The Army
Training and Leader Development Panel
Report (NCO)

Final Report
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ATZL-CG

MEMORANDUM FOR

CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMY, 200 ARMY PENTAGON, WASHINGTON, DC 20310-0200
COMMANDING GENERAL, US ARMY TRADOC, 7 FENWICK RD, FT MONROE VA 23651-1047

SUBJECT: Army Training and Leader Development Panel Phase II (NCO Study) Final Report

1. In accordance with the Chief of Staff, Army charter for the Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP), and the TRADOC Commanding General’s appending letter of instruction, the ATLDP Phase II (NCO Study) Report is forwarded as directed.

2. The purpose of the Panel was to accomplish the training and leader development tasks presented in the CSA Charter, dtd 1 Jun 00, SAB, and TRADOC CG’s LOI, dtd 23 Jan 01, SAB. The Panel effort commenced 18 April 01 with the arrival, from around the world, of officers and NCOs who made up the study groups. The last executive Panel session was completed on 17 January 02.

3. The Panel’s Phase II mission was to determine training and leader development requirements that enable battlefield and operational success, and assess the development of the Army’s NCO Corps to meet the demands of full spectrum operations. The Panel assessed the current state of Army training and leader development of the NCO Corps against those requirements.

4. Enclosed is the Panel’s report that details the conclusions and recommendations for Army consideration and implementation. The Panel concluded that this study was not about “fixing” the NCO Corps; it was an introspection to determine how the Army could make a professional NCO Corps even better. NCOs know and understand Army Transformation and the Army Vision. They know the role the Army and the Nation expect them to play in full spectrum operations in the contemporary operational environment. They believe the Army must recapitalize and modernize the training and leader development tools needed to enable them to continue growing leaders and training soldiers and small units.

5. Major findings:

   • When asked what they would tell the CSA and SMA, officers and NCOs in all components spoke with one voice and in clear text—improve NCOES, improve and provide more training resources, increase trust and micromanage less – allow NCOs to lead and train their soldiers and units.
The NCO’s role in the Army’s leadership, training, and operational doctrine is right. The Army must adapt its leader development programs to provide greater conceptual and interpersonal skills NCOs require in full spectrum operations in the contemporary operational environment.

Designed to provide NCOs able to meet Cold-War requirements, NCOES adequately teaches branch specific technical and tactical skills but NCOs require more combined arms training to perform their doctrinal roles in warfighting. NCOES does not adequately teach the conceptual and interpersonal skills NCOs need to operate in full spectrum operations in today’s contemporary operational environment.

The Army’s training doctrine and principles and training management process are sound but require updating to align them with operational doctrine addressing full spectrum operations. The Army is not following them.

The main effort in training and training resources in our units is not on developing the warfighting competencies of soldiers and small units. Top-down training strategies result in an imbalance between collective maneuver and live-fire training for large units, and training individual soldiers and small units. The Army’s undisciplined execution of its training doctrine and training management has had significant adverse effects on NCO training and leader development: atrophy of individual and small unit warfighting competencies, NCO nonparticipation and consequent apathy about training, and has developed a generation of NCOs who do not understand their role in Army training.

NCOs require well-defined tasks, conditions, standards, and performance measures to ensure soldiers and small units are prepared to function as effective unit and team members. The Army has neither continuously updated the training products its legacy forces require nor developed ones for the Limited-Conversion Divisions, Force XXI units, and Interim Brigade Combat Teams. These individual and small unit training standards require updating, development, and sustainment as doctrine, organizations, and materiel change. The Systems Approach to Training served the Cold War Army well. It fit the Army’s Airland Battle doctrine, Army of Excellence organizations, operational environment with linear battlefields and monolithic threat, and the Army’s training and leader development programs. However, today’s conditions are radically different; full spectrum operations, non-contiguous battlefields and asymmetrical threats, revolutionary changes in technology and training enablers, and Army Transformation with legacy, interim, and objective force units.

The Army has no method of objectively assessing NCOs’ proficiency in tactical and technical MOS skills and grade-related leadership skills. A majority of NCOs believe the Army should conduct an annual assessment of NCOs’ tactical and technical MOS skills and
leadership proficiency against established standards, updated as doctrine, organizations, and materiel change. This competency assessment would improve training and readiness by providing feedback to NCOs, units, and the Army on training and leader development program effectiveness.

• Informal self-development takes place routinely among NCOs as they actively assess the experiences of their subordinates, their units, and themselves; learn from that assessment; and apply it to their next experience. After-action reviews, informal and formal counseling, and mentoring enable this assessment and feedback. The expectations and outcomes of formal self-development of the Army do not correspond with those of its NCOs. The Army expects self-development to be a formalized, directed program that is the foundation of a professional’s lifelong learning process by effectively linking operational and educational experiences with the tools to fill knowledge gaps. NCOs see themselves as responsible for their learning and want the Army to treat them as capable of directing their self-development. NCOs increasingly emphasize self-development for personal development. This is driven by NCOs’ perception that the Army requires civilian post-secondary education for professional advancement.

• NCOs are familiar with distance learning and are interested in using it. However, the Army’s and the field’s expectations for distance learning are not the same. The field perceives the Army views distance learning as a replacement for resident education—a resource-driven requirement versus a means to provide tailored training and education to meet the field’s learning needs. The field also believes the Army is not able to provide the quality of products the field expects: interactive online collaboration, real-time practical applications, and multimedia instruction versus simply uploading text-based lessons onto a new delivery system.

• NCOs clearly understand Army values and their doctrinal role, duties, responsibilities, and authority. They are not as clear about the concept of the warrior ethos. Doctrine on warrior ethos is limited in the Army’s training, leadership, and operational field manuals. Warrior ethos does not have a shared meaning, nor is it a well-understood term. Many soldiers believe that it applies only to combat units.

• NCOs do not perceive that they have adequate involvement in or control over their assignments. They do not believe the assignments process focuses on leader development.

6. There are 78 recommendations grouped into six of the imperatives established in Phase I. Many require decisions by Army senior leaders, setting of priorities, and allocation of resources. Others require principally organizational and direct leaders to act to restore the balance between
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SUBJECT: Army Training and Leader Development Panel Phase II (NCO Study) Final Report

beliefs and practices and execute to standard the current Army training and leader development programs. NCOs ask that the Army:

- Re-establish, update, and publish the NCO Guide with the doctrinal roles, duties, authority, and responsibilities of the NCO. Link to Army efforts on officer duties, responsibilities, and authority and the Army Vision educate the force.

- Transform NCOES now for full spectrum operations in the contemporary operational environment.

- Restore focus on individual and small unit training. Provide more training enablers, improve existing ones, and develop new ones that are cutting edge technology and learning models.

- Update Army training doctrine and discipline training management.

- Update, develop, and sustain individual and small unit training standards and products.

- Re-establish competency assessment for NCOs, link to training and readiness.

- Adopt and inculcate warrior ethos throughout all soldiers in the Army.

- Retool NCO assignments system to focus on leader development

7. On behalf of myself and General(R) Frederick M. Franks, Jr., and SMA(R) Robert Hall, the Panel's Senior Mentors, and CSM Young, the NCO Study Director, please accept our appreciation for the privilege of leading this effort.

Encls

JAMES C. RILEY
Lieutenant General, USA
Commanding
MEMORANDUM FOR

CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMY, 200 ARMY PENTAGON, WASHINGTON, DC 20310-0200
COMMANDING GENERAL, U.S. ARMY TRADOC, 7 PENWICK RD, FT MONROE VA
23651-1047

SUBJECT: Army Training and Leader Development Panel Report Phase II (NCOs) Report

1. In accordance with the Chief of Staff, Army charter for the Army Training and Leader Development Panel Phase II (NCOs) is forwarded as directed.

2. The purpose of the Panel was to accomplish the training and leader development tasks presented in the CSA Charter, dated 1 Jun 00, SAB, and TRADOC CG's LOI, dated 23 Jan 01, SAB. The Panel effort commenced 18 April 01 with the arrival, from around the world, of officers and NCOs who made up the study groups. The last executive panel session was completed on 17 Jan 02. Enclosed is the report in the form of an executive summary and two chapters that detail the conclusions and recommendations for Army consideration and implementation. The report is about the Army's People, the centerpiece of our formations…their beliefs and the systems that sustain their commitment to the Service. It is also about the practices that dilute their efforts and detract from their remarkable, selfless, and honorable service to the Nation.

3. There are 78 recommendations grouped into six major categories. The executive panel felt seven recommendations were of such importance they should be considered imperatives that the Army must address. They are:

- **Army Culture.** Recognize the strong relationship between our Army Culture and the quality of our training and leader development programs. Army culture must operate routinely within an acceptable "Band of Tolerance" for the Army to effectively train soldiers and grow leaders.

- **NCO Education System (NCOES).** Adapt the NCOES to meet the needs of the transforming Army and the realities of the Operational Environment.

- **Training.** Revitalize the Army training system by updating training doctrine, improving home station training, and modernizing the CTCs.

- **Systems Approach to Training (SAT).** Recommit to standards-based training. Standards are the basis for developing training, assessing performance and providing feedback.

- **Training and Leader Development Model.** Adopt a model that clearly shows how training and leader development are linked. The new model must clearly communicate intent and be understandable by junior leaders, staffs, and outside agencies. The product of the model should be self-aware, adaptive leaders, and trained and ready units.

- **Lifelong Learning.** Commit our leaders to lifelong learning through a balance of educational and operational experiences, complemented by self-development. To be a learning organization that supports lifelong learning, the Army must provide training and educational standards and products, a doctrine that fosters lifelong learning; and a digital "Warrior Knowledge Network" to provide one-stop information access for soldiers, leaders, and units. We must provide the doctrine, tools, and support to inculcate the concept and practice of lifelong learning, self-awareness and adaptability in the Army's culture. We must teach the importance of lifelong learning and the metacompencies of self-awareness and adaptability throughout OES. We should strengthen this approach in organizations and in self-development.
SUBJECT: Army Training and Leader Development Panel Phase II (NCO Study) Report

4. With your concurrence, we will brief the DA Staff on the ATLDP Phase II and the recommended action plan during April 02 to integrate the recommendations into the Army G3 Training and Leader Development Management Process.

5. On behalf of myself and General (Ret) Frederick M. Franks, Jr., Sergeant Major of the Army (Ret) Robert E. Hall, the Panel’s Senior Mentors, LTG Riley, the ATLDP Study Director, and all the great soldiers involved in the study, please accept our appreciation for the privilege of leading this effort. We were both impressed and inspired by the commitment and dedication of the Army’s leadership…Sergeant to General…and the extraordinary effort of all involved in this effort. America’s Army will never be second best! Soldiers of the 21st century stand ready!

[Signature]

RICHARD A. YOUNG
Command Sergeant Major, United States Army
Army Training And Leader Development Panel
Phase II (NCO Study) Director
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For further information contact ATLDP Chief of Staff at DSN 552-3591/3582 or Commercial (913) 758-3591/3582.
ATLDP NCO REPORT

PURPOSE

1. This is the report of the Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) for Phase II (Noncommissioned Officer Study). It discusses the Panel’s findings, conclusions, and recommendations, and provides an action plan for Army Staff policy review and resourcing determinations. This report applies primarily to noncommissioned officers (NCOs). Subsequent Panel efforts will address warrant officers (Phase III) and Department of the Army (DA) civilians (Phase IV). The Panel will conclude its work with an overall consolidated report (Phase V). This report is about what the field—commissioned officers, warrant officers, NCOs, junior enlisted soldiers, and their spouses—said about the state of the NCO Corps and the changes to training and leader development needed to meet the requirements of the Army Vision and full spectrum operations in the contemporary operational environment. All involved made an extraordinary effort to make a great Army and NCO Corps even better.

BACKGROUND

2. The ATLDP is that latest of a chain of Army efforts to enhance the quality of the greatest NCO Corps in the world. These efforts began after World War II and have continued into the present. They produced the schools that make up the Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) as well as training materials and procedures used in the field. The Panel examined these and other aspects of the environment confronting today’s NCOs. It sought to determine what NCOs believe they need and how to obtain it for them.

PREVIOUS NCO TRAINING AND LEADER DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS

3. The chart to the right shows the key events in the Army’s endeavors at NCO training and leader development since World War II. In 1947, the Constabulary Brigade in occupied Germany established an NCO academy to provide training and education to meet the requirements of the postwar operational environment. This NCO academy closed due to financial constraints. In 1949, under the guidance of BG Bruce Clarke, the Constabulary Brigade again established an NCO academy. This academy provided training and education in leadership and command, personnel and administration, and tactics.
4. By 1957, the Constabulary Brigade’s success resulted in Seventh Army creating an NCO academy for every division in Europe. Between 1955 and 1957, Army forces in the continental United States (CONUS) adopted the academy concept as well. Fifth Army established the first NCO academy at Fort Riley, Kansas. By mid-1959, the Army had established 17 academies. Local commanders established course lengths, contents, and standards for these academies. In 1957, Continental Army Command (CONARC) established Army standards for all NCO academies. DA codified these standards in AR 350-90, Noncommissioned Officer Academies. The Seventh Army NCO Academy in Munich served as the baseline for these Army standards. The Army conducted an NCO career education study in 1964 to further determine training and education requirements for NCO academies. This study looked at standardizing course length, student selection, and class size and frequency.

5. In 1966, the Army had a shortage of junior NCOs, due in part to the requirements of the Vietnam conflict. To remedy this shortfall, the Army developed the NCO Candidate Course (NCOCC), sometimes referred to as the “shake and bake” course. The NCOCC took soldiers from Advanced Individual Training and trained them for combat duty as NCOs.

6. Between 1955 and 1969, CONARC tried to develop a multilevel NCO educational system. DA either disapproved or shelved these proposals. Partial success was achieved in 1968, when the Chief of Staff, Army (CSA) shelved a plan for a senior NCO college but approved establishing the Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course (BNCOC) and Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course (ANCOC). Classes started in early 1971. However, a new CSA authorized establishing the Sergeants Major Academy (USASMA) in 1973, and the major NCOES components were in place.

7. From 1973 to 1975, the DePuy Initiatives (named for GEN William E. DePuy, commanding general [CG], US Army Training and Doctrine Command [TRADOC], 1973–1977) looked beyond NCO training and leader development based on NCOES. GEN DePuy wanted to delineate NCO roles and responsibilities, which many felt had become blurred in Vietnam. He wanted to develop skills and establish training standards. His initiatives resulted in several families of publications that published Armywide standards for individual and collective training. These included soldiers manuals, soldier training publications, and mission training plans. In addition, the hands-on Skill Qualification Test (SQT) replaced the written MOS (military occupational specialty) test as the primary means of evaluating soldier skills.

8. In 1985, the CSA chartered the NCO Professional Development Study Group. This study group recommended linking NCOES to training and promotions. The first recommendation resulted in establishing the select-train-promote methodology for selecting NCOs for schooling. The second recommendation resulted in transforming the enlisted evaluation report (EER) into the NCO evaluation report (NCOER). Both the select-train-promote methodology and the NCOER are still used today. In 1987, the Sullivan Study, (named for BG Gordon R. Sullivan, Deputy Commandant of the US Army Command and General Staff College, 1987–1988, and CSA, 1991–1995) produced a leader development update process and the Leader Development Model. This model (shown at the right) describes leader development based on Army values, personal ethics, expectations of the leader and the Army, and training and education. A leader’s operational and institutional experiences, rounded out by self-development, were the supporting pillars for a trained and ready leader.
9. In 1988, CG TRADOC chartered a special NCO leader development task force. This task force determined that NCOES was meeting NCO and field requirements and required only some updating. It produced the 1989 NCO Leader Development Action Plan (LDAP). The LDAP led to functional courses, such as the Battle Staff NCO Course (BSNOC) and First Sergeant Course (FSC), and the *NCO Journal*, a professional publication that focuses on NCO leader development.

10. In 1997, the Sergeant Major of the Army (SMA) and the TRADOC command sergeant major (CSM) asked RAND Corporation to undertake a study, “The Future Development of Army Noncommissioned Officers.” The study helped NCOs articulate a vision for the future. In 2000, the CSA charged a task force, Army Development System XXI (ADS XXI) to chart a course for enlisted and warrant officer development. It identified a need to refine NCOES, provide senior NCOs with experienced trainers and educators, and update professional development objectives.

THE CURRENT EFFORT

11. On 1 June 2000, the CSA directed CG TRADOC to form the ATDLP. The ATLDLP’s charter is to review, assess, and provide recommendations for the training and development of 21st century Army leaders. The CSA directed the Panel to focus initially on commissioned officers and to prepare to conduct similar studies of NCOs, warrant officers, and DA civilians. Phase I, the study of commissioned officers, was completed in February 2001. The Panel immediately began Phase II.

12. The ATDLP began its NCO Study with the Nation at peace. The Army was in the midst of its strategic Transformation Campaign Plan, a deliberate and measured effort to transform the Army to meet the requirements of the Objective Force in the contemporary operational environment. Senior leaders were already working on several fronts to prepare for what they saw the Nation would demand: full spectrum operations in a future contemporary operational environment. These included actions in the areas of doctrine, FM 1, *The Army*, and FM 3-0, *Operations*; organizations, the Interim Brigade Combat Team, Interim Division, and Objective Force Units of Action; and materiel, the Future Combat System. At the same time, the Army was conducting the many missions associated with peacetime military engagement and support to civil authorities.

13. The Panel’s mission was to review, assess, and provide recommendations for the development and training of 21st century Army leaders. However, on 11 September 2001, the Nation was attacked and the President declared the Nation to be at war. NCOs quickly found themselves conducting homeland defense missions and leading small units in combat on nonlinear and noncontiguous battlefields against asymmetric threats. Meanwhile, the overseas stability operations and support operations necessary in the post-Cold-War world continued. The Army no longer has the luxury of time to develop training and leader development tools for future organizations, environments, and operations. They are needed now.

THE CURRENT PLAN OF ACTION

14. The Panel convened on 18 April 2001, when the members of the study groups arrived at Fort Leavenworth. These members were drawn from major Army commands (MACOMs) in both the active and reserve components. CG TRADOC served as the CSA’s Executive Agent. CG, US Army Combined Arms Command
(CAC) was the ATLDP Study Director. The Panel conducted a mission analysis and literature review to prepare for conducting field interviews and surveys. Following the fieldwork, the Panel analyzed the information collected, determined conclusions, and made recommendations. The Panel updated the CG and CSM TRADOC, SMA, and CSA at regular intervals. The Study Director delivered a final outbrief to the CSA in Washington, DC on 4 January 2002.

15. The charts below show the ATLDP Phase II organization and subject matter expertise within the Executive Panel. The Panel organized itself into three study groups—Army Culture, institutional training and education, and unit training—and an integration team. Senior officers, NCOs, and civilian subject matter experts from industry and academia provided the study groups and the Study Director with expert advice and direction. The Panel’s analytic process was thorough and concentrated on specified and implied tasks directed by the CSA and CG TRADOC.

ATLDP STUDY DIRECTOR’S INTENT

16. CG, Combined Arms Center established the following intent for ATDLP Phase II (NCO Study):

- **Purpose.** Identify training and leader development requirements for the Army’s NCO Corps that enable battlefield and operational success in full spectrum operations.

- **Method.** US Army Combined Arms Command, using personnel from the field, conducts a comprehensive, qualitative, and quantitative study of the NCO Corps. Provide periodic updates to the Army’s senior leadership, including command sergeants major, on the progress of the study.

- **End State.** Present recommendations to the Sergeant Major of the Army. Submit final recommendations on training and leader development requirements for the Army’s NCO Corps to Chief of Staff, Army (CSA) through the Commanding General, US Army Training and Doctrine Command. Provide a formal report through CG TRADOC to the CSA and the Army Staff:
PHASE II CONCEPT OF OPERATION

17. The Panel conducted its operation in four phases:

- Phase I – Mission analysis, research, task development.
- Phase II – Survey instrument development.
- Phase III – Data collection.
- Phase IV – Analysis and development of findings, conclusion, and recommendations.

18. Based on a thorough mission analysis, the Panel developed the following restated mission:

Determine training and leader development requirements that enable battlefield and operational success, and assess the development of the Army’s NCO Corps to meet the demands of full spectrum operations. Assess the current state of Army training and leader development of the NCO Corps against these requirements. On order, conduct similar studies and analyses for warrant officers and DA civilians.

SPECIFIED TASK IDENTIFICATION

19. To identify its specified tasks, the Panel reviewed the CSA’s charter and ATLDP Study Director’s Intent. In addition, it studied lessons from the ATLDP Phase I (Officer Study), previous studies of NCO training and leader development, and ADS XXI. The Panel coordinated with the SMA, USASMA; and senior NCO leaders from TRADOC, the Army National Guard (ARNG), and the US Army Reserve (USAR) throughout task development. The Panel identified the 20 specified tasks listed below. The Executive Agent (CG TRADOC) approved them on 23 January 2001 and included them in the Executive Agent’s letter of instruction.
### Specified Tasks

| Army Culture | • Assess role of the NCO Corps within the Army to meet requirements for full spectrum operations.  
• Assess the balance of commitment from the NCO Corps to the Army and from the Army to its NCO Corps.  
• Determine why retention is a problem for key military occupational specialties (MOSs).  
• Determine the role of mentorship in NCO development, focusing at platoon through battalion level.  
• Assess the effect of current Army policies on development of NCO leaders.  
• Assess the impact of operational pace on the NCO Corps.  
• Assess how well the Army is using NCO leadership skills and abilities in their assignments; specifically, assess the tools used to evaluate NCO effectiveness.  
• Assess the warrior ethos and service ethic within the NCO Corps.  
• Determine the impact of special duty assignments on NCO leader development.  
• Determine if the current NCO structure can provide the leaders required in both the TOE and TDA forces across the Army.  
  ▪ Determine if NCO assignment policies and practices complement officer assignment policies.  
  ▪ Assess the effect of the select-educate-assign policy for NCOs against Objective Force requirements. |
| --- | --- |
| Standards | • Determine if adequate standards, both individual and unit, exist for NCOs to meet requirements for full spectrum operations.  
• Determine if Army standards for professional competence and military bearing are being universally applied in the NCO Corps.  
• Identify NCO training and leader development requirements to support the Objective Force:  
  ▪ Assess Army expectations of NCOs for training and leader development.  
  ▪ Analyze those expectations with respect to current standards for the transforming force.  
  ▪ Assess the ability of the Systems Approach to Training (SAT) to provide necessary training tasks and standards for the NCO Corps. |
| Feedback | • Assess current feedback mechanisms for the NCO Corps.  
• Integrate the NCO Study recommendations into the Army training and leader development management process. |
| Experiences | • Assess the effectiveness of NCO leader development at battalion level and below.  
• Assess the effectiveness of counseling and mentorship.  
• Assess the role of NCOs in small unit training.  
• Assess the effectiveness of the institutional and unit experience in educating and training NCO leaders from team/crew through battalion command sergeant major; specifically, assess small unit training against the requirement for training that is mission-focused, doctrinally-based, performance-oriented, and conducted as required for the mission environment.  
• Assess the commitment of NCOs to lifelong learning.  
  ▪ Assess whether NCOs have sufficient tools, time, guidance, and commitment from their chain of command to conduct beneficial self-development.  
  ▪ Assess how NCO self-development bridges the knowledge gap between the institutional and unit training experiences. |
Survey Instrument Development

20. The Panel used the model developed during Phase I (shown at the right) as a lens to examine training and leader development issues throughout the NCO Study. The Panel broke each specified task into essential elements of analysis (EEA). It further defined the EEA into related questions used to develop the survey instruments and focus group interviews administered to leaders in the field. They reviewed these instruments with USASMA and the Army’s senior leadership—the Study Director, SMA, TRADOC Command Sergeants Major, and the Command Sergeants Major of the ARNG and Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve (OCAR). The Study Director and Executive Agent conducted a final review and approval of the survey instruments in April 2001.

SURVEY AND DATA COLLECTION

21. Five data collection teams (one each for the US European Command [+], US Pacific Command [+], CONUS (East), CONUS (West), and reserve components [ARNG and USAR]), organized from the ATLDP study groups, traveled to installations throughout the Army between 7 May and 20 June 2001. They conducted comprehensive surveys, focus group interviews, and personal interviews with general officers, other commissioned officers, warrant officers, NCOs, enlisted soldiers, and spouses. This effort obtained assessment and feedback from over 17,000 active component, 8,200 ARNG, and 4,400 USAR soldiers.

ANALYSIS

22. Using the quantitative and qualitative data from the surveys and its own independent research, the Panel developed its findings, conclusions, and recommendations. It presented them to the SMA and Executive Agent in December 2001 and to the CSA on 4 January 2002. The Panel presented its final NCO Study report to the CSA in April 2002.
Survey Demographics
23. The Panel contacted over 30,000 soldiers in 84 locations worldwide—officers, warrant officers, NCOs, junior enlisted soldiers and their spouses—assigned to all components and major commands. These research demographics and the Panel’s independent research provided extensive, credible sampling data for determining findings, developing conclusions, and making recommendations. NCOs composed 53% of the research sample, commissioned officers 19%, and warrant officers 4%.

WHAT THE FIELD TOLD US
24. The Panel solicited information from both soldiers and spouses. Soldiers were asked about the current situation and what they want changed. Spouses were queried concerning how Army life affected them and their families.

WHAT THE SOLDIERS SAID
25. The soldiers interviewed in the field transmitted their thoughts in clear text and with passion. They communicated the same passion and dedication to selfless service to the Nation and the Army as any generation before them. Pride in the Army, service to the Nation, camaraderie, and Army values continue to strongly influence the decisions of NCOs and their spouses to make the Army a career. However, they see Army practices as being out of balance with Army beliefs. NCOs voiced the following major concerns:

- NCOES must be improved. This is the NCO top concern.
- The system used to select NCOs for promotions must be improved. This is the second highest NCO concern.
- Standards are important for training soldiers and small units.
- The Army’s beliefs and practices are outside the Band of Tolerance.
- Leader development of NCOs is not reaching its full potential.

Improve NCOES
26. Improving NCOES is the top NCO concern. The current NCOES worked well for the Cold War, AirLand Battle doctrine, and the Army of Excellence. However, it does not meet current and evolving NCO requirements for Army Transformation and full spectrum operations in the contemporary operational environment.

27. The task-based system that uses the select-train-promote model often results in NCOs attending an NCOES course after they have served in an assignment requiring skills the course teaches. NCOES must migrate tasks downward to better prepare NCOs for a range of assignments after completing the NCOES course for their skill level.

28. NCOES courses need more and better instruction on leader development, counseling, training management, communication skills, and common/MOS tasks.

29. NCOES courses need to increase rigor, raise standards, and provide more experiential learning.

30. A better awareness and use of assessment and feedback between the field and training institutions is needed to maintain the currency and relevancy of NCOES curricula.
31. The Army does not provide the training and education master sergeants need for their assignments.

**Improve the NCO Promotion System**

32. Improving the system used to select and promote NCOs is the second highest NCO concern. NCOs believe promotions are not done fairly (subjective criteria are used rather than objective criteria) and should be more closely tied to meeting performance standards.

33. NCOs perceive the promotion system to be unfair.

34. A majority of NCOs believe the Army should implement a qualification test to provide assessment and feedback on tactical and technical skills for their MOS, and on leadership skills for their grade.

35. Most junior enlisted and junior NCOs think regular testing of MOS skills would give them necessary feedback.

36. NCOs value training but believe training quality and resource availability limit training effectiveness. NCOs want more personnel, training devices/facilities, repair parts, etc. to train with.

37. About one-third of NCOs believe NCOs do not maintain MOS skill proficiency.

**Reinforce the Importance of Standards**

38. NCOs believe standards are important for training soldiers and small units.

39. Over half the NCOs say mission essential tasks are not being trained to standard.

40. NCOs believe they are not given enough time to retrain individual soldiers to standard.

41. NCOs agree it is important to train with standards to prepare soldiers for the full range of operational missions.

42. NCOs do not believe mission training plans (MTPs) are current enough to maintain proficiency in full spectrum operations.

43. Two-thirds of senior leaders said performance standards and standards of conduct are not consistently applied across the components.

**Reconcile Beliefs and Practices**

44. NCOs have great pride and commitment to the Nation and the Army. They understand and are committed to the Army Vision. However, they perceive that the discrepancy between Army beliefs and practices is outside the Band of Tolerance. They believe that their commitment is not fully reciprocated in terms of well-being, pay, benefits, and commitment to NCO leader development.

45. NCOs value mission-related operational pace; it indicates a robust force with great capabilities.

46. The daily business of the Army is training soldiers and growing leaders to fight and win the Nation’s wars; however, nonmission-essential operational pace gets in the way of training and leader development. NCOs say there are too many nonmission competitors for mission-related unit training. About two-thirds say there is not enough time to accomplish what is necessary.

47. Equal opportunity (EO) is a force multiplier that contributes to trust and confidence in soldiers and contributes to unit cohesion and readiness. However, EO training focuses on the legal requirements of equal opportunity.

48. NCOs are responsible for individual and small unit training, but the NCO role in training management has diminished. The Army places greater emphasis on collective combined arms training than on the individual and small unit training that form the foundation for well-trained large units. Training enablers are inadequate and are not at the leading edge of advanced learning models and technologies.
49. The Army is a standards-based profession. It has a system designed to develop training standards in conjunction with changes in its doctrine, organization, and materiel. However, the Army develops and executes changes to its doctrine, organizations, and materiel without disseminating the individual and small unit training standards the field needs to conduct training and leader development.

50. The Army leadership is not disciplining the operational pace. Taskers are too many and often late.

**Improve NCO Leader Development**

51. NCOs believe that NCO leader development is not reaching its full potential.

52. Informal counseling is valuable, done frequently, and provides assessment and feedback.

53. Formal counseling is not being done. Leaders do not know how to do it, and requirements are not meeting the needs of different cohorts.

54. Leaders are not fully committed to NCO leader development. Unit NCO development programs, attendance at NCOES courses and functional education, and time for self-development are sacrificed to meet short-term unit operational requirements.

55. The system used to assign NCOs focuses on meeting Army requirements, not leader development.

**WHAT THE SPOUSES SAID**

56. The Panel asked spouses what they valued as an Army family, how the Army has affected their family, and what support the Army can provide for them.

57. When asked what they valued as an Army family, spouses responded—
   - The ability to become independent and self-sufficient.
   - Pride and patriotism from serving.
   - The spouse as a role model for both family and community.

58. When asked how the Army has affected their family, spouses responded—
   - Change in the culture of deployments (six months) requires change in the culture of supporting families while soldier is “in the field.”
   - Well-being suffers due to NCO workload.
   - The level of pay and benefits creates hardships.
   - As NCOs are promoted, spouse responsibilities for support to other spouses increase.

59. When asked what support the Army can provide, spouses responded—
   - Better benefits, more pay, improved well-being.
   - Prepare young spouses better for what Army life means for their family and their role.
   - Spouses of senior NCOs want support for their education/classes.
   - Reserve component spouses want better information on benefits.
WHAT THE FIELD WANTS CHANGED

60. The following table lists in priority what officers and NCOs said they want changed. In all cohorts and components wanted the following changes: Improve NCOES, Increase and provide more training resources, and Increase trust and less micromanagement. Among NCOs, more consistent standards and better enforcement were important issues. The issues common to all cohorts are underlined. Additional issues common to NCOs of all components are double-underlined.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>NCOs</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Active Component</strong></td>
<td><strong>Active Component</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Decrease nonmission-essential operational pace.</td>
<td>1. Improve NCOES.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. <strong>Improve NCOES.</strong></td>
<td>2. Improve select-train-promote.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Improve pay and benefits.</td>
<td>3. Improve pay and benefits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. <strong>Improve/provide more training resources.</strong></td>
<td>4. <strong>More consistent standards, better enforcement.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Create new job/career opportunities.</td>
<td>5. Increase trust/less micromanagement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. <strong>Increase trust/less micromanagement.</strong></td>
<td>6. <strong>Improve/provide more training resources.</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reserve Components</th>
<th>Reserve Components</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. <strong>Improve NCOES.</strong></td>
<td>1. Improve NCOES.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. <strong>Improve/provide more training resources.</strong></td>
<td>2. Improve/more training resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. More consistent standards, better enforcement.</td>
<td>3. More consistent standards, better enforcement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. More focus on NCO leader development.</td>
<td>4. <strong>Increase trust/less micromanagement.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Improve pay and benefits.</td>
<td>5. Make unit training more focused.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. <strong>Increase trust/less micromanagement.</strong></td>
<td>6. Improve pay and benefits.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS

61. The Army is at a strategic decision point regarding NCO training and leader development. From 1970 through 1990, the Army invested heavily in providing the training and leader development tools NCOs needed to exercise their authority and carry out their duties and responsibilities. The Army assessed its training and leader development in the 1970s, fed back the results into its training and leader development programs in the 1980s, and reaped the return on its investment in the 1990s. That investment led to an NCO Corps that made sure the Army functioned according to its doctrinal, organizational, and operational requirements. These same NCOs ensured the warfighting competence of individual soldiers and teams, squads, sections, and platoons. The return on the Army’s investment was success in missions across the range of operations and spectrum of conflict: combat during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm; stability operations in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo; and support operations in CONUS, among
them, fighting wildfires and assisting in hurricane recovery operations. This success was not limited to the active component: when called, the reserve components provided essential support to both the states and the active component.

62. The Panel concluded that this study was not about “fixing” the NCO Corps; it was an introspection to determine how the Army could make a professional NCO Corps even better. NCOs know and understand Army Transformation and the Army Vision. They know the role the Army and the Nation expects them to play in full spectrum operations in the contemporary operational environment. They believe the Army must recapitalize and modernize the training and leader development tools needed to enable them to continue growing leaders and training soldiers and small units. The Army must reestablish some of the tools it provided NCOs after 1970, execute to standard the beliefs and practices it has on its books, and develop new tools.

63. Army Transformation is not only about the Future Combat System, the Interim and Objective Forces, and doctrine. The toughest part of it is training soldiers and growing leaders. Science and technology alone do not enable battlefield success; it comes principally from the American soldier’s intellect, dedication, and remarkable sense of duty. Successfully conducting full spectrum operations in the contemporary operational environment requires considerably different skills, knowledge, and attributes from 1975. The junior enlisted soldiers who entered the Army in 1975 were platoon sergeants in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm and first sergeants in Bosnia; they are the Army’s senior NCOs today. The Army provided these NCOs with training and leadership doctrine, individual and small unit training standards, and a competency assessment program. It gave them leader development experiences at the Combat Training Centers (CTCs). In addition, it educated them in NCOES courses. The Army is training and developing the NCO leaders of the Objective Force today. Soldiers in Initial Entry Training now will be the command sergeants major of Objective Force battalions.

64. In TRADOC’s Objective Force Unit of Action concept paper, operations are distributed and decentralized. Platoons fight combined arms engagements. They can see and engage enemy forces beyond the line of sight with a probability of hitting and killing at greater than 90 percent. The Army’s draft FM 6-0, Command and Control, introduces the concept of mission command. This concept calls for empowering small unit leaders to conduct decentralized operations. Since 11 September 2001, the Army and its NCOs have gained a greater awareness of what full spectrum operations in the contemporary operational environment entail. NCOs are leading soldiers and small units in war in Afghanistan, stability operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, and support operations providing homeland defense in the United States. Ten years ago, TRADOC began developing the contemporary operational environment concept. TRADOC brought together political scientists, technologists, military personnel, and others to develop what the threat, equipment, battlefield, and other conditions would be in 10 to 15 years and determine what the Army would need to successfully operate in that environment. That contemporary operational environment has arrived today.
STRATEGIC CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

65. The Panel grouped its conclusions and recommendations under Army Culture, NCOES, training, and lifelong learning.

ARMY CULTURE

66. NCOs are strongly committed to the Nation and the Army. They understand and are committed to the Army Vision. They believe as strongly as those who served before them in service to the Nation and the Army. Today’s NCOs have a strong service ethic, take pride in the Army and what they do, and are steadfast in accomplishing the mission. NCOs believe they are committed to the Army, but believe that the Army’s commitment is not equally reciprocated. Like commissioned officers, NCOs expect and accept friction between beliefs and practices. However, NCOs feel this friction is too great. Soldiers are being required to compensate for operational shortfalls with courage, enthusiasm, and inspired leadership. NCOs believe the Army should act to bring Army Culture back within the Band of Tolerance. They are counting on the Army to rise above processes to correct this discrepancy—and to get it right quickly, boldly, and aggressively.

67. NCOs believe the Army Culture is outside the Band of Tolerance because the Army has not maintained a balance between its beliefs and practices in training and leader development.

- The Army believes it is a standard-based profession with a system that develops training standards in conjunction with changes in its doctrine, organization, and materiel. In practice, the Army develops and executes changes to its doctrine, organizations, and materiel without putting in place the individual and small unit training standards the field needs to conduct training and leader development. This lack of standards forces the field to develop its own tactics, techniques, and procedures for training and leader development. As a result, standards vary from unit to unit.
- The Army believes its NCOs are responsible for individual and small unit training. In practice, NCOs lack sufficient input into the training management process that determines training requirements for individual soldiers and small units.
- The Army professes that its daily business is training individual soldiers and small units and growing leaders for fighting and winning the Nation’s wars. In practice, an undisciplined training environment caused by failure to follow training doctrine adversely impacts training and NCO development in units and contributes to a lack of predictability in both professional and personal lives. Nonmission training and requirements consume resources (time, people, dollars) needed for mission training. Over time, a top-down training strategy and focus on larger unit collective combined arms training has resulted in
an imbalance between collective maneuver and live-fire training for large units and training for individual soldiers and small units.

- The Army maintains that self-development is part of leader development. In practice, self-development is sacrificed to accomplish short-term operational requirements. The Army does not place sufficient value on self-development’s role in NCO professional development.
- The Army believes that NCOs are developed through assignments that require them to progressively assume greater responsibilities. In practice, the NCO assignment system focuses more on meeting requirements than on leader development. The Army places little value on NCO input in the assignment process.
- The Army believes developmental counseling is important in leader development. In practice counseling is not conducted to standard.

When NCOs said they want more trust and less micromanagement, they refer to these practices. They want the Army to recommit to the central role of NCOs in training and leader development.

Role of the Noncommissioned Officer

68. The NCO role outlined in current Army training and leadership doctrine is not expected to change under Army Transformation. The primary NCO leadership role is that of direct leader. Direct leaders exercise first-line, face-to-face leadership (FM 6-22, Army Leadership). The following chart lists the roles and responsibilities of commissioned officers and NCOs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Roles and Responsibilities—Officers and NCOs</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Commissioned Officer</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Commands, establishes policy, and manages Army resources.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Integrates collective, leader, and soldier training to accomplish missions.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Deals primarily with units and unit operations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Concentrates on unit effectiveness and readiness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Noncommissioned Officers</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Trains soldiers and conducts the daily business of the Army within established policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Focuses on individual soldier training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Deals primarily with individual soldier training and team leading.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Ensures subordinate teams, NCOs, and soldiers are prepared to function as effective unit and team members.</td>
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</table>

69. The operational environment in which NCOs perform their duties and responsibilities constantly evolves. Today’s operational environment requires increased proficiency with information technology, greater conceptual and interpersonal skills, and increasing self-awareness and adaptability. FM 6-22 discusses the role of NCOs, levels of leadership, and conceptual and interpersonal skills. The following chart lists the categories of conceptual and interpersonal skills that direct leaders require.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Direct Leader Conceptual and Interpersonal Skills</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interpersonal</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Communicating.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- One- and Two-Way.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Active Listening.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Nonverbal Communication.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Supervising.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Counseling.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Conceptual</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Critical Reasoning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Creative Thinking.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Ethical Reasoning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Reflective Thinking.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conclusions

70. The Army has not fully provided sufficient tools for NCOs to carry out their leadership and training roles. NCOs require the following training and leader development tools:

- Reestablish doctrine on the role, duties, responsibilities, and authority of NCOs in the form of an NCO guide. Cross-walk with officer and warrant officer roles, duties, and responsibilities.
- Develop, update, and sustain individual and small unit training standards for full spectrum operations.
- Discipline the training environment and fully fund training enablers for effective mission essential individual and small unit training.
  - Reinvigorate the training management system; involve NCOs more in training management.
  - Restore the balance between individual-soldier, small unit, and collective training.
- Transform NCOES to provide training and education for full spectrum operations.
- Develop and implement a program for assessing and providing feedback to NCOs on their proficiency in the tactical and technical skills required by their MOS and on the leadership skills for their grade.
- Strengthen chain of command support for NCO professional and self-development during operational assignments.
- Discipline the execution of the NCOER system to achieve its leader development functions.
- Provide effective mentoring for professional and personal growth.
- Develop an assignment system that focuses on leader development and education for full spectrum operations and includes NCO interface and involvement while retaining the principle of selfless service.
- Provide clear expectations regarding post-secondary civilian education in NCO professional and personal development.

Recommendations

71. Reestablish, update, and publish FM 22-600-20, The Army Noncommissioned Officer Guide. Ensure NCO roles, duties, responsibilities, and authority are cross-walked and integrated with commissioned and warrant officer duties, responsibilities, and authority under Army Transformation. The update must define and discuss—

- The NCO role in full spectrum operations doctrine, the contemporary operational environment, and Army Transformation.
- NCO duties, responsibilities, and authority and their relationship to commissioned and warrant officer duties, responsibilities, and authority.
- The linked and progressive training and leader development required for NCOs to develop the direct-leader skills—technical, tactical, conceptual, and interpersonal—necessary to exercise their authority and perform their role, duties, and responsibilities.

72. Develop and implement a strategic communication plan to educate soldiers on the role, duties, responsibilities, and authority of NCOs in full spectrum operations in the contemporary operational environment and Army Transformation.

73. Teach the role, duties, responsibilities, and authority of NCOs throughout institutional educational courses and in unit professional development programs.

Warrior Ethos

74. All soldiers need to clearly accept and internalize the warrior ethos. The latest revision of FM 3-0, published on 14 June 2001, no longer divides the battlefield into deep, close, and rear areas with secure lines of communication. Instead, it envisions soldiers accomplishing missions in a contemporary operational environment with nonlinear, noncontiguous areas of operations. Threats are assumed to be asymmetrical and capable of conducting a variety of attacks throughout the area of operations. This environment presents difficult
challenges regarding force protection, especially for combat support and combat service support soldiers. The Army must continually affirm, develop, and sustain the warrior ethos in every soldier. The warrior ethos compels soldiers to strive to be the best in all they do, triumph over adversity, refuse to accept failure, and remain focused on mission accomplishment. Refusal to accept failure does not imply that things never go wrong. It means that soldiers assess the causes for the failure, apply what they learned, and continue the mission. The warrior ethos is a part of the foundation of Army Culture, along with the service ethic, Army values, and lifelong learning. It includes every soldier in the profession, excluding none. All state proudly, my name is___, I am a soldier!

Conclusions

75. NCOs clearly understand Army values and their doctrinal role, duties, responsibilities, and authority. They are not as clear about the concept of the warrior ethos as described in FM 6-22. Doctrine on warrior ethos is limited in the Army’s training, leadership, and operational field manuals. Warrior ethos does not have a shared meaning, nor is it a well-understood term. Many soldiers believe that it applies only to combat units. Combat arms soldiers reinforce the warrior ethos in their unit training more than combat support and combat service support soldiers. NCOES does not reinforce the warrior ethos throughout its curricula.

Recommendations

76. Adopt the following proposed definition of the warrior ethos, and develop doctrine in Army operations, training, and leadership field manuals:

The warrior ethos compels soldiers to fight through all conditions to victory, no matter how long it takes and no matter how much effort is required. It is the soldier’s selfless commitment to the Nation, mission, unit, and fellow soldiers. It is the professional attitude that inspires every American soldier. The warrior ethos is grounded in refusal to accept failure. It is developed and sustained through discipline, example, commitment to Army values, and pride in the Army’s heritage.

77. Inculcate the warrior ethos in soldiers beginning with precommissioning and Initial Entry Training. Strengthen training and education on the warrior ethos throughout soldiers’ institutional experiences. In operational experiences, bolster the warrior ethos in training and leader professional development programs.

78. Better resource combat support and combat service support units to reinforce the warrior ethos. Give them ammunition, ranges, training areas, and time to conduct individual and small unit weapons qualification, fieldcraft, and tactical training.

79. Assimilate Army history instruction into institutional courses and unit professional development programs.
80. Reestablish and publish FM 21-13, *The Soldier’s Guide*. Base it on TRADOC Pam 600-4, *IET Soldiers Handbook*. Make the field manual a pocket reference for subjects in which all soldiers must maintain proficiency. It should condense information from other field manuals, training circulars, Army regulations, and other sources. It should address both general subjects and selected combat tasks. It should include evaluation guides for testing soldiers’ knowledge. The combat tasks selected should be important for all soldiers, regardless of grade or MOS. Include following subjects:

- How the soldier fits into the larger picture of national defense.
- The soldier’s responsibility to the Nation, its leaders, and fellow soldiers.
- Highlights of the Army’s history, heritage, and honors.
- The warrior ethos, Army values, and the service ethic.
- Customs, courtesy, and traditions.
- Individual standards of conduct and bearing.
- Common military warfighting subjects.
- Professional development, well-being, benefits, and entitlements.

**Operational Pace**

81. *Operational pace* is the sum of everything units do. It consists of externally directed requirements and events, and internally developed tasks.

**Conclusions**

82. Soldiers value mission-related operational pace. They believe it contributes to their professional development. For junior soldiers, it is a key component of meeting their developmental expectations. It indicates a robust force with great capabilities. However, an undisciplined operational pace and nonmission-essential training and requirements (principally base operations) get in the way of NCOs training soldiers and small units in their warfighting mission essential tasks. At battalion and below, leaders try to accomplish too many tasks. At brigade and above, leaders schedule too many events. The distinction among the green, amber, and red training cycles is blurred now more than ever. This blurring impacts training readiness when it degrades a unit’s ability to conduct necessary mission essential training to standard. An excessive operational pace impacts NCO leader development when it results in insufficient time for self-development, developmental counseling, and NCO professional development programs. The Army’s daily business is to develop trained and ready soldiers, leaders, and units to meet the warfighting requirements of the combatant commanders and the Nation. To better enable NCOs to train soldiers and small units in their warfighting, mission essential tasks, the Army must fully resource base operations. In addition, leaders must say “NO” more often to nonmission-essential requirements, decrease the number of tasks they try to accomplish, and schedule fewer events.
Recommendations

83. Continue implementing the recommendations in the ATLD Phase I (Officer Study) on reducing and disciplining the operational pace.

84. Review base operations requirements. Fully resource base operations requirements to ensure installation commanders have the resources required to accomplish—
   • Well-being for soldiers and their families.
   • Training support.
   • Power projection support.

The Noncommissioned Officer Evaluation Report

85. AR 623-205, Noncommissioned Officer Evaluation Reporting System, establishes the policies and procedures governing the NCO Evaluation Reporting System. The NCOER system’s purpose is to strengthen the NCO Corps to meet its professional duties, ensure promotion of the best qualified NCOs and improve the Army through increased emphasis on performance counseling. Periodic performance counseling plus accurate and fair reporting are the key components of the system. Taken together, these constitute the primary formal feedback mechanism for NCOs.

Conclusions

86. The problem with the NCOER is not the NCOER itself but that the Army is not executing the NCOER system to standard. Reasons include—
   • Inaccurate, inflated, and unfair input: senior raters change comments without knowledge of performance; excellence ratings are not sufficiently substantiated; ratings are questionable when required counseling and feedback are not provided.
   • Junior officers are not sufficiently knowledgeable about the NCOER rating process.

87. The NCOER system is neither meeting NCO expectations as a leader development tool nor providing the feedback NCOs want. It does not communicate how to improve and progress as an NCO. Assignment managers and leaders in the field do not use it to determine assignments or identify what developmental assignments NCOs require in the future.

88. The field values informal counseling, is satisfied with its frequency, and believes leaders tailor it to individuals.

89. Formal counseling issues include the following:
   • Timeliness and frequency (counseling not being done or done after the fact).
   • Effectiveness (counseling is not an innate skill).
   • The impact of operational pace on time to do counseling.
   • A lack of training and experience in effective counseling, particularly among junior officers.
   • Quarterly requirements for all that do not meet different needs of junior, midgrade, and senior NCOs.
   • The Officer Education System (OES) and NCOES do not train NCOs and officers to counsel effectively.

Recommendations

90. Review instruction on counseling and the NCOER system in NCOES and OES. For leaders to become effective counselors, instruction must be experiential - hands-on, performance-oriented, practical-application training. Ensure junior officers have an adequate knowledge and understanding of the NCOER system. Using Appendix C, FM 6-22, ensure instruction develops an understanding of—
   • Developmental counseling.
   • Leader responsibilities.
   • Leaders as counselors.
   • Leader counseling skills.
91. Update and sustain the Center for Army Leadership counseling web site, US Army Developmental Counseling Library. Ensure it provides the training and educational materials (training support packages) necessary for leaders to develop their counseling skills through self-development, unit NCO and officer professional development programs, and unit training.

92. Review counseling requirements in AR 623-205 to determine if existing counseling requirements meet different cohort and grade requirements.

93. Update Part IV of the NCOER, NCO Responsibilities, in coordination with the reestablishment and publication of FM 22-600-20, The Army Noncommissioned Officers Guide.

Retention

94. While the Army steadily meets its quantitative retention requirements, it may not be retaining enough of the right soldiers with the skills, knowledge, attributes, and passion for the profession that it wants in its leaders.

Conclusions

95. The following chart lists retention issues by cohort.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Retention Issues</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Not serving in the MOS they enlisted and trained for.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Nonmission training and requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Demonstrates ability and potential for sergeant but not recommended.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lack of involvement in the assignment process.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Excessive nonmission-related operational pace.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Lack of involvement in the assignment process.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Excessive nonmission-related operational pace.</td>
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Recommendations

96. Do the following to improve junior enlisted soldier retention:

• Ensure first-term soldiers serve in the MOS for which the Army recruited and trained them.
• Provide mission-focused training for soldiers in their MOS. This would enable the Army to meet soldier developmental expectations and ensure soldiers have the technical and tactical skills necessary to perform as sergeants.
Review all MTOEs (modified tables of organization and equipment), TDAs (tables of distribution and allowances), and borrowed military manpower positions throughout the Army. Ensure MTOEs and TDAs provide the necessary soldiers of the right MOS to perform jobs leaders must now use internal diverted assets to perform. Resource installation commanders to convert borrowed military manpower positions to DA civilian or contract positions.

Ensure all leaders are recommending junior enlisted soldiers for promotion based on meeting Army, rather than unit, standards.

Perform professional growth counseling (Appendix C, FM 6-22) for privates and specialists to help them prepare for promotion to sergeant.

Perform promotion counseling (Appendix C, FM 6-22, and AR 600-8-19, Enlisted Promotions and Reductions) for all soldiers eligible for advancement without waivers but not recommended for promotion to the next higher grade.

Change AR 600-8-19 to require that the soldier’s first-line leader, not the commander or supervisor, conduct promotion counseling.

Do the following to improve NCO retention:

- Design a personnel management system focused on leader development. Reward self-aware NCOs who seek self-improvement by taking personal responsibility for their professional development. Give them greater involvement in selecting their assignments. Allow them to interface with their assignment managers. However, this system must retain the principle of selflessness—serving where necessary for the good of the Army.

- Reduce nonmission training and requirements to provide more time to conduct focused, mission-related training.

Do the following to improve overall retention:

- Continue providing opportunities for professional self-development through institutional and qualitative operational experiences that develop the junior enlisted and NCO direct-leader skills required by MOS, grade, and career management field (CMF).

- Develop and implement a competency assessment program that provides objective feedback on soldiers’ technical and tactical competency in the MOS and leadership skills their grade requires.

- Continue the development, implementation, and strategic communications of the Army Well-Being Campaign Plan.

Assignments

99. PERSCOM (The US Total Army Personnel Command) continues Operation Engage. This program is a series of initiatives designed to increase enlisted soldiers’ participation in managing their careers. At the installation level, assignments focus principally on meeting requirements. Still, NCOs do not perceive that they have adequate involvement in or control over their assignments. They do not believe the assignment process focuses on leader development. The primary goal of the enlisted personnel management system is to “satisfy personnel requirements of the Army. Assigning soldiers so they will have the greatest opportunity for professional development and promotion is a secondary goal (AR 614-200, Enlisted Assignments and Utilization Management). NCOs believe special duty assignments provide them opportunities to gain additional experience in organizational leadership and conceptual and interpersonal skills. However, maintaining MOS and technical proficiency while in special assignments is a significant challenge, particularly for recruiters.

Conclusions

100. The Army must—

- Adapt the NCO assignment system to place greater emphasis on leader development at all levels while retaining the principle of selflessness—serving where necessary for the good of the Army.
• Involve NCOs in the assignment process, including the ability to interface with their assignment manager.
• Leverage information-systems technology to enable NCOs and those involved in assignments to determine an NCO’s next assignment based on leader development needs by comparing requirements in the NCO’s CMF career map against his or her assignment history and enlisted records brief.

The desired end state is greater NCO involvement in the assignment process with a goal of assigning the right NCO to the right job at the right time in his or her career.

Recommendations

101. Design a personnel management system focused on leader development. Reward self-aware NCOs who seek self-improvement by taking personal responsibility for their professional development. Give them greater involvement in selecting their assignments. Allow them to interface with their assignment managers. However, this system must retain the principle of selflessness—serving where necessary for the good of the Army.

102. Make the primary goal of the enlisted personnel management system, “assigning soldiers so they have the greatest opportunity for professional development and promotion while meeting personnel requirements of the Army.”

103. Ensure each CMF has a career development model (career map). This career map should not only describe the developmental assignments but the qualitative experiences in those assignments and the standards to achieve competency.

104. Review special duty assignments—
• Determine ones that develop NCOs’ direct and organizational-leader skills in their MOS and make them part of the CMF career map.
• Review special duty assignment criteria to determine if the requirements are valid to perform successfully in these assignments.

105. Ensure all DA enlisted assignment managers are of sufficient grade and CMF experience to provide adequate career counseling and professional development for the NCOs they are responsible for assigning.

106. Convert the Enlisted Distribution and Assignment System (EDAS) into a web-based leader-development-focused assignment system involving NCOs, DA and Installation enlisted assignment managers, and leaders at every level. NCOs should have greater ability to interface and potential to input in assignments, beginning at the staff sergeant level. Increase that interface and input as NCOs progress in rank. This transformed assignment system must—
• Provide a single-source, web-based portal to determine NCO professional development operational and institutional experience requirements using the NCO’s assignment history, CMF career map, and available assignments.
• Enable NCOs, DA and Installation enlisted assignment managers, and leaders involved in the assignment process (down to unit level) to determine what operational or institutional assignments NCOs need to best meet their professional development needs. Do this by developing a program that electronically links NCO career maps in CMFs to assignment histories (enlisted records briefs).
• Make web-based, specific assignments available at installation level. The assignment should include a link to the duty description, required operational and institutional experiences and skills, and the unit. Ensure NCOs can electronically request specific assignments after reviewing the description, requirements, career map, and their own assignment history.
• Enable enlisted assignment managers and leaders involved in the assignment process to review assignment requests and provide feedback to NCOs. This feedback would enable NCOs to be aware of whether they meet assignment requirements and whether they are selected for a requested assignment.
• Link this assignment system to a web-based orders system that generates all required orders as a single assignment order providing for all actions—administrative, logistic, educational, training, etc.—to enable NCOs to accomplish all actions needed to fill the assignment.

107. Develop and field web-based, interactive media instruction to provide refresher training in technical and tactical MOS skills to NCOs assigned outside their MOS.

Mentoring

108. Mentoring is valuable to NCO professional and personal development. It also serves to transmit professional values and knowledge to the junior leaders who ultimately become senior leaders in the profession.

Conclusions

109. Senior NCOs have the knowledge, skills, and experience to mentor their subordinates. However, the Army lacks a common understanding of what mentorship is, its processes, and its relationship to leadership. This causes confusion in NCO roles, responsibilities, and expectations with respect to mentoring. It diminishes mentoring’s role in professional and personal development. NCOs embrace the elements of mentoring within the FM 6-22 definition (observing, assessing, coaching, teaching, developmental counseling, and evaluating) as functions of their daily leadership responsibilities. NCOs see mentoring as a part of leadership but believe that leadership functions attributed to mentoring in FM 6-22 do not constitute mentorship. NCOs want increased emphasis (education) and support (command emphasis) for mentoring but not a formal or directed program. The chart at the right shows the developmental needs of soldiers over time. When soldiers enter the Army, their developmental requirements center more around the day-to-day functions of leadership NCOs provide. As soldiers grow and develop, their informal assessment and feedback requirements evolve more into mentorship.

Recommendations

110. Publish a revised definition and doctrine for mentorship in FM 6-22. Integrate the ATLDP NCO Study definition into DA Pam 350-58, Leader Development for America’s Army, and AR 600-100, Army Leadership. The proposed definition is—

Mentoring is an informal, personal, proactive commitment to foster growth in soldiers based on mutual trust and respect. The relationship is sustained through active listening, sincere caring, and sharing of professional knowledge and life experiences for the betterment of the individual and the Army.

111. Develop mentorship doctrine using these characteristics of mentors and mentoring:

• A mentor—
  ▪ Is a close, trusted, and experienced counselor or guide.
  ▪ Must be willing to share professional knowledge, training, and experience in a trusted and respected atmosphere.
  ▪ Maintains confidentiality and trust.
A mentoring relationship—

- Is a personal, voluntary, developmental relationship existing between soldiers.
- Is based on mutual agreement between soldiers.
- Is based on common professional interests.
- Is based on positive influence.
- Is an enduring relationship, with frequency of contact based on need, not predetermined events or times.
- Is devoid of conflicting interests.
- Is supportive and interactive.
- May be initiated by a superior, peer, or subordinate.
- Involves two-way communication.
- Is not bound by geographical co-location.
- Requires sincere caring on the part of the mentor.
- Requires an experience differential between the soldiers.

112. Educate the Army on mentoring by providing soldiers a clear definition, concept, and expectations with respect to mentorship.

- Institute mentor training and education in NCOES and OES. Start with basic and advanced courses. Reinforce the role of mentorship at the School for Command Preparation, the senior service colleges, and the Brigadier General Training Conference.
- Do not make mentoring a formal program; rather develop a nonthreatening environment that supports special mentoring relationships between leaders and soldiers.

Individual Performance Standards

113. The Army has established standards for all military activities. The Panel divided Army standards into two categories: standards of conduct and military bearing, and standards for professional competence. Standards of conduct and military bearing promote unit discipline, pride, cohesion, and esprit de corps. Standards for professional competence include individual training standards and collective training standards. Standards for professional competence ensure that soldiers and units can fight and win in full spectrum operations.

Conclusions

114. Soldiers recognize the need for individual performance standards regarding conduct and bearing. They understand the function these standards perform in maintaining order and discipline in a unit. However, leaders do not consistently set, adhere to, or enforce them. This erodes trust in leaders and impacts training and unit readiness. This lack of consistent setting, adherence, and enforcement is growing a generation of leaders who cannot effectively lead because they neither set nor enforce standards. Army leaders must commit themselves to “not walking by a mistake.” Leaders must adhere to and enforce basic standards of discipline.

Recommendations

115. Review and update Army standards of conduct and military bearing. Involve the field. Determine the feasibility, suitability, and acceptability of each of these standards. Publish revised regulations before 4th Quarter, Fiscal Year 2003.

116. Develop and implement a strategic communication plan to reinvigorate leaders’ commitment to adhering to, setting, and enforcing these standards. Link to the reestablishment and publication of FM 22-600-20, The NCO Guide, and FM 21-13, The Soldier’s Guide.
NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER EDUCATION SYSTEM
117. The Army established today’s NCOES in 1970. Its goal is to prepare NCOs to lead and train soldiers who work and fight under their supervision and help their leaders execute unit missions. NCOES is a progressive, sequential, task-based training system designed to prepare NCOs for direct-leader assignments at their grade level (TRADOC 351-10, Institutional Leader Training and Education).

CONCLUSIONS
118. Designed to provide NCOs able to meet Cold-War requirements, NCOES adequately teaches the technical and tactical skills NCOs require to perform their doctrinal roles in warfighting. NCOES does not adequately teach the conceptual and interpersonal skills NCOs need to operate in full spectrum operations in today’s contemporary operational environment. The current NCOES is a rigid, task-based system. It is designed around the select-train-promote model with a-one size-fits-all approach to training and educating NCOs. It does not account for the wide range of assignments or mission sets NCOs encounter today.

119. To maintain its current capabilities, NCOES requires recapitalization of its infrastructure, curricula, and faculty. To better meet the requirements of leaders in full spectrum operations, NCOES requires modernization. It must remain focused on NCO technical and tactical warfighting competencies while integrating greater conceptual and interpersonal skills. The Panel made the following major findings:

- The assessment and feedback system between the institution and the field is not keeping pace with changes in Army doctrine, organization, and materiel. Curricula are outdated and slow to adapt to field requirements.
- The leadership and warfighting focus of NCOES is diluted by an increasing number of mandated nontechnical, non-tactical training and educational requirements. These requirements are redundant: units are required to teach the same subjects.
- The task-based NCOES supports the Army’s select-train-promote model. However, the Army’s practice of assigning many NCOs to positions one to two levels higher than their grade or deferring attendance because of operational requirements results in NCOs attending NCOES courses for education and training already acquired through operational experiences. The Army must reassess when it teaches tasks in NCOES courses.
- Starting with ANCOC, NCOES does not adequately teach combined arms operations common to Interim and legacy force units.
- Between ANCOC and the Sergeants Major Course (SMC), NCOES does not provide NCOs the training and education they require to serve in the variety of staff assignments available throughout the Army and on joint and multinational staffs.
- Instruction methodology in NCOES needs to integrate more experiential learning: performance-oriented, scenario-based, hands-on training using training aids, devices, simulators, and simulations, (TADSS), and equipment units have in the field, particularly the Army Battle Command System.
- NCOES must integrate vocational and technical training that leverages existing civilian resources to teach some specialized and technical skills.
- Integrated training between NCOES and OES makes educational experiences more effective through group interaction and by challenging the students to provide the kind of leadership needed to best lead units. Some proponents have developed shared training opportunities; many have not.

RECOMMENDATIONS
120. Develop and incorporate into a leader development campaign plan, an assessment of the entire spectrum of NCOES, from the Primary Leader Development Course through the Sergeants Major Course. This effort must be linked to the Army’s overall assessment of its officer, warrant officer, and DA civilian training and educational systems. This assessment of NCOES must be a zero-based requirements assessment. It should be
tied to the roles, duties, and responsibilities of NCOs for Army Transformation and full spectrum operations in the contemporary operational environment. These should be determined during the reestablishment and publishing of the FM 22-600-20, *The Army Noncommissioned Officer Guide*. Start with determining what tasks on which the Army must train its NCOs. Determine where to teach the tasks (field, institution, or self-development), how to teach them (resident or nonresident), and when to teach them. Then develop integrated and shared training and education with the other components of the Army’s education and training systems—officer, warrant officer and DA civilian. The assessment must also consider what learning models to use. This overarching NCOES strategy would not just adjust the current NCOES but design a complete education system to provide the right education, at the right time, for the right NCO. A transformed NCOES must provide—

- Technical and tactical training and education throughout an NCO’s career.
- Increased emphasis on the conceptual and interpersonal skills that NCOs require to successfully perform their role in full spectrum operations in the contemporary operational environment.
- A common warfighting focus.
- Education tailored to MOS and operational assignments—the right education for the right NCO at the right time.
- Distance learning blended with resident instruction to supplement resident NCOES courses.
- A reachback capability for education and training to prepare NCOs for new assignments that they can access in current assignments and en route to new assignments.
- Experiential learning.
The end state will be a revitalized NCOES that produces NCOs who—
- Are technically and tactically competent.
- Are self-aware and adaptive.
- Can train soldiers, develop leaders, and lead small units trained and ready to fight and win the Nation’s wars.
- Are committed to lifelong learning.

**Improve Instruction**

121. Improve the quality of instruction in NCOES through more experiential learning. Provide hands-on, performance-oriented, field-based, practical-exercise, scenario-based training and education. Instruction should use equipment NCOs have in units and current TADSS in live, virtual, and constructive environments.

122. Continue to integrate education and training between NCOES and OES as recommended in the ATLDP Phase I (Officer Study).
- Continue developing integrated and shared training and education between basic and advanced NCO and officer courses.
- Develop integrated and shared educational and training opportunities between USASMA and Command and General Staff College (CGSC). End state is a goal of co-locating USASMA with CGSC. This would enable SMC and CGSC students to—
  - Integrate their training and education. This integration would include the Command and General Staff Officer Course, School of Advanced Military Studies, Combined Arms and Services Staff School, and the School for Command Preparation.
  - Train with staff officers, battle captains, operations and executive officers, and battalion commanders in tactical and operational warfighting, logistics, and leadership.
  - Leverage the operational and educational qualifications of the CGSC staff and faculty, the doctrine and combat developers and writers, and simulations and training resources of the TRADOC Deputy Chief of Staff for Training–West (DCST-W), and the TRADOC and Army Transformation experts working these areas at the Combined Arms Center.
- Integrate the Command Sergeants Majors Course into the Pre-Command Course at Fort Leavenworth and branch proponent pre-command courses.

123. Improve the field’s awareness, understanding, and use of the NCOES web-based external assessment system (see, for example, [http://usasma.bliss.army.mil/Feedback/Feedback.htm](http://usasma.bliss.army.mil/Feedback/Feedback.htm)). This web based system should enable NCOs; their leaders; combat, doctrine, and materiel developers; and CTC observer-controllers to provide an assessment and feedback on the relevance and quality of their institutional training and education. This assessment and feedback system between the field and the NCOES institutions must enable NCOES courses to rapidly assess and update curricula to meet the requirements of the field and changes in doctrine, organization, and materiel.

**Enhance ANCOC**

124. Enhance ANCOC to provide the training and education necessary for full spectrum operations in the contemporary operational environment.
- **Purpose.** To provide, for all promotable staff sergeants and sergeants first class, training and education in leading and training soldiers and small units in platoons and companies, knowledge of company team and battalion task force combined arms operations, and the increased staff skills required to operate as members of battalion task force and brigade combat team battle staffs.
- **End state.** Multiskilled sergeants first class with enhanced staff supervisory and battle staff integration skills, trained to assume platoon sergeant or primary staff NCO positions in operational assignments.
- **Payoff.** Competent and confident platoon sergeants and battalion task force and brigade combat team battle staff NCOs.

### Develop a Master Sergeants Course

125. Develop and implement a training and education course to provide all promotable sergeants first class and master sergeants the training and education they need to serve in a variety of tactical and operational staffs throughout the Army and on joint and multinational staffs. This requires developing and implementing separate skill levels for master sergeants (skill level 5) and sergeants major (skill level 6).

- **Purpose.** To provide, for all promotable sergeants first class and master sergeants, training and education in the skills and knowledge needed to serve in company leadership positions and on senior staffs.

- **End state.** Promotable sergeants first class and master sergeants trained and prepared to serve as either first sergeants or operations NCOs, possessing leadership, combined arms, and joint skills to operate successfully in a full spectrum environment.

- **Payoff.** Competent and confident sergeants first class and master sergeants prepared to serve as first sergeants and operations NCOs on Army, joint, and multinational staffs.

### Align Tasks

126. Review the levels at which NCOES teaches tasks to better align training and education with the Army practice of assigning NCOs to positions one-to-two grades higher than their rank. Start by integrating some training and education on battalion-level battle staff NCO tasks and platoon sergeant duties, responsibilities, and authority into BNCOC. Integrate into ANCOC some training that prepares graduates to serve as first sergeants and on tactical unit battle staffs at battalion, brigade, and division.

127. Integrate remaining tasks trained in BSNCOC and FSC into BNCOC, ANCOC, and the proposed training and education for master sergeants. Doing this would enable NCOs in these courses to receive training and education to prepare them for positions in which they can expect to serve before their next NCOES course.

128. Review mandated nontactical and nontechnical training and educational requirements in resident NCOES courses. Determine the best methods—self-development through the distance-learning portion of an NCOES course, or training and education in units—for training tasks not directly associated with technical, tactical, conceptual, and interpersonal skills.

### Provide Resources

129. Recapitalize the NCOES infrastructure, curricula, and faculty to maintain its current capabilities. Modernize to better meet the requirement of leaders in full spectrum operations.

130. Ensure NCOES has the training developers required to update and maintain changes to the curricula within one year of identifying and approving them.

131. Ensure NCOES courses have the vehicles, communications, and Army Battle Command System components that NCOs train with and operate in the field.

132. Review and determine regulatory and resource requirements that would enable reserve component NCOs to attend NCOES (institutional professional development) and annual training (operational professional development) in the same fiscal year, based on time available to the NCO and unit operational requirements.

133. Review functional courses providing technical training and certification to NCOs. Determine which ones the Army should continue to conduct and which ones the Army can reduce resource requirements (facilities, equipment, instructors, and training developers) for by leveraging existing civilian courses.
134. Review the Army Training Requirements and Resources System to see if it meets present and future NCOES scheduling needs of the field and institutions.

**TRAINING**

135. The Panel determined that the Army’s training doctrine and principles and training management process are sound but that the Army is not following them. The Army has no standard training model to doctrinally define the steps in its training management process. The Panel grouped its findings into the categories listed at the right.

### Unit Training
- Training Doctrine
- Training Management
- Training Resources
- Equal Opportunity Training

**Training Doctrine**

136. The Army’s training doctrine says that effective training is the number-one priority of senior leaders in peacetime. Yet, in the OES and NCOES leader courses and in unit professional development programs, there is little to no education and discussion on Army training doctrine and training management processes. Leaders must know and understand the Army’s training doctrine and their roles and responsibilities regarding planning, preparing, executing, assessing, and providing feedback on training.

**Conclusions**

137. In the comprehensive survey, the field stated that the current Army training doctrine in FM 7-0, *Training the Force*, and FM 7-10, *Battle Focused Training*, is sound and supports small unit training. Soldiers, especially NCOs, say that the Army’s current training doctrine supports individual training and collective mission essential training. Soldiers state that the principles of training are effective for training soldiers and units. The field’s assessment and feedback says that the principal problem with Army training doctrine is that leaders do not know its principles and processes and are not executing it.

**Recommendations**

138. Incorporate training requirements for full spectrum operations; the contemporary operational environment; live, virtual, and constructive environments; and a standard training model that doctrinally defines the steps in the training management process into the update of FM 7-0. Reinforce the responsibility for and linkage between collective mission essential tasks and the individual tasks that support them (Figure 1-4, FM 7-0).

**Training Management**

139. Training management is the process used by Army leaders to identify training requirements and subsequently plan, resource, execute, and evaluate training.

**Conclusions**

140. NCOs are competent individual-soldier and small unit trainers. However, the main effort in training and training resources in units is not on developing the warfighting competencies of its soldiers and small units. Top-down training strategy results in an imbalance between collective maneuver and live-fire training for large units, and training individual soldiers and small units. Brigades, divisions, corps, and armies train in staff processes through brigade operations at the CTCs and in BCTP (Battle Command Training Program) warfighter exercises at the expense of individual-soldier and small unit warfighting competency. Leaders not adhering to the Army’s doctrinal training management process—combined with decreased NCO involvement, especially among junior NCOs—adversely affects NCOs’ ability to fulfil their role of training soldiers and small units. Leaders are not scheduling time to prepare for training or retraining on tasks not performed to standard.
141. NCOES focuses training management instruction at the SMC where students’ knowledge is greatest due to their operational experiences. It teaches progressively less about training management at ANCOC, BNCOC, and PLDC. NCOES needs to refocus what, where, and how it teaches training management. Sergeants and staff sergeants must know their soldiers’ individual training requirements. They must be expert trainers who know how to conduct effective individual training and understand the training management process.

142. Senior NCOs must be well-versed in the training management process and in training small units. In MACOM and Army leader courses—such as, company commander, first sergeant, pre-command, and command sergeants major courses—leaders receive little to no instruction on the principles of, and leader responsibilities under, training doctrine and training management.

143. The Army’s undisciplined execution of its training doctrine and training management has had significant adverse effects on NCO training and leader development: atrophy of individual and small unit warfighting competencies, NCO nonparticipation and consequent apathy about training, and developing a generation of NCOs who do not understand their role in Army training.

Recommendations

144. Execute the Army’s current training management doctrine to enable NCOs to perform their role in planning, preparation, execution, assessment, and feedback of training. Focus on the following:

- Senior leader training responsibilities (page 1-5, FM 7-0).
- Leaders training subordinates to understand and perform their roles in training (Figure 1-3, FM 7-0 and page 1-2, FM 7-10).
- Understand the responsibility for and linkage between collective METL tasks and the individual tasks that support them (Figure 1-4, FM 7-0).
- Include weekly NCO training time for training soldiers, crews, squads, sections, and platoons, as described in Figure 3-5, FM 7-10 (the division commander’s guidance matrix of suggested frequency for training events and other activities). Devote training time to small unit leaders for training their units throughout the week, not just one time weekly. Doing this would enhance readiness and cohesion. It would allow junior NCOs to learn and exercise the Army’s training management system at the lowest level. Conducting first-line individual and collective training requires NCOs to—
  - Identify essential soldier and small unit tasks that support the unit mission essential task list (METL).
  - Formulate a plan to correct deficiencies and sustain strengths.
Execution

145. Review Army and MACOM 350-1-series (training) regulations; ensure requirements are achievable and relevant.

146. Execute the Army’s green-amber-red time management system (Figure 3-7, FM 7-0) to standard. Execute taskings in accordance with doctrinal timelines for planning, preparing, executing, assessing, and providing feedback on training.

147. Increase training and education on Army training doctrine and principles, and training management processes in leader courses.
   - MACOM company commander and first sergeant courses.
   - Pre-command courses.
   - OES and NCOES—place emphasis in junior and mid-level leader courses.
   - Unit officer professional development (OPD) programs and noncommissioned officer development programs (NCODPs).

Focus on principles, responsibilities, ownership for leader roles, and conducting training meetings.

Training Resources

148. Training resources are resources (human, physical, financial, and time) used to support training. They may be internally controlled by an organization or externally controlled by a headquarters that allocates their use to units as required (FM 7-0). Training enablers are a class of training resources that support home-station training. These include such things as TADSS, home-station training budgets, and facilities such as wash racks and ranges.

Conclusions

149. Soldiers surveyed said they do not have sufficient training enablers. Specific areas mentioned include—
   - Supplies—expendable items that support training, such as batteries for night vision devices and radios.
   - Personnel—soldiers diverted to borrowed military manpower positions.
   - Time—nonmission-essential requirements that take away from time to train mission essential tasks.
   - TADSS—a lack of TADSS, particularly in the combat support and combat service support units but also in combat arms units (field artillery and aviation in particular).

150. The Panel determined that small, hand-held computers—known generically as “Palm Pilots” or Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs)—could enhance both training and operations. These devices, already in use by the US Navy, would allow leaders to avoid having to bring bulky reference materials to the field. In addition, they could supplement or replace operational documents, such as maps and orders. Pilots and PDAs are available now and rapidly improving in capability. They would allow NCOs to easily download maps, plans, and other operational documents before or during training or operations. Personal notes can also be typed into these devices for reference or sharing. In addition to the benefit of speed and accuracy of information storage and retrieval, digital information does not tear, get wet and muddied, or blow away. The Army has the capability to develop, update, and distribute training, doctrine, and leadership products to soldiers. Soldiers could download them from the Warrior Knowledge Network proposed in Phase I, either through computers to their PDAs or through wireless networks.

Recommendations

151. Fully resource the training enablers needed to execute the Army’s training strategy to standard.

152. Issue existing off-the-shelf commercial PDAs or hand-held personal computers to leaders. Issue PDAs to sergeants when they finish PLDC.
Use existing off-the-shelf software.

Encourage soldier development of applications for—
- Administrative information.
- Operational materials.
- Training products.

Ensure development and formatting of training, doctrine, and leadership material enables soldiers to download, store, and use in PDAs.

Equal Opportunity Training

153. AR 600-20, *Army Command Policy*, governs Equal Opportunity (EO) training. The Army’s EO program formulates, directs, and sustains a comprehensive effort to maximize human potential and ensure fair treatment of all persons based solely on merit, fitness, and capability in support of military readiness. The EO philosophy is based on fairness, justice, and equity. Commanders are responsible for sustaining a positive EO climate within their units. This includes preventing sexual harassment.

Conclusions

154. NCOs generally agree that there are sufficient resources to address EO training and diversity issues. However, instruction focuses on the legal aspects of EO, not on its role as a force multiplier that instills trust and confidence in soldiers and leaders and contributes to unit cohesion and readiness. The quality of EO training needs improving: situational, application-based, interactive training is required. Present EO training teaches facts, but does not facilitate NCO ability to address EO problems. Soldiers do not perceive a significant difference between EO, prevention of sexual harassment, consideration of others, and like programs and training. There are too many stove-piped programs.

Recommendations


- Ensure all human relations training policy and requirements are under a single DA proponent for training and leader development.
- Consolidate all human relations training into a single Army regulation and program.
- Update AR 350-41, *Training in Units* to reflect Army human relations training requirements.

156. Improve the quality of Army human relations training. Develop more situational, application-based, interactive training. Make training support packages available to the field for unit training and self-development through web-based media. Ensure training focuses on EO’s role in increasing trust and confidence in soldiers and leaders, unit cohesion, and readiness.

Lifelong Learning

157. Part of Army Culture is the commitment by its leaders to lifelong learning through a balance of educational and operational experiences, complemented by self-development to fill knowledge gaps left by educational and operational experiences. The Army has the requirement not only to delineate what NCOs are supposed to know and be able to do but must also determine the most satisfactory method for learning and provide the resources for NCOs to accomplish this learning. In return, NCOs must assume the responsibility for learning and developing excellence beyond minimum standards. The Panel examined the aspects of lifelong learning listed at the right.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Lifelong Learning</th>
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<td>• Individual and Small Unit Training Standards</td>
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<td>• Post-Secondary Civilian Education</td>
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Individual and Small Unit Training Standards

158. NCOs require well-defined tasks, conditions, standards, and performance measures to ensure soldiers and small units are prepared to function as effective unit and team members. As shown in the charts on the right, the Army has neither continuously updated the training products its legacy forces require nor developed ones for the Limited-Conversion Divisions, Force XXI units, and Interim Brigade Combat Teams. These individual and small unit training standards require updating, development, and sustainment as doctrine, organizations, and materiel change. The Systems Approach to Training (SAT) served the Cold War Army well. It fit the Army’s doctrine (AirLand Battle) and organizations (Army of Excellence), the operational environment, and the Army’s training and leader development programs. However, today’s conditions are radically different. During Army Transformation, the Army developed and executed changes to doctrine, organizations, and materiel without establishing the individual and small unit training standards the field requires to conduct training and leader development.

Conclusions

159. The Army must determine what system it needs for developing training standards for full spectrum operations. Whatever decision the Army makes, it must provide the resources the required to develop the training products, doctrine, and combat developments necessary for full spectrum operations in the contemporary operational environment.

160. The Army has neither fully developed nor resourced training, doctrine, and combat developments that use information technology to develop, distribute, and update training standards and doctrine. NCOs require these products in a format they can use while preparing for and executing training.

Recommendations

161. Assess SAT to determine if it meets Army Transformation requirements. Determine if the Army should—

- Continue to develop individual and collective training standards for full spectrum operations and Army Transformation with SAT.
- Modify SAT to take advantage of new technologies while retaining its core principles and processes.
- Develop a new system based on the changes in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader development, and the contemporary operational environment since the Army introduced SAT.

162. Provide resources in the areas of training products, doctrine, and combat developments necessary to update, develop, and sustain individual and collective training tasks, conditions, standards, and performance measures for full spectrum operations and Army Transformation.

163. Develop programs and resource training, doctrine, and combat development that use information technology to develop, distribute, and update training standards and doctrine. Training and doctrine products must be modular and interactive and capable of being accessed through the Internet. NCOs must be able to download them onto portable storage devices, such as PDAs and hand-held computers, and print them in traditional, paper form.

164. Accelerate the development and update of Army standards and doctrine by capitalizing on the tactics, techniques, and procedures developed by the field through operational experiences at CTCs, joint and multinational training exercises, and operational deployments. The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)
collects and distributes these. Revitalize the Project Warrior program, the role of instructors in developing and publishing training and doctrine products, and the role of CTC observer-controllers in writing and publishing how-to-fight manuals (formerly the FM 71 series).

165. Reestablish, update, and sustain manuals that provide soldiers with the tasks, conditions, and standards their MOS and rank require. Begin with skill levels 1 (specialist) and 2 (sergeant), first in divisional MOSs, then those at corps and echelons above corps. After that, continue with skill levels 3 (staff sergeant) and 4 (sergeant first class). Explore the capability of the BNCOC and ANCOC staff and faculty to develop, update, and sustain these products.


**Competency Assessment and Feedback**

167. TRADOC developed and implemented the Skill Qualification Test (SQT) in 1977 to replace previous MOS tests. TRADOC designed the SQT to provide an indicator of soldier proficiency in an MOS. The SQT consisted initially of a formally administered written test together with hands-on performance criteria made up of selected tasks from the MOS-specific soldier training publication. In 1983, TRADOC decentralized the hands-on test to the unit level. At that time the SQT, along with the Common Task Test (which evaluated skills basic to all MOSs) and the commander’s evaluation, became part of the Individual Training Evaluation Program (ITEP).

168. The Army made other refinements to the SQT over the years. However, in 1990, TRADOC began developing the Self-Development Test (SDT) to replace the SQT. The rationale behind the SDT was that NCOs should take more responsibility for developing and maintaining their own MOS skills and for their own leadership development, and discipline themselves to study on their own. During fiscal year 1992, 125,000 soldiers took the new SDT to test this concept. For two years, TRADOC trainers fine-tuned the SDT based on scores and comments from the field. In general, plans were going ahead for fully implementing the new, but controversial SDT. However, in December 1994, CG TRADOC recommended the Army eliminate the SDT. The consensus of MACOM command sergeants major was that the SDT was redundant with NCOES and did not provide a battle focus for the Army of the 21st century. The command sergeants major felt that NCOES had advanced to the point where it objectively measured soldier performance better than the SDT. DA accepted CG TRADOC’s recommendation and eliminated the SDT.

**Conclusions**

169. The Army has no method of objectively assessing NCOs’ proficiency in tactical and technical MOS skills and grade-related leadership skills. A majority of NCOs believe the Army should conduct an annual assessment of their tactical and technical MOS skills and leadership proficiency against established standards, updated as doctrine, organizations, and materiel change. This competency assessment would improve training and readiness by providing feedback to NCOs, units, and the Army on training and leader development program effectiveness.

170. Strategic shortcomings of the Army’s earlier efforts at competency assessment include—

- The Army did not develop competency assessment tools for every MOS. Since MOS competency was considered in the promotion process, soldiers perceived the system as unfair.
- Issues with the effect of soldiers’ reading skill levels on test outcomes.
- The Army could not develop an assessment that accounted for different experiences within an MOS. This shortcoming was aggravated because the Army could not provide training and education resources that soldiers could access to develop proficiency on equipment and units that were a part of their MOS but with which they did not serve.
• The Army either could not update the assessment tools as new equipment was fielded or deleted from the Army’s inventory, or the lag time was significant.
• Assessment and feedback was not timely. Soldiers, leaders, and units had moved on to other training events and missions. When feedback was received, it was irrelevant or overcome by events.

171. Army leaders recognized that the cost to develop and sustain a competency assessment test was more than it could afford, given the priorities of the post-Cold War operational environment. The system in place at the time was tied to promotions rather than training and readiness. As a result, developing, updating, and sustaining an assessment test for the enlisted force took second place to operational requirements. It was too daunting a task, given the resources required, the pace of force modernization, and the state of information technology and management systems at the time. Thus, senior Army leaders decided to end the program.

Recommendations
172. Develop and sustain a competency assessment program for evaluating soldiers’ technical and tactical proficiency in the MOS and leadership skills for their rank. Army leaders must commit to the program and link the assessment and feedback to soldier, unit, and Army readiness. Begin with skill levels 1 (specialist) and 2 (sergeant), first in divisional MOSs, then those at corps and echelons above corps. After that, continue with skill levels 3 (staff sergeant) and 4 (sergeant first class). Based on the lessons learned, use the following framework:
• A web-based, interactive, multimedia system tied to technical manuals, soldiers manuals, and field manuals, with the capability to provide paper-based products.
• Linked to a Warrior Development Center through Army Knowledge Online.
• Done in Classroom XXI, unit learning centers, or installation education centers.
• Development, update, and distribution of products linked to training, combat, doctrine, and materiel developments.
• Real-time assessment and feedback to soldiers, units, and the Army to support training and leader development programs and improve soldier and unit readiness.
• Modular assessment—
  • Common warfighting tasks that all soldiers must know, regardless of MOS.
  • Common technical, tactical, and leadership tasks required by MOS and rank.
  • Tailored (commander-determined) tasks based on the unit METL and organization.
• Based on MOS tactical and technical skills and leadership skills for their rank.
• Must be current.
• Must provide reachback capability to institutions so soldiers serving outside their MOS can obtain training products.
• Written evaluation, conducted annually for all soldiers in the active component and biannually in the reserve components.

173. Fix soldier, unit, and institutional responsibilities and provide the necessary resources:
• Soldiers.
  • Prepare for the assessment through training and self-study.
  • Use the results in their self-development.
• Units.
  • Train soldiers, allocate time, and administer the test.
  • Use results to improve unit training and leader development programs.
  • Provide input on individual soldier training requirements, developmental counseling, and semi centralized promotion recommendations.
• Institutions.
  • Develop, update, and sustain the program.
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- Provide soldiers the necessary training and educational products (soldiers manuals with tasks, conditions, standards, and performance measures).
- Proponent involvement: Provide timely assessments to soldiers and units to increase readiness by improving the quality of Army training and leader development programs.

174. Competency assessment would have the following payoffs:
- Improve Army training and leader development programs.
  - Provide assessment and feedback on whether or not these programs are training and educating soldiers in the individual and leader tasks necessary to function as members of small units, train soldiers, and grow leaders.
  - The end state of improved training and leader development programs is to have trained and ready forces for the Nation.
- Strengthen the role of NCOs in training management and leader development.
  - Enable quantitative and qualitative assessment of soldiers’ technical and tactical knowledge to determine individual training requirements. Feed this assessment back into training programs to sustain performance on tasks trained to standard and improve performance on tasks not trained to standard.
  - Use results used in developmental counseling of subordinates and self-development programs.
  - Improve leader development by providing quantitative feedback to raters and senior raters on how well NCOs are demonstrating tactical and technical competence and how well has they have trained their soldiers in MOS skills.
- The training and educational products and the assessment and feedback systems would enable the introduction of lifelong learning through standards and self-development.
- Improve retention by providing leaders with objective assessments of soldiers’ technical and tactical competency to use in recommending soldiers for selection to sergeant and staff sergeant under the semi-centralized system and for selecting those best qualified under the centralized system.

Self-Development

175. Informal self-development takes place routinely among NCOs as they actively assess the experiences of their subordinates, their units, and themselves; learn from that assessment; and apply it to their next experience. After-action reviews, informal and formal counseling, and mentoring enable this assessment and feedback. However, the Army’s expectations concerning the formal self-development process and outcomes do not correspond with those of its NCOs. The Army expects self-development to be a formal, directed program that forms the foundation of a professional’s lifelong learning process by effectively linking operational and educational experiences with the tools to fill knowledge gaps. In contrast, NCOs see themselves as responsible for their learning and want the Army to treat them as capable of directing their self-development. NCOs increasingly equate self-development with achievement of a post-secondary education degree. This is driven by NCOs’ perception that the Army requires civilian post-secondary education for professional advancement.

Conclusions

176. Factors impeding effective self-development include—
- Confusing and unclear beliefs:
  - The Army lacks a definition, doctrine, goals, objectives, and incentives.
  - Soldiers lack an awareness of the products developed for self-development.
- Shortsightedness: Unit leaders focus on near-term operational requirements at the expense of developmental learning.
- Lack of time: Self-development does not compete well with daily operational requirements during duty hours and scarce family and personal time after duty hours.
- Lack of linkage: Self-development is not linked to technical and tactical training.
• Lack of chain-of-command support: Leaders do not provide time and conduct developmental counseling.

• Lack of value: Self-development does not receive effort, emphasis, importance, and support from leaders.

**Recommendations**

177. Develop and publish a clear definition, doctrine, goals, objectives, and incentives for self-development in Army training and leadership publications (FM 6-22, FM 7-0, FM 7-10, and DA Pam 350-58, *Leader Development for America’s Army* and DA Pam 600-25, *U.S. Army Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development Guide*). Proposed definition:

> Self-development is a self-directed, competency-based, progressive, lifelong process soldiers use to augment institutional training and unit experience to attain proficiency at their current rank/assignment and prepare for promotion and higher-level responsibilities. Self-development is an individual responsibility, with assistance from first-line leaders and commanders. Soldiers identify requirements based on self-assessment and feedback. Developmental activities are planned to meet specific individual training goals and needs.

178. Update FM 7-0 and FM 7-10 to establish direct connection between leader development, unit training, and self-development.

179. Revise the self-development doctrine and organize it as a separate appendix in FM 6-22 to establish a direct doctrinal link between self-development, leader development, unit and individual training. Use the framework in the following table.

**Self-Development Framework**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Revised definition.</th>
<th>Bridges knowledge gap between operational and institutional experiences.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structured, yet informal and voluntary—self-directed.</td>
<td>Linked to individual and small unit training in operational experiences, institutional training and education, developmental counseling, self-assessment, and competency assessments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Includes professional development and personal goals.</td>
<td>Army and leaders provide and allocate resources (time, tools, facilities, opportunity).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part of the profession—an obligation to lifelong learning by self-aware and adaptive leaders.</td>
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</table>

180. Make DA G3 (deputy chief of staff, operations) the Army Staff proponent and TRADOC the Army executive agent for self-development.

181. Develop and publish career maps by MOS/CMF linked to task, conditions, and standards for individual and small unit tasks. Provide a menu of possible specific developmental activities NCOs might use for self-development. Ensure publications are current and accessible to enable NCOs to maintain and improve their tactical and technical proficiency as well as prepare for future promotions and assignments.

182. Teach NCOs how to do self-development for themselves and their soldiers in NCOES, beginning with PLDC. Stress developmental counseling, goal setting, and linkage to training in course programs of instruction.

183. Conduct a strategic communications plan to create a pervasive awareness of the products available to sustain the program.

**Distance Learning**

184. The term distance learning does not meet Army Transformation learning needs. A better name for the concept may be *electronic learning*, e-learning for short. E-learning involves education or training courses delivered to remote locations using audio, video, or computer technologies. It comprises both synchronous (occurring in real-time) and asynchronous (not occurring in real-time; not simultaneous) instruction. E-learning
may blend resident and nonresident instruction. This type of learning must be short, flexible, and instantly applicable to soldiers and unit missions. Soldiers should be able to progress through it at their own pace and place. They should be able to access only as much of the training as they need at any time—just enough and just in time. Instruction has to both reach soldiers quickly and deliver information in a way that allows them to absorb it. That means breaking lessons into digestible pieces and having on-line discussion groups or other interactive features that let soldiers demonstrate what they learn. It also usually involves some form of live instruction, whether delivered in person or electronically. Like the integrated tasking or air tasking order, e-learning provides the right package (effects), for the right target (tailored), at the right time and place. E-learning is an umbrella for many types of technology-enabled learning. Some of these are listed in the following table.

### E-learning Applications

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type Training</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Desktop Video-Conferencing</td>
<td>Real-time conference using live pictures between two or more people on a network who communicate via computer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance Learning</td>
<td>In its most common historical form, refers to a broadcast of a lecture to distant locations, usually through video presentations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interactive</td>
<td>Includes both computer-based and multimedia training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desktop</td>
<td>Delivered by computer at one’s desk.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer-Assisted Instruction</td>
<td>Used more commonly in education for any instruction where a computer is used as a learning tool.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Paced Training</td>
<td>Taken at a user-determined time and pace. Used historically for text or audio/video self-study courses, the term is used by some organizations now to include computer-based, web-based, and multimedia training.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

185. Since the US Army initiated eArmyU (an e-learning program) in January 2000, 10,400 soldiers have begun taking courses and earning degrees on-line from 24 participating colleges. The Army expects enrollment to reach 80,000 by 2005, as it takes the program Armywide. The Servicemembers Opportunity Colleges Army Degree (SOCAD) system consists of groups of accredited colleges and universities offering job-related degree programs at the associates and bachelors degree level on or accessible to Army installations and communities. Servicemembers Opportunity Colleges (SOC) continues to add career degrees to the SOCAD program, which maximizes Army learning experiences and minimizes additional college study. SOC are developing degrees to accommodate specific, high-density MOS populations as they move in groups through NCOES. Soldiers reaching the specialty phase of BNCOC are introduced to the SOCAD career degree for their MOS. The objective is to custom-design career degree programs for the technical CMFs in aviation, health science, electronics, administration, and automation.

### Conclusions

186. NCOs are familiar with distance learning and are interested in using it. They see themselves as responsible for their learning and want the Army to treat them as capable of directing their self-development. However, the Army and the field’s expectations for distance learning are not the same. The field perceives that the Army views distance learning as a replacement for resident education—a resource-driven requirement versus a means to provide tailored training and education to meet the field’s learning needs. The field also believes the Army is not able to provide the quality of products the field expects: interactive on-line collaboration, real-time practical applications, and multimedia instruction versus simply uploading text-based lessons onto a new delivery system.
187. NCOs believe distance learning contributes to personal and professional development. They say they have adequate tools for distance learning. They are adamant that knowledge-based distance learning should complement resident NCOES but not replace it. NCOs believe distance learning’s major shortcomings are—

- Lack of time available.
- Lack of leader support.
- Lack of effectiveness versus resident instruction.
- Not protected from training distracters.

**Recommendations**

188. The Army must synchronize its own and the field’s distance learning expectations. Distance learning cannot be viewed solely as a resource-saving measure. It must augment operational and institutional experiences. The quality of distance learning must meet the field’s expectations. Text-based products are not good enough. Army distance learning must use leading-edge learning models: it must be interactive and multimedia. It must also provide a reachback capability to educational institutions for when the soldier wants to take the learning further. Explore adopting the concept of e-learning. Examine the best practices of industry and civilian educational institutions in delivering short, flexible training and education that is instantly applicable on the job. Finally, develop and implement a strategic communications plan to inform the field that the Army understands its expectations for distance learning and to increase awareness of existing training and educational materials available through Army Internet sites.

**Post-Secondary Education**

189. Post-secondary education is an important component of lifelong learning for NCOs.

**Conclusions**

190. Army and NCO expectations about the role and requirements for post-secondary civilian education in NCO professional development do not match. NCOs believe that the Army requires college education, either an associate or bachelors degree, for promotion. The Army does believe that cognitive, interpersonal, and conceptual skills learned through civilian education contribute to professional development, but it expects the focus of NCO post-secondary education to be on subjects that contribute to technical and tactical proficiency. The Army promotes civilian education through—

- Developing programs such as [Army University Access On Line](#) and the [Army Continuing Education System](#).
- Establishing specific goals in CMF career maps.
- Awarding points in semicentralized promotion worksheets.
- Making a strong, explicit commitment in its accession program to providing post-secondary education.

**Recommendations**

191. Combine NCO operational, institutional, and self-development experiences over the course of a career into a single program. This program should enable NCOs to earn associates and bachelors degrees, or obtain professional certification, through accredited post-secondary institutions at critical points in their professional development.

- Make DA G3 the Army Staff proponent for post-secondary education.
- Base the program on training and education in direct-leader technical, tactical, conceptual, and interpersonal skills that NCOs require in their MOS and CMF.
- Accredit the program with appropriate post-secondary education accreditation agencies (the [American Council on Education](#), [Center for Adult Learning Education Credentials](#), and the [Guide to the Evaluation of Education Experiences in the Armed Services](#)).
• Provide 100% tuition assistance for MOS/CMF and leader-development-related certification courses and for Army Degree-Builder Program courses.

• Link the program to—
  ▪ Specific qualitative and quantitative operational experiences.
  ▪ Tasks, conditions, and standards.
  ▪ Competency assessment and feedback programs.
  ▪ NCOES courses.
  ▪ Specific self-development requirements through distance or distributed learning, or resident instruction at post-secondary institutions in conjunction with NCOES courses.

IMPERATIVES
192. There are 78 recommendations in this report. Many require decisions by Army senior leaders, setting of priorities, and allocation of resources. Others require principally organizational and direct leaders to act to restore the balance between beliefs and practices and execute to standard the current Army training and leader development programs. The recommendations are linked to six of the imperatives established in the ATLDP Phase I (Officer Study). Army leaders must endorse and act on them if the Army is to make substantial improvement in training and leader development. The six imperatives are—

• **Army Culture**: Recognize the strong relationship between Army Culture and the quality of training and leader development programs.

• **Noncommissioned Officer Education System**: Adapt NCOES to meet the needs of the transforming Army and the realities of the operational environment.

• **Training**: Revitalize the Army training system by updating training doctrine, improving home-station training, and modernizing the CTCs.

• **Systems Approach to Training**: Commit to standards-based training.

• **Training and Leader Development Model**: Adopt a model that clearly shows how training and leader development are linked.

• **Lifelong Learning**: Provide the doctrine, tools, and support to foster lifelong learning in the Army through balanced educational and operational experiences supported by self-development.

ARMY CULTURE
193. **Recognize the strong relationship between Army Culture and the quality of training and leader development programs.** For the Army to effectively train soldiers and grow leaders, Army Culture must operate routinely within an acceptable Band of Tolerance. Any change that widens the gap between beliefs and practices in the Army Culture affects the Army’s ability to train soldiers and grow leaders.

NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER EDUCATION SYSTEM
194. **Adapt NCOES to meet the needs of the transforming Army and the realities of the operational environment.** Largely untouched since the end of the Cold War and progressively underresourced during downsizing, NCOES does not meet Army needs. Adapting NCOES to the post-Cold-War operational environment requires a new approach. Institutions must focus on providing a common warfighting focus and the right education, at the right time, for the right soldier. They must also provide a tailored education that synchronizes the educational and operational experiences of NCOs, pursues integrated training and education with OES, and educates NCOs to established, common standards.

TRAINING
195. **Revitalize the Army training system by updating training doctrine, improving home-station training, and modernizing the CTCs.** Training doctrine in FM 7-0 and FM 7-10 must be adapted to account for the contemporary operational environment and other realities. It must be linked to operations doctrine in
FM 3-0 and leadership doctrine in FM 6-22. In the meantime, commanders and units must adhere to existing training doctrine, principles, and practices to help reduce operational pace. The Army must provide commanders with the necessary training resources. This includes increasing the availability and quality of TADSS to support training. Finally, the Army must recapitalize, modernize, staff, and resource the CTCs to provide full spectrum, multiechelon, and combined arms operational and leader development experiences.

SYSTEMS APPROACH TO TRAINING

196. **Commit to standards-based training.** Standards-based training has been the strength of Army preparedness since the end of the Vietnam War. Standards are the basis for developing training, assessing performance, and providing feedback. Yet SAT, designed to document and publish those training standards, has atrophied. Without common standards, soldier, leader, and unit readiness—and battlefield success—are in doubt. These common standards must be documented and accessible in digital and paper formats.

TRAINING AND LEADER DEVELOPMENT MODEL

197. **Adopt a model that clearly shows how training and leader development are linked.** The existing leader development model is inadequate. A new model must clearly communicate the Army leadership’s intent and must be understandable for junior leaders, staffs, and outside agencies. The Panel determined that the model must—

- Be based on Army Culture.
- Mandate standards for soldiers, leaders, and units
- Provide feedback to soldiers, leaders, units, and the Army.
- Balance operational and educational experience through education, assignments, and self-development.

The product of the model should be self-aware, adaptive leaders and trained and ready units. The model is meant to be all-encompassing with respect to focusing institutional education, guiding field training, and advocating self-development in a lifelong-learning paradigm. It should also help the Army develop a mature management process that continually addresses training and leader development issues in a decision making forum for the CSA.

LIFELONG LEARNING

198. **Provide the doctrine, tools, and support to foster lifelong learning in the Army through balanced educational and operational experiences supported by self-development.** Part of Army Culture is the commitment by its leaders to lifelong learning through a balance of educational and operational experiences, complemented by self-development to fill knowledge gaps left by educational and operational experiences. To be a learning organization that supports lifelong learning, the Army must—

- Provide the training and educational standards and products that are the foundation for standards-based training and leader development.
- Provide the doctrine, tools, and support to foster lifelong learning through balanced educational and operational experiences supported by self-development.
- Develop, fund, and maintain an Armywide Warrior Development Center that uses information technology. The Warrior Development Center should be a place where soldiers, leaders, and units can obtain standards, training, and educational publications; doctrinal manuals; and assessment and feedback tools. It should also provide access to distance and distributed learning programs for self-development and lifelong learning.
• Provide the doctrine, tools, and support to inculcate the concept and practice of lifelong learning, self-awareness, and adaptability into Army Culture.

• Teach the importance of lifelong learning and the metacompetencies of self-awareness and adaptability throughout NCOES. Strengthen this approach in organizations and in self-development.