped that the Russian Federation will join all which was created to conduct an extensive dialogue on the relevant security issues. This is particularly the case for the Duma, which still has not reestablished its relationship and work program with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ B. Keonders, NATO Relations with Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council Member Countries, on www.naa.be/publications.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

In the context of Russian frustration with the Kosovo campaign, but particularly because of Chechnya and Russia's reactions to international criticism about its conduct of the Chechen war, leading Russian politicians have occasionally signaled that Russia may pursue a more assertive foreign policy towards the West. This is also true for newly elected President Putin, even though he has at the same time stressed that he wants to conduct a pragmatic course towards NATO. In an open letter to the voters, Vladimir Putin called for the reassessment of Russian foreign policy, giving up the claims of being a superpower: "If Russia is being urged to address global concerns costing a lot of money... we must weigh up our capabilities and perhaps wait a little. Only the country's real interests, including economic ones, should be the law for Russian diplomats". The new Russian government is still shaping its policies and it seems that there is not yet an agreement in Russia on the priorities. While the parliamentary and presidential election campaigns of 1999 and 2000 stressed the preponderance of Russian national interests over international agreements, this should not necessarily be taken at face value to measure Russian behavior. What is important is how the new Russian government will pursue its declared goals. The question is whether Russia will conduct a foreign and security policy in a cooperative manner, that is, whether it recognizes the legitimate interests of its partners and neighbors. Or whether it will try to aggressively push through its interests, particularly against smaller countries and against what some Russian policy makers sometimes call the near abroad. Certainly, Russia's future foreign and security policy will depend on both internal and external factors. It can only further Russia's own interests if the newly elected government, supported by the Duma and the Federation Council, will continue the reform processes with new vigor. The West, including NATO, will continue to help, if Russia abides by its international obligations.⁶⁰

In a recent BBC (2002) interview with David Frost, Mr. Putin did not even exclude Russian NATO membership some time in the future. While this may sound unlikely for the immediate future, we should not dismiss his statement as mere campaign talk but rather as a possible, and encouraging, sign to indicate a change of opinion toward NATO. NATO should make it clear that in the long term Russia would be welcome as a member if it meets the criteria as any other applicant country. Of course, including a

⁶⁰ Ibid.

country as large and important as Russia would require the Alliance to make necessary adjustments to its existing structure, particularly the decision-making process.

However, at present and for the immediate future, Russia's war in Chechnya has raised a number of questions and some fears in neighboring countries. As Norway's chief of Defense Gen. Sigurd Frisvold has put it, “[the Chechen war reminds us that] we are still a neighbor to the largest military power in Europe. There is no threat of an invasion, but the situation is unpredictable.” The international community has repeatedly condemned Russian conduct in Chechnya as a violation of human rights. Russia, however, has rejected all criticism as interference in its internal affairs, defining its actions there as a military campaign against terrorists. It is difficult for NATO and its member countries to develop, and hopefully strengthen, a strategic partnership if its counterpart does not abide by universally accepted international conventions.⁶¹

Other contentious issues between NATO and Russia concern U.S. plans to develop and deploy the National Missile Defense (NMD) and further NATO enlargement. “NATO enlargement will by no means weaken Russia's security.”⁶² On the contrary, enlargement will improve the relations between Russia and its Central and Eastern European neighbors. With these countries being NATO members, they will be strongly interested in enhancing cooperation with Russia and will seek to involve Russia in a process of ensuring peace in Europe. An excellent example is the first enlargement round. “Russia was opposed to it as well, but after the first round, this is no longer an issue and these relations tend to improve.”⁶³

Russia's cooperation with NATO within the framework of EAPC, PfP and other forums should provide an opportunity to discuss the enlargement issue and thus convince it of the mutual benefits of the process. Cooperation in strengthening the role of other international organizations, such as the OSCE, is also an important common interest. “It

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid.

is to be hoped that the new Russian government under President Putin will pursue a more active, cooperative partnership with NATO.”⁶⁴

Given the colossal tasks waiting for President Putin, Russia's direct course is presently unclear. Due to its sheer size neither its falling apart nor its turning into a real democracy based on a market economy seem likely in the short run. Rather, we can expect tendencies both towards self-isolation and towards increased cooperation with the West. NATO should, whenever possible, help Russia to develop the latter. This will require the Alliance and its member countries to create, and sustain, a more clearly defined common approach towards Russia. Such a policy would not provide Russia with the right to veto NATO enlargement and it would have to underline the importance of abiding by international (human rights) obligations. However, it would, at the same time, make it clear that the Alliance shows sensitivity towards Russia's security concerns and is willing to integrate these concerns seriously. This will require⁶⁵:

- The development of an explicit set of proposals towards strengthening the transparency of the PJC, including its parliamentary component (via the NATO-PA/Duma Monitoring Group)
- The strengthening rather than jeopardizing of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) regime, including a continued dialogue on Arms Control
- The advancement of the discussion on joint counter-terrorism measures

In short, Russia is definitely a great and important country. To have balance and harmony in European stability, it is necessary to count and rely on Russia's tremendous capability. If it is necessary to integrate Russia into European security architecture, Ukraine certainly cannot be left out.

Ukraine, the largest single country positioned between Russia and NATO, is an important player in European security. It is unlikely to join NATO anytime soon but establishing closer ties with Western institutions clearly is in Kyiv's interest. Since Ukrainian membership in NATO has been kept open as an option for the future, Ukraine-NATO relations have a potential to influence NATO-Russia relations. They could generate irritation or even contribute to the development of tensions between NATO and

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

Russia in case NATO-Ukrainian bilateral ties became ever closer and would be perceived to be directed against its interests by Moscow.⁶⁶

The Balkan countries can take a more active role in promoting regional stability and assisting their neighbors in furthering the security agenda. In a positive recent development, several Balkan neighbors signed an agreement to establish a Multinational Peace Force for Southeastern Europe. Such a force should be steadily developed and engaged to become interoperable with NATO in a range of Alliance missions. Montenegro itself could include itself in this initiative and offer Podgorica as a base of operations.

The Polish-Ukrainian battalion that has been exploited in the interests of two great countries symbolizes the Polish-Ukrainian cooperation. “The formation, equipping and sending of a joint battalion on this mission is a great success of Poland and Ukraine. This proves once again that we can co-operate, break down barriers and prejudices from the past,” stated Polish Defense Minister Bronislaw Komorowski⁶⁷.

The battalion came into being as a result of political decision of the countries as well as a concrete, tangible outcome of the bi-lateral trans-border military cooperation among Ukraine, Poland and Lithuania.

The Polish-Ukrainian Battalion should be considered as a model for the future development of a national-based PK unit dedicated to only peacekeeping missions. While there is a small part of the UAF that is dedicated to professional peacekeeping, there is no standardized structure or devoted peacekeepers who are highly professional that can effectively deploy any peacekeeping missions.

⁶⁶ S. Zgurets, Ukrainian Trident, Polish Eagle, or On Military Parallels from the Life of Strategic Friends, on www.day.kiev.ua.

⁶⁷ S. Zgurets, A Joint Mission In the Balkans, on www.day.kiev.ua.

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IV. AN ANALYSIS OF THE UKRAINIAN EXPERIENCE IN PEACEKEEPING

Every nation should be responsible for promoting peace and international security. Nations committed to collective security, of which peacekeeping is a part, should take the PfP program as a model for developing a structure to secure peace and improve burden sharing. The burden of pursuing the common goal of peace and international security must be shared by all nations, not only by countries that are considered strong states. Involving more countries in the peacekeeping process will enhance international security and stability. Using the examples of existing multinational peacekeeping units, such as the BALTBAT and UKRPOLBAT, would help develop improved approaches for the professionalization of peacekeeping forces. Creating peacekeeping units based on the UAF, and increasing the payment of serving personnel who are directly involved in peacekeeping, would directly and positively affect the level of professionalism of the peacekeepers, and make them more effective and competent.

This chapter examines Ukrainian experiences in peacekeeping, including origins, functions, and possible problems in the Ukrainian approach to peacekeeping. Additionally, this thesis further analyzes the effects of peacekeeping training and operations on personnel before and after participation in UN missions as well as possible solutions to the identified problems. The findings of this work could be used as a framework for ongoing activities of reorganization and redefinition of the UAF, especially for peacekeeping activities. One of the possible models for the future creation and development of peacekeeping activities is the UKRPOLBAT. An analysis and short description of the UKRPOLBAT are also presented in this chapter. The focus will be on peacekeeping activities since 1991.

The development of the independent UAF started with a small patriotic group that initiated an organization of the Ukrainian national army in the fall of 1989. This group's goals were to return all Ukrainians to their homeland, separate the Ukrainian armed forces from those of other nations, create Ukrainian military schools, and outlaw the communist party within the military. Thus, the framework for the creation of the

independent UAF was already in progress before the fall of the Soviet Union. Ukraine was the first nation among all the former Soviet republics to form independent national armed forces. “One of the greatest, and, to date, most poorly recognized, successes accompanying the drive for Ukraine's independence was the rapid and peaceful transformation of the Soviet military units on its territory in the fall of 1991 into an independent military force.”⁶⁸ The first decree, dated 10 September 1991, by the Ukrainian Parliament (Supreme Soviet or *Verkhovna Rada, VR*) was entitled “On Military Formations of Ukraine.” It placed all troops on the national territory, including their weapons, technology and administrative staff, under Ukrainian jurisdiction.

In November 1991, the Supreme Soviet (V.R.), to ensure military loyalty, issued a decree that required all troops to take an oath of loyalty to defend the Ukrainian people and territory. A law on the UAF was passed along with the law on defense on December 6, 1991, the official Day of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Finally, a decree from the President of Ukraine on 5 April 1992 ordered subordination of all military formations on Ukrainian soil to Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense (MoD) ⁶⁹. In October 1992, the first Ukrainian Minister of Defense, Kostiantin Morozov, promulgated a military doctrine for Ukraine. The doctrine, approved by the V.R. a year later, includes politico-military and military-technical aspects.

Politico-Military Aspects

- Ukraine advances no territorial claims on other states and does not acknowledge territorial claims on itself
- Ukraine supports principles of mutual respect and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries
- Ukraine insists on its non-bloc status
- The use of the Ukrainian armed forces in dealing with internal political problems is prohibited

Military-Technical Aspects

- The UAF are configured to wage large-scale conventional war
- The UAF need to be supplied with world-class weaponry, especially precision strike, air, air defense and missile systems, electronic warfare elements, air mobile units and an ocean-going navy

⁶⁸ Jaworsky, Armed Forces and Military Policy w/n Ukraine in the World, p. 225, Harvard University, volume XX, Cambridge, MA.

⁶⁹ Except Strategic nuclear forces, which were under Unified control of the CIS.

- The UAF will undertake substantial redeployments in order to organize an effective defense in all directions
- Political and diplomatic efforts will be made to defuse potentially explosive situations and to reduce the risks of confrontation
- Ukraine will create all-volunteer (professional) armed forces⁷⁰

As with any country pursuing a process of democratization, the Ukraine's military has a role in the transition process. However, Ukraine has enforced civilian control over the military in order to prevent the "restoration of the USSR," any reintegration with Russia and CIS military structures, and for the great reduction of the pro-union armed forces on its territory.⁷¹

As a young independent state, Ukraine has acquired experience through participation in U.N. peacekeeping missions around the world since the very first year of its independence.⁷² This fact has given its political leaders a strong motivation to considerably strengthen the state legislative base. As a result, in April 1999, the V.R. of Ukraine adopted a law entitled "On Participation of Ukraine in the International Peacekeeping Operations." This law reflected the recent growth of international peacekeeping activities and provided opportunities for the Ukraine's participation in them.

Ukraine has become an important contributor of troops to U.N. and NATO-led peacekeeping operations (PKOs). Over twelve thousand military personnel and civilians from Ukraine have fulfilled their duty in these missions of peace. Twenty-three have lost their lives and more than sixty have been wounded. On 1 January 2001, the Ukraine's participation in the current U.N. peacekeeping operations and missions was as follows: ⁷³

⁷⁰ Military Doctrine of Ukraine.

⁷¹ Based on interview with a member of National Security Council on September 3, 2001

⁷² On Ukraine's participation in the United Nations peacekeeping activities, Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the U.N. www.uamission.org.

⁷³ Ibid.

U.N.IFIL (South Lebanon)	An engineer battalion of 650 men.
U.N.AMSIL (Sierra Leone)	A maintenance and training battalion of 540 men.
U.N.MIK (Kosovo, FRY)	Special police unit of 115 men, Special police dog-unit of 35 men, 36 civilian police officers, 1 liaison and 1 civil affairs officer.
U.N.MIBH (Bosnia and Herzegovina)	39 civilian police officers, 3 civil affairs officers.
U.N.MOP (Prevlaka, Croatia)	1 military observer.
U.N.MEE (Ethiopia and Eritrea)	5 military observers.
MONUC (Democratic Republic of the Congo)	4 military observers.
U.N.TAET (East Timor)	8 civilian police officers.
U.N.OMIG (Georgia)	1 civil affairs officer.
U.N.SMA (Afghanistan)	1 liaison officer.
Total:	1440 persons.

Table 1. Ukrainian Participation in Peacekeeping Missions.



Figure 1. Participation of Ukrainian Military Units in Peacekeeping Operations.
From: Ukrainian MoD, the Partnership for Peace and Peacekeeping Operations Coordination Center

Besides, about 220 people are part of the Ukrainian contingent in KFOR in Kosovo and more than 400 men are serving in SFOR, both NATO-led peacekeeping operations. In quantitative terms, Ukraine became the ninth member state in 1997, out of more than eighty troop-contributing states. In fact, Ukraine signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the United Nations regarding its contributions to the U.N. Standby Arrangements. Since 1997 Ukraine has doubled its contribution to that system and expanded it several times.⁷⁴




Figure 2. Contributions to U.N. and NATO-Led Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs).

From: Valentyn Kurzhos, *Peacekeeping Activity of Ukraine: Experience and Perspectives*, Thesis for the Master of Art in Foreign Affairs. Also available on www.un.org/Dests/dpko/pub/pko.htm

On 15 July 1992, the Ukrainian V.R. released a decree for the deployment of the 240th separate special battalion to the former Yugoslavia. Since that initial step, the Ukraine's active participation in peacekeeping has been successful. In addition to standard peacekeeping tasks, Ukrainian personnel were involved in specific peacemaking activities such as the separation of warring factions in Zhepa and Gorazde in 1993-1994. In addition, they participated in the protection of workers who reconstructed and rebuilt a

⁷⁴ Ibid.

local hospital, a school, roads, and the Sarajevo's tramway line, the oldest in Europe. The first tram that left the depot was painted with the yellow and blue colors of the Ukrainian flag.

Despite this, the so-called "frozen" conflicts in some post-Soviet republics, such as those involving Abkhazia, Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh, have created tensions and destabilization in South-Eastern Europe and Ukraine in particular. The situation in the Transdnistrian area also needs to be resolved. Any delay in resolving these conflicts might lead to tragic results. The suffering of civilians in the Caucasus and the poverty of the population "make active peacekeeping efforts indispensable."⁷⁵

Leonid Kuchma, the President of Ukraine, supports the participation of Ukraine in peacekeeping.

In Ukraine, we know the price of peace and security. Our people survived the horrors of the most bloody and destructive war in the history of humankind. This is why Ukraine remains committed to the peacemaking and peacekeeping activities under the U.N. banner. This is one of the genuine and concrete ways in which Ukraine affirms its responsibilities as a member of the Security Council.⁷⁶

Ukraine remains committed to strengthening the leading role of the United Nations in the maintenance of peace and international security and to enhancing its peacekeeping potential. Yet, Ukrainian participation in peacekeeping received respectful as well as negative feedback after making such contributions. In analyzing UAF contributions to peacekeeping, one should identify possible problems that derive from recruiting, pre-deployment training, deployment to a mission area, and post-deployment after the rotation of a unit and the soldier's return to either civilian life or continuing service in the armed forces.

A. NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS FOR PERSONNEL BEFORE AND AFTER PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS

Problems with recruiting and pre-deployment training for the personnel and chronic underfunding of Ukraine's military have seriously affected, and will continue to

⁷⁵ Statement by H.E. Mr. Leonid Kuchma, President of Ukraine at the meeting of the United Nations Security Council at the level of Heads of State and Government. Available at www.brama.com/news/.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

affect, attempts to restructure the UAF. For example, rapid downsizing of the military has caused difficulties due to the poor job opportunities in other sectors of the Ukrainian economy and the state's financial obligations to those released from service.⁷⁷

The military must be embedded within the society,⁷⁸ thus, in the UAF, both conscripts and officers usually live in poor conditions. Substandard housing combined with a poor diet has contributed to some health problems among conscripts, who in many cases are already in poor physical condition when they begin their military service.⁷⁹ “A relatively small percentage of draft-age youth (according to one estimate, 11,5%) are conscripted, an increasing percentage of those who are drafted have a limited educational background, and draft evasion [was] common”⁸⁰ before 1996-7.

The recruiting system, far before the UAF's existence, was negatively changed during and after the 1979-1989 Soviet-Afghan war. This system is less than fully satisfactory due to the unwillingness of some strata of society to “give” their sons to the army. Women are not subject to conscription in the UAF, but they may serve voluntarily. Most of the personnel for the armed forces come from rural areas with low standards of education, and they are often in poor health. The conscripts from urban areas come typically from poor families. Wealthier people try to avoid military service and use all possible measures to keep their sons out of the army. For many young urban Ukrainians a stint in the army is a throwback to a murky time that is perceived as a sentence for a crime they never committed.⁸¹

The growth of the unpopularity of military service appears to have bottomed out at the end of 1997, largely because of very poor job opportunities in the civilian sector. This has been reflected in a growing competition for admission to military educational institutions.⁸² Terrible unemployment among both conscripts and officers occurred after

⁷⁷ Jaworsky, *Armed Forces and Military Policy w/n Ukraine in the World*, p. 229, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA.

⁷⁸ H. Gaffney, *Why Should Civilians Control the Military and How Should They Do It?* p. 4.

⁷⁹ Jaworsky, *Armed Forces and Military Policy w/n Ukraine in the World*, p. 230.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ William Odom, *The Collapse of the Soviet Military*, Yale University Press, 1998. p. 247.

⁸² See Ukrainian newspaper *Den'* 18 July and 13 November 1997, available on www.den.com.

the dismissal of the National Guard (NG) in 1999. More than half of the NG officer corps were former Army officers, but the NG was paid better than the military which is why they joined the NG in the first place. In addition, Ukraine has a “top-heavy” military over-staffed with senior officers. Like other post-communist militaries, the UAF suffers from a lack of capable and well-trained junior officers⁸³ and non-commissioned officers.

Not only are the wage payments to military personnel very low, the payments are also often delayed for months on end and are insufficient to provide for family needs. The situation varies from branch to branch. Unemployment among service members’ wives in many garrisons is a common issue. About 35% of officers’ and enlisted personnel’s wives “cannot find a job; in some garrisons their share amounts to nearly 52%.”⁸⁴ Housing is another grievance. “In December 1997 almost 70,000 servicemen and their families did not have their own accommodations, and over 33,000 retired and reserve officers were on waiting lists to receive housing.”⁸⁵ Further, “They live in barracks and other communal quarters, and in 1997 the state budget allowed only 800 new apartments to be assigned to military personnel to help deal with this housing shortage.”⁸⁶ In such circumstances, many officers and enlisted personnel have adopted an array of survival strategies, including relying on support from relatives and raising crops and domestic animals on garrison territory and its vicinities mainly designated for these purposes.⁸⁷

A significant element in assessing possible remedies for the UAF is the courage of the officer corps. Even though, they constitute only 28%,⁸⁸ their role in the armed forces is crucial:

Such socially important values as moral authority, family life, quietude, zest for life, social activity and patriotism, are suppressed. Instead, the environment encourages values which are evidently negative: consumerism, passivity, solitude, cynicism and skepticism. The majority

⁸³ Jaworsky, p. 230.

⁸⁴ O. Razumtsev, Social Aspects of Armed Forces Reform; the Spirit of Ukrainian Officers. USEPS, National Security and Defense, 2000.

⁸⁵ Jaworsky, p. 230.

⁸⁶ Ibid. p. 231.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ O. Razumtsev, p. 40.

of officers suggest that present Ukrainian society encourages, above all, push and enterprise. Public activity towards leadership and power, frugality and temporization also remain realistic.

[It is noticeable a tendency to] further decrease in social activity...[and] certain signs of officer aloofness toward the society they serve.

Military service for [some] of Ukrainian officers is...a priority value by itself, but it should be associated with adequate well-being; service condition are less important.⁸⁹

Pre-deployment training for future peacekeepers is not only insufficient, but also often incompetent. It is insufficient because of shortages of fuel, maintenance problems, inadequate transportation resources and deficits in material supplies. Incompetence in the training often occurs due to inexperienced officers and enlisted men, and also because of low wages. For example, for a company commander, who is considered the most responsible person in the armed forces structure for equipment and supplies, the task of training his soldiers is often very difficult, if not impossible, due to the obstacles listed above. However, without proper training, a suitable implementation of peacekeeping duty is doubtful. On the other hand, an optimistic sign is that the majority of the personnel of the UAF have a predisposition to high professionalism and outstanding performance of their service.

B. DURING AND AFTER THE PARTICIPATION IN THE PEACEKEEPING MISSION: REALITY

As soon as a unit is deployed on a mission, something strange usually happens to the personnel. On some occasions, some UAF troops have gotten “out of hand” after being deployed on a peacekeeping mission. The discipline of some soldiers often becomes poor almost instantly after deployment into the mission area. However, once the deployment of the personnel has taken place, it is quite difficult to get rid of or to send back to Ukraine of a soldier who has become undisciplined. At this point, the UAF face two problems: 1) reduced training for young officers, and 2) insufficient education of enlisted personnel, most of whom were called up for military service just before the peacekeeping mission.

⁸⁹ Ibid. pp. 40-46.

Another problem is that most of the deployed personnel have one short-term goal: to get their salary and return to civilian life. Thus, the valuable professionalism and accumulated experience of the peacekeeping personnel are lost. In addition, troops have faced uncertainty after completing the peacekeeping mission and have expressed an unwillingness to continue service in the UAF.

Finally, one can assume that many veterans of military conflicts are suffering physical, social, and psychological problems because of their involvement in combat and related military activities, as it was happening with many veterans of the Vietnam and Gulf wars in the U.S or of the Afghanistan's war in the Soviet Union.

C. NEGATIVE AFTERMATH

According to Michael Williams,⁹⁰ peacekeeping is one of the most arduous and complex tasks that a military organization can face. Civilian and military personnel are working together to a greater degree than ever before. However, when an international institution like the U.N. makes strategic decisions, it does so with little input from the military. As a result, in the field there have been clashes of culture and confusion over command when the U.N. has worked with organizations such as NATO or the OSCE. The problems have included disjointed management of operational control arrangements and insufficient operational coordination. These issues and the uneven record of achievements have contributed to a decline in the number of U.N. peacekeeping operations since 1994.

According to D.C. Jett, "The U.N. is always short of the personnel it needs for peacekeeping operations. First World countries with first-rate armies are usually unwilling to put their troops at risk."⁹¹ Thus, these operations are often assigned to Third World countries, and the U.N. sends some of the worst soldiers in the world to places where it can only hope they are not called on to do anything.⁹²

Ukraine has taken steps to reform its military structure. Round table discussions in February 2000 among more than a hundred experts, including the People's Deputies of

⁹⁰Michael C. Williams, Civil-Military Relations and Peacekeeping.

⁹¹ D. C. Jett, The U.N.'s Peacekeeping Failures Are Built In and Intractable, International Herald Tribune, May 23, 2000.

the Verkhovna Rada, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Economics, all power structures and NATO representatives, suggested that a “State Commission for Military Reform...should be formed without delay.” 100% of the participants gave a positive answer to a question of whether Ukraine needs military reform.⁹³




Figure 3. The Preconditions for Successful Implementation of Military Reform.

From: A. Gritsenko et al, Military Reform in Ukraine: Expert Opinion Poll, p. 32.

The current downsizing of the UAF has not improved the lives of officers and enlisted personnel. There is a hope that in two to three years the living conditions will improve. Yet, the personnel now leaving the armed forces are either very resourceful and capable of adapting to civilian life, or totally hopeless and is going to exist somehow by remaining in the armed forces structure, even if often unsuited to military duties.

Even though Ukrainian peacekeepers provided a solid performance throughout their participation in PKOs, it is necessary to conceptually change the approach to training and preparing for peacekeeping missions. The ongoing reform should consider peacekeeping as a parallel option for further development of part of the UAF. The MoD

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ A. Gritsenko et al, Military Reform in Ukraine: Expert Opinion Poll, USEPS, National Security & Defense, pp. 31-39.

cooperating with foreign assistance should sponsor and oversee the creation and development of a dedicated peacekeeping unit.

The following part of this chapter analyzes the opportunity to develop such a unit.

D. THE NEED FOR CHANGE: MEASURES FOR IMPROVING “POST-MISSION” OUTCOMES FOR PERSONNEL

Ukraine and the UAF have to reassess their role and participation in peacekeeping operations. A newly independent state during its transition period of democratic consolidation should receive assistance from the advanced democracies with regard to legislative and economic matters as well as activities such as peacekeeping.

Since the end of the Cold War, multilateral peacekeeping operations have become more numerous, complex and diverse. They are not only military but also political and humanitarian in nature. Calls for increasing the military strength of peacekeepers grow louder each day. These calls were spurred by the end of the Cold War. Previously, many of the world’s “hot” wars were fought between entities allied with the two rival superpowers.⁹⁴ Nowadays, however, the leaders of all countries should consider ways to deal with future regional conflicts. The Ukrainian-Polish battalion is one of the models for consideration to solve the problem of unprofessional and weak performance in peacekeeping.

E. MILITARY EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM: POSSIBLE REMEDIES TO PREVENT PROBLEMS

The high demand for experienced and professional peacekeepers, which changes the whole perception of modern peacekeeping, may create an opportunity for the UAF and other national military establishments that wish to emulate the Ukrainian experience in peacekeeping. However, a clear shortfall is the lack of a professional military education system for peacekeeping to capitalize on this valuable experience.

The Ukrainian MoD, cooperating with the government, needs to increase funding and support for the military education system. It should be considered a high priority in defense spending.

⁹⁴ A. Cowin.

Because of downsizing, increased operations tempo in operations other than war and the technological challenges of the Information Age, [education] was even more essential to the leaders...in the twenty-first century. As the force size decreases, education becomes even more essential, because this new force faces increasing challenges and must be forced to do more with less.⁹⁵

Ethics and morality play an important role in the professional education of a peacekeeper. These two subjects must be continually reinforced throughout the instruction. Personnel with valuable peacekeeping experience should share their knowledge. Leadership training for peacekeeping should be developed for both officers and enlisted men.

Professional peacekeeping training is certainly not the same as conventional tactics and procedures for conducting a large-scale war. In peacekeeping, the objective is to prevent a renewal of fighting in regional conflicts. Rules of Engagement (ROE) are the key words in the arena of peacekeeping. ROE represent the most sensitive part of peacekeeping operations, and they should be emphasized throughout the educational and training process. Moreover, some types of police work for peacekeepers must be introduced and developed. As an officer's technical and tactical proficiency must be enhanced, for example, in terms of ROE, so must his moral and ethical character.

As the force size diminishes, education becomes even more critical, especially amongst the leaders. Military education does not guarantee professionalism and good civil-military relations, but it does provide substantial insurance against the lack thereof.⁹⁶ An educated military will be more respected by the civilian leadership and will be more capable of dealing with the strains of the civil-military relationship.⁹⁷

To coordinate all peacekeeping activities of the Ukrainian MoD, the Partnership for Peace and Peacekeeping Operations Coordination Center (PfP & PKO CC) of the Ukrainian General Staff was established on 4 October 1997. This Center serves the Partnership for Peace Program by offering the Ukrainian MoD, in close cooperation with

⁹⁵ D. Cheney, Professional Military Education: An Asset for Peace and Progress. CSIS, Washington D.C., March 1997. Preface.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Security Council, the opportunity to take part in European military and peacekeeping activities and by promoting security and stability in the region.

The main functions of the Center are:

- to supervise Ukrainian participation in PfP activities
- to plan and control PfP activities for the Departments and Services of the MoD
- to collaborate with the Government and Parliament in issuing PfP and peacekeeping regulations
- to select and to train Ukrainian peacekeeping personnel
- to maintain the operational stand-by status of Ukrainian peacekeeping units⁹⁸

Officers of the PfP & PKO CC conduct regular peacekeeping courses for candidates to the Ukrainian contingents in peacekeeping missions. The duration of the course is three weeks and the number of attendees varies from 25 to 30. Candidates are selected from volunteers in all services and branches of the Armed Forces according to their English proficiency. The course includes language training provided by native speakers of English or teachers from the English Teaching Project for Ukraine. The course also entails briefings, syndicate work and exercises conducted by officers of the PKO Division of the Center. The Center trains personnel to be U.N. military observers, staff officers, military policemen and interpreters.⁹⁹

In a positive aspect of the lessons learned, the Ukrainian Peacekeeping Veterans Association works in close contact with the PfP&PKO CC through the International Peacekeeping Network (INTERPEACENET- Ukraine). Furthermore, the regional training center prepares the contingent for peacekeeping. The INTERPEACENET-Ukraine is a non-governmental interdisciplinary research institution (on-line) which provides analytical and informational support to the highest bodies of executive and legislative power in Ukraine. It covers a wide range of political, economic, legal, defense

⁹⁸ Based on interview with Deputy of the head of the PfP & PKO CC on September 4 2001, also available at <http://www.calguard.ca.gov/ia/Ukr-PKO-Center.htm>.

⁹⁹ <http://www.calguard.ca.gov/ia/Ukr-PKOCenter.htm> and at <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/training/ukraine.htm>

and social issues related to national security in the strategic context. The INTERPEACENET-Ukraine (on-line) also coordinates research activities of research institutions and analytical centers devoted to national security and foreign policy. ¹⁰⁰

The main topics of research are:

- national security
- defense peacekeeping policy;
- foreign peacekeeping policy and security
- social and political development of Ukraine, Russia, other former Soviet republics
- socio-economic strategies
- regional affairs
- environmental security
- modeling and evaluation of the issues related to national security
- development of informational internetworking technologies and informational environment analysis

Forms of activities include:

- conducting research
- elaborating research-based recommendations and development strategies for INTERPEACENET
- co-ordination of research activities of scientific institutions and research centers related to national security
- organization and conduct of scientific conferences and seminars
- publishing research papers and monographs
- co-operation with international institutions and individual scholars
- providing information services¹⁰¹

INTERPEACENET-Ukraine conducts its various research activities in the form of projects. Analytical reports are published as research projects. Leading specialists from universities, analytical centers, and state bodies are invited to discuss these reports. Research coordination facilitates an exchange of information and joint meetings of the

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

staff with researchers from other institutions. International conferences and seminars are also of great importance in research activity.¹⁰²

Ukraine gained useful information from joint peacekeeping exercises. Many of the lessons learned from the first three joint exercises conducted in Autumn 1994 have been collated and were applied in the 1995 program, with the general objective of promoting enhanced interoperability amongst participating States. Eleven joint exercises were scheduled for 1995, including the first ever held in North America.

A series of more than 40 workshops and seminars will prepare for these exercises and train Staff officers for their tasks in multinational Headquarters and formations. Cooperation and interoperability will be further enhanced through a wide range of bilateral and multilateral exercises hosted by individual Allies and Partners.¹⁰³

The Armed Forces branches closely coordinate their assignments with each other, engaging appropriate military arts and equipment. They also participate in law enforcement activities during emergencies, deal with consequences of natural and technological disasters, provide military assistance to other countries, engage in international military cooperation activities and international peacekeeping operations according to international agreements.¹⁰⁴

Former participants in peacekeeping operations and observer missions have described lessons learned and how those missions changed their outlook about civil-military relations issues. Their statements represent reasons why the Ukrainian military should be committed to peacekeeping.

They appreciate the value of peace from having served in a war-torn land. The benefits include:

- the opportunity to serve as a representative for their country, becoming key players in their country's foreign affairs
- the opportunity to mend and improve the military's relationship to civilian authorities after returning from peacekeeping operations

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c950531d.htm>.

¹⁰⁴ Reform and Development through 2005, www.calguard.ca.gov/ia/ua-mod.

- the necessity to learn to appreciate the importance of subordinating the military to civilian control; and the ability to foster cooperation with civilian institutions¹⁰⁵

F. INVESTMENT AND FINANCE COOPERATION FOR THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF THE PEACEKEEPING FORCES: IS IT FEASIBLE?

It is difficult to discuss any kind of reform without better funding of the troops in general and the peacekeepers stationed in Ukraine in their pre-deployment period in particular. “The military budget gives the implementation of military reform no chance; no reform [is feasible] without money; the MoD proceeds from the need to keep the potential we used to have, but the State is unable to maintain it,”—these strong statements were heard from some of the participants in the “Round table” discussion.’¹⁰⁶




Figure 4. Reform of Functions of Power Structures.

From: A. Gritsenko at al, *Military Reform in Ukraine: Expert Opinion Poll*, p. 32.

By comparison, an example of Austria’s military budget of \$1.2 million a year per unit of military hardware and its personnel; in Ukraine, on the contrary, the same aims are funded by only \$31 thousand.¹⁰⁷ However, if the same reduction rate is maintained or

¹⁰⁵ <http://www.calguard.ca.gov/ia/Ukr-PKO-Center.htm>.

¹⁰⁶ A. Gritsenko at al, *Military Reform in Ukraine: Expert Opinion Poll*, USEPS, National Security & Defense, p. 33.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

about 40 thousand men a year, the goal of the MoD to have 150-170 thousand military and 50 thousand civilian personnel in 2005 is quite achievable.¹⁰⁸

Ideally, affluent states could initially sponsor the development of these regional peacekeeping forces and could provide funding, training, and logistic support, if necessary. In the long run it would be more cost effective if peacekeeping operations were conducted by trained, professional peacekeeping forces familiar with the culture, societal differences and traditions of countries in specific regions.

Strong financial backing, especially in the international arena, is necessary, if not vital, to the success of the program. It is, for example, imperative to enhance skills in the seamless exchange of logistical support. Among peacekeeping countries committed to one particular mission, soldiers have varying logistical mechanisms and use the equipment from their own countries, which often equates to incompatibility. One option to minimize compatibility problems is to have one country provide all the equipment used by all members on a mission. Although this option might require interoperability, proficiency, and specialized training by soldiers from other countries, training as “one” force unifies and creates cohesive units.

There is already a lot of money spent on international-level programs, yet they are not completely successful. Perhaps some funds from these programs could be diverted to modify peacekeeping training and support as proposed in this chapter. For example, the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program had a cumulative amount of \$2.7 billion in obligations at the end of FY2000. It is a program which aims chiefly at assisting the de-nuclearization of Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine.¹⁰⁹ Another example of an existing program in which the U.S. provides funding to other countries is counter drug operations. Billions of dollars for training, equipment, and logistics go to Colombia, and no one can measure whether this program is successful.

It is necessary to find a defining goal for the future of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and for a stable, powerful, strong and democratic Ukraine. First of all, national

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Curt Tarnoff, The Former Soviet Union and U.S. Foreign Assistance, available on Congressional Research Service (CRS), March 7, 2001.

defense is the primary defining goal of the UAF, while peacekeeping might be the second. Improving and developing its participation in peacekeeping, the UAF should stand as a beacon for other countries that desire to contribute to regional security in a constructive manner.

Ukraine remains committed to strengthening the leading role of the United Nations in maintenance of peace and security and enhancing its peacekeeping potential. In the year 2000 alone, fully recognizing its additional responsibility as a non-permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, this country increased...its contribution in military and civilian personnel to the newly established or ongoing peacekeeping operations. As a matter of fact, there was no one such operation...without the contribution of Ukraine. Ukraine is determined to contribute further, by its practical deeds, to the... peacekeeping efforts.¹¹⁰

Improvements in the educational system and training with an emphasis on psychological factors, better military-patriotic distinction, peacekeeping tactics and military police work should be undertaken in order to give an initial stage of understanding to the future young officers. Such efforts are important in the development of the peacekeeping forces in the UAF. Principles regarding the use of force and ROE constitute another point of concern for the training of peacekeepers.

Given the example of the existing Ukrainian-Polish peacekeeping battalion as a possible model in terms of implementation, interoperability, and compatibility, the Ukrainian MoD might consider a creation of a dedicated PK unit. Developing the structure of a unit within the UAF, this might be used as a model for a professionalized peacekeeping unit. There are grounds to consider the creation of a national professional peacekeeping force. This model could “spread” to other nations. The involvement of nations within the region would improve the quality of each national armed force and at the same time would enhance regional stability and the international security environment.

¹¹¹ On Ukraine’s participation in the United Nations peacekeeping activities, Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the U.N. www.uamission.org.

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V. A NEW MODEL FOR THE UKRAINIAN PEACEKEEPING FORCES: ELEMENTS OF THE MODEL

Peacekeeping troops have been around for about fifty years under the auspices of the United Nations (U.N.). However, there have been mixed results with successes and failures with peacekeeping around the world. One factor that might cause peacekeeping missions to have mixed results is the use of unprofessional and poorly trained peacekeepers. Part of this problem, with regards to unprofessional peacekeeping, has been low salaries. These problems have contributed to the loss of the legitimacy and prestige of the U.N. There is a perception about the U.N. that it does not have the reputation of being a viable organization to solve the problems of the world. Therefore, strong organizations like NATO have had to take over unsuccessful missions started by the U.N. Despite the mixed history of U.N.-led peacekeeping missions, peacekeeping is the answer in establishing peace and stability. However, modifications have to be implemented to increase its success. This chapter presents a “World Standard” as a model by which the quality of peacekeeping, and therefore, the success of those missions can be increased, which will also bring about peace and stability.

Ukraine is a country that might benefit from joining peacekeeping operations with other countries as will be discussed in this chapter. For example, Ukraine is a transitioning democracy and has many problems that could be partially alleviated by participation in peacekeeping. Ukraine’s involvement in peacekeeping would show how it could improve its economic prosperity, social conditions, and help release ethnic tensions that currently exist in this country.

As stated earlier, peacekeeping missions have not been successful due to the low quality of the soldiers committed to these operations. This chapter addresses dynamics that might improve peacekeeping operations; particularly for those soldiers from Ukraine and other Eastern European countries who tend to be less professional and less disciplined. Increasing the quality of these soldiers dedicated to peacekeeping might increase the benefits at the national, regional, and global arena in terms of security, stability and burden sharing.

A. CURRENT SITUATION

Due in large part to the weak economies of Ukraine and many other countries, particularly in Eastern Europe, even including the new NATO members of Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland, low salaries are paid to soldiers and as a result do not attract educated, experienced, and self-disciplined recruits. This causes these transitioning democracies to spend more money training these low quality soldiers in order to perform their missions at a higher standard. Since peacekeeping training is more dynamic than normal combat training, it requires more training, and thus more money spent, and produces a highly trained soldier. These soldiers are, therefore, worth more and receive higher salaries while peacekeeping and bring this money into the local economy to spend. In addition, these soldiers become a viable asset to the nation that can be dispatched to participate in more U.N. peacekeeping operations. This, of course, means that the U.N. will spend more money on the nation producing the peacekeepers.

In the case of Ukraine, Ukrainians join the military to participate in peacekeeping operations in order to make more than five times their normal military salary. For instance, a Ukrainian captain normally makes about \$120 US a month. If he participates in a peacekeeping operation, he would make around \$700-800 US a month. Upon returning to their country, some immediately leave military service since they are no longer earning the salary of a peacekeeper to the detriment of the state and the overall professionalism of the military. The premise, then, is that if the *average* salaries of soldiers in Eastern European countries are increased, they will *always* have a deployable “quality” force for peacekeeping and defense. It is well known that soldiers in other countries with higher military wages have the incentive to be more professional, motivated and disciplined.

The current situation in peacekeeping is equivalent to security companies providing low quality security workers at airports in the U.S., since because they offer low wages, they only attract people with low education, training and motivation. This practice has ultimately resulted in low quality security service and contributed to the disastrous consequences of the September 11th tragedy. In a similar fashion, low salaries of soldiers in countries that provide peacekeepers result in poor quality of service as well.

The low quality of soldiers is just one part of the professionalization problems of peacekeeping. Command and control difficulties arise in some instances during peacekeeping when there are clashes of culture between the military and the civilian leadership. One of the problems in the civil-military relationship is that the military tends to be institutionally conservative while civil society is more liberal. Many soldiers are uncomfortable working with or for civilians. Moreover, the tour of duty for peacekeeping operations in the military is usually six months, while civilians usually serve for more than 12 months. This causes a disparity and to some extent effects the success of the operation because soldiers need to gain more experience during the pre-deployment training back in their countries. It might cause additional tension between the civilians and the military in the mission. In light of this, “What is a possible answer?”



Existing Practice of PSO Training




Figure 5. Organization of Peacekeeping Training in Ukraine.
From: Ukrainian MoD, the Partnership for Peace and Peacekeeping Operations Coordination Center

A possible answer is the world standard referred to earlier. What is this world standard? First, each participating country should establish a brigade of peacekeepers ready for deployment at all times. Second, the peacekeeping unit should possess the following qualities: 1) The soldiers should be professionals and highly disciplined in their

field. 2) They must have strong financial backing from strong states to increase their ability of command, control, and logistic support. 3) Despite having their origins in different countries, they must be able to maneuver and operate as a single unit. In order to achieve maneuverability and inter-operability, they must have similar unit characteristics.

In addition, another vital point is the important role of civil-military relations. Without useful and effective relations between the military and civil authorities, involvement of the military in peacekeeping cannot be completed. For instance, the country that contributes the peacekeepers must be overseen by its civilian authorities in order to legitimize their actions and input. Moreover, since peacekeeping is implemented on the international scale, oversight by civilians is necessary in order to comply with international laws and regulations. If the peacekeeping force demonstrates positive civil-military relations during its duty in a given country, that obviously adds to the country's prestige.

How might participating countries tackle these requirements for successful peacekeeping? The forthcoming proposal recommends the total professionalization of at least a brigade-size organization to peacekeeping.

B. A PROPOSAL FOR PEACEKEEPING SUCCESS

1. The Brigade of Peacekeepers

Each participating country should create at least a brigade of well-paid¹¹¹, professionalized, and well-disciplined troops that are only dedicated to peacekeeping. They should always be ready to deploy at a moment's notice not unlike the concept of the European Rapid Reaction Force envisioned by the European Union. This should be the universal standard for peacekeeping operations.

Operationally, each country should deploy one battalion of peacekeepers at a time and rotate them every six months so that there will always be high quality troops performing peacekeeping. An incentive for the average soldier in the rest of the armed forces in these countries would be that they would want to motivate and discipline

¹¹¹ Due to the lower living standard in most of the transitioning democratic nations, the cost of maintaining a full brigade should not be high.

themselves with the hopes of being selected for peacekeeping duties in the future. The mere competition for such a well-paid and prestigious duty will help build professional services overall, including the reformation of the armed forces along democratic lines.

2. Professionalism and Discipline

From discussions with soldiers from advanced democracies such as the United States and other Western countries, it is clear that high salaries equate to higher motivation levels, better self-discipline and makes them more receptive to higher standards of training. Higher motivation might encourage soldiers to perform better and be more loyal to their unit and country. Soldiers who are more dedicated to their jobs and performance also help to increase morale. Besides, higher motivation levels make soldiers want to accomplish their mission and follow the rules of engagement and the rule of the law. Through such mechanisms, the quality of the soldier is improved and the mission gets accomplished in a more efficient, professional manner. Therefore, higher salaries do a lot for attracting soldiers with higher education levels and retaining them for extended periods within the armed forces. “The plan to reinforce U.N. regional peacekeeping with more money and more jobs is a good one but will only be effective if the peacekeeping forces themselves become more professional.”¹¹² Thus, while the professionalization of peacekeepers is necessary, it cannot be realized not only without significant training on the part of the peacekeepers, but also from the countries that contribute the troops in terms of burden sharing.

A professional and disciplined force committed to peacekeeping must always be ready and capable to participate in conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and humanitarian aid operations. Arrangements must be made to provide training at the national level. Taking advantage of on-the-job experience is very valuable. The aim to further develop the unit should include the integration skills and knowledge acquired through training, previous experience (if such), and deployment. The national defense structures must ensure full support of the units in terms of management, personnel, logistics, equipment, funding and the continuous improvement of its deployment capabilities.

¹¹² Financial Times Information, [U.N.'s Peacekeeping Woes](#), November 2, 2000.

Regarding peacekeeping, many mistakes are made by troops because officers and soldiers “were not accustomed to performing.”¹¹³ Even among NATO countries, it is noticeable that there is a need for extensive training in the pre-deployment period.

Although contingents from NATO nations brought a high level of staff training and compatible procedures, and the officers of many nations proved to be highly professional, the significant disparity in training and doctrine among other participants made the planning process slower and more complicated than the situation required. First, planners had to determine what various contingents were *capable* of doing before assigning missions. Second, negotiations were conducted to determine what various contingents were *willing* to do based on guidance from their national capitals or the views of the contingent commanders.¹¹⁴

To become more professional and better disciplined, there are several lessons learned from peacekeeping that individual soldiers can take home with them that ultimately benefits their country and society. Argentine general Carlos Maria Zabala made the following comments after having been a U.N. sector commander in Croatia.

It provides first-hand knowledge of the effects of war, allowing our troops to appreciate the importance of the U.N. and its peace operations. On a personal level, it lends opportunity to travel to foreign locations and exposure to other cultures and customs. Additionally, it allows the troops to feel as representatives of their country in an important mission abroad.¹¹⁵

What else must a peacekeeping soldier be responsive to if he is to be professional? According to Morris Janowitz, the professional soldier must be responsive to civilian control because of military tradition and professionalism, the law, and because of his integration of acceptable norms and values supported by democratic society and institutions.¹¹⁶ Civilian leaders depend on military leaders because they recognize their

¹¹³ Thomas J. Marshall (editor), Problems and Solutions in Future Coalition Operation, U.S Army War College, Carlisle, PA, p. 75.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Jorge Dominguez (editor), “International security and Democracy.” A collection of works by different authors, p. 139.

¹¹⁶ Janowitz, Morris, The Professional Soldier, p. 62.

professional competence, and military leaders recognize the lawfully constituted civilian leadership in democracies. Confidence and competence in each other is categorized by basic causal factors as values, issues, interests, personalities, and threats.¹¹⁷

To further expound on this concept of civilian control over the military, it is important to understand that for any country, especially for those that are still transitioning to democracy, that they must have a professional military that willingly subordinates itself to civilian control. An additional intangible and key benefit a military can learn from peacekeeping, and apply within its own country, is the opportunity to mend and nourish the relationship with their civilian authorities and society. One participant of peacekeeping operations made the following observation. “The military’s participation in peacekeeping allowed the armed forces to become a valuable player in the government’s foreign policy, bringing praise and recognition, where they had previously found disdain.”¹¹⁸ Furthermore, peacekeeping provides additional field training in leadership, tactics, and other functions within the framework that requires obedience to civilian authority. For a country’s military, creating a positive relationship with civilian authorities and the society in which they live will generate civilian control and contribute to internal stability. Thus, military participation in peacekeeping missions is “not only conducive to civilian authority, but actually enhances it.”¹¹⁹

Learning to accept their role in society is another valuable lesson that troops can learn through participation in peacekeeping. A deployment to another country allows the troops an opportunity to experience different cultures and customs, thereby increasing their understanding and tolerance of people from different parts of the world. The travel itself to another country is beneficial to the military of any country, especially if they have never left their own soil. They have the opportunity to make more friends and socialize with troops of different countries and cultures.

Peacekeeping operations also provide soldiers with other unique and substantial opportunities. For example, deploying to a real-world mission outside their country

¹¹⁷ Bland, Douglas. A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations, p. 11.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ D. Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux, Military Roles and Civilian Control..., p. 4.

allows them to hone military and/or diplomatic skills, provide field training for leaders, and apply tactics and other functions that enhance good order and discipline.

3. Strong Financial Support

Strong financial backing, especially from the international arena is necessary, if not vital, to the success of the program. This is especially true when one wants to enhance skills in the seamless exchange of logistical support. Among peacekeeping countries committed to one particular mission, soldiers have varying logistical mechanisms and use the equipment from other countries, which often leads to incompatibility and wasted assets. One option to minimize compatibility problems is to have one country provide all of the equipment that is used by all members on a mission. Although this option might require operability, proficiency, and specialized training by soldiers from other countries; training as “one” force unifies and creates cohesive units.

For the richer countries such as the G-7, there is a lot of money available to spend on international-level programs. However, some of the money that is spent on these programs is not fully utilized or maximized for the greatest “bang for the buck.” Perhaps some of the funds that are not efficiently maximized could be diverted to help professionalize peacekeeping as proposed in this chapter. For example, the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program had a cumulative amount of \$2.7 billion in obligations at the end of FY2000. This program aims chiefly at assisting the de-nuclearization of Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine.¹²⁰ While this program of de-nuclearization has been effective overall, much of the money that makes it to the countries listed often is misspent or is misappropriated. Finding the money that is misspent and utilizing it for the professionalization of peacekeeping would be a more efficient use of the money. Another example is the US program called “Plan Colombia,” one of several counter drug programs where the U.S. provides funding to other countries. Billions of dollars for training, equipment, and logistics go to Colombia, but little measured progress has been made with this program.

¹²⁰ Curt Tarnoff, The Former Soviet Union and U.S. Foreign Assistance, available on Congressional Research Service (CRS), March 7, 2001.

4. Combined Training

The prescription of interoperability and ability to operate as a single unit alluded to earlier in the chapter, must be stressed for competent and successful peacekeeping operations. Despite having their origins in different countries, committed peacekeeping troops must be able to maneuver and operate as a single unit. To achieve maneuverability and inter-operability, they must have similar unit characteristics. As discussed previously, good salaries, discipline, and motivation will increase the quality of soldiers as the foundation from which to build on. Then, what is required are similar tactics and training in police functions and human sensitivities in order to effectively accomplish their jobs, which reduces human rights violations, an effect that would accomplish the U.N. mission.

A similar example of what is referred to here, but not quite, is the multinational peacekeeping units such as the Baltic battalion. This battalion is made of Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian peacekeepers. They demonstrate an excellent example of good cooperation in which a common language (English) and common procedures (NATO SOPs) are used on a daily basis. These characteristics offer the inter-operability needed for effective peacekeeping. Another example of inter-operability and unification of a diverse group into one mission is the joint Ukrainian-Polish peacekeeping battalion.

In order to properly carry out peacekeeping operations, certain conditions should be met. These include pre-mission preparation, familiarity with doctrine and procedures used in the mission, and commanders accepting responsibility and exercising initiative when dealing with the local authorities. Units must be stable under stress, able to make decisions, cooperative on a tactical level, reliable and determined. These attributes are essential in a multinational environment. Also important is the formation of a liaison and advisory team from the host unit. This helps to facilitate successful integration with the NGO's working in the area. In addition, a standard language must be used for communicating. Both the U.N. and NATO use the English language for peacekeeping operations. Therefore, English-language skills are needed at all levels and commanders

must be provided with continuous and feedback-enabling implementation of lessons learned.

It is important to note that before a country can participate in peacekeeping operations, their soldiers must be first subjected to a specific type of training. As previously mentioned, the focus of training for peacekeeping is found in police functions and human rights, characterized by the psychology and sociology of crisis intervention. Some of the training also includes the use of escalation and de-escalation of aggression based on the situation and rules of engagement about the conditions of use of force and deadly force. Since peacekeeping may include implied tasks such as searching individuals and temporary seizure of personal belongings, training in police functions is essential to peacekeeping. Also, since other functions may include security and patrolling streets, training in detention and the arrest of individuals is also very important for a mission to be successful.

Carrying out an arrest is the point where an untrained peacekeeper may begin to excessive or deadly force, which can quickly lead to negative political and diplomatic consequences. Therefore, training in police functions and human relations as peacekeepers for the military of any country would stand as an excellent force multiplier. However, the tangibles in revenues, travel, and training opportunities from peacekeeping are just one side of the spectrum of benefits.

C. BENEFITS FOR PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES

Many tangible and intangible benefits can be derived from participating in peacekeeping operations around the world. For some countries, tangible benefits include monetary compensation for salaries and equipment use, and for others, it serves as a form of real income and other material gains.

For example, consolidating a democracy might promote foreign investment by multi-national corporations (MNCs) and produce opportunities to increase economic growth. The North American Free Trade Agreement (N.A.F.T.A.) is just one example in which foreign investment proved beneficial. However, to take advantage of such opportunities, a country must prove to be stable internally. Peacekeeping operations are just one more step they can take towards democratization and increasing economic gains

through foreign investments. Participation in peacekeeping by increasing economic cooperation might decrease insurgency, nationalistic struggle and other disorders.

Protecting innocent lives is another way for participating countries to enhance their own profile domestically and internationally. For example, U.N. forces have cleared mine fields in Kuwait, enforced U.N. mandates in Cyprus, and operated a hospital in Mozambique.¹²¹

Peacekeeping offers military forces intangible benefits such as the opportunity to improve their image and prestige at home and abroad.¹²² For example, peacekeeping forces around the world are directly involved in bringing peace and stability to warring nations, an honorable and prestigious duty worthy of emulation by all the countries in the world. Alternatively, soldiers learn restraint first hand by coping with different situations without having to shoot first and ask questions later.

Additionally, other important elements of military professionalism are military expertise, service responsibility, corporateness, and the civilian application of “objective control” over the military. This means that the civilian authorities grant the military autonomy within its area of expertise and the military agrees to respect civilian authority.¹²³ Therefore, the concept of mutual trust and respect between militaries and civilians can be put into practice during the participation of the military in peacekeeping.

1. Benefits and Concerns at the National and International Level

By encouraging neighboring countries to participate in joint exercises while practicing the proposed model described above, countries can establish their own mutual programs to enhance peaceful co-existence. In addition, they can improve the social, economic and political situation in their regions. Internal stability and peace in any country, as insured by a democratic process, can also bring other tangible and intangible benefits.

¹²¹ Jorge Dominguez (editor), International Security and Democracy. A collection of works by different authors, p. 139.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ D. Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux, Military Roles and Civilian Control... p. 4.

Fulfilling this regional commitment is very resource consuming. It generates a heavy burden for countries in a regional block that want to contribute peacekeeping forces but do not yet have the resources to pay, train, and equip professional peacekeeping soldiers. Therefore, it is important to examine the costs and benefits for future participation in peacekeeping for those states that are willing to share the burden. For those countries that cannot pay for themselves, it is necessary to create a special fund to motivate them to participate in peacekeeping. Nations contributing to the special fund must recognize that it is much cheaper to support regional units financially and logistically than to absorb the cost of long-term peacekeeping operations resulting from inexperienced, uncommitted U.N. troops.

In peacekeeping operations, a concern voiced by countries such as the U.S. and Britain is that their troops must not operate under the command of a foreign officer. This is seen as a violation of their sovereignty. However, because of the success of NATO in Bosnia, countries should be more comfortable in contributing peacekeeping troops under the operational command of NATO for the purpose of implementing U.N. peacekeeping missions. In addition, the U.N. can learn from NATO how to overcome its lack of consultation with military practitioners. On other hand, NATO might recognize the need for greater coordination with civilian actors on an operational level.

Increasingly, crisis response operations bring together more and more countries, working together. “Multinationality is often considered both a military and a political necessity, militarily because resources can be combined and specialized skills utilized, and politically because it gives greater legitimacy to the operation.”¹²⁴

There is also a need to develop and sustain consensus within the international community over the political, humanitarian and military objectives of missions. This point is particularly important for troop providing countries. For example, the situation in former Yugoslavia proves that when a mission becomes progressively more difficult, respective governments increase their obligations and requirements for national contingents, rather than by the U.N. chain of command.

¹²⁴ North Atlantic Assembly Report, <http://www.naa.be/publications/comrep/200/at>.

D. RECOMMENDATIONS

Participating in peacekeeping missions around the world is an honorable profession because it is an expression of goodwill for the world. Leaders of the countries that are members of different international organizations, and the U.N. in particular, must openly examine ways to deal with future regional wars.

Efforts must be carefully waged to maintain robust civil-military relations in country participants, particularly for peacekeeping, since it deals with military might. As an analyst from the U.S. Army War College pointed out, “while military power is essential, it is not sufficient. Indeed, militarizing the effort may be a good indicator of continued failure” during democratic transitions and consolidations in a country.

Admittedly, the most promising alternative to direct U.N. involvement is the employment of regional forces that are well prepared, compatible in training and logistics, and well funded. Three steps need to be considered:

- Increase the strength and responsibilities of regional power blocs. This would include developing regional peacekeeping forces that are trained professionals in peacekeeping operations.
- Strong states initially sponsor the development of these regional peacekeeping forces for funding, training, and logistic support where necessary
- The U.N. should encourage the strengthening of regional powers. Regional conflicts will be solved only when regional powers stop expecting America or NATO to intervene. Regional powers must be allowed to mature.¹²⁵

Peacekeeping operations cover the broad spectrum of actions intended to forestall, diminish, or end outbreaks of violence on the international scene. They “encompass six more or less distinct types of civilian, civil-military or just plain military programs designed essentially to give peace a chance in varying circumstances of violence across the broad front of conflict resolution.”¹²⁶ It is important for the state to participate in such missions in order to obtain the credibility for its armed forces. It has an impact on democratic civil-military relations because a country has to make certain decisions and

¹²⁵ A. Cowin.

¹²⁶ Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, Pamela Aall, Managing Global Chaos, p. 321.

put into practice certain regulations in order to participate in such a mission. That of course requires that a new law be passed in a parliament if one has not yet been created in order to send troops abroad. This is especially important for countries during the process of consolidating democracy because it gives inputs and stimulates discussion on the military. In addition, those officers who take part in peacekeeping missions and work in civil-military relations obtain the knowledge and experience which allows them to use it back in their country.

In general, the success of peacekeeping operations is difficult to evaluate because the objective or mandate of each mission differs. This fact is important to consider for the planning and implementation of a peacekeeping mission.

Paul Diehl of the University of Illinois suggests, however, two basic criteria for evaluating traditional peacekeeping operations that can be applied in partial evaluation of more complex missions as well: how well an operation deterred or prevented violent conflict in its area of deployment; and how much it facilitated “resolution of the disagreements underlying the conflict.” These are useful and seemingly straightforward criteria, yet surprisingly difficult to apply in practice even to traditional operations, because what host and troop are contributing. Also, what members of the Security Council want from peacekeeping operations varies from state to state and from mission to mission.¹²⁷

Equally important, since militaries might use limited force, which “in [the] context of peace operations is very different from the massive use of force,”¹²⁸ this point must be considered by both civilians and militaries.

Politicians, journalists and the general public are confused. For most of them using force is synonymous with going to war and taking sides in a given conflict. The military still struggle with the question of how to use force without getting into a dangerous process of escalation and destroying the entire peace process. In Somalia, the

¹²⁷ W. J. Durch (editor), Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s, St. Martin's Press, NY, p. 17.

¹²⁸ Kühne, W. Peace Support Operations: How to Make them Succeed. Available on www.fes.de/ipg4-99/artkuehne.thm.

confusion about the proper use of force amongst the military and politicians has led to tragic events and a rushed withdrawal.¹²⁹

¹²⁹ Ibid.

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VI. CONCLUSION

Leaders of the countries that are members of the U.N. must publicly examine ways to deal with future regional wars. The most promising alternative to direct U.N. involvement is the employment of regional forces. Three steps need to be considered:

- Increase the strength and responsibilities of regional power blocs. This would include developing regional peacekeeping forces that are trained professionals in peacekeeping operations. “Common Market countries would take primary responsibility for actions in Europe, such as in Yugoslavia, and the Organization for African Unity or the Arab League would do the same in places like Somalia.”¹³⁰
- Strong states that are U.N. members initially sponsor the development of these regional peacekeeping forces, and funding, training, and logistic support if necessary. In the long run, the peacekeeping forces will be more cost effective for the U.N. if peacekeeping operations are conducted by trained, professional peacekeeping forces familiar with the culture, societal differences, and traditions of a country in the certain region. The alternative would force too great a burden onto strong states or entrust the U.N. with responsibilities it cannot fulfill.
- The U.N. should encourage the strengthening of regional powers. Regional conflicts will be solved only when regional powers stop expecting strong states to intervene. Regional powers must be allowed to mature.

Using the examples of existing multinational peacekeeping units, such as the Baltic battalion and the Ukrainian-Polish battalion, can help to develop different approaches to the professionalization of peacekeeping forces. The involvement of nations within the region will improve the quality of each national armed force and at the same time will enhance regional stability and the international security environment. Sharing the burden of the common goal or to keep peace and stability in the world, will be, and must be, implemented by other nations, not only by the great powers.

The task of making regional peacekeeping units would not be easy though. Fulfilling this regional commitment is very resource consuming. It generates a heavy burden for countries in a regional block that want to contribute peacekeeping forces but do not yet have the resources to pay, train, and equip professional peacekeeping soldiers.

¹³⁰ A. Cowin.

Therefore, it is important to examine the costs and benefits for the future participation in peacekeeping of those states that are willing to share the burden. For those countries that cannot pay for themselves, it is necessary to create a special fund to motivate them to participate in peacekeeping. Nations contributing to the special fund must recognize that it is much cheaper to support regional units financially and logistically than to acquire the cost of long-term peacekeeping operations resulting from inexperienced, uncommitted U.N. troops.

The requirements for these units are readiness, high performance, and capability to participate in conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and humanitarian aid operations. Arrangements must be made to provide training on the national level. The opportunity to pursue on-the-job experience is very valuable. The aim of further development of the unit should be to further integrate the skills and knowledge acquired through training, previous experience (if any), and deployment into the national defense structures, ensure full support of the units in terms of management, personnel, logistics, equipment and funding, and enhance its deployment capabilities.

The plan to reinforce U.N. regional peacekeeping with more money and more jobs is a good one but will only be effective if the peacekeeping forces themselves become more professional. If by their inherent nature peacekeeping forces cannot keep peace, then pumping in more funds and personnel will not make a qualitative difference.¹³¹

The United States is one of the strong states in the world whose support is absolutely necessary for this concept of strengthening regional peacekeeping forces. However, the question of whether the U.S. is willing to support this concept, especially as it is seen in its national interest, is far from clear. For example, is the U.S. Congress likely to support proposals for regional peacekeeping units? When the Senate has discussed similar issues, such as a request to fund an operation in Kosovo, most senators expressed the view that other countries must contribute more in sharing the peacekeeping burden. The House, by a vote of 264 to 153, adopted an Amendment sponsored by Congressmen Christopher Shays and John Kasich (R-Ohio) to the 2001 Defense Authorization bill (HR 4205). The Amendment would require the link of funding for and

¹³¹ Financial Times Information, U.N.'s Peacekeeping Woes, November 2, 2000.

participation in Kosovo operations to European funding and participation to the U.S. armed forces' involvement.

The evidence signals significant support in the U.S. Congress for burden-sharing. The question for the Congress is whether the American people will support the idea of creating new peacekeeping forces on a regional basis or not. Congress recognizes that the public is increasingly unwilling to send or involve U.S. troops in the peacekeeping process, especially after operations in Somalia and the "CNN" impact on the American public. If the regional peacekeeping forces are seen as increasingly burden-sharing and an improvement of regional security and stability, while lessening the need for U.S. troop contributions, it might receive Congressional support.

The National Defense Authorization Act, the House of Representatives approved the amendment sponsored by Congressman Christopher Shays designed to encourage our European allies to pay their share of the costs of the peacekeeping mission in Kosovo. Shays cosponsored the amendment with Reps. John Kasich (R-OH), Gary Condit (D-CA), Barney Frank (D-MA), Spencer Bachus (R-AL), and Peter DeFazio (D-OR).

We need to begin to make the tough decisions on defense if we are going to bring our military into the post-Cold War world of the 21st century", Shays said. "Our fighters flew 70 percent of the sorties over Kosovo. Our military took the greatest risk; we've fulfilled our financial obligations. Our allies, unfortunately, have not. If we do not require them to shoulder their fair share of the operational costs, more of our budget surpluses and limited military resources could be eaten up by this open-ended military commitment.

The amendment requires that the next president certify our European allies have made a down payment on their financial and personnel commitments by April 1, 2001. If not, it prohibits Department of Defense funding from being expended for the continued deployment of U.S. ground combat forces in Kosovo.

The amendment is similar to one that was rejected by the House during debate on the emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act in March of this year [2000]. The proposal was modified to address members' concerns. Specifically, the previous amendment mandated a stop to funding for Kosovo operations pending certification our allies are fulfilling their obligations. The amendment also adds 10 months to the certification time, from June 1, 2000 to April 1, 2001. To address concerns raised on the floor during the debate in March, the amendment

provides authority for a 180-day Presidential waiver for purposes of national security. The requirement for withdrawal applies only to ground troops, not to all military personnel, as was previously required.¹³²

There are other documents confirming U.S. willingness and strong desire to support the idea of involvement of other countries in analogical issues. An example is the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. It has a “cumulative total of \$2.7 billion in obligations to the end of FY2000 and is a defense program aimed chiefly at assisting the denuclearization of Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine, where nuclear weapons were located when the Soviet Union fell.”¹³³ The U.S. also provides money for training, equipment, and logistics for counter-narcotics policy and counter-drug forces in Colombia.

The creation of professional peacekeeping forces at the national level among regional powers therefore is necessary to develop and support struggling democratic states, particularly during their transitioning period. The more nations that are involved in the peacekeeping process, the stronger the international security environment and regional stability will be globally.

The establishment of a brigade of well paid, highly trained, and motivated troops in participating countries (that can deploy at a moment’s notice) will surely increase the success of peacekeeping as a whole. The use of peacekeeping troops modeled along democratic lines will usher in peace and stability in those countries. Mature, democratic countries have already learned the value of paying their soldiers well in return for high quality of service and commitment. Since Eastern European countries have not yet achieved an adequate level of economic development to do the same, they suffer the consequences of the low quality of soldiering. As a remedy, financially sound countries that already spend billions in other international programs should divert some of the funding to peacekeeping for the creation of such brigades. The brigades should be trained and supplied as a universal unit so that they will have the capabilities to be fully compatible with each other, and supportive of each other using similar tools and supplies.

¹³² House press release, [House Approves Bipartisan Kosovo Burden Sharing Amendment](http://www.house.gov/search97cgi/s97.cgi?shays), on www.house.gov/search97cgi/s97.cgi?shays.

¹³³ Curt Tarnoff, [The Former Soviet Union and U.S. Foreign Assistance](#), on Congressional Research Service (CRS), March 7, 2001.

The necessity to create another kind of peacekeeping unit is evident. The more nations are involved in the peacekeeping process, the stronger the international security environment and regional stability will be in a certain region. Participating in peacekeeping can demonstrate the commitment of a country to the democratic process, internal and external stability, and mutual trust in civil-military affairs. Therefore, in order to earn respect at home and abroad, the military should apply their civil skills in other countries. In this case, other countries can learn from the military forces' technical expertise in civil affairs mission, not to mention counter insurgency. Military involvement in domestic affairs, on the other hand, should only be reserved for regional or national emergencies.


Peacekeeping and security that result from it has been shown to quicken the pace towards democratization and civilian control of the military, elements that foreign investors like multi-national corporations look for before investing in a country. According to Emmanuel Kant, in the world arena, a democratic country is one that is internally stable, can settle internal problems peacefully, and most likely will not declare war against another democracy. A democratic country also shows a high level of maturity in which other countries can feel they can disagree with, without fearing some sort of retaliation.

Professional peacekeeping must be implemented for higher rates of success and for the improvement of individual nation prestige in the international arena. While only one solution to the problem of failed peacekeeping missions in the past, the professionalization of peacekeepers is an important first step. What is needed for the initial funding and support for this proposal are strong, prosperous states. With this funding and support, peacekeeping can become a successful part of international security.

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
APPENDIX A. MILITARY STRUCTURE OF UKRAINIAN ARMED FORCES

Military Structure of Ukraine



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APPENDIX B. PROPOSED STRUCTURE OF UKRAINIAN PEACEKEEPING BRIGADE



Peace Enforcement Requirements


- *Brigade is self-sufficient, does not require support from Land Forces on a regular basis.
- *Each Infantry Peacekeeping Battalion should have 1 transportation platoon of 6 trucks for humanitarian needs.
- *Engineer Battalion should have: -Bridge Company; -Mine Detection Company; -Road Construction Co.
- *Helicopter squadron must consist of 8X MI-8 and 4X MI-24.

Non-combat Requirements

- *If GS allows, Liaison/Oversight Group should consist of NATO/UN/OSCE representatives.
- *Troops in Brigade should be flexible in peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and peace maintenance missions.
- **Cross-training is one of vital requirements for peacekeeping battalions.

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APPENDIX C. PROPOSED STRUCTURE OF A PEACEKEEPING BATTALION



Total:
 Personnel: 647
 UAZ 469: 25
 UAZ 452: 4
 BTR80/70: 44
 BRDM2: 5
 KAMAZ: 73

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