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Marine Corps University  
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# ***MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES***

## ***COMPLACENCY KILLS:***

***The Need for Improvement in the way the Marine Corps Prepares for Future Conflict***

**SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT  
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES**

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**Title:** Complacency Kills: The Need for Improvement in the Way the Marine Corps Prepares for Future Conflict

**Author:** Major Jason Quinton Bohm, United States Marine Corps

**Thesis:** Although the United States Marine Corps trains successfully for war, it needs to improve on its preparations for Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). This treatise identifies some of the efforts that the Marine Corps should undertake to improve its capabilities for continued success in future contingencies.

**Discussion:** United States Marines face an enormous challenge in responding to crises across a wide spectrum of conflict where the lines separating the levels of war are clouded; and it has become increasingly difficult to distinguish combatants from noncombatants. These challenges require a military that can both win wars and contribute to peace. Joint Vision 2020 describes this force as needing to be "...dominant across the full spectrum of military operations—persuasive in peace, decisive in war, preeminent in any form of conflict."

Many leaders fear that the nontraditional roles that junior Marines are being tasked with conducting may degrade their ability to perform their primary mission—to fight and win our nation's battles. The skills needed for conducting MOOTW should not be looked at separately, but rather complementarily to combat skills. Although the Marine Corps' focus should remain on developing combat readiness, it must do more to properly prepare for future MOOTW. Marines must gain an awareness of the differences between these types of operations, and must develop the ability to quickly transition across the spectrum of conflict in order to remain a relevant force in the defense of its country.

**Recommendations:** The Marine Corps should take a number of steps to improve on how it prepares for future conflict. This is not to imply that the Marine Corps is failing in its mission. On the contrary, it has achieved unparalleled success on the countless operations that it has conducted throughout the years. However, the Marine Corps must continue to adapt to the ever-changing world if it wants to continue being a relevant force. Failure to improve on the capabilities needed to succeed in MOOTW could lead the nation to find another force capable of successfully conducting these missions. This treatise makes the following recommendations on how the Marine Corps can improve on its preparation for MOOTW.

1. Initiate standardized cultural awareness training.
2. Expand the Marine Corps Foreign Language Program.
3. Improve simulation training.
4. Publish a MOOTW (Small Wars #2) Manual.
5. Publish a quarterly MOOTW magazine targeted toward NCOs.
6. Publish a MOOTW Training and Readiness Manual.
7. Implement a MOOTW Instructor Course.
8. Implement a MOOTW Staff Training Course.
9. Implement a MOOTW Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation.
10. Improve/Construct Urban/MOOTW training facilities.
11. Conduct Urban/MOOTW Operation Readiness Exercises

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## Preface

Former United Nations Secretary, Dag Hammershald stated that "Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only a soldier can do it." This insightful statement holds true today as United States Marines continually deploy on contingencies requiring them to successfully conduct a myriad of missions across the spectrum of conflict that requires specialized skills. Junior Marines are being tasked with conducting many nontraditional roles that many leaders fear may degrade their ability to perform their primary mission--to fight and win our nation's battles. The skills needed for conducting military operations other than war (MOOTW) should not be looked at as separate, but rather complementary to combat skills. Although the Marine Corps' focus should remain on developing combat readiness, it must do more to properly prepare for future MOOTW. Marines must gain an awareness of the differences between these types of operations and develop the ability to quickly transition across the spectrum of conflict in order to remain a relevant force in the defense of our country.

The focus of this treatise is to identify some improvements that the Marine Corps should make to better prepare Marines at the tactical level to succeed in future contingencies. I chose to write on this subject, because of the many shortfalls that I personally observed in Marine preparations and conduct during Operations RESTORE HOPE in Somalia, UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti, SAFE PASSAGE in Cuba, FAIRWINDS in Haiti, RESOLUTE RESPONSE in Kenya, and on an antiterrorism mission in Bahrain. My views were further developed by the experiences of many other SNCO's and officers ranging from the platoon sergeant to combatant commander levels

that I had the opportunity to either interview or have an informal discussion with. The one trend that quickly became obvious during my research was that there is no consensus in the Marine Corps on how it should prepare for future conflict. The opinions ranged from those who believed that MOOTW required no additional skills other than those needed for combat, to visionaries looking to make profound changes in the selection of Marines, education of leaders, and organization and equipping of units. My intent is to provide recommendations that will form the bridge between the shortfalls in how Marines are preparing for MOOTW today and the ideas of the visionaries looking toward the future. The recommendations identified in the latter half of this document are focused primarily on improving the capabilities and knowledge of Marines at the tactical level. It purposely avoids detailed discussion on emerging technologies, nonlethal weapons, or MOUT warfare, because the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab has focused its resources and efforts in these areas and has made some great advances.

Many people were helpful in the completion of this project. There are too many to name them all, but I must extend a special debt of gratitude to my mentors, Lieutenant Colonel Robert P. Wagner III and Dr. John Matthews of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and Dr. James Ginther of the Marine Corps Research Center. Their time and guidance given toward the completion of this work is greatly appreciated. I must also thank my wife, Sonja, for her patience and determination in editing the many drafts of this paper. Finally, I would be remiss if I did not thank General Anthony Zinni, USMC (Ret), not only for taking the time out of his busy schedule to meet with me, but also for the many lectures, articles, and interviews that he has conducted throughout the

years on this subject. In my opinion, he is the greatest authority on the subject of MootW that exist today.

## **INTRODUCTION**

As we begin the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, regional powers, rogue elements, and non-state actors will pose security challenges embracing conventional military and non-traditional capabilities. Regional and internal instability will create situations where ethnic, economic, social, and environmental stresses accentuate violence. Multiple belligerents and a blurring of the distinctions and nontraditional affiliations among terrorists groups, subnational factions, insurgent groups, and international criminals will complicate an environment where a direct attack is often the least likely course of action.<sup>1</sup>

The world is a complex and confusing place that is in a constant state of fluctuation. The Armed Forces of the United States face an enormous challenge in responding to crises across a wide spectrum of conflict where the lines separating the levels of war are clouded, and it has become increasingly difficult to distinguish combatants from noncombatants. These challenges require a military that can both win wars and contribute to peace. Joint Vision 2020 describes this force as needing to be "...dominant across the full spectrum of military operations--persuasive in peace, decisive in war, preeminent in any form of conflict."<sup>2</sup> The U.S. military plays a crucial role in protecting U.S. interest while shaping the international security environment. But how should it prepare to achieve full spectrum dominance in achieving this goal? What balance should be maintained between preparing for war and preparing for success in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)? Are the skills required for success in

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<sup>1</sup> United States Marine Corps. *Marine Corps Strategy 21* (Washington DC: HQMC, 3 November 2000), 5.

<sup>2</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Vision 2020* (Washington DC: GPO, June 2000). The focus of JV2020 is to identify and provide guidance for the United States Armed Forces' to prepare now for an uncertain future. It describes the operational concepts necessary for the U.S. to employ decisive force, power projection, overseas presence, and strategic agility to meet the challenges of the future. It describes in broad terms the human talent and operational capabilities that will be required for a joint force to succeed across the full range of military operations in accomplishing its mission in 2020 and beyond. It stresses the great importance of the development of doctrine, organizations, training, and education. The U.S. Marine Corps needs to improve in these areas concerning MOOTW. JV2020 provides the guidance needed to undertake this challenge.

both environments the same? The Marine Corps does not believe so. Marine Corps

Doctrinal Publication 1, *Warfighting*, states:

The Marine Corps, as the nation's force-in-readiness, must have the versatility and flexibility to deal with a situation at any intensity across the entire spectrum of conflict. MOOTW and small wars are not simply lesser forms of general war. A modern military force capable of waging a war against a large conventional force may find itself ill prepared for a "small" war against a lightly equipped guerilla force.<sup>3</sup>

The Marine Corps' challenge is to ensure that it is well prepared for any inevitable contingency that it will be called upon to face.

The United States Marine Corps is known as the premiere fighting force throughout the world. This reputation was earned and has been sustained through the courage, determination, and esprit-de-corps displayed by Marines in combat since its inception in 1775. The Marine Corps' success in battle can be attributed to the high priority that it gives to training for combat. This priority must continue as the country transitions into the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. History has shown that the risk associated with not being prepared for war is too great. The United States' National Security Strategy states that the "primary mission of our armed forces is to deter, and if necessary, to fight and win conflicts in which our vital interests are threatened."<sup>4</sup> The United States has participated in major conventional conflicts approximately once every sixteen years throughout its history. In each instance, the period following a major conflict was characterized by Marines being employed on numerous smaller scale contingencies or operations other than war.

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<sup>3</sup> Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1. *Warfighting* (Washington DC: GPO, 20 June 1997), 27-28.

<sup>4</sup> United States President. *A National Security Strategy For a New Century* (Washington DC: GPO, December 1999), 2.

Military Operations Other Than War is not new to the Marine Corps. On the contrary, Marines have been conducting these types of missions since the days following the Revolutionary War. Marine forces participated in 180 such missions between 1800 and 1934, but the increased complexity of the world today has greatly increased the frequency of Marine involvement in these types of operations. Marine forces responded to worldwide contingencies at an average rate of one every five weeks throughout the 1990's. The Secretary of Defense's annual report for the year 2000 also states:

Based on recent experience and intelligence projections, the demand for small scale operations is expected to remain high over the next 15 to 20 years...these operations will likely continue to pose the most frequent challenge for the U.S. forces through 2015 and may require significant commitments of both active and reserve forces.<sup>5</sup>

Although United States Marines have successfully completed numerous MOOTW missions in the past, they must guard against becoming complacent.

Although the United States Marine Corps trains successfully for war, it needs to improve on its preparation for MOOTW. The Institute for National Strategic Studies states that "U.S. forces will remain the world's preeminent military power by a wide margin. However, their success in future military operations should not be taken for granted."<sup>6</sup> The vast majority of training in the Marine Corps today is devoted to insuring success in battle. There is little doubt that it can achieve this end, but if history is any indication of the future, than the majority of missions that Marines can expect to perform are MOOTW. General Jones, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, made the following

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<sup>5</sup> Department of Defense. *Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress* (Washington DC: GPO, 2000), 6.

<sup>6</sup> Institute for National Strategic Studies. *Strategic Assessment 1999: Priorities for a Turbulent World* Washington DC: National Defense University, 1999), 1.

comment following a meeting of Marine general officers on 16 November 2000 that discussed the future direction of the Marine Corps:

The General Officers Futures Group concluded that the Corps requires only marginal adjustments to successfully adapt. We do, in fact, have it right. Our day-in, day-out commitment to innovation and experimentation and willingness to embrace change has ensured our continued viability. Consequently, we are not compelled to reinvent ourselves. What we do require is a well-planned, purposeful campaign to synchronize our efforts to improve our capabilities.<sup>7</sup>

The purpose of this paper is to identify some of the efforts that the Marine Corps should undertake to improve its capabilities for continued success in future contingencies.

## **FUTURE CONFLICT**

Before one can discuss what improvements should be made to better prepare the Marine Corps for future contingencies, one first needs to understand the environment in which Marines will be operating.

The mission you and I get now isn't two MRC's (Mid-intensity Regional Conflicts), and it isn't going off to fight the 'big one' nice and clean, and end it with some sanitary standoff weapons system that we can put through the porthole of a command bunker. It's going to be this messy kind of stuff. And you can't ignore it and you can't get away from it.<sup>8</sup>

In the next fifteen to twenty years, United States Marines are far more likely to be involved in MOOTW than in major regional conflicts or general wars. The United States' most likely adversaries in a conventional war are currently plagued with domestic

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<sup>7</sup> United States Marine Corps. All Marine Message Number 042/00. "The Vision Statement of the U.S. Marine Corps," 16 November 2000.

<sup>8</sup> Zinni, Anthony, Gen, USMC (Ret). Former Commander in Chief, Central Command. "Non-Traditional Military Missions: Their Nature, and the Need for Cultural Awareness and Flexible Thinking." Quote taken from lecture presented at the Armed Forces Staff College on 4 June 1994 while a Maj Gen serving as the Deputy Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Quoted in Joe Strange's, *Perspectives on Warfighting Number Six: Capital "W" War* (Quantico: Defense Automated Printing Service Center, 1998), 270.

concerns that divert their attention away from the United States. By the year 2003, Russia is expected to cut its military forces by 350,000 troops, because its lagging economy can no longer support a military based on Soviet doctrine. North Korea is currently facing difficulties feeding its own people and has begun peace talks with South Korea. Iraq continues to be put in check as it attempts to recover from the Gulf War, and China's economic concerns and lack of amphibious capability make her an unlikely antagonists in the near future. Very few of the remaining nations of the world possess the military means to pose a realistic conventional threat to U.S. forces; consequently, future conflict will require U.S. Marines to conduct a full spectrum of missions short of war in this confusing and constantly changing world.

### **The Environment**

The world has experienced an enormous population explosion, and in the last twenty years, we have witnessed unprecedented migration of the masses to primitive urban areas worldwide. This shift in the population, combined with increasing globalization, economic interdependence, and a rapid diffusion of technology, has created multifaceted threats involving non-state actors with commercial as well as political interests. Increased ethnic and nationalistic tensions will also contribute to an environment where the distinction between front and rear, and friendly and enemy held areas will be blurred. Formal governments may not exist. U.S. Marines will continue to deploy to increasingly complex and lethal environments that negate their traditional superiority in mobility and firepower. Future adversaries will likely attempt to pull U.S. forces into an urban environment while using asymmetrical means to further diminish

U.S. strengths.<sup>9</sup> Marines may face international coalitions, or factions within, or outside an existing state, that possess their own political interest and ability to initiate and escalate violent actions to achieve their ends.

The chaotic situations experienced in this type of environment will produce a myriad of potential adversaries to U.S. forces. These include ethnic groups, hostile crowds, tribal factions, clans, organized gangs, bandits, militias, political groups, terrorists, other non-state groups, and organized armies. The challenges faced by Marines may be complicated by potential combatants who may not wear uniforms, openly carry weapons, or operate under clear chains of command. They may utilize technologies that are cheap to employ but could cause numerous casualties. Marines will need to coordinate their actions with a number of players to include allies, coalition partners, United Nations forces, and countless additional non-government (NGO) and private voluntary organizations (PVO). Marines will increasingly interact with these players in the littorals.

### **The Littorals**

Many of the future contingencies of the world will occur in the littorals. The United States Marine Corps' Concept Paper, *Operational Maneuver from the Sea*, defines the littorals as:

...those areas characterized by great cities, well-populated coasts, and the intersection of trade routes where land and sea meet. While representing a relatively small portion of the world's surface, littorals provide homes to over three-quarters of the world's population, locations for over 80% of the world's capital cities, and nearly all of the market places for international trade. Because

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<sup>9</sup> U.S. Marine operations in Somalia, Haiti, Cuba, and Kosovo provide countless examples of how success on MOOTW operations rely on the actions of the Marine on the ground and not the technological superiority that U.S. forces experience over their adversaries. Although technology provides forces with some added capability to increase situational awareness, acquire targets, communicate, navigate, and provide force protection to Marines, it cannot replace the knowledge, experience, and judgement displayed by Marine leaders in the performance of their missions.

of this, littorals are also the place where most of the world's important conflicts are likely to occur.<sup>10</sup>

It is estimated that 85% of the world's population will be crowded into these already crammed areas by the year 2020. Many of these cities currently lack adequate infrastructure with which to support these large populations; such lack of support leads to increased poverty and hardship among the populace. The locations of the littorals also make them prone to flooding and other natural disasters. The combined effects of these factors may frequently lead to shortages of food, medicine, and shelter, and would require outside assistance. The increased migration of additional personnel to these areas, combined with ethnic, religious, and economic tensions, will inevitably cause crises requiring U.S. intervention. *Marine Corps Strategy 21* (MSC 21) states that these increased challenges in the littorals will require the continuous forward presence and power projection capability of the nation's naval expeditionary forces to promote U.S. national interests, influence vital regions, and win the nation's battles.<sup>11</sup> The Marine Corps characterizes the potential contingencies that it will likely be called upon to perform as Three Block Wars.

### **Three Block War**

The United States Marine Corps coined the phrase, Three Block War, to describe the conglomeration of potential contingencies across the spectrum of conflicts that Marines will likely deploy to in the future. Former Marine Commandant, General Krulak, defined Three Block Wars as contingencies in which Marines may be confronted by the entire spectrum of tactical challenges in the span of a few hours and within the

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<sup>10</sup> United States Marine Corps. *Operational Maneuver from the Sea* (Washington DC: GPO, 4 January 1996), 3.

<sup>11</sup> United States Marine Corps. *Marine Corps Strategy 21*, 1.


space of a few contiguous city blocks.<sup>12</sup> Many people see the Three Block War in physical terms with Marines conducting humanitarian operations on block one, peace keeping and peace enforcement operations on block two, and mid-intensity combat on block three. The concept of the Three Block War is not so much a physical entity as it is a philosophy; and Marines need to understand that they will be challenged by a number of competing tasks that will require them to act either sequentially or simultaneously across the spectrum of conflict. Marines will operate in a battlespace where the political, cultural, and physical environments collide. This chaotic and at times hostile environment will require the decentralized execution of operations and will rely heavily on the Marine Corps' junior leaders to make timely decisions in accomplishing their mission. Marines will have to make these decisions and take action before the situations that they are faced with become overtaken by events. The inevitable presence of the media will require the Corps' young leaders to make these decisions under great public scrutiny, the implications of which could potentially effect the operational or strategic outcome of an operation. Today's Marines are being tasked with fulfilling a wide range of civil and military roles that are achieving both military and political objectives on the battlefield. Figure 1 provides an example of how this dynamic worked during the 26<sup>th</sup> Marine Expeditionary Unit's (Special Operations Capable) participation in Operation JOINT GUARDIAN in Kosovo.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Charles Krulak, Gen., USMC (Ret). "The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War." *Marine Corps Gazette*. Vol 83, no. 1 (January 1999): 20-22.

<sup>13</sup> Figure reproduced from Maj Nathan S. Lowrey, USMCR, "Peacekeeping Operations in Kosovo: The 26<sup>th</sup> MEU During Operation Joint Guardian," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Vol. 83, no. 12 (December 1999): 59.

**Figure 1. Dynamics of Operation JOINT GUARDIAN**



### **Junior Leaders (a.k.a. Strategic Corporal)**

The decisions and actions of the Marine Corps' junior leadership will effect the outcome of future conflicts. General Krulak used the term Strategic Corporal to refer to the Marine Corps' junior leaders who will be called upon to conduct future Three Block Wars. This title can be misleading, however, for it implies that the Marines who will make the tough tactical decisions--which could have operational or strategic implications--are only corporals or noncommissioned officers. The reality is that any of the nation's young Marines ranging from privates first class to captains will be called upon to make decisions regarding the decentralized operations of the future.

The Marine Corps is a relatively young force. Forty nine percent of the Corps' end strength are lance corporals or below. In addition, there is only one officer to every

nine enlisted Marines.<sup>14</sup> These numbers are nearly, and in some cases, over twice as high as the other services. These numbers indicate that the Marine Corps has the lowest percentage of experienced and mature personnel, with the least amount of officer supervision, compared to the other services. Twenty three percent, or nearly 40,000, of the Marine Corps' nearly 174,000 Marines turnover each year. This large turnover of personnel, combined with a younger force, fewer officers, deployment cycles, and limited training opportunities, make it increasingly difficult to prepare Marines to succeed on the myriad of potential missions that they could face across the spectrum of conflict. Regardless of this fact, the unique capabilities provided by a naval expeditionary force and joint doctrine almost guarantee the Marine Corps' involvement in future U.S. contingencies.

### **The Nation's Force in Readiness**

The Marine Corps can expect to be increasingly utilized as the nation's force in readiness. The expeditionary nature of naval forces combines the attributes of rapid response, self-sustainability, and endurance to apply the appropriate level of force required to achieve the nation's objectives. The Marine Corps, as part of the naval team, will be utilized to promote national interests, influence vital regions, and fight and win the nation's battles. Marines will continue to deploy in support of the U.S. National Security and Military Strategies, combatant commander's theater engagement plans, ambassador's and country team's plans, and will provide civil assistance at home. Realizing the need for continued growth and improvement, the Marine Corps released *Marine Corps Strategy 21* in November 2000.

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<sup>14</sup> *Marines, Almanac 2000* provides a complete breakdown of facts concerning Marine Corps manpower statistics, personnel facts, and Marine active duty and reserve forces demographics.

*Marine Corps Strategy 21* (MSC 21) provides the vision, goals, and aims to support the development of future combat capabilities within the Marine Corps. It describes how the Marine Corps will evolve, grow, and transition for the future. MCS 21 explains that the Marine Corps will provide geographic combatant commanders with scalable, interoperable, combined-arms Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF) to shape the international environment by responding quickly to the complex spectrum of crises and conflicts. It also identifies one of its major aims as creating a dynamic training and education system to prepare Marine forces to succeed in the chaotic environment of the littorals. Additionally, it lists the aims of enhancing the Marine Corps' capability to operate in urban and austere environments, while it provides the Department of Defense with a fully integrated and coordinated non-lethal weapons program. This document clearly illustrates that the Marine Corps is placing greater emphasis on MOOTW, while maintaining its warfighting capability. It must continue to make improvements in this area to better prepare its Marines for success in the multitude of missions in the MOOTW environment.

### **THE COST OF NOT IMPROVING**

The Marine Corps needs to continue to adapt to the ever-changing world if it wants to continue being a relevant force. The U.S. military focuses its training almost exclusively on conventional warfare, but this continues to be the least likely conflict in the foreseeable future. Many critics in the U.S. government believe that the Defense Department's strategy of fighting two near simultaneous wars has caused the military to focus on a worst case scenario at the expense of real-world missions. A commission

chaired by former Senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudmen recommended abandoning the two-war strategy in order to face the more immediate realities of small-scale contingencies.<sup>15</sup> Senator Carl Levin also stated that the country needs to think carefully about the extent to which it spends limited resources on threats that are the least likely to occur.<sup>16</sup>

History demonstrates that nations successful in waging war often achieve less impressive results in MOOTW. The British achieved victory in the Falklands, but could never quell the Irish Republican Army. The Soviets had one of the strongest militaries in the world, but they lost to the Mujahidean in Afghanistan; and the United States achieved victory in the Gulf War, but experienced losses in Vietnam, Beirut, and Somalia. The Marine Corps may experience additional failures in the future if it does not improve on preparing its forces for MOOTW.

### **Visible Proof**

The 26<sup>th</sup> MEU's experiences during Operation JOINT GUARDIAN provide proof that the Marine Corps needs to improve on preparing for future contingencies. On the surface it appears that the 26<sup>th</sup> MEU(SOC) conducted a flawless operation in Kosovo. This is what the nation expects from what the Marine Corps cites as one of the best and most prepared types of unit. The MEUs are the Corps' proverbial "Tip of the Spear," but one needs to look no further than the after action reports and articles written by the leaders who conducted this mission to realize that the Marine Corps needs improvement. One captain stated that "the 'Strategic Corporal' is a real person. NCOs and junior

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<sup>15</sup> Vince Crawley, "Commission: Two War Strategy Damages Morale," *Marine Corps Times* (21 August 2000), 25.

<sup>16</sup> Vince Crawley, "Bush Advisors Propose Allies Form 'Intermediate' Peacekeeping Force," *Marine Corps Times* (4 December 2000), 12.

officers have been and will continue to be faced with perplexing dilemmas unfolding at a rapid-fire pace in Kosovo and future military operations other than war."<sup>17</sup> It was common for junior leaders to be separated from their commands by several miles in Kosovo. One platoon sector was twenty-five kilometers long and included several Serbian and Albanian villages. Another captain stated that "the NCOs were forced to develop standard operating procedures for peace enforcement/security operations on the fly, basically making them up as they went along."<sup>18</sup> Battalion Landing Team 3/8's after action report on the operation also states:

Kosovo should provide all of us with the realization that we are indeed very likely to conduct operations in an urban environment, be it full-scale combat or peacekeeping within a city. Out training is not currently established to prepare Marines effectively for these particular missions.<sup>19</sup>

If these are the views of one of the Marine Corps' best-trained units--a unit that had the benefit of a devoted and focused training cycle and additional resources--then where does that leave the rest of the Marine Corps? The Marine Corps must improve if it wants to continue to be known as the nation's force in readiness.

## **THE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT**

United States Marines must be prepared to conduct and accomplish a broad scope of missions across the spectrum of conflict. Joint Vision 2020 explains that U.S. forces

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<sup>17</sup> Capt David W. Hudspeth, USMC, "Six Lessons for Tomorrow," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Vol. 84, no. 2 (February 2000), 45.

<sup>18</sup> Capt Paul C. Merida, USMC, "The Strategic Corporal in Kosovo," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Vol. 84, no. 2 (February 2000), 47.

<sup>19</sup> Commanding Officer Battalion Landing Team 3/8 message to Commanding Officer 26<sup>th</sup> MEU(SOC), subject: "Quick Look After Action Report Operation Joint Guardian," 26 July 1999.

will achieve spectrum dominance in the accomplishment of future missions.<sup>20</sup> This implies that they will be able to conduct rapid, coordinated, and sustained operations with task organized forces tailored to specific situations. As described previously, these situations could require Marines to conduct a multitude of missions ranging from humanitarian assistance in a permissive environment to mid-intensity combat in a relatively short span of time and space. Figure 2 graphically depicts the spectrum of conflict.<sup>21</sup> It identifies a number of missions that Marines need to be prepared to conduct in the future.

Future conflict will be dynamic and fast moving. A Marine force may enter a conflict at either the low or high end of the spectrum and quickly shift to missions at the opposite end of the spectrum. This fluid transition between missions can either occur sequentially or simultaneously. These different missions may require completely different mentalities and skill sets to accomplish their individual tasks. Examples of this can be found in U.S. operations in Somalia, Haiti, and Kosovo, where the unique challenges of MOOTW were combined with episodes of mid-intensity combat. U.S. forces must have the flexibility to respond effectively to all situations and to the unique requirements created by these types of missions, on which they will undoubtedly

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<sup>20</sup> The overarching focus of JV 2020 is full spectrum dominance--achieved through the interdependent application of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full dimensional protection.

<sup>21</sup> The operations listed in Figure 2 were compiled through referencing a number of manuals, publications, reports, lectures, articles, and interviews. A detailed listing of the sources used can be found in the bibliography of this paper.

## Figure 2. Spectrum of Conflict



continue to deploy in the future.

## **The Missions Will Continue**

Although President Bush pledged to take a hard look at military deployments overseas, many top civilian and military defense officials agree that a strong global presence is vital if the U.S. wants to remain a superpower. General Henry Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated that he thinks that it is naive to think that the U.S. military will be involved only in those areas that affect U.S. vital interests.<sup>22</sup> In July 2000 all three of the U.S. Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Commanders collaborated on an article explaining the importance of naval forces in executing the geographic Commanders-in-Chief's (CINC) engagement strategies. They stated that the CINCs recognized the utility of presence as a tool for crisis response, shaping, and deterrence.<sup>23</sup> Forward deployed forces both aid the maintenance of a stable international environment and provide a symbol of U.S. commitment throughout the world. Proper preparation is essential to achieve success across the spectrum of conflict.

## **Balanced Preparation**

The Marine Corps must have a balanced training program to accomplish the missions that Marine forces will be called upon to perform. It has already been stated that the Marine Corps' primary focus for training should be on winning conventional battles; but the previous paragraphs illustrate that Marines will continue to be involved in a far larger scope of operations. *Operational Maneuver from the Sea* states that it is imperative that the Marine Corps resist the temptation to prepare for only one type of

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<sup>22</sup> Vince Crawley. "Service Leaders: Peace Missions are Inevitable," *Marine Corps Times* 27 November 2000: 11.

<sup>23</sup> Bruce B. Knutson, LtGen, USMC., Earl B. Hailston, LtGen, USMC., Emil R. Bedard, MajGen, USMC. "Marine Forces: Ready and Relevant for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Vol. 84, no.7 (July 2000): 34-35.

conflict. To focus only on one threat greatly increases the possibility that the U.S. will be surprised, and perhaps defeated, by another threat.<sup>24</sup>

Defeat can come in MOOTW as well as in combat. A force may achieve tactical success in combat and still be defeated at the operational or strategic levels due to a lack of understanding and application of the proper skill set for a particular situation. The Vietnam War and experience of Task Force Ranger in Somalia are examples of this. It can be argued that the U.S. might have succeeded in Vietnam had it treated it as a MOOTW operation rather than a war. The British success in Malay provides a perfect example of what could have occurred in Vietnam. The U.S. Marine Combined Action Platoon concept in Vietnam did achieve much success. This program relied on the knowledge, skills, and decision-making abilities of the Marine Corps' junior leaders; and the country still demands the same of its Marines today. However, the tactical actions of junior leaders need to be coordinated and supported by senior military and civilian leaders. Although U.S. failures in these two examples can be attributed to U.S. policy and not to any failure of the rifleman on the ground, they indicate that the Marine Corps needs to continue to improve its training involving the development of the skills necessary to succeed across the spectrum of conflict.

### **NECESSARY TRAITS AND SKILLS**

You may fly over a land forever, you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it and wipe it clean of life, but if you desire to defend it, protect it, and keep it for civilization, you must do this on the ground, the way the Roman legions did, by putting young men into the mud.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> United States Marine Corps. *Operational Maneuver from the Sea*, 3.

<sup>25</sup> T.R. Fernibach, *This Kind of War; a study of Unpreparedness* (New York: Macmillian Press, 1963), 251.

Marine forces must possess a wide range of skills in order to succeed across the full spectrum of conflict. Although the Marine Corps' primary task is to win the nation's battles, the Secretary of Defense provided very clear guidance to the U.S. military when he stated that U.S. forces must be multi-mission capable, and must be trained, equipped, and managed with multi-mission responsibilities in mind.<sup>26</sup> As stated previously, the majority of the Marine Corps' training is focused on combat skills. Many of the skills necessary to succeed in combat also apply to MOOTW operations, but Marines must have the mental agility to quickly transition across the spectrum of conflict. The Marine Corps should not replace, but rather augment its warfighting skills. If the Marine Corps focuses solely on training for combat, then Marines will be lacking the skills needed to transition to a MOOTW environment. Marines will respond to a situation in the way that they have been trained. The application of combat skills alone in MOOTW will lead to mission failure. General Zinni stated that "the situations you're going to be faced with go far beyond what you're trained for in a very narrow military sense...that rigid military thinking can get you into trouble."<sup>27</sup>

In some respects the MOOTW environment is more complex and stressful than that found in combat. In combat, the battlefield usually consists of two or more easily identifiable belligerents fighting along linear fronts where innocent civilians are often times evacuated. Along this linear battlefield, Marines will be primarily concerned with the terrain and enemy threat and not with the numerous other factors associated with MOOTW. MOOTW operations occur in functioning societies occupied by

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<sup>26</sup> Department of Defense. *Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress*, 17.

<sup>27</sup> Zinni, 276.

multidimensional threats, multinational forces, government agencies, NGO's, PVO's, cultural sensitivities, and many other factors that provide junior Marines with far more information to synthesize than that found in combat. The enemy in MOOTW is abstract. It will consist of physical belligerents as well as non-physical entities such as starvation, anarchy, and chaos. Marines will be required to think beyond military convention in this environment. The complex nature of this environment requires the Marine Corps to train its Marines for combat and MOOTW simultaneously in order to continue to succeed across the full spectrum of conflict.

**The Traits**

The Marine Corps must develop a plethora of traits in its Marines to continue to succeed in future conflict. Marines must possess a warrior spirit with the ability to adapt to the uncertainties and complexities of the spectrum of conflict. They must tolerate ambiguity, uncertainty, and friction, while they make informed judgements on taking decisive action to accomplish their mission. Figure 3 lists some of the many traits that must be developed in Marines through their training programs.<sup>28</sup>

**Figure 3. Traits required for MOOTW**

Honor	Personal Accountability	Flexibility
Courage	Self-Discipline	Patience
Commitment	Resolve	Impartiality
Integrity	Restraint	Tact
Initiative	Maturity	Inquisitiveness
Decisiveness	Judgement	Imagination
Adaptability	Strength of Character	Mental Agility

**Transformation**

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<sup>28</sup> This list of traits was created by referencing a number of articles, manuals, publications, lectures, and interviews concerning MOOTW. See the bibliography of this paper for a complete list of the sources used.

General Krulak identified a three-step process that would develop these traits in Marines and prepare them for success in future conflicts. The first step involves the transformation that occurs when a civilian first meets a Marine Corps recruiter. General Krulak stated that the Marine Corps must recruit bold, capable, and intelligent men and women of character and instill in them the Marine Corps' enduring ethos of honor, courage, and commitment. This emphasis on character development will serve as the foundation upon which all additional training will be built. Step two consists of an institutional commitment to lifelong professional development provided through the Marine Corps' formal schools, unit training, education programs, and individual efforts. The final step consists of the development and sustainment of leadership abilities in the Marine Corps' junior leadership. The Marine Corps is doing extremely well in developing many of the intangible traits listed above during step one of this process, but it needs to place greater emphasis on step two, and to a lesser degree, step three. The Marine Corps needs to improve on how it prepares its Marines for future MOOTW operations. There are a multitude of skills that Marines must become proficient in to continue to succeed on future missions.

### **The Skills**

The skills necessary to conduct a MOOTW operation can be categorized into three types:<sup>29</sup>

1. Existing skills that are directly translatable along the entire spectrum of conflict (i.e. The operation of a reverse osmosis unit).
2. Existing skills that require some modification to apply across the spectrum of conflict (i.e. MOUT or patrolling).
3. Skills that do not currently exist in formal Marine Corps training programs.

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<sup>29</sup> The idea of categorizing the skills needed to succeed in a MOOTW environment in this fashion came from an interview conducted between General Zinni, USMC (Ret) and the author.

The skills found in category one are mostly technical oriented and require a standard procedure or process to function. These skills remain the same regardless of the environment in which they are executed. There are many more skills found in categories two and three that are less tangible. The methods in which they are conducted depend on the current environment. Many of these skills can be found in existing Marine Corps training standards, but they may only apply to a very limited military occupational specialty (MOS). In many cases, many more Marines outside of a specific MOS may be required to perform that function. An example of this can be found in the many skills traditionally conducted by military police that were necessary for the Marines of the 26<sup>th</sup> MEU(SOC) to accomplish their mission in Kosovo, where they received over twenty five "911" calls per day.<sup>30</sup> Many of the traditional skills required by small, select groups of Marines like military police, counter-intelligence, interrogator/translator, and civil affairs are now required by a larger Marine Corps population to accomplish MOOTW operations. Figure 4 provides a categorized list of many of the skills required by Marines to conduct MOOTW operations--regardless of their MOS.<sup>31</sup>

**Figure 4. Skills required for MOOTW**

**Category 1. Existing skills that are directly translatable.**

-This category includes a myriad of technical skills too numerous to cover in the scope of this paper. Many of the skills found in this category are support oriented and would be used extensively in humanitarian operations. Some of the less obvious and more general skills in this category include:

- NBC Defense                      -Evade/Resist capture                      -Survival skills
- Mine/unexploded ordnance/Improvised explosive device awareness
- Vehicle/aircraft/watercraft/weapon/uniform identification

<sup>30</sup> United States Marine Corps. Battalion Landing Team 3/8. "BLT 3/8 Measure of Effectiveness Analysis." 11 July 1999.

<sup>31</sup> This list of skills was compiled by referencing numerous reports, manuals, publications, official documents, articles, lectures, and interviews. See the bibliography of this paper for a complete listing of the references used.

**Category 2. Existing skills requiring modification.**

<p>-The skills in this category can be found in the mission requirements of at least one MOS. Their implementation may require modification in the application of these skills according to the situation and will likely be performed by Marines outside the standard MOS requiring the skill.</p>	
-Rules of Engagement	-Criminal/Accident investigations
-Escalation of Force	-Investigate Complaints/Violations
-Civil Disturbance/Riot Control	-Establish/Supervise Protected Zones
-Employment of Riot Control Agents	-Process Confiscated Docs/Equip/Materials
-Counter Intelligence	-Interagency Operations/Roles NGOs/PVOs
-Observation/Monitor/Reporting	-Cooperate with U.S. Authorities
-Nonlethal Weapons Employment	-Info. Exchange with Non-U.S. Military
-Breaching Techniques	-Road Block/Checkpoint/Entry Control Ops
-Force Protection/Physical Security	-Land Navigation/Urban
-First Aid/Hygiene/Disease Prevent	-Command Post Operations in MOOTW
-Communications	-Observations Post Operations in MOOTW
-Psychological Operations	-Surveillance/Reconnaissance
-Unarmed Combat	-Helicopter Operations in MOUT/MOOTW
-EPW/Detainee Handling/Disarming	-Tank/LAV/AAV Employment in MOUT
-Marksmanship	-Reserve/Quick Reaction Force
-Sniper/Countersniper Employment	-MOUT/Room/Building Clearing
-Designated Marksman Employment	-Operational Security
-Foot/Mobile/Urban Patrolling	-Military Working Dog Employment
-Vehicle/Personnel Search	-Judgement Skills
-Convoy Operations	-Decision Making Skills
-Route Security	-Trend/Pattern Analysis

**Category 3. Skills not currently covered by existing standards.**

<p>-The skills in this category may be required for success in a MOOTW environment, but are not listed as a mission requirement for any MOS in Marine Corps training programs.</p>	
-Cultural Awareness Training	-Language Training
-Human Behavior/Group Dynamics	-Media/Public Affairs Training
-Municipal Operations	-Interagency Operations
-Judicial Operations	-Foreign Weapons Familiarization
-Conduct Negotiations/Mediation	-Defensive Driving
-Stress Management	-Reaction to Hostage Situations
-Support to Elections	-Inspection of Facilities

All Marines actively engaged in a MOOTW operation may require the majority of skills listed above. The exact skills are dependent on the situation, a unit's mission, and a Marine's billet. This paper will not attempt to link specific skills to specific units, billets, or MOS's. It is a unit commander's responsibility to identify their unit's Mission Essential Task List (METL) and develop a training plan to provide their Marines with the skills necessary to accomplish their mission. Although certain skills such as cultural awareness, language, and force protection are applicable to all Marines, other skills may only apply to units more directly involved on the ground in a MOOTW operation. Unit commanders must reference joint publications, Marine Corps doctrinal, warfighting, and reference publications, and Marine Corps orders and directives in establishing their METL's and training plans to prepare for success on future contingencies. Unfortunately, the amount of information that must be reviewed in conducting this process is enormous. Doctrine provides the starting point on which all other planning is based.

## **DOCTRINE: THE STARTING POINT**

### **Joint Doctrine**

The Marine Corps recognizes that it will operate as part of a joint team in the future. The joint staff provides a number of publications that establish joint doctrine for how U.S. forces will conduct many of the missions associated with MOOTW. Figure 5 lists the current and working joint operations publications applicable to these types of operations.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> See the Joint Publication Web Page at <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/joint.htm> for a complete listing of all joint publications and their current status.

**Figure 5. Joint Doctrine for MOOTW**

<b><u>Publication</u></b>	<b><u>Subject</u></b>
JP 3-07	Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War
JP 3-07.1	JTTP for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)
JP 3-07.2	JTTP for Antiterrorism
JP 3-07.3	JTTP for Peace Operations
JP 3-07.4	Joint Counter drug Operations
JP 3-07.5	JTTP for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
JP 3-07.6	JTTP for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance
JP 3-07.7	JTTP for Domestic Support Operations
JP 3-08	Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations

The Marine Corps utilizes these publications to develop its own concepts, doctrinal publications, and other reference materials.

### **Marine Corps Doctrine**

The Doctrine Division, Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC), Quantico, Virginia, is responsible for coordinating the development, publication, and maintenance of Marine Corps service doctrine. It has made advances in converting the Marine Corps' concepts for warfighting and MOOTW into doctrine and publishing them in the form of Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications (MCDP) and Marine Corps Warfighting Publications (MCWP). The capstone publication that describes the Marine Corps' warfighting philosophy is MCDP-1, *Warfighting*.

*Warfighting* provides Marines with the doctrine needed to accomplish their mission. Maneuver warfare, the Marine Corps' warfighting doctrine described in MCDP-1, provides the foundation in preparing for MOOTW. In many instances the principles of maneuver warfare apply to future conflicts; but the tactics, techniques, and procedures may have to be modified to accommodate different situations. Leaders will use this doctrine to ensure that Marine forces remain effective throughout the entire spectrum of

conflict in the future. The MCWP's provide a bridge between philosophies and the tactics, techniques, and procedures needed to succeed in future conflict.

The Marine Corps Warfighting Publications provide guidance to Marines for conducting a number of missions across the spectrum of conflict. Although currently in draft form, MCWP-01, *Marine Corps Operations*, provides evidence that the Marine Corps is placing greater emphasis on MOOTW. It devotes an entire chapter to MOOTW, while it describes the principles, types of operations, and considerations applicable to operations other than war. MCWP-01 provides the foundation on which many other warfighting publications are based. Figure 6 provides a list of those MCWP's currently published, or in the development stage, that relate to MOOTW.<sup>33</sup>

**Figure 6. Marine Corps Warfighting Publications relating to MOOTW**

<b><u>Publication</u></b>	<b><u>Subject</u></b>
MCWP 3-33	Military Operations Other Than War
MCWP 3-33.1	MAGTF Civil Affairs/FMFM 7-34
MCWP 3-33.2	Civil Disturbance/FM 19-15
MCWP 3-33.3	Marine Corps Public Affairs
MCWP 3-33.4	Domestic Support Operations/FMFM 7-10/FM 100-19
MCWP 3-33.5	Counterinsurgency
MCWP 3-33.6	Humanitarian Assistance Operations/FMFM 7-16/ALSA Publication

The Marine Corps also publishes a number of reference publications to assist commanders.

### **Reference Publications**

In addition to the Marine Corps' warfighting publications specifically addressing MOOTW, the Marine Corps publishes several Marine Corps Reference Publications (MCRP) and historical Fleet Marine Force Reference Publications (FMFRP) that provide

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<sup>33</sup> See the Marine Corps Doctrine Division Homepage at <http://www.doctrine.usmc.mil> for a complete listing of Marine Corps Warfighting Publications and their status.

additional information in establishing training plans as well as in preparing for MOOTW operations. Figure 7 lists those references currently being published that are most applicable to operations other than war.<sup>34</sup>

**Figure 7. Marine Corps Reference Publications relating to MOOTW**

<b><u>Publication</u></b>	<b><u>Subject</u></b>
MCRP 3-33A	Counter-Guerrilla Operations/FMFRP 7-83/FM 90-
MCRP 3-33B	Foreign Humanitarian Consequence Management Operations
FMFRP 12-15	Small Wars Manual
FMFRP 12-25	The Guerrilla & How to Fight Him
FMFRPs 12-40-12-43	Professional Knowledge Gained from Experience in Vietnam

Although all of the publications discussed above describe some of the requirements needed to conduct MOOTW operations, they do not provide a unit commander with a comprehensive list of the standards needed to develop a training plan for preparing Marines to continue to succeed on these missions. Marine Corps orders and directives provide this guidance.

## **CURRENT MARINE CORPS TRAINING STANDARDS AND PRACTICES**

### **Individual Training Standards System (ITSS)**

All Marine Corps training standards are derived from specific mission requirements and have been developed using current doctrine. They provide commanders with a baseline to determine their unit's deficiencies and strengths, to establish training plans, and to evaluate the results of this training. Training standards are expressed as Individual Training Standards (ITS) for all MOS's or grades, and collective

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<sup>34</sup>See the Marine Corps Doctrine Division Homepage at <http://www.doctrine.usmc.mil> for a

training standards for all type units. The Individual Training Standards System (ITSS), described in Marine Corps Order (MCO) 1510.34A, provides a common base of training for all Marines who have the same MOS. It identifies specific tasks and levels of training that are required of different MOS's. The ITSS also assists unit commanders in ensuring that their training programs are performance and mission oriented. It allows commanders to practice training management in planning, resourcing, conducting, and evaluating training requirements based on the most probable mission that their units will be called upon to perform. The ITSS does not provide commanders with a single source reference to identify the training standards or programs of instruction to train their Marines in the skills listed in Figure 4, or other skills required to succeed in a MOOTW environment. Commanders must currently review literally thousands of pages of Marine Corps Orders, while utilizing the Systems Approach to Training (SAT) in preparing their Marines for future contingencies.

### **The Systems Approach to Training (SAT)**

The Marine Corps Training and Education System establishes the Systems Approach to Training as the methodology for all Marine Corps training in terms of specific objectives written in the ITSS to support task performance in the Fleet Marine Force.<sup>35</sup> The SAT consists of the following five steps:

1. Analysis - Identify a unit's mission requirements and training goals.
2. Design - Select training tasks, personnel to be trained, and incorporate into training plans.
3. Development - Review and select the facilities and resources needed to conduct training.
4. Implementation - Schedule, announce, and conduct training.

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complete listing of Marine Corps Reference Publications (MCRP) and historical Fleet Marine Force Reference Publications (FMFRP) and their status.

<sup>35</sup> See MCO 1553.1B. "The Marine Corps Training and Education System" for a detailed explanation of the Systems Approach to Training.

5. Evaluation - Check the effectiveness of training and that job performance is satisfactory.

Although this process provides a solid framework for ensuring that Marines are properly prepared to accomplish their mission, the Marine Corps needs to improve in a number of areas for the process to effectively prepare Marines for MOOTW.

Commanders will find it difficult to conduct a thorough analysis of their mission requirements and training goals in preparation for a MOOTW mission. As stated previously, the Marine Corps does not possess a single source reference for Marines to utilize in determining the types of skills and other mission requirements needed to conduct specific MOOTW missions. They must review numerous doctrinal, warfighting, and reference publications, Marine Corps orders, articles in professional journals, and after action reports to identify those skills and standards that Marines may need to succeed on a MOOTW mission. Inevitably, therefore, commanders are forced to develop their training plans from scratch, even though someone else in the past has likely accomplished a task similar to that which they are preparing to perform. The lack of adequate training facilities and limited resources also complicates a unit's attempts to develop a realistic training program.

Many future MOOTW operations will be conducted in the urban sprawl of the littorals. Current Marine Corps MOOTW training areas are only large enough to effectively train platoon to company size units; and any training conducted in functioning towns, cities, or other urban areas is often limited, costly, and man-power intensive to support.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory's PROJECT METROPOLIS, Phase 1 After Action Report provides a good explanation of the inherent frustrations and difficulties associated with military training in functional municipal areas.

These shortfalls make it increasingly difficult to implement and evaluate realistic and productive MOOTW oriented training events.

The Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation System (MCCRES) provides commanders with a training management and diagnostic tool.<sup>37</sup> It is an evaluation system based on Mission Performance Standards (MPS), which should also be utilized in developing training plans. Although the MCCRES provides some MPS's for specific skills associated with combat and some MOOTW tasks, it does not provide separate consolidated volumes devoted to specific standard performance tasks associated with MOOTW missions. This makes it difficult for unit commanders to determine their unit's readiness to conduct MOOTW operations. Regardless of these shortfalls, the Marine Corps is beginning to make some headway in improving its Marine's abilities to succeed in future contingencies.

### **Steps in the Right Direction**

The Marine Corps recognizes the need to constantly improve on its warfighting capability. It has recently implemented a number of programs to better prepare for war and MOOTW operations.

#### Martial Arts Program

The Marine Corps' new martial arts program will better prepare Marines both physically and mentally for combat and MOOTW.<sup>38</sup> It is designed to begin training Marines at entry-level schools in how to handle themselves across the full spectrum of

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<sup>37</sup> See MCO 3501.1C, "Marine Corps Combat Readiness and Evaluation System (MCCRES) for a detailed description of the MCCRES.

<sup>38</sup> John Sayas. "Transforming Warriors," *Quantico Sentry*, 17 November 2000, 66<sup>th</sup> year, no. 21., C1.

violence. It trains Marines in physical techniques and also emphasizes values, ethics, and character development.

The physical techniques Marines learn will be able to be applied throughout the entire spectrum of conflict, from humanitarian operations to full-scale battle. Most importantly, the moral and mental discipline will give the individual Marine the strength of character and sound judgement to determine what action is appropriate.<sup>39</sup>

This program will progress and be sustained throughout a Marine's career. It will undoubtedly assist in the development of the traits and skills required from MOOTW listed in Figures 2 and 3.

### MOUT/Urban Training

The Marine Corps firmly believes that it will conduct operations in the urban areas of the littorals in the future. In 1998, the Department of Defense designated the Marine Corps as the lead service for developing joint doctrine for urban operations. This set the Marine Corps in motion in aggressively pursuing a series of urban warfighting experiments, titled URBAN WARRIOR, under the tutelage of the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab. To date, the focus of this experimentation has been on fighting combat in a MOUT environment. The Warfighting Lab's most recent experiment, titled PROJECT METROPOLIS, identified a number of potential tactics, techniques, and procedures that could potentially diminish the number of casualties sustained in an urban fight.<sup>40</sup> Beginning in January 2001, the Warfighting Lab began to shift its focus from

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<sup>39</sup> John Sayas. "Transforming Warriors," *Quantico Sentry*, 17 November 2000, 66<sup>th</sup> year, no. 21., C1.

<sup>40</sup> The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL) has published a number of after action reports concerning both URBAN WARRIOR and PROJECT METROPOLIS. In addition, a number of articles have been published in the *Marine Corps Gazette* concerning these experiments. A listing of some of these articles can be found in the bibliography of this paper. The MCWL's experiments focused largely on how technology can assist MAGTFs operating in an urban environment. They identified several shortfalls in existing technology, while identifying a number of requirements to both enhance training and operational performance in an urban environment. See the MCWL's after action report on these

combat operations to conducting MOOTW operations in an urban environment. The continued experimentation and innovation displayed by Marines and civilians involved with these projects will assuredly reveal additional procedures that will assist in safeguarding Marines, while increasing the Marine Corps' ability to accomplish future missions. The Warfighting Lab is also currently working on input for a MOUT training and readiness (T&R) manual.

### Training and Readiness Manuals

The Marine Corps Training and Education (T&E) Command is currently developing training and readiness manuals for its ground forces.<sup>41</sup> The Marine aviation community has been utilizing a T&R program for years to provide commanders with standardized programs of instruction (POI) for all aviation personnel. The goal of the program is to develop unit warfighting capabilities by identifying standards, regulations, and policies regarding the training of Marines. The aviation T&R manuals identify specific mission qualifications and instructor requirements and delineate mission essential tasks and core competencies required for each aircraft type. The T&E Command is currently using this successful program as a model for continuing to develop a similar program for the Marine Corps' ground combat arms and MOUT operations.

There is currently no plan to produce a T&R manual to address MOOTW operations.

### Interagency Staff Training

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experiments for a detailed explanation on these technologies. Regardless of what technological advances are eventually implemented, success in MOOTW will still require the sound judgment and decision-making ability of the young Marine on the ground.

<sup>41</sup> The Ground Combat Element Branch of the Marine Corps Training and Education Command is currently working on Training and Readiness manuals for Infantry, Military Operations in Urban Terrain, Reconnaissance, and Advanced Armor Amphibian Vehicles (AAAV). It also developed T&Rs for tanks, intelligence, Armored Assault Vehicles (AAV), Light Armored Reconnaissance (LAR), and artillery. These T&Rs can be viewed on the Training and Education Standards Branch homepage at <http://www.tecom.usmc.mil/sids>.

The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory and the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) have taken steps to address the unique character of civil-military interoperability. I MEF annually hosts a six-day humanitarian assistance/disaster relief symposium, titled EMERALD EXPRESS, to familiarize Marines and civilians at the general officer staff level with the coordination and interaction that is required between military and civil authorities in a MOOTW environment.<sup>42</sup> Participants in the seminar conducted in 2000 consisted of four CINCs, ambassadors, representatives from NGO, PVO and government organizations, health care officials, and media and religious personnel. Although this seminar provides many high ranking Marine officers with an awareness of the unique requirements of interagency operations, its target audience is too narrow. It does not provide the MEU, regimental, or battalion staffs that will be directly engaged with these many agencies on the ground with the same awareness.

The Marine Corps is taking other steps to better prepare for future contingencies, but it can still do more. It is lacking a standardized training program to prepare for MOOTW operations. Although a number of sources addressing MOOTW are available, unit commanders must review thousands of pages to capture the specific tasks and standards needed to adequately train their Marines in preparation for MOOTW. Once a commander identifies the standards that they want to train to, they find that the Marine Corps lacks adequate training facilities to provide realistic training for units beyond the

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<sup>42</sup> See the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) internet homepage for further information on interagency operations and a compilation of NGO/PVOs associated with EMERALD EXPRESS. The Marine Corps and the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies announced the creation of the Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities (CETO) in December 2000. CETO will focus on exploring innovative ways to deal with nontraditional threats to U.S. national security, while attempting to solve the problem of lessons learned from nontraditional military operations conducted since the end of the Cold War. The result of all research, analysis, seminars, and simulated war games will be submitted to the Marine Corps Combat Development Command for possible transformation into operational products. CETO will also

company level. In addition, there is no standardized evaluation system in place to ensure that all Marine units that will likely perform MOOTW operations are sufficiently prepared to do so. There are a number of efforts that the Marine Corps should undertake to better prepare for future contingencies.

## **SHORTCOMINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

It is easy to provide recommendations to correct an organization's deficiencies, but the implementation of those recommendations is not an easy task. The challenge in making recommendations to the Marine Corps is to ensure that they are not only feasible, but also acceptable. The Marine Corps is by no means failing. On the contrary, it has achieved unparalleled success on the countless operations that it has conducted throughout the years. The limited time and resources available to Marines are already being stretched to their limits. Nevertheless, the Marine Corps will continue to face new challenges in fighting battles and conducting MOOTW operations. As explained earlier, these operations cannot be looked at separately. The Three Block Wars of the future will call on the Marines to conduct combat operations in close relation to other MOOTW operations across the spectrum of conflict. The recommendations listed in this treatise take these factors into account. They were developed with the five overriding considerations listed below.<sup>43</sup>

1. Provide commanders with the tools needed to better prepare for future contingencies.
2. Augment existing warfighting capabilities.

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assume responsibility for EMERALD EXPRESS. Also see the EMERALD EXPRESS internet address at: <http://www.cpp.usmc.mil/imef/ee98/emerald.htm>.

<sup>43</sup> These considerations are based on the concerns of the many Marines interviewed by the author ranging from a platoon sergeant to a former Commander in Chief (CINC). See the bibliography of this paper for a complete list of those interviewed.

3. Minimize the impact on operational tempo.
4. Minimize the additional resources needed to implement recommendations.
5. Provide added incentive to Marines to develop the knowledge and skills needed to better prepare for future contingencies.

### **Cultural Awareness Training**

In this era of multinational operations and complex threats involving ethnic, religious, and cultural strife, regional expertise, language proficiency, and cross-cultural communication skills have never been more important to the U.S. military.

--National Security Strategy<sup>44</sup>

A thorough understanding of the culture that Marines may be engaged with is imperative in order to minimize any inadvertent provocation of a local populace through Marine's inappropriate actions or negative perceptions of Marine actions. The Marine Corps teaches discipline and restraint to all Marines, but rarely do Marines receive lessons in the history, geography, languages, customs, religions, ethnic groups, and sensitivities of the region that they will be deployed to on contingencies prior to receiving an execute order. The failure to adequately understand the values, infrastructure, and decision making process of a culture can be devastating. Two hundred and forty one Marines paid for this lesson with their lives in Beirut when one faction perceived the Marines as being partial to an opposing faction. Approximately ten years later another poor assessment of a culture led entire neighborhoods of Somalis, including women and children, to engage U.S. Rangers and Delta Force soldiers in the streets of Mogadishu. This lack of understanding by U.S. personnel led to eighteen more U.S. deaths. In both of these examples, U.S. forces learned that trying to superimpose U.S. values and standards onto another people's culture can only aggravate the situation. General Zinni

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<sup>44</sup> U.S. President, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, December 1999, 21.

provides another example of how a lack of culture awareness can lead to frustration and wasted efforts.

We couldn't just bring them (the Kurds) down into a nice temporary military camp that we built with nice lined-up tents, everything very military, very organized. Kurds don't like to live that way. They live in bajeers, which are their communities, inside of which they have zozans (their villages) and little gunds (their neighborhoods), in which all the shelters and buildings need to be facing inboard and all the head facilities (toilets) facing a certain direction, but there has to be a certain layout...this became a very, very trying and difficult effort...for military guys, basic infantrymen like myself, this is an all new experience.<sup>45</sup>

The time to gain an awareness of the importance of cultures is not when you first step foot on foreign soil. It is also too late to start after receiving an execute order to a contingency. There are far too many other tasks that will take priority when preparing to deploy on an operation. Marines should receive an introduction to this subject during entry-level training, and begin focused cultural awareness training upon joining their first unit.

### Recommendation

The Marine Corps should task the Marine Corps Institute (MCI) with publishing a series of cultural awareness correspondence courses.<sup>46</sup> The first book in the series should provide all Marines with a broad understanding of cultures in general, their importance and components, without focusing on any particular region. Completion of this first book should be mandatory for all entry level Marines, both enlisted and officers. This first book should be followed by a series of more detailed cultural awareness books categorized by the regions corresponding to the geographic combatant commander's areas

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<sup>45</sup> Zinni, 250.

<sup>46</sup> See the Marine Corps Institute internet homepage at <http://www.mci.usmc.mil> for a description of the organization and complete list of correspondence courses currently offered by MCI.

of responsibility. Unit commanders could utilize these books as training aids in preparing their Marines for deployment to a particular region of the world. Completion of these follow-on courses should not be mandatory, but rather provide commanders with the flexibility to increase their Marines' cultural awareness as time permits. The publishing, review, and revisions of this series of courses could be tied into the existing Foreign and Regional Area Officers (FAO/RAO) programs.<sup>47</sup> Part of the pay back tour requirement for Marines accepted to these programs should be utilized in managing this series through MCI.

### **Language Training**

The need for Marines trained in communicating in a foreign language cannot be overstated. Very few of the countries that Marines are deployed to use English as their primary language. Having Marines that are able to communicate with a local populace allows a force to better inform the locals of its mission and requirements. This will help reduce misunderstandings and help ensure compliance with Marine desires, while it minimizes the potential for violence. In addition, the presence of Marines trained in a foreign language can facilitate the collection of information.

Marine units have often been forced to hire civilians to act as interpreters due to the lack of Marines available who are fluent in the language of a local populace. This led to some distinct problems. Many of the translators assigned to 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, 2<sup>nd</sup> Marines in support of Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY arrived the day before landing in Haiti with no uniforms, gear, or other essential items. The Combined Task Force (CTF) responsible for conducting Operation UNITED SHIELD in Somalia was forced to

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<sup>47</sup> See MCO 1520.11D, "Foreign Area Officer (FAO) and International Relations Officer (IRO) Program." for further information concerning the FAO/RAO programs.

contract Somali speaking U.S. citizens who arrived on board ship with certain assurances and expectations. Unfortunately, the realities of shipboard living made the fulfillment of these promises impossible, resulting in many of the linguists terminating their contracts and demanding to be returned to the United States. This left the CTF without a critical capability prior to landing. The shortage of interpreters in Kosovo forced the 26<sup>th</sup> MEU(SOC) to utilize signals intelligence and counter-intelligence Marines in this role. This reduced the MEU's collection capability during the initial and potentially most dangerous phase of this operation. Many more examples of the problems associated with not having sufficient Marines able to communicate in a foreign language can be found in the after action reports concerning the numerous operations that Marines have conducted over the past 100 years.<sup>48</sup>

The Marine Corps currently has a Foreign Language Program (MCFLP).<sup>49</sup> This program, taught at the Defense Language Institute, Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC), offers courses in basic, intermediate, advanced, and sustainment training for more than thirty languages. Unfortunately the only Marines assigned to this school are filling critical billets in the intelligence, cryptologic, FAO, RAO, joint, and security assistance areas. The Marine Corps does not have the time or resources to send sufficient numbers of Marines from the operating forces to this school. A local solution is required.

### Recommendation

The Marine Corps Foreign Language Program should be expanded to include the contracting of local colleges and universities, which are already teaching classes on the

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<sup>48</sup> The Joint Unit Lessons Learned System (JULLS) and Marine Corps Lessons Learned System (MCLLS) provide numerous examples of operations in which Marines cited the lack of adequate interpreters as an important shortfall in the successful completion of their missions.

major Marine Corps bases, in order to provide language training to a core of select Marines. The Marine Corps already has Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) implemented with a number of schools teaching on its major bases. These MOU's should be expanded to provide language courses in four separate universal languages spoken throughout the world. All Marines should be administered the Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB) to identify those Marines best suited for learning a language. Each MEF could use this pool of potential candidates to fulfill an annual quota of Marines that they are permitted to send to this training. The MEF's would be responsible for coordinating the languages, time, and locations of this training with their base's Command Education Centers.

This program would be beneficial to the Marine Corps, schools, and Marines receiving the training. The Marine Corps would enhance its translator capability, while it forms a pool to source its more advanced language programs. The schools would be guaranteed the revenue that these courses would produce, and the individual Marine would receive a number of benefits to complete the course and sustain their acquired language skill. Marines would receive eight college credit hours, paid for by the Marine Corps, while becoming proficient in a foreign language.<sup>50</sup> A Marine will need between 120 and 150 hours of studying to receive a satisfactory score of 2/2 on the Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT). Marines attaining a score of 2/2 on the DLPT would be eligible to receive Foreign Language Proficiency Pay (FLPP) of between \$25 and

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<sup>49</sup> See MCO 1550.25. "Marine Corps Foreign Language Program" for a detailed explanation of this program.

<sup>50</sup> The information concerning the ability of the civilian colleges teaching on Marine Corps bases to support this program was derived from an interview that the author conducted with Ms. Susan McIntosh, the Command Education Officer for Marine Corps Base Quantico.

\$100 per month.<sup>51</sup> Marines should also receive fifteen points toward their promotion for each four credit hour class that they complete on this program, vice the ten points currently authorized for completion of a college class.

### **Simulation Training**

Simulation trainers are invaluable training aids. They provide commanders with the tools necessary to help train their small unit leaders in making sound tactical decisions when confronted with limited time, space, and resources. These interactive decision making tools can range from a single Marine utilizing a personal computer to a squad of Marines using pneumatic weapons to engage targets projected on a life-size screen. Units are able to train Marines on a variety of scenarios across the entire spectrum of conflict utilizing the video technology provided by some of these systems. The most recent simulation trainers employed in the Marine Corps are the computer game DOOM, the Indoor Simulated Marksmanship Trainer (ISMT), and the Collins Combat Decision Range (CCDR). Many units have utilized these systems to increase their Marine's operational readiness.

Although Marines receive some excellent training using these systems, their benefit diminishes if the scenarios presented are not updated. Marines become quickly familiar with the standard scenarios used and know how they should respond before a decision is even required. If not continuously updated, Marines will eventually become bored with the systems and stop using them. The ISMT and CCDR possess the capability to create new scenarios, but few units have the time and resources to undertake this project.

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<sup>51</sup> See MCO 1550.25 Marine Corps Foreign Language Program and MCO 7220.52C Foreign Language Proficiency Pay Program for more information on these programs.

## Recommendation

The Marine Corps Training and Education Command should be given responsibility for conducting annual reviews and updates to simulation trainers. Updated scenarios should be based on real world experiences of Marines who conduct combat and MOOTW operations. Whenever possible, these scenarios should be filmed in the environments where these contingencies have taken place. Published manuals describing the scenarios that can be used by units that don't have the infrastructure available to support the use of electronic equipment should accompany these updates. The Marine Corps also needs to develop new situational training scenario programs that can be used by a single Marine using a personal computer. The computer game DOOM does little to stimulate a Marine's decision-making skills.

### **MOOTW Manual (Small Wars Manual #2)**

The Marine Corps is not doing enough to capture and disseminate the many lessons learned by Marines participating in MOOTW operations. U.S. Marines conducted forty-eight MOOTW operations between 1995-2000 alone. The only formal system in place to capture the lessons learned on these missions is the Marine Corps Lessons Learned System (MCLLS). Unfortunately, the MCLLS is not user friendly. It is time consuming, requires a computer to access, and the information is often not current. The Marine Corps faced a similar problem earlier in the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

Little emphasis was given to what was then termed as small wars following the First World War. This focus began to shift as Marines deployed on a number of operations that were dubbed the Banana Wars. Although Marines were increasingly involved with these operations short of war, no attempt was made to capture the many

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lessons that were learned the hard way by Marines on the ground until 1934. In August 1934, Major Charles Miller wrote an article in the Marine Corps Gazette that voiced the need for a work that would consolidate these lessons into a presentable form. This led to the publishing of the *Small Wars Manual* in 1935. This enduring publication has proven extremely useful in helping to prepare Marines for future contingencies. Its value is evident in the fact that it is still being printed today and is listed in Figure 7 of this paper as FMFRP12-15. Although many of the lessons presented in the *Small Wars Manual* are still applicable today, it is nevertheless dated.

### Recommendation

The Marine Corps Doctrine Division should publish a modern version of the *Small Wars Manual*. This work could be titled the *MOOTW Manual* and capture the many lessons learned in the numerous operations that Marines have participated in since the Vietnam War. This manual should reiterate the lessons learned that are found in the *Small Wars Manual* that are still applicable today. It should also address many of the issues unique to modern MOOTW operations. These issues consist of such topics as force protection, terrorism, and the impact of technology on operations today. This reference would be an invaluable tool to commanders in educating their Marines and developing their training plans to prepare their units for continued success on future contingencies.

### **Quarterly MOOTW Magazine**

Although the Marine Corps publishes numerous doctrinal and reference materials addressing MOOTW, it does not publish a document targeting junior Marines and the challenges they will face in future contingencies. A colorful, easy to read publication

should be produced that will capture the interests of junior Marines, as it instills in them the lessons learned by fellow Marines conducting MOOTW operations. The Marine Corps should make every effort to continuously familiarize its Strategic Corporals with the types of environments and requirements expected of them on these missions.

The Marine Corps Division of Public Affairs currently publishes *Marines*, a monthly magazine that is distributed throughout the Marine Corps at no cost to Marines. *Marines* covers general subjects applicable to all Marines. The Division of Public Affairs also publishes a quarterly issue of *Ground Warrior* in the same format as *Marines*. This magazine focuses solely on safety issues concerning Marine ground units. Neither of these magazines specifically addresses MOOTW.

#### Recommendation

The Marine Corps Division of Public Affairs should be tasked with publishing a quarterly magazine devoted solely to MOOTW operations. The target audience for this publication would be the junior Marines who will be conducting MOOTW operations in the future. Each issue should consist of sections that focus on regional and cultural awareness, describe recently conducted MOOTW operations, and give testimonies of young Marines who have conducted these operations. Numerous color photos that depict these operations should be included in each issue. When no current operation information is available, historical examples can be addressed. Junior Marines will be far more likely to read a document presented in the above form than to read a formal reference or doctrinal publication. The publication of this magazine will help develop the proper mentality that is required by junior Marines in conducting MOOTW operations,

and will also display the Marine Corps' reliance on them for accomplishing these missions.

### **MOOTW Training and Readiness Manual**

As described previously, the Training and Education Command is developing T&R manuals, based on the aviation communities' T&R program, to address Marine ground combat and MOUT operations. These efforts will undoubtedly help achieve the Commandant's goal to standardize Marine Corps training, but no effort has been initiated to create a MOOTW T&R manual.

The Marine Corps is in dire need of a single source document that identifies the standards, individual core skills, and unit core capabilities that will support the METL's of units preparing to conduct future contingencies. A MOOTW manual will assist commanders in increasing their unit's operational capabilities and readiness through the development of well-organized and focused training plans. It will also provide guidance to the Marine Corps' formal schools that will include MOOTW subjects in their curriculums. It will further lead to the development of Mission Performance Standards (MPS) that will be evaluated during a MCCRE to provide commanders with an accurate measure of their unit's readiness.

### Recommendation

The Marine Corps Training and Education Command should be tasked with publishing a MOOTW T&R manual. This manual would consolidate many of the existing ITS's relating to the skills listed in Categories 1 and 2 of Figure 4 in this paper. T&E Command should also lead a study that will help identify new ITS's based on the

skills listed in Category 3 of Figure 4 of this paper, as well as MPS's that need to be developed and included in the MOOTW T&R manual.

### **MOOTW Instructor Course**

The Marine Corps lacks a formal course of instruction that is dedicated to teaching small unit leaders the skills necessary to succeed on future contingencies. A course needs to be created that will provide instruction to corporals through lieutenants on the many skills listed in Figure 4 of this paper. A newly created MOOTW T&R manual could be used as the source document for establishing the POI for this course. The intent of this instruction would be to educate the small unit leaders who will be called upon to make the tough tactical decisions that could effect the operational or strategic outcomes of future operations. Graduates of this course would also provide commanders with a cadre of instructors to prepare their units for continued success on future MCCRE's and contingency missions.

### Recommendation

The Marine Corps Training and Education Command should establish a MOOTW Instructor Course to be taught by the Advanced Infantry Training Companies (AITC) of the Marine Corps' Schools of Infantry (SOI). Both of the existing SOI's already possess the facilities and infrastructure to conduct this type of course. The AITC's currently offer a number of courses to the same target audience recommended for this course. The creation of a MOOTW course may require a manning increase of approximately one officer and two enlisted instructors. The logistical burden imposed by this course could be minimized. The training aids required to teach the course could be limited to an ISMT, CCDR, force protection suite of equipment, and communications gear. Since the

students would be NCO's, SNCO's, or officers, they could billet at their normal homes or barracks, which would negate the need for additional barracks space at SOI. The 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division successfully conducted a MOUT Instructor Course similar to the one described above; unfortunately, it is disbanding its Division Schools, and the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> Marine Divisions do not possess one. The relatively low cost of conducting this course at SOI would be greatly outweighed by the benefit that it provides the Marine Corps.

### **MOOTW Staff Training**

Future MOOTW operations are likely to be characterized by a high degree of interagency coordination. The Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) demands maximum interoperability between Marine forces, NGO's, PVO's, joint, multinational, and United Nations forces, and other interagencies.<sup>52</sup> Interagency operations are vital to implementing all of the elements of national power during a MOOTW operation. They facilitate unity and consistency of effort, while they maximize the use of national resources and reinforce the primacy of the political element. Military units may require the perspectives, expertise, cooperation, and assistance of many civilian agencies in accomplishing their mission. Outside agencies are often familiar with the local cultures, languages, and sensitivities of a populace and can become an important source of information. They will, however, pose unique challenges to the Marines who must operate with them.

Interagency operations are difficult to conduct. Outside agencies come from all over the world and usually answer to no one. There is no cohesive body devoted to organizing and pulling these groups together, and many of their charters forbid them from

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<sup>52</sup> Joint Publication 0-2. *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)* (Washington DC: GPO, 24 February 1995), ix.

cooperating with the military. Many of these organizations often view the military as adversaries. Nevertheless, Marines will continue to conduct interagency operations.

Marine staffs at all levels need to be prepared to coordinate civilian and military actions. Marine forces operated with fifty outside agencies in Northern Iraq, sixty in Somalia, and one hundred twenty in Bosnia.<sup>53</sup> Although some interagency training programs do exist, the Marine Corps has no standardized staff training program to teach battalion through MEF level staffs the skills needed to conduct civil-military operations.

Current staff training programs taught within the Marine Corps are targeted to specific audiences and are not standardized. As mentioned previously, I MEF hosts an annual symposium on interagency operations, but its target audience is at the flag level. The MAGTF Staff Training Program (MSTP) also addresses some MOOTW issues with the MEF staffs, and the Expeditionary Warfare Training Groups (EWTG) address MOOTW as an application to the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCP) to MEU and other staffs upon request. MEU staffs also receive training in the rapid planning process, but the only course that specifically addresses MOOTW is the MOOTW Peace Operations course currently offered by EWTG Atlantic. They offer a five-day course that provides military and civilian leaders with a background on MOOTW operations, but the Marine Corps Training and Education Command does not certify this course.<sup>54</sup>

### Recommendation

The Marine Corps Training and Education Command should be tasked with creating and certifying a MOOTW staff-training course that will be taught by the

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<sup>53</sup> Zinni, 271.

<sup>54</sup> See EWTGLANT Instruction 1500.4F, *EWTGLANT Course Catalog* at <http://ewtglant.navy.mil> for more information on the MOOTW Peace Operations Course and other courses offered by EWTGLANT.

EWTG's to battalion through MEU level staffs. This course should be limited to three to five days in length. It should focus on interagency operations, and could be taught either to MEU staffs at the conclusion of the existing rapid planning process course, or to units not in the MEU program using mobile training teams (MTT). The EWTG's currently provide a number of MTT taught courses throughout the Marine Corps. I MEF's EMERALD EXPRESS seminar and EWTGLANT's course should be used as sources for the purpose of developing this course.

### **MOOTW Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation**

No consolidated Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation System (MCCRES) standards currently exist for specific MOOTW operations. MCCRES standards are published as MCO's in the 3501 series. They provide commanders with a comprehensive set of Mission Performance Standards (MPS) that are designed to assist them in the development and evaluation of a unit's training efforts. MPS's are mission-oriented collective training standards that establish minimum acceptable operational performance criteria for the operating forces. The evaluation of a unit's performance of MPS's provides training feedback to the unit's chain of command.<sup>55</sup> Evaluation of a unit's training is the final step in the Marine Corps' system approach to training. Its importance cannot be overlooked.

### **Recommendation**

The Marine Corps Training and Education Command should be tasked with publishing a new volume of the MCCRES that address MPS's applicable to MOOTW operations. This volume should provide a consolidated list of capabilities that are needed

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<sup>55</sup> See MCO 3501.1C, *Marine Corps Combat Readiness and Evaluation System* for further information on the MCCRES.

to succeed in a MOOTW environment. It should also be used as the source document for conducting operational MOOTW MCCRE's for units that have identified MOOTW operations as part of their METL.

Some MPS's that address certain MOOTW capabilities currently exist under MCCRES volumes dedicated to specific units. For example, the MPS's for combating terrorism are found in the Marine Security Battalion's order. These existing MPS's should be integrated into the new MOOTW volume of the MCCRES.

Operational MOOTW MCCRE's should be conducted at the latter end of existing combat-oriented MCCRE's. Marine units should be required to transition from a normal four to five day MCCRE focused on combat to a two to three day extension of the MCCRE focused on MOOTW. This transition would simulate the type of operation that units can expect to face in Future Three Block Wars without degrading a unit's combat capability. The importance of operating under restrictive rules of engagement should be stressed during the MOOTW portion of the MCCRE that could be conducted in new urban/MOOTW training facilities.

### **Urban/MOOTW Training Facilities**

The Marine Corps requires more adequate facilities in order to conduct realistic and challenging training in preparation for combat and MOOTW. As described previously, the majority of future contingencies will occur in the urban sprawl of the littorals. In 1998, Russell Glen of the Rand Corporation reported that 237 of the last 250 U.S. Marine overseas deployments involved urban operations.<sup>56</sup> Unfortunately, existing

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<sup>56</sup> Major Norman L. Cooling, USMC, *Shaping The Battlespace To Win The Next Street Fight*, MMS Paper (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 1999), 3.

U.S. military training facilities do not adequately replicate the urban areas that Marines will most likely find themselves operating in.

The majority of existing MOUT facilities in the U.S. are small pristine villages of twenty to forty buildings built to be durable and easily maintained. They are usually two blocks by one block wide and surrounded by open or wooded terrain. Existing structures are usually built of concrete and are generally not more than three stories high. Their purpose is to train small units in tactical movement--not maneuver or decentralized operations--in an urban environment. Small opposing forces (OPFOR) can usually effectively control entire areas of these facilities, and thus require units to either maneuver outside of the facility, or to conduct costly frontal attacks. Some Marine training is conducted in functioning cities in order to alleviate many of these shortfalls; but this type of training has its own unique challenges associated with it.

Training in functioning communities produces a number of challenges that detract from a unit's training. Training in working urban sites produces numerous safety, environmental, and political problems. Military forces that operate in cities lack the authority to direct how and when events will occur that will support their training; and people in cities are not always prepared or inclined to accept the inconveniences that this training can cause. Members of the Warfighting Lab's PROJECT METROPOLIS believed that the high cost spent in money, time, and supporting personnel to train units in working cities made it impractical.<sup>57</sup> However, functioning cities do provide benefit in conducting tactical exercises without troops (TEWT) and urban navigation. The

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<sup>57</sup> LtCol John H. Reynolds, USMC (Ret), "A case for 21<sup>st</sup> Century MOUT Facilities," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Vol 84, no. 7 (July 2000): 41.

Warfighting Lab created an outstanding alternative urban training facility using a former Air Force base.

Former military bases provide outstanding opportunities for conducting training for MOUT and MOOTW operations. The Warfighting Lab conducted part of PROJECT METROPOLIS at the former George Air Force Base in Victorville, California. This facility provided 300+ acres of land encompassing over 320 single/two story buildings containing over 1200 housing units. The base also contained the facilities and infrastructure necessary to support a working community and airfield. I MEF currently has a one year lease for the use of George to train its Marines, and it is attempting to negotiate an additional five year lease.<sup>58</sup> Former military bases provide a less expensive alternative to constructing new Urban/MOOTW training facilities, but they will need some modification.

### Recommendation

The Marine Corps should initiate a joint venture to persuade the Department of Defense (DOD) to acquire at least one, if not two (one for each coast) former U.S. bases. These bases could be developed as joint Urban/MOOTW training facilities, and would provide the foundation on which to build a number of training areas and facilities. These facilities would simulate the environments that Marines may one day find themselves operating in--ranging from shantytowns to major cities. These facilities should have working utilities and be equipped with furniture and other debris, fire pits, and day and night video to be used for after action purposes. In addition, these areas should be equipped with electronic devices tied into global positions systems used in conjunction

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<sup>58</sup> For a more detailed description of the facilities available and training conducted at the former George Air Force Base see the Warfighting Lab's *Project Metropolis Phase I Report*.

with MILES 2000 gear to identify the location and life status of personnel both inside and outside of buildings.<sup>59</sup> These facilities should have a dedicated live fire area where Marine units can train to the unique marksmanship skills required to fight in an urban environment--that is one often characterized by contacts that are quick, close, and fleeting. The facility should be run and maintained by DOD civilians and employ local civilians to act as role players. A joint cadre of military instructors should be employed to conduct a two to three week MOOTW operational readiness exercise (ORE) with MAGTF's on a monthly basis. Priority for the use of these facilities would be provided to any units on a known deployment rotation, or to any units that have received a deployment order to participate in a Urban/MOOTW operation.<sup>60</sup>

#### **Urban/MOOTW Operational Readiness Exercise (ORE)**

The Marine Corps is lacking a capstone-training event to challenge Marines in the most likely scenario that they will face in the future. *Warfighting* states that exercises should approximate the conditions of war as much as possible. They should introduce friction in the form of uncertainty, stress, disorder and opposing wills. Only in approved free-play exercises can we practice the art of war.<sup>61</sup> This description applies equally to operations other than war. Unfortunately, with the exception of the few units involved in the MEU program, the Marine Corps has no premiere training event with which to

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<sup>59</sup> The Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES) is a training device in which laser transmitters are attached to existing weapons systems that initiate a laser burst when a blank munition is fired from a particular weapon. This laser burst activates an alarm on a receiving device that is worn by an opposing force during training scenarios. This system is used for force on force exercises and provides real time feedback on the employment of a service persons weapon system. It allows servicemen to utilize the actual weapons that they will employ in combat in a safe training environment.

<sup>60</sup> For a more detailed explanation of the types of facilities and capabilities that this type of facility should have see LtCol John H. Reynolds, USMC (Ret), "A case for 21<sup>st</sup> Century MOUT Facilities," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Vol 84, no. 7 (July 2000).

<sup>61</sup> Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1. *Warfighting*, 60.

prepare Marines for MOOTW operations like the Combined Arms Exercise (CAX) does for combat.

The CAX is the premiere training event in the Marine Corps. It uses the building block approach to training in preparing units to conduct MAGTF operations in a combat environment. Each CAX begins with unit staffs and line units receiving separate training in their respective areas of responsibility. This progressive training continues and culminates in a large final exercise that integrates all of the elements of the MAGTF. This same process is needed to better prepare units for the MOOTW operations they will likely conduct in the future.

A MOOTW ORE should follow the same structure as the CAX. Staffs and line units would initially receive separate training, but would consolidate for a final exercise that challenges the MAGTF across the entire spectrum of conflict. Although Marines should receive some live fire training during this exercise, the focus should be on engaging an OPFOR--operating under restrictive rules of engagements (ROE) and being forced to deal with noncombatants and outside agencies. Much of the time and resources needed to conduct this training could be acquired through reallocating certain Marine Corps assets.

The Marine Corps could reallocate some of the time and resources required to conduct this training by training its units more efficiently. Units participating in the MEU program devote an inordinate amount of time, effort, and resources to missions that they will not likely conduct. The focus of the MEU work-up cycle is on conducting company raids and Maritime Special Purpose Force (MSPF) missions. History proves that the disparity between the likelihood of conducting one of these missions to

conducting a MOOTW operation is enormous. Nevertheless, this is where the Marine Corps continues to place its focus. Some Marine units are also devoting approximately two months of their limited training time and a large amount of assets to train at the Mountain Warfare Training Center (MWTC) located on over 65,000 acres of the Sierra Nevada Mountains that the Marine Corps maintains. Although this training helps to challenge and develop the Corps' junior leaders, the large amount of time and resources devoted to both of these programs would be far more productive in challenging Marines in the most likely scenarios and environments that they will be confronted with.

### Recommendation

The Marine Corps needs to develop and allocate its time and resources to establish a MOOTW operational readiness exercise. This exercise should become a capstone-training event for units preparing to deploy. It should be run by a Tactical Exercise Control Group (TECG) provided either by a joint cadre at a new Urban/MOOTW training facility as described previously, or by the Special Operations Training Groups (SOTG) organic to the MEF's. The T&E Command via a newly created MOOTW T&R manual could provide guidance for the POI used in conducting this training, and it should incorporate recent lessons learned from current operations. The price of not adequately preparing Marines for future contingencies could prove costly.

### **FLEETING RELEVANCE**

Failure to improve the Marines Corps' capabilities in conducting MOOTW operations could lead the nation to find another force capable of successfully conducting these missions. The bipartisan Commission on National Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century,

which will advise President Bush on how to reshape the nation's national defense, believes that the United States' current two-war strategy is not producing the capabilities needed for future contingencies. It believes that future operations will require forces different from those designed for major war. This would require the United States to adapt portions of its military force structure to meet these needs. The commission recommends the creation of a separate professional peacekeeping force to serve as an intermediate force between combat troops and police.<sup>62</sup> This could have grave consequences for the Marine Corps.

The creation of a separate peacekeeping force could lead to decreased military force structure, training opportunities, and funding for the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps has used its expeditionary nature and countless contingency deployments in the past as a means to convince Congress to continue funding its programs and help maintain the vast majority of its infrastructure following the last Quadrennial Defense Review. The creation of a separate force to conduct the many missions that Marines have traditionally conducted can lead Congress to divert much of the funding and resources usually assigned to the Marine Corps to this new force.<sup>63</sup> The Marine Corps could lose invaluable training opportunities presented by contingency missions; it could also lose its relevance as the new force assumed the title as the nation's new "911 Force." It will

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<sup>62</sup> Crawley, "Commission: Two-War Strategy Damages Morale," 25.

<sup>63</sup> The U.S. Army recently created a new Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) in an attempt to make its forces lighter, more transportable, and more relevant for future contingencies. The U.S. Army aggressively pursued the acquisition of new gear and equipment to outfit this newly organized unit, while developing and publishing the doctrine needed to organize, train, equip, and employ this force. This doctrine specifically addresses the MOOTW environment and the types of missions that soldiers will be tasked with performing in the future. Although many high ranking Marine and Army officers will argue that this force is not attempting to replace, or take over Marine missions, a congress focused on reducing defense spending may see things differently. See FM 7-7X (Initial Draft Manual (IDM)) Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) Infantry Platoon and Squad, FM 7-10X (IDM), IBCT Infantry Company, FM 7-20X (IDM), IBCT Infantry Battalion, and FM 7-30X (IDM), IBCT for more information concerning the Interim Brigade Combat Team.

become increasingly difficult to convince Congress to fund Marine Corps projects when the new force is conducting all of the missions. The Marine Corps must place greater emphasis on preparing its Marines for MOOTW in order to assure continued success, and must also convince Congress of the lack of a need for a separate peace keeping force.

## **CONCLUSION**

The Marine Corps needs to improve on preparing for MOOTW operations if it wants to continue being a relevant force in the defense of the United States. In a leadership development symposium conducted in Washington DC in December 2000, General Zinni stated that "The U.S. military is over prepared for the least likely event-- MTW (Major Theater War)--and must shift their training focus to operations other than war and train in their required specialized skills."<sup>64</sup> This training should not replace, but rather augment existing warfighting capabilities. The Marine Corps needs to develop a balanced training and evaluation program using the guidance provided by MCI, instructor, and staff training courses, reference and T&R manuals, and Marine Corps Orders. Marines must develop an awareness of the complex and changing environments and potential adversaries that they will confront across the spectrum of conflict.

There will be little time available to develop this awareness after receiving the order to execute a mission. Future belligerents will not provide the six months afforded to U.S. forces in preparing for DESERT STORM. The Marine Corps' short-term goal is to possess the capability to rapidly deploy two brigades of nearly 40,000 Marines anywhere in the world, regardless of available infrastructure, and to be ready to operate in

one week or less.<sup>65</sup> This implies that Marines must possess the skills needed for success in MOOTW well before receiving an execute order. These skills can be developed best during an operational readiness exercise conducted at an improved urban/MOOTW training facility.

The skills developed in junior Marines during these exercises will provide them with the confidence, knowledge, and ability to succeed in any mission across the spectrum of conflict. It will teach young Marines that success in battle does not always equate to mission success. Marines may be the world's premiere fighting force, but the sole use of combat skills will not lead to success on future contingencies. This lesson was highlighted in a conversation between a U.S. Army colonel and North Vietnamese colonel about the Vietnam War. The U.S. colonel stated, "You know you never defeated us on the battlefield," to which the Vietnamese colonel responded, "That may be so, but it is also irrelevant."<sup>66</sup> Complacency kills--The challenge the Marine Corps faces today is to continue to make the necessary improvements that will ensure its standing as a relevant force long into the future.

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<sup>64</sup> Joint Advanced Warfighting Program (JAWP), Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA), Highlights of remarks made by General Anthony Zinni (USMC, Ret) at Leader Development Symposium conducted in Washington DC on 11 December 2000.

<sup>65</sup> Mark C. Brinkley, "Punching Up 911, A Brand New Vision for Tomorrow's Marine Corps," *Marine Corps Times* (4 December 2000), 15.

<sup>66</sup> Col Jefferey R. Barnett, USAF, "Nonstate War," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Vol. 78, no. 5 (May 1994), 85.

## Glossary

<b>AITC</b>	<b>Advanced Infantry Training Company</b>
<b>ALSA</b>	<b>Air Land Sea Application Center</b>
<b>BLT</b>	<b>Battalion Landing Team</b>
<b>CAX</b>	<b>Combined Arms Exercise</b>
<b>CINC</b>	<b>Commander in Chief (Combatant Commander)</b>
<b>CTF</b>	<b>Combined Task Force</b>
<b>DLAB</b>	<b>Defense Language Aptitude Battery</b>
<b>DLIFLC</b>	<b>Defense Language Institute, Foreign Language Center</b>
<b>DLPT</b>	<b>Defense Language Proficiency Test</b>
<b>DOD</b>	<b>Department of Defense</b>
<b>FLPP</b>	<b>Foreign Language Proficiency Pay</b>
<b>EPW</b>	<b>Enemy Prisoner of War</b>
<b>EWTG</b>	<b>Expeditionary Warfare Training Group</b>
<b>FAO</b>	<b>Foreign Area Officer</b>
<b>FM</b>	<b>Fleet Manual</b>
<b>FMF</b>	<b>Fleet Marine Force</b>
<b>FMFM</b>	<b>Fleet Marine Force Manual</b>
<b>FMFRP</b>	<b>Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication</b>
<b>HMM</b>	<b>Medium Helicopter Squadron</b>
<b>IED</b>	<b>Improvised Explosive Device</b>
<b>ITS</b>	<b>Individual Training Standard</b>
<b>ITSS</b>	<b>Individual Training Standards System</b>
<b>JP</b>	<b>Joint Publication</b>
<b>JTTP</b>	<b>Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures</b>
<b>MAGTF</b>	<b>Marine Air Ground Task Force</b>
<b>MCCDC</b>	<b>Marine Corps Combat Development Command</b>
<b>MCI</b>	<b>Marine Corps Institute</b>
<b>MCLLS</b>	<b>Marine Corps Lessons Learned System</b>
<b>MCCRES</b>	<b>Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation System</b>
<b>MCDP</b>	<b>Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication</b>
<b>MCPP</b>	<b>Marine Corps Planning Process</b>
<b>MCRP</b>	<b>Marine Corps Reference Publication</b>
<b>MCS-21</b>	<b>Marine Corps Strategy 21</b>
<b>MCWP</b>	<b>Marine Corps Warfighting Publication</b>
<b>MEF</b>	<b>Marine Expeditionary Force</b>
<b>METL</b>	<b>Mission Essential Task List</b>
<b>MILES</b>	<b>Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System</b>
<b>MOOTW</b>	<b>Military Operations Other Than War</b>
<b>MOS</b>	<b>Military Occupational Specialty</b>
<b>MOU</b>	<b>Memorandum of Understanding</b>
<b>MOUT</b>	<b>Military Operations in Urban Terrain</b>
<b>MPS</b>	<b>Mission Performance Standard</b>
<b>MSSG</b>	<b>MEU Service Support Group</b>

<b>MSTP</b>	<b>MAGTF Staff Training Program</b>
<b>MTT</b>	<b>Mobile Training Team</b>
<b>MWD</b>	<b>Military Working Dog</b>
<b>NBC</b>	<b>Nuclear, Biological, Chemical</b>
<b>NGO</b>	<b>Non-Government Organization</b>
<b>OPFOR</b>	<b>Opposing Force</b>
<b>ORE</b>	<b>Operational Readiness Exercise</b>
<b>POI</b>	<b>Program of Instruction</b>
<b>PVO</b>	<b>Private Voluntary Organization</b>
<b>QDR</b>	<b>Quadrennial Defense Review</b>
<b>RAO</b>	<b>Regional Area Officer</b>
<b>ROE</b>	<b>Rules of Engagement</b>
<b>SAT</b>	<b>Systematic Approach to Training</b>
<b>SOI</b>	<b>School of Infantry</b>
<b>SOTG</b>	<b>Special Operations Training Group</b>
<b>T&amp;E</b>	<b>Training And Education</b>
<b>TECG</b>	<b>Tactical Exercise Control Group</b>
<b>TEWT</b>	<b>Tactical Exercise Without Troops</b>

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