

**Cultural Awareness and Cross Cultural Communication:  
Combat Multipliers for Leaders In The Next Millennium**

**MONOGRAPH**

**BY**

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
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
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## ABSTRACT

Cultural Awareness and Cross Cultural Communication: Combat Multipliers for Leaders in the Next Millennium by LTC George A. Latham, 54 pages.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 ended the Cold War. This resulted in a change of the United States National Security Strategy from containment of communist aggression to engagement worldwide to protect national interests. "Global Meliorism," the aim to spread democracy endorses a strategy of engagement. Globalization, the process of accelerated economic, technological, cultural and political integration continues to bring citizens of all continents closer together.

The result of the United States National Security Strategy, is the United States military involved worldwide implementing portions of the engagement strategy. Peacekeeping operations, humanitarian assistance and at times combat operations are conducted. A commonality in all these operations is United States officers and soldiers coordinating and interacting with host nation populaces, government and civil leaders, members of non-governmental agencies, soldiers of foreign armies (allied/coalition/host nation/militias) to accomplish an assigned mission.

The monograph addresses the question are cross-cultural communication and cultural awareness necessary skills for United States Army officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers to successfully accomplish missions on future battlefields? Captain John J. Pershing and the United States Army during the Moro Campaign in the Philippines 1899-1903 and "Operation Uphold Democracy" in Haiti, 1994, are analyzed as pre and post war case studies. The use of cultural awareness and cross cultural communication positively and negatively by military forces, to accomplish the objectives of the operation are researched and presented.

The monograph concludes that cross-cultural communication skills and cultural awareness were necessary in past military operations to enhance success. These skills will continue to be essential for military forces to employ in future operations to ensure successful mission accomplishment. The United States Institute for Peace, Special Report, 1999 outlining U.S. Army General Officers Agreement with the monograph conclusion is presented. The general officers recommendation for success in future military operations is outlined.

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## INTRODUCTION

### CHAPTER 1

“Nearly 55 years ago, in his final inaugural address, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt reflected on the lessons of the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century. “We have learned,” he said, “that we cannot live alone at peace. We have learned that our own well being is dependent on the well being of other nations far away. We have learned to be citizens of the world, members of the human community.”<sup>1</sup>

With victory of the allied coalition in World War II, resulting in the development of the opposition of ideologies between the western world and the Soviet Bloc countries and its Communist surrogates, the Cold War began. From 1946 to 1989, the United States engaged in a security strategy of containment of communist aggression. This is evidenced in the defeat of the North Korean invasion against South Korea, establishing the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel demilitarized zone. The United States attempt to push North Vietnam back to its original border, during the Vietnam War. Containing Cuba via military means and an economic embargo, supporting the El Salvadorian government against a Communist insurgency by the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) and endorsing the Contra insurgency in Nicaragua against the Communist, Sandinista Government. Additionally, throughout the Cold War the United States endorsed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and countered the Soviet Bloc. Generally, the United States imparted a consistent policy with a focused strategy of containment against a specific enemy.

The Cold War ended in 1989 with the fall of the Soviet Bloc, resulting in a new world order and the potential for the United States to develop a new National Security Strategy. However, the Gulf War of 1990 to 1991 overshadowed the United States government adjusting to the new world environment as the policy of containment continued until the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was solved.

Walter A. McDougall in Promised Land, Crusader State, (The American Encounter with the World Since 1776) states that during the early 1990's:

Many bright people offered insights into how the world had changed and how U.S. policy ought to adjust. The trouble was they all disagreed. Francis Fukuyama wrote of the final triumph of liberal market democracy over the ideologies that had plagued the world since the French Revolution. In a philosophical sense, he said, we had reached "the end of history." No, said Henry Kissinger, not only would geopolitics continue to shape the international system, but the diffusion of economic and military power meant that the post Cold War world was reverting to multipolarity. Hence the United States must learn to play the role of primus inter pares in a balance of power system. No, said Samuel Huntington, neither the triumph of liberal democracy nor a classical balance of power would define the new era, but rather deepening cleavages between cultural zones – Muslim, Confucian, Hindu, Western – thus raising the risk of a "clash of civilizations." No, said Edward Luttwak, geoeconomics would shape the global competition of the twenty-first century, so the United States better get rid of its trade deficits, boost savings and research, and restore productivity. No, said Paul Kennedy, Jessica Tuchman Mathews and Robert D. Kaplan, the greatest challenges of the coming century would include proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and demographic and environmental disasters resulting in widespread famines, mass migrations and local genocides.<sup>2</sup>

Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, 1991-1993, the last military operation under the Bush Administration and the first under the Clinton Administration, codifies the previous quotation. Operation Restore Hope, Somalia, began as a humanitarian assistance mission, developed into peacekeeping and ended in combat operations. The author presents the previous paragraph to convey to the

reader that in fact all theories presented can be argued as sound as the last decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, political, military and economic policies/operations demonstrated we have no specific enemy or mission. The threat can be anywhere in the world, asymmetrically applying capabilities, resulting in the United States military responding to varied and numerous missions.

During the early 1990s, the present national security strategy under the Clinton Administration developed in response to the national strategy. Over the past eight years the refinement of a militant "Global Meliorism, the aim to make the whole world democratic; simply the socio-economic and political-cultural expression of an American mission to make the world a better place. It is based on the assumption that the United States can, should and must reach out to help other nations share in the American dream. The model verbs "can, should and must" in tern imply the assumption that the American model is universally valid, that morality enjoins the United States to help others emulate it, and that the success of the American experiment itself ultimately depends on other nations escaping from death and oppression."<sup>3</sup>

The National Security Strategy for a New Century, December 1999, published on January 5, 2000 embraces "Global Meliorism," ensuring the United States military remains engaged overseas. Additionally, globalization, "the process of accelerated economic, technological, cultural and political integration is bringing citizens from all continents closer together, allowing them to share ideas, goods and information in an instant. However, it also brings risks. Outlaw states and ethnic conflicts threaten regional stability and progress in many

important areas of the world. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD), terrorism, drug trafficking and other international crime are global concerns that transcend borders. Other problems originating overseas – such as resource depletion, rapid population growth, environmental damage, new infectious diseases, pervasive corruption, and uncontrolled refugee migration, have increasingly important implications for American security.”<sup>4</sup> Thus, the United States National Security Strategy is predicated on engagement, resulting in the continued and future employment worldwide in varied situations of the United States military.

As outlined in the National Security Strategy of December 1999:

Our strategy is founded on continued U.S. engagement and leadership abroad. The United States must lead abroad if we are to be secure at home. We cannot lead abroad unless we devote the necessary resources to military, diplomatic, intelligence and other efforts. We must be prepared and willing to use all appropriate instruments of national power to influence the actions of other states and non-state actors, to provide global leadership, and to remain a reliable security partner for the community of nations that share our interests. The international community is at times reluctant to act without American leadership. In some instances, the United States is the only nation capable of providing the necessary leadership and capabilities for an international response to share challenges. By exerting our leadership abroad we have deterred aggression, fostered the resolution of conflicts, enhanced regional cooperation, strengthened democracies, stopped human rights abuses, opened foreign markets and tackled global problems such as preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, protected the environment, and combated international corruption.<sup>5</sup>

As the United States enters the new millennium, President Roosevelt’s lessons of the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century apply now and are embraced in the present National Security Strategy. The 1999 strategy and the theory of globalization ensures continued military involvement in operations ranging from humanitarian assistance, peace keeping, peace enforcement and combat

operations. In all these operations United States military officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers coordinate and interact with host nation populaces, government and civil leaders, members of non-governmental agencies, soldiers of foreign armies (allied/coalition/host nation/militias/enemy) in order to accomplish the assigned mission. Soldiers and leader preparation to successfully operate or enhance mission success on future battlefields may entail interpersonal skills and characteristics that were not needed by military forces, during the Cold War; as the scenario was mainly decisive combat with limited civilian contact. This monograph answers the question: Are cross-cultural communication and cultural awareness, necessary skills for United States Army military officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers to successfully accomplish missions on future battlefields?

The words of the monograph research question (cross cultural communication, cultural awareness, cultural sensitivity) are addressed in doctrinal manuals and publications, and used by senior leaders, however, an explicit definition of the word groups were not found by the author in military documents. However, as defined in the Webster Dictionary:

- Communication is an act or instance of transmitting a verbal or written message/a process by which information is exchanged between individuals through a common system of symbols, signs or behavior/personnel rapport.
- Culture is customary beliefs, social reforms and material traits of a racial, religious or social groups.
- Cross culture is the dealing with or offering comparison between two or more different cultures.<sup>6</sup>

Thus, a person who transmits a verbal or written message, to a person of another culture by exchanging words, signs, symbols or behavior is conducting the act of cross cultural communication. The art of successful cross-cultural communication, is ensuring the message is accurately conveyed and understood.

Awareness is to be aware, cognizant, conscious, sensible, alive, awake meaning knowledge of something. It implies vigilance in observing or alertness in drawing inferences from what one experiences. Sensitivity is awareness of the needs and emotions of others.<sup>7</sup>

The distinction between cultural awareness and cultural sensitivity is critical as these terms are at times used in the field as being synonymous, and they are not. Distinction between terms is essential, as a soldier may enhance mission success by being culturally aware and not necessarily culturally sensitive. When working with a host nation populace, the ability of a soldier to draw inferences from experiences of actions or study are critical to enhance the success of the overall operation, in support of the national strategy. Cultural sensitivity is but another subset or part of being cultural aware.

Cross culturally, there is difficulty in interpreting the success of performance. The monograph author's research concludes, that to be effective in cross cultural communication, one must have understanding of rudimentary concepts of interpersonal communication and some aspects of culture.<sup>8</sup>

It is not the authors intent to imply in the monograph that traditional warfighting skills are becoming less significant, in fact the opposite is the case. The asymmetric battlefield with the numerous threats, enemies and the changing

world have produced a scenario where the soldier must be an expert warfighter. However, potentially the ability to employ other interpersonal skills may be needed to enhance tactical, operational and strategic success. The monograph will answer this thought.

As noted in the United States Institute of Peace Special Report:

Ironically, the most important skill needed in peace operations remains warfighting. According to former NATO Commander General George Joulman, I'd look for the best warfighter in the world. I'd look for the best guy that can fight. You ought not to think that you can develop somebody that got this political military experience that can't go quickly to the next step. I want a warrior. I'll train him to the mission.<sup>9</sup>

The monograph outlines two historical examples where United States Army soldiers use of cultural awareness and cross cultural communication skills were of value or not. The pre Cold War example of Captain John J. Pershing in the Moro campaign on the Philippines Islands from 1899 to 1903 will be presented. The post Cold War example of Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti in 1994 will be the second operation studied. A conclusion that analysis's the success or failure of the two operations in relation to answering the monograph question will end the study. An answer to the monograph question is addressed, along with recommendations.

The monograph supports the pretense, that success in future military operations is enhanced by the study and knowledge of the enemies or host nations culture. Additionally, the ability to communicate cross culturally is a combat multiplier for leaders in the next millennium.

## CHAPTER 2

### THE U.S. ARMY AND GENERAL JOHN J. PERSHING

#### THE MORO CAMPAIGN IN THE PHILIPPINES

Is cultural awareness valuable for military forces?

You need to culturally orient your forces so you don't end up being your own worst enemy simply out of cultural ignorance. Many times Russian soldiers made serious cultural errors in dealing with the Chechen civilians, once insulted or mistreated, they (the Chechens) became active fighters or (at least) supported the active fighters. Russians admit they underestimated the affect of religion on the conflict.<sup>10</sup>

Russian Army Lessons Learned from the Battle of Grozny  
Office of the Secretary of Defense, C3I,  
LTC Dave Shelton, USMC, 1999

Was cultural awareness valuable for military forces in the past?

He (Pershing) is today the one great American to the Moro minds. They regard him as a supernatural being and the great mass of Malanoas are now his fast friends. He always treats them justly and fairly, never makes a promise which he cannot fulfill and at the same time he has shown them that he can punish wrong doers swiftly and well. I know that his success is not the result of chance. It's due to his own personality and nearly four years of study and labor on the Moro question.<sup>11</sup>

George T. Bowman  
Pershing's Adjutant reported to the Secretary of War, 1903

Ninety-six years apart and in two different parts of the world with two different cultures, military operations in Checneya and the Philippines were influenced by soldiers and leaders use of cross cultural communication and cultural awareness.

This chapter presents a historical military example from over ninety-six years ago, where cross cultural communication and cultural awareness

enhanced the success of an operation, involving peace enforcement, peace keeping and pacification.

The victory of the United States against the Spanish during the Spanish American War of 1898 to 1899 resulted in Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippine Islands becoming possessions of the United States. With no other feasible option available, the federal government directed the War Department to administer the operations and governing of these territories. This directive resulted in the United States Army, supported by the Navy conducting "peace building, peace enforcement, and humanitarian operations"<sup>12</sup> similar to present day operations. Commonalties between past and present duties of the United States Army in the Philippines are the separation of warring factions, disarming of host nation populaces, assisting in nation building, (including civil projects and the operation of government), and humanitarian assistance. Additionally, the ability of the armed forces to mobilize, deploy and execute the mission, regardless of training or job description are the key factors that influenced the United States political leaders in the past and the present to use the military to conduct these operations.

The example of Captain John J. Pershing in command of United States Army Forces against the Moro tribes on the Southern Philippine Islands of Mindanao and area, throughout the years of 1899 to 1903 are presented to assist in answering the research question.

John J. Pershing was born on or about January 13, 1860 near Laclede, Missouri where he was raised, educated and experienced events of youth that

shaped his personality, morals and ethics. His background and work ethic were influenced by an honest, hardworking and family oriented father. Pershing's father progressed from railroad foreman to store owner, to civil official. He operated the post office and worked in the local government. He also was a landowner of two 160 acre farms, considered one of the wealthiest men in the area of Laclede. His positive example of service to the community was evident in his influence in the building of the town church, leader in the local militia and success in negotiating with the state government to make Laclede a township. The Methodist religion also influenced John Pershing as both parents were active in the church community and emphasized it at home.<sup>13</sup>

During the Panic of 1873, Pershing's father reverted to a travelling salesman in order to financially survive, thus John became responsible to operate the farm. These experiences formed the foundation of the man as John J. Pershing noted when he said "It was the best thing that ever happened to me. Gave me greater confidence and a keener sense of responsibility than anything else could have done."<sup>14</sup> Additionally, during his youth John worked on the railroad, taught at a local African-American school, worked as a janitor and taught at a school at Prairie Mound, Missouri to assist his family financially and earn college tuition. Ultimately after studying at Kirksville, Missouri, John Pershing received an appointment to the United States Military Academy at West Point in 1881.

John J. Pershing's background is significant for he lived a disciplined, hard working life, influenced by a strong, civil minded family. He bore responsibility

early and was exposed to experiences in life that allowed him to respect work, hardship and mankind.

From 1882 to 1886 John Pershing attended West Point where his reputation was established not through academics, but his innate ability to command and lead. He was older than his peers and comfortable being in charge. Elected as class president for his year group all four years and attaining the highest rank each year to include the first Captaincy his senior year exemplify his desires and attributes to be in charge and command. He earned a reputation as a strict disciplinarian.<sup>15</sup>

Upon graduation from West Point in 1886 Pershing was assigned to the frontier of the United States. He served in the cavalry, from posts in New Mexico to the Dakota's. During this time he continued honing his basic military skills of marksmanship, horsemanship and leadership.

Pershing kept growing, He picked up Indian fighting and learned how to handle enlisted men. When occasions demanded, he settled a dispute man to man with fists rather than pull rank on a recalcitrant subordinate. He treated men "stronger" without trying to domineer. But they knew what he liked and didn't – as anyone could testify who was ever caught mistreating an animal.<sup>16</sup>

Operations on the frontier involved interface and negotiation with Indian leaders, which forced Pershing to use interpersonal skills, judgement and the abilities to communicate across cultures. The assignments encompassed direct stand off and confrontation with the Indians as occurred with the Zunis tribe in May of 1889. A group of horse thieves were besieged at the [S] Ranch by a party of Zuni Indians.

After a hard ride, Pershing came upon a log cabin surrounded by a hundred Indians firing a steady fusillade. The Zunis, greatly excited, explained that the men inside were horse thieves who had killed some of their tribesmen in a running fight.

Pershing replied that his orders were to rescue the white men and take them under arrest to Fort Wingate. Only with difficulty did he persuade the Zuni chiefs to permit this action, to see thieves and killers ride off unpunished was not their idea of justice. He then walked to the cabin and got the men to surrender, an easy task, for they knew they were doomed if they stayed.

The critical moment, of course was when they had to pass through the Zunis; anything might happen if some young buck started pumping bullets. On the way in Pershing said to one of his soldiers, "we are going to take those men away and if these bucks get hostile, remember we mean business" mounting troopers on either side of the prisoners he rode rapidly through the lines of the threatening braves. No shots were fired.

COL Eugene A. Carr, Commanding Fort Wingate, commended Pershing for successfully handling a touchy assignment.<sup>17</sup>

This incident displays Pershing's ability to successfully communicate cross-culturally while demonstrating a technique of firmness and the ever present option to use force if necessary. This was a technique Pershing demonstrated throughout his career and especially when negotiating with the Moro's.

An assignment that greatly influenced Pershing toward the end of his first tour on the frontier was commanding a company of Sioux Indian scouts.

Their job was to go wherever disaffection was suspected, watch for gun running and inter-tribal conspiracies, smooth over trouble, and act as a go between for the government and the Indians. They were to take the pulse of Indian Affairs, so that an uprising such as had just occurred (Massich Craze of 1890 in the Dakota's) could immediately be detected and checked, or better so that discontent would never reach the revolt stage.<sup>18</sup>

This was Pershing's first experience in commanding men of a different race and culture. He succeeded with them by treating them with respect and consideration. He uses these skills in his success with the Moro tribes in the

Philippines. "He did not tolerate them; he liked them, and almost universally they liked him in return. More than once a Sioux Scout appointed himself Pershing's personal body guard when they were in dangerous territory."<sup>19</sup>

Was the experience gained by John J. Pershing on the frontier of value? Maj General William A. Kobbee said on 4 November 1906: "The experience a large majority of our officers got at frontier posts between the Civil and Spanish Wars was pretty worthless."<sup>20</sup>

Soldiering and maneuver was at small unit level on the frontier, and arguably had limited value in preparation for maneuvering divisions, corps and armies in coordination with combined arms in World War I. However, there was value for individuals and small units who would be conducting peacekeeping operations as a result of the Spanish American War.

Pershing's biography, Donald Smythe notes in Guerilla Warrior the Early Life of John J. Pershing:

Pershing learned how to get along with people and how to go along with his fellow officers, with the enlisted men, with the angry Zuni and with the strange Sioux who needed special handling and who were almost a school of psychology in themselves. He discovered the value of a bold front when danger threatened and learned to live with equanimity in situations where one could never be sure death wasn't around the corner. Two months before his Sioux Scout service a fellow officer was murdered while visiting an Indian Camp. Pershing began service with what has been called the "Old Army" and it left its mark on him.<sup>21</sup>

"After standing up exceptionally well when engaged in combat for the first time and earning the reputation as cool under fire, in Cuba during the Spanish-War, Pershing was assigned to the Philippines in August 1899."<sup>22</sup> Initially, he

served as an adjutant in Manila, but ultimately went to Zamboango, headquarters of the Mindanao-Jalo area in the southern part of the Philippine Islands.

This part of the Philippines was a new district to the U.S. Army, recently occupied and covering vast unexplored terrain. The military's strategy was to occupy coastal towns and operate them under the discretion of the local commander. "There were few precedents and little knowledge of local conditions. The Army was feeling its way, trying to make friends with the natives (Filipino and Moro) while opening up roads for better communications."<sup>23</sup>

Additionally, the realities of the clash of different cultures and priorities were noticed. Language problems were obvious as few United States Army soldiers spoke native languages and few natives spoke English. The natives may have learned some spanish through Spain's occupation, but few soldiers spoke spanish either. Culturally, the natives took their time while the Americans were impatient.

In southern island areas of the Philippines, law was non-existent. Soldiers were continually in a state of readiness as incidents of ambush and death occurred for reasons of theft and religious difference. After Pershing's arrival, Moros attacked four soldiers for no other motive than the soldiers were Christians and the Moros, Mohammedas.

The United States military responded quickly. "An officer was sent to the village where the attack occurred and demanded custody of the murderers under threat of executing the village chiefs. When they were surrendered, an America detachment executed them. The official report stated that the prisoners had tried

to escape. Pershing approved of such tactics. "All Moros have heard of this act and it is said to be current among them that the life of an American will cost them ten Moros. It is fortunate such ideas prevail among them."<sup>24</sup>

After two years of serving in various staff positions in Zamboanaga, Pershing was promoted to captain in concert with an officer reorganization which offered the opportunity for him to command. Iligan was an isolated coastal post in the North of Mindano where Pershing was assigned to command. As Pershing stated:

The officer who commands Iligan will have a rare opportunity for important service. The most warlike people in Mindano are the Moro's of Lake Lanao. So far they have been left alone; we know little about them, except that the Spanish made several attempts to subjugate them and failed. But someday, perhaps soon, it will be necessary to bring them under control, if American rule is to be effectively extended in Mindanao. And the place from which any movement to get in touch them will start is Iligan.<sup>25</sup>

Commander of the Department of Mindanao, Brigadier General

George W. Davis issued Pershing his guidance in the fall of 1901:

Pershing as you are the only man left here who knows anything about the Moros, I'm going to send you to Iligan. I'll give you two troops of your regiment and three companies of infantry. Do everything possible to get in touch with the Moros of central Mindanao and make friends with them.<sup>26</sup>

Upon assuming command in Iligan, Captain John J. Pershing imparted his command philosophy of unwavering discipline through a series of inspections and establishment of high standards throughout the command. He then focused his attention on the mission given him of "getting in touch with the Moros of central Mindanao and make friends with them." His ultimate objective was to get

to Lake Lanao in central Mindanao, the Forbidden Kingdom and meet the Moros there.

Pershing's strategy of pacifying the Moros was to meet and gain the confidence of the various Moro chiefs or dattos, as they were a tribal society, like the American Indians. He did this by inviting the leaders to Iligan and subsequently hoping for an invitation to their homes and tribes. This strategy of mutual confidence and engagement was the surest way to make the area of Iligan and central Mindarao safe for Americans.

He had to convince these suspicious, semi savage people that he was their friend. His ultimate goal was to reach the Lake Lanao Moros in the interior, the Forbidden Kingdom. He could fight his way in, but that was costly and a last resort. His job was to make friends out of enemies. It was not a military problem, Pershing told Frederick Palmer later, and Pershing had one solution for the problem. He treated the Moros as humans.<sup>27</sup>

Pershing's force protection posture entailed intermingling with the Moros at the Saturday markets in order to gain intelligence and to learn the customs, habits, traditions and leadership. Here he learned that the number one Moro chief in the area was Ahmai Manibilang. Not an openly hostile sultan, but he had only visited Iligan one time during the Spanish occupation. Ahmai Manibilang had abdicated responsibility of his tribe to his son, but was still the sultan with authority in the area. Pershing visited and coordinated with the son resulting in two visits to Iligan and letter exchanges by Pershing to Ahmai Manibilang. Positive word got to the sultan about Captain Pershing which resulted in Ahmai Manibilang visiting Iligan. Pershing hosted the sultan in his quarters and made every effort to treat the ruler and his entourage with respect due his position.<sup>28</sup>

During this visit initial negotiations were conducted that positively effected the response of other sultans towards Pershing and the United States.

Pershing assured Manibilang there would be no interference with religion, offering as proof that the Sultan of Constantinople ("Stamboul" as Manibilang called it), to whom the Moros owed spiritual allegiance, exchanged representatives with the President of the United States.

He explained that the Americans were not going to leave the Philippines. Unlike the Spaniards, Americans were "a different and more friendly people." They would help Moros get right. They would build roads and buy products at good prices.

They would also support sultans and dattos. Although the Americans would hold them responsible for any crimes their people committed, the Moro rulers might govern their people in their own way.

Two topics Pershing carefully avoided: slavery and polygamy. He knew they would eventually have to be stamped out, but his was no time to raise the question. The job was to quiet fears and establish good relations.<sup>29</sup>

The results of this first meeting gained a positive reputation for Pershing among other dattos and sultans. They began to frequent Iligan and Pershing personally made it his responsibility to meet each leader upon their arrival.

Ultimately, Pershing was invited to the interior of Mindanao and Lake Lanao. "A spanish priest, Padre Tel Plarido, warned that no white man will ever go up into those forests and hills and come out alive."<sup>30</sup> However, Pershing accepted the invitation and traveled with three native scouts, an interpreter and no weapons to show his trust and confidence for Manibilang, his host and sponsor on the journey.

The trip was considered a success, Pershing met various sultans and dattos throughout the area, and addressed an audience at a market place emphasizing friendship and answering questions about United States motives on Mindanao. Though successful there were tense times during the trip as some

Moro leaders disagreed with befriending the Americans. The end result was that Pershing became the first white man to travel to the interior of Mindanao and come out alive. He was trusted because of his initial firm but honest dealings with the Moros, addressing their concerns, but emphasizing the interests of the United States and the Army. He consistently stayed engaged with the Moros from the leadership to the common people which enhanced his success.

As Pershing was having success in peacekeeping in the Northern Lake Lanao area, due to his relation with Manibilang and his ability to communicate successfully with the Moros, murders and ambushes were still occurring in other areas. This resulted in campaigns against other Moro tribes. Ultimately this affected relations between Captain Pershing and the Moros in northern Mindanao.

After the murder of three soldiers and the ambush of an officer and seventeen soldiers, where one was killed and all their horses stolen, BG Davis, the Commander of the Department of Mindanao-Jolo, ordered an expedition north toward Lake Lanao to capture the criminals and recover the property. Pershing's initial approach was to warn the Moros in his area and to reiterate they had nothing to fear. As the expedition moved north unrest developed in northern Luzon. Manibilang wrote on April 26, 1902 to Pershing, "I am very much distressed as I have heard that the Americans have arrived at Ganassi. If this is true that we are friends, think before you do us any harm."<sup>31</sup>

On April 27, 1902, Pershing moved unarmed toward Lake Lanao to personally reassure the Moros in his sector of responsibility that the expedition was not against them.

When they saw Pershing they seem to hold him personally responsible for what had happened. You have invaded our country with your troops! One fiery datto walked directly up and, in a threatening, overbearing manner, berated him for his talk about friendship, helping Moros get rich, and not interfering with their religion or their property. You lied to us.<sup>32</sup>

Manibilang defended Pershing and agreed to assemble all the northern Moro leaders the next day where Pershing responded:

You have nothing to fear, nothing is happening in the south except what I told you would happen, that the murderers must be punished. You have nothing to fear from us. On the other hand, we are not going to live in fear from you. We are going to explore and open roads. These roads will help you. We are going to go where we please.<sup>33</sup>

CPT Pershing was successful in keeping the peace with the northern Moros in his area of responsibility, however the campaign was not a success. As stated by Donald Smythe, in Guerilla Warrior:

There was ill will after the engagement, with the prospect of more fighting, and perhaps an extended guerrilla war. This was not what General Chaffee wanted. He felt that COL Frank D. Baldwin, who led the American advance from the south, had been too quick to pull the trigger, too slow to parley. Was there someone, Chaffee wondered, who could handle Moros without killing them? He thought of the captain at Illigan, the first white American to penetrate to Lake Lanao, alone and unarmed. He seemed to have a way with Moros. He had prudence and tact. Chaffee sent for him on May 13.

When Pershing reported, Chaffee explained that after the Pandapatan fight American troops had withdrawn about a mile and established temporary camp at a place named Vicars. They were up in the Lake Lanao region now and intended to stay. But they did not want any more fights, unless absolutely necessary. Peace and friendship were the watchwords. Then Chaffee came to the point.

You have been successful in handling the Moros on the North. I want you to go up to the lake for station and do what you can to pacify the Moros on this side and prevent another clash.<sup>34</sup>

Upon assignment to Cp. Vicars in the southern portion of Lake Lanao and Mindanao, Pershing continued his strategy of "Waging the Peace"<sup>35</sup> in order to pacify the Moro's. Pershing, as a captain ultimately replaced COL Frank D. Baldwin. Brigadier General George W. Davis explained to the War Department the character traits the successful leader in this mission would need:

It was in my opinion absolutely indispensable that the man to command on the spot should possess certain qualities not easy to find combined in one man: capacity for command, physical and mental vigor, infinite patience in dealing with these fanatical semi-savages, wise discretion, a zealous desire to accomplish the work set for him and knowledge of the Moro character.<sup>36</sup>

Pershing employed the same techniques utilized at Iligan to gain the Moro confidence in the area of Vicars. He frequented the market place and attempted to restore good relations after the Pandapata fight by personal contact, fair dealing and appealing to Moro self interest. He engaged with the populace often. He offered work building sheds for horses and mules, bought Moro wood and grass, rented Moro ponies and drivers to support U.S. Army operations. He visited any rancheria which invited him, though in this area he moved with an infantry escort.

His most important work was accomplished in conferences, which, because of Moro loquaciousness, were often interminable. "A conference with Moros is a matter of hours, not of moments," said the surgeon at Vicars. "I cannot conceive anything requiring more tact, patience and courage than is requisite to deal properly with the Moros of Mindanao, and to extract the truth from people who pride themselves on their ability to lie and deceive."<sup>37</sup>

As time passed, Pershing continued to win the leaders and tribes to the American side. The Moros served as a secret service passing intelligence information to the U.S. forces. However, some hostile leaders and tribes resisted any pacification or relationship with Pershing and the U.S. forces. The hostile elements provoked war through ambushes and night raids on various American encampments.

On 1 September 1902, one soldier was killed and two wounded at Mataling Falls, seven miles southeast of Vicars. This incident forced Pershing to request permission to implement the other half of his pacification strategy, that of force.

He wrote to his superiors: We are losing influence with our friends who continuously ask, why do you Americans not punish some of those people? Datto Grande and his people have been threatened by the Bayon hostile element and I loaned them two carbines for protection. Nightly prowlers come about in search of outpost's guns, and my secret service Moros report much talk of hostile intent and all that. The rice crop is now gathered and most Moros have nothing to do. My own conviction is that a good sound drubbing will be necessary and sufficient and it may be administered at Bacolod or summarily at some rancheria whose people have most recently attacked us. I believe at the same time that we have made and are making material progress towards pacification, the situation is not critical in any sense and no uneasiness need be felt. We should however, without further hesitation punish some of the renegades, it will help us very much in the pending peace negotiations and bring openly to our support many Moros who yet cling to what appears to them to be the stronger side. I can handle it if permitted to do so.<sup>38</sup>

This conveys that Pershing believed a major element of power in peace operations was not just good will and negotiation but force if needed. In the employment of combat he approached the Moro defenses called cotos, and with artillery and snipers he engaged using stand-off tactics. This technique avoided

American casualties and allowed the Moros to escape. This enhanced his method of American good will and ultimately forced more tribes to accept American sovereignty.

The event that demonstrates Captain Pershing's ultimate success during his campaign in the Philippines was when he conveyed to the Moros at Bayan that their resistance had gone far enough. He sent a letter to the pandita, directing the Moros to accept American sovereignty or face the consequences.

On February 10, 1903, Pershing moved cavalry and field artillery to Bayan. He was invited to the cotta but was apprehensive of the Moro motives.

As the Americans approached the pandita's cotta, Sajiduciman came out, threw his arms about Pershing, and kissed him on each cheek. Pershing unflinchingly returned the favor. Sajiduciman then gave him a guided tour of the cotta and ended by allowing an American flag to be raised over it, a formal acknowledgment of his submission.

Next Sajiduciman indicated that he had something special to say. He and Pershing squatted on their heels while attendants set down a rare copy of the Koran, the Moslem Bible. An old Mohammedan priest performed incantations under a red parasol, symbol of Moslem authority. Beautifully engraved silver boxes of betel nut were handed around and each took a chew. Then Sajiduciman leaned over, betel-nut saliva trickling down his beard. Embracing Pershing, he said with the utmost solemnity, "You have been made a Moro Datto. Both men placed their hands on the Koran and swore allegiance to the United States.

Pershing was to be in many ceremonies in his life – before kings, presidents, emperors, educators, and churchmen. But this ceremony in the wilds of Mindanao above shimmering Lake Lanao, squatting on his heels and chewing betel nut, swearing fealty on the Koran, was "the most unique ceremony in which I . . . ever participated."<sup>39</sup>

Pershing's success in the Philippines was his appreciation for cultural awareness and cross cultural communication as a combat multiplier. He factually engaged the Moro at every chance, employed force where necessary

but treated the Moro's with dignity and respect which earned their confidence and loyalty.

The overall success of the United States Army campaign against the Moros can be debated. Captain Pershing enhanced United States interests by leaving a positive reputation and memories of the United States Army service on Mindanao with the Moro tribe. Additionally, when he returned to be the governor of the Moro Province, his policies were implemented with less problem and resentment by the Moros because of his reputation. He valued cultural awareness and cross cultural communication, learning about the Moros, and applying his knowledge of their culture in a manner that would enhance his mission success. He studied his enemy and used it to this advantage.

## CHAPTER 3

### The Effectiveness Of Cultural Awareness And Cross Cultural Communication By U.S. Military Forces During "Operation Uphold Democracy" In Haiti 1994

The intervention of United States military forces onto Haiti, to protect United States national interests occurred twice during the twentieth century. In 1915, at the request of the United States Ambassador to Haiti, a battalion of United States Marines were dispatched off the USS Washington to quell violence and restore order during Haitian political unrest. Additionally, with the completion of the Panama Canal in 1914, and the ongoing war with Germany, the security of Haiti in relation to the mouth of the Panama Canal was considered in the United States national interest.

The United States imposed a treaty on American backed Haitian President Philippe Dartiquenaul, resulting in an intrusive policy in the management of the economy. The United States proposed civic projects to assist in improving sanitation works, agriculture and education. When operations were complete, United States military forces remained in Haiti from 1915 to 1934. The result was a deep seated resentment toward the United States by the indigenous Haitian population.<sup>40</sup>

The forces conducted, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and combat operations. Regarding, military intervention, the value of cultural awareness and interpersonal skills are evident, assisting in answering the monograph question.

As the Americans settled in to restore order across the country, the Marines encountered assorted bands of "CACOS," mercenary fighters from the rugged interior of the country who typically found employment in Haiti's struggles for political power.

Under ambiguous and confusing circumstances, young Marine officers often found themselves attempting to conduct negotiations with caco chieftains, a task for which they had received no special preparation.

Cultural appreciation of Haiti was sadly lacking. As late as 1929, according to one Marine veteran, there was no special preparation of any kind for deployment to Haiti, only standard basic training at Paris Island. Indeed, Marine trainees sometimes learned of their destination only days before departure.<sup>41</sup>

This statement reinforces the idea that cultural awareness, the ability to communicate across cultures (negotiate) would have enhanced the success of operations in Haiti at the beginning of the twentieth century.

Sixty five years later the United States became involved in operations again in Haiti, under the name of "Operation Uphold Democracy." Again, the same mistakes were made as in 1929. The circumstances were similar to the early 1900's where political instability, unrest and uncontrolled murders occurred. A military coup on 30 September 1991, ousted the elected President Jean Bertrand Aristide to Venezuela. He was replaced by a military junta led by Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras the Chief of Staff of the Haitian Army. Cedras drew international attention to Haiti as mob attacks occurred on the Vatican Mission and numerous "boat people" were fleeing the island for refuge in the United States, specifically Florida. Internally, Haiti did nothing to stop the flood of refugees which was overwhelming for the United States.<sup>42</sup>

Negotiations between the international community, the United States and Haiti occurred throughout 1991-1993. The intent was to restore Aristide to

power, potentially pardon those who participated in the coup and return Haiti to an assemblance of normality.

The United States established a policy of repatriation, returning the boat people to Haiti. Also, the United States and other members of the United Nations were reluctant to get involved militarily or even tighten the embargo on Haiti. Finally on 16 June 1993, the United Nations Security Council imposed a ban on petroleum sales to Haiti and froze the financial assets of the important Haitians. The result was Cedras and Aristide, meeting on Governors Island, New York to establish an agreement to return Mr. Aristide to power. The result was Mr. Aristide would return to Haiti on 30 October 1993. Additionally, United Nation's military forces and an international police force would enter Haiti prior to Mr. Aristide's return to train the military and police.

After the Governors Island accord, hundreds of pro-Aristide supporters were killed, beaten or arrested. As the United Nations Peacekeeping Force attempted to enter Port-au-Prince, Haiti from the United States vessel, the USS Harlan, it was turned away in Port-au-Prince harbor because of mob violence and potential resistance at the landing site.<sup>43</sup>

Coincidentally, on 3 October 1993 the problems with Task Force Ranger occurred in Somalia. Cedras and the junta planned that if they could influence international public support by discrediting the UN peacekeeping force, they would remain in power. The Haitian leadership believed the United States and other nations, did not want to be involved in another Somalia.

On October 16, 1993, the UN imposed a naval blockade on Haiti due to the turning back of the UN peacekeepers on the USS Harlan and the killing of the Haitian Minister of Justice Guy Malany in Port-de-Prince, Haiti.

When the USS Harlan left Port-au-Prince, Haiti and political options and international pressure failed, military planning guidance to resolve the Haiti crisis changed. The Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the United States Atlantic Command in October 1993, to change the current plan focused on evacuation of non-combatants to a plan centered on forced entry and potential combat operations. The United States Army and XVIII Airborne Corps were given the mission for developing the plan with the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division as the main combat force. As the XVIII Airborne Corps Chief of Plans, Lieutenant Colonel Gordon Bonham stated:

The primary objectives of [OPLAN 2370] were to neutralize the Fad'H and police; to protect U.S. citizens, third country nationals, designated Haitians' interests and property, to conduct a NEO as required, to restore civil order, to establish essential services; . . . and to set the conditions for the reestablishment of the legitimate government of Haiti.<sup>44</sup>

In May of 1994, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recommended to the United States Atlantic Command to develop another plan (OPLAN 2380) focused on a peaceful entry scenario into Haiti. Again the XVIII Airborne Corps received the planning mission. The 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division was selected by the Army leadership to conduct the mission as this operation had the potential to last much longer than OPLAN 2370, over 179 days. The logic was not to commit the forced entry forces, 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division and Special Operation Forces for that long. The 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain, began the preparation and planning at Ft. Drum, NY.

On 15 September 1994, President Clinton addressed the United States public and informed them he was directing the movement of two aircraft carriers, the USS Eisenhower and USS America toward Haiti. He also announced that the Secretary of Defense would be calling up reservists in support of military operations in Haiti.

In explaining his actions, the President declared that beyond the human rights violations the immigration problems, the importance of democracy, the United States also had strong interests in not letting dictators, especially in our own region, break their word to the United States and the United Nations.<sup>45</sup>

The invasion was planned for the morning of 19 September 1994 utilizing OPLAN 2370. Concurrently, Cedras contacted former President Jimmie Carter, requesting his support to negotiate other options other than a military invasion. On September 17, 1994, Mr. Carter, with retired General Colin Powell and Senator Sam Nunn went to Haiti to ultimately formulate an agreement for Cedras to relinquish power, leave Haiti, and Mr. Aristide reinstated.

The American invasion was cancelled while forces were enroute to Haiti, and the peacekeeping, permissive entry scenario OPLAN 2380 was implemented by the United States Atlantic Command. The operational conditions of 2380 were changed from "benign entry" to an "uncertain environment." The plan was known as OPLAN 2380-plus, as it designed the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division as the main effort to accomplish the objectives.

As articulated in Invasion, Intervention, Intervasion, A Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy the following statement reiterates

the importance of cultural awareness and establishes that the United States military may have enhanced mission accomplishment if prepared.

Uphold Democracy introduced U.S. forces into a culture vastly - different from their own. Yet, in planning for the Haiti operation, the Army, in general, had little appreciation of Haitian history and culture. Few planners knew anything about Haiti, other than its basic geography. In a combat operation, where overwhelming firepower achieves objectives, sensitivity for the local population's culture and traditions clearly is not a top priority. In a peace operation such as Uphold Democracy, however, knowledge of how a people think and act, and how they might react to military intervention arguably becomes paramount. The U.S. military culture, in general, focuses on training warriors to use fire and maneuver and tends to resist the notion of cultural awareness.<sup>46</sup>

The senior United States Commander on the ground adjusted to the change of mission and had a vision:

As Lieutenant General Shelton observed in an interview, "Never in my wildest imagination did I think that I would be coming in here with the mission of cooperating and coordinating in an atmosphere of mutual respect. The abrupt switch in approach just hours after forcible-entry operations had been put into motion not only necessitated a hasty psychological adjustment but left considerable uncertainty about the situation on the ground in Haiti. Suddenly, according to the new rules and conditions of American entry, Shelton had to transform himself from a soldier into a diplomat.

Compelled to choose a course of action, Shelton opted to err on the side of caution, balancing impressive displays of military power with a civil but firm personal demeanor. He decided that from the moment of his arrival, his personal posture should reflect the confident authority of one who enjoys unquestioned control of the situation.

He subsequently attempted to press his point home in face-to-face meetings with Cedras and other leaders of the current regime by means of tough talk and unequivocal demands for prompt compliance with all his directives. The posture of American forces in the streets of Port-au-Prince and elsewhere was to reinforce this message for the benefit of the public at large. Shelton wanted America's military presence to be visible, simultaneously imposing and reassuring.<sup>47</sup>

Lieutenant General Shelton's overall strategy was:

US Forces to become attuned to 'street rhythms' and therefore maximize engagement of the populace. Achievement of the mission required winning the trust and confidence of the populace, a task calling for far more intimate contact with the people in their own streets and neighborhoods. Not only would such contact serve to create the proper psychological climate for the restoration of civil life, but such engagement, on a regular and sustained basis, would predictably yield a bounty of information on local circumstances and events.<sup>48</sup>

LTG Shelton, as Commander JTF 180, had a vision of attaining success in Haiti, though it was not implemented to his satisfaction. JTF 190, the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division arrived with one Brigade Combat Team on 19 September 1994 to secure the Port-au-Prince International Airport. The follow on forces arrived between 20 and 28 September. The 2<sup>nd</sup> Brigade Combat Team occupied and took responsibility of the town of Cap Haitien, the secondary center of gravity, and Task Force Mountain formed around the nucleus of the Division artillery at Port-au-Prince, the principle center of gravity. The division's arrival did bring order, but the strategy of engagement by military presence never fully evolved. The 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division's overall concept of operation was to patrol the capital by day to ensure stability and later to seize weapons storage sites in order to ensure disarmament prior to Mr. Aristides arrival. Ultimately, the military police proved more effective than the infantry, as their training was oriented toward interacting with a subject and defusing situations with patience, prudence and respect for the host nation personnel. The 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division leadership believed the work done solely by the military police was adequate to meet LTG Shelton's intent, regarding engagement.

The approach the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division took to operations, specifically in Port-au-Prince where the division headquarters was located, emphasized force protection. Full body armor and helmets were worn at all times, and restrictions to the base camp called Camp Democracy, (The Light Industrial Complex) was strictly enforced. The method of operation of not engaging the Haitians is arguably the part of Operation Uphold Democracy that failed. It also “poses possibly the greatest controversy of the operation. Force protection not only drove the mission, it almost became the mission.”<sup>49</sup>

There are three main reasons for this. Recently the unit had returned from Somalia, where the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division soldiers experienced a peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance operation which evolved into full combat with casualties. Many officers and soldiers were veterans of Somalia and erred on the conservative side of protecting the force. They had experienced what an angry civilian population can do, with low technical weapons if united with a common cause against a common enemy.

As stated by the JTF 190 J-3, Colonel Thomas Miller:

If anything, it's a lesson learned from Somalia that you never drop your guard. That you treat every single operation you do as a combat operation.

[P]eacekeeping/peace enforcement does not mean anything for a rifle squad leader; it means a lot to me; [to] the Commanding General, but it means nothing to a rifle squad leader. He is going out on the street in a combat operation, because of the potential for hostility, force protection is always going to remain paramount. [T]he way to ensure force protection for them [U.S. soldiers], is through overwhelming combat force. We have it so you should use it because we've got good leaders that can constrain the use of that and understand how to apply it. [T]he peoples of nations like Haiti [then] understand that you mean business. . .<sup>50</sup>

Additionally, at home station the units prepared for the operation, based on the OPLANS. The two options were the "permissive, unopposed scenario" and the "uncertain scenario." Arguably, the commanders prepared for the most dangerous scenario, uncertainty, and emphasized combat operations.

Finally, elements of the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division leadership intentionally treated operation Uphold Democracy as a combat operation regardless of the situation upon arriving in Haiti. In an "effort to avoid combat casualties," the leadership chose to intimidate the Haitian population, the same populace it was meant to provide safety and security.

That posture not only intimidated the Haitians, as expected, it also threatened to unravel the entire idea of upholding democracy. The Haitians, many of whom have preconceived expectations of their American "liberators," now felt betrayed due to a command-directed, physical barrier between themselves and the U.S. soldiers, who represented Americans and their democratic values. Despite a relaxation of that separation over time, the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division had caused many Haitians to question what American democracy is all about.<sup>51</sup>

In Cap Haitien, the commander of the 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade Combat Team, 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division, Colonel James Dubik approached the mission differently than in Port-au-Prince. His soldiers still adhered to the division's policy of force protection, the wearing of combat gear and the use of security at all times, however, the soldiers and officers directly engaged with the local populace. They established their presence as outlined in the OPLAN through engagement. "Colonel Dubik daily interfaced with local officials, explained what the military was doing, and what constituted democracy. As Dubik put it; I had to conduct a civics lesson everyday."<sup>52</sup>

Forces not under the command and control of Task Force 190, were the Special Operations Forces (SOF) composed of United States Army Special Forces, Rangers, Civil Affairs elements and Psychological Operations Forces. These components experienced some success in accomplishing the objectives of "Operation Uphold Democracy."

The SOF forces acted in an economy of force role, controlling the countryside and the smaller villages and towns. The Special Forces conducted operations to restore order and stability to the area they were assigned. They conducted weapons searches and disarmament, arrested thugs, assisted in establishment of democratic town government and helped in civil projects. They lived and worked directly with the Haitian populace. In certain locations they lived with the "Fad'H," the Haitian military, to convey democratic ideals and maintain control.

Bob Shachoris, a published author, columnist and writer for numerous national publications, published an op-ed piece, "Our Two Armies in Haiti," in the Sunday New York Times:

In Haiti, I wrote, the conventional army with its twenty thousand infantrymen seemed misplaced and misled, superfluous and perhaps even counterproductive to what had rapidly become a peacekeeping mission tailor-made for the army's unconventional forces – specifically, Special Forces A-teams, whose sophisticated training and multidimensional skills were redefining military success on the ground in an ambiguous, low-intensity conflict that helped clarify the post-cold war tactical environment in the third world.<sup>53</sup>

The Special Operations Forces assisted in meeting the operational objectives of Uphold Democracy by implementing the JTF 180 commander, LTG

Shelton's intent of engagement. "The notion of hearing what the populace was saying, or gathering "street rhythms" as Lieutenant General Shelton put it, served the U.S. Special Forces community in Haiti well."<sup>54</sup>

Ultimately, Operation Uphold Democracy can be viewed from a political and military perspective as a success. The military Junta under General Cedras was disbanded and exiled from Haiti. The democratically elected President Mr. Aristide was reinstated as the president. The Haitian military, the Fad'H were neutralized and disarmed. The police were retrained and new personnel recruited. A secure and stable environment to allow the legitimate government to operate was established in Haiti. However, for the strategic long term value to United States interests, the chance to influence a change of thought of the Haitian populace toward democratic ideals was lost.

As stated in Invasion, Intervention, Intervasion, a Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy:

While U.S. Army Special Forces moved freely throughout the country and mingled with the people (except in the Capital), the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain in Port-au-Prince, by and large remained a secluded force. The Army, however, failed to engage the Haitian population and influence lasting change. While the Haitians must eventually change themselves, U.S. conventional forces in Port-au-Prince failed to act as role models for affecting that change.<sup>55</sup>

One Haitian described American soldiers as "sterile" in their approach toward Haitians. Another Haitian believed that the Americans did not interact with the population out of contempt, the same contempt that her father told her the U.S. Marines of the 1920's felt toward him. These comments, and others, indicate that the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division did not present a totally positive image with the populace.<sup>56</sup>

The opportunity to influence the Haitians towards democratic ideals was lost in Haiti because of the inability of military leadership to adjust to a changing situation and studying the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB). Good planners and commanders always prepare and train for the worst case scenario in order to ensure success and minimize casualties, this is a basic responsibility of a leader. However, as situations change, commanders and planners must adjust operations in order to reach the designated end state of the military and political leader.

The study of the Marine operation at the turn of the century, and a cultural assessment of Haiti, could have enhanced a lasting difference and affected change toward democratic ideals in the national interests of the United States. Lieutenant General Shelton's strategy of engagement was simple, yet true. The same strategy General Pershing advocated in the Philippines ninety-six years before. Intelligence for force protection would have been gathered, by learning the "street rhythms." Aggressive patrolling, would undoubtedly put the United States in charge and would have passed on democratic ideals. The individual soldier throughout history, proves to be the best ambassador.

## CHAPTER 4

### CONCLUSION

At this moment in history, the United States is called upon to lead – to marshal the forces of freedom and progress; to channel the energies of the global economy into lasting prosperity; to reinforce our democratic ideals and values; to enhance American security and global peace. We owe it to our children and grandchildren to meet these challenges and build a better and safer world.<sup>57</sup>

The previous quotation from the National Security Strategy, coupled with the concepts of “Global Meliorism,” the aim to make the world democratic, and globalization, ensures United States military forces remain engaged overseas in support of United States national interests. Inherent in the strategy of engagement, as demonstrated by Chapters two and three of the monograph, is that United States military forces will conduct cross cultural communication during operations. Additionally, cultural awareness is essential in successful accomplishment of the operational objective. As conveyed in the Institute for Peace, Special Report, Training U.S. Army Officers for Peace Operations, October 29, 1999, consolidated thoughts of lessons learned of United States Army general officers:

In peace operations, required skills include patience, the confidence to delegate authority and take risks, and the ability to engage with people outside the military, including representatives of non-governmental and international organizations and the media. The Army needs to develop a set of principles, that enhances all levels of officer education, including reference to geopolitics, cultural awareness, foreign language and interpersonal skills.<sup>58</sup>

General Shinseki, the Chief of Staff of the US Army, perception of the Bosnia operation was that it was "Intellectual Warfare." Lieutenant General Meigs, the US Army Europe Commander, believed that commanders had to spend private time learning about the historical, political, cultural and social factors of the host nation country, in order to enhance mission success.<sup>59</sup>

The study endorsed the monograph research question positively, by articulating the importance of cultural awareness and interpersonal relationships that often constitute the difference between success and failure, between progress and stalemate, in operations. Those most likely to demonstrate strong interpersonal skills are also those who have the ability to adapt to a new environment. The ability to adapt and adjust is a fundamental step on the road to success in peace support operations and combat operations.<sup>60</sup>

Captain Pershing, during the Moro campaign in the Philippines, implemented all the principles that the board of present day U.S. Army general officers deemed essential for success in present and future operations. Pershing interacted routinely with others outside the military. He constantly engaged with local leaders and the host nation populace. He had a vision which he articulated to those he interacted. His understanding of the United States political and military landscape was conveyed in his engagement strategy at every opportunity. He displayed courage and confidence both in combat operations, but just as importantly in the difficult and dangerous negotiations and travel he conducted with the various dattos and sultans of Mindanao. He adhered to principle and moral steadfastness, as well as treating the Moro's fairly and even-

handly. He advocated and constantly improved his soldiers broad intellectual background. He studied the Moro history, political, cultural and social factors which earned him a reputation as an expert within the United States Army on the Moro subject. Finally, he was extremely patient but not opposed to implementing military action in order to avert future conflict.

The overall success of the United States Army campaign against the Moros can be debated. Captain Pershing enhanced United States interests by leaving a positive reputation and memories of the United States Army service on Mindanao with the Moro tribe. Additionally, when he returned to be the governor of the Moro Province, his policies were implemented with less problem and resentment by the Moros because of his reputation. He valued cultural awareness and cross cultural communication, learning about the Moros, and applying his knowledge of their culture in a manner that would enhance his mission success. He studied his enemy and used it to his advantage.

Operation Uphold Democracy, though considered successful, arguably did not affect long term change in Haiti because of a lack of cultural awareness and cross cultural communication. The vision of engagement by the JTF 180 Commander, LTG Shelton was never fully implemented by the overall military force. Thus, a stalemate not progress occurred. Patience was not a foremost principle applied, as the focus of operations oriented on the exit strategy. Authority was delegated, which proved to be the major success of the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division. The Second Brigade, under Colonel Dubik, applied the principles that the Institute for Peace, Special Report advocated and Captain

Pershing applied. They were considered successful in stabilizing the Cap Haitain area. Finally, there was a limit on the broad intellectual background. Just as in 1929 with the Marines, the majority of forces in 1994, did not study the historical, political, cultural and social factors of Haiti, prior to deployment. The warfighting principle in concert with force protection prevailed, ultimately alienating numerous Haitians and distracting from enhanced mission success. The JTF 190 forces in Port au Prince, did not adapt to the changing situation upon arrival in Haiti. They made little attempt to communicate cross culturally or become culturally aware in order to enhance mission success. Thus, the present day reputation of limited success is given to Operation Uphold Democracy.

The United States Institute for Peace, Special Report of October 1999,

recommended a formal solution to enhancing success in future operations:

Greater emphasis must be placed on geopolitical and cultural training for the Army's officers corps. Such training must begin at the officer basic course and continue at all levels of the Professional Military Education (PME). Officers at all grades will benefit from such training because of the likelihood that they will be involved in peace operations on multiple occasions throughout their careers. The general officers interviewed for the study singled out senior service college institutions as the place where leadership training for peace operations must be conducted and the place that needs the most curriculum development. A greater emphasis on peace operations and on geopolitical and cultural awareness is needed at these institutions.<sup>61</sup>

Captain Pershing, LTG Shelton, BG Potter and Colonel Dubik employed strategies that ensured enhanced mission success with experience and interpersonal skills. The commonality of the successful commanders was consideration of the following principles:<sup>62</sup>

- warfighting – to avert potential conflict

- vision – understanding the political-international landscape
- courage – take risks
- interact with others outside the military – engagement
- confidence – with authority, tell host nation military what they can or can't

do.

- patience – examine issues and take time to make decisions, deliberation
- delegate authority – areas of operation are normally too big
- moral steadfastness, fairness and even handedness to all parties.
- broad intellectual background: learn history, political, cultural and social

factors.

These commanders used cross cultural communication and cultural awareness to enhance mission success. These skills have been critical in the past as outlined in the monograph and will continue to be critical in future operations.

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup>A National Security Strategy for a New Century, The White House, January 5, 2000, 2.

<sup>2</sup>McDougall, Walter. Promised Land, Crusader State, (New York, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1997) 200.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid, 173, 174 and 201.

<sup>4</sup>A National Security Strategy for a New Century, The White House, January 5, 2000, 4 and 5.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid, 7.

<sup>6</sup>Webster Ninth New Colligiate Dictionary, (Springfield, MA, Merriam-Webster Inc., 1986) 266, 309, 314.

John C. London and Fatter S. Yousef state in An Introduction to Intercultural Communication: communication is any behavior that is perceived and interpreted by another, whether or not it is spoken or intended or even within the person's conscious awareness.

Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms states: Communication – a method or means of conveying information of any kind from one person or place to another.

An Introduction to Intercultural Communication states: culture is fundamentally a property of information, a grammar for organizing reality, for imparting meaning to the world. "Culture," he posits, "consists in patterned ways of thinking, feeling and reaction, acquired and transmitted mainly by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of human groups, including their embodiments in artifacts; the essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e., historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values." Humankind can be thought of as displaying a rich selection of physical hardware. We come in a variety of shapes, sizes, and shades, but our gramming of the human system, the "software," that translates potential into actuality, converting the American ideals of freedom, individuality, and migration into an inanimate object like a mobile home.

Human software, then, is made up of ideas, meanings, conventions, and assumptions. It molds our perceptions, so that where the city dweller sees only sand, the nomad picks up a host of clues about the nature of the terrain, the presence of wildlife, the weather, the availability of pasture, and the proximity of other tribes. It structures our ideas, so that one group sees work as the fulfillment of human destiny while another sees it as a curse. It shapes our

actions, defining the rules of interaction for meeting, parting, bestowing hospitality, trading, begging, giving, and negotiating. Whereas artifacts and buildings are observable, the substructure of principles that underpins thought and behavior is less accessible to the casual observer. Because most social interaction takes place within, rather than among, cultures, we usually take all those assumptions and conventions for granted or assume they are of universal validity.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid, 120, 1072.

<sup>8</sup>London, John C., Yousef, Fatter S., An Introduction to Intercultural Communication, (New York, The Bob Merrills Co.) 1975, 120.

Standards of acting and even the value of performance are likely to vary from culture to culture, a problem likely to affect Americans, especially. A recent trend in communication education in the United States is manifest in a variety of ways, such as "sensitivity training," or expressions such as "Tell it like it is." While we do not wish to be unduly critical, this trend is really very "American," for Americans are likely to dislike status differences, formality, host-guest roles, and anything that looks like older and therefore (in the American view) more rigid systems. North Americans want to get down to "brass tacks," to "reality," to "business," to "the nitty gritty" – the terms change but this value or value orientation or complex of value orientations seems to have remained remarkably consistent over the years. Such values eschew the idea of performing. And yet ceremony, speeches (even in an extremely non-speech oriented society such as Japan), and social amenities of all kinds are expected, even demanded. The American is often unprepared for this, both in experience and in cultural values.

<sup>9</sup>Olsen, Howard, and Davis John. Training U.S. Officers for Peace, Special Report, U.S. Institute for Peace, 5.

<sup>10</sup>Shelton, Dave LTC, USMC. E-mail from Secretary of Defense, C3I, Russian Army Lessons Learned from the Battle of Grozny, 1999, 1.

<sup>11</sup>Smythe, Donald. Guerilla Warrior, The Early Life of John J. Pershing, (New York, Charles Schribner Sons, 1973) 109.

<sup>12</sup>Joint Pub 3-07.3. Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Peace Operations, 1999, 9.

- Peace Building is critical in the aftermath of conflict. Includes the identification and support of measures and structures which will promote peace and trust among former enemies, in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.

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- Peace Enforcement Operations undertaken that are coercive in nature and are conducted when the consent of all parties to a conflict has not been achieved. Designed to maintain or reestablish peace.

- Humanitarian Operations – are conducted to alleviate human suffering.

<sup>13</sup> Smythe, Donald, Guerilla Warrior. The Early Life of John J. Pershing, (New York, Charles Schribner Sons, 1973) 4.

*The Dictionary of America Biography*, supplement 4 states:

The panic of 1873 virtually broke the Pershings. Even with Jack helping his father in the fields and teaching, the family fortunes dwindled. At last, all but the house was gone; Jack's father became a traveling salesman and left his oldest son to hold the family intact. Jack's dreams of a college education went with the savings, and little beyond country teaching and odd-jobbing loomed in his future. Yet he managed to save tuition money from his \$35 monthly wage and in 1879 entered the State Normal School in Kirksville, Mo.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., 6.

<sup>15</sup>The Dictionary of America Biography, (New York, Charles Schribner Sons, 1950) supplement 4, 1946-1950, 654.

Pershing won admission to the plebe (freshman) class in 1882. Once through the storied gates of "the Point," Pershing changed. The challenge of soldiering intrigued him, and the routines of ragging regimentation, marching, studying, riding and learning the courtesies and rights of rank became second nature to him. He did well in things military and became probably the most soldierly man in his class. Mathematics came easily enough, and even the vagaries of English grammar. History and law were consumed with gusto. French and Spanish lessons were definitely not to his taste, but he finally struggled through them.

Each of his years at the Point found him rewarded with cadet offices – corporal; sergeant; and then for his first class year, the most coveted rank of all, first captain. This office came to the best man in general faculty and cadet esteem and, coupled with the election to life presidency of his class, left a lasting mark on him. The responsibility was never forgotten.

<sup>16</sup>Smythe, Donald, Guerilla Warrior. The Early Life of John J. Pershing, (New York, Charles Schribner Sons, 1973) 15.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid, 19.

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<sup>18</sup>Ibid, 23.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid, 24.

The Dictionary of America Biography, supplement 4, 1946-1950, 654 states:

Pershing took command of a company of Sioux scouts – it was one of the army's "noble experiments" that worked. Both the Sioux and Pershing learned affection and respect for each other; the experience taught the young officer that men should be judged for what they do.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid, 25.

<sup>22</sup>The Dictionary of America Biography, (New York, Charles Schribner Sons, 1950) supplement 4, 1946-1950, 655.

On May 5, 1898, 1<sup>st</sup> Lt. Pershing (he had been promoted by reassignment to the Tenth Cavalry in October 1892) received orders to join his regiment at Chickamauga, GA. He went with it to Cuba, where he took a prominent part in the battles of San Juan and Kettle hills and in operations around Santiago. Reckless bravery under repeated exposure to enemy fire won him praise from Col T.A. Baldwin.

<sup>23</sup>Smythe, Donald, Guerilla Warrior. The Early Life of John J. Pershing, (New York, Charles Schribner Sons, 1973) 61.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid, 61 and 62.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid, 64.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid, 65.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid, 68.

The Dictionary of America Biography, supplement 4, 1946-1950, 655 states:

Promoted to captain in the regular army on Feb. 2, 1901, and dropped from volunteer rolls, Pershing soon had an independent command on Mindanao. There the fierce Moros controlled most of the interior and had successfully resisted all opposition for generations. Operations against them had wrecked many careers, and regular officers diligently shunned the territory. But Pershing used his appreciation of Indians and blacks to win the trust of Moros, fought them

when he had to – especially around Lake Lanao – with Moro-like tenacity, and in fighting and in governing this warlike people won the admiration of his superiors and the public.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid, 69 and 70.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid, 71

<sup>31</sup>Ibid, 77.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid, 78.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid, 80.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid, 81.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid, 81 and 82.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid, 86

<sup>39</sup>Ibid, 92.

The Dictionary of America Biography, supplement 4, 1946-1950, 656 states:

“No other American administrator displayed affection and understanding to equal Pershings, and when recalled to the United States in 1914, the Moros mourned his departure.”

<sup>40</sup>Kretchik, Walter E., Baumann, Robert F., Fishel, John T. Invasion, Intervention, “Intervasion” A Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy. (USCGSC Press, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, 1998), 7.

Hans Schmidt in the United States Occupation of Haiti 1915-1934 states:

The various racial and cultural antagonisms which acted as barriers to Haitian-American cooperation were augmented by mundane hostilities attendant to most foreign military occupations. Haitians resented being ruled by foreigners, and resistance to the occupation rallied around the central theme of nationalism and patriotism. Haitians also resented the fact that Americans took over the

most expensive houses and neighborhoods for themselves. Haitian novels written about the occupation stressed American racism and vulgarity.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid, 7 and 8.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid., 27-34.

<sup>43</sup>Heinl, Robert D., Heinl, Nancy G. Written in Blood, The Story of the Haitian People, 1492-1995, (New York, University Press, 1996) 746-749.

<sup>44</sup>Kretchik, Walter E., Baumann, Robert F., Fishel, John T. Invasion, Intervention, "Intervasion" A Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy. (USCGSC Press, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, 1998), 47 and 48.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid, 73 and 74.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid, 188.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid, 95

Robert and Nancy Heinl in Written in Blood, The Story of the Haitian People, 1492-1995 states:

The first American troops landed at Port-au-Prince's civilian airport at the relatively civilized hour of 9:30 a.m. Monday. Disgorged in full battle gear from army choppers, the soldiers, fierce and combat-ready, were startled to see thousands of cheering Haitians pressed against the airport fence. Port-au-Prince was clearly not going to be Kuwait City.

In the vanguard was Lieutenant General Henry H. Shelton, Commander of the American troops in Haiti. While his troops were busy setting up camp at the Eastern end of the runway and in nearby structures that had, in better days, housed some of the assembly factories that had provided precious jobs, Gen. Shelton conferred with Ambassador Swing. Then, Shelton (Haitians quickly nicknamed him "Shelltox" after Haiti's most efficient pesticide) was driven to Military Headquarters near the palace to discuss with General Cédras the logistics of landing and billeting some 15,000 American troops. The meeting was described as "cordial." Over the next few days, troops landed at the Cap and fanned out across the country. In many cases there was no one to surrender to them. The army had, for the most part, shifted into civilian clothes and tried to melt back into the population, leaving barracks and government buildings empty.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid, 109.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid, 189-194.

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<sup>50</sup>Ibid, 191 and 194.

<sup>51</sup>Ibid, 194.

<sup>52</sup>Ibid, 192.

<sup>53</sup>Shacochis, Bob, The Immaculate Invasion, (New York, Viking Penquin Group, 1999), 284.

<sup>54</sup>Kretchik, Walter E., Baumann, Robert F., Fishel, John T. Invasion, Intervention, "Intervasion" A Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy. (USCGSC Press, Ft.Leavenworth, Kansas, 1998),195.

<sup>55</sup>Ibid, 196.

<sup>56</sup>Ibid, 202.

<sup>57</sup>A National Security Strategy for a New Century, December 99, 4.

<sup>58</sup>United States Institute for Peace, Special Report, Oct 99, 6, 7.

The following list is a consolidation of the principles the general officers involved in the special report saw of value in conducting operations:

- Warfighting – these skills avert potential conflict.
- Vision – the understanding of the international political landscape.
- Courage – to take risks.
- Interact with others outside the military – interpersonal skills are identified as that principle which ensured progress vice stalemate, especially among political leaders. Consensus and team building key to success, utilizing interpersonal skills.
- Confidence – being firm on decisions, even without prior experiences on the subject, especially with host nation personnel.
- Patience – you need more deliberation. Examine issues and take time to make decisions.
- Delegate authority – as areas of operation are so big.
- Adherence to principle and moral steadfastness – fairness and even handedness to all parties.

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- Broad intellectual background – learning about historical, political, cultural and social factors.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid, 6.

<sup>60</sup>Ibid.

The Institute for Peace Special Report consolidated the opinions and experiences of numerous U.S. Army General Officers who served in Bosnia, Somalia and Haiti in making the reports deductions.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid 10.

<sup>62</sup>BG Potter commanded the Joint Special Operation Task Force during Operation Uphold Democracy. All Special Operations Forces were assigned under his command.

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