

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
Newport, R.I.

**War Termination:  
Winning the War and Winning the Peace—  
What's a CINC To Do?**

By

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Joint Military Operations Department.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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## Abstract

### WAR TERMINATION: WINNING THE WAR AND WINNING THE PEACE— WHAT'S A CINC TO DO?

War termination planning is an iterative process, which spans the Peace - War - Peace spectrum of conflict. While ultimately the responsibility of the President of the United States, successful war termination depends upon the soldier and statesman alike.

This research paper offers four recommendations for more effective war termination:

1. Ensure the soldier and statesman are cognizant of their cross-spectrum war termination planning requirements;
2. Sensitize the National Command Authorities to the importance of clearly articulated and militarily achievable strategic objectives and desired end state;
3. Joint doctrine must fully and clearly address war termination. Joint doctrine must not only embrace the ideals of successful war termination, it must illuminate the concept clearly for the planner; and
4. The soldier and statesman must maintain continuous dialogue, not only on the status of hostilities, but also how they affect and support war termination.

There is a fundamental difference between winning wars and winning peace. War termination, the process, is the bridge between winning the war and ultimately winning the peace.

THESIS:

*"No one starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to achieve it."*

*Carl von Clausewitz  
- On War*

Carl von Clausewitz's words are as fitting now as they were when written over one hundred and seventy-five years ago. The quote speaks to the correlation of ends and means with an implied caution to carefully consider the plan or strategy to achieve victory prior to initiating hostilities. This paper will highlight the importance of considering war termination in all phases of planning. Often the most difficult decision a statesman must make is *when* to go to war. Much has been written about how difficult the decision to go to war is. Further, a wealth of literature exists on the military prosecution of wars. War termination, on the other hand, is often a far more difficult undertaking and is far less studied. The literature reveals wide agreement on the difficulty of satisfactory war termination. It is the thesis of this paper that war termination is an iterative process, which must be actively considered throughout the Peace - War - Peace planning spectrum. Further, while war termination responsibility rests clearly with the President of the United States, the unified military commander-in-chief or combatant commander must play an integral role in the process. As such, successful war termination depends upon the statesman and soldier alike. The intent here is to further flesh-out the role of the soldier in war termination.

NATURE OF THE PROBLEM/DEFINITION OF TERMS:

*"War is the continuation of politics by other means."*

*Carl von Clausewitz  
- On War*

To take Clausewitz's definition of war one step further, war is a means to a political end. As an instrument of political purpose, war's ultimate aim is to force or compel one nation's will upon another nation. Historically, politics has been the province of the statesman, whereas war has been the province of the soldier. It is no leap of faith to infer the existence of a potential civil-military friction point. Indeed, an argument could be made that the ideal occurs when one man wears both hats. Regardless, war is not waged in a vacuum. The duties and responsibilities of the statesman and soldier are not separate and distinct across the spectrum of conflict. There are, indeed, gray areas wherein the division of responsibility is not clearly defined or universally understood. Ultimate responsibility, as well as military subservience in this civil-military relationship is clearly understood. The relevant questions are *who does what* and/or *who should do what*. Some argue that war reflects a failure of diplomacy; and perhaps on one level it does. In this paper, war is viewed as a change in phase of the larger process by which countries interact. The statesman maintains many tools through which to implement his statecraft (political, diplomatic, informational, economic and military). Yet, the statesman continues to retain those other non-military implements of his statecraft and may implement them simultaneously with the military option. So, perhaps in some instances war may not be a failure of diplomacy.

War termination is more than simply ending hostilities. War termination is a process which spans the spectrum of conflict (peace - war - peace). It is the

responsibility of both the President of the United States and the unified commander-in-chief/combatant commander.<sup>1</sup> The ultimate objective of war termination is an acceptable resolution to the issues precipitating the conflict and leading to a lasting peace in the region on terms most favorable to the United States.

John T. Fishel has defined desired end state as, “what the leadership desires the battlefield and the surrounding political landscape to look like when the war is over, and it represents a range of acceptable political/military outcomes. Moreover, end-states suggest descriptions, in fairly great detail, of the goals of national policy”.<sup>2</sup> As will be explained later in greater detail, desired end state and supporting political objectives are not set in stone. Rather, the interactive nature of war and attending fog, friction and uncertainty lead to situations wherein these types of goals and objectives change—and this is properly so.

Armed with definitions of several of the more important war termination concepts (war, war termination and desired end state), attention can now be focused briefly; on *how* wars end and *why* war termination is difficult. “Clausewitz envisioned three reasons why wars should be terminated: (1) One side has been defeated, (2) It is impossible to achieve victory, and (3) The costs are unacceptable.”<sup>3</sup> These reasons certainly appear logical-- perhaps some would say even display common sense. Why then is war

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<sup>1</sup> Throughout the essay I often refer to the President of the United States as the statesman and the unified Commander-In-Chief as the soldier.

<sup>2</sup>John T. Fishel, “Liberation, Occupation, and Rescue: War Termination and Desert Storm.” Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 31 August 1992.

<sup>3</sup> Professor Michael Handel Strategy and Policy lecture at the Naval War College of 16 October 2000.

termination difficult? What is it about the rational calculus inherent within these three questions, which make war termination so perplexing? “Professor Michael Handel of the Naval War College distilled the difficulties in the ‘rational calculus of war termination’ down to three overriding concepts: (1) Inaccurate perceptions, (2) Incomplete information, and (3) Human nature—investment already made, prestige, wishful thinking, political careers, passions.”<sup>4</sup> Clearly, fog, friction and uncertainty compounded by the frailties of human nature complicate the process of war termination.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS FOR WAR TERMINATION:

The warfighting responsibilities of a unified commander-in-chief/combatant commander are clearly understood. Moreover, warfighters have an almost instinctive sense of how to bring force to bear toward the goal of the destruction of the enemy’s forces. What is often not clearly understood by the warfighter is *how* to bring war to a successful conclusion-- how to ultimately match military objectives to political goals. This is especially true in limited wars, where unconditional surrender or the annihilation of the enemy force may not be practicable. What follows are four recommendations to guide the CINC through a three-phase war termination planning process—the pre-hostilities phase, the hostilities phase and the post-hostilities phase. The capstone concept is greater involvement on the part of the CINC in the war termination process.

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<sup>4</sup> Ibid. See appendix A for Handel’s “Rational Calculus” of War Termination.

**(1) Ensure the soldier and statesman are cognizant of their cross-spectrum war termination planning requirements.**

Pre-Hostilities Phase:

*“Nothing succeeds in war except in consequence of a well prepared plan.”*

*Napoleon I*

The importance of comprehensive planning for military operations cannot be overstated. In times of peace the unified commander-in-chief/combatant commander drafts operations plans (OPLANS) based on theater strategies and the National Military Strategy, which in turn reflect the President’s National Security Strategy. This detailed and deliberate planning process, which culminates in an OPLAN, serves as the “ready template” for theater crises. As crises develop, crisis action planning ensues and OPLANS are modified as necessary to guide the conduct of military operations. It is self-evident that OPLANS based upon a thorough and detailed deliberate planning process significantly benefit crisis action planning. War termination is a critical ingredient to effective war planning. “Herman Kahn suggests the critical missing connection between military planning and execution is insufficient thought about how and under what circumstances to terminate conflict.”<sup>5</sup> In addition to careful consideration and planning in advance of hostilities, pre-hostilities war termination planning requires extensive dialogue up the chain of command. This is a critical time when the soldier can, in a sense, “school” the statesman in the types of situations and

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<sup>5</sup> Michael R. Rampy, “The Endgame: Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Activities” in Military Review 72, October 1992, 20.

circumstances that are conducive to successful war termination. Effective war termination does not just happen—it is not just stumbled into after pummeling one's adversary into submission—rather, effective war termination is based upon planning. It is imperative that soldier and statesman realize from the outset that war termination planning is an iterative process, which spans the spectrum of conflict.

Hostilities Phase:

*"No plan survives first contact with the enemy."*

*Helmuth von Moltke*

The United States of America enjoys the greatest, most lethal armed force this world has ever known. Troops, tactics, training and technology are literally years ahead of the next best force. That said, the application of force toward political aims might be for naught if in the final analysis the battle is won, yet the peace is lost.

World history is filled with examples of military victories that ultimately failed to achieve the desired political objectives. Examples in the American experience include World War I and to a lesser degree the Gulf War.<sup>6</sup>

Von Moltke's generally accepted maxim calls to mind the requirement for flexibility in the conduct of war. If it were not for the interactive nature of war—two opposing forces locked in combat slogging it out through the fog and friction of imperfect knowledge of one another—then the entire conflict could be virtually scripted in advance,

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<sup>6</sup> The treaty of Versailles ending World War I is believed by many to have set the stage for World War II. Some view war termination of the Gulf War to be ambiguous, inconclusive or incomplete—as Saddam Hussein and his regime remained a threat following the war. However, the counter-argument is that the allies accomplished the political objectives set out in NSD 54.

the outcome based upon relative strengths and weaknesses. In essence, a scientific/mathematical calculation could be developed to determine the outcome of conflicts. Reality is that conditions change and statesmen and soldiers must realize this and modify their plans accordingly. Once again a leit motif of this paper: close interaction between the statesman and soldier is required throughout.

All during the hostility phase the soldier must fight with an eye toward driving his opponent toward a negotiated settlement. Operational pause, with consequent negatives and positives, must be carefully considered as a means of enticing the adversary to the peace table. Strategy and tactics can and should be amended to this end. James Reed noted in his *Parameters* article, "Clausewitz reminds us that political interactions do not cease with the onset of war, and either implicit or explicit bargaining and negotiation occur as an inherent and continuing aspect of war."<sup>7</sup> Paul Pillar further emphasizes the importance of leading one's adversary to the bargaining table; his analysis suggests that empirical data bear out that fully two thirds of interstate conflicts have ended as a result of negotiations either before or after an armistice.<sup>8</sup>

Finally, there must be close collaboration between the soldier and the statesman regarding enemy surrender. One of the criticisms following the Gulf War was the decision by General Schwarzkopf (at the armistice table) to allow Iraq to continue rotary air operations as an expeditious means of transportation. General Schwarzkopf took the request at face value and granted it without the considered input of the statesman. This

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<sup>7</sup> James W. Reed, "Should Deterrence Fail: War Termination and Campaign Planning" in *Parameters* (Summer 1993), 2.

<sup>8</sup> Paul R. Pillar, *Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), 25.

unfortunate concession facilitated the slaughter of countless Shi'ites in southern Iraq. Closer soldier-statesman interaction may have precluded this unfortunate episode.

Post-Hostilities Phase:

*"If you concentrate exclusively on victory, with no thought for the after effect, you may be too exhausted to profit by the peace, while it is almost certain that the peace will be a bad one, containing the germs of another war."*

*B.H. Liddell Hart*

War termination is this paper's topic. And chronologically the post-hostilities phase *follows* war termination. Yet the planning for war termination, as stated earlier, must include planning for post-hostilities. While there is great potential for friction with the NCA in regards to redeploying and demobilizing in the theater of operations as expeditiously as possible, the CINC must maintain forces sufficient to isolate and extinguish pockets of resistance, quell spontaneous uprisings and facilitate the transition from war to peace. Many of the activities in this phase of war fall under the rubric of civil affairs. Joint Doctrine notes the following planning considerations:

- *"The post-hostilities military mission and U.S. policy objectives*
- *The need for and roles of integrated military-civilian organizational and oversight elements or agencies.*
- *The extent of devastation and the potential of the defeated government to regain its place in the family of nations.*

- *The complexity and duration of stability and reconstitution assistance efforts required to counteract local violence and mobilize indigenous resources toward self-sufficiency.*
- *The availability of indigenous leaders and civil servants.*
- *The desires and objectives of multinational governments.*
- *The degree of US domestic political support to involve US military in nation building activities, regardless of identified needs.”<sup>9</sup>*

Traditionally, the post-hostilities phase continues until the CINC completes the transition from his “supported role” to his role of supporting the agencies and institutions assisting the “defeated” government in its re-constitution and re-assuming its role in the family of friendly nations. It is imperative that the fruits of victory not be squandered in the critical period from the end of hostilities until the realization of the desired end state. An argument can be made that due to theater engagement responsibilities, a CINC never totally disengages. In fact, the CINC must be both a soldier and diplomat at all times.

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<sup>9</sup> Joint Pub 5-2.20. Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures, 13 January 1999, IX-54.

**(2) Sensitize the National Command Authorities to the importance of clearly articulated and militarily achievable strategic objectives and desired end state. Formalize a construct whereby the soldier assists the statesman in assessing the military achievability of these objectives.**

*“Never go anywhere unless you know what you’re going to do there. . . when you commit forces to combat and there is the distinct possibility of people being hurt, there must be clarity of purpose, there has to be a clear-cut objective and a clear-cut chain of command. . .”*

*General J.J. Sheehan, USMC  
Commander in Chief  
United States Atlantic Command*

Clearly expressed strategic objectives and a fully articulated desired end state are essential to successful planning by the warfighter. To march to war without clearly defined and achievable objectives risks embroiling the country in the type of prolonged and costly conflict this country endured in Vietnam. As noted, these objectives may not be set in stone. History shows us that objectives, goals or aims will change. Likewise, the desired end state may change. The environment and conditions in which these types of decisions were made change and new possibilities emerge, often dictating changes in objectives. U.S. experience in the Vietnam War, where objectives were not uniformly understood, led to the development in the 1980’s of the Weinberger Doctrine and Powell Corollary. One of the fundamental tenets to be met prior to the application of military force was, “the country must have clearly defined political and military objectives”. The language is specific—not the nation *should*, or it *is advisable*, or *when practicable*—the country must have clearly defined political and military objectives. A consequence of the

Weinberger-Powell Doctrine was the submission of Nation Security Directive (NSD) 54 issued by President George Bush prior to commencing hostilities against Iraq in the Gulf War. NSD 54, dated 5 January 1991, outlined political and military objectives required prior to the cessation of hostilities:

- a. to effect the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait;*
- b. to restore Kuwait's legitimate government;*
- c. to protect the lives of American Citizens abroad; and*
- d. to promote the security and stability of the Persian Gulf.<sup>10</sup>*

A drawback of clearly articulated political objectives and desired end state perceived by some statesman, is a reluctance to be constrained or perhaps "held hostage to" these goals. Yet, this fear does not stand-up to scrutiny. As has been reiterated throughout this paper, war is fluid and goals will change. Finally, in addition to and in direct support of clearly articulated and militarily achievable strategic objectives and the desired end state, the statesman and the soldier must be lashed-up in the planning process early in a crisis. The fourth and final recommendation will help to institutionalize this relationship.

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<sup>10</sup> President George H.W. Bush, "Responding To Iraqi Aggression in the Gulf", NSD 54 (15 January 1991).

**(3) Joint Doctrine must fully and clearly address war termination. Joint Doctrine must not only embrace the ideals of successful war termination, it must illuminate the concept clearly for the planner.**

*“At the very heart of war lies doctrine. It represents the central beliefs for waging war in order to achieve victory. . .”*

*General Curtis E. LeMay USAF*

The process of war termination is not adequately or coherently addressed in joint doctrine. Indeed, war termination endures an almost schizophrenic approach in joint doctrine. On the one hand Joint Pub 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations clearly states the importance of war termination:

*“Properly conceived conflict termination criteria are key to ensuring that victories achieved with military force endure.” Further, “. . .because the nature of the termination will shape the futures of the contesting nations, it is fundamentally important to understand that conflict termination is an essential link between national security strategy, National Military strategy, and posthostility aims—the desired outcome”. Lastly, “. . .conflict termination should be considered from the outset of planning and should be refined as the conflict moves toward advantageous termination.”<sup>11</sup>*

Yet on the other hand, curiously, Joint Pub 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations only obliquely mentions war termination and, then, in the context of a campaign plan. Specifically, that a campaign plan (inter alia), “clearly defines an end state that constitutes success, failure, mission termination, or exit strategy”.<sup>12</sup> Moreover,

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<sup>11</sup> Ibid., I-9.

<sup>12</sup> Joint Pub 5-0. Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, 13 April 1995, II-18.

Joint Pub 5-03.1 Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume 1 (Planning and Procedures) does not specifically address war termination at all. The heart of the problem is, often times, one gets what one plans for—poor planning leading to flawed war termination. One positive sign in Joint Doctrine is found in Joint Pub 5-00.2 Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures. This publication does devote a small section to termination planning. Moreover, it tends to reinforce at least a portion of this paper's thesis—"planning for termination of operations must be ongoing during all phases of COA development, deployment of forces, and execution of operations".<sup>13</sup> Finally, Joint Pub 5-00.2 includes a rather basic checklist for termination planning. The checklist concentrates on post-hostilities activities; however, several items are germane to activities in the hostilities phase.

In conclusion, Joint Doctrine does not address with any specificity the CINC's war termination requirements. Furthermore, Joint Doctrine fails to outline what the CINC should expect from the NCA regarding war termination. These omissions must be addressed in further iterations of Joint Doctrine-- authoritative guidance is needed.

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<sup>13</sup> Joint Pub 5-00.2. Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures, 13 January 1999, IX-54. I have enclosed the "Checklist for Termination Planning" as Appendix B.

**(4) The soldier and statesman must maintain continuous dialogue, not only on the status of hostilities, but also how they affect and support war termination.**

*“Everyone had a great picture of the tactical-operational aspects of Desert Storm, of how to fight and win the war, but no one had given very much thought to the difficulties and exigencies of conflict termination.”<sup>14</sup>*

*Lieutenant General J.J. Yeosock*

*Commander, Third Army*

Michael Rampy postulates that, “it is axiomatic that prior to intervening in a conflict of whatever classification or intensity, decision makers must presage how to terminate on favorable terms. In this regard, effective conflict termination requires a continuous discussion and decision procedures between political decision makers, military strategists and the theater commander. While it is true that the ultimate decision to terminate a conflict resides at the national political level, these decision makers rely extensively on senior military leaders for advice on the prosecution and termination of a conflict.”<sup>15</sup>

No one is closer to the conflict on the battlefield (or the situation in the theater) than the CINC—not the Secretary of Defense, not the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, not the NSC. Effective executive decision making concerning war termination or war in general is largely based upon dialogue with the CINC. One solution to facilitate and institutionalize “the continuous discussion and decision procedures” urged by Rampy is to assign a senior member of the CINC’s staff to an entity within the statesman’s inner circle (either augmenting the NCA, NSC Staff, or an ad hoc interagency group focusing

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<sup>14</sup> General Walter E Boomer, Lieutenant General John J. Yeosock, Admiral Stanley A. Arthur, and General Charles A. Horner, “Ten Years After,” Naval Institute Proceedings (January 2001): 63.

<sup>15</sup>Michael R. Rampy, “The Endgame: Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Activities” in Military Review 72, October 1992, 11.

on war termination). The objective is not to impinge upon the President's civilian or military (read SECDEF/CJCS) defense advisor's responsibilities. Rather, the CINC's representative will support both the President's civilian and military defense advisors. In F.C. Ickle's seminal work on war termination he noted, "governments tend to lose sight of the ending of wars and the nation's interests that lie beyond it, precisely because fighting a war is an effort of such magnitude."<sup>16</sup> Distance from the battlefield may intensify this effect. Add this to the myriad other requirements which require resolution by the government (even during time of war) and one can easily see how one loses sight of the forest for the trees. Better integration between statesman and soldier can ensure focus remains on the end game and keeping the trees and the forest in one's sights.

Arguably many may view this suggestion as impracticable. The loss of a senior member of a CINC's staff, for a liaison (LNO) function may be unacceptable. Moreover, seniority at one level may not amount to enough access or influence at another. The goal, however, is increased dialogue between the soldier and statesman concerning the planning and implementation of war termination. This individual will help bridge the information gap between soldier and statesman. The bridge may help bring into focus the disparity of effort between execution and resolution, as noted by General Yeosock.

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<sup>16</sup> Fred Charles Ickle, Every War Must End, (New York and London: Columbia University Press Press, 1991), 2.

## COUNTER-ARGUMENT:

An argument can be made that war termination, as war itself, is wholly political in nature and is thereby under the sole purview of the statesman.<sup>17</sup> The sword of the military is but one instrument the statesman yields in the affairs of state. The soldier who propels himself into this political arena is inadequately prepared and may indeed corrupt the process. Furthermore, a relationship already exists between the statesman and soldier and that is in the form of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). The Chairman is *the uniformed military advisor* to the President. An additional advisor for war termination may be a perceived or actual threat to the power/responsibilities of the CJCS.

Indisputably, ultimate responsibility for the initiation and conclusion of military operations resides with the President of the United States. Yet, as inadequately prepared as the soldier may be in the political arena, so too may be the statesman in the military arena. The point is that the two must work together toward the common goal. As to usurping or diluting the authority of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CINC and his staff are closer to the problem and as such may be of more direct value to the NCA or his NSC Staff. The actions of both staffs (CINC's and CJCS') must be complementary in supporting the statesman.

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<sup>17</sup> This "Foggy Bottom" approach, albeit extreme, is meant solely to contrast potential (vice actual) points of view.

## CONCLUSION:

*“Preparation equals performance.”*

*General Dwight David Eisenhower*

The title of this essay, “War Termination: Winning the War and Winning the Peace—What’s a CINC To Do?” involves several interrelated concepts. The first concept is a fundamental difference between winning wars and winning peace. Consensus appears to be coalescing around the idea that the former may well be easier than the latter. The second concept involves the CINC’s responsibilities in what is defined here as a war termination *process*-- a process which spans the spectrum of conflict. The final concept is more subtle. Succinctly, the process of war termination is the bridge between winning the war and winning the peace.

Contrary to what many believe historically to have been a part of the American Way of War— War Termination will NOT take care of itself. It is part of a process, the outcome of which relates directly to General Eisenhower’s sage words of wisdom. Moreover, preparation for the peace is inextricably linked to preparation for the war. Successful war termination is the *shared* responsibility of the statesman and soldier. The interactive nature of war dictates that war termination is an iterative process requiring close coordination between the two. Former President Clinton’s National Security Strategy (NSS) was based largely upon a “Strategy of Engagement”. “This strategy inextricably tied security at home to U.S. engagement and leadership abroad.”<sup>18</sup> U.S. National Military Strategy (NMS) evolved to support Clinton’s strategy of engagement.

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<sup>18</sup> President William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy for a New Century. December 1999, 3.

A key enabler or implementer of this strategy, in a regional context, is the unified commander-in-chief. As such, here-to-fore “political” or diplomatic responsibilities are blurred with the more traditional “military” responsibilities of the CINC. Paul Pillar argues that, “a theater commander, in any campaign, is not merely limited to the handling of his troops, he commands that whole area politically, economically and militarily.”<sup>19</sup> The National Security Strategy appears to support Pillar’s thesis in times of war and in times of peace—and further solidifies the necessity for closer integration of the soldier and statesman.

Michael Rampy brings the argument full circle in offering that, “the stated purpose of national military strategy is to deter aggression and failing that, to terminate conflict on favorable terms, it is logical to assume that warfighting and conflict termination are not separate entities, but part of the same dynamic conflict.”<sup>20</sup> Closer integration of the statesman and soldier coupled with better depth to war termination planning across the spectrum of conflict will result in more advantageous war termination. The United States will be better positioned to win both the *war* and the *peace*.

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<sup>19</sup> Paul R. Pillar, Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), 33.

<sup>20</sup> Michael R. Rampy, “The Endgame: Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Activities” in Military Review 72, October 1992, 2.

APPENDIX A

Rational Calculus of War Termination<sup>21</sup>

Weak Incentives to Terminate War

When one is doing militarily better than the enemy.

When victory is available.

When increased outside support is expected.

When the enemy makes unacceptable demands (e.g. unconditional surrender)

When quitting the war will endanger the survival of the leaders in power.

Strong Incentives To Terminate War

When the enemy is doing better militarily.

When victory is impossible or too costly.

When the cost of continuing the war is too high.

When outside support is not forthcoming.

Lack of domestic support.

When continuing the war will endanger the survival in power of the political leadership.

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<sup>21</sup> Michael I Handel, "The Problem of War Termination." Hand-out accompanying lecture at the Naval War College, Newport, RI. 16 October 2000.

APPENDIX B

**CHECKLIST FOR TERMINATION PLANNING**<sup>22</sup>

- Has the end state been achieved?
  - Have stated operations objectives been accomplished?
  - Have the underlying causes of the conflict been considered and how do they influence termination planning?
  - Has the commander, joint task force identified postconflict requirements?
  
- Can forces be safely withdrawn from the joint operations area? What are the force security requirements?
  - What additional support will be required for redeployment?
  - What is the policy for redeployment? What is the relationship between postconflict requirements and the redeployment of JTF forces?
  - What is the policy for evacuation of equipment used by JTF forces?
  
- Has coordination for redeployment of the JTF been conducted with appropriate commands, agencies, and other organizations?
  
- Has consideration been given as to when Reserve Component forces will be released?
  
- Has transition planning been accomplished in the event that operations are transitioning to another military force, regional organization, United Nations, or civilian organization?
  - What arrangements have been made with other organizations to accomplish the postconflict activities? For example, will there be humanitarian, governmental, and infrastructure assistance requirements?
  
- Will the JTF be expected to support these types of activities?

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<sup>22</sup> Joint Pub 5-00.2 Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures  
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