A STRATEGIC BUFFET:

What The Brahimi Report Says About UN Peace Operations And The Opportunities It Offers To The Regional U.S. Unified Commanders

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the NWC in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Joint Military Operations Department for the Masters of Arts Degree in National Security and Strategic Studies. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Introduction and Thesis

On 21 August 2000, the Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi A. Annan, published a short guide for strategic, doctrinal, and operational changes necessary for UN peace missions to effectively pursue a desired end state.[1] Known as the "Brahimi Report,"[2] the document provides the results of a comprehensive review of UN peacekeeping operations by a blue ribbon panel of experts chaired by Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi of Algeria. The Brahimi Report contends that success in the complex peace operations the UN undertakes depends on the rapid deployment of a credible military force and an integrated strategy for post-conflict civilian and military tasks that permit "ending a mission well accomplished."[3]

Two reasons militate for United States regional Unified Commanders (CINCs) taking notice and taking action on the operational recommendations contained in the Brahimi Report. First, in some circumstances the failure of a UN peace operation in a CINC's regional area of responsibility (AOR) can become a matter of riveting national military importance requiring the use of U.S. military forces as occurred in Bosnia in 1995. Second, the recommendations contained in the Brahimi Report for better training, equipping, and rapidly deploying forces to UN operations offers CINCs substantial opportunities to expand regional engagement activities. By better understanding the needs of UN peace operations, CINCs may more effectively tailor their activities to shape the international environment and thereby better protect U.S. interests, prepare for an uncertain future, and advance U.S. objectives of peace, security, democracy, and human rights.[4]

Traditional UN Peace Operations

A brief review of UN peacekeeping operations helps place the Brahimi Report in perspective. The first UN peace operation began in 1948. Called the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), this mission used an *ad hoc* force of unarmed military officers from the U.S. and other nations as observers to assist the UN Mediator for Palestine. Without specific authorization this military arm of the United Nations developed as an improvised response to end conflict based on the consent of the warring parties rather than the five Permanent Members of UN Security Council (China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States) authorizing action under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter.[5]

In 1947, a year before UNTSO deployed, agreement between China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States collapsed over the means they would use to conduct combined military action to impose peace on the post-World War II world.[6] The five Permanent Members of the Security Council, through the Military Staff Committee established in the UN Charter, could not find agreement on what forces to provide or how to operate them.[7] The concept of collective security enforcement described in the UN Charter was thereby stillborn. The action taken to deploy troops in Korea in 1950 under a UN command was possible only because the Soviet Union absented itself from the Security Council and was not present to cast a veto.[8] With the onset of the Cold War, the consequence was to make autonomous UN commanded peace enforcement operations impossible for the next 40 years.

Peacekeeping, as opposed to peace enforcement, is not mentioned in the UN Charter. It was a concept proposed by Canada and developed in the 1950s to provide a UN military presence as a buffer between two opposing forces, but only with the consent of the warring states and

with the minimum use of force. In the four decades from 1948 until 1988, sufficient consent was reached within the UN and with belligerents to authorize only 15 missions.[9] Six of the missions addressed problems between Israel and its neighbors: Egypt; Lebanon; Syria; and an observation mission in Yemen.[10] Three missions involved India and Pakistan.[11] Two occurred in Africa: Congo and Angola.[12] One mission occurred in the South Pacific: West New Guinea; one in the Eastern Mediterranean: Cyprus; and one in the Caribbean basin: the Dominican Republic.[13]

While individuals had occasion to display military bravery, operationally UN peacekeeping developed as mostly a sedate affair.[14] Just two --the 1960 UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) and the 1962 UN Security Force in Western New Guinea (UNSF)-- had core responsibilities different than observing a cease-fire, occupying a buffer zone, or monitoring the voluntary separation of formally warring forces.[15]

Over these forty years of practice the UN gleaned lessons from attempting to support peace agreements with a small number of lightly armed, impartial, international military personnel. Practice became method.[16] In the successful operations, UN forces were assigned to a relatively small geographical area and avoided the use of force except in self-defense. They drove clearly marked white vehicles, wore national uniforms with UN blue berets, and transparently worked to build cooperation and conciliation to stop military conflict.[17] United Nations military personnel supported the diplomatic mechanisms of mediation, negotiation, and persuasion. And, when all else failed in these missions, reporting back to UN Headquarters in New York, was an effective mechanism to halt fighting and reduce conflict.[18] This worked because the heart of UN peace operations was the modest goal of halting

the escalation of proxy wars between clients of the Western and Communist power blocs.[19]

When the conflicts flared beyond the ability of the peacekeepers' field negotiations to manage, reporting back to UN Headquarters in New York mobilized external resources. Often these were military or economic assistance programs provided by the U.S. or the Soviet Union that gave military assistance, better health care, stimulated trade, or encouraged greater support from neighboring nations that lasting peace depends upon.[20] Within the often unpredictable limitations of maintaining consent at the UN, this gentle management of "teacup wars"[21] permitted peacekeeping missions to remain unsaddled with peacebuilding activities and enjoyed low key success. In recognition of the value of the effort, in 1988 the Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded the Nobel Peace Prize to the United Nations Peacekeeping Forces.[22] Even as the peacekeepers garnered this accolade, however, the strategic foundation that UN peace operations rested upon shifted with undreamed of abruptness.

In December of 1988, the leader of the Soviet Union, Mickail Gorbachev, proclaiming his policies of *glasnost* and *perestroika* (openness and restructuring), appeared before the General Assembly of the UN. There he announced that his country would now actively support multilateral cooperation with the UN.[23] The lid held on UN peace operations by the forces of the Cold War lifted. A geyser of UN peace operations followed.

Post Cold War UN Peace Operations

With the enthusiasm of a land rush rather than with the rational calculus of war the Security Council began to approve mandates for new peace operations with seemingly idealistic abandon. After only 15 peace missions in the first 40 years of the organization, in 1988 the Security

Council added three new missions to the five that were ongoing.[24] Between 1989 and 2000, the Security Council granted another thirty-eight new UN peace operations approval.[25] Intervening in larger countries that required greater numbers of peacekeepers and assigned increasingly ambitious mandates, the *ad-hoc* structure of UN peacekeeping became awash with missions, costs, expectations, and ultimately became adrift from the narrow range of operational practices that had adequately served its needs.[26]

Numbers only intimate how topsy-turvy UN peacekeeping turned in the 1990s. At the beginning of the decade developed nations such as Canada, Sweden, Belgium, France, and the Netherlands, were the top contributors to the UN.[27] In August 2000, the main contributors to the UN included Bangladesh, Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, India, Jordan, Pakistan, Ukraine, Australia, New Zealand and Argentina.[28]

Starting in 1988 with 9,500 peacekeepers, UN forces peaked at 78,000 in 1994 during the simultaneous Somalia and Bosnia missions.[29] At the end of those two large missions the number of peacekeepers plummeted to 10,000 in 1997 before again rising to 30,000 in 2000 when the Brahimi Report was written.[30] In the 1970s and 1980s the largest UN missions operated with 6,000 to 7,000 forces.[31] In 1994 the UN Protection Force in Bosnia (UNPROFOR) had 35,000 peacekeepers, support personnel, military observers, civilian police, international civilian staff and local staff under its command.[32] Where previous missions had been generally dispersed around the world,[33] in the 1990s 18 missions were assigned to Africa and seven to the Balkans.[34]

As the number of forces and missions rose costs soared. In 1988 peacekeeping cost the UN $230 million; in 1990, $400 million; and in 1994 it jumped to $3.46 billion, almost four times the regular budget of

the UN.[35] In 1997 the peacekeeping budget fell to about $1 billion. By 1999, because of the deployments to East Timor, Kosovo, Sierra Leone and the operation of 12 other active missions, the authorized military strength of UN peacekeeping forces stood at 30,000 at a cost of $2.5 billion.[36]

More important than the vast fluctuation of troops and money, the most dramatic change came in operational fundamentals. The desired end state for UN missions became more expansive. UN peacekeeping ambitiously shed its old skin in Somalia in 1992. Striding over past reservations about non-intervention in the internal affairs of nations, the UN began to conduct operations that dealt with non-state actors in the internal affairs of a nation.[37] Instead of maintaining a cease-fire, nation-building became an objective.[38] UN peacekeeping missions expanded. Components were added for human rights, civilian administration, civilian police, elections, economic rehabilitation, repatriation, and maintaining oversight of the non-government agencies and private volunteer organizations that flooded UN mission areas.[39]

In these new, expanded missions, the UN found itself embroiled in intrastate, as opposed to interstate, conflicts. The belligerents it faced were secessionist movements, warlords, or other local actors whose consent to the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force was neither sought nor necessary. As UN peacekeeping sailed into intrastate disputes it also slipped its mooring from the complementary political and economic activities that tempered conflict during the proxy wars.[40]

The clan leaders, ethnic army generals, warlords, para-military forces, and large collection of brigands the UN peacekeepers confronted had slight interest in their disputes being concluded by mediation, negotiation, or cooperation.[41] For some, the conflicts consuming their

countries provided them rich opportunities for personal profit. For others the cessation of hostilities brought about by UN intervention merely constituted an operational pause between engagements. For many, whether the operation was called peacekeeping or peace enforcement,[42] the methods of the UN during the 1990s offered great opportunity to manipulate the international community and to avoid any resolution to the crisis.[43] These untethered actors and malefactors at the centers of regional crisis too often raised a military challenge UN peacekeeping efforts could not meet.[44]

To be fair, a number of UN missions performed well. Successes in Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia, Mozambique, and Croatia deserve special notice.[45] However, the failures of UN peace operations in the 1990s were more than the costs of wrenching change from a venerated institution. They added to modern horror. Peacekeepers were murdered in Mogadishu and Kigali, taken hostage in Bosnia and Sierra Leone, and unable to protect or intervene during the genocide and war crimes in Rwanda and Srebrenica. Considering the long duration and inconclusive results of many UN peacekeeping missions, the competency of the UN to advance international peace through military activities seemed an open question.

The UN a long time to answer this question. Finally, in November and December of 1999, it published detailed investigations of what are considered the worse tragedies of UN peacekeeping: the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the 1995 fall of Srebrenica.[46] These investigations concluded that grave failures occurred at many levels within the UN and among the member states that led directly to massive loss of life.[47] Following the release of these reports Secretary General Annan commissioned the Brahimi panel to review all aspects of UN peace operations.[48]

The Brahimi Report

Starting in March 2000, the work of the panel chaired by Ambassador Brahimi lasted four months. Beyond the Rwanda and Srebrenica reports, another compelling reason for a complete review of UN peace operations were the difficulties encountered by the four UN peacekeeping missions created in 1999: Kosovo (UNMIK), East Timor (UNTAET), Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). Meanwhile, a fifth mission, to monitor the armistice between Ethiopia and Eritrea, also loomed.[49]

The Brahimi panel interviewed UN personnel at each ongoing missions, reviewed the current literature on UN peace operations, and relied on their own extensive personal experience within the UN system.[50] The panel punctuated its efforts with three separate public three-day sessions. The Brahimi panel produced its results quickly. This permitted Secretary General Annan to release the Brahimi Report as a topic for Millennium Summit of the Heads of State at the UN Headquarters in September 2000, beginning at the highest governmental level the long process of implementation.[51]

With freshness borne of necessity, the Brahimi Report made blunt statements about the United Nations. The standard it set to judge UN peacekeeping operations was whether the UN was meeting the challenge of saving future generations from the scourge of war. "Over the last decade, the United Nations has repeatedly failed to meet the challenge, and it can do no better today."[52] Member states have an essential responsibility to "strengthen both the quality and the quantity of support provided to the United Nations system to carry out that responsibility."[53] An effective collection and assessment capability of information that includes "an enhanced conflict early warning system that can detect and recognize the threat or risk of conflict or

genocide" is required.[54] The UN must increase its capacity for an integrated approach to preventive and post-conflict peace-building activities. The capacity for UN Headquarters to plan peace operations required dramatic improvement. "While the United Nations has acquired considerable expertise in planning, mounting, and executing traditional peacekeeping operations, it has yet to acquire the capacity needed to deploy more complex operations rapidly and sustain them effectively."[55] Finally, holding UN personnel to high standards that rewards merit and dismisses incompetence is an imperative.[56]

The main body of the report then provided a justification of how the 57 specific recommendations the report contained remedied the deficiencies of UN peacekeeping operations.[57] A large number of these deal with personnel and internal UN processes that can only be resolved by policy decisions reached between the member nations and the Secretariat in New York.[58] The other recommendations mix bold innovation with a few surprisingly rudimentary corrections.

The Brahimi panel proposed radical breaks from usual UN practices. The first major change would start with the initial movement of military units to the mission area. Presently UN forces are often unable to begin unit travel to the crisis area no sooner than 120 days from when they are notified by the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).[59]

Several factors contribute to this delay. They include the world-wide dispersion of troop-contributing nations, their distance from mission areas, the diminishing stockpile of recycled mission support equipment located in Brindisi, Italy, and the necessity for the UN to contract and schedule strategic lift. Full deployment can take more than a year.[60]

To gain the advantage prompt projection of military force provides to an operation, the panel recommended the UN develop ways to quickly maneuver its forces to the crisis area.[61] To capture the momentum for peace available during the six to twelve weeks following a ceasefire, the report urges "rapid and effective" deployment of the UN mission headquarters within 15 days of the Security Council's approval of a mandate. The forces of traditionally sized peacekeeping operations (about 1,000) should follow within 30 days and the larger, complex peacekeeping missions (about 3,000 personnel) should be deployed within 90 days.[62] For this rapidly deployed force to be immediately effective upon arrival in the mission area, the panel recommended six important changes.

First, despite 52 years as an ongoing international military activity, the UN lacks a formal mechanism to rapidly assemble a mission.[63] It maintains no "battle-rosters" or crisis-manning lists that are formally maintained to quickly put together a staff. To correct this rudimentary shortcoming, the panel recommended the UN develop a database of pre-screened military officers, civilian police officers, and civilian technical experts that are available to be called to New York within seven days. Second, have the notified staff members meet in New York instead of introducing themselves in the mission area.[64] Once these new mission staff members arrive at UN Headquarters, they would receive situation and orientation briefings and start the team-building process. Working with the mission planners in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), this newly formed staff would undertake the task of starting up the mission. However, in a significant break from past practices, this effort would not be conducted in isolation. [65]

To cut the Gordian knot constricting unity of effort within the UN system, the panel's third recommendation for rapidly deploying effective UN forces broadens the effort of creating and supporting missions. The UN Headquarters lacks a single focal point for political analysis, military operations, civilian police, electoral assistance, human rights, development, humanitarian assistance, refugees and displaced persons, public information, logistics, finance, and personnel recruitment. Although DPKO was created in 1992 with this in mind, its extraordinarily slim capabilities have been gravely overmatched by the mammoth burden.[66] To provide a comprehensive effort for creating and supporting missions, the Brahimi Report recommends creating an Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF) that includes the many distinct units, organizations, funds, and specialized agencies of the UN[67] that will provide money, people, and program guidance to the operational mission.

Like the efforts in private industry[68] and the U.S. military when forming crisis action planning teams, this concept requires the many UN entities to each dedicate a full-time representative to work in the IMTF. Under the lead of DPKO, the IMTF participants would coordinate and synchronize the contributions of their parent organizations within the overall mission while also serving as liaison officers back to their parent organization to ensure that timely, correct, information about the mission planning is being communicated and acted upon. All of the energy of the IMTF would be directed towards mission specific planning and support --a previously unknown concept in UN mission planning. This means the IMTF would produce a mutually agreed upon entrance strategy, tasks and responsibilities for the various components of the mission, timelines, measures of effectiveness, and follow-on

courses of action.[69] Once the mission deployed with its entrance strategy and goals, the IMTF would remain in existence at UN Headquarters to continue to provide integrated support for the mission.[70]

The fourth major change the panel recommended to improve the effectiveness of rapidly deployed UN missions is tactical. In traditional UN peacekeeping lightly armed forces --usually foot-mobile infantry with little logistical capability--- served as the mission building blocks. To decrease the friction of interoperability and increase the striking power of UN military operations the Brahimi Report recommends changing from battalions to brigades of about 5,000 troops.[71] Countries with smaller militaries that desire to participate in UN operations would be encouraged to adopt the Scandinavian model of the so-called Standing High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG). In this arrangement nations contribute separate force components to form the brigade and train together with familiar leadership, common equipment, doctrine, organic mobility assets and logistical support.[72]

Swapping light battalions for effective, rapidly deploying brigades is a change that will consume Herculean labor. For the concept to work the UN will need to develop achievable training and equipment standards. To avoid the deployment of "naked" forces that have occurred in the past, the UN will have to conduct inspections to confirm that contributed troops meet UN standards.[73] Comprehensive, authoritative doctrine for UN forces that guides their functions in all phases of the operation--an organizational template that has eluded description for 52 years-- would have to be written. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations must create a global logistic strategy that will support the rapid deployment goals, embracing the possibility of the nearly

simultaneous creation of several missions as occurred in 1999.[74] Finally, developing an overarching strategy for acquiring information technology, analyzing and disseminating all-source information (intelligence), and employing information operations to securely knit peacekeeping missions and the entire UN system to the actual situation on the ground must occur.[75]

The fifth change the panel proposes to ensure more effective UN missions is operational. When the UN brigades arrive in the mission area, muscular peacekeeping should begin. The Brahimi panel believes UN forces require the authority to use force to defend themselves, civilian members of the component, and the mission mandate.[76] "Rules of engagement should not limit contingents to stroke-for-stroke response but should allow ripostes sufficient to silence a source of deadly fire…and not force United Nations contingents to cede the initiative to their attackers."[77] "[W]here one party to a peace agreement clearly and incontrovertibly is violating its terms, continued equal treatment of all parties by the United Nations can in the best case result in ineffectiveness and in the worst may amount to complicity with evil."[78] Instead of the neutrality of traditional peacekeeping, the report asserts that modern peacekeepers should strive for impartiality and dedication to the principles of the UN Charter and the mission mandate. "[I]mpartiality is not the same as neutrality or equal treatment of all parties in all cases for all time, which can amount to a policy of appeasement. In some cases, local parties consist not of moral equals but of obvious aggressors and victims, and peacekeepers may not only be operationally justified in using force but morally compelled to do so."[79]

The sixth change the Brahimi panel offered to make UN missions more effective was a better sequencing of the peacekeeping tasks. New UN doctrine should be written and implemented to conduct peace-building tasks in the areas the UN brigades secured. Programs that disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate (DDR) the former combatants into civil society must occur in the early phases of the mission.[80] The duties of UN civilian police (CIVPOL) should be shifted from solely monitoring local police authorities to actively encouraging the return of the rule of law to the war-torn area. This means employing the expertise of CIVPOL to training police forces to a international standard, assisting the creation of impartial judiciary, and developing or maintaining a humane penal system.[81] Finally, to undergird the many facets of the peace-building process, the Brahimi Report recommends the UN develop a generic legal code that meets all international standards of fairness and human rights protection that can be used by the UN when it is conducting all the functions of a domestic government.

The Brahimi Report concludes by acknowledging that its implementation requires a significant change of UN culture. Promises to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations to end strife and maintain or restore peace must be acted upon.[82] Only then will the United Nations have, "the ability to fulfil its great promise and to justify the confidence and trust placed in it by the overwhelming majority of humankind."[83]

After reviewing the Brahimi Report's litany of recommendations the question is whether its recommendations will be acted upon. To judge this, it is useful to consider how the UN works. For the panel's recommendations to be implemented, mustering a strong consensus of their obvious value is required. The formal approval chain for these

expensive, fundamental changes runs through the Security Council, the General Assembly, and to the capitals of the member nations--most notably the United States, the single largest contributor to the UN and the world's remaining global power. This helps explain why, despite the many paragraphs of tough talk, the Brahimi Report actually describes operational minimums for the UN peacekeeping to competently conduct complex modern peacekeeping missions. It also explains why the report's 57 recommendations are consistent with other longstanding suggestions made by the U.S.[84] and others to improve UN peace operations.[85]

Relevance of the Brahimi Report For U.S. Unified Commanders in Chief

Whether or not the UN adopts its proposals the Brahimi Report is important to U.S. regional CINCs. Its flaying autopsy of UN peace operations graphically exposed the tangled ways and limited means used to pursue laudatory ends. Yet, however flawed UN peace operations may currently be, the creation and conduct of UN missions in a CINC's area-of-responsibility(AOR) constitutes a significant military event.

UN peacekeeping operations only occur when there is near unanimity of international opinion that a crisis is a threat to international peace.[86] Such a crisis will most likely be harming U.S. national interests by disrupting economic activities, injuring U.S. citizens, threatening human rights, or undermining democratic values.[87] Nations in the CINC's AOR will react to the crisis in numerous ways. Some nations will assist the UN mission by providing troops, material support, and access rights to ports and airfields.[88] Others may be at risk of being drawn into the conflict because of incursion of their territory by refugees, insurgents, or guerillas.[89] Because the U.S. pays a quarter of the cost of all UN peacekeeping operations the National Command Authority and Congress will certainly be seeking the CINC's assessment

of the operation. Finally, as both a grim historical note and a matter of readiness, when UN missions fail, the U.S. frequently has to conduct unilateral or coalition operations.[90]

Given the operational shortcomings of UN peacekeeping described in the Brahimi Report, the U.S. regional CINCs should take steps to improve the chances of success for UN operations. First, the names of U.S. military officers and civilian specialists should promptly be provided to DPKO as available to help form the staff nucleus in New York for new missions in the CINC's AOR. This step is separate from the more contentious question of assigning U.S. units to UN command. It provides to the UN considerable expertise in staff planning for complex coalition operations. The U.S. has extensive doctrine on organizing combined, joint, civil-military operations for success across the spectrum of conflict.[91] Second, U.S. CINC concept plans (CONPLANS) should be reviewed to determine the feasibility assisting the rapid deployment of UN forces to mission areas as described in the Brahimi Report. This step should consider inter-theater airlift to move UN forces from one mission to another. This CONPLAN review should also determine the conditions where U.S. interests would support employing the unparalleled capability of the U.S. for port and airfield operations in an austere environment to permit the reception of UN forces. Although matters of cost abound, by any calculation a successful UN operation is vastly less expensive than a unilateral U.S. action.[92]

Another reason for the Brahimi Report's significance to U.S. CINCs is the expanded opportunities and legitimacy it offers to U.S. regional peacetime engagement activities. As the current list of troop contributing nations to UN operations displays, peacekeeping operations are a global growth industry for military forces of the developing

world.[93] For numerous reasons, this participation shows that UN peacekeeping operations are accepted as legitimate multinational military activities by countries from all the U.S. regional CINCs' AORs.[94]

United States engagement activities that assist these countries to train, equip, organize and exercise their forces for greater effectiveness during UN peace operations garner positive cooperation. Presently 11 African countries participate in two programs the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) conducts that are consistent with what the Brahimi Report requests. Called the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI)[95] and Operation Focus Relief[96] the distinction between the two programs is that ACRI intends to improve peace operations capability at the brigade and battalion level while Operation Focus Relief will provide battalions to the UN mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). Like all popular engagement programs, beyond assisting the UN and visibly displaying the U.S. intention to breathe life into promises, ACRI and Operation Focus Relief provide the U.S. the ancillary benefits of gaining access to these eleven countries, improving interoperability, and enhancing relations with friendly foreign forces.[97] Because international forces from all regional CINC AORs participate in UN operations, these two programs are ripe for expanding peacetime engagement activities in U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. South Command, and U.S. Central Command.

Beyond training and equipping programs, large exercises could also be conducted to improve readiness for peace operations as occurring during Native Fury/Natural Fire 2000. In the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) exercise the U.S., Kenyan, Tanzanian, and Ugandan forces participated in brigade size maneuvers in a complex UN peace operation

scenario.[98] From training, exercise, and lessons learned from actual employment in UN operations, the U.S. could take the next step for enhancing international interoperability by writing the much needed doctrine for UN peace operations. Given the feast of opportunities for peacetime engagement activities with friendly foreign nations the recommendations for improving UN peace operations contain, the U.S. military should consider the Brahimi Report a fulfilling strategic buffet.

Conclusions

The decision to adopt the changes in UN peace operations proposed by the Brahimi Report rests at the highest level of international politics. For U.S. regional CINCs, the distillation of the UN's bitter experiences during peace operations in the 1990s is of great value no matter what action the world community takes. Understanding clearly the weaknesses of UN operations permits U.S. CINCs to take steps that assist the UN to achieve its mission without encountering the several difficulties that can arise from assigning U.S. units to UN duty. These steps can range from augmenting the UN's planning effort, conducting supporting operations, and assisting troop contributing nations around the world provide more capable, interoperable forces to UN missions. These steps protect U.S. interests, shape the international community to prepare now for an uncertain future, and advance U.S. objectives of security, human rights, and democracy. For these reasons the U.S. military should immediately seize the opportunity to aggressively support the recommendations contained in the Brahimi Report.

Recommendations

U.S. regional CINCs should support UN Peacekeeping Operations by sending U.S. officers to augment the DPKO mission planning staff for those peacekeeping missions in the CINC's AOR whether or not the U.S. will be a troop contributing nation.

Concept plans maintained by U.S. CINCs should be reviewed to determine the feasibility of providing U.S. military assistance to rapidly deploy to an austere environment UN peacekeeping forces that are anticipated within 15-90 days from the approval of the UN mandate.

The U.S. regional CINCs should place a high priority on peacetime engagement activities such as exercises, training, and developing doctrine that improves the operational capability of foreign forces to participate in UN operations consistent with the recommendations contained in the Brahimi Report.

Criteria should be developed to expand to other U.S. CINC AORs the two United States European Command programs to train and equip foreign national troops for participation in UN peacekeeping missions, the African Crisis Response Initiative and Operation Focus Relief.

Table 1

UN Peace Operations Conducted Between 1948 and 1988

Region/Country- Mission Name	**Creation/Completion**
Middle East - **UNTSO**	June 1948 --
India/Pakistan - **UNMOGIP**	January 1949 --
Middle East - **UNEF I**	November 1956 to June 1967
Middle East - **UNEF I**	November 1956 to June 1967
Lebannon - **UNOGIL**	June 1958 to December 1958
Congo - **ONUC**	July 1960 to June 1964
West New Guinea - **UNSF**	October 1962 to April 1963
Yemen - **UNYOM**	July 1963 to September 1964
Cyprus - **UNFICYP**	March 1964 --
India/Pakistan - **UNIPOM**	September 1965 to March 1966
Golan Heights - **UNDOF**	June 1974 --
Lebanon - **UNIFIL**	March 1978 --
Afghanistan/Pakistan - **UNGOMAP**	May 1988 to March 1990
Iran/Iraq - **UNIIMOG**	August 1988 to February 1991
Angola - **UNAVEM I**	December 1988 to May 1991

Table 2

UN Peace Operations Conducted Between 1989 and 2000

Region/Country- Mission Name	**Creation/Completion**
Middle East - **UNTSO**	June 1948 --
India/Pakistan - **UNMOGIP**	January 1949 --

Cyprus - **UNFICYP**	March 1964 --
Golan Heights - **UNDOF**	June 1974 --
Lebanon - **UNIFIL**	March 1978 --
Afghanistan/Pakistan - **UNGOMAP**	May 1988 to March 1990
Iran/Iraq - **UNIIMOG**	August 1988 to February 1991
Angola - **UNAVEM I**	December 1988 to May 1991
Namibia - **UNTAG**	April 1989 to March 1990
Central America - **ONUCA**	November 1989 to January 1992
Western Sahara - **MINURSO**	April 1991 --
Iraq/Kuwait - **UNIKOM**	April 1991 --
EL Salvador - **ONUSAL**	July 1991 to April 1995
Angola - **UNAVEM II**	May 1991 to February 1995
Cambodia - **UNAMIC**	October 1991 to March 1992
Former Yugoslavia - **UNPROFOR**	February 1992 to March 1995
Cambodia - **UNTAC**	March 1992 to September 1993
Somalia - **UNOSOM I**	April 1992 to March 1993
Mozambique - **ONUMOZ**	December 1992 to December 1994

Table 2
UN Peace Operations Conducted Between 1989 and 2000

Region/Country- Mission Name	**Creation/Completion**
Somalia - **UNOSOM II**	March 1993 to March 1995
Rwanda/Uganda - **UNOMUR**	June 1993 to September 1994
Georgia - **UNOMIG**	August 1993 --
Liberia - **UNOMIL**	September 1993 to September 1997
Haiti- **UNMIH**	September 1993 to June 1996
Rwanda - **UNAMIR**	October 1993 to March 1996
Chad/Libya - **UNASOG**	May 1994 to June 1994

Tajikistan - **UNMOT**	December 1994 to May 2000
Angola - **UNAVEM III**	February 1995 to June 1997
Croatia - **UNCRO**	March 1995 to January 1996
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia - **UNPREDEP**	March 1995 to February 1999
Bosnia and Herzegovina - **UNMIBH**	December 1995 --
Croatia - **UNMOP**	January 1996 --
Croatia - **UNTAES**	January 1996 to January 1998
Haiti - **UNSMIH**	July 1996 to July 1997
Guatemala - **MINUGUA**	January 1997 to May 1997
Angola - **MONUA**	June 1997 to February 1999
Haiti- **UNTMIH**	August 1997 to November 1997
Haiti - **MIPONUH**	December 1997 to March 2000

Table 2

UN Peace Operations Conducted Between 1989 and 2000

Region/Country- Mission Name	**Creation/Completion**
Central Africa Republic - **MINURCA**	April 1998 to February 2000
Sierra Leone - **UNOMSIL**	July 1998 to October 1999
Croatia - **UNPSG**	January 1998 to October 1998
Kosovo - **UNMIK**	June 1999 --
East Timor- **UNTAET**	October 1999 --
Sierra Leone - **UNAMSIL**	October 1999 --
Democratic Republic of The Congo - **MONUC**	December 1999 --
Ethiopia and Eritrea - **UNMEE**	July 2000 --

Table 3
UN Peace Operations 2001

Region/Country- Mission Name	**Creation**
Middle East - **UNTSO**	June 1948 --
India-Pakistan - **UNMOGIP**	January 1949 --
Cyprus - **UNFICYP**	March 1964 --
Golan Heights - **UNDOF**	June 1974 --
Lebanon - **UNIFIL**	March 1978 --
Western Sahara - **MINURSO**	April 1991 --
Iraq/Kuwait - **UNIKOM**	April 1991 --
Georgia - **UNOMIG**	August 1993 --
Bosnia & Herzegovina - **UNMIBH**	December 1995 --
Croatia - **UNMOP**	January 1996 --
Kosovo - **UNMIK**	June 1999 --
East Timor- **UNTAET**	October 1999 --
Sierra Leone - **UNAMSIL**	October 1999 --
Democratic Republic of the Congo - **MONUC**	December 1999 --
Ethiopia and Eritrea - **UNMEE**	July 2000 --

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End Notes

[1] Thoughtfully designed military campaigns or significant operations provide a clear description of how the vortex of political, diplomatic, military, economic, social, ethnic, and humanitarian conditions should be settled at their conclusion to achieve strategic objectives. Milan N. Vego, Operational Warfare, NWC 1004 (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2000), 433. The U.S. joint doctrine defines the "end state" as: "What the National Command Authorities want the situation to be when the operations conclude--both military operations, as well as those where the military is in support of other instruments of national power." Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, (Washington, D.C.: 1993, amended 2000), 157. Or, more directly, the more complex the campaign or operation, "the more imperative the need not to take the first step without considering the last." Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974; Princeton University Press, 1989), 584. Achieving the desired end state does not mean the end of efforts to advance or protect interests. It does describe the necessary conditions to transition to another phase of the campaign or operation in pursuit of the ultimate objective. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia, (Washington, D.C.: 1997), 274.

[2] United Nations, Secretary General Letter, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, A/55/305-S/2000/809 (New York: 2000) Here after cited as the Brahimi Report.

[3] Brahimi Report, xv.

[4] President, White House, A National Security Strategy For A Global Age, (Washington, D.C.: 2000), 3, 16; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Shape, Respond, Prepare Now: A Military Strategy for a New Era, (Washington, D.C.: 1997), 3, 11; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual, Theater Engagement Planning, CJCSM 31113.01A (Washington, D.C.: 31 May 2000) A-10.

[5] Stephen M. Schwebel, Justice In International Law, Selected Writing Of Stephen M. Schwebel, Judge Of The International Court of Justice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 311.

[6] United Nations Charter, Articles 2(7), 42-47; Brunno Simma, ed., The Charter of the United Nations, A Commentary (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 576, 639; Abba Eban, "The UN Idea Revisited," Foreign Affairs, Volume 74, No. 5, (September/October 1995): 44; Rudiger Wolfrum, ed., United Nations Law, Policies and Practice (Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995), 957.

[7] Eban, 42.

[8] The dispute was over the matter of recognition of the Communist government of China, rather than the nationalist government led b Chiang Kai Shek. While nominally under UN command, the troops in Korea were mainly from the U.S. and commanded by a U.S. general.

[9] See Table 1. John Hillen, The Strategy of UN Military Operations, (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1998), 21; Department of Peacekeeping Operations Overview, UN Peacekeeping 1991-2000, Statistical Data and Graphs, 2001. http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/pub/pko.htm [6 May 2001]; Michael D. Davis, "The United States, the United Nations, and the Invention of Multinational Peace Operations, 1946 to 1968" (Unpublished Thesis, University of Maryland, College Park, MD: 1999), 408-427.

[10] These missions were UNTSO (1948- to present), UNEF I (1956-1967), UNOGIL (1958), UNEF II (1973-1979), UNDOF (1974- to present), UNIFIL (1978- to present), and UNYOM (1963-1964).

[11] These missions were UNMOGIP (1949- to present), UNIPOM (1965-1966), and UNGOMAP (1988-1990).

[12] These two missions were ONUC (1960-1964) and UNAVEM I (1988-1991).

[13] These three missions were UNSF (1962-1963), UNFICYP (1964 to present), and DOMREP (1965-1966).

[14] From 1948 to 1990 there were 844 fatalities during UN peacekeeping missions. "UN Peacekeeping Operations" "United Nations Operations," United Nations Peacekeeping From 1991 To 2000 Statistical Data and

Graphs, 2001, <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/pub/pdf/13.pdf > [6 May 2001]; Iqbal Riza, Chief of Staff to the Secretary General, "Implementing the Brahimi Report," Working Dinner Remarks, Peacekeeping and Peace Building: Building on the Brahimi Report -Next Steps. World Peace Foundation Program on Intrastate Conflict, J. F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Boston, MA, 4 May 2001.

[15] William Durch, "Discussion of the Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations (The "Brahimi Report"), 10 November 2000,
< http://www.stimson.org/unpk/panelreport/unpkstimsondiscussion.pdf>, 8, [19 April 2001]

[16] Davis, 381.

[17] Ibid, 8; Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, ed., Encyclopedia of International Peacekeeping Operations, (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, Inc.: 1999), xi; Peter R. Baehr and Leon Gordenker, The United Nations In The 1990s, 2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 78.

[18] See Tables 1, 2, and 3 for the length of time some UN peace operations can last. For instance, the first two UNTSO and UNMOGIP, continue in operation. Hilaire McCoubrey and Nigel D. White, The Blue Helmets: Legal Regulations of United Nations Military Operations, (Brookfield, VT: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1997), 3-6.

[19] Davis, 384, 394; Phyllis Bennis, Calling the Shots, How Washington Dominates Today's UN, (New York: Olive Branch Press, 1996, updated edition 2000), 66, 77. The peace the UN kept during most of the Cold War has been called "negative peace" or merely an absence of fighting rather than the broader task of restoring and rebuilding a stable society that is often described as "positive peace"and usually associated with nation-building.
Derek Boothby, "Reorganizing the UN to Strengthen Peacekeeping and Peace Building." Joint presentation. Peacekeeping and Peace Building: Building on the Brahimi Report -Next Steps. World Peace Foundation Program on Intrastate Conflict. J. F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Boston, MA, 4 May 2001.

[20] William Shawcross, Deliver Us From Evil, Peacekeepers, Warlords, And A World Of Endless Conflict, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), 28; Kofi A. Annan, "Challenges of the New Peacekeeping," Olara A. Otunnu and Michael W. Doyle, ed., Peacemaking and Peacekeeping For the New Century, (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998), 173.

[21] Lawrence Gelb, "Managing the Teacup Wars," Foreign Affairs, Volume 73, No. 6, (November/December 1994): 5; Lawrence Gelb, quoted in Dennis C. Jett, Why Peacekeeping Fails, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 8.

[22] "Nobel Peace Prize for 1988," Nobel e-Museum, 16 June 2000, <http://www.nobel.se/peace/laureates/1988/press.html> [1 May 2001].

[23] Simma, 573, footnote 11; Beaehr and Gordenker, 151; Dennis C. Jett, 126.

[24] These were in Afghanistan/Pakistan-UNGOMAP, Iran/Iraq-UNIIMOG, and Angola-UNAVEM I. (See Table 2). "Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Operations" Completed Missions, 2001. <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/co_miss.htm>[6 May 2001]; "Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Operations," Current Missions, 2001. <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/cu_mission/body.htm> [6 May 2001].

[25] See Table 2.

[26] Durch, 9; Robert I. Rotberg, ed. Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement In Africa: Methods of Conflict Prevention, (Arlington, VA: Oakland Street Publishing, 2000), 4.

[27] "United Nations Operations," United Nations Peacekeeping From 1991 To 2000 Statistical Data and Graphs, 2001, <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/pub/pko.htm >[6 May 2001]; Pamela Aall, Daniel Miltenberger, Thomas Weiss, Guide to IGOs, NGOs And The

Military In Peace And Relief Operations, (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000) 222.

[28] "United Nations Operations," Contributors, 2001, <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/mar.htm> [6 May 2001]; Eric G. Berman and Katie E. Sams, Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities, (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2000) 238, 405-409.

[29] "United Nations Operations," United Nations Peacekeeping From 1991 To 2000 Statistical Data and Graphs, 2001, <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/pub/pdf/2.pdf > [6 May 2001]; Kofi A. Annan, "Challenges of the New Peacekeeping," Olara A. Otunnu and Michael W. Doyle, ed., Peacemaking and Peacekeeping For the New Century, (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998), 177; Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, xiii.

[30] "United Nations Operations," United Nations Peacekeeping From 1991 To 2000 Statistical Data and Graphs, 2001, <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/pub/pdf/2.pdf > [6 May 2001]; "United Nations Operations," Contributors, 2001, <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/sep.htm> [6 May 2001].

[31] These missions were the UNFICYP, UNEF I, UNEF II, and UNIFIL. Hillen, 89.

[32] Wolfrum and Philipp, 959; "United Nations Operations," United Nations Peacekeeping From 1991 To 2000 Statistical Data and Graphs, 2001, <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/pub/pko.htm >[6 May 2001].

[33] See Table 1.

[34] See Table 2.

[35] It is not widely recognized that 1999 UN regular budget of approximately $2 billion covered two years of activities.

[36] "United Nations Operations," United Nations Peacekeeping From 1991 To 2000 Statistical Data and Graphs, 2001, <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/pub/pko.htm >[6 May 2001].

[37] See paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 837, 6 June 1993, that remarkably [*sic*] "Demands once again that all Somali parties, including movements and factions, comply fully with the commitments they have undertaken in the agreements they concluded at the informal Preparatory Meeting on Somali Political Reconciliation in Addis Ababa…" Shawcross, 88; Baehr and Gordenker, 83; Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, xxiv.

[38] Kenneth Allard, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned, (Washington, D.C., National Defense University Press, 1995), 90.

[39] Pamela, Aall, Daniel Miltenberger, Thomas G. Weiss, Guide to IGOs NGOs and the Military in Peace and Relief Operations, (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000), xiv, Figure I.1.

[40] Annan, 173.

[41] Jett, 115-117; Shawcross, 31.

[42] The descriptions of the changes that UN peacekeeping has undergone is legion. In 1992 Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali divided the efforts to achieve peace into five categories: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, Peace Enforcement, and Post Conflict Peace Building. "Report of the Secretary-General", An Agenda for Peace - Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping, (UN Doc. A/47/277-S/2411 (17 June 1992). For a legal analysis of these various categories see: Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., Jus Paciarii, Emergent Legal Paradigms for U.N. Peace Operations in the 21st Century, (Stafford, VA: Paciarii International, LLC, 1999), 11-30. Other terms that are bandied about include: peace inducement, coercive inducement, peace restoration, peace implementation, muscular peacekeeping, aggravated peacekeeping, gray area operations, middle ground operations, hybrid operations, multi-functional peacekeeping, and Chapter 6 1/2 operations! See Donald C. F. Daniel, Wandering Out of the Void? Conceptualizing Practicable Peace Enforcement, (Newport, RI: Strategic Research Department Research Report 3-96, U.S. Naval War College, 1996), 3; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrinal Publication 3-07, Joint Doctrine For Military Operations Other Than War, (Washington, D.C.: 1995), III-12, III-13,

III-14; Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations, (Washington, D.C.: 1999), I-10.

William H. Lewis, ed., Military Implications Of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, (Washington, D.C.: Institute For National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, McNair Paper Seventeen, 1993), 13.

[43] Jett, 115.

[44] What constitutes success or failure of UN missions is a matter more of judgement than rigid criteria. Ibid, 19.

[45] See Table 2. Eden, 51; Jett, 19.

[46] "Report of the Independent Inquiry Into the Actions Of The United Nations During The 1994 Genocide In Rwanda", 15 December 1999, Peacekeeping Operations Special Reports, <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/reports.htm> [6 May 2001]; Report of the Secretary-General, The Fall Of Srebrenica UN Doc A/54/549. New York: 1999, <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/reports.htm> [6 May 2001].

[47] The Rwanda Report contained a number of operational level recommendations to improve the "capability and the willingness" of the UN to conduct peacekeeping operations. The include instilling UN forces with a responsibility to act when confronted with genocide and human rights violations, better information gather and analysis capabilities to support peacekeeping missions and greater coordination of national evacuation operations with UN missions. "Report of the Independent Inquiry Into The Actions Of The United Nations During the 1994 Genocide In Rwanda," 34.

[48] The actions of Secretary General Annan, the former head of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) when the events in Rwanda and Srebrenica occurred, to form the Brahimi panel, can be seen on two levels. It is certainly an institutional attempt to prepare the UN for the challenges of peacekeeping in the 21st century. More poignantly, it may also be seen as a personal attempt by the Secretary General to rectify past shortcomings. The concluding paragraphs of the Secretary General's Report on Srebrenica contains this apology: "Through error, misjudgment and an inability to recognize the scope of the evil confronting us, we failed to do our part to help save the people of Srebrenica from the Serb campaign of mass murder. No one regrets more than we the failure of the international community to take decisive action to halt the suffering and end a war that had produced so many victims…I urge all concerned to study this report carefully, and to let the facts speak for themselves. The men who have been charged with this crime again humanity reminded the world and in particular, the United Nations, that evil exists in the world. The taught us also that the United Nations global commitment to ending conflict does not preclude moral judgments, but makes them necessary. It is in this spirit that I submit my report on the fall of Srebrenica to the General Assembly and to the world." The Fall of Srebrenica, 111.

[49] Durch, 2. The problems included attempting to enforce a flawed peace agreement in Sierra Leone followed by a battalion of Kenyan troops being captured there. The difficulties connected with the suddenness of the Kosovo mission, the potential size of the mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the slowness of the mission creation and deployment to East Timor.

[50] Brahimi Report, iii. Along with Ambassador Brahimi, the ten member panel included:

Brian Atwood, (United States) former Administrator, the U.S. Agency for International Development; Ambassador Colin Granderson (Trinidad and Tobago) former Executive Director of the UN International Civilian Mission to Haiti; Dame Ann Hercus (New Zealand), former Head of Mission of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP);

Richard Monk, (Great Britain) former Commissioner of the UN International Police Task Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina; General (ret.) Klaus Naumann (Germany) former Chairman of the Military Committee of NATO during IFOR, SFOR, and Kosovo;

Hisako Shimura (Japan) former Director, Europe and Latin America Division of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations; Ambassador Vladimir Shustov, (Russia) Ambassador at Large with 30 years association with the UN; General Philip Sibanda (Zimbabwe), former Force Commander of the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III); Dr. Cornelio Sommauga (Switzerland) former President of the International Red Cross.

William J. Durch, Senior Associate of the Washington, D.C. based Henry L. Stimson Center, served as the project director.

[51] Whether purposefully or not, the pace of the project left total no time for extensive consultation about the results of the report with the member nations before its publication.
J. Brian Atwood and Jonathan Moore, "Reorganizing the UN to Strengthen Peacekeeping
And Peace Building," Joint presentation. Peacekeeping and Peace Building: Building
On the Brahimi Report -Next Steps. World Peace Foundation Program on Intrastate
Conflict. J. F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Boston, MA, 4 May 2001. "

[52] Brahimi Report, 1.

[53] Ibid, 1.

[54] Ibid, 1.

[55] Ibid, 2

[56] Ibid, 2.

[57] A summary of the recommendations is provided at the end of each section of the report and in Appendix III, pages 54-58.

[58] Some of these recommendations appear hortatory such as advising the Security Council to leave in draft form resolutions authorizing sizable peace operations until member nations provide the Secretary-General firm commitments of troops and equipment. See paragraph 64.b, Brahimi Report, 11. Other recommendations deal with the rotation of UN staff between Field Missions and UN Headquarters, career progression issues, the coordination of the various units within the Secretariat such as DPKO and the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), enhancing the peace mission planning capability of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, structural adjustments of responsibilities within DPKO, and how various funding issues should be resolved within the UN system.

[59] George Garner. <garner@un.org> "Draft Brahimi Briefing." [E-mail to S. L. Bumgardner <bumgards@nwc.navy.mil>] 30 April 2001.

[60] Brahimi Report, 33.

[61] Ibid, 15.

[62] George Garner. <garner@un.org> "Draft Brahimi Briefing." [E-mail to S. L. Bumgardner <bumgards@nwc.navy.mil>] 30 April 2001.

[63] Brahimi Report, 14, 20, and 22-25.

[64] Ibid, 17, 22-25.

[65] Ibid, 34.

[66] Perhaps the most critical language in the entire Brahimi Report describes DPKO's paucity of capability. The Department is treated "*as though it were a temporary creation and peacekeeping a temporary responsibility of the Organization*." [Emphasis added.] Brahimi Report, 30. With a total staff of 62, that includes an 11 person 24 hour situation center, just 41 military and civilian police officers provide all mission planning, support, guidance, training, and doctrinal development for UN peacekeeping. "*No national government would send 27,000 troops into the field with just 32 officers back home to provide them with substantive and operational military guidance. No police organization would deploy 8,000 police officers with only nine headquarters staff to provide them with substantive and operational policing support*." [Emphasis added]Brahimi Report, 31. Equally understaffed is the Field Administration and Logistics Division (FALD) the 2O person section of DPKO that provides logistical and administrative support both peacekeeping missions and all other UN offices worlds wide.

[67] A complete description of the UN structure can be found at the UN web page, <http://www.un.org. >. Units of the UN Secretariat involved in the peacekeeping missions other than DPKO include the Executive Office of the Secretary-General, the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), the Field Administration and Logistics Division (FALD), the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA), the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the Department of Public Information (DPA), the Office of the UN Security Coordinator, and the Department of Management. The

recognized UN programs and funds include the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), UN Development Programme (UNDP), World Food Program (WFP), the Office of the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights (UNHCHR) and the UN Volunteers (UNV). Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, United Nations Handbook, 2000, (Wellington, NZ: 2000), 159-161, 169-204. The Specialized Agencies of the UN are related to the UN but remain autonomous organizations created by agreements that are separate from the UN Charter. Benedetto Conforti, The Law and Practice of the United Nations, (Boston: Kluwer Law International, 2nd ed. 2000), 239. Specialized agencies that would be involved in a peace mission include the World Health Organization (WHO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD).

[68] The Rand Corporation and the World Bank are the two examples cited for using "matrix management" method of flexibly providing a temporary work force to address a large project without creating a permanent new organizational structure. Brahimi Report, 36.

[69] Ibid, 17.

[70] Ibid, 35.

[71] Ibid, 19.

[72] Ibid.

[73] "This must stop. Troop contributing countries that cannot meet the terms of their memorandum of understanding should so indicate to the United Nations and not deploy." Ibid, 18.

[74] Ibid 28; George Garner. <garner@un.org> "Draft Brahimi Briefing." [E-mail to S. L. Bumgardner <bumgards@nwc.navy.mil>] 30 April 2001.

[75] Ibid, 42.

[76] Ibid, 9. This authority to use force to protect self, others, and for mission accomplishment is consistent with the changes made in 1994 to the U.S. Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE). Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction, CJCS 5800.7, Standing Rules of Engagement, (Washington, D.C.: rev. 2000).

[77] This change would provide UN peacekeepers the same authority to use force for mission accomplishment provided to U.S. military personnel by the U.S. Standing Rules of Engagement. See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction, CJCSI 5800.7, Standing Rules of Engagement, (Washington, D.C.: 2000), ix.

[78] Brahimi Report, ix.

[79] Ibid, 9.

[80] Ibid, 8.

[81] Ibid, 7.

[82] Member nations "acknowledge that they, too, need to reflect on their working culture and methods, at least as concerns the conduct of United Nations peace and security activities...[S]ometimes dialogue alone is not enough to ensure that billion-dollar peacekeeping operations, vital conflict prevention measures or critical peacemaking efforts succeed in the face of great odds." "Expressions of general support in the form of statements and resolutions must be followed up with tangible action." Ibid, 46

[83] Ibid, 47.

[84] Generally see, Nancy L. Kassebaum and Lee H. Hamilton, Report of the Working Group on Peacekeeping and the US National Interest, Report No. 11, (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, 1994).

[85] Annex II, References, pages 50-53 of the Brahimi Report contains an excellent bibliography of recent criticisms and recommendations concerning UN peacekeeping operations.

[86] UN Charter, Chapter VII, Article 39; Chapter III, Article 17.

[87] Supra, 3.

[88] Kenya performed these activities during the UN operations in Somalia, Thailand during the UN operations in Cambodia, and Italy during the UN operations in the Former Yugoslavia.

[89] This presently is the situation in East Timor and the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, Macedonia.

[90] Recent U.S. operations occurred as a consequence of the UN mission failures in Rwanda, Somalia, Bosnia, East Timor.

[91] For instance, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine For Joint Operations, (Washington, D.C.: 1995); Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Publication 3-35, Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations, (Washington, D.C.: 1999); U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Doctrinal Publication 5.00.2. Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures, (Washington, D.C.: 1999); Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Publication 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, (Washington, D.C.: 1995); Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Publication 3-07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations, (Washington, D.C.: 1999); Joint Warfighting Center, Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook on Peace Operations, (Monroe, VA: 1997); Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Publication 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, (Washington, D.C.: 2000).

[92] In 1997 the cost of deploying a U.S. division was judged between $2-4 billion. Michael O'Hanlon, Saving Lives With Force, Military Criteria For Humanitarian Intervention, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 1997), 63.

[93] "United Nations Operations," Contributors, 2001, <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/sep.htm> [6 May 2001].

[94] Ibid.

[95] Berman and Sams, 277. Beginning in 1997 the ACRI started training with eight countries, Benin, Coe d'Ivoire, Ghana Malawi, Mali, Senegal, Uganda, and Kenya. The program provides $1.2 million worth of non-lethal equipment for individuals and the battalion that includes uniforms, boots, personal equipment such as first aid-kit, mess kit, canteens, communication gear, night vision binoculars, water-purification equipment, generators, and mine detectors. Small arms ammunition is provided for individual marksmanship training only. Over a three-year cycle of 30 and 60-day training periods, the ACRI program moves progressively from basic tactical skills to military tasks required during peacekeeping operations. These include establishing security areas, creating checkpoints, and dealing with refugees and organizing rescue teams. Human rights training and tactics, techniques and procedures for establishing good relations with the local society are also taught. The desired goal of the program, expected by 2002, is to fully train 10 to 12 battalions. David Josar, "U.S. Servicemembers training Senegalese on Peacekeeping," Stars and Stripes, 2 November 2000, <http://www.pstripes.com/ed1102m.html>[30 April 2001].

[95] CJCSM 3113.01A, A-13.

[96] Human rights training and procedures for establishing good relations with the local society are also taught. The desired goal of the program, expected by 2002, is to fully train 10 to 12 battalions. Operation Focus Relief is a more rapid, expensive, program that was announced during President Clinton's visit to Nigeria in August 2000. At a total cost of $42 million in equipment for five battalions, the U.S. is providing training for five battalions (three battalions from Nigeria, one from Ghana, and one from Senegal) with the goal of their deploying to Sierra Leone to join the UNAMSIL by the summer of 2001. The equipment provided included trucks, mortars, crew-served machine guns, rifles, ammunition, uniforms, boots, communication gear, and medical supplies. Under the supervision of U.S. Special Forces, using a train-the-trainer approach, the battalions received human rights training and instruction on the employment of the equipment during the conduct and coordination of complex tactical operations. U.S. State Department, Fact Sheet: U.S.-Nigeria Cooperation on Peacekeeping and Military Reform, 26 August 2000, <http://www.eucom.mil/africa/nigeria/usis/ooaug28.htm> [2 May 2001].

[97] CJCSM 3113.01A, A-13.

[98] Timothy C. Conway, <tcconway@mfp.mil> "Native Fury 00 AAR," 2 June 2000, [2 June 2000]