



**STRATEGY
RESEARCH
PROJECT**

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**SPECIALIZED RESERVE COMPONENTS TEAMS CAN SERVE
JOINT GLOBAL COMMITMENTS**

BY

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ABSTRACT

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The United States is currently deploying throughout the world at a rate approximately three times that of the Cold War. These deployments stretch thin an Army structured and trained for two near simultaneous Major Theaters of War. Small Scale Contingencies (SSC) will remain a fact of life for the U.S. armed forces. SSC deployment requirements will call for the ability to influence the world climate through the use of rapidly deployed Joint Task Forces (JTF). These JTFs must react to specific world problems with the ability to morph missions as situational changes occur. Joint Forces Command is looking at a possible cellular JTF Headquarters for centralized command and control of future national missions. This headquarters would require support or attachment of "plugs", force structure designated and trained in a specific capability, to manage each mission. Some of these plugs could be located in the U.S. rather than the mission theater and will most likely consist of members, cells, and teams from all branches of the armed forces. In the late 1990s, when the Army considered designs for Force XXI Corps Headquarters with JTF capability, the size of the headquarters increased considerably. With current constraints in force structure the increase required to build this capability into the corps headquarters is a huge limitation. The Force XXI Corps Headquarters redesign effort was even postponed as efforts shifted to the transformation efforts. The Army National Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve are good sources for the trained cells and teams to reduce the burden on the active Army and still supply the capabilities required in the mission theater.

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SPECIALIZED RESERVE COMPONENTS TEAMS CAN SERVE JOINT GLOBAL COMMITMENTS

The changes that we now see in the security environment of the United States will force another major effort of rethinking our situation, our goals and our strategies.

—Andrew W. Marshall

The United States is rethinking the security environment of the world. A large piece of the U.S. security environment is the ability of the Army to maintain its mission capability and still be able to help manage the country's smaller, worldwide commitments. The United States military is currently deploying throughout the world at a rate approximately three times that of the Cold War. These deployments stretch thin an Army structured and trained for two near simultaneous Major Theaters of War (MTW). In the last ten years this triple deployment rate has had a tremendous impact on the Army. The Army as an ever-smaller force, approximately thirty percent smaller than a little over a decade ago, must carry out these deployments. This combination of smaller size and more deployments has led to a crippling operational tempo. The Army's ability to train and remain trained for the main mission has been reduced. The Army mission is to fight and win America's wars, but with the possibility of war seeming beyond the horizon, the Army will have to focus and adapt to Small Scale Contingencies (SSC) and asymmetric threats that loom constantly. SSCs will remain a fact of life for the U.S. armed forces. The Army must retain the ability to fight and win wars while improving the ability to manage smaller conflicts.

SSC deployment requirements will call for the ability to influence the world climate through the use of rapidly deployed Joint Task Forces (JTF). These JTFs must react to specific world problems with the ability to morph missions as situational changes occur. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) is looking at a possible cellular JTF headquarters for centralized command and control of future national missions. This headquarters would require support or attachment of "plugs", force structure designated and trained in a specific capability, to manage each mission. Some of these plugs could be located in the U.S. rather than the mission theater and will most likely consist of members, cells, and teams from all branches of the armed forces. Since the Army will always have the largest percentage of troops on the ground in any SSC, it must help identify the threats and various contingencies. Once identified, preparation must allow for any of the existing threat possibilities. In the late 1990s, when the Army considered designs for Force XXI Corps Headquarters with JTF capability, the size of the headquarters increased considerably. With current constraints in force structure the

increase required to build this capability into the corps headquarters was a huge limitation. The Force XXI Corps Headquarters redesign effort was even postponed as efforts shifted to the transformation designs. The Army can attain a higher level of preparedness using functional teams aligned with the threats and SSCs and manned in the reserve components. The Army National Guard (ARNG) and the U. S. Army Reserve (USAR) are good sources for the trained cells and teams to reduce the burden on the active Army and still supply the capabilities required in the mission theater.

The Army has tried to come to grips with the direction or scenarios for which it should train and prepare for as well as structure its force. Future deployments are more likely to be involved with Humanitarian Assistance, Peace Operations, and Nation Building. As the Army moves away from the two MTW scenarios, limited force structure must be carefully metered out to maximize the ability of the United States to manage and prepare for the threats as best possible. The Army's current transformation also demonstrates the need to modernize the force with the most appropriate equipment with the best opportunity of success in the most likely scenarios. In addition to diverse missions, a wide and varied number of threats exist to the U.S., U.S. Military, and U.S. allies. This impacts all aspects of the Army. The type and level of modernization of weapons and equipment will remain dependent on resources, airlift capacity, and the set of scenarios used in the process. ". . . national interest demands the willingness of a state to uphold its morals and national values with the commitment of its blood, treasure, time, and energy, to achieve sometimes specific and sometimes inspecific ends."¹ Of course, the National Military Strategy and the Defense Planning Guidance drive most of the decisions. We must keep in mind the mission of the Army remains to fight and win the nations wars.

THREATS AND CONTINGENCIES

Even though the mission of the Army is still to fight and win the major conflicts, it must also be able to handle many other, possibly more limited, but diverse threats. There are many possible types of direct action threats. These include, but not exclusively, weapons of mass destruction, armies of hostile nations, non-state entities, and information warfare. These threats and weapons, when used against our friends and allies, also constitute a real threat to the United States and the freedoms we represent.

As potential regional aggressors expand their technological capabilities and modify their doctrine, they will pose more lethal threats to military operations. The proliferation of modern defense technologies means that U.S. forces must maintain a substantial advantage over potential adversaries to ensure quick and decisive victory with minimum casualties. U.S. forces simultaneously must be prepared to operate in the face of asymmetric threats, such as the use of

nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons, terrorism, and information warfare.²

The threat from weapons of mass destruction is in itself a global threat. Weapons of mass destruction can be employed by any of the enemies of the United States inside the United States and throughout the world. These enemies can use these types of weapons against our infrastructure, citizens, and military. The non-specific nature of these weapons makes them difficult to deter, plan, and organize scenarios.

In the realm of military affairs and national security, asymmetry is acting, organizing, and thinking differently than opponents in order to maximize one's own advantages, exploit an opponent's weaknesses, attain the initiative, or gain greater freedom of action. It can be political-strategic, military-strategic, operational, or a combination of these. It can entail different methods, technologies, values, organizations, time perspectives, or some combination of these. It can be short-term or long-term. It can be deliberate or by default. It can be discrete or pursued in conjunction with symmetric approaches. It can have both psychological and physical dimensions.³

The threat from armies of hostile nations has been the most obvious threat and the threat that has received the most attention when strategy, guidance and planning occur. This in turn drives the Army's force structure requirements. Force structure and equipment are then aligned towards that requirement within the confines of resources. The armies of hostile nations may be the least likely to confront, but are a huge threat. This threat may still be the most obvious and best threat to plan, equip, train, and prepare against. Preparedness indicates the ability to manage the worst-case scenario. The U.S. military must retain the ability to win against the armies of hostile nations, even while deployed in other locations.

The threat from non-state entities is possibly the least understood and may be the most difficult to deal with. Non-state entities include religious zealots, militias, terrorists, and criminals. Many of these non-state entities do not pose a direct threat to this country proper but are eminent threats to U.S. interests and citizens throughout the world. The non-state entities are not tied to conventional ethics or laws. Although individuals and organizations in this category can be loose knit, they can be highly organized and well financed. They provide the ultimate in asymmetrical disorder, with the least possible methods of direct defeat or detection.


The information warfare threat is real and completely global in nature. With global access in and from all parts of the world, the United States must regard this threat with upmost attention. All enemies will have the ability to work towards disruption within the information infrastructure. Information technology is growing at a fantastic rate. Internet usage has more than doubled in the last four years⁴ to 165 billion users in 2000.⁵ The worldwide use places this

technology directly in the hands of all potential adversaries, including those who use it as an actual weapon verses extensive information gathering and access. "Cyber-terrorists are non-state actors with an objective – not states, not individuals or criminals. They are not engaged in public diplomacy, or cyber-espionage, or the use of web sites to release information. . . . What is cyber-terrorism? It is the destruction or disruption of information and systems."⁶

Information technology also results in the time and distance factors being greatly reduced. This reduction can be of benefit and a liability to both sides of the equation. "The Information Age is making distance less relevant. Information, and the decisions that result, can travel almost instantaneously to the place(s) where they are needed, making the location of those who gather, analyze, make decisions, and possibly those who act on these decisions, largely irrelevant. . . . These changes in the dimensions of time and space are increasing the pace of events, or operating tempo, in many different environments."⁷

In an ambiguous and uncertain world, U.S. military forces will be expected to help shape the international security environment as well as execute missions throughout the spectrum of conflict. With greater risk in future war, military leaders will have to provide solutions quickly and more closely coupled to political objectives. Thus, the demand for speed along with risk management will permeate military operations. Over the course of coming decades, U.S. forces must develop operational concepts that can overcome access-denial efforts and achieve rapid...[and decisive conclusions]...through the utilization of information age technologies but which understand the fundamental, unchanging aspects of war.⁸

As shown in the chart below, there are many possible SSCs leading up to a full-scale war. At times missions blend and morph into another type SSC while the same military forces are present. Therefore, the in-theater force must be able to be flexible and change with the mission. The U.S. Army must be able to function in all of the complex missions and be prepared for all of the threats. The Army must have forward deployed forces ready to quickly respond throughout the world to any mission and manage all threats. Continuous reductions in the numbers and sizes of bases overseas have greatly increased the reaction time U.S. forces need to respond. Conversely, the forces and units required to accomplish the mission may not be large, but the logistical requirements of such forces are still quite evident. As a result, these task-organized units must be focused to accomplish the mission with efficiency. The units will be deployed longer distances and required to conduct operations from bases not necessarily located near the operations area. Since mission requirements are the main driver when units



The Army must transform to meet these 21st century security requirements across the spectrum of operations.⁹

and equipment requirements are chosen, it is imperative that the Army be able to identify those requirements for all possible SSCs.

JOINT FORCES COMMAND AND JOINT TASK FORCES

In the future, as now, the Army will be involved in various types of missions around the world. The April 1999 Defense Planning Guidance established a requirement for JFCOM to develop new concepts to cope with operational missions.¹⁰ JFCOM is looking for better methods to manage and operate within as diverse as possible missions with a flexible JTF headquarters. The Army will need to fit in with future JFCOM designed JTFs regardless where or what the task, mission, or contingency. JFCOM is looking at the JTF headquarters to help provide the leadership, guidance, command, and control for any given scenario. JFCOM has identified the 18th Airborne Corps as the near term choice for the planned JTF headquarters. "Although the potential for unilateral action exists, the consensus is that future American military operations will be expeditionary, joint, and combined. . . . the Army needs to follow the lead of the Navy and Air Force to organize into smaller, modular formations."¹¹

The Army is structured and funded for the near two simultaneous major theater of wars. The Table of Organizational Equipment (TOE) designs are still primarily the little evolved structure designs from the cold war. These TOE designs represent the doctrinal, deployable force structure that consists of all combat, combat support, and combat service support units in the Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve. Many problems remain in aligning the approved force structure authorizations with the actual requirements. The Army is currently designing and equipping another transformation into a quicker, lighter, more deployable force.

At the completion of Total Army Analysis (TAA) 07.1, the active Army's end strength is 480,000. TAA is a process that uses doctrinal requirements and force structure analysis to determine the quantity and type of units in the Army, the ARNG, and the USAR. The mix of combat, combat support, and combat service support units is also determined within the force structure. TAA is based on the National Military Strategy and the Defense Planning Guidance. The authorized force structure of two MTW war fight units is actually at 303,000 force structure spaces. The ARNG and the USAR constitute only another 490,000 force structure spaces towards the near simultaneous two MTW scenarios. The war fight force structure requirement, which does not make the resource priority list in the TAA process, remains at an unacceptable level. TAA 07.1 left the Army approximately 49,000 force structure spaces short of filling the doctrinal requirement for the two MTW scenarios.¹² Assuming an average company is approximately two hundred, this shortage represents approximately 245 units short of the mission for the two MTW scenarios. This is a low level of authorizations. If the two MTW scenarios are changed most of the requirements will no doubt transfer to the new approved SSC scenarios or whatever set of scenarios are decided upon. The new TOE designs from transformation and modernization will result from the decisions made to resource the priority force structure requirements.

JFCOM is studying the Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) concept to help analyze the key elements in Joint Vision 2020. RDO is defined by JFCOM as "Joint or combined military operations characterized by rapid, intense, focused attack of an adversary's strategic and operational vulnerabilities, centers of gravity, and decisive points anywhere in the battlespace to force the adversary to do our will without a protracted campaign."¹³ RDO is a concept to achieve rapid victory by attacking the coherence of an enemy's ability to fight. It is the synchronous application of the full range of our national capabilities in timely and direct effects-based operations. It employs our asymmetric advantages in the knowledge, precision, and mobility of the joint force against his critical functions to create maximum shock, defeating his ability and will to fight.¹⁴

The RDO concept describes how the JFC [Joint Force Commander] can undertake operations immediately to strike at the heart of the enemy's vulnerabilities and most dangerous capabilities to achieve rapid strategic success. The concept seeks to rapidly deny, degrade, or destroy strategic and operational centers of gravity using methods and capabilities that provide viable military options without having to conduct an extensive buildup of forces and support in the theater of operations.¹⁵

The need for a strategic regional focus is reflected in the military's current geographic organization. The emergence of this structure reflects post-Cold War realities. During the Cold War the super powers exercised significant influence over regional conflicts, dampening tensions, limiting conflict, and at times forcing settlements on antagonists. Today these regional conflicts are mostly unchecked, giving a regional character to modern security exigencies. As Lake and Morgan state: "In the foreseeable future, violent conflicts will mostly arise out of regional concerns and will be viewed by political actors through a regional, rather than global, lens. ...[A]s states focus increasingly on regional conflict and conflict management, analysts of the changing security environment must also delve into the nature and success of regional order." The focus on the regional strategic level in no way obviates the global strategic perspective. It simply recognizes that the regional strategic level has become increasingly relevant to security issues and therefore is more effective in addressing those kinds of problems. Other issues, such as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, the spread of ICBM technology, remain global security problems.¹⁶

The Department of Defense "should consider the creation of something like a center for the study of emerging threats closely linked to the Joint community, . . . This center should be tied to the Joint Experimentation Process at Joint Forces Command, the Pentagon's Office of Net Assessment, the Defense Intelligence Agency's futures programs, and the service experimentation programs, concept development centers, and battle labs."¹⁷

In the future modeling and simulation will become even more important or possibly imperative with the limited resources in all areas of the military. Modeling the complexity of future requirements will enable the Army to build a force that is trained to cover most of the possible contingencies. The ability to save time, money, and man-hours will make modeling and simulation the cornerstone of future experimentation and training. JFCOM is currently using a modeling software package Gensym's G2, an object-oriented environment for building and deploying expert applications. With this software JFCOM will experiment with the required expertise to operate around the world with various tasks, missions, or contingencies. The design and use of good accurate models will greatly enhance the ability to raise, train, and deploy the correct Joint Force. This force can then be applied to a specific region or problem regardless where in the world it may exist.

"The Army must simulate an urban environment, crowds, intelligence collection, IO, communications, fire control, logistics, engineering and air defense in the confines of cities. . . . it needs to model asymmetric foes armed with computers, cellular phones, access to the Internet, personal digital assistants, weapons of mass destruction, and lethal, high-tech weapons."¹⁸ The use of simulations by battle labs and various war fighting centers will be instrumental in working out the concepts. Simulations allow a quick and repetitive look at various models and concepts to fine-tune them to the precise scenario.

CELLS AND THE RESERVE FORCES

In the development stages of the RDO concept, a portion of the concept involved the use of JTF headquarters augmentation plugs.¹⁹ If and when applied to force structure and force management practices, these plugs would undoubtedly need to mature as cells or teams with a doctrinally required and developed TOE with the correctly annotated Standard Requirement Code (SRC). The SRC is the code for the specific type of team required for a mission or phase. Examples include special engineer teams, civil disturbance teams, or unique intelligence teams. These teams or cells could fill a specific need for a location and type of operation or mission.

The JFCOM JTF headquarters augmentation plug's TOE could be lighter and more deployable if it were required to fill the need for a specific scenario driven knowledge set. The ARNG and USAR force structure could provide the cell requirements, if they are truly only knowledge and training intensive. This type of light unit or team can be mobilized and deployed quickly. These teams can be documented and located throughout the country using the vast diversity within the 54 states and territories.

Most future operations will involve the ARNG and the USAR. The Army is making strides in blending its three components. An example of ARNG integration into the Army is demonstrated by the new AC/RC Integrated Divisions. These divisions were established in 1999. The two divisions are headquartered at Fort Riley, Kansas and at Fort Carson, Colorado but they are not actually deployable, maneuver divisions. They are manned with the two active Army division headquarters and the brigades (the six are enhanced separate brigades) in the ARNG. The division's ability to provide full time training management and planning will greatly enhance the ARNG brigades to be trained and ready with the ability to perform their mission as required throughout the world. This type of training relationship could exist with the scenario cells and the active military portion of the JTF headquarters.

There are several ways to determine and build the cells required for the various scenarios. Even if the Army were to receive guidance to stay with the two MTW scenarios, the

cells could be in the ARNG and USAR. In addition, a cellular TOE could be designed like a template with the flexibility to take required task force elements from a cell type matrix and allow specifics to be documented to the Unit Identification Codes (UIC) or derivative UIC level. The ability to assign the UIC allows for activation, manning, and equipping a specific unit at a specific location or station. This unit could then be stationed where the specialized skills exist in the population. In the broad-spectrum, the ARNG and USAR both have the ability to reach into the populace of the country to recruit and train the diverse specialists required to fill these teams. Both the ARNG and USAR also have units that could be dual missioned.

A matrix could be designed with all the possible regions on one axis and the various mission scenarios on the other axis. Each box in the matrix represents a specific scenario that requires specially prepared and structured cells to accomplish the mission required. This coincides with the point Metz and Johnson made, "... the U.S. military should prepare for asymmetric challenges by making modularity a central criterion in the force development process."²⁰ If JFCOM and the Army were to build an accurate matrix, it could be large, but still quite finite. The think tanks, war colleges, and all services need to organize and complete a process similar to the Army's TAA process to vet and align the true mission requirements in all the accepted scenarios. The true requirements need to be determined through extensive research and rigorous study. After this process is completed, each block in the matrix must match with a doctrinal required mission and designed SRC for the special cell or team.

It is important to remember these cells or teams are in addition to the MTW structure requirements that exist at the end of all requirement processes. With careful analysis some of the current war fight structure will migrate into different missions thereby reducing additional force structure bills. Also guidance to the Army may reduce the authorized requirements at the Corps level. This could possibly free up force structure within the authorized limits. A balance of force structure can provide the Subject Matter Expert (SME) requirements from the current evolving force structure. As the SME requirements are determined the ARNG and USAR may already contain the SMEs and trained in the correct military skills.

A higher rank heavy structure will probably be required in order to achieve the high level, experienced expertise and knowledge base required of the SMEs for the various contingencies and scenarios. This will be advantageous to the ARNG and USAR by providing force structure worthy of the high level SMEs. This is also an opportunity for the reserve components to impact the economies of the local communities. They would be glad to accept units required and validated in the TAA process as a SSC requirement. The force structure spaces from the current requirements can supply the cells required. The ARNG and USAR both have units that

could be swapped for higher priority units that specialize in a specific facet of the SSC requirements list.

“How will Army leaders ever find sufficient expertise and language capabilities given a short notice deployment?”²¹ Hall partially answers his own question. He believes that with the use of information operations the Army can develop, maintain, and access a database of experts in this country both military and civilian. He also points out that these experts do not always need to deploy, but instead be able to supply the required information utilizing multimedia. This allows the cells or teams to provide the reach back capability that will reduce the footprint in theater while retaining the ability. This also ties in with the concept of identifying the requirement and manning that requirement at least partially in the reserve components. These teams will be extremely light, highly mobile, and easily deployable. These military educated and qualified experts could be mobilized and deployed on short notice. In the event the expertise is not required in the area of operation, the mobilized reserve component SMEs can transition into a round-the-clock mode in support. This support can be through the multimedia or military communication networks. Civilians and contractors are unable to adequately fit the required support and cannot be ordered into harms way. Unless civilians are a special category of Department of Defense or government employee they would probably not be flexible enough to deploy on any short notice. America’s citizen soldiers have a civilian career, occupation, or profession and are also trained and ready Army soldiers. These citizen soldiers have the training and skills needed to perform military tasks required but also come to deployment with a full set of skills and knowledge from their civilian jobs. This is a tremendous resource the Army normally ignores.

An actual example, and possibly a good model, of the diverse cells is the ARNG linguist teams that capture military intelligence language requirements the Army articulates. The linguists present a possible template for the future expert teams, their structure and equipment requirements. The Army does try to estimate the true language requirements, even though there is never enough authorizations to fill them. The ARNG then either recruits or trains linguists towards those authorizations based on the documented requirements. An interesting fact demonstrating the dramatic need for, but the near total lack of, correct linguists teams was illustrated in Somalia. This example demonstrates the difficult task of determining and allocating the correct doctrinal requirement. The Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, as part of an Army language requirement review, had decided that the ARNG and the USAR should be authorized two, five-person Somali linguist teams. In the first few days of the efforts in Somalia, one hundred Somali linguists were needed. The assignment of the ten

authorizations was not even documented yet at that time, so the Army was essentially short one hundred linguists. Had this assignment occurred a few years before and had there been a realization of the true requirements this drastic shortage might have at least been reduced. In reference to Bosnia, "There were shortages of linguists throughout the theater, which especially exacerbated problems with intelligence."²² This is no different than any other SRC requirement, but the ability to capture and train a fairly unique skill is less daunting when spread around the country. Even though there is a low probability that a trained linguist may ever be used, the cost of maintaining this asset in the reserve components is low compared to the total cost of the active Army equivalent.

Another possible example is the information specialists that already exist in the civilian world. These specialists are or can be part-time reservists with the ability and training to be prepared on short notice to fill a SSC requirement. The ARNG and USAR have the ability and demographics to reach out and capture these national assets. Admittedly this may not be an easy task, and there will be cost associated in recruiting and training. These costs should still be significantly lower than an active duty counterpart.

Yet another example is in the area of urban conflict specialists. There are many urban specialists in the ARNG and USAR as Military Police and in other military skills. These are the civilian police officers that belong to the National Guard or any of the reserve forces. Many of these officers are even members of swat teams or are trained in similar high-level urban tactics. Depending on rank and experience these soldiers could contribute directly or even have oversight over the other branch soldiers as situations dictate. The ability to have specialized area urban experts trained and ready to deploy could be a quick and efficient method of enabling a function that quite likely will be needed. Similar to the urban conflict specialists is the need during the post conflict phase for legal teams and lawyers. The problems involved with rebuilding any country's legal system after a conflict is resolved or the situation stabilized presents a challenge to the U.S. and its allies. Civilian attorneys serve in the ARNG and USAR in many units throughout the U.S. and in many cases they are not in legal type force structure. It is estimated that there are actually thousands of lawyers that belong to this group.²³ Unfortunately as mentioned before, the Army currently lacks an adequate database of the civilian acquired skills or second languages. These civilian skills can be used in all phases of any conflict or scenario. The ability to capture these skills that have been honed through entire careers is already in the varied units in the ARNG and the USAR.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Deploying throughout the world at a rate approximately three times that of the Cold War stretches the Army thin. It was structured and trained for two near simultaneous MTWs. With the possibility of major war seemingly low, the Army must focus and adapt to SSCs and asymmetric threats while retaining the ability to fight and win wars. Despite the many uncertainties facing the Army in the future, there are several certainties:

- The world will not suddenly become friendly and peaceful.
- All future operations will be joint in nature.
- All future operations will have the potential of having a life cycle of significant duration.
- All future operations will depend on Army forces supplying a large portion of the Joint Force required to conduct any given SSC.
- All future operations will require diverse knowledge and experience base.
- All future operations will require specialized, non-military, police type, and legal functions that will have to be conducted by U.S. military personal.
- All future operations will involve the Army National Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve, due to the limited force structure of the active Army.
- The Army will continue to operate with constrained resources, to include force structure, end strength, equipment, training time, and dollars.

JFCOM is studying designs of a JTF headquarters that can manage the various threats. A possible cellular JTF headquarters probably has the best chance of meeting all the various requirements known at this time. The JTF must have the ability to influence the world and manage SSC deployment requirements. The JTF must also react to specific world problems with the ability to morph missions as situational changes occur. This headquarters could require support or attachment of teams to manage each mission. Some of these cells could be located in the U.S. rather than the mission theater and will come from all branches of the armed forces. Since the Army will always have the largest percentage of troops on the ground in any SSC, it must help identify the threats and various contingencies. Once identified, preparation must allow for any of the existing threat possibilities. With current constraints in force structure, the increase in force structure required to build this capability into the corps headquarters is a huge limitation. For a Corps to manage a JTF and remain a viable Corps, it would have to grow more than the Army authorizations would allow. The Army can attain a higher level

of preparedness using functional teams aligned with the threats and SSCs and manned in the reserve components.

The military has long used the specialized team as solution to specific problems faced in time of need. Teams are coalesced together many times from existing force structure or units with other main mission functions. There are good examples of the use of specialized cells and teams to supply skills that are difficult to recruit, train, and retain. Also a specialized weapons team that is put together with various military skills or technological abilities to fit the technological requirements of a new system or weapon. The military intelligence linguist teams may provide the best model of both structure and equipment. This model could easily apply to information specialists. Urban conflict specialists may have a slight increase in equipment, but the same cellular team concept should work well. With very low equipment needs, legal teams and lawyers could be a perfect match for this lightweight, easily deployable, highly specialized team concept. All these legal teams may fit existing linguists team models. The ARNG and the USAR are good sources for the trained cells and teams to reduce the burden on the active Army.

One drawback in the Army is the lack of a civilian acquired skills database. For instance, the Army does not capture second languages well. There is an attempt to improve this shortcoming. Most military specialties are independent of civilian acquired skills, but these skills could provide diversification in the skill base of JTF participants. In the ARNG and the USAR there are many soldiers performing military specialties completely unrelated to their civilian employment. This information could provide a wealth of potential skills that should be captured for possible use and benefit to the Army.

The ARNG and the USAR are logical sources for diverse, trained, functional cells and teams. These teams can supply the needed information and skills for a high percentage of the future contingencies that global JTFs may require. If JTF headquarters were to be designed with functional cells dependent on what and where the particular SSC entails, the ARNG and the USAR could serve as a base from which the cells can be mobilized and deployed. With thousands of hometown armories located around the country, the use of the ARNG and the USAR for the Army's subject matter expert cells could leverage the diversity of the population of the United States of America.

WORD COUNT = 5658

ENDNOTES

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² Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000), 40.

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⁶ *Ibid.*, 89.

⁷ David S. Alberts, John J. Garstka, and Frederick P. Stein, *Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority*, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense C4ISR Cooperative Research Program, 2000), 20-21.

⁸ *Initial Concept Report: E03, Rapid Decisive Operations* (Suffolk, VA: USJFCOM, 2000), iv.

⁹ Louis Caldera and Eric K. Shinseki, *The Army – Soldiers On Point for the Nation ... Persuasive in Peace, Invincible in War: A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army, Fiscal Year 2001*, Posture Statement presented to the 106th Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 2000), 14.

¹⁰ *A Concept Framework for Rapid Decisive Operations* (Suffolk, VA: USJFCOM/J9, 1999), 1.

¹¹ Conrad C. Crane, *Alternative National Military Strategies for the United States* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2000), 4.

¹² Leodis Jennings <Leodis.Jennings@ngb.army.mil>, "RE: Contact," electronic mail message to Neil L. Johnson <njohnso@odu.edu>, 30 March 2001.

¹³ *A Concept Framework for Rapid Decisive Operations*, 4.

¹⁴ Rapid Decisive Operations; available from <<http://137.247.242.50/RDOpg.htm>>; Internet; accessed 22 February 2001.

¹⁵ *A Concept Framework for Rapid Decisive Operations*, 3.

¹⁶ *Initial Concept Report: E03, Rapid Decisive Operations*, 4.

¹⁷ Metz, 16.

¹⁸ Wayne M. Hall, "The Janus Paradox: The Army's Preparation for Conflicts of the 21st Century," *Land Warfare Papers*, no. 36 (October 2000): 20-21.

¹⁹ *Concept Paper Rapid Decisive Operations (Draft)* (Suffolk, VA: USJFCOM, 2000), 5.

²⁰ Metz, 17.

²¹ Hall, 17.

²² Crane, 24.

²³ Peter D. Menk, *The Answer to the Army's Post Conflict Conundrum, Leverage Civilian Skills* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute), 6.

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