



**STRATEGY
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**U.S. MILITARY EVOLUTION IN COUNTERNARCOTICS
OPERATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA**

BY

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ABSTRACT

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The role of the U.S. Military in counternarcotics operations in Latin America has evolved significantly since its first tentative efforts in 1977. As an institution it has changed from a reluctant participant to an active leader in the counterdrug arena. This study will explore the military's evolution in stemming the flow of illicit narcotics from Latin America, and the current model of participation in order to determine first, its level of criticality to the national counterdrug effort, second, if it has been successful in accomplishing Congressionally mandated tasks, and third, if it is an appropriate model to accomplish national counternarcotics (CN) strategy for supply suppression. Critical to this study will be an analysis of the DOD's participation in the interagency process at the sub-national and sub-institutional levels, and an assessment of the military's unit selection and command structure choices. My hypothesis is that the current organizational model for DOD involvement in CN efforts is fundamentally flawed, because it has allowed short-term tactical and operational successes, but has not permitted long-term strategic success in supply suppression.

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U.S. MILITARY EVOLUTION IN COUNTERNARCOTICS OPERATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA

The role of the U.S. military in counternarcotics operations in Latin America has evolved significantly since its first tentative efforts in 1977. As an institution it has changed from a reluctant participant to an active leader in the counterdrug arena. This study will explore the military's evolution in stemming the flow of illicit narcotics from Latin America, and the current model of participation in order to determine its level of criticality to the national counterdrug effort. Additionally it will determine if it has been successful in accomplishing Congressionally mandated tasks, and, if it is an appropriate model to accomplish national counternarcotics strategy for supply suppression. Critical to this study will be an analysis of the DOD's participation in the interagency process at the sub-national and sub-institutional levels.

My hypothesis is that the current organizational model for DOD involvement in the counternarcotics effort is fundamentally flawed, because it has allowed short-term tactical and operational successes, but has not permitted long-term strategic success in supply suppression.

This study examines the impact of presidential directive and legislative mandate on the DOD, and how the nature of subsequent military reaction played out in foreign policy engagement in Latin America and in the domestic interagency process. Although supply-side solutions are discussed at length, this study is not meant to stand as an advocacy of supply suppression over demand-side options. Indeed, it is this author's measured opinion that a sound international strategy must emphasize both components, as well as address the intricacies of narcotics in transit and that of international money laundering.

Furthermore, rather than debate the merits of the U.S. counternarcotics policy or the relative success or failure of such policy, this project will explore problems of policy implementation, and how structural decisions relating to institutional organization, unit selection, and command and control have shaped the counterdrug effort in unintended ways. The ironic consequence of these decisions and the resulting model for DOD involvement has been felt across the operational spectrum -- rather than facilitating the strategic effort, the current model has created distortion, confusion and constraint for law enforcement and military commanders to such a degree that it can be considered a decisive factor in this government's inability to achieve strategic success. While there have been numerous examples of tactical success, and arguably, in the case of Operation Green Clover, regional and operational success, this has been done in spite of the operational model rather than as a result of it.

To be sure, there have many alterations to the national counterdrug machine over the last two decades. Most of these changes have been exercised in an effort to overcome legal constraints,

institutional protectionism, and resource shortcomings. Such adjustments have, in general, improved tactical capabilities and intelligence gathering resources, which have in turn led to more tactical successes.

However, as this study argues, such changes did little to solve the model's fundamental shortcomings at the operational and strategic levels. Although there was early recognition that serious flaws existed in the organizational and command and control structure, little was done to solve it. Rather, an easier path was chosen, namely, widespread adjustments at the tactical level, and some tinkering at the operational level.

The current model exists, capable of routinely producing stunning tactical achievement, but unable to transform these many small victories into strategic success. The one ray of hope has been the creation of the Joint Inter Agency Task Force (JIATF), but even this positive step, when closely analyzed, will highlight the fundamental flaws in the current counterdrug model.

Such a study is important because it will demonstrate to the policy maker that the way we conceptualize and organize for what Abraham Lowenthal terms "intermestic" issues, is every bit as vital, and perhaps more vital, than the resources allocated. Intermestic issues, those issues such as illicit narcotics trade, illegal immigration, international crime, and arms trade, which are domestic as well as international concerns, have come to the forefront in the post-Cold War era. However, the U.S. Government (USG) and many of its lawmakers continue to conceptualize these issues in Cold War frameworks. Policy makers, in order to improve not only counternarcotics concerns, but other intermestic issues as well, can use the structural recommendations advocated by this project, which address institutional and international inadequacies. This can be done because U.S. institutions, departments, and agencies uniformly suffer under structures, which have been slow to adjust, and remain largely ineffective in their efforts to formulate and execute appropriate and synchronistic response to the new challenges, the post-Cold War.

Part of the problem is that the USG is still saddled with institutions designed during the administration of President Truman for Cold War imperatives. While Presidents Bush and Clinton have made modest changes to some of our foreign engagement institutions, there has to date been no serious effort to restructure institutions for the challenges of transnational issues. Intermestic problems require more cross-fertilization between institutions and agencies at lower levels than is currently permitted.

These new issues are complex in nature and potential solutions must be searched out among institutions, agencies, international organizations and NGOs; courses of action should be debated not at the highest levels, but at the low and mid-levels, with relative freedom from institutional mandates. Furthermore, solutions must be applied in a sensitive manner, and well coordinated between institutions and among nations. Such a hybrid institution, capable of institutional and interagency cooperation and shared management does not currently exist, and may not be politically feasible. By recognizing that such a

shortcoming exists, however, the policy maker can begin to understand why there has not been a complete and lasting strategic success, which is the first step toward the creation of a compromise model capable of providing the desired result. An understanding of the new international landscape, its vital imperatives, and the impotence of Cold War institutions to respond to them, is critical to a realization that intermestic issues, such as the narcotics trade, cannot be adequately addressed without some level of architectural modification to these vehicles of policy formulation and execution.

As this study traces DOD involvement in the counternarcotics effort, the overarching problem of institutional inadequacy will continue to surface. Radical change to domestic and international institutions would, in theory, bring focused and efficient attention, ultimately leading to satisfying goal accomplishment. The likelihood of such change is remote, however, due to domestic political considerations and international concerns charged with nationalism and perceived threats to sovereignty. This study then searches for a middle course. One that offers modest institutional remodeling at key locations to prepare the USG for the particular challenges of the narcotics trade, but which could also be used as a model to improve U.S. response to other intermestic issues.

Limitations

This research will be limited by the decision not to include classified sources. Some amount of detailed and current data pertinent to this subject will, therefore, be absent. However, this should not significantly detract from the project, because most classifications for counterdrug operations are purely force-protection driven, and as such, normally lead to immediate release of general information and mission results upon completion. Additionally, the conclusions derived from this study are trend driven, and therefore, will not be adversely affected by the omission of isolated operations still under classification.

THE DOD COUNTERDRUG EVOLUTION

Counternarcotics Prisms

When examining the evolution of the U.S. military's role in the counternarcotics effort, it is useful to view them through two counternarcotics prisms. The first prism, the Survival Prism, is the DOD optic toward

executive and legislative branch mandates. The specter of Vietnam, though not as pervasive as it once was, continues in the 2000s to be a nearly tangible item in the halls of the Pentagon. Its invocation into foreign policy debate still carries enough weight to arrest or alter application of military force abroad, and was the catalyst for protectionist policies such as the Weinberger Doctrine, and the "Exit Strategy." The Vietnam factor was even more insidiously present in policy development during the early 1980s when the counternarcotics mission began to gain serious attention. The DOD viewed, and still views the counternarcotics mission with a cautious eye when considering its potential impact on the recently acquired and hard-won respect that the military institution enjoys with the American public. When viewing events through this prism it is evident that there was a perceptible evolution in DOD philosophy and activity, from reluctant participant to innovative leadership.

The second prism, the Politico-military Prism, involves the convergence of international relations, HN (Host Nation) counternarcotics policy and U.S. counterdrug policy. When using this prism it is apparent that HNs have the power to exert a great deal of pull-influence over U.S. foreign policy. There have been four counternarcotics windows of opportunity created, or opened by specific Andean nations. The U.S. government (USG) has responded to these windows of opportunity with varying degrees of enthusiasm and has achieved varied results.

Domestically, the U.S. military was both pushed and constrained by legal directive as it operated in these windows of opportunity. However, in an interesting and perhaps contradictory change of tradition, the military was pushed far more than it was constrained in its first decade of counternarcotics engagement. The military's institutional caution, created by its perspective through these two counternarcotics prisms, as it reacted to legislative and executive initiative, greatly influenced, not only the direction and shape of the military's involvement, but was also a significant factor in the mutation of the national counterdrug strategy.

The DOD, by exercising a high degree of caution, which at times bordered on obstructionism, abdicated constructive engagement in early strategy formulation. Rather than provide innovative and forward looking leadership and policy prescriptions, the military at the highest echelon, reduced its role to one of foot dragging follower-ship. By failing to constructively engage, and by withholding the "best and brightest" from the counternarcotics policy formulation, the military allowed a national strategy to go forward which was based, not on success, but on institutional protectionism. This failure to engage created political space for a multitude of other agencies to operate with a greater degree of influence on the legislative and executive branches than would have otherwise been the case. The resulting melee of policy participation led to a strategy driven by budgetary survival on the one hand, and institutional or agency expansionism on the other hand, as opposed to one based exclusively on achieving national goals.

Today some 57 federal services, agencies, and departments have a stake in the counterdrug struggle. Each year they compete for their piece of a total annual budget for counternarcotics, which has grown from approximately \$1 billion in 1982, to a requested budget in excess of \$19.2 billion for 2001.¹

Examining the proliferation of Federal Counternarcotics Intelligence Centers as indicated in the table below will confirm this trend. While the DOD was reluctant to act in the early to mid-1980s, other agencies were lobbying Congress, making plans, and then establishing new centers. The table shows that while the DOD waited until the late 1980s, the FBI, Coast Guard, and Customs Service quickly capitalized on the space created by DOD inactivity and built new centers earlier in the decade.

Table A: Creation of Counternarcotics Intelligence Centers

DATE	ORGANIZATION	LOCATION	# of CENTERS (cumulative)
1967	Defense Intelligence Agency	Arlington	1
1974	Drug Enforcement Agency	El Paso, Texas	2
1984	Federal Bureau of Investigation	Washington D.C.	3
1984	U.S. Coast Guard	Washington D.C.	4
1986	U.S. Coast Guard & Customs Service	Miami, FL	5
1987	U.S. Coast Guard & Customs Service	Miami, Florida	6
1987	U.S. Coast Guard & Customs Service	Gulfport, Mississippi	7
1987	Southwest Border Committee	Buffalo, New York	8
1988	U.S. Customs Service	Riverside, California	9
1989	Central Intelligence Agency	Washington, D.C.	10
1989	U.S. Customs Service	Oklahoma City, Oklahoma	11
1989	Drug Enforcement Agency	Arlington	12
1989	Defense Intelligence Agency	Arlington	13
1989	Department of Defense	Key West, Florida	14
1989	Department of Defense	El Paso, Texas	15
1989	Department of Defense	Colorado Springs, Colorado	16
1990	Department of Defense	Alemeda, California	17
1990	U.S. Coast Guard	Miami, Florida	18
1990	Department of Treasury	Washington D.C.	19

Source: ONDCP

William von Raab, a political appointee who became the Commissioner of the Customs Service in 1982, exemplifies shrewd maneuvering to improve his agency. Congress was frustrated and wanted results, and Customs had the ability to generate positive results/actions. The Customs Service expanded under von Raab (1982-89) from 12,000 to 18,000 personnel; enforcement agents went from 600 to 3,500. He initiated an unprecedented two-fold increase in the Service's air wing to 133 aircraft. Other agencies were likewise rapidly expanding and also putting together lobbying teams to convince lawmakers that their organization was worthy of more money than their fellow institutions -- and more responsibility.²

As it became clear that the counternarcotics mission was not going away, and that it was a budgetary windfall, the military changed its position. It moved from a position of being nearly obstructionist, to one of institutional grumbling about the mission still considered dangerous and not worthy of military participation by many, to one of active participation. However, from a policy formulation perspective, it was forced to play "catch-up" in an arena now jammed with many actors. Rather than being in a position of primacy when advising the executive on engagement abroad, (or at least sparring with the Department of State for that position) the DOD found itself fighting to keep up with other actors. It would not be until the early 1990s that the military would begin to exert any real sense of initiative and leadership in the counternarcotics arena. To date, the military has not placed institutional emphasis nor significant priority on the counternarcotics mission.

DOD Evolution

The U.S. military involvement, as an institution, in the counternarcotics effort can be placed in three phases. For practical purposes, the start point occurred when President Reagan came into office with a campaign promise to control the illegal flow of narcotics. The phases of U.S. military involvement in the counternarcotics efforts are as follows:

Phase I - Reluctance: 1981-85

Phase II - Acceptance: 1986-91

Phase III - Regional Initiative: 1992-99

Prior to 1981, the military role was small and sporadic. The support given was by exception on a case-by-case basis. Beginning in 1966 the Border Patrol requested and received ground sensors from the DOD, which they employed along the border to track illegal immigration and drug smugglers.

In 1977, Operation Green Harvest became the first reported case of direct U.S. military participation involving personnel and equipment. Operation Green Harvest was a multi-agency effort involving the Hawaiian National Guard, the Hawaiian State Police, and local Law Enforcement Agencies (LEA). The NG provided helicopter support and assisted in the search for cultivated marijuana.³

In 1975 the U.S. government released the White Paper on Drug Abuse, which advocated joint law enforcement activities with the Mexican police. The Mexican government refused to participate in joint operations, but did accept U.S. support. Mexico initiated Operation Condor that was essentially a large-scale aerial herbicidal spraying campaign with marginal interdiction efforts. The U.S. military, in conjunction with the DEA, assisted Mexico with their eradication efforts by providing aerial photographic equipment, telecommunications equipment, helicopters, specialized aircraft, spare parts, and training for Mexican pilots.⁴

PHASE 1 - RELUCTANCE: 1981-1985

This phase can best be described as a U.S. military that practiced institutional isolationism as a protective mechanism and was extremely reluctant to project assets abroad. Despite this reticence a U.S. counternarcotics regime began to emerge that involved some elements of the DOD. However, this growing regime exhibited more rhetoric than action. The U.S. policy on counternarcotics during this period was marked by confusion, although there was a strong message from the executive to counter the problem, there was little authority and budgetary initiative given to act on the message. Therefore, the U.S. counternarcotics regime, such that it was, found itself on the international sidelines, reduced to a role of cheerleader as an aggressive Colombian President stepped up to the plate on the anti-drug field.

Domestic Factors.

The major domestic politico-military elements during this phase were the decision to involve the U.S. armed forces in the counternarcotics struggle and the definition of that role. Their mission would be one of

support to LEAs.

The dynamics of the exploding coca trade in the U.S. overwhelmed domestic LEAs and by 1980 it was clear that they were fighting a losing battle. On December 1, 1981, the U.S. Congress, reacting to presidential pressure and a public opinion that favored military involvement, voted with bi-partisan majorities to repeal parts of the Posse Comitatus Act and authorized military support to drug LEAs, by changing Title 10, U.S. Code and passing Public Law 97-86 (the annual defense appropriation bill).

In 1982 two actions were taken which further involved the military in counternarcotics operations. On February 1982, President Reagan declared a war on drugs.⁵ The militant direction of his statement was unmistakable, and it fed the public perception that the military would be a silver bullet solution, even as the Pentagon dragged its feet. The second significant action was the passage of the Defense Authorization Act in 1982, which allowed U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) personnel to ride U.S. Navy (USN) ships and conduct law enforcement. The number of patrol days devoted to counternarcotics operations as reported by the USN, went from zero in 1983 to 2,325 by 1987 and involved 178 ships.⁶

International Factors

The international developments that impacted most heavily on the U.S. counternarcotics effort during this phase emanated from Colombia, which created the first window of opportunity for potential U.S. involvement abroad in counternarcotics cooperation.

During the 1970s organized crime networks in Colombia made great gains in their efforts to control the marijuana trade, and once accomplished, began to diversify to the cocaine trade. Rising demand and a desire to maximize profit potential led Colombian narco traffickers to expand their production base into the Chapare and Beni regions of Bolivia and the Upper Huallaga Valley of Peru. The soil and terrain in these regions offered the best conditions for coca cultivation.⁷ These areas produced a coca leaf that was ideal for cocaine production – higher in alkaline, it was not desirable for the traditional practice of mastication or tea.⁸

During the administration of Colombian President Alfonso Lopez Michelson (1974-1978), drug traffickers experienced a rapid rise in power, and went from being considered a limited threat, to one causing damage to the very fiber of Colombian society.⁹ Colombian president Turbay Ayala (1978-1982) declared a state of siege and made counternarcotics and counter-guerrilla operations his highest priority. Turbay aggressively pursued these groups by invoking the National Security Statute of 1978. In a large operation that same year, President Turbay sent 12,000 soldiers to Guajira to conduct marijuana eradication, law enforcement, and counter-guerrilla operations while simultaneously using the Navy to blockade his own

coast to prevent drug shipments from leaving Colombia.

In 1979 Colombia approved the extradition treaty with the U.S., a step that would polarize sides in future debates over sovereignty, and one that significantly pressured senior narcotraffickers. Operation Tiburon, a Colombian counternarcotics action executed in December 1980, with some U.S. assistance, resulted in the seizure of more than 2,700 tons of marijuana.

In short, Colombia's aggressive counternarcotics activity exemplified the very sort of initiative the U.S. would call for in future years from nations of the Andean region. President Turbay created the first window of opportunity to which the U.S. counternarcotics regime in general, failed to respond, and more importantly, failed to recognize as significant.

The Protection Prism

There was concern in the Pentagon that the counternarcotics effort could turn out to be the next Vietnam. Officers that served in Vietnam as lieutenants and captains, who fought in the jungles and firebases in an *unconventional war* - a war without front lines, a war without victory; and whose lives and careers were shaped by the conflict and the domestic political turmoil, now held the most senior leadership positions in the armed forces.

The television coverage of the **Arm Chair War** helped perpetuate and cement images of protesters spitting upon the uniform of returning soldiers, and shouts of **Baby Killers**, into the national psyche. More importantly for this discussion, the images became part of the Survival Prism through which the senior leadership of the U.S. military viewed all applications of military power. These officers gauged all potential use of military assets, not only on feasibility, but also on potential public reaction. This represented a strident reach by the U.S. military institution into the political arena.

The counternarcotics endeavor was particularly troubling to the Pentagon for two major reasons. First, narcotrafficking represented a problem of enormous dimension -- a trade regime that stretched across the globe and was organized by savvy leaders and defended by well-armed and well-paid gunmen. This would not be an easy victory nor a short commitment, which was troubling because in the post-Vietnam calculus, short conflicts were acceptable, because they could be executed and completed before public support turned negative. Second, the Andean region is one of mountains and jungle. This environment precludes the application of conventional military power such as mechanized and armor units, which made

up the majority of the Army's war fighting capability. Additionally, the Andean environment, such that it is, conjures up images of highlands in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

The DOD reticence can be exemplified by two cases, the U.S. involvement in El Salvador and the Grenada invasion. The Pentagon was hesitant to commit U.S. advisors to the El Salvador conflict, worried about public perception of Special Forces (Green Beret) advisors once again assisting government forces of a questionable democracy engaged in guerrilla warfare. A self-imposed limitation by DOD established a 55 man ceiling for advisors in country. Subsequently, the 55-man limit became an obstacle to overcome by those advocating a greater DOD role.¹⁰ The El Salvador case can be contrasted against the enthusiastic DOD support for the invasion of Grenada. While it did not offer an opportunity to exercise conventional units, Grenada, a tiny island, represented an opportunity for all Services to be involved in a short, lightning sharp action against a feeble enemy. There was never any doubt that the military could bring the full weight of its power to bear in a short sure victory.

El Salvador represented doubts as to victory. The Pentagon had learned its lesson. Guerrilla warfare on a large land mass was a very difficult and long process. The call for military involvement in support of counternarcotics operations suffered from a similar calculus of thought in the DOD as did El Salvador, except that the counternarcotics case lacked the ultimate trump card of anti-communism. To overcome this handicap, the counternarcotics mission would in short order be linked to national security.

To view the military and its reaction to the counternarcotics mission only as a shell-shocked institution however, would be deceptively simplistic. Another component of the military survival prism was budgetary concern. This concern evolved over time. Initially, the military was instructed to give support to LEAs, but Congress did not fund this support. In the late stages of the Cold War, the Pentagon calculus included concern over remaining prepared for a high intensity two-theater war, while simultaneously looking toward a low intensity conflict in Central America, and a stepped up technology and arms race. Though military budgets were increasing under Reagan, so were the requirements. A counternarcotics requirement that was not funded did not earn a very important seat at the Pentagon table. In addition, there was among many in the officer corps, a feeling that domestic law enforcement was a less prestigious, less noble, and ultimately a less important profession than service in the armed forces. To defend one's country could not, in the eyes of many, compare to policing one's neighborhood.

The Weinberger Doctrine emerged as the measuring stick for military involvement during this phase. In 1984 Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger made a speech to the National Press Club in which he

outlined six conditions that must be met before exercising the military option. These six tests became known as the Weinberger Doctrine. Weinberger felt that forces should only be committed when the following conditions have been met:

1. A vital national interest is at stake,
2. Sufficient forces are committed to win,
3. Clearly defined political and military objectives have been established,
4. Adjustment of forces is permitted once committed,
5. Reasonable assurance of congressional and public support is expected,
6. Military forces are committed only as a last resort.

Using the Weinberger Doctrine as a measuring stick, military involvement in counternarcotics was not justified, and possibly never could be, especially with respect to the final point. Clearly, the U.S. military as an institution would resist involvement in the counternarcotics effort so long as Weinberger was at the helm.

Military Agency

With the domestic and international dynamics in place, this study will now turn to U.S. military activity during this phase. In 1983 the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS) was formed under the direction of the Vice President. It was the first effort to institutionalize military and civilian law enforcement cooperation and equipment sharing. The military, however, remained reluctant to act and the DOD did not assign a high priority to counternarcotics operations. Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger characterized military involvement in the counternarcotics missions as "very dangerous and undesirable." With this guidance the DOD made no attempt to modify its own institution in order to react to the new support role. In the Pentagon, it was very much business as usual - there was no move to create a support strategy, no involvement of a *Jedi Knight* type think tank; counternarcotics support missions were being received and approved or disapproved on a case by case basis.¹¹

Some of the justification for refusing missions can be explained by pragmatic budgetary concerns. Congress did not authorize additional counternarcotics money for the DOD until 1985 (see Chart B below). A

fiscal argument however, does not explain why the DOD did not approve low cost training missions to contentious areas in the Andean Region. The DOD only approved **safe** missions, those that stayed far from the edges of the new legislation. Although reluctant and cautious, the DOD was however, increasingly conducting missions in support of the counternarcotics effort as the expenditures below point out.

Table B: Estimate of DOD CN Expenditures

Fiscal Year	Direct Costs	Operating	Allocated Costs	Appropriated Equipment Costs
1982	4.8		NA	NA
1983	9.7		NA	NA
1984	14.5		NA	NA
1985	54.8		NA	NA
1986	69.7		136.3	138.6
1987	72.7		131.4	314

(In millions of U.S. dollars)

Source: DOD Drug Enforcement Task Force (The RAND Corp.: 1988)¹²

A large percent of the counternarcotics budget was spent on thousands of surveillance sorties, conducted by AWACS, E-2, E-3, and OV- 10 aircraft from the U.S. Air Force (USAF), USN, and the U.S. Marine Corp (USMC). During this phase (1981-1985) the USAF operated three aerostat (balloon) radars on a 24-hour basis to provide intelligence along the Southern border and in the South Florida region. The NG also flew aerial surveillance and provided air transportation.

The DOD loaned more than \$138 million worth of equipment from 1981-1988 to drug LEAs, such as Army helicopters, Mohawk aircraft, communications equipment, and ground surveillance radars. The Navy, during this same time period contributed 1,287 ship days, including the PHM hydrofoils.¹³

Summary

In summary, this phase of U.S. military activity was characterized by hesitancy and protectionism. Military support lacked direction, it was piecemeal response; support was doled out on a case-by-case basis rather than as a coordinated part of a coherent military support strategy. The DOD, by abdicating constructive participation in early policy debate, stimulated a mutation in counternarcotics strategy development process by creating space for other agencies and institutions.

PHASE 2 - ACCEPTANCE: 1986-1991

By the mid-1980s the Reagan administration decided that they needed to move from a policy of strong rhetoric to one of stronger activity, a move that Congress had long been calling for U.S. military agency in this phase can be described as tentative.¹⁴ The DOD was forced incrementally to be more aggressive. During the first portion of this phase the U.S. military tried to respond in a manner similar to their reaction in the Phase of Reluctance, but Presidential Directives, administration rhetoric, and Congressional legislation, compelled the Secretary of Defense to change course. Public support remained high for further involving the U.S. military in the counternarcotics effort. Internationally, Bolivia would set the tone and open the next window of opportunity.

Domestic Factors

The first domestic politico-military factor that impacted the DOD was the Presidential National Security Directive NSD 221, issued in April 1986. This directive labeled illicit narcotics a threat to U.S. national security, and called for the DOD to expand its role into the anti-drug mission. With the Anti-Drug Act of 1986, the U.S. Congress authorized an unprecedented \$3.9 billion for anti-narcotics efforts in fiscal year 1987. Approximately 75% was earmarked for supply-side reduction such as law enforcement, interdiction, eradication/substitution programs, and the other 25% was designated for demand-side reduction programs like education, prevention, treatment, and rehabilitation.¹⁵ With this budget the DOD was for the first time

authorized specific moneys for their participation in the counternarcotics effort.¹⁶

In 1988 the U.S. Congress passed the legislation, which had the most significant impact on the military during this phase. Three factors influenced the Congress to act so stridently. First, it was impatient with DOD foot dragging. Second, Congress had become frustrated with the lack of measurable success, and third, lawmakers needed to manage election year politics.

In a demonstration of this lack of patience, Congressman Bill Dickinson (R. AL), authored a bill in 1989, which ordered the President to, "substantially halt" the flow of drugs into our country, "within 45 days." Senator Sam Nunn (D. GA) called this directive, "the equivalent of passing a law saying the President shall, by Thanksgiving, devise a cure for the common cold."¹⁷ Dickinson's Bill would have forced the President to order the military (active duty, reserve, and NG forces) to begin complete night radar coverage of the entire southern border. The military was authorized to seize any planes or boats caught smuggling, and to arrest the crews.¹⁸ Senator Nunn, leading more moderate legislators on this issue, maneuvered a compromise in the form of Defense Authorization Act for FY 1989.¹⁹

The 1989 National Defense Authorization Act assigned DOD the mission to be the "lead agency" for air and sea surveillance, monitoring and interdiction. The Secretary of Defense was given the authority to approve military support within the U.S. and to HNs, and to employ active duty, reserve and NG forces to accomplish it. The DOD was also required to organize and combine the communications and technical intelligence assets of all U.S. agencies into a single network. The Congress, clearly demonstrating its impatience with the military, required the Secretary of Defense to report directly to Congress as to the status of the DOD's implementation of the new law's requirements. Additionally, Congress asked the DOD to consider the feasibility of, and provide testimony on other initiatives, ranging from a more aggressive role for Special Operations Forces in interdiction, to ideas such as temporarily assigning military lawyers to the Department of Justice.²⁰

The second significant piece of legislation, the Comprehensive Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, was passed in late October 1988, just short of the national elections. The new law again repeated the requirement for the DOD to participate more vigorously in an interdiction role. It also carried tougher penalties for narcotraffickers, and created measures to combat money laundering. This bill generally leveled the overall demand-side and supply-side spending, bringing both to approximately fifty percent. The level of spending was, and still continues to be the subject of vigorous debate, with some arguing that in pragmatic terms supply-side spending remained higher, perhaps by as much as ten percent; while policy analysts

maintained that separate demand-side programs contained within agency budgets must be considered when determining the total demand suppression budget. There was, nonetheless, a perceptible and significant increase in demand reduction, which indicated a greater acceptance of co-responsibility, a shift long awaited by Latin American leaders, who felt the U.S. was not making equivalent sacrifices.

The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 also created the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP); the Director became commonly known as the "Drug Czar." It made the Director of the ONDCP a cabinet level position, and dismantled the NNBS. The creation of this position was significant because it legislatively stipulated that a cabinet member who was not dual-hatted must deal with counternarcotics issues at the highest level. This measure however, began a blueprint for organizational confusion. The Director of ONDCP was charged with coordinating policy, and conspicuously, was not given operational control of assets, nor sufficient authority to force agencies to participate in a meaningful national strategy process. In reality, this position has been alternately ignored by administrations or used as a bully pulpit to wage public relations campaigns against the use of drugs.

President Bush increased the legal basis for the military activity outside of the U.S. borders. In August 1989 he signed NSD 18, which permitted U.S. military trainers to go beyond "secure areas." In effect, this permitted military personnel to accompany the forces they have instructed on training missions, rather than remaining on fortified bases.²¹ Some have argued that this directive was used to permit U.S. military advisors to conduct direct action against narcotraffickers in host nations, but this author found no evidence to support that charge.

The Andean Strategy

The next politico-military action, which impacted on the incremental push to force the military to act more aggressively, and arguably the single most important measure in the history of the U.S. counternarcotics effort, was the Andean Strategy. In September 1989, Bush unveiled the National Drug Control Strategy, which came to be known as the Andean Strategy due to its regional focus. The strategy called for increased cooperation with HN governments to eradicate and interdict, while at the same time providing economic aid to encourage alternative development. The strategy used a five-year, foreign assistance package known as the "Andean Initiative." The package included \$1.11 billion in economic aid and \$1.04 billion in support to HN military and LEAs. The Andean Strategy represented a dramatic shift from

the previous strategy in a handful of ways. First, it recognized the essential role that multilateralism should have in counternarcotics affairs. Second, was acknowledgment that successful economic development was an important component to a successful counternarcotics campaign. Third, the counternarcotics effort must be carried out in a democratic framework, where human rights are respected. Fourth, the U.S. accepted its share of responsibility, and agreed to take a more active role combating demand-side problems.²²

The Andean Initiative led directly to the Cartagena Summit in February 1990, where President Bush met with the leaders of Peru, Bolivia and Colombia. The Declaration of Cartagena announced the commitment of all four countries to aggressively undertake the policies of the Andean Strategy. It can be argued here that the U.S. used economic aid as a lever for accepting an increased military support. The U.S. government has continually denied this assertion, saying instead that Andean cooperation was linked to counternarcotics performance. The administration maintained they would be satisfied if the counternarcotics mission was accomplished without the military.²³ Another Bush initiative, the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA), became the trade component to the Andean Strategy. This relaxed the rules of origin and duty-free status of approximately 6,000 Andean products.²⁴

The Cheney Proclamation

The Cheney Proclamation unseated the Weinberger Doctrine in 1989 as the lightning rod for the U.S. military's institutional policies. In the same month that President Bush announced the Andean Strategy, Defense Secretary Cheney proclaimed that the counternarcotics effort was a high priority national security mission of the Department of Defense. The Cheney Proclamation was the capstone to a shift in military attitude toward counternarcotics that began in 1986 when Reagan signed NSD 221.

The military protection prism would begin to change color during this phase of involvement. From an activity that could not earn itself a seat at the table, counternarcotics operations, once funded could command attention. Chart C (below) demonstrates this change. The end of the Cold War brought calls for a "peace dividend" and the Bush administration drafted plans to reduce the military. Manpower was being reduced by at least 25 percent, divisions were deactivated, and ships were mothballed, while simultaneously, funding for Special Operations and counternarcotics operations were being dramatically increased. A pragmatic budget-based shift occurred as Services and branches within Services scrambled to prove they could conduct Special Operations and/or counternarcotics operations and thereby earn part of the new

white-green gold. A doctrine eventually emerged that spread the wealth and legitimized what became known as Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), as worthy missions for conventional units, and thereby assured all a small slice of the pie.

Table C: DOD CN Funding Evolution

PHASES	FISCAL YEAR	AUTHORIZED BY CONGRESS
Phase 1 - 1981-85	1981-1985	\$0
Phase 2	1986	\$138.6
	1988	\$200
	1989	\$438
Phase 3	1997	\$947

* (In millions of U.S. dollars)

*Source: DOD Drug Enforcement Task Force (The Rand Corp. 1988); and The Washington Post (29 Nov 96).

During Phase 2, additional justifications for military involvement were articulated to address a national security threat and to demonstrate national commitment. The first engendered widespread public attention and debate, while the second received little attention. A debate over the relative merits of the national security linkage does not fall within the scope of this study. What is important for our purpose is that the link was established, and as such demanded attention from the DOD.

Another justification for military involvement emerged as doubts about interdiction grew in Congress. Military support to interdiction agencies was initially authorized because it was argued that interdiction would reduce the availability of drugs in the U.S., drive up the street price of cocaine, and serve as a deterrent to traffickers. It is not the purpose here to debate the success or failure of the interdiction effort, rather I would point out that over the course of several years there emerged in Congress a *perception* that interdiction was not capable of achieving the dramatic success once anticipated. The Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) being employed relied on quantitative data relating to trends in cultivation, and in wholesale and retail pricing.

Opponents of DOD involvement began to assess military performance solely on the merit of these quantitative methods of effectiveness (MOEs). Advocates of DOD engagement turned to qualitative MOEs. In 1986, the President's Commission on Organized Crime (PCOC) endorsed military involvement in interdiction, both as a deterrent and as a symbol of national determination. Senator Phil Gramm (R. TX) argued for military involvement to demonstrate to the nation the gravity of the problem and concern by political leadership.²⁵ The use of the military therefore, began to be justified, based in part on a commitment message - a message intended for a domestic and international audience.

The Congress, though now less unanimously, continued to push for military involvement in interdiction, while at the same time elevating demand-side strategy to the same level of importance as supply-side. It is ironic that some members of Congress began to have doubts about the capabilities of supply suppression component of the emerging counternarcotics strategy, even before the U.S. military had begun to actively participate in it.

International Factors

The international politico-military prism through which the U.S. military viewed the counternarcotics arena was colored most deeply by Bolivia during Phase Two. The Paz Estenssoro administration stood in stark contrast to pest public corruption, most notably that of General Lucas Garcia Meza. Meza, financed by the Roberto Suarez family, conducted a "cocaine coup" to assume power in 1980 and subsequently turned Bolivia into a haven for narco-traffickers. President Paz Estenssoro initiated successful economic stabilization and adjustment programs, took aim at the narco-traffickers, and requested U.S. military assistance. Paz Estenssoro's aggressive counternarcotics stance created a "pull effect" on U. S. - Bolivian relations and opened the second window of opportunity for U.S. involvement. Into this window the U.S. counternarcotics regime entered and dragged with it a somewhat less reluctant U.S. military.

1984 was the year that narco-traffickers made significant inroads in Ecuador, and Ecuadorians became concerned about becoming **Colombianized**. President Leon Febres Cordero aggressively fought back with Ecuadorian counternarcotics units. By 1987 these developing narco-trafficking organizations were nearly eliminated. During these three years U.S. military support to Ecuador was limited to the loan of helicopters, but in September 1989, the same month that the Andean Strategy was announced, the

Ecuadorian Foreign Minister requested additional counternarcotics assistance from the U.S. In 1990 Venezuela decided to formalize the role of the Venezuelan military in the counternarcotics effort, and they required additional expertise. From this point forward Ecuador maintained a steady, but low-key procession of U.S. counternarcotics Mobile Training Teams (MTT) to repair helicopters, and teach counternarcotics tactics and intelligence analysis.²⁶

Military Agency

The first entry into this window of opportunity was Operation Blast Furnace (July-November 1986). Bolivian and U.S. policy makers grossly miscalculated the political impact of this operation and mismanaged the public announcement and deployment process. Operation Blast Furnace was a tactically sound interdiction operation that ended as a strategic loss because of the public fallout in Bolivia over U.S. conventional combat troops operating within their borders. USSOUTHCOM deployed the 210th Combat Aviation Battalion and the 193rd Infantry Brigade to Bolivia for a four-month campaign. The 210th Aviation brought Blackhawk helicopters, and the 193rd Infantry used conventional infantry troops to support the DEA and Bolivian counterdrug police forces in their efforts to interdict production facilities and trafficking networks. The USAF provided deployment transportation via a C-5 aircraft and five C-130 aircraft.²⁷ The C-5 is the largest transport aircraft in the USAF inventory and not a common sight at airports, whereas many South American countries own C-130s. The operation presented a large foot print in a very small country. Operation Blast Furnace had a short-term impact on the cocaine trade. The price paid for coca leaf dropped below the profitability threshold, the price of coca base plummeted, and production dropped a reported 90 percent, but recovered shortly after the operation was over.²⁸

Operation Snowcap (1987-1991) was an attempt to institutionalize the successes of Operation Blast Furnace. Operation Snowcap was a joint DEA and INM (State Department Bureau of International Narcotics Matters) program and it initiated and funded many U.S. military MTT. U.S. Special Forces personnel from 7th Special Forces Group conducted the bulk of these MTT, but there were also USMC and Navy SEAL (Sea Air Land, special operations forces) MTT.

Operation Snowcap called for an additional 90 DEA personnel to deploy on a temporary basis to the Andean Region. The DEA, concerned with its institutional lack of field skills and military tactics, took two actions. First, it hired contract, ex-military personnel who had a strong Special Forces or Ranger

background. These personnel served as field advisors and as communications and medical support personnel. Second, the DEA requested military training for their agents. Company A, 3rd Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group, stationed in Panama, in conjunction with the Jungle Operations Training Battalion (JOTB), provided training for the first group of Andean bound Snowcap DEA personnel. Personnel were trained in jungle operations, survival skills, emergency medical training, indigenous and U.S. communications equipment and weapons systems. The Ranger Training Brigade conducted subsequent DEA training at Fort Benning, Georgia.

Operation Red Dragon, which began in May 1987, was the first of the Snowcap funded MTT. Again Company A, 3rd Bn, 7th Special Forces Group was called. It was tasked to deploy a detachment to Chimore in the Chapare Region, build a training camp and train members of the UMOPAR (Unidad Movil de Patrullaje Rural). The UMOPAR is a special anti-drug unit created in 1983 comprised of approximately 640 soldiers recruited from the national police; a 60 member, 12 helicopter air wing from the national Air Force; and a 35 member, 5 boat riverine element from the Bolivian Navy. Their mission is to interdict coca processing facilities and labs in the Chapare region and Bern and Santa Cruz departments; control the trade of precursor chemicals and to investigate and immobilize drug traffickers. Except for manpower, the U.S. provided everything needed for the UMOPAR to include food, uniforms, housing, vehicles, weapons, aircraft, boats, communications equipment and salary supplements. Between 1981-89 this cost the U.S. some \$30 million. The first detachment from 7th Special Forces group constructed a base camp modeled after the Vietnam style A-Camp or small firebase. A series of Red Dragon Operations continued for the next four years, which placed a continual 7th Special Forces Group presence of 10-24 trainers in Chimore. Additionally, both the USMC and USN SEAL units conducted smaller and less frequent riverine MTT to the unit known as the "Blue Devils" during this period. A U.S. Army warrant officer trained the Bolivian pilots of the UMOPAR air wing, or "Red Devils" on loan to the Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) from DOD. In addition to training in Bolivia, select members also received training at the U.S. Army's School of Americas in Fort Benning, Georgia. The following information demonstrates the impact of Special Forces training on UMOPAR's unit performance.²⁹

Table D: Bolivian Interdiction Statistics

	1987	1988	1989
Labs Destroyed:			
Cocaine HCl	11	20	17
Cocaine base	17	20	17
Cocaine paste	482	1,421	2,324
Drugs Seized (kgs):			
Cocaine HCl	24	554	1,046
Cocaine base	1,121	1,364	456
Cocaine paste	2,918	8,173	10,240
Precursor Chemicals:			
Acetone (barrels)	79	90	66
Ether (barrels)	260	130	24
Hydrochloric acid (barrels)	0	8	2
Sulfuric Acid (barrels)	55	150	161

Potassium Permanganate (kgs)	0	2,323	4,029
Coca Eradicated (hectares)	1,042	1,476	2,504
Arrests	746	498	593
Assets Seized:			
Vehicles	6	15	34
Weapons	0	12	58
Aircraft	5	11	15

U.S. currency	\$3,585	\$190,433	\$197,950
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Source: DEA

Another Window of Opportunity

International Factors

In 1989 events in Colombia created the third window of opportunity for the U.S. to engage more actively in the international counternarcotics effort. In the summer of 1989, the Governor of the Antioquin Department, and Senator Luis Carlos Galan Sarmiento, who was a candidate for president, were assassinated. President Barco reacted immediately and forcefully, he declared a state of siege, authorized the seizure of narco-trafficker properties, and in the ensuing months some 10,000 people were arrested.³⁰ The narco-traffickers fought back, declaring "total and absolute war" on August 24. In the next nine months, two more president hopefuls were assassinated, 262 members of the CNP (Colombian National Police), 93 soldiers, 3 judges, and 15 members of the press were killed.³¹

President Bush reacted to this crisis with a \$65 million emergency aid package for Colombia. Approximately 77 percent of this package went to the military, and 16 percent went to the CNP.³²

Military Agency

In 1989 the DOD began to improve the intelligence and communications capabilities available to country teams in the Andean region. This was done by deploying Tactical Analysis Teams (TATs) to selected embassies. They were staffed with DOD intelligence officers, and Special Forces personnel. The TAT came with a sophisticated satellite communications, imagery and computer package. In addition to the technology upgrade the TAT provided intelligence analysis, and assisted in target selection and operations planning.³³

The new personnel and equipment were put to good use during operations on what Ambassador Marilyn McAfee calls drug "Free Zones," places where narco-traffickers controlled entire towns and could operate with impunity. The new Kingpin Strategy was initiated with the San Ramon Raid on 8 Nov 1989, and involved 300 UMOPAR soldiers, 30 DEA agents, 3 Bolivian C-130s, and 9 UH1H helicopters. Additionally, General Thurmon, Commander In Chief (CINC) of USSOUTHCOM, sent down three officers to assist with planning and organization, because, according to Ambassador McAfee, the DEA had little experience in this type of operation.³⁴

The Santa Anna Raid (Santa Anna del Yacuma), in June 1991, called Operation Safe Haven involved TAT planning, 580 UMOPAR members, 33 DEA agents, and C-130 and UH1H airlift. Both of these operations netted numerous arrests, laboratory destructions and estate seizures, but they failed to net a major trafficker. The real success of these operations, however, was the precedent setting demonstration of successful planning, execution and control of a joint/combined counternarcotics operation. This was another evolutionary step in the increasing sophistication of the international counternarcotics effort.³⁵

The Bolivian Army and National Police institutionally deeply mistrusted each other. This situation was exacerbated as the Bolivian Army, watching from the sidelines, began to resent the funding and training that the UMOPAR was receiving. President Paz Zamora requested a training package for the Bolivian Army, which was approved on April 4, 1991, after bitter debate by Bolivian Congress. Operation White Spear began on that same day. Fifty six men from 7th Special Forces Group arrived and conducted a ten-week training course for the Bolivian Army. They trained the Manchego Battalion, interestingly; the very same battalion that hunted down and executed Ernesto "Che" Guevara, just one month after Special Forces Major "Pappy" Shelton and two detachments arrived to conduct training in 1967.³⁶

The SF trainers who were training the new Manchego Battalion provided instruction for 500 recruits and issued new M16A2 assault rifles. In October 1991, another SF company, Company A, 1st Battalion, 7th SFG(A), arrived and conducted similar training, this time for 12 weeks for a light infantry battalion called the "Jordan". The training took place at Riberalta in the Beni Department. The coca growers union mobilized several protests, and the Bolivian military remained hesitant to conduct counternarcotics operations so in early 1992 Paz Zamora stated that the military would no longer be involved in counternarcotics missions.³⁷

The DEA in Peru, likewise compensating for weakness in military operations, hired a retired SF Master Sergeant to serve as their Upper Huallaga Valley (UHY) field coordinator in April 1989. He was subsequently replaced by an active duty Colonel in an agreement between DOD and Department of State. A TAT also operates in Peru, providing identical services.³⁸

On February 10, 1989 Ambassador Alexander Watson suspended all Snowcap activities in Peru because of security concerns in the UHY and because Peruvian counternarcotics units lacked sufficient military training. In early 1989 Operation Blue Venture began, which involved personnel from the 7th Special Forces Group training the Peruvian National Police to plan and execute counternarcotics operations. This training took place at a base camp at Mazamari. After the training, and when the base camp at Santa

Lucia was fortified, the Ambassador authorized Snowcap operations to resume.³⁹

In 1991, Operation Stone Bridge replaced Operation Red Dragon in Bolivia. The concept behind Operation Stone Bridge was to allow a trained and experienced cadre of UMOPAR personnel to conduct the training, while being advised by SF soldiers. This is known in SF circles as "working yourself out of a job," and is the goal of "train-the-trainer" or cadre instruction type MTT. Operation Stone Bridge also permitted SF personnel to provide advisory and training assistance to the DEA in Bolivia.⁴⁰

Full implementation of the military component of the Andean Strategy was, however, delayed by as much as three years. Some of the ground based radar equipment and aerial detection platforms were diverted to the Middle East, which created holes in an emerging system. Additionally, President Fujimori slowed the process by balking at the conditionality of U.S. economic aid, but signed a bilateral anti-drug accord in May 1991.⁴¹

During this phase the USAF and the USN maintained the same types of coverage outlined in Phase One, but increased their overall number of missions. Their activities, in conjunction with LEAs were credited with successfully interdicting the Caribbean-Florida smuggling corridor. The narcotraffickers denied this lane, shifted strategy, which brought the majority of their product along an alternate supply route through Mexico. Some scholars have argued that this shift points to the futility of the counternarcotics effort, because the narcotraffickers will always be able to innovate and change tactics and strategy. This same argument has been applied to production centers and is called the Balloon Theory. This holds that when pressure is applied to one area, expansion will occur in another area. When, however, a global view is taken, and articulated in military terms, the analysis is somewhat different. First, in terms of supply routes, for that is essentially what these are, when you deny the enemy the use of his main supply route, you have seized some of the initiative and have achieved a small victory. The enemy must now react to your move, and must transport cargo over a less desirable route. Additionally, he is now more canalized, and you can concentrate more of your forces in the choice points of this canal. This is not to say that total victory is at hand, far from it. The enemy in this case is very resourceful, and has chosen to move his supply route through a traditional political safe haven - Mexico.

The NG role during this phase expanded greatly when the U.S. Congress earmarked \$40 million for it in 1989. By 1991 the NG was providing support to federal, state, and local LEA in 54 states or territories and in that same year conducted 5,815 support missions. Its man-days increased from 50,771 in 1988 to

almost 900,00 in 1991. In 1989 it reported participating in operations resulting in the confiscation of \$1.7 million, and in 1991, \$47.5 million worth of narco-trafficking assets. The NG conducted domestic eradication operations that resulted in the destruction in 1989 of four million marijuana plants, and by 1991 that number had risen to 21 million plants. The street value of illicit drugs seized by LEAs which received NG support, rose from \$9.8 billion in 1989 to \$47 billion in 1991. The NG, however, prefers to rely on customer satisfaction surveys for its measures of effectiveness (MOE). Using customer feedback, they report a 95 percent satisfaction rating.⁴²

Counterdrug Joint Task Force Concept

The most important activity conducted by the military during this phase was its acceptance of the congressionally mandated role of lead agency, and subsequent moves to build a counternarcotics inter-agency infrastructure. With the issuance of the Cheney Proclamation, the Secretary of Defense assigned counternarcotics missions to the CINCs of the combatant commands. These commanders in turn created Joint Task Force (JTF) 4, JTF 5, and JTF 6 in late 1989. The term Joint designates inter-service cooperation. The JTFs were designed to exercise tactical control (TACON), in other words to command, control, and communicate with military assets in support of LEA operations. Secondly, they were to serve as a conduit of information and intelligence between the military asset and the customer (supported LEA). Each of the JTF conducted 24-hour operations and interfaced with nearby U.S. Customs, DEA, FBI, Customs and Border Patrol facilities.⁴³

JTF 4, located in Key West, Florida, is a sub-command of USJFCOM, which exercised TACON over military assets in the Caribbean and Western Atlantic region, and primarily focused on transportation nodes. On any given day JTF 4 averages 9 ships, 22 aircraft, 15 radar stations, and 3,000 military personnel deployed. The annual averages during this phase were approximately 4,000 ship days and 38,000 flight hours. Placed in perspective, this is what would have been expended over a year on a Sixth Fleet deployment to the Mediterranean. Each year JTF 4 looked at about 95,000 air tracks and 40,000 ship tracks. Between 1989-1992 this contributed to the seizure of 153 tons of narcotics, the capture of 100 vehicles and aircraft, and 370 arrests. Between 1990-1991 the following trends were noted in the Caribbean Basin; total seizures were up 43 percent, cocaine seizures were up 47 percent, aircraft and vessel seizures

were up by 109 percent, the percent of suspect tracks that were seized increased by 5 percent, and the percent of seizures per operational day went up by 45 percent.⁴⁴

JTF 5, located in California, is a sub-command of USPACOM, and is focused on the vast ocean areas and the Eastern Pacific Air Corridor (EPAC). JTF 5 tracks the South to North movement of cocaine, heroin and marijuana, and the West to East movement of heroin, methamphetamines, and cannabis products (primarily hashish). Additionally, JTF 5 routinely coordinates with USACOM over the movement of narcotics along the air-bridge from the Andean region. JTF 5 quickly evolved its strategy from one of random patrols to one that is poised ready to respond to intelligence cues. With 101 million square miles of ocean, that has no choke points, and carries 5000 vessels on any given day, the area is too large to be affected by routine patrols. In addition to the USAF radar platforms mentioned earlier in this study, JTF 5 employs B-52 bomber aircraft as a surface surveillance platform. JTF 5 plays a vital role on tracking Andean originated narcotics, especially when it moves from EPAC into Mexico. As an example, in FY 1992, JTF 5 assisted LEAs in the seizure of more than 400kgs of cocaine. The majority of JTF 5 seizures involve west to east narcotics and are not included within the scope of this study.⁴⁵

JTF 6, located on Fort Bliss, near El Paso, Texas, is a sub-command of USFORSCOM. It plans and coordinates all DOD support requested by Federal State and Local drug LEA within the Southwest border region, and then exercises TACON over all supporting units. The primary source of support requests emanate from Operation Alliance, a multi-agency effort begun in 1986 to coordinate the LEA counternarcotics effort in the Southwest Border region which is located less than a mile away at Biggs Army Airfield. JTF 6 also routinely interfaces with the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) that has the responsibility to provide a comprehensive and accurate intelligence picture of worldwide drug movement as it relates to the U.S. JTF 6 uses its Land Intel Unit to directly participate in the EPIC activities. JTF 6 now monitors six aerostat radar balloons which are stretched along the border JTF 6 has supported over 144 different LEA at all levels and has used 168 separate U.S. military units including all Services, active, reserve, and NG components. JTF views this support in three categories:

1. Operational Missions Listening Posts, Observation Posts, and Reconnaissance patrols (air and ground), diving operations, and terrain denial by large units. These missions represent 48.4% of completed missions.

2. General Support Missions: Smaller in scope and not area specific, these missions include MTT, intelligence analysis, transportation support, and communications support. They represent 41.8% of the missions completed.

3. Engineer Operations: Construction and repair of roads, docks, helipads, and rifle ranges to enhance LEA capabilities. These missions represent 9.8% of the missions completed.⁴⁶

The operational tempo is high at JTF 6 as well; a typical day would see 52 independent missions along the border, involving 875 DOD personnel. JTF 6 also prefers qualitative over quantitative methods of effectiveness (MOEs). It issues customer and supporting unit surveys, and routinely gets extremely high satisfaction ratings (normally near 99 percent satisfaction rating from customers).

National Guard support to Customs officials at border crossing points has allowed the U.S. Customs Service to double the number of containers inspected, and during surge operations this is elevated to a 35 percent increased capacity. To illustrate the colossal nature of this endeavor however, it should be pointed out that only 3 percent of all containers from all countries importing goods are ever inspected, and that only 13-15 percent of all containers from suspect countries are ever inspected.⁴⁷

SOUTHCOM Integration

The USSOUTHCOM has played a pivotal role in multi-lateral C4 (Command, Control, Communications, and Computers) integration. The initial technology package sent to Bolivia as discussed earlier (TAT), was the pilot program for the Command Management System. This system allows field agents to tap into intelligence data bases located in Panama and the U.S. It also allows an agent to take a photo with a digital camera, and using computer and satellite links, transmit that image for analysis. The Caribbean Basin Radar Network's fixed systems have been institutionalized along with a communications system that allows real-time transference of intelligence information between the JTF, SOUTHCOM, EPIC, and other intelligence centers in the U.S.

Summary

In summary, this phase was one that saw the military gradually accept an increased role in counternarcotics. The DOD reluctantly accepted its role, pushed at first by Congressional mandates and then in an ironic twist, compelled by its own pragmatic protectionism. The most powerful politico-military events occurred in 1989: assassinations in Colombia, the Andean Strategy, the Cheney Proclamation, and the 1989 National Defense Authorization Act. Following these events the military took steps to institutionalize the military-LEA relationship.

PHASE 3- REGIONAL INITIATIVE: 1992 - 1997

... the (Bolivian) Navy hates UMOPAR, dislikes DEA and continue(s) to disrupt any attempt to work operations. Their commander... states that he was forced into this job and that he does not want it...

—U.S. advisor to the Bolivian Navy Special Riverine Unit (1989)⁴⁸

This phase can be U.S. military institution that accepted the counternarcotics effort as a legitimate mission, and now began to exert some levels of inter-agency leadership, and regional initiative.

Domestic Factors

Domestically, there was little politic-military activity that carried significant change for the U.S. military and its counternarcotics effort. There were no legislative changes of direction and orders to increase involvement. Policy guidance, budgetary requests and rhetoric from the new administration presented a confusing picture. Campaign rhetoric, and comments made by Attorney General Janet Reno, Lee Brown, Director of ONDCP, and President Clinton's press secretary all pointed to a major shift in policy toward more demand-side focus, which then did not appear. President Clinton reduced the manpower in the office of ONDCP from 146 to 25. Total funding for the international counternarcotics effort for FY 1994 was

reduced by eight percent (\$44 million less than Bush's FY 1993 budget of \$536 million). The Clinton budget only marginally changed the ratio between supply-side and demand-side spending and only modestly boosted spending for treatment (6 percent), and law enforcement (7 percent). In short, the budget contained no fundamental shift in terms of demand-side vis-à-vis supply-side.

There was, however, a 35 percent reduction in the authorization for the Andean Strategy. This seemed to contradict the guidance from President Clinton's PDD-14, which represented a "controlled shift" in the supply-side strategy that pulled assets away from the transit zone and placed more emphasis on the source-country reduction. As an example, AWACS counternarcotics flight hours in the Caribbean Basin fell dramatically from a high in FY 1991 of 5,265 to 1,448 in FY 1996. The FY 1995 budget contained a further reduction of funding for transit zone operations and a 44 percent reduction in OPTEMPO funds for all DOD counternarcotics activities.⁴⁹ President Clinton presided over a gradual reduction in military funding for the counternarcotics effort, and gave conflicting guidance with regard to the Andean Strategy.

A closer look at PDD-14, issued on November 3, 1993, with its stated national goal of demand reduction, included three major points. First, it again identified counternarcotics as a national security issue. Second, it placed greater emphasis on building and strengthening counternarcotics institutions in source and transit countries. Third, it intensified the certification process.⁵⁰

The "controlled shift" of PDD-14 can be seen in new DOD policy guidance from October 1993. Conspicuously missing from this guidance is any reference of support to transit countries and border operations:

1. Support to cocaine source nations.
2. Intel support targeted toward dismantling cartels.
3. Detection and monitoring of transportation of illegal drugs.
4. Support to drug LEAs.
5. Demand reduction.⁵¹

The other two politico-military events worth mentioning both occurred during the 1996 election year, during which there was a perception among political analysts that Clinton suffered from a weak image on drug enforcement. Clinton appointed General (retired) McCaffrey as Director of ONDCP. Part of the bargain for McCaffrey's acceptance included McCaffrey's demand to be installed as a member of the NSC,

a dramatic re-staffing from a personnel level that had dwindled to an all time low, and finally increased freedom to make organizational changes.

McCaffrey subsequently requested a FY 1997 budget that represented a 7.3 percent increase for interdiction, and a 25.4 percent increase for international programs.⁵² The other noteworthy change was the aggressive application of the certification process, spearheaded by Bob Gelbard, head of the State Department's INL. This resulted in Colombia being twice decertified, while Mexico underwent intense scrutiny, but received certification. In 1997 the certification process itself came under fire as lawmakers debated the merits of a policy that applies the standards of certification in different ways, and one that arguably approaches international counterdrug relations from the position of a hegemon doling out punishment.

International Factors

During this third phase Peru was the most important actor in the Andean Region and opened the fourth window of opportunity in the U.S. counternarcotics experience. President Alberto Fujimori, elected in 1990, aggressively set about accomplishing three goals: economic recovery, destruction of the Sendero Luminoso, and solving the cocaine dilemma. Amazingly, he rapidly accomplished the first two items. He resorted to a tactic called **autogolpe** on April 5, 1992. During which all-possible resources were used ostensibly to achieve success against the Sendero Luminoso. While the move was wildly popular in Peru, it was a point of great concern for Latin American scholars studying the quality of democracy in Peru. Whether this retreat from democracy was necessary to accomplish his goals is the subject of considerable debate.

Fujimori rejected the first year of aid (\$35.9 million) offered with the Andean Strategy because he felt that the U.S. plan relied too heavily upon military aid, and not enough on economic aid. In May 1991 the two governments agreed on a compromise agreement that more specifically addressed both points. His actions represent an adroit ability to manage international relations, even while negotiating from a position of relative weakness.

In 1993, Fujimori invoked a decree that gave the Peruvian Air Force an aggressive air interdiction mission. The Air Force would begin to locate, monitor and track suspect aircraft, and once identified as narco-trafficker force them to land or if they refused, to shoot them down.⁵³

Fujimori's bellicose counternarcotics activities and his additional requests for military aid and radars created the fourth window of opportunity. This window of served as the first opportunity for regional, as well as interagency activity. One year after Fujimori gave the Air Force lethal interdiction authority, the government of Colombia signed a similar act.

Military Agency

Shortly after the Colombian and Peruvian legal changes, SOUTHCOM ramped up with Operation Support Justice (discussed later) and sent radars, operators, and advisors to the region. Then, as the system began to produce results, and narcotraffickers were shot out of the sky or forced to the ground, the DOD slammed the window shut. On May 1, 1994 the radars were abruptly turned off without notice to the host nations (HNs), to the U.S. Embassies, or to the U.S. Congress. The HN were confused and frustrated, U.S. Ambassadors were angry, and the U.S. Congress called for hearings. One former Ambassador to the region stated, "Barry McCaffrey (then CINCSOUTH] treated Latin America as if it was Oklahoma." Brian Sheridan, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support, said that he was concerned about possible legal action directed at the DOD. When pressed by the Joint Committee, however, Sheridan's response seemed somewhat more idealistic:

"Well, let me just remind you that it was never the DOD's intention to cease providing information, but we had wanted and hoped, and continue to hope, that those nations will not use our information to shoot down civil aircraft in flight.⁵⁴ "

Joint Inter-agency Concept

With the international politico-military prism in place, this study now turns to the U.S. military counternarcotics activity during this phase. The most significant part of PDD-14 was the improvement that it called for in the counternarcotics institutions and inter-agency process. In a move to streamline organizations, improve interagency communications and coordination and reduce duplication, the Joint Inter- Agency Task Force (JIATF) was created. Three JIATFs were established: JIATF-South in Panama, JIATF-East in Florida, and JIATF-West in California. These JIATFs replaced or combined several different task forces and intelligence centers in each area.

The JIATFs can be thought of as national task forces, combining most pertinent agencies and all military services under one roof. PDD-14 also created the Domestic Air Interdiction Coordination Center (DAICC), which combined inter-agency air coverage to reduce duality and improve coordination.⁵⁵

The U.S military began to regionalize its efforts during this phase, though it had been officially instructed to do so as early as 1988, and again in 1989, and 1990. Operation Support Justice was a precedent setting regionalized undertaking. Under the direction of General Joulwan, the Commander in Chief for SOUTHCOM (USCINCSO), a counter narcotics effort was begun to target the entire Andean region. Ground Based Radars were positioned in Peru, Colombia, and Ecuador, and manned by U.S. and HN personnel. Their mission was to detect track, sort and pass information about suspected narco aircraft from one country to another, or to launch interceptors.⁵⁶ Not only was this a successful interdiction operation, but it also established a framework of inter-regional cooperation between air force officers.

USCINCSO continued his emphasis on regionalization with a series of annual exercises, beginning, at the U.S. Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) in Fort Chaffe, Arkansas (later moved to Fort Polk, Louisiana). The U.S. paid for company-sized units from each of the participating units / countries to travel to the JRTC for two-three weeks and conduct exercises as part of a large cooperative security operation in a low intensity scenario. In April 1992 and again in May 1993 units from Ecuador and Venezuela participated in this groundbreaking experiment.⁵⁷ In 1994, at General McCaffrey's (then USCINCSO) insistence the participation included multi-lateral Andean participation, and the exercise included a peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance component.

Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela took part in the 1994 exercise, which emphasized cooperative security operations against narco-guerrillas located in border regions with civilian population. This rotation is noteworthy because for the first time the task force commander was not an U.S. officer. Forces from the U.S., and the three Andean nations served under a colonel from Ecuador.⁵⁸ This annual event has to date not included Peru. The process of deployment and exercise is greatly enhanced by Special Forces personnel. A SF operations and intelligence (O&I) liaison element is normally sent to the participating units about a month before the exercise. This element helps resolve compatibility and logistical problems. During the exercise, some elements from a Special Forces battalion (six, 12-man detachments), also participate in the exercises at JRTC, most frequently serving as advisors to the visiting units. Additionally, Special Forces personnel assigned to JRTC as cadre members act as exercise observers and controllers.

In 1993, USCINCSO sponsored a counternarcotics conference in Quito, Ecuador.

General officers and important civilian leaders attended this conference. McCaffrey, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1994, said it improved cooperation and succeeded in strengthening relationships between attending countries.⁵⁹

A shift was also seen in annual exercises that take place in Latin America, from bi-lateral to multi-lateral exercises. The SOUTHCOM sponsored "*Fuerzas Unidas*" for example, in 1995 included forces from El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala participating with Special Forces, USN SEAL and Special Boat Units (SBU), USCG, and USAF personnel in a regional counternarcotics operation. SOUTHCOM also hosted a peacekeeping mission, which brought together forces from the Puerto Rico NG, Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. These events were significant because they promoted dialogue between regional countries, which have traditionally been reluctant to discuss cooperative security arrangements.⁶⁰

JIATF-East coordinated multi-national counternarcotics operations in 1995, and hosted an orientation conference for Caribbean nations. 32 nations and territories from the region attended and pledged multi-national support.⁶¹

The USN also began to promote regionalization within the framework of its annual *Unitas* exercise. *Unitas* was a bi-lateral event involving the U.S. and one participating country. The exercise was expanded to include several different countries in the fall of 1994. Navy personnel from Colombia, Ecuador, and the U.S. participated in a series of Humanitarian - Civic Action (HCA) projects along the Ecuador coast and then vessels from all three countries conducted interoperability maneuvers off the coast of Colombia.⁶²

During Phase three the USAF and USN continued their critical role in providing radar platforms, and interdiction support. As these two services consume a sizable portion of the counternarcotics budget in terms of operating costs and maintenance, they were impacted to a greater degree than the U.S. Army by the PDD14 strategy shift away from transit interdiction.

The U.S. Navy added a new dimension to their counternarcotics interdiction support program by using submarines to patrol off the Western coast of South America and in the Caribbean. A spokesman for Submarine Group Two confirmed that subs have been involved in counternarcotics operations, but would not provide details.⁶³

JTF 6 continued its aggressive border operations despite a reduced emphasis from DOD leadership. JTF 6 trained 4,300 LEA personnel and employed 10,295 military in counternarcotics support operations during FY 1995. Military units engaged by JTF 6 conducted over 750 counternarcotics support missions during this same time period that reportedly led to 1,894 arrests.⁶⁴ From 1990-1997 JTF-6 has

controlled a total of 3,275 operations in support of law enforcement agencies along the border.⁶⁵

The National Guard continued the construction missions mentioned in Phase 2, and began building border fencing where directed.⁶⁶ Since 1990, National Guard engineer assets have accomplished the following tasks on the U. S. - Mexico border: built 209 miles of new road, repaired 1,200 miles of road, constructed 46 miles of new fence, and built 34 miles of barriers.⁶⁷

The National Guard continued to increase and enhance their support to local law enforcement agencies across the United States. National Guard support missions have increased dramatically over the last two decades. In 1977 it performed one operation in support of law enforcement, and by 1988 it was supporting approximately 100 counterdrug missions annually. In 1992 the National Guard supported 5,926 such operations and in 1996 that number had increased to 9,695 missions in 53 States and territories, and the District of Colombia.⁶⁸

One highly requested and successful National Guard unit is the Reconnaissance Interdiction Detachment (RAID). These units use OH58A helicopters, thermal imaging, enhanced listening devices, and other night surveillance equipment and cameras to record the street situation and drug crime scenes for police units. RAID units are only allowed to perform missions in support of drug enforcement, as requested by law enforcement agencies, and must keep their helicopters at a non-intrusive height to prevent violating the civil rights of those captured on film. There are now 33 such units across the country.⁶⁹

In addition to Special Operations Forces on the Southwest border region, conventional units began to conduct operations for JTF 6. This was the result of a doctrinal shift, which legitimized Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) as viable missions for conventional units. This doctrinal shift by the DOD created problems in the "soft" application of military force in sensitive operations, many of which had previously been reserved for Special Operations Forces (SOF). Where SOF have years of training in sensitive missions, a higher intellect, higher rank more experience, maturity, and work within units that possess institutional knowledge and provided training and support for such operations, conventional units, with few exceptions, do not. The new doctrine brought forth a mentality that any good soldier could effectively engage in counternarcotics operations.

Simply stated, conventional units do not have the right troops, with right training, with sufficient maturity to work in such delicate situations. If military ground assets are required, SOF should provide them, to the greatest extent possible. This conclusion is at odds with a bill currently under consideration by

Congress, which if passed, would authorize the deployment of up to 10,000 troops to the border region. Civilian LEAs stand to gain much from the military's involvement, but the USG has the responsibility to ensure that it calls upon the correct caliber of soldier.

Headway in the Andean Region

In many ways the counternarcotics operations that occurred in the Andean region in 1995 have been the most significant to date. Four major accomplishments can be pointed to. First, the Andean air bridge that allowed narco-traffickers to transport coca leaf, base and paste to Colombia for refinement was dramatically disrupted. Approximately 50 narco-trafficking aircraft were forced down and seized, shot down, or destroyed on the ground. Second, the bottom fell out of the local coca market as the glut in the market in Peru caused the price of leaf and base to drop by more than 50 percent. Third, the narco-traffickers were forced to change export strategies. The price paid to pilots skyrocketed, which has caused a fivefold increase to the cost of shipment. Usage of the air bridge was severely curtailed, and what flights continued were routed East into Brazil then Northwest into Colombia. More coca began to be transported via river and land. Fourth, nations of the Andean Region, together with the U.S. demonstrated regional commitment. When evaluated together these items represent a significant and widespread accomplishment. However in all areas, except perhaps for regional initiative, moving beyond the short-term may prove elusive. How large a victory, and if it is sustainable, remain unclear.

How did the U.S. military support this disruption of the air bridge? The radar network that Operation Support Justice had installed was expanded and refined. Ground based radars were installed at strategic positions in Peru, Colombia and Ecuador, installed and manned by USAF personnel. Host nation (HN) personnel also provided radar operators, who worked alongside U.S. counterparts. In the air, USAF and USN provided a variety of aerial radar platforms, using aircraft primarily launched from Howard, AFB in Panama (no longer a reality), now Ecuador. At sea, USN and HN navies provided radar coverage that was useful in picking up suspect tracks, which attempted to go west out to sea and then north along the Eastern Pacific Air Corridor (EPAC).

On the ground, members from U.S. Special Forces, Navy SEAL, and USAF formed a Joint Plans and Assistance Team (JPAT). Special Forces provided the majority of JPAT personnel. This mission normally, entailed 10-12 personnel located at the U.S. Military Group or U.S. Embassy, a liaison position at

the HN Military Headquarters, and 2-4 man teams located at key HN air force nodes. The JPATs served as a liaison, providing communication conductivity between HN military Headquarters, radars, units, aircraft, and the Counter Drug Operations Center (CDOC), the U.S. Embassies, and all other concerned U.S. assets. An additional mission of the JPATs was to serve as extra protection for U.S. aircraft, specifically; to prevent another disaster, as happened when the Peruvian military shot a hole in a U.S. C-130 and one airman was killed.

As it became evident that this operation was succeeding, SOUTHCOM decided to conduct a surge operation to further exploit the impact that this was having on narcotraffickers. Operation Green Clover (Sep-Dec 95), provided additional interdiction support and assets to Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, Brazil, Venezuela, and selected transit states. The types of support provided was additional Re-locatable Over The Horizon Radars (ROTHAR), U.S. Customs Service tracking aircraft and crew, additional JPAT personnel, USN SEAL unit and Special Forces trainers, and USAF technical advisors.⁷⁰

Operation Laser Strike, which began on April 15, 1996, was an attempt to maintain pressure on the narcotraffickers that first started to increase when Peru opened a window of opportunity. Regional nations increased this pressure with Operation Support Justice, and once radars were turned back on once again stepped up activities in 1995, then finished the year with Operation Green Clover. Operation Laser Strike is an inter-agency regional effort coordinated by USSOUTHCOM, and has refined the types of support provided by Operation Green Clover.

In conjunction with the U.S. counternarcotics initiatives in 1995 and 1996, the Colombian Army and National Police launched two intensive and wide spread counternarcotics efforts called Operation Condor, and more recently and more aggressive, Operation Conquest. These operations netted a large number of destroyed cocaine labs, disrupted the flow of precursor chemicals, and eradicated approximately 9,000 hectares of coca leaf. Additionally, the Colombian Army has captured documents, which definitively established a long debated link between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the coca trade. These documents show an accounting trail that not only indicates profiteering from protection of the coca trade, but a much deeper leadership and organizational involvement in the production process up to the point of exportation. However, these documents do not bear out charges that the FARC has evolved into the "third cartel."⁷¹

The total weight of regional counternarcotics efforts during this phase has stunned the narcotraffickers and provoked a radical reaction. Indications of this impact are reports of large protests of

suddenly unemployed coca workers; some protests of as many 20,000 have been reported. The FARC has responded violently to eradication and interdiction efforts, launching bloody raids against government forces. As stated earlier, it is difficult to determine if these significant advances can be turned into a long-term counternarcotics victory. Many factors not within the scope of this study are at play, such as HN initiative, alternative development and demand suppression.

Summary

In summary, Phase Three can be characterized as a budding regional initiative. This regional effort was a manifestation of the Andean Strategy, and was coordinated by an infrastructure organized by the DOD. The implementation of this strategy was most strongly shaped by Peru, which opened a window of opportunity during this phase. The window of opportunity was closed by a DOD decision to turn off the radars, but was quickly reopened because of pressure from regional actors and the U.S. Congress. The DOD, during Phase three, exhibited initiative and leadership for the first time in the counternarcotics effort. It built a counternarcotics infrastructure that coordinates DOT) assets, national intelligence assets, LEAs from the local, state, and national levels, pertinent other government agencies (OGAs), and some international assets.

ANALYSIS

This project uses three phases to trace the historical evolution of the U.S. military in the counternarcotics effort from reluctant participant to innovative leadership. During this evolution the U.S. military viewed this new operation through two counternarcotics prisms: the Survival Prism and the Politico-military Prism. The Survival Prism is a cautious optic that fears the loss of hard-won respect, which the military institution enjoys. The Politico-military Prism involves the convergence of international relations, HN counternarcotics policy and U.S. counternarcotics policy.

There have been four counternarcotics "windows of opportunity" created by specific Andean nations. The U.S. government has responded to these windows of opportunity with varying degrees of enthusiasm and has achieved varied results. The U.S. military operated in these windows and evolved their operating procedures, while being simultaneously pushed and constrained by legal directive, and

shaped by the institution's perspective view through two counternarcotics prism.

The first phase of U.S. military activity was characterized by hesitancy and protectionism. Military support lacked direction, it was a piecemeal response; support was doled out on a case-by-case basis rather than as a coordinated part of a coherent military support strategy. The first window of opportunity for an increased U.S. involvement in the counternarcotics effort was opened by Colombia during this phase, but the U.S. did not engage to a significant degree.

The second phase was one that saw the military gradually accept an increased role in counternarcotics. The DOD reluctantly accepted this role, pushed at first by Congressional mandates and then in an ironic twist, compelled by its own pragmatic protectionism. The cost of the DOD's initial hesitancy was an altered landscape of strategy formulation and a temporary loss influence. The U.S. military began an effort during this phase to institutionalize the military-LEA relationship. The second window of opportunity opened by Bolivia, resulted in the U.S. experiment with the use of U.S. conventional infantry troops in an effort that was a tactical success, but a strategic and bi-lateral politico-military blunder. In 1989, events in Colombia created the third window of opportunity for the U.S. to engage more actively in the international counternarcotics effort. The U.S. infused massive amounts of emergency aid into Colombia. The most important activity conducted by the military during this phase was its acceptance of the congressionally mandated role of "lead agency" in coordinating the counternarcotics intelligence gathering and support effort.

Phase three was a regional effort guided by the Andean Strategy, and coordinated by an infrastructure created by the DOD. This infrastructure coordinates DOD assets, national intelligence assets, LEAs from the local, state, and national levels, pertinent OGAs, and some international assets. Peru opened the fourth window of opportunity during this phase. SOUTHCOM coordinated regional counternarcotics efforts beginning with Operation Support Justice, and increased the pressure with Operations Green Clover and Laser Strike. The DOD, for the first time, exhibited institutional initiative in the counternarcotics effort, and exerted some levels of regional as well as inter-agency leadership.

The DOD has brought to the table immense resources, a C4 framework, improved technology, and research and development projects. One of the most vital items that the U.S. military provides however, is a Theater Perspective. The DOD has the institutional knowledge to conduct large campaigns, spread over continents and involving a myriad of components operating on different levels. LEAs on the other hand bring a Case Perspective, to the table.⁷² The combination of these two perspectives has produced

counternarcotics victories at the tactical and operational levels, but has not yet resulted in strategic successes.

It is a mistake to judge the U.S. military contribution to the counternarcotics effort in quantitative terms. The military cannot be held responsible if a counternarcotics mission, which it supported, failed due to actions beyond its control. By the same token, the military cannot claim credit when a mission succeeds, after it provided only marginal support. The reason for this is because the DOD is attempting to provide leadership without command authority. In fact, one of the fundamental problems with the current model is that no institution exercises command. Furthermore, the scales of the U.S. military's counternarcotics efforts are enormous. No other agency in the world could attempt what it has accomplished. The size, diversity, and complexity of the U.S. military's activities do not lend themselves to quantitative analysis.

Qualitative measures of effectiveness initially seem to offer the best opportunity to assess the military's performance, but this can also be problematic. Systemic improvements to command, communications, and computer networks are clearly evident, but history offers us many examples of technologically and numerically superior forces who suffer defeat at the hands of less well equipped and smaller units. The use of customer surveys is undoubtedly a useful tool, but data can be easily skewed by question phraseology, the timings of questionnaires, and location of administration.

The obvious solution would be to employ some mix of quantitative and, qualitative methods of effectiveness (MOEs), but arriving at the correct mix stirs a large debate worthy of its own research project. Having stated this, qualitative analysis offers the best snapshot of U.S. military performance. At some point, however, perhaps at the strategic level, the support given by the DOD must be evaluated in terms of the overall performance of the national counternarcotics effort - despite the fact that the DOD is not the commanding agency, nor involved in direct action.

The U.S. military is more than just a component of the U.S. counternarcotics effort - it has become the framework for an international interdiction regime in its infancy. This framework provides conductivity, compatibility, cooperation and initiative. Regionalization of the counternarcotics effort is at the same stage that the U.S. counterdrug national strategy was at ten years ago - there are no institutionalized regional counternarcotics organizations that are internationally managed, there is questionable commitment, and hesitancy.

The next phase in the DOD's evolution points toward Mexico and Colombia. Mexico has become increasingly cooperative since the NAFTA negotiating process began. Military to military relations have been

established to combat the flow of illicit drugs. DOD equipment and helicopters were delivered for this purpose. 7th Special Forces Group trained an entire cadre of counternarcotics soldiers at Fort Bragg, NC. If Mexico continues on this path, they could very well open the next window for international involvement in the counternarcotics effort. Efforts in Colombia continue to be haunted by the controversial "Plan Colombia". Which many fear will be the next failure of our counternarcotics efforts and Foreign Policy.

The institutionalization of civil-military cooperation in the counternarcotics arena has created an observation and analysis quandary. As inter-agency cooperation becomes more seamless, it necessarily becomes more difficult to separate the military effort from the LEA effort. As systems are enmeshed so are the agencies into new institutions that exhibit a great deal of teamwork and increasing unity of effort. A counternarcotics camaraderie has developed among a committed, but diverse group of agencies. One potential ramification of the international counternarcotics effort is that a new breed of civil-military institutions may be here to stay.

CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this project has been to study the military's evolution in stemming the flow of illicit narcotics from Latin America, and to examine the current model for DOD participation in order to determine if it is an appropriate model to accomplish national counternarcotics strategy for supply suppression. The hypothesis which I have attempted to prove is that the current organizational model for DOD involvement in the counternarcotics effort is fundamentally flawed, because it has allowed short-term tactical and operational successes, but has not permitted long-term strategic success in supply suppression.

Such a hypothesis naturally invites comment on its underlying assumptions, counter arguments, and potential implications. One could argue, for example, that a national effort against drugs is doomed to failure, either because such an effort is morally illegitimate, it ignores some of the central laws of economics, or because it is a facade to maintain U.S. hegemony in Latin America. Continuing this line of reasoning, you might argue that since the U.S. effort against drugs will not succeed, it is therefore, illogical to maintain a position that structural adjustments to the current model will positively affect the final outcome.

However, it is not the intent of this project to engage in such a discussion. Arguments over the morality and plausibility of U.S. policy have held center stage during the last two decades of drug strategy debate. The

result has been ambiguous, self-perpetuating, and has created a sub-industry of drug advisement, which has spent hundreds of thousands of dollars analyzing the subject matter, always including the latest quantitative or qualitative data and a fresh round of analysis.

This study moves from a position that a legitimate national counterdrug strategy has been, for better or worse, determined through legislative action and presidential action. DOD engagement in national policy is examined with the assumption that among possible outcomes are strategic success, strategic failure, and a protracted struggle with no clear winners.

DOD Metamorphosis

The counterdrug institutional environment in which the DOD and scores of other USO agencies, bureaus, and departments operate, is a very difficult and rigid. It is an environment that was constructed to wage Cold War under the unifying banner of containment. The institutions of the Cold War have proved sorely inadequate to simultaneously handle today's numerous intermestic issues, and the increased international and increased synchronization that they require.

This study has traced the DOD's evolution in the counterdrug effort while it operated in an inadequate institutional environment. Through a series of legislative mandates and presidential directives, the DOD underwent a transformation from reluctant participant to an active leader, providing significant regional initiative.

DOD's early hesitancy created political space for a multitude of other actors and led to a mutation in the process of national counterdrug policy formulation. As a consequence, future attempts by the DOD to exert initiative and leadership occurred in an arena crowded with actors, each with its own operational niche and sphere of political influence. This dynamic has profoundly slowed the policy approval process and narrowed the field of acceptable courses of action.

What the DOD has achieved in terms of organizing into regional networks, a diverse group of surveillance platforms, intelligence gathering assets, and command and control nodes that operate domestically and internationally across the operational spectrum, has been quite impressive. There exists no other military on the globe with the wherewithal to project surveillance tentacles into two oceans and across a region to produce pertinent, timely, and actionable intelligence; to then organize and deploy communications and advisement nodes to allied nations so that they can act on this real-time information; and finally, to create joint inter-agency task forces capable of coordinating these assets. This has given a budding international

counternarcotics regime an invaluable tool in its effort against narcotraffickers — one which is far from perfect, and lacks the proper elements for international synchronization, but one which has been remarkably effective, sustainable, and reliable.

The DOD, more than any other single organization has launched the process of counterdrug regional action. Though this appears to have come less from a genuine desire to achieve regional parity, than an institutional drive to exert theater control over other USG agencies; the DOD has nonetheless, initiated and nurtured a process which has engaged other nations in a unified effort. That these other nations have been invited to participate on a limited basis, without true equality or managerial participation, and that this process has yet to deliver strategic success are issues that are lamentable, but they should not be allowed to obscure the remarkable accomplishments to this point, nor the potential that they offer.

Flawed Counterdrug Model

This study has demonstrated that the current model for DOD involvement in the national counterdrug effort for supply suppression is fundamentally flawed. The historical study described a number of tactical successes, but failed to find evidence of sustainable strategic success.

Even though the DOD is one of the largest actors in the national counterdrug effort, it cannot be held solely accountable for strategic shortcomings, because it has neither designed the strategy, nor commanded its execution. Rather, as the case study chapter pointed out, it is the structural design of the model that has prevented long-term success. There have been many adjustments to this model, but these changes have largely been instituted to overcome legal constraints, interagency turf battles, and resource shortcomings, instead of resolving fundamental flaws at the strategic and operational levels. Therefore, the majority of adjustments, with the notable exception of the JIATF concept, have occurred at the lowest levels. This has led to a fairly widespread incidence of tactical proficiency, which has been combined with operational and strategic confusion, created as various USG agencies have attempted to execute their portion of a national strategy, which suffers from an absence of command.

A close review of Operation Green Clover highlighted a central contradiction in the model for DOD involvement in the counterdrug struggle. The DOD has been simultaneously tasked with the roles of leadership and support. It has been expected to organize and lead land and sea surveillance and interdiction, but has also been tasked to remain a supporting agency to LEAs. This has put the DOD in a position of exercising

leadership without command authority. Two schools of thought have emerged among military leadership, as some military leaders have chosen to emphasize the supporting role, while others have emphasized the leadership role. In its efforts to maintain a theater perspective, and to regionalize the counterdrug operations, SOUTHCOM came to the realization that it must exert greater leadership than it had clearly been authorized. Its activism however, created resentment among other USO agencies convinced that the DOD had overstepped its bounds. This prevented the international and interagency synchronization needed for strategic success.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Although the current model for DOD involvement in the counternarcotics effort is flawed, that does not indicate that it has failed, only that it has failed to produce strategic success because of its flaws. Replacement of the current model, which would include radical change to domestic and international institutions, and installation of a new framework of institutions built for intermestic imperatives and prepared for unfettered global cooperation, could in theory, provide the desired strategic success. Such radical change is unlikely because of domestic and international political considerations, and problems with international adjudication. The recommendations put forth by this study, therefore, stake out a middle ground, offering modest, but vital structural adjustments to the current model. These adjustments are designed to fit into the realm of the politically possible, rather than to orbit in conjectural fantasy.

Strategic Adjustments

Above all, a command structure is needed to propel the current model toward strategic success. The command needs to have sufficient directive and adjudication powers over other concerned institutions. There are, obviously, numerous ways to accomplish this. The ONDCP could be transformed into a joint inter-agency counterdrug command, and its leadership could rotate among, or be chosen from the key agencies. Another possibility would be to select one of the key agencies (DOD, DOS, or DEA) and give them similar powers, with the additional directive to create a joint inter-agency counterdrug staff made up of all key agencies, bureaus, and departments. A third viable possibility would be to select a command headquarters that is already in existence and empower it to direct the national effort; again, tasking it to create a joint inter-agency staff, if none

currently exists. One such command, and a logical choice, is the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM).

Another possibility would be to create a hybrid of these options, for example, giving the ONDCP joint inter-agency command, and consolidating DOD counterdrug authority under USSOCOM. The advantage of using USSOCOM in this role is that it has few command responsibilities when compared to the other unified commands; it contains a high level of institutional subject matter knowledge, and a global perspective rather than a regional one.

Creating such a command would not only provide adjudication, and streamline command and control, but would also bring international synchronization. The current model has often seen the regional CINCs and the DOS battling over theater cooperation, which has left little time or resources for strategy coordination between theaters. Indeed, the theater concept is a product of the World Wars and is not a necessary, nor desired concept in the counternarcotics operations. A command that could address counternarcotics with a global, rather than the traditional turf conscious theater perspective, would deliver more international respect, increase the likelihood of success, and could serve as an example for other intermestic institutions. Perhaps such a concept could then be expanded into a national intermestic institution, which commands pertinent agencies and military force packages until success is achieved. In this way, by modestly changing the lines of command and control for temporary periods, under a permanent headquarters or institution, the national strategy would be more effectively implemented, unity of effort would be achieved, the field of potential courses of action would increase, and the way in which solutions to intermestic issues are conceptualized would be significantly altered. An independent command functionally geared to carry out delicate and selective counterdrug operations with global synchronization, would necessarily be designed for the business of exporting coordination and influence, rather than for the exportation of violence. The concept behind many military commands is the conquest of terrain, space, or technology, while the concept needed for strategic success in the counternarcotics arena for supply suppression is sustained aggressive regional activities, which are synchronized internationally, combined with the ability to react and adjust resources rapidly as narco-traffickers change strategies. To facilitate this process, any command created should employ coordination/influence nodes, which can be dispatched to pertinent states, and agencies to achieve rapid consensus on possible responses.

Operational Adjustments

Institutional modification at the highest echelon is not enough to ensure strategic success; adjustments should also be made at the operational levels. Today's institutions often lack the flexibility and authority needed to effect mid-level coordination, research, and synchronized operations with other institutions. This is due in part to a lack of institutional imagination, in part to institutional protectionism, and in part to bureaucratic machinations, which do not recognize outside solutions with legitimacy. To overcome these roadblocks, and to encourage the level of institutional cross-pollination required to effectively develop and execute national counterdrug policy, "institutional corridors" should be created between pertinent agencies, bureaus, and departments.

At each level where these institutional corridors intersect, coordination, communications, and policy planning nodes should be created. However, these nodes, or "institutional halfway houses" should not be created from scratch -- should not be staffed with new personnel. Rather, the elements currently residing within the pertinent agencies, departments, and bureaus that now conduct these operations should be moved lock, stock and barrel to a new venue. For example, the entire office of the DOD's Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support should be moved to an institutional halfway house. Each relevant institution would, likewise, pack-up its narcotics affairs and policy offices and send them to the halfway house. Counternarcotics offices would cease to exist in separate institutions, but these organizations would still maintain a level of policy influence since they would staff a portion of the halfway houses. This would force institutional interaction and reduce the burdensome compulsion to create policy based on institutional protectionism. Separate halfway houses for policy development, operations, and research could be established. Using institutional halfway houses is a compromise solution, but one, which could, if genuinely executed, provide the USG with the tools, needed to effectively develop and carry out national counternarcotics policy.

Intelligence centers should be consolidated, but complete consolidation is most likely not politically feasible. Therefore, an intelligence halfway house should be created to consolidate actionable intelligence, and should serve as the sole information point for customers of counternarcotics intelligence. An alternative to this suggestion would be to transform the DEA into the intelligence halfway house.

In order to increase the legitimacy and effectiveness of the regional counternarcotics approach, relevant HN military and LEA representation should be genuinely incorporated into the task force process. The

JIATF should be changed to add HN participation - to a Joint Combined Interagency Task Force (JCIATF), or perhaps a multinational, multi-agency task force (MNMATF). Currently JIATF-South includes HN participation, but only for liaison purposes. Any new organization or task force should include HN personnel in the decision-making and managerial process. Those opposed to such a change cite security concerns. These concerns could be addressed by a different / separate security management system. We can adjust security classifications, using security flags or filters by a more aggressive release policy. Additionally, all pertinent USG agencies, departments, and bureaus should be represented and participate in the various task forces.

Tactical Adjustments

Numerous adjustments have been made over the past two decades to the Tactical level of the counterdrug effort, so recommendations offered here are less structural in nature and more an attempt to refine successful procedures.

The CPG, TAT, JPAT, and JOITAT missions should be institutionalized as a standard package to those countries receiving USG counterdrug assistance. Since USSOCOM almost exclusively provides the personnel for these missions, it should be tasked with planning and implementing this transition. One recommendation that was repeatedly mentioned in operational after action reports were that personnel sent on these missions were sent for too short a period of time. The recurring complaint centered on the importance of establishing rapport and maintaining continuity with HN personnel and embassy staff. Therefore, serious consideration should be given to the permanent stationing of suitable USSOCOM personnel to fill these positions.

In order to avoid duplication of effort and to avoid fratricide, this package should be integrated with the NAS, DEA, and CIA counterdrug planning, operations, and intelligence assets at each embassy.

Counterdrug/development teams should be employed when feasible. Rather than sending just a military element into frontier areas to advise HN military or LEAs, consideration should be given to such attachments as USAID officers, in order to nominate potential alternative development projects and/or eradication targets.

At JTF6 on the Southwest border region, USSOCOM rotates a battalion at a time to conduct operations for a short period in support of the INS' Border Patrol, and other LEAs. A more effective, but less economical course of action would be to permanently post a battalion at JTF6. This would improve

continuity, institutional knowledge, area familiarization, and individual expertise. Since the operational tempos of each of the special forces groups is remarkably high, permanently pulling one battalion from a Group would have a devastating impact on its operational capabilities. Therefore, one SF group should receive authorization for an additional battalion, and once this unit is formed and trained, it should be posted to JTF6. The logical choice for this Group would be the 7th Special Forces Group, because of its Spanish language capabilities, and its long history of and institutional knowledge in counternarcotics operations.

As discussed before, conventional infantry units from the USMC and U.S. Army should not be employed to support JTF6. They have been trained for a vital mission, which is decidedly more aggressive in nature than what is required when operating on the U.S. - Mexican border. The U.S. Special Operations Command can deliver a soldier that has a higher rank, higher IQ, is older, more mature, more highly trained, and who has practical experience in sensitive operational environments. To enhance personnel capabilities, improve institutional knowledge and increase interoperability, a counterdrug course should be created within the Department of Defense. The student body, however, should not be limited to military personnel, and in fact attendance should be encouraged, if not required, from all pertinent U.S. government agencies departments. Invitation for attendance should also be extended to nations cooperating in the counternarcotics effort. The curriculum of this course should as a minimum describe the international-interagency process, present the national international strategies, tactics, and operating systems. The course should also offer utilitarian information such as lessons learned, points of contact, information resources.

The logical agency to build such a course would be the U.S. Special Operations Command, which conducts numerous courses on related fields in the U. S. and abroad, and has the institutionally knowledge, experience, and resources to quickly and effectively launch such a project. The development and instruction of this course should be shared among U.S. government institutions; in addition, international input should also be sought. Instructors and administration personnel from key states should be invited to participate. The venue of the new course could be in the U.S. or in one of the concerned nations. The final recommendation is to create and distribute a counterdrug newsletter. The purpose of this periodical would be emphasize interagency-international unity of effort down to the lowest level of each bureau, agency, and department. Additionally, copies should be translated and sent to pertinent institutions in cooperating nations. The types of information could include operational lessons learned, institutional initiatives, success

stones, recent trends, statistical data, and declassified intelligence data. A handful of institutions have the capability to resource, produce and distribute this type of a product, but the DEA would seem to be the most logical choice. The DEA has a great deal of experience producing utilitarian counterdrug literature, and is extremely responsive to information requests. Another possibility would be to assign the newsletter to the counterdrug course faculty members, although this may overburden and distract instructors, and could inhibit a well-rounded approach, and a broader perspective.

CLOSING THOUGHT

The suggestions offered above are neither radical nor comprehensive. They present the policy maker with selected options, which are politically feasible and operationally plausible. If effectively implemented, they could improve the current model's international legitimacy, operational effectiveness, and above all, may lead to the long-term strategic success, which has remained so elusive for the past two decades.

In today's increasingly complex web of international relations, with its plethora of new security concerns, a more effective method of defining problems, conceptualizing, organizing and resourcing solutions, and executing responses is required. An additional benefit of the alterations advocated by this study is that they could serve as a model, or building block, for the interagency-international cooperation and synchronization needed to successfully plan and carryout solutions to other transnational issues in a rapidly changing and complicated post-Cold War era.

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ENDNOTES

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³ U.S. Congress, Special Report. 102-752, p.44.

⁴ Maria Celia Toro, Mexico's "War" on Drugs (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), pp 16-18.

⁵ Bruce M. Bagley and Juan G. Tokatlian, "Dope and Dogma: Explaining the failure of U.S. Latin American Drug Policies" in The United States and Latin America in the 1990s: Beyond the Cold War, eds. Hartlyn, Schoultz and Varas

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⁷ John T. McNamara, The Effect of U.S. Counter-Drug efforts on the Ecuadorian-Colombia Bilateral Relationship (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1995), p. 34.

⁸ Marylin McAfee, former Ambassador to Guatemala, and former Deputy Chief of Mission in Bolivia (1989-91), Interview, Georgetown University, November 20, 1996.

⁹ McNamara, p. 35.

¹⁰ Elliot Abrams, former assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Lecture given at Georgetown University, 25 Sep 1996.

¹¹ Term "Jedi Knights" was used to refer to U.S. military officers who are selected to attend the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, a one year long graduate level program that grooms planners for the Corp Commander. Normally, this is a group of 50 selected annually from a pool of officers who are attending the Command & General Staff College (CGSC). The "Jedi Knights" were credited with war gamming much of the Persian Gulf strategy.

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¹⁴ Bagley and Tokatlian, pp. 224, 229; and Bruce Bagley, "The Bush Administration's Drug Strategy in Historical Perspective," in Drug Trafficking in the Americas, eds. Bruce M. Bagley and William O. Walker III (Miami: University of Miami North-South Center Press, 19%), pp. 2-3.

¹⁵ Bagley and Tokatlian, p. 224-230.

¹⁶ Wade, p. 16.

¹⁷ Bill Dickinson, U.S. Congressman. "Anti-Drug Package Uses Dickinson Amendment," Dickinson Reports to the People, August, 1988, p. 1; and "House Votes to Enlist Military in War Against Drug Flow," Washington Post, May 6, 1988, p.4' as cited in Wade, pp. 10-11.

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²⁰ Roy R. Trumble, USSOCOM Support for Counter Narcotics (U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks. PA, 1991) pp 4-5

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²³ Ibid

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²⁵ Gramm, Phil, Senator. Lecture, Montgomery, AL, November 2, 1988. AWC Distinguished Lecture Series, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

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²⁷ Wade, p. 17

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³⁰ Colombia Country Study, pp. xxvii, 209

³¹ U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, 101st Cong., H. R. 101-673, pp.74-79

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³⁶ Documents provided by archives, 8th Special Forces Group and See Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillas & Revolution in Latin America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 78

³⁷ 7th Special Forces Group After Action Reports (AARs 7th SFG) and see James Painter, Bolivia & Coca: A Study in Dependency (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1994), pp. 96-102.

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³⁹ Ibid. and AARs 7th SFG.

⁴⁰ Ibid. and WOLA, p. 83.

⁴¹ WOLA, p. 67

⁴² U.S. Congress, Special Report. 102-752, pp.42-43.

⁴³ See U.S. Congress, Special Report. 102-752.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ U.S. Congress, Special Report. 102-752, pp. 56-57. These percentages were compiled before the March 1992 hearings.

⁴⁷ See U.S. Congress, S. Report. 102-752

⁴⁸ U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, 101st Cong., H. R. 101-673, p. 60

⁴⁹ Bruce Bagley, "After San Antonio" in Drug Trafficking in the Americas, eds. Bruce M. Bagley and William O. Walker III (Miami: University of Miami North-South Center Press, 1996), pp. 70-73; and U.S. Congress, H. Committee on Armed Services Oversight and Investigation Subcommittee, Hearing on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, H. R. 4301, 14 April 1994.

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⁵² William G. Bozin in testimony before the U.S. Congress, S. Caucus on International Narcotics Control and H. Committee on Transportation, 12 September 1996.

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⁶⁵ Sources: DOD and INS as cited by Ruth Larson, "Military Ponders its role in securing U.S-Mexico line," The Washington Times, 1 September 1997.

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